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Priceless Advantage 2017-March3.Indd United States Cryptologic History A Priceless Advantage U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence and the Battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians series IV: World War II | Volume 5 | 2017 Center for Cryptologic History Frederick D. Parker retired from NSA in 1984 after thirty-two years of service. Following his retirement, he worked as a reemployed annuitant and volunteer in the Center for Cryptologic History. Mr. Parker served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1943 to 1945 and from 1950 to 1952. He holds a B.S. from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. This publication presents a historical perspective for informational and educational purposes, is the result of independent research, and does not necessarily reflect a position of NSA/CSS or any other U.S. govern- ment entity. This publication is distributed free by the National Security Agency. If you would like additional copies, please email [email protected] or write to: Center for Cryptologic History National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road, Suite 6886 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755 Cover: (l to r) Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander in Chief, Japanese Combined Fleet, 1942; aircraft preparing for launch on the USS Enterprise during the Battle of Midway on 4 June 1942 with the USS Pensacola and a destroyer in distance; and Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, ca. 1942-1944 A Priceless Advantage: U.S. Navy Communications Intelligence and the Battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleutians Frederick D. Parker Center for Cryptologic History National Security Agency Reissued 2017 with a new introduction First edition published 1993. Second edition 2011. A Priceless Advantage Contents Introduction to 2017 Edition by John A. Tokar ........................................................................................................................................ v Historian’s Introduction to 2011 Edition by David A. Hatch ................................................................................................................................... vii Foreword to 1993 Edition by Henry F. Schorreck .............................................................................................................................. ix Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1 Part One: The Battle of the Coral Sea Japanese Strategy ..................................................................................................................................3 American Countermeasures ..................................................................................................................5 Japanese Preparations for Moresby........................................................................................................8 Naval COMINT Centers and Their Reports on Japanese Preparations for the Invasion of Port Moresby, Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia ..........................................................................10 Melbourne ........................................................................................................................................11 Hawaii (Hypo) ...................................................................................................................................12 OP-20-G Washington/Negat ............................................................................................................16 Communications Intelligence and Japanese Intentions toward Port Moresby ....................................17 The Battle Begins ..............................................................................................................................26 Overview ...........................................................................................................................................27 The Land Route to Port Moresby ......................................................................................................29 Notes .................................................................................................................................................30 Part Two: The Battles for Midway and the Aleutians Japanese Strategy ............................................................................................................................... 35 Japanese Preparations ........................................................................................................................ 36 COMINT Reflections of Japanese Preparations for Midway and the Aleutians ..................................38 The Battles Begin ..............................................................................................................................54 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................60 Epilogue .............................................................................................................................................62 Notes .................................................................................................................................................67 Bibliography .......................................................................................................................................73 A Priceless Advantage Introduction to 2017 Edition Th e Center for Cryptologic History is pleased tologic efforts paid obvious rewards with respect to reissue one of its earliest works, Fred Parker’s to the outcome at Midway, Mr. Parker also pays 1993 study, A Priceless Advantage: U.S. Navy Com- particular homage to how groundbreaking this munications Intelligence and the Battles of Coral Sea, work was in the months preceding the Coral Sea Midway, and the Aleutians, to commemorate the engagement. Furthermore, his treatment of the 75th anniversary of these important World War II attack on the Aleutian Islands, often neglected, is battles. Th is is the second time that CCH has cho- fascinating. sen to reprint it, the last being in 2011. While the Did communications intelligence provide layout and design of the previous edition were in the margin of victory at Midway and, to a lesser need of a refresh, Mr. Parker’s research and writing extent, Coral Sea? The sailors, marines, and avi- stand the test of time. ators who risked their lives in May and June of Few will argue with the seminal importance of 1942 certainly deserve the bulk of the acclaim. the outcome of the Battle of Midway, not only on However, the decryption of the Japanese Impe- the war in the Pacific, but ultimately on America’s rial Navy codes and subsequent analysis by Joe role in the world. After June 1942, Japan would Rochefort and others enabled Nimitz to decisively never again be on the strategic offensive in the position his forces to attack Yamamoto’s carriers. Pacific, even though three bloody years of fight- Armed with solid estimates of the size, direction, ing would ensue. After ultimate victory in World and attack date of the enemy force, Nimitz not War II, the United States could no longer enter- only had confidence in how and where to deploy tain notions of isolationism and was thrust into a his ships, he was able to argue against the alterna- leadership role which we have never yielded. The tives being proposed by some in Washington. We long-term repercussions of these relatively brief remain indebted to Mr. Parker for this powerful moments of history are undeniable. contribution to cryptologic history. As NSA Historians Henry Shorreck and David Others have since built upon this very solid Hatch have noted in the previous introductions to foundation, but Mr. Parker was one of the earli- this work, Mr. Parker’s real talent was his ability to est historians to compile such a complete picture connect the far-flung cryptologic threads leading of communications intelligence in the Pacific. to Coral Sea and Midway in a way that had not For those seeking additional study, consider Mr. been done earlier. Prior to this work, World War Parker’s Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy II histories, when they talked about cryptology at Communications Intelligence, 1924-1941, also all, tended to focus upon its impact to a particular available from CCH, and Elliot Carlson’s book, battle or event. Mr. Parker’s monograph brilliantly Joe Rochefort’s War: The Odyssey of the Codebreaker paints a picture of the meticulous work performed Who Outwitted Yamamoto at Midway. by cryptologists in Hawaii, Washington, DC, and John A. Tokar elsewhere, and how they provided Admiral Nimitz Chief, Center for Cryptologic History with this “priceless advantage.” While these cryp- v v A Priceless Advantage vi A Priceless Advantage Historian’s Introduction to 2011 Edition Fred Parker’s 1993 study of the early World This is what makes Mr. Parker’s book of last- War II battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and the Aleu- ing value. Along with the story of how cryptol- tians, A Priceless Advantage, was one of the earlier ogy served the nation well in a period of crisis, he books published by the Center for Cryptologic details how communications intelligence was pro- History. It was, in fact, a companion piece to Mr. duced, and how it grew through the experience of Parker’s Pearl Harbor Revisited. those who supported the war fighters. As then-historian Henry Schorreck pointed Mr. Parker also adds a clear exposition of the out in his original introduction to the mono-
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