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Hans Von Seeckt: Reformer of the Reichswehr

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Hans Von Seeckt: Reformer of the Reichswehr Western Michigan University ScholarWorks at WMU Honors Theses Lee Honors College 4-19-2013 Hans von Seeckt: Reformer of the Reichswehr Aaron Miller Western Michigan University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/honors_theses Part of the Oral History Commons Recommended Citation Miller, Aaron, "Hans von Seeckt: Reformer of the Reichswehr" (2013). Honors Theses. 2271. https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/honors_theses/2271 This Honors Thesis-Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Honors College at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. General Hans von Seeckt: Reformer of the Reichswehr By Aaron M. Miller Hist 4990: Senior Thesis Western Michigan University Spring 2013 Dr. Marion Gray Dr. Kenneth Steuer 5-15-2013 Page | 1 When the Great War erupted in Europe in 1914, the parties involved imagined a quick war, believing that the troops would be home for Christmas. At the onset of war, the Germans initiated the Schlieffen Plan, which called for a highly mobile right wing to travel through Belgium and northern Europe and encircle Paris, while the left wing fixed the Allied forces in Eastern France. Had this plan worked perfectly, it would have quickly eliminated France from the war and allowed Germany to focus on its Eastern Front. Modifications to the plan which weakened the right wing and the lack of mechanized infantry, however, hindered its successful execution and the plan ultimately failed. In response, the German and allied armies refocused their plans on maintaining land already gained and outflanking the enemy, resulting in a line running south from the North Sea to Switzerland. As both sides promptly fortified their positions along this line, trench warfare quickly ensued on the Western Front. Trench warfare was a type of positional warfare which resulted from a lack of mobility and an abundance of firepower. The conflict developed into a war of attrition in which artillery and machine-guns became the chief weapons employed. As there was no room for any maneuver except a frontal assault, the warring nations were forced to send wave after wave of soldiers into no man’s land, directly at the enemy’s heavily fortified position. As the war carried on, soldiers and civilians continued to die as each nation attempted to drain the enemy of its resources. This resulted in an astronomical number of casualties, which the involved nations could no longer deem acceptable. As a consequence of this bloody stalemate, each side developed new tactics and technologies to end the horrific violence. Some of these measures, such as poisonous gases and rolling artillery barrages, were aimed at suppressing enemy artillery and forcing enemy Page | 2 soldiers to evacuate their trenches. Others, such as tanks and infiltration tactics, restored mobility to the battlefield. Troops who managed to break through enemy defenses were able to continue the attack, bypassing enemy strongpoints and leaving them for follow-up forces.1 The overarching goal was to create a weaker enemy position that the attacking infantry could capture with more acceptable casualties. During the spring of 1918, the Germans initiated their last offensive on the Western Front: the Ludendorff Offensive. During this offensive, the troops clearly demonstrated what infiltration tactics could accomplish by quickly gaining miles of territory. The Germans, however, were unable to capitalize on their gains for two main reasons. First, the hungry troops often stopped the assault after capturing Allied points in order to rest and take advantage of the supplies.2 Second, the advancing troops moved more quickly than the rest of the army and thus could not maintain contact, resulting in a lack of support from the rear. The Allied forces eventually stopped the offensive and, in turn, broke through the German front and forced a diplomatic end to the Great War. The conditions of peace established at Versailles were especially restrictive for the German military, which was forced to limit its armed forces to 100,000 men. In addition, these men could not be conscripted and were required to serve a lengthy term of enlistment (twelve years for enlisted men, or twenty five for officers). The Allies imposed these long terms of enlistment with the goal of preventing Germany from training a substantial army, but instead it resulted in the creation of a highly trained officer corp. Enlisted men received years of training, making them highly capable. Also, the fact that the treaty abolished conscription ensured that only those dedicated to the service of Germany actually enlisted, infusing the Reichswehr with Page | 3 zeal. The treaty also dictated the organization of the army and navy, prohibited the creation of an air force, and restricted the production, exportation, and importation of war materials such as tanks, airplanes, artillery, and grenades.3 The