DOCSLIB.ORG

The Breaking of JN-25 and Its Impact in the War Against Japan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Breaking of JN-25 and Its Impact in the War Against Japan From AFIO's The Intelligencer Association of Former Intelligence Officers 7700 Leesburg Pike, Suite 324 Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Falls Church, Virginia 22043 Web: www.afio.com * E-mail: [email protected] Volume 26 • Number 2 • Winter-Spring 2021 $15 single copy price result was that we detected absolutely no warning When Intelligence Made a Difference of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor.”5 Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) communications security and — WWII — misinterpreted radar indications on the morning of December 7 contributed to the lack of warning.6 Iron- ically, IJN messages intercepted prior to Pearl Harbor but not decoded until after the war strongly hinted at planned operations against Hawaii.7 JN-25 – the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Command and Control Code The Breaking of JN-25 The IJN introduced two new enciphered codes and its Impact for general purposes in 1939; American cryptanalysts in the War Against Japan dubbed one of the systems the “Flag Officers Code” and the other, JN-25. The US Navy got little intercept in the Flag Officers Code and the effort against it was by Peter C. Oleson abandoned in December 1941.8 As historian John Prados explains, to commu- Introduction nicate over radio the alphabet is reduced to a code, such as the dots and dashes of Morse Code. To protect hile US Navy radio intelligence efforts in the easily read plaintext the sender uses a letter or digital 1930s and 1940 and 1941 had been focused transposition or substitutes whole words or phrases on Japan, there was no specific forewarning that only the sender and receiver know. Numeric mes- W sages could have a random additive number, which of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The decryption of the Japanese diplomatic PURPLE codes by the US then “were considered ‘enciphered’ or ‘encrypted.’” A Army’s Signal Intelligence Service (SIS) clearly showed cryptanalyst’s recovery of a message required getting a deteriorating relationship with an aggressive Japan, rid of the additives (“deciphering”) using mathemat- especially after the freezing of Japanese assets by the ical techniques, which were aided by having multiple US in July 1941.1 intercepted messages allowing comparison of com- Navy cryptanalytical resources were very limited.2 monalities to gain entry into the code.9 Priority went to the high-level diplomatic cables (i.e., “JN-25 consisted of a codebook with approxi- PURPLE). Station Hypo, “… the radio intelligence unit mately 27,500 entries and an additive book for super- at Pearl Harbor [was assigned] to work exclusively on enciphering the codebook values. The additive book the Imperial Navy’s Admirals’ Code rather than have consisted of 300 pages, each page containing 100 any role in deciphering diplomatic codes or the more random five-digit groups. It should be noted that this widely used JN-25,” the Imperial Japanese Navy’s (IJN) additive book for JN-25 was not a one-time pad: the command and control code.3 Station C (“Cast”), the five-digit groups were re-used, as needed. In studying radio intelligence unit in the Philippines, and the Navy JN-25, US cryptanalysts had to collate large numbers Department’s OP-20-G in Washington led the crypt- of Japanese messages over time. Their first goal was to analytical attack on JN-25b, introduced in December recover the indicator in each message which showed 1940.4 Before December 7, 1941 Navy cryptanalysts where in the additive book numbers were taken; then could not read any of the JN-25 messages. “The net recover and strip away the additives themselves to get 5. Capt. Biard, “Joining the Dungeon,” https://stationhypo.com. See 1. The US Navy devised an analogue machine to “strip the ciphers” also Stephen Budiansky. “The monthly reports filed by OP-20-G off of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Red code in the 1930s. After the confirm that at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, not a single JN-25 Japanese changed to the more complex PURPLE code in 1939 it too message from the previous 12 months had been read.” “Too Late for was solved by September 1940, and the US developed an analogue Pearl Harbor.” