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OFHCIALS FACE THE MASSES: CITIZEN CONTACTING IN MODERN CHINA

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

By

Laura M. Luehrmann, B.A., M.A.

****

The Ohio State University 2000

Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Kevin J. O’Brien, Adviser

Professor R. William Liddle Advjfer Professor Chung-min Chen Department of Political Science UMI Number 9962428

Copyright 2000 by Luehrmann, Laura Marie

All rights reserved.

UMI*

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Bell & Howell Information and Leaming Company 300 North Zeeb Road P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor. Ml 48106-1346 Copyright by Laura Marie Luehrmann 2000 Abstract

Scholars have long wanted to understand how leaders find out about pressing issues that require their attention. In this dissertation, I examine institutions that promote citizen contact and make leaders more aware of problems within the polity. Political participation by ordinary citizens tends to be overlooked by students of non-democratic regimes, even though common individuals are the holders of precisely the information that leaders seek. To gamer this feedback, regime elites formalize the means by which citizens can get in touch with them. Through these channels, elites gather information about local affairs, and citizens have the opportimi^ to report their problems.

In this dissertation, 1 explore institutions that facilitate a Qpe of formally sanctioned political participation known as contacting. 1 analyze specific contacting institutions within modem China as a way to understand the evolutionlong-standing of patterns of elite-mass communication. Chinese conqtlaint bureaus, which have origins in imperial times, were established in the 1950s to promote popular iiqtut in policies and decision making and to serve as a conduit for officials to reach out to the masses. 1 argue that by examining these institutionalized means for soliciting mass opinions, we gain a better appreciation of political changes and challenges in modemChina.

Complaint bureaus are more than safety valves to relieve steam and prevent

0.1 unrest. While individuals are looking for solutions to "grievances," representatives of the powerful are looking for "problems and issues" that may make their continued leadership problematic. This interactive dynamic ironically strengthens control by higher officials over subordinates, and, when it is done well, promotes regime legitimacy.

I propose two arguments. First, meaningful participation by citizens can take place within the restrictions of a non-democratic regime. Second, I challenge the notion that Chinese citizens are apathetic about political matters. In this study, by highlighting organizations designed to (Militate citizen participation, I demonstrate that people other than political dissidents challenge officials and take part in political affairs.

I l l Dedicated to my parents, who made it ail possible

IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Education is not a solo endeavor, and I have been blessed with generous and gifted mentors all my life. I am thankful to all of my teachers. For their encouragement in college and their fateful suggestion that I consider graduate school, I thank Margaret Kams and Mary Durfee. For guidance and assistance throughout my years at Ohio State, I thank all of the professors in the Department of Political Science, but especially my committee members, R. William Liddle and Chung-min Chen, for their help throughout this dissertation project.

Without a doubt, 1 owe my greatest thanks to my adviser and mentor, Kevin

O'Brien, especially for his encouragement, attention to detail and timely responses to my drafts. Kevin’s perceptive advice, reminding me that writing is simply “placing word after word,” helped me produce a document of which 1 can be proud. Few graduate students are as luclqr as 1 have been to have such a gifted mentor who is willing to share his insights and his time as Kevin has done. commitment His to the success of his smdents is unmatched.

For financial support for Chinese language training and dissertation write-up, 1 owe many thanks to the East Asian Studies Center at Ohio State. Owen Hagovsky deserves special kudos for his encouragement. Additionally, this project would have never gotten off the ground without the generous support of the International Sisterhood of PEO, who funded my fieldwork through a generous International PEO Scholar

Award. I am particularly grateful to the women of the Sandusky Cluster, especially

Mrs. Ann Daniel.

The earliest stages of this project were made much more pleasantthanks to the advice and support of Lianjiang Li. Li helped me formulate my ideas for the prospecms, aided me in the detailed prqtarations for fieldwork in China, and supported me throughout the writing process. Most importantly, Li served as a model for what it takes to transition from graduate student to researcher and scholar.

For their help in the field, I must thank my dear friend Zhu Guanglei, Vice

Chair of Political Science Department at Nankai University, Che Mingzhou, and Liu

Zehua. To the graduate assistants at Nankai who helped me navigate interviews and enjoy Tianjin’s night life, especially Hu Weihong, Jia Yimeng and Feng Quan, I am very grateful.

My graduate experience at Ohio State was filled with intellectual rigor and peppered with fun. Thanks to my intramural basketball team-mates, fellow Buckeye football devotees, and the members of Theophilus lay Marianist community: each group of people helped me develop both sides of the brain and spirit. 1 have been touched by so many people during these past years, but special thanks go to Ann Auer, Susan

Bellotti, Cynthia Duncan, Chris Grabarkiewicz, Leanne Jablonski, Kent Kille, Takeshi

Kohno, Laura Leming, Susan Meyer, Zoe Oxley, Doug Perkins, Ruth Roberts-Kohno,

Steve Scanlan, Heike Schommartz, Marilyn Schwieterman, Courmey Smith, Gul Sosay and Louisa Ward. And, to Nicci Crocker, with whose friendship I have been blessed v i since 1987; thanks for all of the rendezvous atLa Chatelaine, walks by the Scioto River

(frozen or not), and, of course, for the laughter.

I feel that my family has endured the most throughout my graduate education, and without their love and supportI would not be whereI am today. I givethanks to my Grandma, who patiently asked about "the book" each time she called, and who always reminded me that no matter what, she loved me. My brothers. Sonny and

Michael, have always stood by their “kid sister,” and cheered me along the way.I am also fortunate to come from a large extended Amily, including many aunts, uncles and cousins who have supported me through the years. Cousin Sue deserves some sort of a

“bravery award” for making the trek to China to join me during my fieldwork in 1996.

She weathered the broken down buses, cold showers, unpredictable travel plans and some of the less savory personal habits of the Chinese like a trooper. I am also thankful to my parents-in-law. Bill and Sue Burdick, for their support and encouragement, visits, and overallcuriosiQr about my writing. Thanks for always offering the peaceful refuge of "Talking Trees."

I am especially appreciative of my husband and life-parmer, Joe Burdick. Joe’s faith and commitment helped us make it through five arduous years of commuting between Buffalo and Columbus.Thanks for sharing your life with me, and for your unfailing support during the late nights which ran into early mornings, and the cycles of frustrations and joys that are endemic to graduate school and the dissertation enterprise.

Your support during the edits, re-writes, and periods of writer's block was my guiding light. Thank you for being my beacon and my best friend.

And finally,I thank my parents. Ever sinceI was a little girl, you taught me v i i that I could accomplish whatever I set out to do.Thanks for providing me with the background and foundation to pursue a lifetime of leaming.Thanks for the independence to become my own person. And most of all, thanks for the tremendous gift of faith in God and belief in the goodness of all people. Words can not express how grateful I am for all that you have done. To you, in thanksgiving for your support, your commitment to each other and family, and your love, I dedicate this dissertation.

V l l l VTTA

December 17, 1969 ...... Bom - Cincinnati, Ohio USA

199 2 ...... B.A. International Studies University of Dayton

1995 ...... M.A. Political Science Ohio State University

1993 - June 1999...... Graduate Teaching and Research Associate, Ohio State University

September 1999 - present...... Assistant Professor, Wright State University

PUBLICATIONS

1. Kevin J. O’Brien and Laura M. Luehrmann (1998),Institutionalizing “ Chinese Legislatures: Trade-offs Between Autonomy and Capacity,”Legislative Studies Quarterly, 23: 1 (February).

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science

Areas of Concentration: Comparative Politics, Chinese Politics, East Asian Studies

IX TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract...... ii

Dedication...... iv

Acknowledgments...... v

Vita...... ix

List of Figures...... xii

Chapters

1. Introduction: Participation and Information...... 1

1.1 Elite-mass communication in non-democratic states...... 1 1.2 The dual purpose of contacting institutions...... 4 1.2.1 Promoting political expression...... 4 1.2.2 Relaying Information...... 9 1.3 The political significance of contacting in China...... IS 1.4 A note on method...... 16 1.5 Chapter outline...... 17

2. The Origins of Chinese Complaint Bureaus...... 20

2.1 Introduction...... 20 2.2 Historical development...... 20 2.3 Citizen contacting in the PRC...... 29 2.4 Conclusion...... 35

3. Facing Citizen Complaints, 1951-1996...... 36

3.1 Introduction...... 36 3.2 Time periods...... 36 3.2.1 Establishment (1951-1965)...... 37 3.2.2 Rupture (1966-1977) ...... 43 X 3.2.3 Restoration (1978-1988)...... 47 3.2.4 Equilibrium (1989-1996)...... 51 3.3 Accounting for citizen contacts...... 55 3.4 Categorization of conq*laints...... 57 3.4.1 Community relations...... 59 3.4.2 Public services...... 59 3.4.3 Economic livelihood...... 60 3.4.4 Political affairs...... 61 3.4.5 Appeals...... 62 3.5 Conclusion...... 65

4. Challenges in the 1990s...... 67

4.1 Introduction...... 67 4.2 "Hot spots" in modem complaint work...... 67 4.2.1 “Skipping levels”...... 68 4.2.2 Collective complaints...... 72 4.2.3 A pressing combination; group complaints at higher levels...... 75 4.2.4 Other indicators of poorly executed contacting work...... 76 4.3 Institutional dilemmas...... 78 4.4 Conclusion...... 85

5. Supervision and Control...... 87

5.1 Introduction...... 87 5.2 Meanings of supervision...... 88 5.3 Supervision widi Chinese characteristics...... 92 5.4 Conclusion...... 112

6. Conclusion: Consequences...... 115

6.1 Beyond the dual purpose...... 116 6.2 Contacting and political change...... 118 6.3 Implications...... 120 6.4 Conclusion...... 122

Appendix A: List of Counties...... 126

Bibliography...... 128

XI LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

3.1 County level complaints, 1951-1965...... 43

3.2 County level complaints, 1966-1977 ...... 46

3.3 County level complaints, 1978-1987...... 48

3.4 County level complaints, 1988-1994...... 51

3.5 Average county level complaints, 1951-1994...... 56

X I 1 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: PARTICIPATION AND INFORMATION

"Power is not strongest when it uses violence, but weakest. It is strongest when it employs the instruments of substimtion and counter attraction, of allurement, of participation rather than of exclusion, of education rather than of annihilation.

1.1 Elite-Mass Communication in Non-Democratic States

It is not difficult to find examples of restrictions on expression in non- democratic states. Groups and organizations are routinely required to register with the government, opposition parties, if they exist at all, are forced underground, and activists who dare to openly challenge official policies put themselves, and often their family and friends, at risk. All of this would lead us to expect that government functionaries do whatever is in their power to limit face-to-face interaction between officials and citizens, and that, particularly, the expression of dissatisfaction would be vigorously prohibited. Therefore, it might appear puzzling that leaders in non- democratic regimes actively solicit input from society, including citizen complaints. In this dissertation, I examine the processes involved in one type of officially approved

^Merxiam 1934:180. political participation, by focusing on the operation of so-called "complaint bureaus" in the People's Republic of China.

In order to stay in touch with socieQr, governments establish institutions which foster communication between elites and masses. In democratic systems, elections, public opinion polling, constituent casework, and political party activities provide the basis for most elite-mass communication. In non-democratic systems, political elites devise alternative ways to receive this feedback, which is deemed essential for long­ term stability.^ Elites in non-democratic countries as diverse as medieval France,

Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Singapore and the

People's Republic of China established formal channels to permit citizens to file petitions, complaints, and suggestions with the government. Even in strictly controlled single-par^ systems, there are channels to monitor officials, oversee government policy, and give a voice to the masses, although these organizations have never been intended to challenge the ruling establishment.

Institutions such as petition ofGces, problem centers, and reception bureaus allow citizens to relay their concerns to officials. This category of voluntary participation, in which individuals approach government officials to seek "help for themselves, their families or larger social groups", is often referred to as contacting.^

Contacting is an institutionalized form of citizen participation, with established rules and procedures, as well as predictable patterns of behavior. It can be either an individual or a group act, although most governments ardently strive to limit collective

^Fainsod 1979; Friedgut 1979; Rueschemeyer 1990. attempts to wage complaints. Even though contacting often begins on citizen initiative, participants take their cues from governmental representatives charged with acting as a conduit for the legitimate expression of dissatisfrction. Citizen contacting is not always rooted in the traditional institutions of civil socie^, such as families, schools, jobs, and churches, but is instead mediated through public offices which were established deliberately for this purpose. It is distinct from other forms of political participation because it

"does not involve the selection of office holders, does not include public demonstrations of political strength, and does not require the formation and maintenance of ties among claimants, whether through political parties, interest groups, or other political associations."* In this study, I analyze contacting in China by focusing on public offices that handle citizen complaints. I use contacting to encompass legal, conventional requests that are filed within approved institutional routes. Protests, dissident appeals outside of these authorized channels, and acts of terrorism are not included in the concept as I employ it.

How and why are contacting institutions established? What explains their patterns of use? What are the most demanding issues in contacting work, and what are the consequences of these difficulties? Does this participation lead to any increased

^Zuckertnan and West 1985: 117. *Ibid. For another study which analyzes citizen contacting, see Nicholas Lampert's study of * whistle-blowing' in the Soviet Union (1985) . It is interesting note that a formal complaint sytem in the Soviet Union developed much later than its counterpart in the PRC. Even though citizens' right to submit proposals and complaints existed in lawbefore the 1930s, the first formal resolution permitting citizen contacting was not passed by the Central Committee until 1967, and a * Letters Department' was not established until 1978. See Lampert 1985: 65. demands for civil society, or to any forms of political change? These are the questions that will be the focus of my study.

1.2 The Dual Purpose of Contacting Institutions

Institutions that facilitate citizen contacting have a dual purpose. First, they provide a way to meet people's desires to participate and be heard by their leaders. In every political system, people encounter difficulties within their daily lives. From traffic problems, to complaints about public services including trash collection and utilities, to more explicitly political concerns such as reports of corruption and malfeasance, individuals and groups attempt to articulate their concerns through whatever channels are available. Second, contacting institutions furnish information to the ruling elite, who are often disconnected from afWrs in the localities, including actions by their subordinates. Contacting institutions provide governments the chance to systematically gather information about popular preferences and officials' behavior.

1.2.1 Promoting Political Expression

Formal institutions to facilitate citizen participation exist even in the most anti­ democratic regimes. Why do leaders provide such access? With respect to political participation, contacting channels everywhere are designed primarily to accomplish three goals; promote citizen efficacy; prevent the expression of unsanctioned opposition; and finally, to foster support for the regime.^

I use the classic definition of political participation provided by Verba, Nie and Kim, "those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take" (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978: 46) . In non-democratic regimes, there are a variety of political activities in which citizens may take part, including writing letters or petitions, speaking out in work and other employment related meetings, participating in voluntary associations, joining demonstrations or collective protests, and using personal relations or connections with officials. Yet, it is often claimed that citizens in non-democratic states are complacent or even indifferent toward politics.^ In response to these assertions, many scholars have encouraged an emphasis on less recognized, informal patterns of participation, such as networking, letter-writing, gift-giving and passive non-compliance by "citizen gatekeepers" who transform desires into demands.^ Another helpful distinction, which redirects our attention toward the range of issues around which people mobilize, is that between "high politics" (leadership activities and abstract political concepts) and "low politics" (daily life matters, including issues in the workplace and home).^ In the domain of both high and low politics, as many have shown, people living in non-

*This is particularly an assumption in studies of Asian countries. For a classic refutation of this argument in pre-communist China, see Lin 1936. For a more recent response to this debate, see Patten 1998. ^Easton 1965: 93-4 introduced the gatekeeper analogy. For a sampling of some of the more recent literature on political participation in non-democratic states, which refutes the notion of acquiescent citizens, see Fitzpatrick (1994), Shi (1997) Singerman (1995), Yan (1996), and Yang (1994).

®For more, see Bialer 1980: 166-67. Others, including Tang and Pairish (unpublished. Chapter 7) have pointed to this type of participation as well, referring to what Bialer calls "low politics" as "non-political" types of participation- I prefer Bialer's language, as I agree that, in state- dominated regimes such as China, daily life and subsistence issues should indeed be viewed as "political". Burns distinguishes between "politically relevant" and "politically non-relevant" participation by Chinese peasants, based on whether activists make "demands on the state" (relevant) or "maximizing behavior in the market" (non-relevant) (Burns 1984: 127). For an interesting discussion on the difficulties of drawing distinctions between political and apolitical participation, see Singermein 1995, 7-8. democratic regimes have been successful at persuading officials and achieving their goals/

Through contacting channels, autocratic leaders from Nikita Khrushchev to Lee

Kuan Yew to Mao Zedong have allowed and even encouraged citizen contacting; exhibiting what one Soviet scholar called an "un-Stalinist attitude of encouraging criticism, feedback, and initiative.''"’ Often, institutions which frcilitate this feedback are created to formalize citizen inclusion that is already occurring. For exanqtle, petition boxes in Japan were created to limit illegal direct appeals to high officials, as well as to curb the problem of unsigned accusations against officials.” Contacting offices are commonly branches of government or ruling parQr offices. Yet, even in the cases where contacting institutions assert nominal independence, the source of their power is quite obvious. In Singapore, although the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) attempted to separate the Citizens' Consultative Committee (CCC) from the regime, the effort was modest at best.’^

As much as contacting institutions permit popular participation, they usually also limit both the content and expression of citizen complaints. By narrowing the channels through which citizens can appeal, and restricting the issues which are viewed

^Jennings 1997; Li and O'Brien 1996; O'Brien and Li 1995; Shi 1997: 1-18; Singerman 1995.

^°Bialer 1980: 166. ^^Roberts 1994: 426-30. ^“Singapore's CCCs are formally under the Prime Minister's office. Because of the PAP'S dominance in politics, they are closely associated with the ruling party. Opposition parties have argued this "sponsorship" helped the PAP maintain its control for so long, and that opposition parties were operating at a clear disadvantage because they did not have access to that information (Bellows 1970: 101; Hill and Fee 1995: 175). as legitimate, the powers that be typically attempt to orchestrate popular demands.”

The role of contacting channels in limiting the popular appeal of opposition parties provides a telling example. By effectively responding to citizen demands through the

Citizens' Consultative Committees, PAP leaders in Singapore helped keep opposition parties at bay.'^ This crafting of expectations leads some to emphasize governmental leaders' ability to manipulate popular opinion through the regulation of contacting channels.”

Such control is also evident in attempts to limit the size of complainant groups: regime leaders vigorously try to prevent people from collectively articulating their concerns. This goal is seldom realized. When there are efforts to expand the act of contacting beyond an individual matter, it is usually met with official condemnation.”

Among contacting channels in general, there is variation in the topics that offices are empowered to handle. Some, such as media and party bureaus, permit the filing of complaints related to virtually any issue. Others are more narrowly defined.

Examples include "residents' committees", as well as offices within voluntary (or mass) associations, such as women's leagues, children's associations, and trade unions. As

^Bellows 1970: 106; Bialer 1980: 164. ^Bellows 1970: 101. ^^Bellows uses Che distinction between "manipulative" and "articulative" to express opposition group's concerns about the tight relationship between the Citizens' Consultative Committees and the ruling People's Action Party in Singapore. His own analysis is that these para-political organizations were only "tangentially manipulative" (Bellows 1970: 106-7).

^^In her discussion of peasant letters in the 1930s, Fitzpatrick states that, even though many wanted to wage collective complaints, most peasants wrote individual letters, in order to avoid the accusation of inciting a conspiracy against the regime (1994: IS) . Collective complaints (jiti shazigfang) in China have become an increasing issue in recent years, as will be discussed in Chapter 4. will be discussed below, functional specificity may help citizens avoid bureaucratic hassles while trying to solve their problems.

Contacting institutions localize the expression of discontent, and divert criticism fiom central authorities to local bureaucracies. The goal of government officials is usually to contain the expression of dissatisfaction at the grassroots, before it "bubbles- up" through the system.Yet, higher level appeals are rarely averted, and central contacting organizations are often inundated with citizen complaints. People appeal to higher levels when they doubt the effectiveness of contacting institutions: this can be a serious problem for any regime.'^

Ultimately, by promoting participation through contacting channels, officials hope to maintain acquiescence and build support for the govenunent, by "draining off hostility" and preventing "sporadic outbursts" of unrest.'^ Promoting evenminimal a sense of efficacy in people's lives can help curb the number of people who turn to unconventional modes of political expression, including protests and more contentious forms of resistance.“

Soviet scholar argued that locally-waged complaints deflect "bolts of lightening" from the central government (Fainsod 1958: 408).

^®More on this phenomenon, known as "skipping levels" (yueji) in China, will be discussed in Chapter 4. This problem was common in the Soviet system, as well. See Fitzpatrick 1994: 44, 67; Friedgut 1979: 225, 228.

^®Bellows 1970: 108, 125. ^^Students of political participation have noted a correlation between cynical attitudes and rates of participation in illegal political acts to articulate their interests. See especially Citrin 1974, Mueller 1972 and Paige 1971.

8 To the extent that the regime is successful in limiting expression, structuring demands, and promoting a sense of efficacy, it can lead to the development of what may be called a "petitionary political culture", in which grievances are funnelled and resolved in a manner conducive to government control/' This formally sanctioned participation, although voluntary, is a ^ cry from the autonomous citizen engagement that we associate with democratic regimes. Yet it also is less regime-directed than the mobilized participation that marks most Leninist regimes.^

1.2.2 Relaying Infonnatioa

If contacting institutions were designed only to achieve the first objective, that of allowing limited participation, they would be little more than "safe^ valves" designed by the government to allow the population to release their frustrations in a non-threateningmanner However, there is more to citizen contacting than the airing of grievances and controlling citizen participation. It is in their second objective that contacting channels are most useful to governments: they provide the regime elite with

^^Chan 1990: 81. ^^Researchers of contacting channels have been careful not to make the leap from participation, which most agree is increased via institutional openings, and democratization. This requires analysts to walk a fine line between "meaningful" and "un-meaningful" participation. For more on this distinction, see Hahn 1988, pp. 30-38. For two early accounts in which scholars asserted the meaningfulness of citizen participation in the Soviet Union, without connecting this to democratization, making an unwarranted leap to "democracy", see Oliver (1969) and Urban (1982) . For more on mobilization campaigns, see Jowitt 1975; Huntington and Nelson 1976: 8-11; Lowenthal 1970. For a perspective on the positive aspects of mobilization strategies, including an articulation of the continuation of "institutionalized mobilization" in the post-revolutioneiry period, see White 1990. details about sources of popular resistance, the behavior of local officials, and "trends in society.”^

Leaders in non-democratic regimes face an inherent contradiction; basic information from the public is difficult to acquire and yet acutely necessary for successful policy-making and long-term stability.^ Negative opinions and problems, or

"friction points"^ of the system, are precisely the matters of which leaders need to be aware. Establishing channels to overcome this paucity of information poses an irony to leaders of non-democratic states. As one observer of the Soviet Union noted; it is

"paradoxical that the regime should devote enormous effort to keep everyone from talking and then waste further effort to leam what people are talking about and what they want.

In his seminal work. Nerves o f Government, Karl Deutsch argues that all governments depend upon the processing of information.” He contends that there are three kinds of information needed for a political system to function: information about the outside world; information from the past, and information about itself and its own parts.^ This last category, which he later calls "internal intelligence", includes knowledge about governmental personnel and constimencies. It is this category of information that is sought through contacting channels. «

^^Lan Zhengxing 1991: 35. ^^Harry Harding includes inadequate information as one of the most important five "organizational maladies" faced by large organizations (Harding 1981: 5) .

^^Fainsod argued that petitions in the Soviet Union provided state leaders with a " panaroma of friction points of Soviet existence' (1958: 378) . ^®Amalrik 1970: 32.

10 Ordinary people are a tremendous source of information for government leaders.^ For example, in the Russian countryside during Stalin's time, paid "rural correspondents" served as the "signalling channels" of the government." Leaders in

Singapore set up "consultative committees", and more limited "residents committees", which were referred to as the regime’s "sensory system. Facing an attentive audience for their grumblings, informants voluntarily relay perceived injustices, inefficient bureaucratic processes, and wasteful policies pursued by representatives of the government. Through these institutions, leaders often attempt to take the "pulse" of the population. The information conveyed increases their awareness of citizen demands and preferences. Citizen contacts are especially useful in areas where the government's presence is less established;

"The Soviet leaders of the 1930s regarded petitions and denunciations as an important chaimel of information from the grassroots, and used it to compensate for the weakness of the state's administrative presence in the countryside."" They also help govermnental leaders regroup after a lapse in popular appeal. A pertinent example of one government's recognition of this aim is found in Singapore.

^^Deutsch 1966: 145. ^®Deutsch 1966: 129. ^*For more on this, see Ming Xia 1997: 31. Ming reports that 75% of crimes committed by Party and government officials in China which were successfully prosecuted were reported by citizens writing letters to the authorities. Letters from the masses have been an integral part of recent anti-corruption campaigns. This use of complaint work will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Bellows discusses this "network of informers" (107) as the darker side of the CCCs in Singapore. Fitzpatrick and Fainsod both mention paid informants to newspapers, with Fainsod pointing to the need to distinguish such letters from spontaineous ones (1958: 384).

^°Fitzpatrick 1994: 15; Friedgut 1979: 7; Remington 1988: 123. ^^Chan 1989: 81; Hill and Fee 1995: 178. ^^Fitzpatrick 1994: 15. 11 After poor election results in 1984, the PAP established a "feedback unit" within the

Ministry of Community Development, inviting people's recommendations and complaints. Many professionals and intellectuals responded with detailed suggestions for the Party This act of reaching out helped bolster the perception of responsiveness by multiple sectors of the population.