Allied powers believed that these severe restrictions would permanently disarm Germany and ensure that it would never again threaten world peace.4 From the German perspective, however, the treaty was both detrimental and humiliating, preventing any means of security. Although the Allied powers intended to maintain the peace after the Great War, the countries involved realized the need to learn from their mistakes in the event of future conflict. The unpredictability of war, however, made drawing relevant conclusions extremely difficult and oftentimes led to ineffective solutions. The French, who saw the folly of attacking en masse during the war, concluded by 1929 that future victors would again occupy heavily fortified positions and use heavy artillery against enemy forces. The resulting Maginot Line— consisting of trenches, machine-gun nests, artillery parks, and other obstacles—epitomized their anticipation of positional warfare. On the other hand, Germany’s defeat prompted a more critical analysis of the tactics employed, rendering the idea of reform more acceptable. Many believed that Germany’s inability to sustain its losses ultimately led to its defeat, a problem which military thinkers sought to remedy. Among the most prominent figures of this group was the Chief of Staff, General Hans von Seeckt, who proposed reforming the German military doctrine in such a way that the future army would never again be drawn into a stationary war. As a result of his experiences, Seeckt identified what he believed to be the German tactical failures of the Great War and revised the existing doctrine accordingly, preparing the Page | 4 German army (Reichswehr5) for a new mode of war. Seeckt’s vision was based primarily on movement and combined arms, which he felt would successfully prevent the recurrence of trench warfare. He also forged relations with the Soviet Union, allowing the disarmed Reichswehr to gain access to equipment otherwise forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. As a whole, these doctrinal reforms and political maneuvers created a formidable, apolitical weapon with which future generations could wage effective war. Ultimately, Seeckt facilitated the successful development and implementation of tactical reform within the Reichswehr, precipitating the transition from a war of position to a war of movement; his attention to leadership, terrain, and combined arms transformed the army into a capable, modern tool and for this reason Seeckt emerged as one of the most influential military leaders in the interwar period. Given his position of Chef der Heeresleitung (Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr), Seeckt has been a focal point for investigators. Although their arguments reflect both military and political perspectives, they usually address the same question: how was Germany able to rebuild its armed forces while operating under the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles? Robert Citino argues that Seeckt was instrumental in the 1920s in creating a doctrine that the later German government (the Third Reich) used as the foundation for Blitzkrieg.6 Citino, however, does not believe that Seeckt was preparing Germany for an imminent war. Similarly, Matthias Strohn contends that Seeckt’s reforms were essential in rebuilding the German military, but his intent was to create a force specifically to defend Germany in this vulnerable time.7 Contrarily, Macgregor Knox asserts that Seeckt rebuilt the Reichswehr with the goal of waging war to regain Germany’s status in Europe.8 Knox believes that Germany—and Seeckt— Page | 5 were indeed preparing for a war with a target already selected. Eric D. Weitz and Erich Eyck examine the Reichswehr’s role in stabilizing the Weimar Republic and thus consider the role of Seeckt. To scholars such as these, Seeckt was critical in his dealings with the Weimar Republic and instrumental in creating a stable Reich.9 Still, there are others who investigate Seeckt’s clandestine dealings with Russia, such as Hans W. Gatzke and George W.F. Hallagarten. These scholars assert that Seeckt was the mastermind behind the military relations with Russia which provided Germany access to vital military experience and hardware.10 Despite the fact that these arguments are sound, they lack unity. Although this study provides analysis from a military perspective, it offers a more complete picture of Seeckt’s role in the Reichswehr both militarily and politically. This paper concludes that, from an examination of his training manuals and field maneuver observations, evidence of his dealings with Russia, and attention to similarities later visible in Truppenführung, Seeckt successfully effected military reform during the interwar period amidst notable political instability. These changes would create a mobile and efficient German army, capable of avoiding the horrors of the previous war. When the Great War began, Colonel Seeckt, the chief of staff to the III Army Corps, was stationed on the Western Front near Belgium and France.
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