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 125, no. 12 (Dec. 1999): machine to decipher up to seventy-five messages per day. (John p 47-51. Prados. Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intel- 6. For the story about the missed indications from radar see Harry A. ligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II. Annapolis, MD: Naval Butowsky, PhD, “Mystery of the Opana Radar Site,” http://npshistory Institute Press, 1995, p 163.) .com/publications/valr/opana-radar-site.pdf. 2. Army SIS assets were also limited in Washington. SIS and Op-20-G 7. Prados, p 156-7. shared the translation workload for PURPLE decrypts. 8. “JN-25,” https://www.nsa.gov/about/cryptologic-heritage/center 3. Prados, p 166. -cryptologic-history/pearl-harbor-review/jn25/. 4. Prados, p 175. 9. Prados, p 74. Winter-Spring 2021 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 79 down to the codebook values; and, finally, recover the Attacking JN-25 meanings in plaintext Japanese of the underlying code- On December 10, 1941 the Navy Department gave book values, which would allow messages to be read, Hypo permission to attack the Japanese “five-digit, at least in part. A second version of this system, known two-part, enciphered, widely used strategic code,” to US Navy cryptanalysts as JN-25b, was introduced JN-25.14 In early 1942, Commander Joseph Rochefort, on December 1, 1940. Six months later, the Japanese the commander of Station Hypo, and his staff began Navy replaced the additive book. The additive book to make progress, but painfully slowly.15 In early was replaced in August and again on 4 December 1941, January 1942 the initial breaks were made by Station three days before the Japanese attack on American Cast, OP-20-G in Washington, and soon thereafter bases in Hawaii. These rapid changes in the codebook by the British Far Eastern Combined Bureau (FECB), and its additive required that US cryptanalysts begin an outpost of Britain’s Government Code and Cipher again with each change — virtually at the beginning School at Bletchley Park. “By the end of January… we — to attack the system. It is estimated that prior to were obtaining significant bits of information in more the change of the additive book in August 1941, the and more messages.” By February “… bits of opera- cryptanalysts had recovered only 2,000 code groups in tional intelligence we did… succeed in pulling out of JN-25 — about 4% of the codebook — and these were JN-25 sometimes were verifiable, as in the case when mostly numerals and stereotyped phrases.”10 we could put a submarine on the track of the carrier US Navy cryptanalytic efforts were complicated Kaga, which was returning to Japan for repairs after by the scarcity of cryptanalysts and Japanese transla- hitting a shoal off Malay.”16 tors. The IJN prior to and during World War II devel- oped a form of Morse code which used a syllabary of seventy-three kana, each with one or two suffixes that might alter its meaning.”11 As explained by two Australian professors of mathematics and statistics, “The methods used in the code breaking behind the successes of Allied Pacific Signals Intelligence are quite different to those used against encryption machine ciphers such as the [Nazi’s] Enigma. The reason is that the main cipher systems used by both the… IJA and the… IJN were based on code books rather than a machine.”12 Much of insight gained from radio intelligence before the decryption of JN-25 came from the exter- nals of a transmitted message. Each radio intercept station could get a bearing of a transmission. By comparing two or more station’s bearings allowed By March, the US had cracked part of JN-25. calculation of a transmitter’s geographic position. However, it could intercept only about 60 percent of If bearings changed the transmitter was from a transmissions and by May had the resources to ana- ship or aircraft and its direction and speed could be lyze only about 40 percent of intercepted messages. calculated. As many messages were transmitted at Even then, code breakers typically could read only 10 high frequencies, the US Navy developed by 1940 a to 15 percent of the code groups in a message. Navy network of sixteen High-Frequency Direction Finding radio intelligence traffic analysts primarily used direc- (HFDF – “huff-duff”) stations covering the Atlantic tion-finding and message externals to learn about and Pacific Oceans.13 order of battle and disposition of forces and where ships were heading.17 14. Biard. “Joining the Dungeon.” 