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Proquest Dissertations INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submMed. Thus, some tfiesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may t>e from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedtfwough, sut)standard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that tfie author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to t>e removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, t)eginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional cfiarge. Contact UMI directly to order. Bell & Howell Information and Learning 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 800-521-0600 UMÏ OFHCIALS FACE THE MASSES: CITIZEN CONTACTING IN MODERN CHINA DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Laura M. Luehrmann, B.A., M.A. **** The Ohio State University 2000 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Kevin J. O’Brien, Adviser Professor R. William Liddle Advjfer Professor Chung-min Chen Department of Political Science UMI Number 9962428 Copyright 2000 by Luehrmann, Laura Marie All rights reserved. UMI* UMI Microform9962428 Copyright 2000 by Bell & Howell Information and Leaming Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. Bell & Howell Information and Leaming Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 Copyright by Laura Marie Luehrmann 2000 Abstract Scholars have long wanted to understand how leaders find out about pressing issues that require their attention. In this dissertation, I examine institutions that promote citizen contact and make leaders more aware of problems within the polity. Political participation by ordinary citizens tends to be overlooked by students of non-democratic regimes, even though common individuals are the holders of precisely the information that leaders seek. To gamer this feedback, regime elites formalize the means by which citizens can get in touch with them. Through these channels, elites gather information about local affairs, and citizens have the opportimi^ to report their problems. In this dissertation, 1 explore institutions that facilitate a Qpe of formally sanctioned political participation known as contacting. 1 analyze specific contacting institutions within modem China as a way to understand the evolutionlong-standing of patterns of elite-mass communication. Chinese conqtlaint bureaus, which have origins in imperial times, were established in the 1950s to promote popular iiqtut in policies and decision making and to serve as a conduit for officials to reach out to the masses. 1 argue that by examining these institutionalized means for soliciting mass opinions, we gain a better appreciation of political changes and challenges in modemChina. Complaint bureaus are more than safety valves to relieve steam and prevent 0.1 unrest. While individuals are looking for solutions to "grievances," representatives of the powerful are looking for "problems and issues" that may make their continued leadership problematic. This interactive dynamic ironically strengthens control by higher officials over subordinates, and, when it is done well, promotes regime legitimacy. I propose two arguments. First, meaningful participation by citizens can take place within the restrictions of a non-democratic regime. Second, I challenge the notion that Chinese citizens are apathetic about political matters. In this study, by highlighting organizations designed to (Militate citizen participation, I demonstrate that people other than political dissidents challenge officials and take part in political affairs. I l l Dedicated to my parents, who made it ail possible IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Education is not a solo endeavor, and I have been blessed with generous and gifted mentors all my life. I am thankful to all of my teachers. For their encouragement in college and their fateful suggestion that I consider graduate school, I thank Margaret Kams and Mary Durfee. For guidance and assistance throughout my years at Ohio State, I thank all of the professors in the Department of Political Science, but especially my committee members, R. William Liddle and Chung-min Chen, for their help throughout this dissertation project. Without a doubt, 1 owe my greatest thanks to my adviser and mentor, Kevin O'Brien, especially for his encouragement, attention to detail and timely responses to my drafts. Kevin’s perceptive advice, reminding me that writing is simply “placing word after word,” helped me produce a document of which 1 can be proud. Few graduate students are as luclqr as 1 have been to have such a gifted mentor who is willing to share his insights and his time as Kevin has done. commitmentHis to the success of his smdents is unmatched. For financial support for Chinese language training and dissertation write-up, 1 owe many thanks to the East Asian Studies Center at Ohio State. Owen Hagovsky deserves special kudos for his encouragement. Additionally, this project would have never gotten off the ground without the generous support of the International Sisterhood of PEO, who funded my fieldwork through a generous International PEO Scholar Award. I am particularly grateful to the women of the Sandusky Cluster, especially Mrs. Ann Daniel. The earliest stages of this project were made much more pleasantthanks to the advice and support of Lianjiang Li. Li helped me formulate my ideas for the prospecms, aided me in the detailed prqtarations for fieldwork in China, and supported me throughout the writing process. Most importantly, Li served as a model for what it takes to transition from graduate student to researcher and scholar. For their help in the field, I must thank my dear friend Zhu Guanglei, Vice Chair of Political Science Department at Nankai University, Che Mingzhou, and Liu Zehua. To the graduate assistants at Nankai who helped me navigate interviews and enjoy Tianjin’s night life, especially Hu Weihong, Jia Yimeng and Feng Quan, I am very grateful. My graduate experience at Ohio State was filled with intellectual rigor and peppered with fun. Thanks to my intramural basketball team-mates, fellow Buckeye football devotees, and the members of Theophilus lay Marianist community: each group of people helped me develop both sides of the brain and spirit. 1 have been touched by so many people during these past years, but special thanks go to Ann Auer, Susan Bellotti, Cynthia Duncan, Chris Grabarkiewicz, Leanne Jablonski, Kent Kille, Takeshi Kohno, Laura Leming, Susan Meyer, Zoe Oxley, Doug Perkins, Ruth Roberts-Kohno, Steve Scanlan, Heike Schommartz, Marilyn Schwieterman, Courmey Smith, Gul Sosay and Louisa Ward. And, to Nicci Crocker, with whose friendship I have been blessed v i since 1987; thanks for all of the rendezvous atLa Chatelaine, walks by the Scioto River (frozen or not), and, of course, for the laughter. I feel that my family has endured the most throughout my graduate education, and without their love and supportI would not be whereI am today. I givethanks to my Grandma, who patiently asked about "the book" each time she called, and who always reminded me that no matter what, she loved me. My brothers. Sonny and Michael, have always stood by their “kid sister,” and cheered me along the way.I am also fortunate to come from a large extended Amily, including many aunts, uncles and cousins who have supported me through the years. Cousin Sue deserves some sort of a “bravery award” for making the trek to China to join me during my fieldwork in 1996. She weathered the broken down buses, cold showers, unpredictable travel plans and some of the less savory personal habits of the Chinese like a trooper. I am also thankful to my parents-in-law. Bill and Sue Burdick, for their support and encouragement, visits, and overallcuriosiQr about my writing. Thanks for always offering the peaceful refuge of "Talking Trees." I am especially appreciative of my husband and life-parmer, Joe Burdick. Joe’s faith and commitment helped us make it through five arduous years of commuting between Buffalo and Columbus.Thanks for sharing your life with me, and for your unfailing support during the late nights which ran into early mornings, and the cycles of frustrations and joys that are endemic to graduate school and the dissertation enterprise. Your support during the edits, re-writes, and periods of writer's block was my guiding light. Thank you for being my beacon and my best friend. And finally,I thank my parents. Ever sinceI was a little girl, you taught me v i i that I could accomplish whatever I set out to do.Thanks for providing me with the background and foundation to pursue a lifetime of leaming.Thanks for the independence to become my own person. And most of all, thanks for the tremendous gift of faith in God and belief in the goodness of all people. Words can not express how grateful I am for all that you have done. To you, in thanksgiving for your support, your commitment to each other and family, and your love, I dedicate this dissertation. V l l l VTTA December 17, 1969 .............................................. Bom - Cincinnati, Ohio USA 199 2 .....................................................................
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