Petitions, letters and appeals can break down the barriers against free-flowing communication that exist in many non-democratic regimes. Although they are not mandated to act on the issues they become aware of through contacting chaimels, leaders nevertheless tend to encourage input from the masses. For example, Japanese petition boxes directly linked the regional lord to his people in Imperial Japan.^

Through approved channels, peasants were asked to contribute their comments on drafts of the Soviet Constitutions.^^ During "unified political days" Russian leaders presented policies and then invited questions from the masses, summaries of which were forwarded to the propaganda departm ent."M eet the people" sessions in

Singapore's Communier Centers were times for people to raise issues, but also for government representatives and Ministers to explain government programs.

Government channels can also allow officials to explain policies to the masses, as well

^^Chan 1990: 83. Roberts called these institutions the " most honest form of communication permitted* in Imperial Japan. Roberts 1994: 426, 436. ^^Fitzpatrick 1994: 100; Hahn 1988: 168. ^^Remington 1988: 49-51. ^^Bellows 1970: 105. 12 as inform the government of public complaints.^ Each of these institutions promotes increased interaction between rulers and the ruled.

Finally, the information received through contacting institutions assists government leaders in overseeing their own officials. As a Soviet scholar put it,

"with the help of the letters both the central and regional leadership were able to leap-firog the formal administrativehierarchy and to maintain a check on their own agents in terms of the reaction from below. Sometimes the threat alone of being reported could be enough to restrain illicit behavior of cadres.^

If informants are not forthcoming through institutions made available by the government, leaders often solicit letters from appointed volunteers.*' Often, these letters are printed in the state-run media, as a warning to the offending official or group. In fact, letters to the media and party offices have been extremely common in many regimes.*^ Such outlets are often favored by regime leaders because they encourage individual participation, and "do not entail the risk of mobilizing and coalescing individuals into self-conscious opinion groups. One Soviet newspaper

^®Lian 1971: 21. ^®Fainsod 1958: 408. *°For examples in the Soviet and Japanese cases, respectively, see Fainsod 1958: 408; Roberts 1994: 447. ^^Remington 1988. *^For more, see Fainsod 1958, Chapter 20, Fitzpatrick 1994. A tremendous resource of petitions and complaints from citizens during the early Soviet era was captured from Smolensk first by the Germans, and later by Americans. For more information about the Smolensk Party archives, see Fitzpatrick and Viola (1990) .

‘'^Connor and Gitelman 1977: 3. 1 3 received so many complaints about officials that they classified such letters under a

separate heading, "abuse of power and wrecking."^

Contacting institutions also provide officials an opportunity to comb the

population for pockets of unrest or potential dissension. The genesis of the Citizen

Consultative Committee (CCC) in Singapore is indicative of this objective; the Japanese

occupational government formed village councils to "maintain order and keep the

Japan^e administration informed of grassroots activities, The councils devel<^>ed

into larger committees designed to help establish"communal harmony" especially after

ethnic riots in 1964.““

Successful contacting work informs authorities of problems, and limits fallout

from leaders' inability to meet citizen demands. By narrowing the appeal of expressing

dissatisfaction, solving daily "low politics" issues which are within the capacity of local

officials to settle, and enhancing supervision over recalcitrant officials, contacting work

can strengthen, rather than weaken, governments. In his study of whistle-blowing in

the Soviet Union, Lamport goes as far as to call it a form of "submission from below",

since activists followed the demands of the leadership to enforce Soviet morality.*^

Fitzpatrick offers a difierent spin: she labels peasant letter-writing an act of

Fitzpatrick 1994: 200. The formal monitoring of complaints is conducive to the supervision of citizens, as well. As an example, the "KGB uses the mailbags of media organizations both as general indicators of the public temper and as a source of names and addresses of particular complainants" (Remington 1988 : 126).

“®Hill and Fee 1995: 178. “®Ibid. ^^Lampert 1985: 8. 14 "manipulation of the state", arguing that peasants used denunciations in letter writing to intervene in village feuds

What is the best way to conceptualize the impact of complaint work in the PRC?

Is contacting in contemporary China a form of submission, or one of the few ways citizens can grapple with state power?

1.3 The Political Significance of Contacting in China

Since the 1960s, scholars have been searching for ways to characterize the representation of popular interests in state-socialist regimes/’ If we use pluralist models to measure citizen participation in government today, or to gauge government responsiveness to citizen needs, we find an insulated state and an apathetic socieQr.^

But there is more to it than this approach would suggest.

While the right of the population to press demands on sensitive topics continues to be denied, and organized opposition, in the form of alternative parties or unauthorized demonstrations is consistently repressed, governmental leaders need to monitor officials, track trends in policy implementation, and satisfy basic requests of citizens. In late 20th century China, as in Imperial times, these systemic needs are partly met by contacting institutions Citizen contacting in China, which now occurs

^^Fitzpatrick 1994: 16. **For some of the classics, see Janos 1970; Schwartz and Keech 1968; Skilling 1966. ^°Even though PRC does not recognize the legitimacy of interest groups, associations with limited sectoral appeal are increasingly common. For example, the China Consumers Association received approximately 300,000 formal complaints in 1996 alone. See Burstein and de Keijzer (1998: 323).

^^Lieberthal and Oksenberg referred to this as the " bureaucrat i c encapsulation of interests", arguing that "leaders reject the interests of any given group, but they embrace the idea of resolving problems they have 15 primarily through government and parQr-sponsored complaint bureaus, is based on the time-honored right of people to redress grievances. More than ten years ago, at the end of their study of Chinese bureaucracies, Lieberthal and Oksenberg posed a question they were unable to answer; how do leaders become aware of issues that demand their attention?^ I suggest that contacting channels, in the form of complaint bureaus, go a long way in helping fill the void left in the absence of an independent media, autonomous interest groups and other connections between officials, bureaucrats, and ordinary citizens. 1.4 A Note on Method

In studying citizen contacting, a focus on political participation alone would underscore what is not permitted and what is not occurring in today’s China. It would find that citizen interests articulated to leaders remain within the commonly understood boundaries of the "non-political," that challenges to the regime are harshly denounced, and that most people feel hopeless facing the regime. Such an emphasis would not help us understand governmental capacity for meeting citizen demands. Likewise, it would not further our knowledge of institutional tensions endemic in resolving conflict within a system that is at once rigidly hierarchical and at the same time, loosely configured and flexible.

identified through creating organizations to deal with problems" (1988: 400) . They present it as an alternative to the emphasis, within the interest group literature, on popular influence in government, and the corporatist focus on state's capacity to mold interests and their representation.

^^Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988: 400. 16 In this study of Chinese conq)laint bureaus, I adopt a primarily institutional approach. I focus on the origins, development, and challenges that contacting bureaus face. In particular, I emphasize how leaders use this set of institutions to manage the expression of discontent and keep abreast of the concerns of citizens. A focus on people's motivation for enlisting the assistance of cadres would produce a different picture and require a much different research design than I employ here.”

This research relies mainly on interviews and extensive archival research, rather than quantitative measures. During my fieldwork in China in 1996,1 interviewed ofGcials at local complaint bureaus and met cadres from mass organizations, including the Chinese Women's Federation and the Communist Youth League. I also had fruitful exchanges with a number of Chinese researchers and students, several of whom had been studying complaint bureaus for many years. In addition, I interviewed supervisors in "mass work offices" at two of China's major newspapers. The written materials that

I collected include many nationally circulated journals, govermnent reports and handbooks which were published for complaint cadres. Local county and provincial histories have also been very useful for gathering information. 1.5 Chapter Outline

This thesis has five additional chapters. In Chapter Two, I discuss the institutional means available for citizen contacting in the pre-communist period. I

his recent study of urban political participation in China, Tianjin Shi (1997) addresses this, and similar questions. See especially pp. 60-1.

17 pursue this topic through the formal inauguration of complaint bureaus in the PRC in

1951.

To expand our understanding of citizen contacting in China, I present much of my empirical data in Cluster Three, in which I develop a six-part typology of complaints, and present the dominant trends in complaint work from 1951-1996. In this chapter, my goal is to examine the changing roles of complaint bureaus in each period.

In Chapter Four, I focus on citizen-contacting in the 1990s, detailing the main issues in complaint work during the current period. 1 pay particularly close attention to the national regulations on citizen "letters and visits" promulgated by the State Council in 1995. I discuss challenges in the capaci^ of complaint bureaus to meet the needs of citizens and leaders alike, as well as the unintended consequences of the 1995

Regulations, as well as other institutional dilemmas that Chinese complaint bureaus face.

Following that, I expand the conceptual reach of the dissertation by examining the larger context in which complaint bureaus operate in modem China. In Chapter

Five, I explore the meaning of supervision(jiandu). By examining organizations including the Central Discipline Inspection Commission, mass work offrces in the media, and legal changes, including the Administrative Litigation Law, the State

Compensation Law and the recent Supervision Law, I develop an understanding of the

18 ways in which relationships between officials and citizens are changing in the contemporary period.

Chapter Six concludes the study. In it, I discuss the implications of contacting for future political change to complete the thesis.

19 CHAPTER 2

THE ORIGINS OF CHINESE COMPLAINT BUREAUS

“Wheu avenues of expression (of the people’s opinion) are free the government is regarded as good, and when these avenues of expression are blocked, so that the Emperor has no way of finding out the true conditions and opinions of the people, the government is doomed to failure.”^

2.1 Introduction

As I argued in Chapter One, even in non-democratic regimes, elites devise institutions to promote communication between rulers and the ruled. In this chapter, I present a brief sketch of Chinese contacting channels over the centuries, leading up to and including the establishment of complaint bureaus in the 1950s. 2.2 Historical Development

Institutions facilitating contacting between officials and citizens have a rich history throughout Asia. Channels such as palace memorials, censors, "discussion groups" and complaint drums demonstrate complex elite-mass communication linkages, complete with detailed instructions of where to lodge complaints and appeal lower-level decisions, as well as outside individuals who would help "improve" petitions through

^Lin 1936: 59-60. 20 exaggeration and fobrication.^ These offered opportunities for participation (albeit limited) by lower ranking leaders and citizens, while providing information about cadre performance and popular conditions more generally.

The earliest reference to the formal solicitation of citizen input traces to the second century BC, when a local Chinese official invited the masses to conununicate evidence of corruption via a petition box.^ This practice, and others which followed, embodied the Chinese tradition of encouraging criticism of the government, and even of the Emperor himself * Similar to most communication between lower level elites and the Imperial Administration, almost all contact between the masses and officialdom took place within prescribed channels.

Written memorials presented to the throne were the primary communication link between rulers and the ruled during imperial times. On an average day, the emperor acted on two to three dozen documents, including those submitted by both capital and provincial officials.^ The majority of memorials were concerned with building, maintaining, and promoting virtuous government.^ They also served as checks on officials throughout the government hierarchy and they provided a way for the emperor to spy on and eliminate enemies. Emperors tried to use this information to track how closely subordinates were following imperial mandates.

^Hucker 1966; Ocko 1988: 292. ^Roberts 1994: 427. *Lin 1936: 6-7; 59-60. ^Huang 1981: 15. ®Lui 1978: 50, 100. 21 In addition to information on conditions in the localities, the enqieror also received "rain reports" about agricultural conditions, accounts of insubordinate officials, and other local concerns via memorials/ After receiving a memorial and conducting an investigation, summary reports were collated and distributed throughout the empire. Memorials, and the Emperor's response in the form of edicts, were often published in the mass-mediaPeking Gazette, particularly those containing information relevant to provincial administration/ In tiict, this newspaper originated as a periodical that reproduced memorials and edicts. Beginning in the late 1500s,Peking Gazette was a "common source of information" throughout provincial and capital agencies.^

The palace memorial system was expanded in the 1700s to improve administrative efficiency. By 1712, all senior courtministers of thirdrank or above were ordered to present palace memorials, changing the system from a method of informal contact into a "full-fledged channel" for privileged communication. ° By establishing a formal "memorial box" with multiple keys, the Yung-Cheng Emperor increased the avenues by which individuals could present memorials, and guaranteed the anonymity of memorialists." Commoners were also encouraged to submit memorials to the throne, so long as their topic impinged on the national interest.

’Wu 1970: 34-35, 107-108, 116. ®Wu 1970: 4, 31. ®Hucker 1966: 67. ^°WU: 1970: 110. 1970: 115. ^Hucker 1966: 8. 22 Censors (yushî) submitted more memorials directly to the throne than any other group." These officials served as intermediaries between enqxrors and the in ^rial bureaucracy. They were simultaneously the "eyes and ears" of the emperors, and the

"lips and tongue" of the Chief Ministers. These so-called "talking officials"(yan guan) relayed opinions between the Chief Ministers and the Emperor, and were able to speak relatively firankly without fearing retribution, provided they did not attempt to punish an official without sufficient evidence."

Censors originated as clerical agents." However, they later assumed surveillance duties, including gathering accounts of wrongdoing and dissent, and arbitrating disagreements between rival departments. They monitored the performance of all imperial officials, including the Emperor, and reported on conditions both within and outside of the bureaucracy. Censors usually focused their criticisms on one of two areas: (1) the administration of justice, including breaches of the law, and (2) the behavior of individuals and groups, including the emperor." Censors were also known to get quite involved in disputes about eunuchs, who allied themselves with former targets of censors' criticisms, and masterminded many inq)erial power-plays."

^^Lui 1978: 24. ^“Lin 1936: 59; Lui 1978: 3; Mu 1982: 74; Wu 1970: 23. ^^Lin 1936: 60; Lui 1978: 24-5. Lin questions Che ease with which censors challenged the administration, pointing out that many "braved personal dismissal or death or making enemies of powerful officials, without the benefit of any constitutional protection whatsoever for themselves" (Lin 1936: 6) . For more on this, see Lin Chapter 7.

’■®Lui 1978: 2. ^^Lui 1978: 46 ^®Lin 1936: 68-73. 23 As both surveillance agents and inspectors, censors provided the enqterors with

knowledge of the inner workings of palace government, and political advice about how

to deal with the masses. Censors received much information from unofficial sources,

including anonymous letters, posters, mass demonstrations, and contacts who were

willing to furnish confidential details.S till, it was often difficult for censors to fulfill

their investigatory duties. They had no permanent staff, and often lackedfinancial

resources to conduct investigations. Their information camemainly through

participation in closed-door debates, and from largely unfettered access to documents

and reports, including memorials and court orders.^

Censors had their feet in both the world of the elites and the masses: while their

primary responsibility was to serve the Emperor, they also possessed a "moral duty" to

look after the welfrure of the common people.^^ Ordinary citizens often requested that

censors intercede on their behalf. Even though censors couldmake inquiries on their

own, much of their time was consumed with matters brought to them by critics of the

regime.^

Imperial censors effectively served as brokers. For example, they reported to

the government and lobbied for reductions in the tax burden, often arguing that this

would increase popular support for the regime. They also aided in relief management,

suggested assistance to prevent the demoralization of the peasantry, and some were

^®Hucker 1966: 67; Lui 1978: 99. ^“Hucker 1966: 67-101; Lui 1978: 99. '^Lui 1978: 78. ^^After citizens contacted a censor with a complaint, they could file an appeal if they were dissatisfied with the initial response, and these appeals could be taken as high as the emperor (Hucker 1966: 98-99; Ocko 1988) . 24 known to help detect tax crimes committed by local officials.^ Lin even called them the "equivalent of publicists" who expressed the "voice of the people, " although others have challenged this characterization/*

Hucker, for exanq>le, warns against conceptualizing censors as defenders of people's rights or as independent critics of theadministration, primarily because of the risks involved in criticism.^ Despite many shortcomings, including their role in keeping officials submissive, and their dependence on rulers' idiosyncratic responses to petitions, censorial officials still had an impact on governmental policies and administration. They "corrected many injustices, brought about adoption or modification of policies and practices, and often gave rulers cause to reconsider their decisions."^ Through their actions, memorials, and reports, censors promoted contacting during the imperial age.

In addition to censors, another group of people who submitted memorials were members of qingyi, or "pure discussion" groups.” These "unofficial critics among the scholars"^ evolved from the tradition of encouraging individuals who sought a governmental position to criticize and discuss the behavior and morality of prospective

^^Lui 1978: 78-85. *“Lin 1936: 59. ^^Hucker 1966: 288-290. Lin also acknowledges the dangers of being a censor (1936: 48), although he uses this as evidence to support their dutifulness. Despite the risks, many censors participated in what Lin called a " h a r i- k a r i'' spirit of martyrdom, sometimes even sending a "petition by corpse", i.e. writing a petition and then committing suicide (Lin 1936: 62-3).

^®Hucker 1966: 291. ^^For more on these organizations, see Eastman 1965; Lin 1936: Chapter 4; Mu 1982; Rankin 1982. ^®Lin 1936: 7. 25 office-holders.” They used both official and unofficial channels to express their concerns. Although some preferred directly presenting their beliefs to the throne via memorials, most qingyi members used "ordinary conversation, letters, poetry, songs and decorative scrolls" to communicate their views."

Participants in "discussion groups" were mostly men in the lower and middle ranks of the bureaucracy, including censors and other individuals who had the ear of the emperor. Rather than mobilizing "public opinion" per se, they often engaged in what one scholar characterized as "irresponsible and undisciplined opposition. Their criticism ranged from offering advice about foreign affairs, to protecting against "non-

Confucian" behavior, to concrete policy recommendations on matters such as railroad construction and the behavior of eimuchs.^^ Despite their activism, "pure discussion" participants rarely organized around particular policies for any protracted period of time, although loosely affiliated groups did emerge in the late 1800s, in an attempt to provide concrete links with others in the bureaucracy. The most famous of these was the Qingliu group in Beijing, which, despite its fame, Eastman characterized as a

"relatively amorphous group.""

Crises helpedqingyi participants exert influence beyond their intellectual core group. Sometimes their methods were direct, although they often had the most

^^Eastman 1965: 597. ^°Eastman 1965: 596. 1982: 74. ^^Easttnan 1965; Lin 1936: 31-37; Rankin 1982. ^^Eastman 1965: 596-601. 2 6 influence through intimidation, as officiais avoided actions for fear of aggravating qingyi circles and suffering their wrath/*

Qingyi opinions were influential, and viewed as a threat to the ruling administration. For example, well known Chinese intellectuals, including Kang

Youwei and his student Liang Qichao, drafted massive petitions opposing the Sino-

Japanese peace treaty and calling for reforms.” Kang and Liang especially advocated attempts to forge links between Wucated literati, who were aligned with "discussion groups", and the masses.” In 1898, while in exile in Japan, Liang published the

Qingyibao (Pure Criticism Periodical). This publication, along with all others written by Kang and Liang, was later banned by an Imperial edict in January, 1900. This action demonstrates not only the influence of these twoqingyi participants over the

Chinese public, but concern about the criticism movement more largely.”

While ordinary citizens were permitted, and sometimes encouraged to provide feedback through written memorials, they more commonly used the "complaint drum"

(dengwen gu) to communicate concerns. This drum, which was placed in front of the imperial palace and censorate offices, was used to inform capital officials of perceived breaches of justice.” By striking a complaint drum, an aggrieved individual summoned a censor or judicial officer forward to hear a grievance and initiate an investigation.

Eastman 1965: 603; Lin 1936: 7-8. In fact, Lloyd Eastman argues that q in g y i groups, in their conservative influence, "contributed significantly to the failure of the Chinese state in the 19th. century to respond successfully to the challenge of the Western Powers" (Eastman 1965: 609- 610) .

^^Eastman 1965: 602-3; Rankin 1982: 470. ^®Lin 1936: 95. ^^Lin 1936: 97. 27 Even though direct appeals to the capital were discouraged, such demands were

particularly common in the case of capital sentences. Individuals were often granted a

stay of execution if a friend or relative struck the complaint drum in protest.^’

At one point, the complaint drum had its own command of officers, and

required daily attendance by an investigating censor.^ Yet, its use also presented dangers to complainants if they tried to extend their appeals beyond personal grievances. Clearly, the complaint drum "was not to be an excuse for public debate on matters of policy.

Each of the above-mentioned forms of contacting established precedents for monitoring the behavior of officials, gauging public support for individuals and policies, and for allowing alternative voices in governmental affairs. Communication with individuals outside the intimate ruling circle was largely limited to the literate within society, however, among this group there still was a "continuous stream of public criticism, mostly contained within institutions ordained precisely for this purpose.

Collectively, these institutions provide evidence of recognition by the imperial elite that channels to express grievances were necessary. Contacting institutions flourished through the years because they served the purposes of officials and ordinary citizens alike. The tradition of crafting formal institutional channels to strengthen elite-

^®Esherick and Wasserstrom 1990: 850-851; Lin 1936: 49, 63; Ocko 1988: 294. ^®Hucker 1966: 99. ‘“’Hucker 1966: 99-100; Kracke 1953: 33-34. ^’^Esherick and Wasserstrom: 1990: 845. ^^Lin 1936: 8. 28 mass relations in the communist period took the form of the "mass line" and its

expression in "letters and visits" offices, to which I now turn.

2.3 Citizen Contacting in the PRC

From the "mass line", to sending leading cadres to the local levels, to concern

for "local conditions" in policy-making and implementation, an integral part of Chinese

Communist practice has been the attempt to solicit input fi’om those outside of the

party.^^ Since the I%Os, opinions from the masses have been sought through street

committees, rural production meetings, and "big character posters"(dazibao), as well

as through the custom of approaching officials with grievances and complaints.^

One of the most comprehensive statements on Chinese elite-mass protocol is the

mass line, "From the masses, to the masses" Ccong qunzhong zhong led, dao qunzhong

zhong qu").*^ The concept was formally announced in Mao's 1943 speech, "Some

Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership" (June 1, 1943). The motivation behind

the mass line is to place priority on "points of direct contact" between cadres and

Chinese citizens, in order to overcome "bureaucratism" and promote the proper

education of political leaders and the general population.^ It was to be fulfilled not

"^Stephens 1992. ^^Lan Zhengxin 1991: 34; Stephens 1992; Townsend 1969: 172-177 ^^For more on the mass line, see Blecher (1991, 1979), Lewis (1963) , especially Chapter 3, and Starr (1979). Blecher (1991) distinguishes between mass mobilization (activity which was circumscribed for a direct purpose) , and the mass line (the act of legitimately gathering public opinion) . For a more recent look at past mass line practices, see Selden (1995) .

Lewis 1963: 220. While communist leaders in both the Soviet Union and China claimed popular support, "Mao was the first Chinese leader to develop in action a line based on the reciprocal and orgeuiized relationship between political leaders and the general Chinese population" (Lewis 1963: 22) .

29 only through direct interaction during poiic^-makmg, but also through secondary associations, including street committees, rural production units, and other mass organizations/^

Following the mass line, the "model"(moxing) Chinese Communistcadre participates in a continuous cycle of tapping public attitudes, reporting them to the leadership, and formulating policies in light of local conditions. Mass line practices, highlighted in the 1950s and continued with less formal enq>hasis today, encourage cadres to investigate and aggregate accounts from below, to help ensure that the highest levels of administration reflect popular sentiment.^ During the initial stages of policy formation, CCP cadres are encouraged to seek out complaints and suggestions from the masses. This period of limited consultation is followed by the rigid implementation of policies decided upon by the Party. Even though sometimes this included undercover investigation,'*’ the main idea behind the mass line was to instruct cadres to openly collect people's reactions and communicate those upward to the leadership. Deviations from this approach include "tailism" (blindly following popular demands),

"commandism", "isolationism", "bureaucratism" (being a hindrance rather than a help), and "warlordism" (using personal connections to stall the mass line)."

^^Townsend 1969: 172. ^°Oksenberg referred to it as the “distilled wisdom of the masses' (1974: 28) . In the 1960s, cadres went undercover to investigate corruption. Oksenberg talks about Liu Shaoqi's wife, Wang Kuang-mei, living within a commune for this purpose (Oksenberg 1974: 22).

^°Lewis 1963: 78. One Chinese author called complaint bureaus the "contemporary embodiment" of the OOP's mass line (Lan Zhengxing 1991: 34) .

30 Another illustration of promoting education and integration of the masses through direct contact with ofticials was the practice of "transferring downward"{xia fang). As part of the rectification campaign of 1957-1958, the Central Committee initiated this policy to re-locate urban cadres in areas where the Party had less of an organized presence. From 1958-1961, more than 1,300,000 cadres were "rotated" as part of this campaign.^' Sent-down cadres supervised daily activities to help them get more in touch with citizen's problems/^ This polity, like the mass line itself, was designed both to educate and gain the support of the masses (through arousing the

"enthusiasm" of the peasants), and to train and supervise local officials (through contacts and the cultivation of informants).

The current system for receiving letters and visits from the masses draws on both the imperial heritage of direct contact between representatives of the state and ordinary people and the mass line ideal.^ In the 1950s, the informal encouragement of mass visits to leaders, evolved into explicit "receiving rooms"(jiedai shi) within government and Party branches. Party leaders, especially Mao, encouraged cadres to

^^Lewis 1961: 165-6. ®^Lewis 1963: 225. Officials often used success in complaint bureau work as a bar for measuring achievement of the mass line. For more on a related mass mobilization policy which was designed to increase ties between elites and masses, see Bernstein (1977) . He writes about an extended campaign which targeted urban youth in the 1950s and 1960s, known as sbaziff-sbcui xia-xiang ("up to the mountains, and down to the villages") . Approximately 10% of the population were sent to the villages between 1957-1970, most of them permanently. See "North China Bureau, CO, CCP, Calls Meeting on Work in Dealing with Public Complaints", Tianjin Rlbao, December 9, 1952, in C u rre n t Background, 224, January 15, 1953, p. 2.