15. https://stationhypo.com/2020/03/05/march-5-1942-station-hypo 10. “JN-25,” NSA. -started-reading-japanese-jn-25-2/#more-11789. 11. Prados, p 9. “Katakana and hiragana are both syllabic forms of 16. CAPT Biard. “Doolittle Raid and the Battle of Coral Sea,” https:// writing developed in the ninth century to simplify written Japanese….” stationhypo.com/2016/12/26/capt-biard-doolittle-raid-and-the-battle-of 12. Peter Donovan & John Mack. Code Breaking in the Pacific. Switzer- -coral-sea-part-3-of-4/#more-3057. land: Springer International Publishing, 2014. Preface. 17. “Battle of Coral Sea – What was the ‘RZP’ Campaign?” https:// 13. Prados, p 75. stationhypo.com/2017/04/17/part-1-of-5-battle-of-coral-sea-what-was-the Page 80 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Winter-Spring 2021 A notable cryptanalytic breakthrough occurred On April 18, the Doolittle raid, launched from as early as January 18, 1942.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Georgetown University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies
    THE BATTLE FOR INTELLIGENCE: HOW A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF INTELLIGENCE ILLUMINATES VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR II A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies By Edward J. Piotrowicz III, B.A. Washington, DC April 15, 2011 Copyright 2011 by Edward J. Piotrowicz III All Rights Reserved ii THE BATTLE FOR INTELLIGENCE: HOW A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF INTELLIGENCE ILLUMINATES VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR II Edward J. Piotrowicz III, B.A. Thesis Advisor: Jennifer E. Sims, PhD. ABSTRACT Does intelligence make a difference in war? Two World War II battles provide testing grounds for answering this question. Allied intelligence predicted enemy attacks at both Midway and Crete with uncanny accuracy, but the first battle ended in an Allied victory, while the second finished with crushing defeat. A new theory of intelligence called “Decision Advantage,”a illuminates how the success of intelligence helped facilitate victory at Midway and how its dysfunction contributed to the defeat at Crete. This view stands in contrast to that of some military and intelligence scholars who argue that intelligence has little impact on battle. This paper uses the battles of Midway and Crete to test the power of Sims‟s theory of intelligence. By the theory‟s standards, intelligence in the case of victory outperformed intelligence in the case of defeat, suggesting these cases uphold the explanatory power of the theory. Further research, however, could enhance the theory‟s prescriptive power.
    [Show full text]
  • THE JERSEYMAN 5 Years - Nr
    N J B B June 4, 2007 Midway Atoll photo courtesy of 4th Quarter Welford Sims, Raleigh, North Carolina 2007 "Rest well, yet sleep lightly and hear the call, if again sounded, to provide firepower for freedom…” THE JERSEYMAN 5 Years - Nr. 56 The Battle of Midway — 65 years... MIDWAY ATOLL (June 4, 2007) - Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Adm. Robert F. Willard, delivers his remarks during the 65th anniversary of the Battle of Midway commemoration ceremony on Midway Atoll. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class James E. Foehl) 2 The Jerseyman Battle of Midway Commemoration... MIDWAY ATOLL – Distinguished visitors and more than 1,500 guests of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, International Midway Memorial Foundation and the U.S. Pacific Fleet, assembled on Midway Atoll, June 4, to commemorate the 65th anni- versary of the Battle of Midway. “We‟re gathered here today at one of the most re- mote and special places on earth. Midway, is where the course of history was changed,” said the Honorable Linda Lingle, Governor of Hawaii. The Battle of Midway was fought June 4 – 7, 1942, and served as a turning point in the Pacific during World War II. “No one knew it at the time, but the tide of war in the Pacific had turned because of the heroism and sheer determination of those who fought on June 4, 1942,” said Dr. James M. D’Angelo, president and chairman, International Midway Memorial Foundation. “It‟s not hard to imagine what we would‟ve heard if we‟d have been here this day 65 years ago.
