3µ¢Ø≤§©Æ°¥©ØÆ - ©ß≤°¥©ØÆ °Æ§ - Ø¢©¨©∫°¥©ØÆ 3¥≤°¥•ß©•≥ ¶Ø≤ £Ø∞©Æß ©Æ °Æ °¨¥•≤•§ ≥•£µ≤©¥π ≥©¥µ°¥©ØÆ .©Æ° ,°Æß≥¨•¥ - °≥¥•≤ ¥®•≥©≥ ©Æ 3Ø£©Ø¨Øßπ $•∞°≤¥≠ •Æ¥ ض 3Ø£©Ø¨Øßπ °Æ§ (µ≠ °Æ '•Øß≤°∞®π &°£µ¨¥π ض 3Ø£©°¨ 3£©•Æ£•≥ 5.)6%23)49 ض /3,/ - °π '(() ii 3µ¢Ø≤§©Æ°¥©ØÆ - ©ß≤°¥©ØÆ °Æ§ - Ø¢©¨©∫°¥©ØÆ 3¥≤°¥•ß©•≥ ¶Ø≤ £Ø∞©Æß ©Æ °Æ °¨¥•≤•§ ≥•£µ≤©¥π ≥©¥µ°¥©ØÆ .©Æ° ,°Æß≥¨•¥ - °≥¥•≤ ¥®•≥©≥ ©Æ 3Ø£©Ø¨Øßπ $•∞°≤¥≠ •Æ¥ ض 3Ø£©Ø¨Øßπ °Æ§ (µ≠ °Æ '•Øß≤°∞®π &°£µ¨¥π ض 3Ø£©°¨ 3£©•Æ£•≥ 5.)6%23)49 ض /3,/ - °π '(() iii iv *≥¥≤°£¥ Why do people respond differently to an apparently equal security threat, and which factors are decisive in the decision making? The present thesis explores different strategies for coping with an altered security situation among Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan. In 2001 a US-led coalition toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. This had severe implications for persons belonging to the Pashtun ethnic group in northern Afghanistan. The Pashtun constitute the biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan. In the north, however, Pashtuns are a minority, who have traditionally benefited from being associated with the power-holders in Kabul, who have been largely Pashtun. After the fall of the Taliban, all Pashtuns in the north were accused of being loyal to the Taliban, which had drawn most of its support from Pashtuns. The new non-Pashtun power-holders in the north made the Pashtuns in the north targets of severe harassment. The thesis explores how Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan coped with the new political context after the fall of the Taliban. This is a qualitative, explorative study, drawing on both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources consist of informal conversations and qualitative open-ended interviews with key persons. The secondary sources are made up of reports, surveys, news articles and academic literature relevant to the case. Drawing on resource competition and political opportunity structure approaches, and inspired by Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty, three possible response strategies are discussed: subordination, migration and mobilization. Subordination implies remaining in the area and subordinating to the new power-holders. The second strategy, migration, involves leaving the area, and the final strategy is to mobilize against the new power- holders in order to protect or to win back access to resources. By assessing the costs and benefits of the various strategies, Pashtuns choose the strategy which is perceived as most beneficial. However, if the costs of one of the strategies change, this will influence the relative costs of the residual strategies, even though their actual costs remain the same. I argue that the choice of which strategy to adopt is v dynamic, and that people continuously reassess their alternatives, and may combine the various strategies, either simultaneously or in a sequential manner. vi *+ , Looking back on the process resulting in this thesis, I realize just how many persons who have been involved in the project, one way or the other. First of all, I want to thank all the people in Afghanistan who have contributed to making this study feasible. Gratitude goes to my informants, who will remain unnamed. Your insights and experiences have been very valuable to me. A special warm “thank you” is sent to my assistant in Kabul. Without him I would have been completely lost. That he answered all the small and not so small questions I had, and introduced me to parts of Kabul that I would not have seen without his introduction, is highly appreciated. CPAU should be thanked for organizing my ticket and welcoming me to Kabul. I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Kristian Berg Harpviken, for his enthusiasm for my project and for his indispensable advises. I benefited immensely from his knowledge of Afghanistan, and from being introduced to his Afghanistan network. While writing up my thesis I have had the privilege to be affiliated with the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo, PRIO. Here, I have especially enjoyed being a part of the migration team. The ambitious environment at PRIO has been inspiring. Many people should be mentioned here, but I especially want thank Ellen Fadnes and Maria Hernández Carretero for good company in many breaks (in between all the hard working!). I have also mobilized friends and family. Marjan Nadim read and commented on the whole thesis. Thank you! My family should be thanked for their attempt to convince me not to go to Afghanistan. It was understood as a token of solicitude. And their support, both morally and economically when they understood that I had made up my mind is greatly appreciated. Eva deserves a special warm thank you for her comments on drafts, but even more for her constant moral support. Finally, gratitude goes to Lars who has done his best to “holde kvinden at humør” throughout this process. Nina Langslet, Oslo, May 2008 vii viii 4!",% /& #/.4%.43 !