31 pay close attention to letters written to the Communist Party leadership, as a way to strengthen contacts between theCommunist Government and the people/*

Even before complaint bureaus were established, the Central Party Office received thousands of citizen contacts/^ In 1949, three central level systems had units to handle letters and visits firom the masses: the Central Committee of the CCP, the

Government Administration Council (GAQ, forerunner of today 's State Council, and the Prime Minister's office/^ hi December 1950, the Central Committee and the GAC joined efforts in complaint bureau work, later merging with the Prime Minister's

Office. The final step before the creation of a formal letters and visits system was the

GAC establishment of a "letters from masses small group" {xiaozfi).^

In June 1951, leaders of the GAC announced that people's governments at the county level and above should establish special departments and personnel to take care of mass letters and visits This was the first step toward formalizing the already common practice of approaching party officials with complaints. The GAC decision, the "Directive on Dealing with Letters From the People and Receiving Callers From

Among the Masses of the People" {Guanyu chuli renmin laixin he jiedai renmin lai fang

^“*Liang Guan 1990: l; Quanguo Xinfamg Gongzuo Huiyi 1989: 5. ^^Diao reports that in 1949, over 4000 individuals lodged complaints at the Central Office. In 1950, over 26,000 petitioners were recorded. Diao: 1996: 23.

^^For more on the GAC, which was established in August 1949, see C u rre n t B ackground (CB) #209 (September 10, 1952, and #246 (June 9, 1953) .

®^Diao 1996: 37. ^®"GAC Decision on Disposal of Letters from the Public and Receiving the People", X in h u a , June 8, 1951, in Current Background, 224: Januairy 15, 1953, pp. 18-19 (American Consulate General, Hong Kong) .

32 gongzuo de jueding) had six provisions.^’ It stated that complaint bureaus would serve

as a means of encouraging "the people to supervise their own government and its

personnel.”" Complaint bureaus should include a leadership small group{xinfang zu),

an inquiry desk(wenshi chu), and a reception room(jiedai sAf) " The directive also

established the relationship between complaint bureaus, discipline inspection

committees and public securi^ bureau branches, and made these supervisory

institutions the court of final appeal.^

This GAC decision was followed by a meeting to review complaint work, held

by the North China Bureau of the CCP in 1952, which included representatives from

the CCP Central Committee General Affidrs Office (GAO) as well as the Central

Discipline Inspection Committee (CDIC). At this meeting, ParQr leaders announced

that the "increase of letters from the public and of callers indicated that the people were

having confidence in the par^. It was also announced that, due to high rates of

illiteracy among the masses, complaint bureaus should post officials to receive visitors,

holding reception hours at least two days a week.^

^^Xinfangxue Gailun 1991: 149.

®°"GAC Decision": 18.

^^Xinfangxue Gailun 1991: 149.

^^The rule states, "cases having to do with accusations against various organs or their working personnel should be turned over to be dealt with by- people's supervisory organs" ("GAC Decision": 18).

"North China Bureau": 2.

"North China Bureau" : 3.

33 In this meeting, cadres discussed early problems in formal complaint work.

Some cadres feared that the system was in a "state of chaos and weakness."^

Representatives stressed the need to strengthen basic-level work in order to prevent the growing tendency for people to run to higher levels for resolution of their questions and problems.^ For example, the discipline inspection committee of the North China

Bureau was charged with drawing up ^propriate regulations to increase the "struggle against bureaucracy" within non-con^liant bureaus.^ This was an important first stq> toward institutionalizing a national system of contacting channels. Following this meeting, the GAO of the North China Bureau formulated the first set of procedures for handling letters and visits.

These regulations, which arose largely out of publicity generated from the

Chang Shun-yu case, were published inTianjin Ribao.^ Part of the aim of the regulations was to delineate the duties of complaint cadres and direct citizens to offices appropriate to their appeal. Section 5 stated:

"letters may be transmitted ... to relevant organs, including the Discipline Inspection Committee (party disciplinary action problems). United Front World Department, and others... matters not included in

"Directive on work in the disposal of letters from the public and the receiving of public callers", Tianjin Ribao, December 9, 1952, in Current B ackground 224, January 15, 1953, p. 8.

®®Townsend 1969: 178. "Bureaucracy Must Be Uprooted", Renmin Ribao, May 30, 1052, in C u rre n t Background, 196: July 30, 1952, p. 7-9. The discussion of the Chang Shun- yu case, which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 3, was a major theme of these North China Bureau meetings.

^®Chang spent one year and "walked 1000 li" to overcome officials' reluctance to hear his complaint about his employer. See "The Communist Bureaucracy in Action: Case of Chang Shun-yu", Current Background, 196: July 30, 1952.

34 any of the above categories shall be dealt with directly by the General Affairs Office (of the North China Bureau)."® ParQr cadres reported many failings in the early years of complaint work as a way to both convince the masses of the utility of these bureaus, as well as warn cadres of the dangers of failing to heed par^ directives. For example,Renmin a Ribao editorial from January 19, 1953, titled "Deal Seriously with Letters from the Masses of the People; Expose Courageously the Crimes of Bureaucratism" disclosed many instances of large scale neglect by complaint cadres, including failure to follow-up or even register citizens' complaints, and passing letters from office to office.^ For example, one woman wrote the government asking for free medical service to treat her illness. By the time the government responded, she had died.^' 2.4 Conclusion

Chinese complaint bureaus have developed over generations. Begiiming with a petition box, and spreading to include channels as limited as intellectual discussion groups and as accessible as complaint drums, the practice of presenting demands and complaints to officials has origins that long pre-dated thecommunist revolution of

1949. This tradition continues through the 1990s, as 1 demonstrate in the following chapter.

Procedure in Dealing": S.

Renmin R ibao Editorially Calls Attention to Proper Handling of Public Complaints", X in h u a , January 19, 1953, Survey of China Mainland Press, 498: January 23, 1953.

^^"People's Governments in Various Areas": 15. This type of shirking, which Tianjin Shi refers to as "tipigiu", "kicking people back and forth like a ball", continues to plague complaint bureaus today (Shi 1997: 62).

35 CHAPTERS

FACING CITIZEN COMPLAINTS, 1951-1996

"Complaint bureau work is important not only for our relations between the party, government and the masses, for fostering a clean government, and promoting legal construction, but even more so to persist in the life and death struggle of our parQr and government.

3.1 Introduction

As I discussed in Chapter 2, complaint bureaus extended the Chinese tradition of remonstrance that had been passed on through the Dynasties. In this chapter, I demonstrate how Chinese complaint bureaus have evolved since 1951; organizationally, through both vertical and horizontal expansion, and substantively, based on the content of their work. I present data on the numbers of contacts recorded in complaint bureaus since 1951, and introduce a five-part categorization of grievances presented to these ofRces. 3.2 Time Periods

To trace trends in Chinese complaint bureau work since 1951, we can identify four separate periods. These snapshots, based on national complaint bureau

^statement from the Fourth National Complaint Bureau Conference, October, 1995 (Han Wuyan 1996a: 7).

36 publications and county-level data collected from local histories, demonstrate the ebb and flow of formal citizen contacts with officialdom/ Throughout these forQr-five years, with the notable exception of the Red Guard Phase of the Cultural Revolution from 1966-69, complaint bureaus promoted the dual purpose of contacting institutions identified in Chapter One.

3.2.1 Establishment (1951-1965)

At the outset of the 1950s, CCP leaders, weary from almost three decades of civil and regional war, attempted to consolidate their victory by grooming reliable cadres and promoting harmonious relations with the masses. As part of the much larger efrbrt to solidify the communist regime, complaint bureaus were just one tool for establishing political control.

In the early 1950s, complaint work at the Government Administration Council

(GAC) was dominated by reports of offenses(jicatju), accusations (konggao) and other negative accounts of cadre behavior. These accounts correlated well with Par^ and state leaders' attempts to uncover coimter-revolutionary behavior and punish violations of law and discipline.^ Judging bysummary a report of the General Affairs Office of the North China Bureau of the CCP, many local cadres fidled to take complaint work seriously, and suffered from the error of "bureaucratism."'*

For more on the use of local histories, see Thogersen and Clausen (1992) . They contend that most histories published in the 1980s were at the county level (1992: 179).

^Jinghal Xianzhli 442; Townsend 1969: 178. North China Bureau CC, CCP, Calls Meeting on Woric in Dealing with Public Complaints", Tianjin Ribao, December 9, 1952, in Current Background, 224: January 15, 1953, p. 2. One of the early urban rectification campaigns, 37 Overcoming the resistance of local authorities to accqit and act on contacts from

citizens proved to be an exacting task. The 1951 Chang Shunyu case indicates the

difficulties complainants faced in gaining the cooperation of local officials.^ In an

attempt to reign in wayward cadres and encourage citizens to contact local officials,

central-level leaders publicized the plight of this young cart driver. The persistent

Chang attempted to report the illegal behavior of his boss, who forged road passes in an

attempt to flee a party rectification canq>aign. Initially reporting his allegations to

authorities in Shanxi Province, Chang ended up approaching officials in 27 separate

government organizations, in his "miniature Long March" to formally denounce the

"counter-revolutionary landlord and despot," Sung Yude. Ultimately, Chang took the

charges to the North China Bureau of the Central Committee, which ordered a detailed

investigation into the matter. This 1951 episode, which later received national attention

when it was published in theRenmin Ribao, became the poster case for overcoming

"violations of law and of party discipline"(yveifa luanji), as well as the eliminationof

bureaucratism within Party ranks/

As revolutionary fervor dwindled in the mid-1950s, and the routine tasks of

governing set in, regime leaders faced increased demands for information about local

known as the "S a m -fa n ” ("three evils") movement, from 1951-2, highlighted cadre corruption and government waste. Party leaders who felt this attempt was inadequate called for a "new s a n -fa n " campaign in 1953, focusing on violations of party and administrative discipline, commandism, and other power abuses. Ensuring that complaint letters were processed properly was an explicit goal of the latter campaign. See Harding 1981: 34, 47-62, 83; and SCMP #622, July 31, 1953, pp. 27-32.

^"The Communist Bureaucracy in Action: The Case of Chang Shunyu", Current Background, 196: July 30, 1952.

® "North China Bureau* : 2. 38 af&irs. The newly inaugurated citizen conq>Iaint system was central to this effort/

Party cadres recognized that conq>laint bureaus, similar to earlier contacting channels, could help leaders become aware of festering problems. For this, they looked to the ordinary people for help. In 1953, People’sa Daily editorial argued,

"The most practical, the most economic, and the most direct method for the masses of the people to criticize and to offer recommendations is the writing of letters. The letters now received by leadership organs at all levels today are still very few compared with the problems existent in our various tasks and the scale and needs for the nation's construction enterprises."* In the 1950s, complaint work was valuable in helping the ParQr leadership make the transition from being revolutionaries to being state administrators. People's letters were often sources of raw information on what needed to be done to consolidate the regime.’

Yet local level officials largely resisted the time-consuming and often tedious tasks associated with complaint work. As a result, part of the goal of the first national conference on complaint bureau work, held in 1957, was to raise leadership awareness

As a result of Che party expansion drive in 1955-56, the creation of the township level of administration, and collectivization campaigns, officials in Beijing treated local information as a premium resource. For more on this, see Oksenberg 1974: 32. Harding (1981) makes a similar argument : he points out that 1949-53 was a major period of organizational building at the central, regional, and provincial levels, to control economics, increase effectiveness of party, mobilize popular support, and rationalize Party as a whole (Harding 1981: 33-4) .

®"Renmin Ribao editorially calls attention to proper handling of public complaints", SCtSP, 498: January 23, 1953, p. 13.

*This use of contacting chcuinels has been observed in other newly consolidating regimes as well. For example, imperial radicals in Japan who overthrew the To)cugawa regime in 1868 immediately set up petition boxes to increase the appeal of their government (Roberts 1994: 456) .

39 of the importance of mass contact to improve government work. ° At this conference, one cadre argued that,

"it is especially important now that we pay attention to problems that are revealed to us through the people's complaints, as we are making many mistakes, we have much to leam ... if we pay attention to our mistakes, things will not be that big of a deal

An essential part of the development of complaint channels during this period was their extension to local levels, and to organizations beyond the Par^ and the government. In the late 1950s, central-level organizations including the Ministry of

Labor (Laodong Bu), Ministry of Supervision(Jiancha Bu), Ministry of Agriculture

(Nongye Bu), Health Ministry (Weisheng Bu), Ministry of Culture {Wenhua Bu) and others, formalized reception rooms and procedures for masses' letters and visits.

In the mid-1950s, provincial level parQr committees and governments also established formal complaint bureaus, and specialized offices within provincial organizations, including the courts, people's congresses, and public securiQr bureaus began to develop during this time.'^ Even though the 1951 GAC decision establishing complaint bureaus ordered offices to be established at the county level and above, formal complaint bureaus became prominent at the county level only in the late 1950s, mostly after the anti-rightist campaign of 1958. In areas where formal bureaus were not established, there was often a complaints "small group"(xiaozu) within party and

^°Quanguo Xlnfang Huiyi 1989: 3; Wang and Chen 1987: 72. ^^Quanguo Xinfang Hulyi 1989: 8. ^^For example, the copmlaint bureau at the Jiangsu Province Supreme Court began formally receiving citizens' letters in the mid-1950s. Reported pecJcs were between 1956-57, 1963, and 1981-2. See Jiangsu Sbengzhi (Shenpan Zhi) 68: 1997, Jiangsu Sheng Difangzhi Bianzhu, Chapter 8.

40 government offices. These local offices, however, were often unable to satisfy conq)lainants, many of whom proffered their grievances at higher levels instead, often going straight to Beijing.

In the late 1950s, especially between 1955 and 1957, citizens filed a record numbers of complaints. The average increase in 21 provincial-level bureaus between

1955 and 1956 was 5 8 .2 % .This surprising increase likely has three sources: the publiciQr surrounding Chang Shunyu and similarly aggrieved citizens, formal directives aimed at promoting mass work in general, and a more relaxed environment for consultation and deliberation.^ This pattern, however reversed after the Anti-Rightist campaign, as the risk for speaking out increased. As one indication of the danger of

In one of the speeches at the first national conference, an official alludes to the Beijing City Complaint Bureau Conference which had taken place prior to the National Conference in 1957 (Xinfang Gongzuo Huiyi z 1989: 7) . The official confirmed that hordes of masses were approaching the leadership compound at Zhongnanhai, State Council Offices, and other ministries with their demands. There was much discussion at the first national conference about how to better equip local level bureaus to solve problems and prevent this skipping levels (yueji) . As I discuss in Chapter 4, this problem continues to plague complaint bureaus today.

^^Author calculated, based on data in Diao 1996: 76-7. Diao's data also demonstrates a dramatic increase in the second half of 1956, in response to the Hundred Flowers Campaign. I was unable to obtain sufficient data on complaints at the county level during this period to expand the argument to that level as well.

^^Summary Report on Major Problems Existent in Connection with the Disposal of Letters from the People and the Receiving of Callers", Tianjin Ribao, December 9, 1953, in Current Background 224, January 15, 1953, pp. 14-15. Liu (1996: 223) calls 1957 the height of "mass political culture". He claims that in 1957, people genuinely believed the CCP was interested in public opinion, although this perception was smashed during the Anti-Rightist campaign in 1958.

41 public challenges, central level complaint bureaus noted a rise in letters signed anonymously or with vague pseudonyms{shujia

1961-1966 was a "brisk" ihuoyue) period for complaint work, when numbers of complaints again began to rise at national and provincial level bureaus. In spite of this tendency to lodge central level complaints, counQr level bureaus also reported peaks in numbers of complaints, especially in 1963 and 1964 (See Figure 3.1). Most of the cases recorded during this period concerned economic matters, particularly wage disparities in rural areas, and appeals from earlier cam paigns.D uring the period immediately following the Great Leap Amine, people desperately sought audiences to improve their plight. Many complainants bypassed local level bureaus, even dramatically presenting their plea written in blood{xue shu) to central authorities.

This dynamism within complaint bureau work would not be seen again for over ten years, as the country was gripped by the internal struggles of the Cultural Revolution.

Diao 1996: 119. The issue of anonymous letters will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 4, in which I treat it as an issue challenging the capacity of complaint bureaus in the 1990s.

^^Diao 1996: 163. The average annual increase in complaints posed to the GAC between 1960-1965 was 39.4%, with the largest increase (107%) between 1961 and 1962. Author calculated, based on data in Diao 1996: 165. Many provinces also reported sharp increases in the number of complaunts during the first half of the 1960s, including Anlie, Shanxi, and Sichuan.

^®Diao 1996: 167. 42 County Level Complnints 1951 -1965

8000

6000

4000

2000

1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 1961 1963 1965

CH JH •WQ YCU ■AT GA -f— CS PH CK

Figure 3.1: County level conq)laints, 1951-1965^

3.2.2 Rupture (1966-1977)

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR), which officially began in

August 1966, ushered in a bleak era for most Chinese institutions, and complaint bureaus were no exception. During this period, complaint work in most areas was

"discontmued"izhongduan) as a bourgeois practice.™ In some locales. Revolutionary

^^Antu X ia n z h l (1993: 459-60); Cenkung X ia n z h i (1993: 257); Chiashan Xianzhi (1995: 655); GaoAn xianzhi (1988: 337); Huang Cijin (1989: 27); J ia n g h a i X ia n z h i (1995: 442); Pinghu Xianzhi (1993: 572); Wuging Xianzhi (1991: 718);, Yongchun Xianzhi (1990: 608). Many counties show no record of complaints at all in 1966 or 1967, not reporting any contacts again until 1968 and 1969. One county history reported that all party and government offices, including complaint bureaus, were attacked, forcing the discontinuation of their normal work {C h ia xia n g X ia n z h i 1997: 495). This closure was not unusual. From April 1969-December 1978, neither Party discipline inspection committees nor governmental supervisory organs existed. More will be discussed on both of these institutions in Chapter 5.

43 Committees took over complaint work during the so-called "Red Guard phase" of the

revolution. For example, leaders in Wiiqing County (Tianjin) reported that,beginning

in September 1966, "many people joined together in a counter- revolutionary

spirit...most of the complaint bureau work of this period was against the law, and was

not recorded. A textbook for complaint bureau cadres, published jointly by the

Central Committee Complaint Bureau office and the State Council Complaint Bureau,

noted a "high tide"(gao chao) in complaints received during the second half of 1966

and 1967. The report stated, however, that these complaints were "distinct"(bu tong),

and that they were not reflective of objective contradictions, or the "regular patterns"

of complaint bureaus.^ Reading between the lines, complaint offices, to the extent that

they existed, were overrun with personal vendettas that strayed from the established

purpose of contacting work.

Any meaningful ties which had been fostered between complaint bureau cadres

and the masses during the 1950s were largely lost in this period of social unrest.^^ As one interviewee put it, during the Cultural Revolution, some complaint bureaus existed

in name, but even those did not engage in anything that could be called "working with the masses."^ Many higher-level complaint bureaus closed during the years of the

Cultural Revolution, and were not re-established until 1979 or later. The Complaint

^^Wuqing Xianzhi 1991: 717. ^^Zhongyang Bangongting Xinfang Ju and Guovmyuan Bangongting Xinfang Ju, editors, (1991), Xinfangxae Gailun, p. 150.

^^Diao 1996: 212-3; Han 1996a; Wang and Chen 1987: 75. Interview with Head of District Complaint Bureau, 1996.

44 Bureau at the National People's Congress, for example, did not formally reopen until

October 1988.^

Activi^ in local complaint bureaus began to reappear in 1969, at the end of the first and most violent stage of the GPCR (see Figure 3.2). By 1972-3, the number of complaints tendered to county-level bureaus was again reaching peak levels, although, judging by reports of the swarms of people who bypassed complaint bureaus to place their demands at the gates of government and party offices in Beijing, local bureaus were unable to satisfy people's demands. In the absence of effective public reception rooms at many levels, people often went to Beijing Parfy and Government offices directly to complain, placing a strain on central-level authorities.'^ In February 1972,

Zhou Enlai called on local leaders to more effectively manage their work with the masses, demanding that complaint bureaus in all organizations solve citizen problems at the basic levels, in order to decrease the nmnbers of masses going to Beijing lodge complaints.'’

People's Congress Handles Grassroots Petitions", Xinhua, 25 February, 1993, in FBIS-CHI-93-037, 26 February 1993, p. 17.

^^Wang and Chen 1987: 45. ^’wang and Chen 1987: 75. 45 County Level Complaints 1966 -1977 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500

19661968 1970 19721974 1976

CH FK JH WQ LJ YCU AT LX PH HC

Figure 3.2: County level complaints, 1966-1977^

The Second National Conference on Complaint Bureau Work was held in

September 1978. The speeches of the conference reveal more about elite conflicts than procedural details of complaint work. There were some reports at this conference of the continuing problem of people storming Beijing en masse.^ But, because of issues surrounding the looming leadership succession, most notably the struggle between Hua

Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping, this conference did not introduce any major changes in

28Antu Xianzhi (1993: 459-60) Fenkai Xian Xinfancf Zhi (1995: 442); Hanchuan X ia n z h i (1992: 494); Huang Cijin (1989: 27); Jinghai Xianzhi (1995: 442); Laixi Xianzhi (1989: 608) ; Longjiang Xianzhi (1991: 517) ; Pinghu Xianzhi (1993: 572); ffuqing Xianzhi (1991: 718); Yongchun Xianzhi (1990: 608). 29 For more on this, see speech in nfang Gongzuo Huiyi (1989: 391) .

46 complaint bureau work.^ Once this difficult period of modem Chinese politics subsided, complaint bureaus began a new phase of contacting work.

3.2.3 Restoration (1978-1988)

After Deng Xiaoping's ascendancy to the helm of state power in December,

1978, the so-called "new period"{xin shiqi) of complaint bureau work began, during which "new types of demands, more extensive problems...and "concrete, everyday issues" were handled by rejuvenated complaint bureaus across the country.^^ In particular, 1979-1982 was a time of "restoring" (huiju) complaint offices. This included clearing away the influence of the revolutionary committees, increasing the numbers of front-line cadres staffing complaint bureaus, and developing new training programs.^

A chief aspect of the "new period" was the record numbers of complaints filed at bureaus at every level, with most reporting "high tides" in 1978 and 1979. Although this terminology was used in other periods to describe peak contacts, one study designated a "high tide" as a day during which more than 1200 visitors were received at a complaint bureau. Diao Jiecheng reported that the Beijing "United" Complaint

Bureau recorded such elevated complaint totals in January, April and August of 1979,

Wang and Chen 1987: 76. The Chinese source for this assertion places the blame on the "mistakes of the ' two whatevers ', referring directly to Hua Guofeng ' s attempt to act on Mao ' s purported wishes that he be the chosen successor.

^^Wcing and Chen 1987: 81. ^^Diao 1996: 252-255. A related development reported in Xinfang Xue Gailun (1987: 151) highlights the establishment of complaint offices in mass organizations, often staffed by "moonlighting" (jian zhi) complaint cadres from party and government bureaus.

47 tallying in only seven months a figure more than twice all of 1978/^ Diao cites that approximately one-third of those visits were "repeat" visits and appeals of lower complaint bureau decisions. He also states that many provinces and cities also chronicled record numbers of complaints in 1979, a claim that I extend to the county level, based on data from 20 counties (See Figure 3.3).

County^ Level Complamts 1978 -1988

16000 12000 8000 4000

A -- -l'i»! I 9 2 1 8 9 6981980 1982 1984 19861978 1988

-*-CH -m-FK -A-JH -^W Q 4 K -JX -# -L J YCA — YCU LH AT GA JO — NO LX ♦ - O S PY — PH — HY — HC S» XF

Figure 3.3: County level complaints, 1977-198734

After 1978, the Central Level CCP and Government Complaint Bureau merged, taking on the titles "dangzheng xinfang” and " L ia n h e ” (united) xinfang ju. Patterns for combining provincial and county level complaint bureaus are less clear, although most county level bureaus in the 1980s reported joint work as well.Diao 1996: 230. ^^Antu Xianzhi (1993: 459-60); Chiashan Xianzhi (1995: 655); Damg and Wen (992: 453); Fenkai Xian Xinfang Zhi (1995: 44), GaoAn Xianzhi (1998: 337); Haiyen xianzhi (1994: 402); ffanchuan Xianzhi (1992: 494); Jinghai Xianzhi (1995: 442) Huang Cijin (1989: 27); Jiaxiang Xianzhi (1997: 495); L a ix i X ia n z h i (1989: 608); Liuhe Xianzhi (1991: ^37},Longjiang Xianzhi (1991: 517); Neiqu Xianzhi (1996: 213); Pinghu Xianzhi (1993: 572); P ingyuan X ia n z h i (1993: 522); Waging Xianzhi (1991: 718); Xinfeng Xianzhi (1990: 527); Yongchang Xicuizhi (1993: 884); Yongchun Xieuizhi (1990: 608). 48 The Third National Conference on Complaint Bureaus, held in 1982, stressed

the constitutional mandate of complaint work as a way to achieve "socialist

democracy”. Leaders addressing this gathering frankly admitted that the errors of the

previous decade had damaged relations with the masses, and that every attempt should

be made to rectify this situation.

A major focus of complaint work during this period was to mend "historical grievances, " referred to in Chinese ”lishias yiliu wenti” (literally, "problems handed down from history").^ More specifically, these historical problems were typically requests to reverse verdicts(ping fan) and rectify injustices{jiu^eng yuan jia) from the

Cultural Revolution.” 1980-86 was the critical period for handling this so-called

"historical problem. "” In 1982, it is estimated that 80% of all letters and visits

^^Quanguo Xinfang Gongzuo Huiyi 1989: 403. ^^Barretc McCormick argues that there has been "considerable progress toward reversing the verdicts of the Cultural Revolution", but there are still potentially reversible verdicts that have been ignored, such as sentences following the anti-rightist campaign, as well as the counter- revolut ionary verdict of 1989 (1998: 126). Belatedly, Sullivan highlights the role of the Secretariat, the Organization Department, and control committees in reversing verdicts on party rightists following the GLF (1984: 603). For more on the issue of rehabilitation and the reversal of official verdicts, see Lee (1983) .