    [Show full text]
  • Register of the Papers of William S. Sims
    Register of the Papers of William S. Sims RICAL C STO OLL HI EC L T A I V O A N N NE D WP AN ORT, RHODE ISL Naval War College Newport, RI REGISTER OF THE PAPERS OF WILLIAM S. SIMS Compiled by Evelyn M. Cherpak, Ph.D. Manuscript Register Series No. 31 Naval Historical Collection Naval War College, Newport, RI 2002 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Biographical Sketch .........................................1 Chronology of Naval Service ....................................3 Description of Papers ........................................5 Arrangement of Papers .......................................6 Series I, Correspondence of William S. Sims ..........................6 Series II, Correspondence of Anne H. Sims .........................19 Series III, Correspondence of Anne H. Sims to her sisters ..................29 Series IV, Photographs ....................................30 Series V, Miscellany ......................................30 Appendix: .............................................31 Source materials in the Naval Historical Collection......................31 Publications of William S. Sims ................................35 Biography William Sowden Sims was born on October 15, 1858, in Port Hope, Ontario Province, Canada, to Alfred William and Adelaide Sowden Sims. His father was a civil engineer involved in constructing harbor facilities on Lake Ontario. The Sims family, consisting of five siblings, lived in Canada until 1872 and then moved to Orbisonia, Pennsylvania. Sims was appointed to the U.S. Naval Academy from Pennsylvania in 1876. He was not particularly well prepared for academic life and was an average student. After graduating in 1880, he served in USS Tennessee and later in USS Swatara, where he was promoted to ensign. Between 1882 and 1897, he served in USS Yantic, the schoolship, Saratoga, USS Philadelphia, USS Charleston, and the receiving ships Colorado and Richmond.
    [Show full text]
  • Rochefort Vinse a Midway, Fu Sconfitto a Washington
    StO ROCHEFORT VINSE A MIDWAY, FU SCONFITTO A WASHINGTON ALAIN CHARBONNIER «Si può raggiungere qualsiasi risultato, purché nessuno badi a chi va il merito», era scritto alle spalle del capitano di vascello Joseph J. Rochefort nel Dungeon, il seminterrato di Pearl Harbour, dove i decrittatori della stazione ‘Hypo’ che lavoravano sui codici della Marina giapponese misero l’ammiraglio Nimitz in grado di vincere a Midway. Ma c’era chi al merito badava, e come, e voleva appropriarsene. Rochefort era approdato alla crittoanalisi quando negli Stati Uniti era considerata quasi una stregoneria. Sedici anni dopo, nonostante i brillanti risultati, ne fu estromesso dai burocrati di Washington. «Un ex studente di giapponese non può comandare un centro dell’intelligence navale», dissero. La vittoria di Midway fu ascritta a suo merito soltanto nel 1985, nove anni dopo la morte. Impianto desalinizzazione in avaria. Riserva acqua potabile prevista in 14 giorni con razionamento. Provvedere rifornimento». Il 20 maggio 1942 il Comando della Marina americana a Pearl Harbour, nelle isole Hawaii, ricevette il messaggio ‘flash’ tramesso dalla guarnigione di Midway, un atollo distante quasi 2000 chilometri, da poco tempo rinforzata dal Comando del Pacifico. I centri d’ascolto giapponesi intercettarono la comunicazione e avvertirono il Co - mando Generale della Nihon Kaigun , la flotta imperiale, che ‘l’unità aerea AF’ aveva chiesto un immediato rifornimento idrico. Il messaggio giapponese, criptato nel codice JN-25, fu captato e decodificato anche dalla stazione ‘Hypo’, di Honolulu, alle Hawaii, dove il capitano di vascello Joseph J. Rochefort lo stava aspettando. Per lui era la conferma che la sigla ‘AF’ indicava Midway, come aveva intuito nelle settimane precedenti, quando si era delineata l’ipotesi che i Giapponesi stessero preparando una nuova offensiva.