#+./7 ,%$'%- %.43 6)) !.[9 hC /hbÇ9bÇ{ ).42/$5#4)/. ! ! ! h ! 4(%/2%4)#!, &2!- ).' /& - /"),):!4)/.# 35"/2$).!4)/. !.$ - )'2!4)/. $ w /# $ t 5 / % ! & h ' { ( { a a ! 5 # * + , /& w# * - % - %4(/$/,/')#!, &2!- %7 /2+ & ! ! & . D L ! " b Dh [ ! ! 5 ! C t ' ( { ( ) ! ! !' ( ! , / !/ ' #/.4%84 % , 9 ! ! t! h ! ! ! ! ! + , L 1 !+ , ! / & 2 ./3.-( !( , , Ç # # %# !. , $ / % 4 5 1 ,! , + Ç 6 ,, $ 35"/2$).!4)/. '& $ í ' & & t 6& 4 4 3& $/ + ! t! , ë . w a + + 91 t! , [ . 1 . + ix + 5 ' t! , 5 . ++ $ /# * t9 '' $- $ ! t $( $ , Ç {6& +/ + a ' 2 + a ! ! ! 2 + ! ' ( 2 + ! ' 2 $ $ / +! ) - )'2!4)/. )$ + Ç & # ++ + í -/ + ! w# & & - + , / ( * - /"),):!4)/. +% - t : // (, ) [ ' ) t ! ! ! ) Ç! ! " ' 2 ) Ç! 4 ! " ' ) - D%# & # 6 1 (- ) a ! ) /! ( ' 6 - ! Ç 6 6& . ) Ç( 6 ) I ! Ç 6 ) I ! Ç 8 6+ ) a 9 : ( 62 - , / // + #/.#,53)/. % !00%.$)#%3 ) !'# <D' L ! (' L D ( LL [ & # % 4 LLL í 4 b ! 2 Lë t Lë a (: ëL Ç # ëLL 9# L% 4 & óL ")",)/'2!0(9 8)) x - °. Ø0 !01 Map adapted from worldpress.org xi - °. Ø0 Æ/2 13 2 01 Map adapted from AIMS xii -.( )Æ¥≤اµ£¥©ØÆ Why do people respond differently to an apparently equal security threat, and which factors are decisive in the decision-making? Given the number of armed conflicts in the world, exploring how people react to severe security threats is of relevance, not only to understand better how people cope with conflict, but also to enhance our knowledge of why conflicts persist. Afghanistan has been affected by conflicts much of the last three decades, and is still considered as one of the most conflict-ridden countries in the world. In early October 2001, only a month after the terrorist attack in New York and Washington, a US-led coalition launched an armed attack on Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. Within a month Kabul was under allied control. This marked the end of one of the more stable, yet oppressive periods in recent Afghan history. The fighters on the ground were almost exclusively Afghan, a vast majority of them returning from exile in neighbouring countries. In the north, an alliance of political cum military movements, most of which had been active in the mujahedin1 war against the Soviet invasion and in the following civil war, made up the troops on the ground. After the ousting of the Taliban, these factions controlled northern Afghanistan (Harpviken forthcoming). !∞∞≤Ø°£®©Æß ¥®• ≤•≥•°≤£® ±µ•≥¥©ØÆ The fall of the Taliban had severe implications for the Pashtun population living in northern Afghanistan, who are the subjects of this study. The Pashtun is the largest ethnic group and constitute the majority in Afghanistan. In the north, Pashtuns are a minority, making up approximately 13 percent of the population. Despite being a minority in the north, Pashtuns have traditionally benefited from being associated with the power-holders in Kabul, who have been largely Pashtun. To a large extent that means that Pashtuns have also held powerful positions in the north. The Taliban have been perceived as a Pashtun movement, in spite of the fact that they have never portrayed themselves as such, or mobilized using ethnic arguments. To the contrary, the aim of the Taliban has been to 1 Mujahedin are Islamic resistance fighters. The mujahedin war was the war against the Soviet invaders 1979-1989. See appendix 1 and 5. 1 provide security and reunify Afghanistan (Dorronsoro 2005: 258; Rashid 2001). Since the Taliban was perceived as a Pashtun movement, all Pashtuns in the north were accused of being loyal to the Taliban, and became targets of brutal harassments committed by groups loyal to the new power-holders after 2001 (HRW 2002; Marsden and Turton 2004). The aim of this thesis is to explore how Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan responded to the new political context after the fall of the Taliban. Why did some choose to subordinate to the new power-holders, while some chose to migrate, and yet others chose to mobilize? The harassments against the Pashtun minority in the north have been no secret to the allied forces, the interim government or the international community, yet little documentation is available. I have not been able to identify any academic research on the Pashtun response to the new political situation (but see HRW 2002). Harassments against the Pashtuns were for the most part perpetrated by allies of the international forces present in Afghanistan. Speculation inevitably arises that this is one of the reasons for why the topic has been largely neglected. The lack of research on the topic was a prominent reason for making the northern Pashtuns the subject of this study. Methodologically, the lack of documentation led to severe challenges. It has been necessary to invest considerable effort in data collection in order to be able to document on the course of events. Simply establishing the exact chronology of the actions has been challenging, and this is not even of supreme relevance to understand the overall development of the case.