^^Han 1996b: 12-15; Huang 1995: 834. The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection was also involved in this task, directly hamdling the verdicts of Party members who argued they were unjustly accused during the Cultural Revolution (I discuss this organization and its supervisory role in Chapter 5) . Over 3.6 million corruption cases were reported in "public letters" handled by party discipline inspection departments at various levels from 1982-1987 {X inhua, November 25, 1988, "Public Oversees Party Discipline". See also, Manion's discussion of dossiers and unjust cases from the Cultural Revolution (1985: 225).

^®For more on this, see Zizhi Bumen xinfang Gongzuo Changyong Wenjian ilia n b ia n . Section III.

49 requested redress for GPCR grievances, a percentage which steadily declined, to 30%, in 1986.”

In the latter half of the 1980s citizen complaints focused on more contemporary problems, including the regional discrepancies of economic modernization.*'' For example, Jianchang County (Liaoning Province) reported its two "big cases"{zhongda xinfang anjian) of complaint bureau work during the 1980s; both were labor-related disputes.*' The first was essentially a worker's compensation case during which a forestry employee sought and received assistance firom the county complaint office in receiving reimbursement for lost wages and medical costs due to an injury incurred on his job. The second major dispute reported in this county history was a case brought by 25 community school instructors who objected to their paltry level of compensation.

The latter case was solved with the help of the county assistant CCP secretary and the village secretary.*^

In the mid-1980s, a new focus on "complaint bureau information"(xinfang xinxi) began to emerge, as leaders strived to systematically analyze the content of citizen complaints for the insight that they provided into "policies and trends. By processing the "societal information" received through citizen's letters and visits,

^^These statistics are reported in Huang 1995: 823. In multiple interviews, informants corroborated the general pattern of redressing cases, although they could not cite the actual statistics confirming these trends.

*°Diao 1996: 275. *^It was clear from the text that a "major case" was defined by whether or not a county leaders became involved in its resolution.

*^Dang and Wen 1992: 470. *^Shi Yi 1995: 10; Hou Lei 1990: 67; Wuqing Xianzhi 1991: 717. 50 officials attenq)ted to better understand citizens' "lifestyles”, and to forecast trends in society.'*'*

3.2.4 Equilibrium (1989-1996)

Beginning in the late 1980s, the waves of complaint bureau high tides started to recede. The decline in county level results during this period was a result of increased venues for presenting complaints, as well as a rising tendency to report local level problems to higher jurisdictions (See Figure 3.4). Both trends provide evidence for continued participation in contacting channels and point to a wider range of possibilities for complainants to pursue.

County Level Complaints 1989 -1994

1000

500

1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

JH -x -C H X NQ CSFKWQ

Figure 3.4: County level complaints, 1988-199645

Hou Lei 1990: 69. 45 Chiasbcm Xianzhi (1995: 655) ; Cbiaxiang Xianzhi (1997: 335); Dang and Wen (1992: 442); Fenkai Xian Xinfang Zhi (1995: 44); Neiqiu Xianzhi (1996: 213); Pinghu Xianzhi (1993: 527); Wuqing Xianzhi (1991: 718). 51 In recent years, the number of public channels to express grievances, of which complaint bureaus are only one part, has been increasing.^ Some see this as a natural evolution, as a spillover effect from economic liberalization. Expressing this view,

Minxin Pei wrote,

"The (increase) confirmed what many informed analysts of Chinese politics had long suspected: the slow evolution of China's political system during economic reform had created multiple avenues for redressing public grievances, thus helping reduce the pressure on the government.

While the coun^ data that I have reports a decline in numbers of local complaints, data at the provincial and central levels indicates increases. For examples,

Hunan provincial officials reported that during 1998 the total number of complaints handled by provincial authorities exceeded 3(X),000, which was the largestannual number since the mid-1980s Dongguan City (Guangdong) also reported increases since 1992.^^ Officers in Beijing MunicipaliQr cited peak numbers of letters and visits for each year in the 1990s, claiming that most were "collective petition activities".“

In some areas, the decline in absolute numbers of complaints has been attributed to "hot lines" and other channels that I discuss in Chapter Five. For example, complaint departments in Fujian Province reported a 23.8% decrease in 1998 from 1997 (letters exposing problems with grassroots cadres) . Suggestions rose by 36%. Leaders attribute decline to other "transparency" channels instituted since 1997. See Zhsuig Yan and Xiang Ying, "Let villagers become genuine masters of their own villages, commentary on the national work of village affairs transparency and democratic management", Xinhua, 6/21/99, FBIS-CHI-1999-0623, 6/24/99.

“^Pei 1997: 19. ‘*®The report attributed the increase to disputes about land development. See "Hunan Party Chief on handling people's complaints", FBIS-CHI-99-024, 24 January 1999, Hunan Ribao, 16 January 1999, p. 1.

^®See "New ties between government officials and people", Xinhua, 6/19/96, FBIS-CHI-96-121, 6/24/96.

^°See Liu Feng, "Beijing says "no" to collective petition", Zhongguo Xinwen 52 Local statistics firom people's congresses show that the number ofcomplaints made to the congresses have more than doubled since the mid-1990s. Althoughcomplaints have never been exclusively a "local" issue, trend shows that center leaders' attempts to keep issues at the local level have largely been in vain.

Additionally, citizens’ choice of contacting methods has broadened. As recounted in ajournai dedicated to complaint bureau work, offices in some areas are reporting a dramatic increase in citizen phone calls to their offices. Officials in a district level complaint bureau in Longyan C i^ (Fujian province) reported that citizens use phones to report "urgent issues", and matters which they want to conceal, as well as to make suggestions to officials.^^ Recently, ministry officials in Beijing have made public their personal e-mail addresses.

In the 1990s, complaint bureaus have been caught up in the effort to build

"honest government"(lion zheng). In fact, "corruption"” ranks at the top of citizens' dissatisfaction with government performance in contemporary China, particularly as the

Communist Party deepens its anti-corruption(fan fubai) campaign.^ As a simple she, 9/14/99, in FBIS-CHI-94-183, 11/12/95.

^'"Huang 1998. Dalian encourages citizens to evaluate officials" , FBIS-CHI-1999-0623, 6/24/99, from Xinhua. "Corruption" is translated tanwu, fu b a i and sometimes fu h u a in Chinese. For detailed analysis of the meanings of corruption in mod e m China, see Kwong (1997).

^“*Han 1996b: 12; Huang 1995: 835; Pei 1997: 18. Even though the fan fu b a i campaign has received increased attention recently, CCP attempts to root out "corrupt elements" have been omnipresent. For more on the "emergency" regulations issued on corruption by the Central Committee and the State Council in 1982, see Sullivam 1984. For components of the recent anti­ corruption struggle (fan fubai douzbeng) , see O'Brien and Li 1999b: 379-382. The Party also announced a major effort to combat corruption in 1993 as well. Contacting channels have a long history of serving as the sounding 53 measure of the seriousness with which central level leaders approach the problem of cadre malfeasance, it is often reported that Jiang Zemin refers to the CCP's battle with corruption as the "life and death struggle" of the PartyA ccording to more than one source, at the Central Level Government and Party Complaint office, one third of all grievances reflect concerns about clean government and cadre work sQrle/^ It has also been reported that 80% of the clues used in prosecuting malfeasant cadres came firom complaint bureau work.” In the countryside, where objections to corrupt cadre practices have reached a boiling point in recent years, cases alleging abuses in tax and fee collection have also been widely recounted. A 1993 article published by the Central

Level Complaint Bureau reproduced a citizen's letter titled "It is still difficult for cars to travel on the roads", which highlighted the intimidation by officials in collecting illegal fees from peasants.Following the letter was an order to develop a

bells for exposing cadre malfeasance. As one example, in Che Ming Dynasty, "most impeachments were exposures of corruption" (Lin 1936: 63) .

^^Such an analogy is hardly new. Chen Yun made comparable references before the Cultural Revolution. Leaders in the Yuan Dynasty similarly pointed to such dangers of the loss of control over anger caused by corruption (Sullivan 1984: 605; Young 1984) . For more on the " reporting" iju b a o ) system as a way to promote reliance on the masses, see O'Brien and Li 1999b: 381-2.

®®Han 1996: 8; Luo 1996: 9. Han 1996a: 9; Huang 1995: 835. There has been much informal discussion that one of the most well-)cnown cases of corruption, that of former Beijing Party Secretcury Chen Xitong, began with clues which were revealed in a letter sent to a local complaint bureau office. Chen was expelled from the Politburo in 1995, and sentenced to a 16 month jail sentence in August, 1998. For more detailed discussion of this case, which is the highest level conviction for a Communist Party official, see Miles 1996: 151-152. See also " Reasons for Chen Xitong conviction", Kai Fang (Hong Kong), #141, 9/3/98, in FBIS-CHI-98-2S1. This independent journal argues that Chen took the heat "for the rest of the crocodiles who stayed in the shade."

®®Han 1996a: 9. 54 “coordinated strategy” for collecting fees, requiring all related departments to stop being careless (suibian) in this matter.

In addition to reports of corruption and malfeasance, people turn to complaint bureaus to solve increasingly "concrete"(futi) problems, including issues such as street repair, traffic congestion, and access to educational ibcilities.^’ In this way, complaint cadres are becoming more akin to caseworkers attempting to solve the everyday ills of constituents

3.3 Accounting for Citizen Contacts

In figure 3.5, I present the average number of complaints reported by county

Complaint bureaus from 1957-1994. Looking across this data, we observe stark variations in the numbers of citizen "letters and visits” through the years. While part of this variation can be understood by the increasing number of channels, there is more to it than that. A cynic might respond that people have lost their sense of efficacy in dealing with govermnental officials, particularly through formally approved public channels. While there is some truth to this claim, and this interpretation is supported by evidence of rising numbers of contentious protests and other un-institutionalized expressions of discontent, this explanation does not help us understand the other periods.

^^Liang 1990: 8-9; Ma 1994; Shi Yi 1994; Interview with head of district Level complaint bureau, 1996.

®°For similar work by people's congress deputies, see O'Brien 1994. 55 Average County Level Complaints 1951-1994

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

1951 1955 1959 1963 1967 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991

Figure 3.5; Average County level complaints, 1951-199461

Chinese complainants, like activists in any system, are savvy entrepreneurs, literate in the contours of the political environment. A large part of the variation observed since the 1950s can be understood by tracing major national trends in political programs. Complainants take cues from these happenings. The best example of this relationship is during the first phase of the Cultural Revolution, when the political- ideological conflict of the period brought complaint work to a near halt. Citizen contacts returned again after the tide turned; reaching their highest levels in the earliest years of the Deng regime. Buoyed by official proclamations of more rationalized

Author calculated based on data used for figures 1-4. Note: this tcible begins in 1957 in order to have a meamingful statement of averages (prior to 1957, I only bad two data points, both in 1952) . It ends in 1994 for the same reasons. The data are based on records of 22 county-level complaint bureaus across 15 provinces and provincial level units. 56 decision-making by high-profile victims of the ideological carnage, including Deng

Xiaoping himself, complainants felt a sense of empowerment when approaching officials and presenting their grievances. This argument, which takes into account a strong sense of individual agency on the part of complainants, helps us understand the other peak in contacts observed since the Maoist period, in 1986. This was also a relatively liberal period of open debate and speech, during which time citizens were able to capitalize on these openings.

Secondly, as I argued above, con^laints to any one office rise and Ml based on the venues available to petitioners. When the government operated a virtual monopoly on the provision of goods and services, as well as the employment market, solving problems related to these matters required approaching government officials. As this hold loosened, first with the introduction of joint ventures, and later extending through such basic needs as housing and education, other "problem-solving" units were generated to handle affairs within their purview. As an increased number of area- specific units are established, citizens have more choices and the government is increasingly relieved of its mediating role.

The frequency of complaints recorded at official governmental offices is only part of the story. I now turn to an analysis of the content of citizen complaints.

3.4 Categorization of Citizen Complaints

What types of problems do people present to Chinese complaint cadres? The issues that have been identified in public bureaus are largely the universal problems that

57 people in almost all governmental regimes gripe about: corruption, taxes, uneven economic growth, incompetent officials, and the like. In an attenq)t to understand the major substantive trends of Chinese contacting work since 1951,1 group the primary categories of complaint bureau work into five Qrpes.

Scholars often try to place messy, boundary-crossing issues into neatly crafted analytical categories that defy the conq>lexify of life on the ground. Recognizing the limits inherent in any such enterprise, it is still useftd in that it allows us to speak of larger patterns, rather than idiosyncratic stories. These patterns illustrate the topics that are perceived to be within the accepted discourse of allowable contention.

Studies of institutionalized political participation in China often focus on the form of participation, rather than the content of the act itself. This likely derives from the "modes" focus in the prominent comparative studies of political participation.^^

For example, in his study of urban workplace participation, Tang distinguishes between

"instrumental, managerial, and regime consonant" participation.^^ In his analysis of peasant interest articulation. Bums differentiates between written, personal relations and violent forms of expression.^^ Scholars have also identified Chinese political participation based on the institutions for channeling sanctioned behavior. Since I focus on one set of institutions, one dominant "mode" (particularized contact), and treat the "forms" (written letters, personal visits, and telephone calls) as equal, my focus

Che classic compsurative study of political participation. Verba, Nie and Kim established categories that served as the foundation for other studies that followed. (1978). ®^Tang 1993. *‘*Bums 1984. ®^Bums 1984; Huang 1995; Shi 1997. 58 here is on the content of this participation. I base the categories below on registers of contacts at national, provincial and county level complaint bureaus, as well as conventions developed by other studies of Chinese political participation.^^

3.4.1 Commanity Relations

This category includes the seemingly least political types of contacting work, but shows that complaint cadres are oftencommunity mediators and problem solvers.

Many issues brought to the attention of complaint ofGcials are related to everyday struggles with neighbors, businesses, or families. In one Tianjin District, the conq>laint office reported a barrage of citizen complaints about the need for regulations for an open air market in the housing district.^ Conghua CounQr (Guangdong) officials reported that one of their "big cases" in 1984 was helping an anxious groom procure a place to hold his wedding ceremony.^^ Officials have also been contacted to help locate missing children and estranged family members, and citizen contacts have helped alert leaders of trends in drug-trafficking in southern China.

3.4.2 Public services:

People also commonly turn to local complaint bureaus to report problems in receiving services, including public transportation, housing, electricity, water, as well as other resources in scarce demand.™ Included in this category would be the so-called

®®Chen and Chen 1995; Diao 1996; Jennings 1997: 365-366, Shi 1997. ^’interview with District-level complaint biirea.u chief, 1996.

®®Huang 1989: 11. ®®Han 1996a: 8; Interview with mass work office director, 1996. ^°As Tianjin Shi stated, when there is a shortage in the supply of these public goods and services, "complaint bureaus are usually the first place of recourse" (Shi 1997: 61).

59 "concrete" (juti) issues, which have become so dominantin complaint work since the late 1980s. This category includes matters such as thetiming of activating heating unites in public buildings, problems with roads and mail delivery, etc.^* Complaints about schools and training Acilities were common in one Guangdong Coun^.^^ A citizen complaint in Tianjin about hospital overcharging(duafei) was solved only after it was publicized in the local newspaper.^

3.43 Economic Livdihood

Most con^laint bureau handbooks or histories that record categories of complaints include a focus on livelihood or production, signaling that these issues generate many citizen concerns. Issues related to personal financial hardship, difficulties finding housing beyond the public sector, and more recently, problems with personal financial investments, including losses in the stock market and other forms of trading, would be included in this category. This category can include contentious acts.

For example, five Guizhou veterans collectively committed suicide after their petition at the provincial office was unsuccessful. In Shijiazhuang, 250 retirees stormed provincial offices in Shijiazhuang, calling the leadership there "a newborn Kuomintang" because of their slow response.’"*

Bums (1988: 10) argues that activities are "political" because actors attempt to obtain advantages from state and party officials or their agents... and because these activities have an impact beyond individual concerns on the wider community".

Huang 1989: 10 . Interview with director, mass work office, 1996.

’*See Yueh Shan, "Retired veteran cadres take to streets", Cheng Ming, 2/2/98, in FBIS-CHI-98-092, 4/4/98.

60 Complaint cadres also address the thorny problems of relocating workers displaced during the Cultural Revolution, and helping individuals and families find a place to settle down/^ Conghua County reported the case of one worker separated from his family in 1964, who, when he returned in 1982 was denied full-level wages

Transfers of household registrationQiukou) and the so-called "floating population" iliumin) have also been common issues with which complaint cadres have had to deal/^

3.4.4 Pulitkal Affairs:

This category includes most aspects of formal elite-mass relations. Designating a means by which citizens could report problems in local political affairs was one of the motivations for initiating formal complaint work in the 1950s. Citizens approach complaint bureaus to report offenses(jianju), make accusations (konggao), and level criticisms (piping) at local political leaders.

Within this category, there are two types of political affairs about which citizens grumble. The first targets are policies and regulations, including the birth control policy, taxation, and local policies which complainants argue run counter to the central party line. Secondly, citizens express contempt for individuals, usually pointing to cadres whom they view as corrupt "local emperors"(tu huangdi)-

It is difficult to find evidence of complainants challenging central level policies.

It is more common, however, to find accounts of citizens charging that central level

’^Jinghai Xianzhi 1995: 442. ’®Huang 1989: 11. ” xiao Xue 1994: 32-33. 61 policies are being distorted, mishandled, or just plainly ignored/^ Complaints surrounding the problem of “peasant budens” and the contentious practice of issuing lOUs would fall into this category.”

Criticisms of individual officials, the second type of "political affiurs" complaint, are most common. Citizens have been very active in exposing local corrupt officials, such as cadres who use public office for privategain (jiagong jisi), as well as other forms of "whistle-blowing."^ When people report the extortion of funds, lavish lifestyles and blatantly illegal behavior, their complaint is not with CCP policies, but rather with individual Party members. This is an important distinction to make; both for complainants and regime leaders alike. Once individuals' complaints rise beyond the idiosyncratic behavior of a single misguided official or small Action, it goes beyond the realm of legitimate activity. It then, in the government’s view, becomes an illegitimate challenge.

3.4.5 Appeals

The final category of citizen complaints that I highlight are appeals, of which there are two types: appeals of decisions made either by lower level complaint bureaus.

’^O'Brien argues that this is a common tactic pursued by " rightful resisters" who use central laws and policies to pursue their ends (1996: 32). See also O'Brien and Li 1995: 759-60. ’^Peasants' "burdens" is a term used to convey the challenges that rural agricultural workers are facing in light of economic, social, and political changes in the Chinese countryside. Most often, it refers to taxes and fees illegally imposed on citizens in the countryside. For more, see Han 1996a, also "Guanzhu Nongcun, Gaunzhu Nongmin", Liaow ang 1996: 14, April 1, 1996, pp. 23-4. See also Bernstein 1999; Lu 1997 aind Wedemen 1997.

‘“For analogous activities in the Soviet context, see Lampert, (1985) .

62 or other organizations, and attempts to overturn past political judgments, primarily related to the Cultural Revolution.

According to the 1995 regulations, conq>lainants have 30 days to request the agency that originally handled their complaint to reconsider (Article 33). Individuals are given the right to present charges against infringements on their "legitimate rights and interests as complainants", according to Article 8 of the 1995 Regulations. Enough mention is made of the illegality of acts of retribution against complainants, both in regulations and in training documents intended for complaint bureau personnel, to suggest that this is an area of great concern.

Historical appeals, particularly of counter-revolutionary verdicts branded on individuals during political campaigns, complete this categorization.^' Complaint bureaus at all levels have been magnets for individuals and families hoping to overturn past Judgments related to political campaigns, especially the Cultural Revolution.

Many of these complaints arepost mortem attempts by family members to clear a relative's tarnished name. As I discussed above, this subsection of complaints dominated party and government offices from approximately 1978-1986.

Since I created these categories after the data was collected, and because of the absence of a uniform categorization scheme for the data I do have, I am unable to

In this sense, I am conceptualizing "appeal" as am act of overturning a decision. This is different from citizens' use of complaint bureaus, for example within the MPC, as a legal "court of appeal", as Pei talks about. Pei (1995: 71) cites that each year citizens contact NPC with over 100,000 letters seekimg assistance. I discuss legal appeals, amd increasing institutional channels available for such activities, in Chapter 5.

63 report precise empirical accounts of complaints across these categories. Instead, I present general trends in contacting categories.

In a government and party affairs handbook on complaint work, one author argues that citizens contact complaint officers for two reasons; either to report a situation they feel needs to be monitored, or to ask assistance in solving a problem.

Three of the categories that I highlighted above are dominated by the latter type of work ("Community Relations", "Public Services", and "Appeals"). The two remaining categories, "Political Ariairs" and "Economic Livelihood", are a hybrid of resolving dilemmas and communication situations to superiors. It is from these hybrid complaints that governmental leaders can cull the most insight into local affairs, and also in which citizens may derive the most satisfaction of participating ia political ariairs. Clearly, there are limits to the types of issues people may successfully present to complaint bureaus. Contentious politics in China, even within the boundaries of formalized channels, remains a dangerous game. Similar to the pre-communist institutions that existed to receive feedback from the masses, some issues simply are not up for debate.” Cadres are instructed that "the basic guiding principle (of complaint work) is to satisfy the proper or legitimate demands of the people. In contemporary

China, it is permissible to disagree, but not to rebel. Complaints likely to be solved in the official bureaus I have discussed are related primarily to personal, rather than

®^Hou Lei 1990: 129. ®^See Esherick and Wasserstrom 1990: 851.

®^Liang 1990: 9, emphasis added.

64 systemic, grievances, or they are complaints about mis-in^lementation of policies, rather than the wisdom of the plan in the first place.^ Complaint bureaus are not arenas for challenging, for example. Communist Party rule, reversing verdicts from

1989, or ending the "one-child-per-couple" population control policy.

3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have challenged two common assumptions about Chinese politics and society. The first assumption is that Chinese citizens are apolitical. By tracing the record formal citizen contacts, I have highlighted times of high citizen activism, particularly in the thawing periods that followed major political campaigns. I have shown that, even under the constraints of a non-democratic regime, individuals are astute in learning how to work the system to theirminimum d isa d v a n ta g e .I will expand on this claim in Chapter Five, when I enlarge the view of citizen contacts to include other quasi-supervisory institutions and channels.

The second common misunderstanding that I have attempted to refute is that

Chinese state leaders are insulated from trends within society, and operate without any meaningful contacts with citizens. Complaint bureaus represent the Party's most public attempt to negotiate effective elite-mass relations. Similar to other Chinese institutions, they climbed to a crowning point between 1954-57, before the cyclical campaigns of

There is an emerging consensus within participation literature that argues even though demands are seemingly particularistic, they can have an impact on the larger society. For a recent elaboration of this point, see Ekiert and Kubik's (1998) study of protests in Eastern Europe. They argue that although protestors' identities were predominantly particularistic, over time, they acted on behalf of the entire society.

®*For more on this, see Hobsbawm 1973: 13. 65 opening and retracting began, and sank to their nadir during the darkest days of China's ten-year Cultural Revolution. The institutional transformation within these institutions since 1978 is also one of rising and Ailing; with the highest level of interaction between elites and masses in formalized bureaus in 1978 and 1979, cooling off from this peak period again in the mid-1990s.

Complaint bureau work has been a dynamic link between political officials and ordinary citizens in China, inasmuch as it is the primary sanctionedchannel for the expression of dissent and dissatisAction. As a vehicle for political participation, it has real limits; as a means for receiving feedback from the masses, it is also incomplete. I now turn to some of the main challenges facing complaint bureaus in recent years.

66 C H A PTER 4

CHALLENGES IN THE 1990s

"Conçlaint offices originally were places to solve contradictions (in socieQr) and other concentrated issues. After reform and opening, including the development of the socialist market economy, complaint bureaus became places where difficulties converge and where society's hot spots' can be represented."*

4.1 Introduction

As I discussed in Chapter Three, the use of formal contacting institutions has experienced pronounced periods of highs and lows since 1951. In this chapter, I examine the institutional capacity of complaint bureaus in the 1990s. Specifically, I address the following questions; where are the pressure points in the operation of this system of offices? What are the sources of these difficulties? What does this tell us more generally about modem Chinese political institutions?

4.2 * Hot Spots" in Modern Complaint Work

Contacting is by nature a highly personalistic means of problem-solving.

Inherent in this type of political participation are several limitations. Complainants need to be "self-starters" who possess both a sense of political awareness and sufficient

^Shi Dongju, Jin Feng amd Gong Dafa 1996: 6.

67 frustration or fury to act/ Participants knowingly incur formidable risks as a consequence of their decision to come forward with a grievance. Complaint work is also limited because it requires an agent or group of people to work on behalf of the petitioners: no level of effrcacy, activism, or risk can overcome a disinterested official unwilling to investigate a citizen's case. And finally, contacting is set in motion after a problem has already occurred. This makes it difficult to prepare for unexpected demands.^

The above issues are not unique to citizen contacting within the PRC. Rather than focusing on these universal difficulties of contacting, in this chapter I concentrate instead on areas that have been identified as "hot spots"(re diem) within Chinese complaint work. Topping the list are petitioners who bypass local offices to carry their complaints to higher levels, and collective complaints by groups of aggrieved citizens.