    [Show full text]
  • Ladies and Gentlemen
    reaching the limits of their search area, ENS Reid and his navigator, ENS Swan decided to push their search a little farther. When he spotted small specks in the distance, he promptly radioed Midway: “Sighted main body. Bearing 262 distance 700.” PBYs could carry a crew of eight or nine and were powered by two Pratt & Whitney R-1830-92 radial air-cooled engines at 1,200 horsepower each. The aircraft was 104 feet wide wing tip to wing tip and 63 feet 10 inches long from nose to tail. Catalinas were patrol planes that were used to spot enemy submarines, ships, and planes, escorted convoys, served as patrol bombers and occasionally made air and sea rescues. Many PBYs were manufactured in San Diego, but Reid’s aircraft was built in Canada. “Strawberry 5” was found in dilapidated condition at an airport in South Africa, but was lovingly restored over a period of six years. It was actually flown back to San Diego halfway across the planet – no small task for a 70-year old aircraft with a top speed of 120 miles per hour. The plane had to meet FAA regulations and was inspected by an FAA official before it could fly into US airspace. Crew of the Strawberry 5 – National Archives Cover Artwork for the Program NOTES FROM THE ARTIST Unlike the action in the Atlantic where German submarines routinely targeted merchant convoys, the Japanese never targeted shipping in the Pacific. The Cover Artwork for the Veterans' Biographies American convoy system in the Pacific was used primarily during invasions where hundreds of merchant marine ships shuttled men, food, guns, This PBY Catalina (VPB-44) was flown by ENS Jack Reid with his ammunition, and other supplies across the Pacific.
    [Show full text]
  • Quiet Heroes Cover.Qxd
    UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY Series IV World War II Volume 7 The Quiet Heroes of the Southwest Pacific Theater: An Oral History of the Men and Women of CBB and FRUMEL Sharon A. Maneki CENTER FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY Reprinted 2007 This monograph is a product of the National Security Agency history program. Its contents and conclusions are those of the author, based on original research, and do not necessarily represent the official views of the National Security Agency. Please address divergent opinion or additional detail to the Center for Cryptologic History (EC). Page ii Table of Contents Foreword . v Preface . vii Acknowledgments . xii An Introduction to the Central Bureau Story . .1 Chapter 1: The Challenge of Reaching Australia . .3 Escaping from the Philippines: A View from the Navy . .3 Escaping from the Philippines: A View from the Army . .5 Traveling from Stateside . .7 Chapter 2: Challenges at Central Bureau Field Sections . .11 Mastering Japanese Intercept . .12 The Paradox of Life at a Field Site . .13 On the Move in New Guinea . .16 An American Perspective on Traffic Analysis . .18 Chapter 3: Cryptanalysts at Work in Central Bureau . .23 The Key to Success Was Teamwork . .25 The Joy of Discovery . .30 Putting Our Cryptanalytic Skills to the Test at Central Bureau 1942-1945 .34 Developing the Clues to Solve the Cryptanalytic Puzzle . .37 Chapter 4: Central Bureau: A Complete Signals Intelligence Agency . .39 The Trials and Tribulations of an IBM Operator . .39 Supporting Central Bureau’s Information Needs . .41 A Central Bureau J-Boy . .42 A Bizarre Experiment .