4.2.1 "Skipping Levels"

"Even though most of the problems presented in complaint work are basic level problems, many of the masses are rushing about between various levels to solve their problems. Currently, the masses' desire to look to higher levels to solve problems is an urgent desire. We have to do "dredge work"(shudao) to help break this habit."'*

As I discussed in Chapter Three, the institutional development of Chinese complaint bureaus included establishing local offices at the county and above, with

^Verba and Nie ranked "direct contact" with a local official or political leader as one of the more difficult political actions, since it requires initiative and effort (1972: 31-40).

^Li Yunqing called complaint issues the signal (xinhao) of problems that have already intensified (Li 1995: 98).

^XU Fa 1996: 23.

68 "small groups" at the grassroots level to handle grievances. According to prevailing regulations, individuals are required to present their complaint to officials at the level at which the dispute occurred, or to the next higher administrative organization. To keep local predicaments from growing into larger issues, complaint cadres are urged to

"return to the source" (gui kou) to solve issues.^ As a provincial party Secretary in

Hunan put it, "A problem which should be solved in a township or town should not be handled by a coun^, and a problem which should be solved in a county should not be handled by a prefecture or city."^ In violation of these norms, many citizens bypass immediate offices (yueji), skipping levels to present their complaint to officials at provincial and national bureaus. A report in a provincial complaint office journal lamented that this is an ordinary(fan) occurrence.^ Others have called it an inescapable pattern, "for the first time a person complains, it is inevitable that he or she goes to the next higher organization or important leader, even if this person has nothing to do with the responsibiliQr of the complaint. Extensive level-jumping causes grievances to back up in the system, invites duplication of investigation, and prolongs the time for resolution. This leads to fiiistrated complainants and over stretched complaint cadres.

What motivates people to skip levels? Beyond the truism that people seek higher authorities to confirm the gravity of their situation, citizens complain at higher

®XU 1996: 22. ®"Htinan party chief on handling people's complaints", FBIS-CHI-99-024, 24 January 1999, Hunan Ribao, 16 January 1999, p. 1.

^"Lingdao Xianchctng Bangong Chuli Jiti Shangfcuig" (1996) , Heilongjiang^ X in fa n g , #123; 1996 (March), p. 12.

®Iii Yunqing 1995 : 99 . 69 levels to challenge what they regard to be inappropriate responses by local cadres.

They appeal to superior-ranking leaders, who may or may not be assigned to a

complaint bureau, as a way to apply pressure on officials below. Through these higher-

level complaints, citizens also gain the anonymity that dealing with local power holders

fails to afford them.

The crux of the issue is that most complaints are poorly handled from the

beginning. Basic-level cadres often are not responsive to citizen demands, either

because they lack the power to solve a problem, or because they pigeonhole or simply

ignore the issue at hand.’ Complaint cadres often have insufficient rank to solve disputes among more powerful bureaucrats at their level of administration. Often, they

are part-timers who are "moonlighting"(jianzHî), and do not have a sense of urgency in

responding to citizen demands. Petitioners bypass local problem-solvers in the hope of

gaining the attention of a higher-ranking official who can take the case tmder their

wing.

Zhao Chengyao, a retired accoimtant from Fujian, is an example of the need for persistence, even when skipping to the highest levels. ° Zhao had written directly to

For more on localities turning a "blind eye" to citizen complaints, see FBIS-CHI-95-225, p. 15. This is not a new issue. In the 1952 Directive on Complaint Bureau work, members of the CCP Central Committee warned that the most serious issues in complaint work could be found at the county level, because "many of the masses still do not believe that their problems can be solved at this level". "Directive on Work in the Disposal of Letters from the Public and the Receiving of Public Callers", Tianjin Ribao, December 9, 1952, in Current B ackground 224, January 15, 1953, p. 12.

^°His case was reported in the South China Morning Post, "Zhu gets old cadre's message from ëibove", January 22, 1999 (Internet Edition),- also "Premier orders blitz on public complaints". South China Morning Post, February 9, 1999 (Internet Edition) .

70 Premier Zhu Rongji to report a tax dispute, but received no reply or acknowledgement.

Only after Zhao shouted from his apartment window to catch the attention of the

Premier Zhu’s entourage did cadres from the State GeneralAdministration of Taxation act on his complaint.

As a result of this usually ineffective first response, problems commonly fester.

For complaint cadres at higher levels, citizen contacting work may have less to do with the actual substance of the original problem as much as dissatisfaction with how the issue was handled by the first layer of institutions. Frustrated petitioners who submit their grievances over and over again are disparagingly labeled "pesteringcomplainants"

(chanfang hu). These "old visitors"(shangfang laohu) repeatedly appeal the decision of their original grievance to higher levels, becoming professional complainants of sorts. Luo Gan, Secretary General of the State Council, recently stated that "of the people who have come to Beijing's central departments to appeal for help, 90% had already gone to the provincial or prefectural level but had not obtained satisfaction, or their visit had no follow-up development.""

In addition to bringing more powerful people into the picture to solve the dilemma, complainants go higher to avoid the source of their grievance in the first place. Complainants report infiingements on their "legal rights and interests"{fiefa

Public Discontent Worries Government", FBIS-CHl-98-065, 6 March 1998, from Cheng Ming, 1 December 1997, 246: 23-4.

71 quanyï), including violent acts against them.'^ Despite the efforts of resolute complainants, though, the problem is most often referred back to the original level.

Going straight to the top is a rational and often preferred course of action, from both sides of the table. Local bureaucrats want to avoid thorny power issues in their own backyard; they would rather not rock the boat in a small pond of shared resources and tight personal coimections. Complaint cadres are often out ranked by other local officers who are the targets of citizen con^Iaints. Petitioners understand the pressures toward inertia that exist at local levels, and look to more powerful, higher ranking officials to solve their concerns. Yet, systematically, this behavior overloads higher levels, and results in a less responsive network of response.

4.2.2 Collective Complaints

Petitioners around the world seek strength in numbers. The increase in collective complaints, some with participants numbering in the hundreds, is one of the biggest issues facing Chinese complaint bureaus in the contemporary period." Similar

"Public Discontent Worries Government", 6 March 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-065, from Cheng Ming, 1 December 1997, 246: 23-4. For an example of the murder of a persistent complainant by four village cadres, see O ’Brien and Li 1995: 779.

^^For example, even though officials in Heilongjiang Province reported a "slight decline" in collective complaints between 1994 and 1995, the first target outlined in their "goals for 1996" was to decrease the number of collective complaints and level-skipping. See "1996 nian quan sheng xinfang gongzuo yaodian", Heilongjiang Xinfang #122, 1996:2, p. 2. Later in the year, a conference on workers' collective complaints was held. See "Lingdao Xianchauig Bangong Chuli Jiti Shangfang (1996) , Heilongjiang X in fc in g , #123, 1996:3, p. 12. For a discussion of the problem of collective complaints at the central level, see Dong 1994; Han Wuyan 1996. The director of a county complaint office whom I interviewed argued that the number of collective complaints to her office has increased since 1991; before, the office only had one or two collective complaints a year. In 1996, they had more than twenty. My interviewee argued that the increase was brought on by a rise in "concrete problems" facing individuals at the local levels.

72 to the problem of skipping levels, collective visits often arise because of dissatisfaction with grievance procedures. The majority of group appeals are repeat visits{fu laifimg) by complainants appealing lower-level decisions.'*

Collective visits are hardly a new issue. For exanqile, Jinghai Coun^ (Tianjin) reported its first collective complaint in 1956, when more than 500 people sat in the county secretary's office for three days.'^ At the inaugural conference on letters and visits in 1957, one cadre reported that 9000 people from Hebei Province boarded a train to present a common petition in Beijing.'^ In the mid-1980s, cadres noted rapid increases in collective complaints.'^ Recently, the problem was viewed to be important enough for the State Council Complaint Bureau ofGce and the CCP Central Office to publish a special report {baogao) on solving collective complaints.'^

From the perspective of officialdom. Large scale petitions threaten stabili^ and order. Legally, joint visits of more than five representatives violate Article 12 of the

'*Diao 1996: 230, 301. Lampert: observed a similcu: pattern leading to collective cases in the Soviet Union (1985: 132).

'^Jinghai X ia n zh i 1995: 442.

^®See Quaxiguo X in fa n g H uiyi 1989: 8.

^^See speech given at the 1986 National Complaint bureau conference, in Quanguo Xinfang Huiyi Gongzuo (1989: 653-659) . The data showed an increase not only in the absolute number of collective complaints, but in the number of people participating in these appeals as well. For example, between 1985 and 1986, national data revealed an increase of 128% in the numbers of visits, and a 413% increase in the number of participants. Jinghai County (Tianjin) also reported a large series of collective complaints from March- April 1986, with over 20 group complaints, involving more than 650 people (Jinghai Xianzhi 1995: 442). For more examples of reported rises in collective complaints at the county level, see O'Brien and Li 1995: 760- 767.

^®Cadres emphasized the role of the most basic levels in solving citizen complaints (Diao 1996: 300).

73 1995 regulations. More importantly, though, regime leaders view groupcnmplainLs as

illegitimate challenges to political authority.Leaders actively discourage collective petitioning out of concern that complainants will combine their grievances, or link up with other disaffected individuals.^ Successful groupcomplainants designate a limited number of representatives to present a written complaint signed by others who join in the appeal.^*

Allegations that CCP officials are participating in, and in some case leading, mass petition movements have heightened fears of unrest caused by mis handled complaints. For example, a 1998 report by the Central Organization Department recounted the case of a Hubei provincial cadre who was renounced for rallying the masses and "giving vent to personal spite. " He was placed on one year probation and

Commenting on the situation during imperial times. Jack Gray wrote, "in observing the scope and the limits of China's democratization, one is reminded of the British Army's oldest Catch 22: if one man complains, that's a complaint; but if two men complain, it's mutiny... In imperial China, the individual official who remonstrated with the Emperor was a hero, but the official who sought support among his fellows for his remonstrations was a traitor." (Gray 1982: 304). This perspective continues today.

^°This exigency has been raised by Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji and other central leaders in their attempts to quell group complaints. For recent statements see, "Zhu moves to discourage group protests". South China Morning Post 2/9/99, "Premier orders blitz on public complaints". South China Morning Post 2/9/99, and "Jiang Wages War on Instability", Willy Wo- lap Lam, South China Morning Post, 1/20/99. See also "Lingdao" (op cit) p. 12; "CPC Said Prohibiting Members from presenting petitions", FBIS-CHI-98- 206, 25 July 1998, in Pinguo Ribao, 22 July 1998, p. 20. For examples of successful " sandwhich strategies* and leadership support of collective petitioning, see O'Brien and Li 1999: 176-180.

^^Interview with head of district complaint bureau office (Hexi qu), 1996. The morning I conducted the interview, the office had just received a phone call from some residents complaining about the noise and inconvenience of construction around their apartments. The caller threatened to send two hundred people from her work unit to the complaint bureau if the matter was not attended to immediately. Before I arrived for the interview, two representatives from the district office visited the location of the disturbance to try to prevent the collective onslaught on the office.

74 his annual retirement allowance was revoked.^ The report argued that "a small number" of Party members have encouraged and even organized group petitions, and that this was a clear violation of party discipline.

4.2.3 A Pressing Combination: Group Complaints at Higher Levels

Collective complaints and grievances extended to higher levels of jurisdiction often occur together; the greatest challenge to complaint bureau work occurs when people bypass local levels in groups.^ For example, 14 people were arrested in Henan

Province after they organized 500 villagers to gather at government offices to protest rural taxes.'* As recently decreed by a Hunan Provincial Party Chief,

"the authorities of various levels should resolutely stop the rapidly increasing trend of such crowd application for audience with higher authorities. It is necessary to adhere to the principle of handling at the proper level. Premier Zhu Rongji also recently highlighted the importance of meeting these demands before the situation gets worse,

"Everything possible must be done to reduce moves to appeal to higher levels of government and especially to reduce collective appeals... these kind of appeals not only fail to solve the problem, but give a minority of people a chance to cause a row."^

^^"CPC Said Prohibiting Members from presenting petitions", FBIS-CHI-98- 206, 25 July 1998, in Pinguo Ribaio, 22 July 1998, p. 20.

^^"Hefei holds conference on dealing with people's complaints", FBIS-CHI- 97-197, 16 July 1997, from Hebei Ribao, 22 June 1997, p. 1.

'*The irony of this protest, amd the likely reason for the arrests, was that the villagers were led by their elected village representatives. See South China. Morning Post, 11/3/99, “ Village officials held in tax protest ^"Hunan Party Chief on Hamdling People's Complaints", FBIS-CHI-99-024, 24 January 1999, Hunan Ribao, 16 January 1999, p. 1.

'^"Premier orders blitz on public complaints". South China Morning Post, 75 These statements suggest that many complaints catapult their demands beyond the prescribed limits, and that they are achieving at leastminimal levels of success in these efforts, thanks to loose institutional boundaries, officials willing to look the other way or even encourage such behavior, and enterprising activists. In &ct, a back door asserting the right of "higher-level administrative organs to directly accept complaints” was included in the 1995 National Regulations on Complaints. Chinese group complaints at higher levels have not yet become as institutionalized as petitions in late

18th-century England, complete with newspaper advertisements and formal lobbying,” and regime leaders want to assure that this threatening transformation does not take place.

4.2.4 Other Indicators of Poorly Executed Contacting Work

Even when individuals complain at the appropriate level, citizen contacting is tense work. It often has all of the makings of a showdown; aggrieved individuals, entrenched interests, and coveted resources. Therefore it should not be surprising that contacting can turn violent. Authorities report turbulent incidents within complaint bureaus, including the "occupation" ofparQr and governmental offices, personal attacks on cadres, deaths, and suicides by disaffected petitioners.^ For example, a Hebei ParQr

(Internet Edition), February 9, 1999.

^’Por more on the transition "from private to mass petitioning" in England, see Tarrow 1994: 41.

^®See "Public Discontent Worries Government", 6 March 1998, FBIS-CHI-98- 065, from Cheng Ming, 1 December 1997, 246: 23-4. One publicized suicide involved a laid off railway worker from Henaui Province in early 1998. See also Willy Wo-lap Lara, "Jiang Wages war on instability", SCMP 1/20/99, and "CPC Said Prohibiting Members from Presenting Petitions", FBIS-CHI-98-206, 25 July 1998, in Pingguo Ribao, 22 July 1998, p. 20; "China Mews Digest" (Internet edition), 1/15/98. 76 Secretary reported a clash in June 1997 between hundreds of complainants and officials.

At the end of the day, 170 people were injured by iron bars and switchblades.^

Disconcerted complainants have also sent funeral bouquets, pig heads, and bombs to party officials.”

Fears of revenge are not only harbored by those who receive complaints: petitioners also display misgivings about openly challenging officials or policies. The high number of letters written anonymously(nimingxin) or signed with pseudonyms

(shujia ming) points to such concerns. It is estimated that one quarter of all letters received by complaint bureaus are anonymous, although in some provinces, this number has been reported to be as high as 40-50% Letters with concealed identities are customarily sent by "insiders" who know the "full story"(zhiqingzhi)-^^ Most anonymous complaints concern personal disagreements with leaders, employment disputes and financial corruption.” Although "whistle-blowers" in almost any regime

^^"Public Discontent Worries Government", 6 March 1998, FBIS-CHI-98-065, from Cheng Ming, 1 December 1997, 246r 23-4.

^°For more on these incidents, described as "unexpected tricky moves" ijuezhao), see An Qixiong 1993.

^^See Shi 1997: 64. Pseudonyms are commonly used in the Chinese media. One example in complaint bureau journals is the Minqing yu Xinfang author who is identified as "Chang Xin", literally meaning "frequent letters" (Chang 1994).

^^Tian 1993: 38. ^^Han Wuyan 1995; Li Xiaoshan 1994; Luo Xingping 1996: 9. One source argued that "corrupt bribes, using power for personal gain lyiquan mousi) and violations of financial discipline" make up approximately 45% of anonymous letters (Tian 1993: 38). Interviews with provincial and district complaint bureau office directors confirmed these relationships. 77 are prone to retribution for their actions, in a system where citizens are largely unprotected by laws, their exposure to harm would seem much greater.^

4.3 Institutioiial DUemmas

Complaint bureau work in the 1990s is laden with difficulties that impair both principal functions of contacting. Contentious disputes decrease the government’s ability to cull meaningful information and use contacting work as a source of information. Because of threats to their personal safe^ and frustrations with inaction, the participatory potential of these institutions is also limited. The “hot spots” highlighted above are indicative of characteristics within Chinese institutional structures beyond the complaint system. Specifically, I highlight two; institutional overlap and personalism.

Petitioners in China who want to report a grievance can approach almost anybody: complaints can be tendered to virtually any office, and then routed to the appropriate locale. The inclusion of multiple organizations necessarily comes with the territory of contacting institutions.^^ In cases that directly invole multiple departments.

For a string of examples of acts of reprisal against individuals who reported corrupt actions by leaders in Vietnam, the Soviet Republics, and China, see Holmes 1993: 204-5. For more subtle negative responses against perceived "trouble makers", including whispering campaigns, counter-letters sent to law enforcement agencies and general reputation smearing, see Lampert 1985: 121-2.

^^Friedgut introduced the idea of "layering" institutions throughout the hierarchy. He argued that "this provides opportunities to apply, appeal, and complain not only to those nominally responsible for a particular function, but in the absence of responsiveness, to their superiors" (1979 : 316) . In addition, he argues that the redundancies within the system help any one group from exercising a monopoly on the flow of information (1979: 316) . For more on the overlap of contacting institutions in East Germany, see Rueschemeyer 1990: 572). Although I do not have data for the 1990s, in the 1950s, offices rarely reported that they solved cases on their own. In a survey of 23 bureaus (provincial and central level) , only five 78 complainants are instructed to contact either the Party secretary or people's government

(the State Council at the central level) for assistance/^

While the proliferation of places where people can go to complain makes these offices more accessible to the public, it can also lend itself to seemingly endless cycles of shirking/^ For example, with multiple cadres and officials involved in investigating and solving a single case, it can become difficult to track down the "responsible person" (fttze ren). The vague notion of "related departments”(you guan bumen) adds to the likelihood that citizen complaints get deflected to so many different offices that they never get solved/^ In the end, the interconnected maze of organizations and personnel leaves few with genuine authority.

The absence of decision-making power has been openly conceded by the people to whom problems are most often re-routed: Party secretaries. The DepuQr Secretary of the Anhui Provincial CCP committee also acknowledged that: "cadres work under great stress, but their wages are not high. They shoulder great responsibility, but have little authority."^* reported solving more than 50% of citizen contacts independently (Diao: 1996: 144) .

^^Liang Guan 1990 : 83. ^^For discussion of the advantages of a less-institutionalized system for complainants, see O'Brien 1996: 44-45. ^°One Chinese author pointed to a situation in which "Everybody has a hand in it, but no one is responsible ... they are all kicking the ball". Zhu Tiezhi, "Bureaucratism is the archenemy of modernization", L ia o v a n g #19, May 10, 1999, p. 13, in PBIS-CHI-1999-0603, 10 May 1999. Tianjin Shi identified the dilemma as "getting kicked around like a ball (tipigiu)" (Shi 1997: 62).

^^"Anhui County's handling of complaints probed", 20 January 1999, FBIS- CHI-99-020, Anhui Ribao, 6 January 199, p. 1. Similar comments were made by the Hubei Provincial Party Secretary, FBIS-CHI-97-102, May 2, 1997.

79 Lacking the autfaorlQr to actually solve problems presented to them by citizens, some complaint workers see themselves primarily as "reporting" and"communicating" agents.^ An Anhui Deputy Party Secretary stressed that cadres need to critically evaluate their role; "to hear the complaint is only tenqmrary. To bring about a permanent solution is something else."'*' One "model cadre" admonished that if all employees do is receive complaints, without ever solving them, they fail in their mission to help the masses/^ For contacting channels to be more than information offices, in this view, they must be empowered to act on the problems reported to them.

The second institutional characteristic that can impede complaint work is the dominance of informal norms and personalism. Yet, there are two sides to this equation. Without codified rules, institutions are more permeable to activists. Yet, in the absence of these structures, participants are forced to rely on favorable connections or the good nature of involved parties, without much room for recourse.

As I discussed earlier, personalism characterizes contacting work nearly universally. This is exacerbated in the Chinese context, where personal connections and "back-door" relations continue to impact many aspects of life.*^ Although it is

This attitude was often expressed in my interviews. I was surprised when the Director of a Provincial Legislative Complaint Bureau lamented that his office was not a "power" office (z h in e n g human) . This cadre argued that, even in his highly visible and high-ranking position, the bulk of his work was to turn over citizen complaints to other "related departments" {youguan human) to solve.

"Anhui County's handling of complaints probed", 20 January 1999, FBIS- CHI-99-020, Anhui Ribao, 6 January 199, p. 1.

^^Shi, Jin and Gong 1996: 5. *^For a sampling of the literature which highlights the seemingly informal patterns of personal relationships and "connections" Ig u a n x i ), see Bian 1994; Kipnis 1996; Pye 1995; Wang 1995, 1996; Wilson 1997, Yan 1996a, 80 difficult to quantify, complainants often approach individuals whom they know well,

usually a visible government member or Party cadre, who then forwards the complaint to the appropriate office. A complainant may not even directly interact with any of the officials who investigate his or her grievance.

National complaint regulations were promulgated to regularize complaint work and overcome personalism; to set up procedures independent of personal relationships/^ Yet, there is much concern about how well regulations are being implemented, and the effects of their mis-implementation by complaint cadres,

"If all organizations do not follow the regulations for handling citizen petitions and complaints ... this will harm economic development and social stabili^, because the masses will not be satisfied with the results of their work and will skip levels.

The largest attempt to regularize complaint bureau work was the promulgation of comprehensive national regulations. In October 1995, the State Council passed regulations on letters and visits, the first set of national guidelines since 1952.^ These

State Council regulations have purview over people's governments and "affiliated administrative organizations. The 1995 regulations stipulate that investigations

1996b; and Yang 1994.

^**Yet it is important to acknowledge the positive potential of a highly personalistic system. In the case of personal accusations against officials, as Shi acknowledges, personal ill feelings and vindications can work in the favor of either the complainant or the accused official (Shi 1997: 62)-

*^Xu 1996: 23. ^^Draft regulations were prepared in 1963, although never formally adopted. At the third national complaint bureau conference in 1982, another set of provisional regulations was drafted, as well. Both of these documents can be found in Diao 1996: 389-402.

Xinfang Tiaoli, Guowuyuan di 185 Hao (1995) , [Jîegulations on letters and 81 initiated by citizen's conq>laints should be concluded within thirty days, with the possibility for extensions, if necessary (Article 30).^

Local regulations (at provincial and ciQr levels) exist as well; in Act, many were promulgated before the national regulations. For exanq>le, Heilongjiang, Guizhou and

Shanxi provinces each passed local complaint bureau regulations in the late 1980s, Jilin

Province passed regulations in 1992, and Tianjin City did so in 1994.^’

How do regulations affect contacting by Chinese citizens? One might assume that formal regulations would assist activists in their attenq>t to solve grievances. Yet, in the case of Chinese complaint regulations, I argue the effect could be precisely the opposite. They provide bureaucrats more opportunities to delay casework and limit complainants' claims. Ratherthan establishing a clear chain of command, the regulations make vague claims and open loopholes. For example. Article 30 deems that complaints should be concluded within 30 days. Yet, the time frame can be extended for "complicated situations"(qingkuang Juza de). Complaints which are transferred to other offices should be handled in 90 days, unless more time is necessary (Articles 31-

Visits], State Council Document Number 195 (also included in Diao 1996: 403-409) . For an English translation of the regulations, see "Regulations Issued on Hcindling Complaints", X in h u a , 30 October, 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95- 216, November 8, 1995, pp. 13-16.Article 42 establishes that "social organizations, enterprises, amd institutions will use these regulations for reference in handling complaints".

^^Forwarded complaints should be concluded within 90 days (Article 31) .

"^Diao 1996: 282; Liang 1990:4. Counties also adopted their own sets of regulations: Conghua County in Guangdong Province, for example, adopted complaint bureau regulations in 1982. Diao lists other counties which adopted laws and regulations related to complaint bureaus, including counties in Fujian and Hubei provinces (1996: 282-3) . People's congresses in 16 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities have issued regulations on the handling of public complaints as well. See "NPC attaches importance to popular complaints", Xinhua, 3/2/96, in FBIS-CHI-96-043, 3/5/96. 82 32). Articles 34-35 limit conqxiainants' appeals to one office, and if the superior office is in agreement with the lower-level decision, its actions are final. The high number of repeat appeals discussed earlier suggests thatcomplainants largely disregard this provision.

Also, the regulations specify many restrictions on complainants; for example, two chapters out of seven of the reguations detail standards for allowable behavior by complainants. Petitioners should not"nag , insult, beat or threaten" personnel (Article

14). Complainants with infectious diseases or mental illnesses should be handled by health authorities or Public Securify Bureau cadres (Articles 20-21).

The regulations dictate that complaints should be settled "according to relevant laws and administrative rules" (Article 16). Cadres are expected to have a firm grasp on policies and laws applicable to complaint work. This is not an easy task. In fact, some of my interviewees insisted that complainants were more aware of laws and policies than they were.^ In an attempt to help disseminate necessary information to complaint cadres, massive collections of government policies have been published, but these efforts alone have not been able to meet the need for basic training and education.^' A compilation of letters published Liaowangin highlighted citizen

Interviews with newspaper mass work office directors, director of women's federation district complaint office, and head of district Communist Youth League mass work office. For rural complainants' skilled use of legal tools, including the development of "rights consciousness" among participants, see Li and O'Brien 1996; O'Brien 1996 and Pei 1997.

^^One of the policy compilations that I was able to collect was over 1000 pages long, containing any governmental policy or legal order that could ostensibly be related to complaint bureau work. Xinfang Gongzuo Jianbian [Concise Book of Complaint Bureau Policies] (1987), Shangyebu Bangongting Bian.

83 complaints that legal development was "not really genuine because it does not apply to cadres."^ Without formal remedies for the lack of enforcement, regulationsremain largely toothl^s documents for frustrated complainants seeking redress.

The mishandling of complaints and petitions, whether due to personal inadequacies or structural defects, only intensifies them. The consequence of poorly executed contacting work encourages disaffected citizens to forego contacting channels and seek other means of being heard.^^ The absence of reliableinformation increasingly cuts regime leaders off from society. To the extent that problems are solved, and citizens feel a sense of efficacy, regime legitimacy is enhanced.^ Yet, to the extent that the problems addressed above continue, it spells trouble not simply for complainants and cadres, and it can pose a formidable challenge to elites’claims that they “rely on masses” and take their problems seriously.

The distinction between an individual complaint cadre and the collective CCP is a fine one; every word and action by complaint cadres' represents the par^ and government's "image"(xingxiang).^^ In all honesty, officers in complaint bureaus are sparsely endowed mediators in a crowded institutional environment, yet the public perception equates them with "the state. " This association is even stronger since the

^^"Fan fu chang lian, minxin suo xiang" (1996) .

^^For more on this, see Bernstein 1999: 217. For discussion on how regime legitimacy is enhanced through citizen contacting, see Holmes 1993: 203-4. She argues that the encouragement of whistle-blowing strengthens citizens ' s sense of support for government in that it allows citizens to closely identify with authorities who appear to be abiding by their professed ethical code of conduct.

^^For more on this appeal to the masses, see O'Brien amd Li 1999: 381-2) . Shi, Jin and Gong 1996: 6. 84 merger of government and ParQr conq)laint bureaus in the mid-1980s. Complaint cadres can not afford to "pick up the sesame seeds but overlook the watermelons, " or, as we would say in the US, "Mling to see the forest for the trees,"” as bureaucrats are known to do. The stakes are high: as one cadre dutifully reported, "the basic aim of our complaint bureau work is to promote an overall situation of stability. Much hangs in the balance.

4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have focused on key problem areas within contemporary

Chinese complaint work. What we have seen is that complainants consistently face much frustration attempting to report and solve their grievances. The inadequate response to citizen complaints at the local level is central to each of the contemporary struggles in Chinese complaint work. The upward tension propelled by foot-dragging at the local level suggests limits in what has changed at the grassroots levels since the beginning of local elections in the mid-1980s. Rather than turning to their locally elected representatives to solve a problem, citizens tend to seek officials at higher levels, with whom they share no real constituent connection. This suggests that the existing electoral mandate may be less than binding on local behavior. Flagrant violations of Party discipline have not gone unnoticed, either by central leaders or

^^Zhu Tiezhi, "Bureaucratism is the archenemy of modernization", L ia o w a n ^ #19, May 10, 1999, p. 13, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0603, 10 May 1999.

®®C3ien 1996: 8. 85 ordinary citizens, and are by no means limited to institutions established to handle citizen grievances.”

To this point, I have focused on party and government complaint offices. While these are clearly the most visible bureaus to which citizens may appeal for help, an increasing number of less official contacting avenues has been developed to filter citizen input and assist in elite-mass problem solving. Today,complaint bureaus are woven together with other institutions in order to increase the options available to

Chinese citizens for solving problems and reporting the misdeeds of officials. I now turn to the larger context of mass relations work in contemporary China, byexamining the concept of "supervision with Chinese characteristics."

^^See Zhang Quamjing's discussion of Jiang Zemin's speech on "Attaching Importance to Politics", FBIS-CHI-96-028, 9 February 1996.

86 CHAPTERS

SUPERVISION AND CONTROL

"In our country, the people may, through correspondence and interviews, put forward their demands, make known their desires, tell what they think of the work carried out and criticize some working personnel. This is a form of democratic right as well as a means for the people to supervise governmental work."'

5.1 Introduction

Despite monolithic images of authoritarian iron-fisted control, a more nuanced look at China today reveals a complicated picture, complete with Beijing's struggle to implement a national tax code, local officials who openly scorn central regulations, and ubiquitous back door deals that, at the very best, dance around the edges of legal behavior. To what extent are "ordinary citizens{laobaixing) " able to go above the heads of local officials, engaging in behavior that we may, even in a rudimentary sense, term "supervisory?" To this point in the dissertation, 1 have focused on government and party complaint bureaus used to report problems. In this chapter, 1 include other offices, agencies, and means by which citizens can challenge decisions that affect their daily lives. 1 analyze possibilities for citizen supervision over mid-level cadres. By

^ "State Council Directive on Strengthening of Work Relating to the Haindling of People's Letters and Interviewing of People", Rezualn Ribao, 11/25/57, in SCMP #1665, 12/5/57.

87 using contacting channels to solve their concerns, complainants promote supervision by higher level Chinese officials. This consequence of citizen complaints has become increasingly strategic for Chinese officials, especially as top leaders continue to publicly tackle the thorny problem of corruption, while at the same time attenq)tmg to maintain social stabili^.

5.2 Meanings of supervision

In his seminal work. The Nerves c f Government, Karl Deutsch asks, "who watches the watchmen?"^ Governmental leaders, in essence, are managers who need to be attentive to the actions of their subordinates. To check on their subordinates, higher level leaders rely partly on the assistance of ordinary citizens. Much of this citizen involvement is mediated through formally organized channels within government and administrative offices, as I discussed above.

The literature on supervision in non-democratic states tends to focus on the association between supervision and control.^ To examine emerging possibilities for supervision within contemporary China, I use the concept of "Are alarm oversight"

See Deutsch 1966: 158. Deutsch also talked about the need for enforcement agencies to "keep themselves informed about the behavior of officials and subsidiary organizations" (p. 158) .

note on terminology: it has been customary in English to refer to supervisory organizations within the COP as "control organs", reflecting their emphasis on party rationalization and inner control. On the administrative and state side, organizations to promote oversight have been referred to as "supervisory". For a sampling of some of the literature on Party supervisory committees, see Harding 1981, Schurraann 1966, Sullivan 1984. For literature on administrative supervision, see Chang 1998, Huang 1995.

^McCubbins and Schwartz 1984.

88 McCubbins and Schwartz introduce the metaphor of a "fire alarm" to dispute the notion that the United States Congress is lax in its oversight obligations. They argue that congressional representatives face many institutional incentives to promote de­ centralized "fire-alarm" tactics over more activist "police-patrol" monitoring. Police patrol oversight entails the systematic review and surveillance of agencies. It is active and direct, both examining and detecting violations. In contrast, fire alarm oversight establishes a firamework by which officials respond to citizen reports of misconduct.

Fire alarm oversight consists of

"rules, procedures and informal practices that enable individuals, citizens and organized interest groups to examine administrative decisions, charge agencies with violations, and seek remedies."^ McCubbins and Schwartz's distinction helps us examine how multiple channels within the govenunent, party, and the media facilitate supervision over non-central government and party employees.® While officials "patrol" each other, they also establish various outlets by which citizens may pull "fire alarms" to trigger investigations. I conceptualize "supervision", what the Chinese refer to”jia as n d u ” to include increased transparency and the ability to take recourse in unsatis&ctory

McCubbins and Schwartz 1984: 166. This fire alarm thesis is not without detractors. For one of the more articulate critiques, see Aberbach (1990), pp. 97-103. Aberbach's criticisms, however, are based on empirical disputes about chcuiges in patterns of US Congressional oversight, rather than of their conceptual distinction, which I employ. Furthermore, my goal in this chapter is not to argue that Chinese supervision is more "fire alarm" or "police patrol", but rather, to portray how ordinary citizens use "fire alarms" to accomplish their goals. For a recent extension of McCubbins and Schwartz's ideas, including the addition of bottom-line oversight, or "smoke detectors" to their typology, see Maier, Polinard and Wrinkle, forthcoming, "Politics, Bureaucracy, and Farm Credit", Public Administration Review.

®This is not a precise category, but I use it to illustrate that few people are successfully using such channels to challenge Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, Li Peng, Tian Jiyun or other central - level officials.

8 9 circumstances/ Specifically, I analyze three sets of institutions; formal inspection and supervisory committees, increased opportunities for civil litigation, and programs within the media which facilitate citizen whistle-blowing.

A common Chinese word in discussions of mass supervisiongongkai is ("to make public"). Through citizen use of fire alarms, some central-level officials in China are attempting to promote a more transparent system, particularly at the local levels.^

To date, the effort to curb corruption has focused on exposing the so-called "few bad apples" in order to demonstrate that the larger "crop" is still healthy.^Common citizens, complaining about policy mis-implementation and abuse, sharesimilar interests with higher level officials who are concerned with preventing unrest and promoting efficient government. Yet, the extent of this mass inclusion has stimulated much debate among Chinese officials. In the 1980s, both conservative and reform leaders articulated concerns over mass supervisory work, using contrasting rationales.

Although it is not a focus of this chapter, there is a developed literature on the concept of institutional supervision in the Chinese system. This literature is particularly strong in the area of people's congresses. For a sampling, see Ding 1992, Dowdle 1997, O'Brien 1990 and Ying and Dong 1997.

®Xue (1996) . See also Renmin Luntan, 1: 1/15/99, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0212, 2/16/99 for efforts within Zhaoyang City to "make public" attempts to crackdown on corrupt acts. In April, 1998, the State Council issued a "circular on extensively implementing the system of village affairs transparency cind democratic management in rural areas". In some rural areas, offices for "Village affairs transparency" have even been established. For details on the Provincial Office in Shanxi, see Zhang Yan and Xian Yang, "Let villages become genuine masters of their own villages", commentary on the national Work of Village affairs transparency", Xinhua 6/21/99, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0623, 6/24/99.

®In one excwnple of a representative statement by central leaders, former NPC chairman Qiao Shi stated, "Some cadres, including a small number of grassroots political auid legal cadres, have a weak sense of law and discipline ... the overwhelming majority of our grassroots cadres are good". Han Wuyan 1996a; 9.

9 0 Orthodox par^ leaders opposed publicizing disciplinary work out of concern that this would contribute to public qmicism. Moderates and reformers feared Cultural

Revolution-sQrle mass supervision, which was erratic and marred by personal attacks/"

Yet, in the attempt to strengthen support for the CCP by visibly cracking down on corruption, top leaders have highlighted the role of mass supervision. Wei Jianxing,

CCP Central Committee Standing Committee member and Secretary of the Central

Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIQ, highlighted the connection between supervision and efforts to combat corruption:

"the key to preventing power abuse is to reinforce supervision. It is necessary to establish and improve the mechanism of restraint that ensures die lawful exercise of power, integrate supervision within the party, legal supervision, and mass supervision; to bring into play the role of media supervision, (and) to effectively prevent and prompdy expel corruption."” When citizens use contacting channels to report wrongdoing, these attempts at problem solving are also a form of supervision. Below, I expand on the focus of the previous four chapters by looking more broadly at elite-mass institutions which citizens may use to review political outcomes. This form of oversight increases the ability of ordinary citizens to speak up for their interests. In so doing, it concomitandy promotes leadership control over the actions of their subordinates.

Sullivan. 1984: 614. White reports that over 70% of the 1.2 million "criminal cases* opened during the Cultural Revolution were later formally classified as political attacks (White 1999: 337).

Prevent and Control Corruption at Source : Wei Jianxing on Increasing Intensity of Opposing Corruption", Iiiaowang 2/9/98, in FBIS-CHI-98-060, 3/1/98.

9 1 5.3 Supervision with Chinese characteristics

Officials in any organization need to oversee the behavior of their subordinates.

This is particularly true within the ranks of the CCP membership, as leaders are eager to root out deviations from the "party line"(dangxian) or of the murkier conceptions of behavior fitting a CCP cadre, known as the "party spirit"(dangxing).

Supervision in China is rarely a coordinated endeavor, but more ofren involves duplication of effort across many institutions.'^ Conq)laint bureaus in party and govenunent offices are only part of the network established to promote "democratic supervision"{jninzhu jiandu).^^ Within both party and administrative supervisory organizations, offices similar to complaint bureaus have long been promoting citizen contact. Additionally, an increasing repertoire of laws provide complainants a foundation to back up their claims. Finally, mass work offices and media outlets facilitate the expression of citizens' "legal rights and interests"(fufa quanyi).

Formal supervisory channels are located within both the Party and Government hierarchy, with the CDIC at the head of the Party system, and the less powerful

Ministry of Supervision (MOS) at the apex of the government. Initially, each ministry had its own independent supervisory organization. Yet, "dual leadership"

Harding 1981: 78 argues that this duplication was an intentional policy to ensure that the bureaucracy would be responsive. It was also a means to prevent over-reaction to perceived problems. As an example, he highlights the debates during the san-fan campaign about the true seriousness of the corruption problem.

'^^Huang 1995 gives what he identifies as a "partial list" of the less known offices involved in administrative monitoring in China: provincial general offices, the petition system. Ministry of Supervision, and the General Auditing Administration.

9 2 {shuangchong lingdao)^ meaning oversight by the parallel Party committee in addition to organizational superiors, has been a defining characteristic of theseorganizations for most of their existence.**

This Party oversight continued throughout the 1950s and 1960s.*^ Even the mere presence of supervisory units fluctuated with the ebb and flow of ideological campaigns. Echoing the Cultural Revolution history of many organizations in China, from April 1969-December 1978, neither party discipline inspection committees nor governmental supervisory organs existed.*^ Following the push for normalcy after the

Third Plenum in 1978, organizations within both hierarchies served a key role in attempting to repair the damage from the "ten dark years. " In the current period, during which "promoting supervision and discipline" is the byword for combating

Given this involvement of the Party committee, some challenge whether or not there is a meaningful distinction between party amd state supervision in China. See Chang 1998. As he put it, "although their objects amd scopes of supervision aure different, the content of their work overlap" (p. 56) . The 1982 Party Constitution stipulated that DICs are no longer subordinate only to their parallel Party committees, but rather they aure under the dual leadership of Party committees and higher- level discipline inspection commissions. See Young 1984: 31. This is affirmed in the 1992 CCP Constitution, Article 43.

^^Framz Schurmann provides the most detail on attempts within the Ministry of Control to assert independence from the Party. Advocates of this change were promptly accused of opposing the mass line amd ridiculing "letters from the people". Schurmann goes to great lengths to uncover the personal- political motives behind this attack which was framed in terms of "the people's interests". In essence, he argues that the basis for the charge was the rivalry between the Ministry of Machine Industry amd the Ministry of Heavy Industry, amd the involvement in student movements in the 1930s. The result of the lost turf battles was the end of amy talk of a supervisory system independent of the CCP. See Schurmann 1966: 355-8. Also, in 1956 CCP leaders warned control organs against operating outside of the authority of party committees and abusing their "organizational powers" by taking " inappropriate disciplinary measures against party members ". See Sullivan 602-3. Harding 1981: 189 argues that both the MOS and procuracy were accused of seeking independence from the Party during the Great Leap Forward. For more, see Survey o f China. Mainland Press (SCMP) 1679.

*"^Their functions were largely replaced by Mao Zedong and Kang Sheng's so- called "specicil case groups". See Chang 1998: 45; Sullivan 1984: 603.

93 corruption, supervisory units in both the government and Party system are increasing their visibility.

The most powerful formal institutions used to investigate the behavior of CCP officials are the discipline inspection commissions (DICs){jilu jiancha weiyuanhui).

They originated under the Ministry of State Control in the early 1950s. Control organs were a common feature in systems withdominant communistparties.'^ Their primary goal was to help make the party more responsive to the population byhandling masses' complaints about cadres.Throughout the 1950s, the Central People's Control committees directly handled complaints about officials.

Initially, DICs did not exist below the province. Yet, in 1955, the Central

Control Commission(zhongyang jiancha weiyuanhui) was created, establishing a system which reached to the local levels.” These Party control committees were

Their leaders were in charge of checking bureaucratic abuse and promoting top-down control throughout not only the Party, but also the state system as a whole. For more on this aspect of control committees, see Sullivan 1984: 597-600. Young points out that control commissions were originally designed, in the 1956 Party Constitutions, to handle violations of the Party Constitutions, Party discipline, "communist ethics", and state laws and decrees (1984: 27-8).

^^Discipline inspection committees have been involved in citizen complaints since the early 1950s. See Current Background 196: July 30, 1952, p. 4., also # 224, 1/15/1953, p. 2. Diao 1996: 118 measures the number of citizen complaints to the CDIC from 1957-1960. During the four year period, complaints averaged 9,010 annually.

^®See Cohen 1968: 188-192; Harding 1981: 83; also SCMP 403, 8/27/52, pp. 7-9, and Schurmann 1966, especially 315-6.

^°On the relationship between Chinese and Soviet control organizations, as well as the genesis of discipline inspection commissions, see Sullivan 1984. Schurmann 1960, Chapter Six also provides a concise introduction to control techniques in the Chinese Communist bureaucracy.

94 abolished during the Cultural Revolution/' The re-establishment of control committees in the 1977 ParQr Constitution led to the creation of the Central Discipline Inspection

Commission (CDIC) {zhongyang jilu jiancha weiyuanhui) in the same year. After the

Third Plenum in 1978, the CDIC was heralded as a beacon in the attempt to "strengthen party discipline" by providing an official forum through which to criticize activists from the Cultural Revolution. Its work focused onhandling complaints and appeals of parQf members, particularly rectifying {jiiÿu} cases of individuals who were imjustly accused during previous campaigns.^

Party officials concerned with the large-scale demonstrations of 1978-79 hoped that the DICs, working together with the procuracy and public security bureau units, would provide a manageable outlet for solving citizens' problems in an orderly manner.^ In the ftrst seven months after the CDIC was established, DICs at all levels handled more than three million inquiries related to Cultural Revolution and other movements’ grievances.^

^^Harding argues it was because they were ineffective monitors of official behavior (1981: 287), and Sullivan points to their subordination to party committees and their lack of power to investigate cases (1984: 601) .

^^See Wcuag 1999: 84-85. He presents the number of party members who were either exonerated or expelled because they "followed orders" during the Cultural Revolution. He cites data from the Xinhua News Agency that there were 150,000 letters of appeal addressed to the central-level commission between December 1978 and August 1979, in the end cleauring the names of millions of party members and cadres who were accused of wrongdoing during the Cultural Revolution.

^^For further discussion, see Sullivan 1984: 606-7.

^‘‘initial reports indicated that "sent up petitions" from the masses overwhelmed the CDIC in the late 1970s (Beijing Daily, August 23, 1979, in Sullivan, p 609), even though "mass supervision" of cadres was down-played apparently because it evoked Cultural Revolution images (Sullivan 607, fn 42) . See also Young 1984: 39.

9 5 While it was originally founded to help overcome Party abuses during the

GPCR,^ the CDIC and local discipline inspection commissions currently stand firmly in the center of the anti-corruption struggle. It is in this context that they can be said to promote "fire alarm supervision." CDIC Secretary Wei Jianxing recently said:

"The main objects of such supervision are as follows: how well the party's line, principles, and policies have been implemented; how well the principle of democratic centralism has been adhered to and the system of combining collective leadership and individuals assuming personal responsibilities has been followed; how well they have done in organizing collective discussions and making decisions on the basis of the minoriQr being subordinate to the majority, on important policies, important cadre appointments and dismissals, arrangements for important projects, and the use of largesums of money. Recent high profile cases that the CDIC has prosecuted include Chen Xitong, former member of the Central Committee Political Bureau and Secretary of the Beijing

Municipal Party Committee, and his assistant, Wang Baosen, former Standing

Committee member of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee and executive Vice-

Mayor.” Similarly, reports from provincial discipline inspection committees reveal thousands of cadres getting caught red-handed with unauthorized cars, houses, and other signs of "lavish lifestyles." This includes cracking down on obvious displays of graft, including hosting elaborate banquets with public funds, driving unauthorized cars

The first CDIC Secretary was Chen Yun, and the standing committee for the newly formed Central Commission consisted of 24 party veterans, each of whom had been purged or mistreated during the Cultural Revolution. See Wang 1999: 83.

" Prevent and Control Corruption at Source : Wei Jianxing on Increasing Intensity of Opposing Corruption", Liaowang^ 5, 2/9/98, in FBIS-CHI-98-060, 3/1/98.

^’"Discipline Inspection Work Report", from X in h u a , 9/23/97, in FBIS-CHI-97- 267, 9/24/97. Chen is the highest-ranking CCP official convicted for corruption. 96 (often sedans or expensive J^anese Inqwrts), illegally acquiring military and police and foreign vehicles, holding part-time posts at enterprises, accepting credit cards, and speculating in shares.^ Additionally, rural residents commonly report illegal checkpoints on roads and highways to DICs.

There is evidence of high numbers of complaints from citizens being filed at

DICs, including large-scale collective conq>laints.^ Accusations of officials "wantonly collecting charges" were highlighted in several DIG reports, along with the inappropriate use of enterprise funds, and exorbitant charges for primary and middle school students. For example, the Henan Province DIG investigated 5,300 cases of random and illegal charges in 1994, totalling 65.62 million yuan.^

According to Jiang's recent speech at the 15th Party Congress, public complaint bureaus and reception rooms within discipline inspection committees "bolster" the power of DICs. ^ Wei Jianxing pointed out that "following improvements .... of

The concept of "discipline" extends into the personal lives auid governmental roles as well. As a recent example, the Hubei Provincial Vice Governor Meng Qingping was expelled from the procuracy after a CDIC investigation uncovered his extra-marital affair. See Huang Hai, "Why have a small number of cadres become corrupt", L laow ang 5: 2/1/99, FBIS-CHX-1999- 0213, 2/16/99.

^*For more on the rising number of collective complaints submitted to DICs in the countryside, see O'Brien 1996: 44, and Wang 1999: 5-6. For a scathing report of the demise of the former Deputy Secretary of the Guizhou Provincial Planning Commission Party organization, see Chen Weiwei and Zheng Hongfan, "Crimes behind power -- analyzing the serious economic crimes committed by Yan Jianhong", Remain Ribao, 1/17/95, in FBIS-CHI-95-015, 11/19/95.

^°See "Henan Discipline Inspection Commission Report", Henan Ribao, 12/27/95, in FBIS-CHI-96-019, 1/30/96,- "Hebei Issues Discipline Inspection Report", Hebei Ribao, 10/29/95, in FBIS-CHI-95-242, 12/19/95; and "Discipline Inspection Work Report", from X in h u a , 9/23/97, in FBIS-CHI-97-267, 9/24/97.

^^Renmin Luntan, 1: 1/15/99, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0212, 2/16/99.

9 7 complaint units in various localities and departments ... more and more reports were received from members of the public. From October 1992 to June 1997, 7.55 million complaints from the public were lodged with discipline inspection organs, of which over 930,000 cases were directed at cadres at and above the county level.^^

These statistics were also supported by provincial level DIC reports and accounts in the

Xinhua publication Lfoowong(Outlook) For example, from 1989-1994, Henan discipline inspection units received 335,567 conq>laints via masses' “letters and visits,” and punished 42,495 parQr members, including expelling over 7100 cadres from the

Party.”

The other central-level organization responsible for supervisory tasks is the

Ministry of Supervision(Jiancha Bu).^ The MOS has had a tumultuous history. It

FBIS-CHI-97-267, 9/24/97, "Discipline Inspection Work Report". Han Wuyan (1996a) claims that many regulations regarding cadre discipline were promulgated based on information supplied by central complaint bureaus, including the regulations requiring declaration of personal incomes of cadres ranking at and above section chief, regulation that leading cadres may not take up a position in any economic entity, and the prohibition of wining and dining at public expense. Han Wuyan (1996a: 9) .

^^FBIS-CHI-97-267, 9/24/97, "Discipline Inspection Work Report".

^^By November 1998, discipline inspections departments had accepted more than 1,612 million tips through visits, letters, and telephones for masses. 3,970 at country/department level; 293 cadres at prefecture (autonomous region government), 11 cadres at provincial/ministerial level, (show how most are turned in at local level) . Huang Hai, op cit.

^^In addition to the punishments above, 1,160 cases were transferred to the judiciary for further investigation "according to the laws". See "Henan Discipline Inspection Commission Report", Henan R ih a o , 12/27/95, in FBIS- CHI-96-019, 1/30/96. Han Wuyan (1996a: 9) claims that 80% of clues used by central and local DIC departments were obtained from public complaints and letters. Huang (1995: 835) also reported similar statistics.

^^For more on the role of the MOS in administrative supervision, see Huang 1995, pp. 836-7. He calls the MOS the "administrative equivalent" of the CDIC.

9 8 grew out of the people's supervisory committees (renmin jianwei) which were

established shortly after 1949/^ From its beginning, close ties to the masses were emphasized. In fact, most of the cases it received in the 1950s were from citizen complaints (approximately 70%).^*

The MOS was abolished in 1959, with its functions transferred to ParQr control committees It was re-established in 1985. The work of supervisory channels within both the parQf and government hierarchy was effectively combined in the early 1990s, even though the MOS officially continues to bear responsibility for cadres (CCP and non-CCP alike) working within state institutions.^

In addition to these formalized supervisory organizations, ordinary Chinese citizens may also invoke forms of "indirect" supervision over cadres, through channels not exclusively established to promote mass supervision.^' Laws and media programs.

^^Diao 1996: 38; Harding 1981: 34, 79.

Diao 1996: 39. Diao also reports the numbers of citizen complaints presented to the supervisory committees from 1957-1960. During this four year period, an average of 1091 complaints were received annually (p. 118) .

^®Cohen 1968: 198, fn 43; Harding 1981: 189.