    [Show full text]
  • US Navy and Coast Guard Vessels, Sunk Or Damaged Beyond
    Casualties: U.S. Navy and Coast Guard Vessels, Sunk or Damaged Beyond Repair during World War II, 7 December 1941-1 October 1945 U.S. Navy Warships Mine Warfare Ships Patrol Ships Amphibious Ships Auxiliaries District Craft U.S. Coast Guard Ships Bibliography U.S. Navy Warships Battleship (BB) USS Arizona (BB-39) destroyed by Japanese aircraft bombs at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 7 December 1941, and stricken from the Navy List, 1 December 1942. USS Oklahoma (BB-37) capsized and sank after being torpedoed by Japanese aircraft at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, 7 December 1941. Aircraft Carrier (CV) USS Hornet (CV-8) sunk after being torpedoed by Japanese aircraft during the Battle of Santa Cruz, Solomon Islands, 26 October 1942. USS Lexington (CV-2) sunk after being torpedoed by Japanese aircraft during the Battle of the Coral Sea, 8 May 1942. USS Wasp (CV-7) sunk after being torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-19 south of Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, 15 September 1942. USS Yorktown (CV-5) damaged by aircraft bombs on 4 June 1942 during the Battle of Midway and sunk after being torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-168, 7 June 1942. Aircraft Carrier, Small (CVL) USS Princeton (CVL-23) sunk after being bombed by Japanese aircraft during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Philippine Islands, 24 October 1944. Aircraft Carrier, Escort (CVE) USS Bismarck Sea (CVE-95) sunk by Kamikaze aircraft off Iwo Jima, Volcano Islands, 21 February 1945. USS Block Island (CVE-21) sunk after being torpedoed by German submarine U-549 northwest of the Canary Islands, 29 May 1944.
    [Show full text]
  • Atomictwo.Pdf (2562
    CHAPTER THREE: SHIP’S HISTORIES FOR THE SUNKEN VESSELS James P. Delgado Twenty-one target vessels and small craft sank flight deck, which as built was 874 feet long at Bikini as a result of Operation Crossroads. (later extended to 888 feet) and overhung the The characteristics, histories, and Crossroads hull forward and aft. “Above the water line role of each vessel sunk at Bikini, as well as the hull shape was determined by the Prinz Eugen, are discussed here. requirements for as wide a flying deck as possible. This has given a very pronounced flare both forward and aft.’” From keel to USS SARA TOGA (CV-3) flight deck, the depth of the hull was 74-1/2 feet. The hangar deck below was built to Characteristics accommodate 90 aircraft maximum, Saratoga usually carried 81 to 83 planes. Saratoga’s USS Saratoga (CV-3) was a steel-hulled vessel maximum beam was 105-1/2 feet, with a mean with a waterline length of 830 feet. The draft of 31 feet. Saratoga “officially” displaced cruiser hull of Saratoga was wedded to the 33,000 standard tons in compliance with the 43 Washington Naval Treaty. The vessel actually mounted 5-inch/38 caliber guns in four houses; displaced (full combat load) 43,500 tons--later single 5-inch guns of the same caliber were alluded to by “official” tonnage upgrades to added to the sponsons, replacing the original 36,000, later increased to 40,000, tons. The 5-inch/25 caliber weapons. Thirty 20mm ship’s trial displacement was 38,957 tons.2 Oerlikon antiaircraft guns were added, and four Saratoga’s characteristics as an aircraft carrier quad 40mm Bofors guns were installed.
    [Show full text]
  • The Archeology of the Atomic Bomb
    THE ARCHEOLOGY OF THE ATOMIC BOMB: A SUBMERGED CULTURAL RESOURCES ASSESSMENT OF THE SUNKEN FLEET OF OPERATION CROSSROADS AT BIKINI AND KWAJALEIN ATOLL LAGOONS REPUBLIC OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS Prepared for: The Kili/Bikini/Ejit Local Government Council By: James P. Delgado Daniel J. Lenihan (Principal Investigator) Larry E. Murphy Illustrations by: Larry V. Nordby Jerry L. Livingston Submerged Cultural Resources Unit National Maritime Initiative United States Department of the Interior National Park Service Southwest Cultural Resources Center Professional Papers Number 37 Santa Fe, New Mexico 1991 TABLE OF CONTENTS ... LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ......................................... 111 FOREWORD ................................................... vii Secretary of the Interior. Manuel Lujan. Jr . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................... ix CHAPTER ONE: Introduction ........................................ 1 Daniel J. Lenihan Project Mandate and Background .................................. 1 Methodology ............................................... 4 Activities ................................................. 1 CHAPTER TWO: Operation Crossroads .................................. 11 James P. Delgado The Concept of a Naval Test Evolves ............................... 14 Preparing for the Tests ........................................ 18 The AbleTest .............................................. 23 The Baker Test ............................................. 27 Decontamination Efforts .......................................