“°For more discussion on their combination of duties, see Chang 1998, Huang 1995, 836-7. The clearest example Chang gives of this de f a c t o merger was Wei Jianxing's title accumulation. Prior to 1992, Wei was head of the Ministry of Supervision. At the CCP's 14th Congress in 1992, he was elected a member of the CDIC, and consequently appointed CDIC Secretary. This evidenced a reversal of the campaign to separate Party and State {dangzbeng fe n k a i) in the early 1980s.

^^For more on "indirect methods" of oversight, see Harding 1981: 83-4. He includes letters to the press, contact through mass organizations, and investigative reports by people's congress deputies as subtle forms of “mass supervision".

9 9 including television and radio shows and letters to newspapers are two forms of such

oversight.

CCP Secretary and State President Jiang Zemin has said, "The most basic thing

we should do (in fighting corruption) is to rely on education and the legal system.

Laws increase the voice of citizens who approach reporting centers and mass work

offices. Officials in complaint bureaus frequently cite changes in law as one of the

biggest changes in their work between the 1980s and 1990s, arguing that people now

use laws to solve their issues One official in the General Office of the NPC said,

"The legal track must be the ultimate choice of the work of handling public complaints".^

The 1990 Administrative Litigation Law{Xingzheng Susong Fa) empowers

individuals and enterprises to seek judicial review of administrative and governmental decisions, in efiect, allowing individuals to sue the government over contentious issues such as police detention, work unit decisions, and administrative penalties and fines.

"Henan Discipline Inspection Commission Report", Henan Ribao, 12/27/95, in FBIS-CHI-96-019, 1/30/96.

interview with the District Level Complaint Office Director, 1996, highlighted this most strongly, although others echoed his point as well.

^^See "Public complaints to be handled through legal system", Xinhua, 12/4/96, in FBIS-CHI-96-235, 12/6/96.

^^See Finder's early piece on its promulgation and potential (1989) and Potter's work appraising its initial impact (1994). Additionally, an edition of Chinese Law and Government devoted entirely to the ALL includes translations of related documents (24:3: 1991). For the most in depth empirical assessment of the implementation of the ALL to date, see Pei 1997. 1 0 0 Prior to its promulgation, citizens were legally able to file lawsuits against government agencies and officials, although the numbers of such cases were expectedly few/'

While the primary purpose of the Administrative Litigation Law (ALL) is to establish a supervisory relationship between the courts and the bureaucracy, it is also being used by ordinary citizens as a "fire alarm" to alert judicial agents to the bureaucratic misdeeds of individuals in local government offices, public security bureaus, and work units. The Law creates an avenue o f ^p e a l for Chinese citizens beyond lodging complaints in formal offices, including the bold and previously taboo act of suing officials in courts.

The ALL has limits, such as its restricted definition of what can be included under review, and the odds of winning a public trial against the government are slim.^

But, a case recently reported in theNew York Times highlighted one couple who bad been punished because their daughter was born without the permission of the mother's

^^Pei reported fewer than 10,000 cases in the 1980s, compared to almost 80,000 from 1990-1996 (1997: 836) .

^^For example, Pei 1997: 851 reports on two successful collective lawsuits in rural Sichuan townships over fee collection. When faced with suits invoking the Administrative Litigation Law, judges cite fault with particular actions, rather than whole policies, and their actions are limited to rectifying individual complaints (Pei 1997: 841).

^^For more discussion on the limits of the ALL, see Potter 1996: 282-87. Yet, Pei 1997 records a high number of out of court settlements. He states, "filing a suit to induce tdae government agency to change its actions before trial has about the same probability of obtaining effective relief as filing the suit and receiving a favorable ruling after the trial" (Pei 19 97 : 843) .

1 0 1 work unit/’’ The couple successfully sued her employer, using the ALL, arguing that the fine was too severe/"

In addition to the Administrative Litigation Law, the 1995 State Compensation

Law promotes increased mass supervision that I would characterize as a "fire alarm. "

This legislation is designed to help citizens who are victims of government errors. It is the first bill that compensates citizens and organizations for government errors, such as illegal detention and custody, arrest, and beatings. Before 1976, the government provided living allowances or assigned jobs to children of citizens who were wrongfully persecuted. The State Compensation Law (SCL) builds on that precedent.

The SCL assists individuals who feel they have received an inadequate response from a formal complaint bureau. The South China Morning Post recently reported a

Guangdong City Intermediate Court ruling in fovor of a man who proved he had been wrongfully detained for a crime he did not commit. The plaintiff filed a complaint in the CiQf Public Security Bureau after he served 12 months in prison. After he did not

‘‘^See Elisabeth Rosenthal, "A day in court, and sometimes justice, for Chinese", New York Times April 27, 1998.

^°It is important to note that the plaintiffs were not challenging the legality of China’s birth control policy, but rather, the unreasonableness of the fines imposed on them. For more on the distinction between legal {hefa) and reasonable (heli) acts, see Bruun 1996: 202. O'Brien and Li also tell how villagers have used the Administrative Litigation Law to accomplish their goals, using it especially to report excessive fees, government departments that sell shoddy equipment to villagers, etc. They say "more than a few township officials we have encountered have expressed real concern that if they continued to tackle problems in their usual fashion they would be sued by villagers under the provisions of this Law" (1995: 766) .

1 0 2 receive a reply, he requested review of his case by the courts. As a result of the ensuing investigation and trial, he was compensated a year's wage/^

The most recent law that serves to enhance citizen oversight is the

Administrative Supervision Law(Xingzheng Jiandu Fa).^ This legislation enables citizens and groups to review the activities of people's govermnents and provides compensation for illegaladministrative acts against citizens. Part of its goal is to ensure government decrees are implemented. According to article 6,

"It is necessary to rely on the masses to carry out supervisory work. Supervisory organs should set up a report system. Citizens have the ri^ t to report on or file cases against acts of law-breaking and of dereliction of duty by any state administrative organs, government functionaries and other personnel appointed by state administrative organs to supervisory organs." Full implementation of the Supervision Law would go a long way in promoting mass supervision over agents of the Chinese state and would complement other reforms. The first step is turning the promulgated legislation into regulations that promote its enforcement. This involves the organizations that I discussed above. For example, both the CDIC and MOS are currently drafting guidelines for Party cadres and government employees to use in their implementation of the Supervision Law.^

^^Chan Yee Hon, "8,740 for more chan year in prison". South China Moming^ P o s t, 10/9/98.

^^The ASL was adopted and promulgated May 9, 1997. It replaced the "regulations on Administrative Supervision of the PRC" (1990) . Part of its goal, as outlined in Article 1, is to "ensure the smooth implementation of government decrees, maintain administrative discipline, promote clean emd honest administration building".

^^See Zheng Hongfan and Wamg Leiming, "Official Discusses Anti-Corruption Tasks", Xinhua, 4/14/99, FBIS-CHI-1999-0422, 4/23/99.

1 0 3 Laws are available to citizens to sound the bell when they feel they have been wronged. Laws help complainants use already existing contacting channels. Other explicit offices for receiving citizen input, similar to complaint bureaus, help further this cause. For example, the Supreme People's Court of China set up a complaint center. Between January and August 1998, almost 15,000 "flawed" court cases were highlighted as part of a judicial rectification campaign. Based in Beijing, this office handles complaints against judges in the Supreme People's Court, Higher People's courts and Intermediate People's courts.^ Additionally, special offices were opened in the summer of 1998 to help citizens uncover the diversion of funds for flood relief. Far less prominent, yet with potential for the future, are internet sites for reporting official malfeasance.”

Increasingly, outlets within the media are providing citizens an opportunity to point out problems and injustices.” These include media supervision centers, television

"Beijing sets up reporting centers to combat corruption", FBIS-CHI-98-134, 14 May 1998; Daniel Kwan, "Faults Found with 9,400 Court Cases, Legislators Told", "South China Morning Post”, 5/13/98.

^^Agence France-Presse, "No more suffering in Silence", 3/12/99, South China Morning Post reported the proliferation of telephone hot-lines, radio columns, and internet sites established by press organs to relay complaints to NPC deputies prior to annual session last March. Ministry officials in Beijing have also publicized their e-mail addresses in an attempt to be more accessible to the public. See "Dalian encourages citizens to evaluate officials", Xinhua, 6/23/99, FBIS-CHI-1999-0623, 6/24/99.

^®In a recent survey, 25% of people said they would choose the media to voice their complaints, up from 9% in 1988 (Minxin Pei 1997: 18-19) . Interviews 11.20-01, 11.20-02 both confirmed this increasing trend. There has been much written lately about the transfozmiation of the Chinese media in recent years. For discussion of the change of focus from ideology to commercialism, see Yuezhi Zhao (1998), Media, Market, and Democracy in China: Between the Party Line and the Bottom Line (University of Illinois: Chicago). For earlier discussion of the so-called "Westernization" of Chinese news and advertising, including the role of media outlets in promoting to transition to a consumer society, see Robinson 1981.

1 0 4 and radio programs, and columns within newspapers. Even though most journalists are formally employed by the CCP, a surprising number of people are openly talking about their abili^ to report problems as they see them, even when they involve Party cadres and policies.” In fact, vigilant newspaper reporters and editors who are able to place spicy details in bold headlines have evoked anxieQr among cadres. Cheng Weigao, provincial par^ secretary of Hebei Province, remarked on those who "have no fear for internal circulars but fear the most to appear in the new sp^r.

Party cadres have long been encouraged to regularly consult the "letters from readers" {dmhe laixin) section for "critical opinions and suggestions".” Each major newspaper has its own contacting office which fields letters and phone calls from concerned citizens.*” "Mass work offices"(qmgong bu) help citizens expose and solve problems. Letters are printed on one or two designated days a week, often alongside the results of the ensuing investigation.

Some papers are even known to specialize in publishing critical letters of government, bureaucracy, and individuals. As an example, Robinson discusses the Yangcheng Evening News (Guangzhou) as one of these papers (1981: 61) .

^®Li Demin and Wang Jinhai, "Drive out the Evil, Usher in the Good to Encourage Healthy Tendencies: Giving Full Play to Role of Media Supervision", Renmin Ribao, 10/4/98, in FBIS-CHI-98-301, "Role of Media Supervision Lauded", 10/28/98". Consistently in interviews and casual conversations with people, I was told that cadres do not fear the courts, but rather they fear newspaperreporters, for their ability to expose corrupt acts. See also Lincoln Kaye, "Fade to Black", Far Eastern Econom ic R eview , v. 160, 11/6/97, pp. 56-8.

^®"GAC Decision on Disposal of Letters from the Public and Receiving the People", Promulgated June 8, 1951, Xinhua, in Current Background, 224: January 15, 1953, p. 18.

®°For more on this, see Nathan 1986: 156-7; Shi 1997: 64-66.

1 0 5 The types of letters which are published in the open press vary from linguistic objections to television commercials using too many English phrases, to concerns about the dramatic increase in the numbers of cars on the road and the need to develop a low cost "people's car," to complaints that anti-theft devices for cars are making too much noise/' Newspapers are used by people hoping to launch a large scale investigation of power abuses, as well. An instance of hospital fee problems investigated Tianjinby

Ribao provides a case in point. According to letters submitted to the newspq>er ofRce, one of the major city hospitals was blatantly overcharging patients for their services.

After a month-long investigation, the editor of the "Letters from Readers" section published an expose on the hospital, along with an accounting of the resulting compensation received by the complainants.^

At the two major newspapers in Tianjin, directors of the mass work offices estimated that they publish between 10-20% of letters they receive.^ Contentious letters are rarely published in the popular press, although they are likely to be included in internal documents and reports(neibu kanwu). These publications offer varying

Renmin RiJbao 10/X6/96; China Daily 10/14/96. The letter-wriCer complained that contemporary commercials were using Western language to introduce new products to Chinese. This letter was published during the height of Jiang's campaign to promote socialist spiritual development (shehuizhuyi jingshen wenming) . For accounts of peasant letters about IOÜS, and the role of Nongmin Ribao in e^osing the problem, see Bernstein 1999: 209-210. Hugh Thomas (1980) published a collection of letters published in the P e o p le 's D a ily from January-December, 1978. The letters he collected reveal a wide range of content: letters on rural and urban politics, cultural life, class struggle, corruption, and youth.

®^See "Zhuyuan shisi tian, shoufei qiqian duo", Tianjin Ribao, August 28, 1995. The problem reported in this series of letters was found to be true. Another case, in which citizens reported tuition over-charging, was found to be false and referred to the Public Security Bureau for investigation. Interview with Director of Mass Work Office, Tianjin Ribao, 1996.

1 0 6 degrees of confidentiality. Some are available to CCP Central Committee Members and Central Government Ministers only.Xinhua News Agency publishes Guonei

Dongtai Xuanbian ^Collections o f Recent Domestic Developments). Renmin Ribao publishes Qunzhong Laixin Zhaibian {Collection o f Letters form the Masses) and

Qunzhong Laixin ISutibian Tekan {Special Issues o f Collections o f Letters from the

M asses). The Chief Editor's Office ofRenmin Ribao also publishes a daily report,

Qingkuang Fanying {Reflections on the Situation).^

The most difficult aspect of this type of supervisory work is sorting out the people with legitimate complaints from the overzealous (or mis-directed) alarm sounders. Newspaper investigators commonly begin researching a particular problem only to turn the case over to another ofGce, often the Public SecuriQr Bureau or the

People's Government, to see the problem through to its solution.^ One "mass work" office chief whom I interviewed characterized his office as a "communication window for both good and bad things."^ To the extent that this promotes transparency and accoimtabiliQr, such work should be considered supervisory.

In addition to these "letters to the editor" sections, newspapers offer other columns for airing grievances and reporting problems. Many of these features have

Interviews with mass work directors, Tianjin Ribao and Tianjin Wanbao, November, 1996. ^^See Shi 1997: 65-66. For more on "internal circulars", see Robinson 1981: 62.

^^The credibility of the reported alarm is a major problem with "fire-alarm" oversight. See Maier et al., unpublished 2-3, Bawn 1994. In a misdirected case of tuition overcharging in Tianjin, for example, the case was handed over to the Public Security Bureau. Interview 11.20-01.

Interview with Director of the Mass Work Office at Jin ftan Bao, 1996. 107 been introduced in recent years, includingRenmin Ribao’s "Today's Talk" and

"People's Forum", Guangming Ribao's "Monthly Focus", later known as "News

Focus", Jingji Ribao's "Weekly Topic"; China Youth Daily's "Freezing Point", and

Fazhi Ribao's "Delivery of News from Far and Wide."®^

Television and radio programs which allow citizens to vent their frustrations are also becoming increasingly common." For example, in Yunnan, "Par^ Style and

Honest Government" television programs have been shown throughout the province."

Central People's Radio Broadcasting Station has a program called "News in

Perspective" which focuses on hot issues in current events.™ A Central China

Television (CCTV) show called "Focus", which began in April 1994, also seeks to expose contentious issues.^' These programs are known to be far-reaching. Daily,

Demin and Wang Jinhai, "Drive out the Evil, Usher in the Good to Encourage Healthy Tendencies : Giving Full Play to Role of Media Supervision", Renmin Ribao, 10/4/98, in FBIS-CHI-98-301, "Role of Media Supervision Lauded", 10/28/98".

^^Although this aspect of television and radio programs is increasing, it is not completely new. In the early 1980s, as Robinson reports, there were "candid cameras series" catching the use of public cars for personal trips by high officials. See excerpt by White and Sobelman in Robinson 1981: 66 and also p. 69. At least 90% of letters sent to CCTV offices are sent spontaneously, and as one television official said, "there is a lot of criticism, even in the letters we solicit" (Lull 1991: 36) . Lull also claimed that CCTV publishes a volume of audience letters each month for internal use (Lull 1991: 37).

®^This was set up by the Yunnan Provincial news Media Supervision Center in Kunming. The directors of the center are the deputy secretary of the provincial discipline inspection commission and the executive deputy director of the propaganda department of the provincial party committee. See He Benchang, "Yunnan Provincial News Media Supervision Center Set up in Kunming", Kunming Yunnan Ribao, 11/19/98, in FBIS-CHI-98-340, 12/6/98.

^°Li Demin and Wang Jinhai, "Drive out the Evil, Usher in the Good to Encourage Healthy Tendencies : Giving Full Play to Role of Media Supervision", Renmin Ribao, 10/4/98, in FBIS-CHI-98-301, "Role of Media Supervision Lauded", 10/28/98".

’^This "60-minutes"-style nightly news show often investigates low-level 108 there are "scores of petitioners" going to CCTV to seek reporters willing to investigate their case.”

Channels in the media that focilitate mass supervision also include an increasing number of "hot lines"(re xian).^ A daily morning radio program based out of Radio

Shanghai has a "complaint hot-line" that receives calls mostly about consumer complaints.^'* Newspapers have these hot lines as well, and, from my experience with the two Tianjin newspapers, they deal with more political and social issues.” In frict, when a large group of complaints about a particular area is received, special offices are ofren formed to handle them. For example, after the ciQr government in Dongguan

(Guangdong Province) received a throng of letters about the effects of urban sprawl on the region's farmland, a special office directly under the mayor was opened to address and solve the issues.” corruption among Chinese officials. Li Demin and Wang Jinhai, "Drive out the Evil, Usher in the Good to Encourage Healthy Tendencies: Giving Full Play to Role of Media Supervision", Renmin Ribao, 10/4/98, in FBIS-CHI-98- 301, "Role of Media Supervision Lauded", 10/28/98".

’^Li Tesheng, "Petitioners from Various Places come to Beijing One after another to lodge complaints", Hong Kong Ming Pao, 22 November 1995, in FBIS- CHI-95-225, 22 November 1995. See also O'Brien and Li 1999: 179.

’^See "New ties between government officials and people", Xinhua, 6/19/96, FBIS-CHI-96-121, 6/24/96. Zhongshan City (Guangdong) established a "Mayor's Hotline".

Radio Justice", Inside China Today Daily Report, 2/23/99.

^^Tianjin Ribao and Tianjia Wanbao both clearly print the direct phone line to their mass work office on the "Letters from Readers" section of the paper. Representatives from the mass work offices at both of these papers differentiated the types of problems they receive in letters versus phone calls, stating that people with "emergency problems requiring immediate attention" contact the newspaper via phone. Tianjin Ribao had a separate office just for receiving phone calls, the J ie d a i S h i ("Receiving Office") .

’®See "New ties between government officials, people cited", Xinhua, 6/19/96, FBIS-CHI-96-121, 6/24/96. For more on the establishment of hot-lines in 109 Relatedly, in Beijing, a direct line to monitor the in^iementation of the

Environmental Protection Law was installed.^ "Hotline supervisory systems" have been established in other cities as well. The Dalian municipal people's congress

(Liaoning Province) created a 20-member panel of deputies, officials, professors and neighborhood committee members to handle calls from public. The panel received 300 calls in its first month.^ Villages throughout the nation have established bulletin boards, "transparent^" books and walls, and petition boxes.^ In some locales, their use has led to a decrease in the use of traditional complaint bureaus. For example, in

Fujian province, letters critical of grassroots cadres declined by over 23% between

1997-1998, and more than 3(X) "complaint-lodging villages" in the province have

"quieted down."“

Through these institutions, ordinary citizens are being handed new tools for advocacy and activism. Yet, "sounding a fire alarm" does not necessarily mean that the

Tianjin, Chongqing, Beijing and Guangzhou, see "report views increase in ■political participation'", Xinhua, 7/6/94, in FBIS-CHI-94-130, 11/12/95.

’’"Law implementation facilitated by examinations", Xinhua, 3/10/97, FBIS- CHI-97-068, 34/12/97.

’®See "Dalian encourages citizens to evaluate officials", Xinhua, 6/23/99, FBIS-CHI-1999-0623, 6/24/99.

’®Anhui, Fujian, Beijing, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia and Hebei provinces each reported this development. See Zhang Yan and Xian Ying, "Let Villagers become genuine masters of their own villages -- commentary on the national work of village affairs transparency", Xinhua, 6/21/99, in FBIS-CHI-1999- 0623, 6/24/99.

*°See Zhang Yan auid Xiang Ying, "Let villagers become genuine masters of their own villages -- commentary on the national work of village affairs transparency and democratic management", Xinhua, 6/21/99, FBIS-CHI-1999- 0623, 6/24/99.

1 1 0 fire will be extinguished. Outcomes are not always positive, and efforts to promote mass supervision remain limited.

The continuation of Leninist Party^ principlesremains a key factor limiting the potential for mass oversight. Supervision that is ultimately accountable m one, un­ challenged political party is rarely neutral, in^artial oversight. Dual leadership sets up a mirror effect among organizations. For exanq>le, since each discipline inspection commission is responsible to its parallel Party committee and the inspection commission one step above, a challenge to any organization or group of leaders is deflected at least one level above the initial complaint. Initially, this provides a buffer zone between the complainant and the local power structure, but it also stifles the initiative to be actively responsive to local concerns. Institutional overlap also produces a confusingchain of command.^'

Finally, state leaders have a clear interest in amplifyinggains in "democratic supervision" and manipulate outcomes for purposes beyond "helping the masses". The possibilities for such over-reporting are most present in the media channels, especially columns for "hot spots" and current events. Columns highlighting troubles in society serve as much a warning to potential recalcitrants as any challenge to local leadership.

State and Party leaders have an interest in propagandizing every effort to "weed out bad

The following statement from a provincial discipline inspection commission annual report illustrates this confusion well: Party organizations "have persisted in combining supervision from the higher levels with that from the lower levels, inner party supervision with supervision outside the party, and supervision from special organs with supervision from the masses, and strengthen supervision over party members and cadres, particularly leading party members and cadres". From "Henan Discipline Inspection Commission Report", Henan R ib a o , 12/27/95, in FBIS-CHI-96-019, 1/30/96.

I l l elements". The comiptioa cases discussed most publicly dominantly involve middle

level cadres, the fall of which will not adversely affect citizen's perception of the

legitimacy of the Party as a whole. In fact, their demise provides an opportunity for

central-level leaders to profess their responsiveness to citizen demands and their whole­

hearted effort to maintain a "clean" government.^

One limitation of the tack I have taken in this chapter is the difficulty of

verifying the extent to which organizational procedures are followed. Clearly,

informal, personal interactions hold the key to success for mostcomplainants.”

Another drawback in my application of McCubbins and Schwartz's fire alarm thesis is

the designating of who acts after citizens sound the alarm. In the U.S. context,

McCubbins and Schwartz pictured representatives in Congress as the clear recipients of

calls to investigate. In the way I have applied their metaphor to China, I have not designated a single group or committee to which citizens may turn. In fact, the existence of so many offices, hot lines, and media channels may be both a help and a hindrance to complainants hoping to solve a problem. While it allows astute complainants to find the individual and structure that most suits their purposes, it also

invites shirking and buck-passing.

5.4 Conclusion

McCubbins and Schwartz, in their initial analysis, addressed this incentive that presents itself to elected officials as well: leaders do not address violations "unless potential supporters have complained about them, in which case he can receive credit for intervening" (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984 : 168) .

®^Huang deals quite frankly with this limitation in his 1995 article on administrative monitoring. He justifies his focus on formal institutions because they give rise to incentives and condition actual behavior. 112 The Chinese state remains authoritarian, intrusive, and hostile to attempts to challenge single party rule. It is not a difficult task to find evidence to support such arguments. But, subtle institutional changes, as I have addressed above, limit the ability of local officials to blatantly ignore rules and procedures.

In this chapter, I have connected efforts to increase mass supervision to the ongoing struggle of the regime to limit misbehavior within its ranks. Premier Zhu

Rongji is famous for his hard-line stance on corruption.^ Yet, he and his associates are playing a rislty game when they expose corrupt officials. As conservatives warned in the early 1980s, by airing their dirty laundry in public, the Party risks losing the support of the people. Contacting channels, to the extent they are perceived to be effective, are integral in the effort to prevent this downward spiral. Party officials continue to promote official, limited points of access for staging con^laints because they fear what would happen if this dissatisfaction is not ameliorated.

There are two main targets of supervision in contemporary China. The first is well known to scholars of non-democratic regimes; agents of the state keep their eye on citizens, especially activists, to monitor whether their behavior conforms with regime norms. Recent crackdowns in China onFalun Gong practitioners and underground Christian church communities provide evidence of this type of control.

Yet, what I have emphasized in this chapter is another side of the oversight coin:

One of ten-repeated story is that Zhu dismissed one of his advisors on the spot during a meeting when the cadre was sporting an imported Rolex watch that Zhu felt was way beyond the cadre's means. Recently, the South China Morning Post reported that Zhu said "We will kill, kill, kill. It's very likely the Vice-Minister of Police will be executed", after the mainland's top anti-smuggling police officer was detained on suspicion of corruption. "Beijing holds 'Corrupt' police chief", 1/8/99. 1 1 3 masses have a voice to use against local officiais. By reporting conduct that deviates from central policies, ordinary people can denounce cadres who step outside the "par^ line. " This supervision by exposure helps central level leaders demonstrate that they are an ally of the masses and are against corrupt leaders.

These increased opportunities for ordinary citizens to blow the horn on malfeasant behavior support the central government's attempt to control its own officials. The individuals who contact investigatory committee do so in order to solve their own problems, rather than to help leaders such as Wei Jianxing promote social stability. Yet, by approaching a governmental bureau or by initiating an administrative lawsuit, complainants also permit senior level officials to monitor their appointees.

Supervisory institutions in China need not be paving the way toward political liberalization or democracy. Rather, central leaders may be atten^)ting to encourage citizens to reign in Communist officials who refuse to follow the center’s wishes.

Indeed, the primary rationale behind increasing avenues for supervisory power is to safeguard central control. Even though there are increasing fire alarms available to

Chinese citizens today, this Qrpe of supervision is sporadic, reactive and largely particularistic.

1 1 4 CHAPTER6

CONCLUSION: CONSEQUENCES

"The significance of contacting rests on morethan its ubiqui^. No matter how ephemeral any one encounter between citizen and government official, taken together the interactions affect the pattern and content policymakingof "^

People everywhere experience problems. Often, they turn to public leaders or

appointed representatives to settle their troubles. In the effort to keep citizen frustration

from burgeoning out of control, regime elites establish routes to report issues and

facilitate their resolution.

At the beginning of this project, 1 set out to explore institutional mechanisms

established by modem Chinese leaders to meet citizens’ demands. examination My

revealed not only the historical precedent for formal offices to receive citizen iiq)ut, but

also the uses and abuses of this system. In this concluding chapter, I explore the degree

to which citizen contacting can lead to political change, and whether or not the

cumulative effects of these acts of political participation can impact society and the

polity at large.

^Zuckerman and West 1985: 118.

1 1 5 6.1 Beyond the Dual Purpose

In the first chapter, I emphasized the dual purpose of contacting. Elite-mass institutions have been established around the world to facilitate communication about and participation in public affairs. As I have shown, Chinese citizens use complaint bureaus to solve problems, report the illicit behavior of officials, and make suggestions to leaders. For officials, complaint bureaus provide an expedient way to demonstrate their responsivmiess to citizens, as well as a relatively efficient source of information about mass preferences and local happenings in general.

In addition to these two primary functions, contacting instimtions are also used to control the behavior of individuals and groups. Governments around the globe attempt to ensure increased adherence with national policies and laws. As I discussed in Chapter 5, supervision and control can be closely connected. In the case of China, discussions about compliance bring to mind examples of limits on organizing, legislation banning ‘^hooliganism,” and registration requirements for civic and grassroots organizations. We tend to view citizens as the sole target of government attempts to secure compliance. Governmental leaders must procure the obedience of their own officials as well.^ Through contacting channels, they gamer citizen feedback to supervise local officials and attempt to bring their subordinates more in line.

In fact, in m o d e m China, one of the biggest struggles central leaders face is the distortion and mis-implementation of key policies. For some recent examinations of this, see Lu's work on the central government's largely unsuccessful attempts to limit illegal exaction of fees by local officials (Lu 1997) and O'Brien and Li's studies of "rightful resistance" against cadre mis-implementation (Li and O'Brien 1996; O'Brien 1996; O'Brien and Li 1999). 1 1 6 Yet the story is not so one-sided: complaint bureaus benefit ordinary citizens as well. Contacting institutions help fill the void that is left behind in the absence of other institutions which aggregate citizen interests and communicate them to power holders.

For example, even without independent newspapers, citizens write letters to editors reporting problems in local service delivery, corrupt officials, and pleas for help with family problems. The “mass work offices” in organizations such as the Women’s

Federation and All-China Federation of Labor Unions, which remain tightly connected to the ParQr leadership, are also popular targets for grumbling citizens. Lacking autonomous conduits, people appeal directly to governmental officials to solve their problems.

Because available channels are sponsored by the regime, there is a tendency to discount most political participation in non-democratic states. I argue that this view is not entirely accurate. Just because the conduit is state-enabled does not mean that the outcome is fabricated solely for official purposes. If propaganda and acquiescence were the only rationale behind the establishment of contacting channels, it would be difficult to explain the fiiction resulting from complaint bureau work. Such a perspective would also fail to take into account the number of complainants who risk reprisal to approach officials. I argue that potential activists recognize the utiliQr of contacting channels and opt to pursue these avenues because they genuinely believe there is a good chance their problem can be solved through them. Recognizing both the limits and the utility of contacting, can it be a catalyst for change?

1 1 7 6.2 Contacting and Political Change

In recent years, scholars have noted the increasingly diverse means by which

Chinese citizens are participating in their political system/ Faced with renewed attention to the legal system, a rise in complementary institutions which support mass and elite supervision, and an increased concern in Beijing over the wayward actions of local autocrats, citizen contacting in the modem period has become more developed, diverse, and pervasive.

In the 45 years that were the focus of this study, there was a wide breadth of issues presented to complaint bureaus. For example, in the early 1950s, contacting units within the ParQr were used to report problems in the new governing system and to instruct cadres on how to deal with the masses. By the 1980s, contacting was hailed as a means of overcoming historical grievances. In the mid-1990s, the content of complaint work ranged from “low politics” issues to reports of high-level corruption.

Additionally, citizens now have more tools, including legal remedies and media exposure, to assist them with their claims. Across the time period that 1 studied, contacting offices also expanded, in both quantiQr and type. Complaint bureaus initially fell within the purview of the government and ParQr. Contacting bureaus can now be found everywhere from the courts, public security bureaus and people’s congresses, to newspapers and mass organization units. This diversity could suggest that previously existing offices were insufficient in their handling of grievances. But it could also point

Bemsetein 1999; Bsherick and (Tasserstrom 1990; Finder 1989; Jennings 1998, 1997; Liebman 1998; O'Brien 1996; O'Brien and Li 1999a, 1999b, 1996, 1995; Oksenberg 1998; Pei 1997, Shi 1997. 1 1 8 to an increasing level of specialization within institutions even those whichremain closely allied with the ParQr.

As a result of the increasing pervasiveness of citizen contacting, citizens have more opportunities to brush with authori^. Because of the location of receiving rooms in party and government buildings, Chinese citizens have access to govermnent offices that would otherwise be off limits. Additionally, as a result of the proliferation of these

“borderline” institutions/ leaders must devote at least minimal attention to citizen demands, by designating hours for receiving the public, establishing roaming offices in the suburbs, and answering citizen letters in public venues.^

While contacting remains limited in its potential to present large-scale challenge to the regime, it enables citizens to curb the actions of local officials who would otherwise operate with a free hand. The role of complaint channels in anti-corruption campaigns is a case in point. Contacting also provides leaders with a mechanism to publicly rectify “official errors.” Reversing Cultural Revolution verdicts was part of a larger program to re-legitimize the government in the eyes of citizens, and both complaint bureaus and discipline inspection commissions were front-line players in this effort.

Baum and Shevchenko use this terminogy to capture the class of recently- emerged institutional spaces which defy clear definition as part of either "state" or "society" (1999: 346). ^Interviews with provincial congress complaint director. Women's Federation mass work director, and newspaper editors, 1996. Across China today, there are growing signs that what we might call "public opinion" or "citizen's interests" are increasingly being taken into account by Chinese leaders. See "Playing the leading role of public opinion as a guide even more effectively", Zhongguo Jizbe (The Chinese Journalist), February 15, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-102, May 24, 1996, pp 35-40; "Demonstrating new achievements and greeting the 15“ Party congress", Renmin Ribao September 9, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-275; Li 1999; Liu 1996; Ming Xia 1997: 35; Oksenberg 1998: 29; Pei 1997 and Rosen 1991. 1 1 9 6.3 Implications

Citizen contacting is a particularistic act that occurs within regime defined limits. As I have demonstrated, the results of citizen contacts are crucially dependent upon the continued support of regime leaders. This leads us to question whether contacting is an act of submission or one of the few ways that citizens can wrestle with power.

Ironically, petitioners, by abiding by the institutional rules of the system, often strengthen regime institutions. Few complainants, even most participants in collective grievances, are out to overthrow the system writ large. In most acts of contacting, including collective petitions, there is little organization, leadership, or ideology framing the conduct. Complainants in China, like petitioners around the world, rarely organize into social groups that are able to sustain their identity beyond their original grievance. Rather than creating centrifugal pressures, these complainants often help sustain the central government’s legitimacy, appeal, and ultimately, power.

It is because of this symbiosis between citizens and socieQr that it is difficult to claim contacting is promoting **civil society” in China today. In the search for civil society, scholars comb the political landscape to find citizens banding together in autonomous organizations to keep out the state. They tend to draw attention to the cumulative effect of churches, unions, the media, intellectual associations, and non­ governmental organizations in carving out space independent of govenunental control.

1 2 0 Using this conceptualization, we would conclude that contacting institutions are likely to have a very limited impact on the development of civil socieQr/

I also do not believe that contacting reveals corporatistaims of the state. While it is true that regime leaders largely determine which typesof complaintswiU be solved through official channels, they also encourage complaints of many different natures as a source of information. For example, even though theFahtn Gong petitions have failed to produce the desired result, they hardly fell on deaf ears. What is controlled through contacting is less the expression of interests than the outcome of demands.

Contacting channels have shown tremendous flexibiliQr and adaptability, as demonstrated in the proliferation of connections discussed in Chapter Five. While other communist structures, including the formal household registration system ihukou) , work units idanwei) and even CCP membership, may be less relevant to people’s lives in the future, complaint bureaus are likely to show substantial staying power.^ Their pervasiveness and continued development into non-governmental areas suggest that this is often a meaningful form of communication, for both citizens and

Yet, the idea of government empowering civil society is not a new concept. Continental European theories, with much influence from Montesquieu and Hegel, entertain a more positive view of the state in civil society. In this view, meaningful challenges to unjust actions can occur within official channels and organizations. For example. Heath Chamberlain (1993) writes of a similar conception of state empowering civil society; he recognized a role for the state in crafting organizations which might eventually lead to civil society. This argument is not confined Co the modern period. Rankin, looking at Qingyi groups from 1878-1898, forcefully demonstrates that substantial demands for the redistribution of political power came from within the state structure, rather than as a direct confrontation with state authority (1982: 476). ’in 1995, Pei argued that the greatest challenge to the Chinese political system is the uneven pace of institutional change. While communist authoritarian political institutions are decaying at a "dizzying rate", other institutions capable of improving governance, organization political participation, and mediating conflict are emerging poorly and very slowly (1995: 77). 1 2 1 leaders alike. The question for the future is whether institutions designed to fulfill a given aim may blossom into larger opportunities for limiting the actions of government officials. Through the enterprising acts of petitioners and a little boundary-stretching by officials, this development is likely to occur. Newspapers, particularly their “letters from readers” sections, perhaps are already undergoing such a transition. From the

1950s through the late 1970s, this section of the newspaper was designed to educate readers, citizens and cadres alike, about Party policy. Since the mid-1980s, these columns have published increasingly biting citizen letters, uncovering corruption by government and Party leaders.°

6.4 Conclusion

In their comparative study of political contacting, Zuckerman and West contend that most examinations of participation omit the political institutions and personal incentives that encourage elite-mass contacts.^ In this project, I have highlighted the role of a “web of institutions” in mediating citizen participation. With this focus, I have revealed the long-standing resonance of an established tradition of elite-mass contact, as well as the ongoing interaction between formal structures and personal contacts.

This research has highlighted the endurance and adaptability of Chinese political institutions. Analysts of China often lament the absence of institutions, especially legal structures, claiming that personal contacts define power. Perhaps personal norms and

^Interview with newspaper mass work office director, November 1996. ^Zuckerman and West 1985: 119. 1 2 2 institutionalization are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Successful activists exploit

formal institutional structures to take advantage of personal connections or

relationships.The spunky activists who have appeared in this study have found ways to make the most of personal contacts within the formal structures that surround them.

Indeed, as highlighted in Chapter Four, personal connections, supported by the

increasing openness of contacting institutions, help people break down barriers and solve their problems. The prevalence of "level-skipping” and collectivecomplaints is indicative of this potential. While regulations attempt to prevent this, activists who feel their case will be ignored at the level of first instance completely bypass the prescribed channels and often find success up the hierarchy. Sometimes, they draw on personal connections with powerful leaders, but other times they join forces with similarly aggrieved citizens to create a force that cannot be ignored.

My research helps expand our conceptualization of what is a political act. Even if not ostensibly about political matters of state, contacting involves resources, power, and prestige. A Chinese citizen approaching a cadre to register his or her anger over rising fees for education is clearly asserting a political right. Activists who rally potential supporters around a collective petition draw strength from their numbers and their uniQr, however transient the alliance may be. Individuals who write a letter to a higher level of government to report misdeeds by government cadres insert themselves, however temporarily, into the political game.

Zuckermcin and West argued that contacting is the result "of a relationship, of cui existing political bond" more than depending on idiosyncratic characteristics, such as education, income, efficacy or need {1985: 119) . 1 2 3 Finally, a close examination of the institutions and outcomes of contacting show that power is not zero-sum. Rather than trying to resolve who gains more by the act of contacting, I have shown how communication structures can serve both regime and citizen interests. To do this, we must deconstruct the monoliths of ‘‘state” and

“society,” and recognize the interactions between local cadres, higher level officials, and ordinary citizens. As I discussed throughout, in the act of conq>laining, unexpected alliances between citizens and ofGcials are crafted. Successfulcomplainants draw their sustenance from state power, rather than from challenging it. The majoriQr of complainants, with the notable exception of some who engage in collective petitioning, have refrained from defying authority outright. Yet, contacting does not lead to the loosening of control by the state over society: when working properly it allows the state to exert more control over its own agents." Relatedly, contacting does not usually empower complainants at the expense of the state.

It is not difficult to find evidence of restrictions on participation in China today.

Rather, by examining means by which the participation of citizens is encouraged, we can challengeclaims of a regime autonomous from the people. Faced with evidence of citizens searching out patrons among the powerful in Beijing, we can re-examine emphases on strong central states, and focus instead on comparatively weak local institutions designed to handle conflict.

The terminology used by Lu Xiaobo in his study of "peasant burdens' is useful in this case. Lu advocates a Weberian distinction between the leaders, the "staff", and the masses. In this conceptualization, it is the staff who are the target of control. 1 2 4 Chinese citizens today may not have a direct inq>act on leadership activities at the highest levels of the Party leadership. Nor can they actively engage leaders in debates about the legitimate role of government. Yet, due to the evolution of a long­ standing tradition of formalizing elite-mass communication, citizens today are more able to tend to matters, including substantial workplace and political issues that help improve theirqualiQr of life.'^

Since 1949, the government of the People’s Republic ofChina has claimed to act in the interest of the people. Only by allowing the people to speak, even if in constrained, govemmentally-established and manipulated chaimels, can regime leaders realize this aim. Contacting may not change fundamental policy directions, but without it, the regime is doomed to drift only further away from the people.

There is much written about how seemingly apolitical actions can lead to political, even revolutionary, change. For an example drawn from the Chinese case, see Zhou's claim that farmers' “spontaneous, unorganized, leaderless, nonideological, and apolitical" acts “revolutionized" Chinese society (1996: 241). 1 2 5 Appendix A

List of Counties

Antu (AT), Jilin Province

Cenkung (CK), Guizhou Province

Chiaxiang (CHX), Sichuan Province

Chiashan (CS), Zhejiang Province

Conghua (CH), Guangdong Province

Fenkai (FK), Guangdong Province

GaoAn (GA), Jiangxi Province

Hanchuan (HC), Hubei Province

Haiyen (HY), Qinghai Province

Jianchang (JC), Liaoning Province

Jiaxiang (JX), Shandong Province

Jinghai (JH), Tianjin

Laixi (LX), Shandong Province

Liuhe (LH), Jilin Province

Longjiang (U ), Heilongjiang Province

Neiqiu (NQ), Hebei Province

Pinghu (PH), Zhejiang Province

1 2 6 Pingyuan (PY), Shandong Province

Wuqing (WQ), Tianjin

Xinfeng (XF), Jiangxi Province

Yongchang (YCA), Gansu Province

Yongchun (YCU), Fujian Province

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Schunnann, Franz (1966),Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Schwartz, Joel and William R. Keech (1968), "Group Influence and the Policy Process in the Soviet Union",American Political Science Review, September.

Selden, Mark (1995), "Yan'an communism reconsidered".Modem China, 21:1: January.

Shi Tianjin (1997),Political Participation in Beijing, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Skilling, Gordon (1966), "Interest Groups and Communist Politics",World Politics, April.

Song Bing (1994), "Assessing China's system of Judicial Review of Administrative Actions", China Law Reporter, 8, 1-2, 1994.

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Sullivan, Lawrence R. (1984), "The Role of Control Organs in the Chinese Communist Party, 1977-1983", Asian Survey, 24:6, June.

Swaine, Michael D. (1990), "China feces the 1990s: A System in Crisis",Problems of Communism, 39: May-June.

Tang Wenfang and William L. Parish (forthcoming),Chinese Urban Life Under Reform: The Social Contract, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tanner, Murray Scot (1994), "The erosion of communist party control over lawmaking in China",China Quarterly, 138: June.

Tarrow, Sidney (1994),Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and P olitics. Cambridge: New York.

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Thomas, Hugh (1980), Comrade Editor: Letters to the People’s Daily, Hong Kong: Joint Publishing Company.

Townsend, James R. (1969),Political Participation in Communist China. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Urban, Michael E. (1982), "Information and Participation in Soviet Local Government",Journal o f Politics, 44:1, February.

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Chinese Books and Articles

"1996 nian quan sheng xinfang gongzuo yaodian," [“Important points from provincial- wide letters of and visits work in 1996,]”,Heilongjiang Xinfang [Heilongjiang Letters and Visits], 122.

An Qixiong (1993), "Shangfrmg saomiao lu: yichang shangfrng," ["Scanning the record of complaints: unusual complaints, Minqing"] yu Xinfang, [Popular Sentiment and Letters and Visits], 1993:4, April.

Antu Xianzhi [Antu County History] (1993), Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe.

Cenkung Xianzhi [Cenkung County History] (1993), Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe.

Chang Xin (1994), "Jiaqi xinling qiaoliang", ["Support the spirit of the bridge (to the people),"] Minqing yu Xirtfang, [Popular Sentiment and Letters and Visits], 1994: 12: December.

Chen Peixiang and Chen Jinhong (1995),Fenkai Xian Xirtfang Zhi, [Fenkai county letters and visits history] Guangdong Sheng Fenkai Xinfang Bangongshi.

Chen Pengfei (1996), "Guanche luoshi xinfrng tiaoli' qieshi zuo hao xin xingshi xia de xinfang gongzuo," ["Carrying out the letters and visits regulations, conscientiously perform the complaint work arising out of new circumstance,"]Heilongjiang Xinfang, [Heilongjiang Letters and Visits] 1996: 4, April, #124.

Chiashan Xianzhi [Chiashan Coun^ History] (1995), Shanghai: Shanghai Fendian Chubanshe. 1 3 7 Chiaxiang XianzHe [Chiaxiang Xianzhe] (1991), Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe.

Dang Jiang and Wen Lu (1992),Jianchang Xianzhi, [History of Jianchang CounQr], Liaoning Daxue Chubanshe.

Diao Jiecheng (1996), Renmin Xirtfang Shilue. 1949-1995, [A Brief History of the People's Letters and Visits, 1949-1995], Beijing: Beijing Jingji Chubanshe.

Dong Ping (1994), "Yiqi zhigong jiti shangûm yinqi de fansi" ["Together workers and staff members stage collective complaints”] Minqing yu Xirtfang, [Popular Sentiment and Letters and Visits,] 1994: 12: December.

“Fan Fu Chang Lian, Minxin Suo Xiang,” (1996),Uaowang [Outlook], 1996:6: February 5.

Fenkai Xian Xirtfang Zhi [A History o f Fenkai County's Xirtfang Office] (1995).

GaoAn Xianzhi [GaoAn Coun^ History] (1988), Jiangxi Renmin Chubanshe.

"Guanzhu Nongcun, Guanzhu Nongmin" (1996), ["The Interests of the Village are the Interests of the Peasants"],Uaowang, [Outlook] 14, April 1.

Haiyen Xianzhi (Haiyen CounQr History] (1994), Lanzhou: Gansu Wenhua Chubanshe.

Han Wuyan (1996a), "Zhongnanhai Qinxi Yiwann Renmin" [Zhongnanhai is affectionately linked withmillions upon millions of people],Uaowang, [Outlook], 1996: 11, March 11.

Han Wuyan (1996b), "Xinfang: Chuangkou, Qiaolang, Niudai", [Xinfang: the window, the bridge, and the link].Uaowang [Outlook]. 1996: 1, March 11.

Hanchuan Xianzhi [Hanchuan County History] (1992), Beijing: Zhongguo Chengshi Chubanshe.

Hou Lei (1990), Xirtfang Gonguto. [Xinfang work] Beijing: Dangan Chubanshe.

Huang Cijin (1989),Conghua Xian Xinfang Jianzhi, [Conghua county “letters and visits” history], Conghua Xian Yinhuachang.

1 3 8 Huang Xiaoxia (1998), "Ban hao qtaizhong dianhm xinfang, rbdn wei ndnfuwu”, [‘‘Handle mass conq)laints through phone calls well,w arm lyserve the people”], Renmin Xirtfang, [The People’s Letters and Visits], 1998: 4: 23.

Jianchang Xianzhi [Jianchang County History] (1992), Liaoning Daxue Chubanshe.

Jiaxiang Xianzhi [Jiaxiang CounQr History] (1997), Shandong Renmin Chubanshe.

Jinghai Xianzhi (1995: 442), [Jinghai County History], Jinghai Xianzhi Bianxiu Weiyuanhui Bianzhu.

Laixi Xianzhi [Laixi Coun^ History] (1991), Nanjing: Zhongguo Chengshi Jingji Shehui Chubanshe.

Lan Zhengxing (1991),"Fahui Xinfang zai Juece Zhang de Teshu Zuayong”, ["Take Xinfang into account as a special part of policy-making"],Juece yu Xinxi [Policymaking and Information], 1991:8: August.

Li yunqing (1995), "Shilun dang he guojia xm&mg zhidu de gaige", [On the reform of party and government xinfang office],Jing Shehui Kexue, [Beijing Scientific Sociology], 1995:3, 135-41, Reprinted in Zhongguo Zhe/tgzh/9.

Liang Guan (1990),Xirtfang Changshi [General Knowledge about Letters and Visits], Xueyuan Chubanshe.

Lingdao Xianchang Bangong Chuli Jiti Shangfang (1996), [Leaders need to conscientiously work to solve collective complaints”],Heilongjiang Xinfang, [Heilongjiang Letters and Visits], #123: March.

Liuhe Xianzhi [Liuhe CounQr History] (1991), Jilin Renmin Chubanshe.

Longjiang Xianzhi [Longjiang County History] (1991), Nanjing: Zhongguo Chengshi Jingji Shehui Chubanshe.

Luo Xingping (1996), "()ueshi yikao qunzhoung fjm fiibai", [Conscientiously rely on the support of the masses against corruption],Uaowang [Outlook], 1996:10, March 3.

Ma Hongyi (1994), "Zhineng Zhuanhuan: Xinfang jigou qixu juejue de xianshe wenti", [The function is transforming letters and visits construction to solve practical problems], Shike Xinxi, [Social Science News], ia Zhongguo Zhengzhi, [Chinese Politics] 1994: 9.

Neiqiu XianzfU [Neiqiu CounQr History] (1996), Zhonghua Shuju Chubanshe. 13 9 Pingyuan Xianzhi [Pingyuan County History] (1993), Shanghai: Qihai Shushe Chubanshe.

Qinghai Xianzhi [History ofQinghai County] (1995), Beijing: Remnin Shehui Chubanshe.

Quanguo Xirtfang Gongzuo Huiyi (1989), [Country-wide Letters and Visits Work Conferences], Zhonggong Zhongyang Bangongting, Guowuyuan Bangongting xinfang ju Bianjin.

Shi Dongji, Jin Feng and Gong Da£a (1996), "Jiceng dangyuan ganbu de bangyang: Wu Tianyang", [Basic level party cadre sets a good exanq>le: Wu Tianyang], Heilongjiang Xinfang, 126: 1996:6: June.

Shi Yi (1996), ”Renda Xirtfang Gongzuo you guan wenti jieda”, ["Answering questions related to people's congress xinfmg work"],Minqing yu Xinfang [Popular Sentiment and Letters and Visits], 1996:1: January.

Shi Yi (1995), "Zuo hao xinfang xinxi gongzuo you guan wenti huida", ["Answering questions related to performing letters and visits information work”],Mirujing yu Xinfang, [Popular Sentiment and Letters and Visits] 1995: 1: January.

Tian Jinxin (1993), "Niming xinfang: Chuli yuanze ji fangfa", [Anonymous letters: approaches to solving in a timely manner],Minqing yu Xirtfang, [Popular Sentiment and Letters and Visits] 1993: 1: January.

Wang Xiantang and Chen Hongbin (1987),Xirtfang Xue Gailun, [An outline for studying letters and visits”] Liaoning Daxue Chubanshe.

Wu(png Xianzhi (1991), [Wuqing Coun^ History], Wuqing Xian Difang Shizhi Weiyuanhui.

Xiao Xue (1994), "Huji de Fanli", ["The hurdle of household registration"],M inqing yu Xinfang, [Popular Sentiment and Letters and Visits] 1994: 12: December.

Xinfeng Xianztd [Xinfeng County History] (1990), Nanchang: Jiangxi Renmin Chubanshe.

Xu, Fa (1996), "Guanche Zhixing "xinfang tiaoli", cujin quanshi jingjiz fazhan he shehui" ["Implement and carryout the xinfang regulations, promote the market economy and social stability"],Heilongjiang Xirtfang, [Heilongjiang Letters and Visits] 1996: 7: July, #127. 1 4 0 Xue Hongzhen (1996), "Gongkai Banshi 2Ihidu Qianghua Minzhu Jiandu",Zhongguo Jiancha [Supervision in China], 1996:3, March.

Yang Zhouxin (1995),”Dui xirtfang gongzuo de jUüan yijian” ["Some opinions on xin&ng work"], Minqing yu Xirtfang, [Popular Sentiment and Letters and Visits], 1995: 11: November.

Yonghcang Xianzhe [Yongchang CounQr History] (1993), Gansu Renmin Chubanshe.

Yongchun Xianzhi /A History of Yongchun County/ (1990), Yuwen Chubanshe.

Zhu Kexin (1993), "Yiqian babai sanshiyi ci gaozhuang", ["Lodging 1831 complaints"], Minzhu yu Fazhi, [Democracy and the Legal System], 9.

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