    [Show full text]
  • Code Breaking in the Pacific
    Code Breaking in the Pacific Peter Donovan • John Mack Code Breaking in the Pacific 123 Peter Donovan John Mack School of Mathematics and Statistics School of Mathematics and Statistics University of New South Wales University of Sydney Sydney, NSW, Australia Sydney, NSW, Australia Additional material to this book can be downloaded from http://extras.springer.com ISBN 978-3-319-08277-6 ISBN 978-3-319-08278-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-08278-3 Springer Cham Heidelberg New York Dordrecht London Library of Congress Control Number: 2014945227 © Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher’s location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
    [Show full text]
  • On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: the Memoirs of Admiral James O
    Review Article On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson (USN Retired), As Told to Vice Admiral George C. Dyer (USN Retired). Washington DC: Naval Historical Division, Department of the Navy, 1973, 471 pages. Martin Merson On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor: The Memoirs of Admiral James O. Richardson (USN Retired), As Told to Vice Admiral George C. Dyer (USN Retired), with an introduction by Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, (USN Retired), Director of Naval History, is a fundamental book for anyone in- terested in ascertaining the truth concerning the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, including the role of Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) and the Navy’s state of readiness. A review of the Richardson book appeared in Officer Review (The Military Order of the World Wars), Vol. 27, No. 6, January 1988, page 5.1 Although this book was completed in 1958, the publication date appearing in the book is 1973. To this reviewer’s knowledge there is no satisfactory explanation for the fifteen-year delay in making the book avail- able to the public. We have unofficial information that the delay may have been due to the fact that Harold Stark, Chief of Naval operations during the crucial early war years, did not die until 1972; the book is indeed highly critical of Admiral Stark. This writer has also been told that Admiral Arthur 1Martin Merson, “On the Treadmill to Pearl Harbor” Officer Review (The Military Order of the World Wars, 6 January 1988). 1 Radford, then serving as Chief of Naval Operations, insisted that Chapter XXII, entitled “Retrospect,” be included as a condition for publication.
    [Show full text]
  • Summer 2020 Volume XXV No
    NAVAL ORDER the of UNITED STATES www.NavalOrder.org Summer 2020 Volume XXV No. 3 Fair Winds and Following Seas Rear Admiral Thomas Francis Brown III In this Issue Commander General's Report…………….Page 2 John Scott and the USS Liberty………......Page 15 Frank Boo and the Battle of Midway……Page 16 Quentin Walsh, USCG at Normandy.........Page22 NOUS Commander General 2001-2003 In Memoriam...............................................Page 29 Page 4 COMMANDER GENERAL’S REPORT TO THE ORDER The Naval Order Newsletter is published quarterly by THE NAVAL ORDER OF THE UNITED STATES Commander General Col Allan F.P. Cruz, USMC (Ret.) - [email protected] Vice Commander General Communications MCCS Robert A. Hansen, USN (Ret.) - [email protected] Registrar General CAPT Kris Carlock, USN (Ret.) - [email protected] Marcy Weiss Executive Editor - [email protected] My Fellow Companions, The Naval Order is blessed to have several distinguished authors among its membership. I regret to inform you that Companion Dennis Koller, who writes military our Congress for 2020 in themed fiction in a mystery vein has graciously Buffalo, New York has made the following offer: been canceled. This is a direct consequence of Dennis would like to donate $2.50 to NOUS (in your the Corona Virus name) for every novel you purchase from his outbreak. The fact that website. Go to denniskoller.com/navalorder, pick two of the three hotels in out a book (or books) and place your order. He will Buffalo we had worked mail your personally autographed novel(s) the very with closed their doors forever due to the virus is a next day.
    [Show full text]