The Impact of Political Islam on Cultural Practices in Badakhshan, Afghanistan, During the Taliban Era

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The Impact of Political Islam on Cultural Practices in Badakhshan, Afghanistan, During the Taliban Era The Impact of Political Islam on Cultural Practices in Badakhshan, Afghanistan, during the Taliban Era by Bruce E. Koepke A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ofThe Australian National University October 2002 84 Chapter Three 1965a:26). One has to bear in mind that the harsh and extreme weather conditions of this region made these particular sections of the Silk Road passable for only limited times of the year. Badakhshan' s primary role in this trade route was as a distributor rather than a supplier of goods (see Grevemeyer 1982:101; Raunig 1978:554). Many old caravanserais (rest houses) continue to be used and thus testify to the continued popularity of this ancient trade route. Yet the Silk Road has not only been important for the trade of consumer goods; it has also been a vital means of transmitting cultural practices including those of aesthetic entertainment. Musicians, dancers and actors would have been especially popular at the major caravanserais and chaikhanas (teahouses), since their performances were not reliant upon local languages, but utilised the extra-linguistic media of music, dance and mime (see also Haussig 1988:108- 109). Towards the end of the seventeenth century the discovery of maritime routes between Europe and the East had a significant impact on the monopolistic position of Central Asia and Afghanistan as transit trade centres. These new routes proved to be safer, cheaper, and in many respects faster (see Gregorian 1969:21; Grevemeyer, 1982:1 02), their inevitable popularity thus contributing to the subsequent economic and cultural isolation of northern Afghanistan. The Bolshevik reconquest of Western Turkestan which followed the Russian Revolution in 1917 and the Chinese Communist takeover of Muslim Eastern Turkestan in 1949, culminated in the closed border policies of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (henceforth USSR) and China in the 1920s and 1950s respectively. These trade and travel restrictions further impacted upon the peoples of Badakhshan, particularly merchant families who had been involved in long distance and cross-border trade (see Shahrani 1984:143). In 1924, the area of Badakhshan under the control of the Bokhara Amir was integrated into the former USSR, and later became the autonomous province of Gorno-Badakhshan in the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic (see Grevemeyer 1982:72).62 Yet even with Tajikistan's independence in December 1991, its borders with Afghan Badakhshan have remained closed and any trans-border trade remains illegal. Since the early twentieth century, the illegal trade of high quality opium from Badakhshan' s abundant poppy fields has markedly increased. In 1870-1880, opium was already being grown in the Pamir region of Sheghnan, but was 62 See earlier footnote 5. Badakhshan: Social and Cultural Context 85 mainly used by local communities, including the court of Mir Yousef Ali Shah (see Holzwarth 1990:209, 220n5).63 However, just prior to World War 1, China's enormous population of opium addicts created the lucrative opportunity of an opium export market. 64 Bypassing Britain's strictly controlled opium trade, Badakhshan quickly adapted its agricultural traditions and began to cultivate the labour-intensive poppy plant. By 1922 the opium poppy had become the province's main crop with Xinjiang, for example, importing exclusively from Badakhshan (Holzwarth 1990:209-210).65 In recent years, particularly during the Rabbani Presidency (1992-2001), the cultivation of opium has dramatically escalated to become the main source of income for many farmers. Although officially prohibited by the Islamic State of Afghanistan under President Rabbani and also by the Governor of Badakhshan, there has been no effective means of enforcing bans in the poverty-stricken province, despite support from the UN. Importantly, the poppy plant is not only a vital source of income for many local communities, but has numerous useful by-products including animal fodder, vegetable oil and soap that are greatly valued by the impoverished population. 66 In fact, in 1998 and 1999, Badakhshan needed to import most essential goods such as additional grains, oil, salt, sugar, fuel, and medicines, as well as the luxury .items of soap, batteries, soft drinks, and clothing. While oil and salt were available from neighbouring provinces, most other items originated in Iran and Pakistan and were smuggled via donkey or truck through Taliban territories to Taloqan (Takhar Province), Sar-e Pul (Baghlan Province) and then onwards to Faizabad. In addition, a small number of household and luxury items reached Badakhshan via the Topkhana!Shah Salim Pass during the summer months. However, these goods tended to be available only in the larger district centres of Keshem and Faizabad in the western mountain regions, and in Jurm and Baharak in the central basin. In comparison, the bazaars in the villages of the high mountain areas in south- and north-eastern Badakhshan were characterised by a marked scarcity of tea, sweets, fruit, and clothing. 63 Mir is a Tajik word for a local chief. 64 In 1907, China had an approximate population of 13.5 million opium addicts (see Holzwarth 1990:208). 65 During this period, Jurm established itself as a centre for Badakhshan's opium production and trade. 66 The stem of the poppy plant, for example, is used as fuel; its ashes are utilised in soap production. The seed is extracted for oil production and used for cooking and the remaining seed pulps are fed to domestic animals (see Afghanaid 1995:Appendix Iii). 86 Chapter Three This economic and geographic isolation, together with its lack of natural resources, meant that Badakhshan occupied a peripheral political position during Afghanistan's modem area (1950-1978). Even before the Marxist coup in 1978, Badakhshan was categorised by the UN as one of the poorest and most backward provinces of Afghanistan (see UNIDATA 1992:5). UN recommendations published in 1976 were never implemented (UNIDATA 1992:5) with the consequence that the levels of poverty in the province continued to escalate. These cycles of impoverishment are further perpetuated by the fact that approximately one third of the local population is landless (see Goodhand 2000:272). Moreover, throughout its history, Badakhshan has been prone to food shortages (see Goodhand 2000:268) and regular floods continue to erode precious arable land. During my field research, bartering continued to be a common practice as a consequence of scarce employment and irregular payment of salaries. In the bazaars, locally hand-made items such as traditional Badakhshi shoes, coats, caps, pottery, lapis lazuli jewellery, saddle goods, and urns were sold next to basic household goods imported from Pakistan and Iran. With this virtual lack of cash flow, opium resin became a quasi-monetary unit, providing many impoverished farmers with immediate finances and often in hard currency. The limited employment options available for Badakhshi men in Badakhshan were to work with one of the few international NGOs, 67 to serve as a soldier for one of the numerous military commanders belonging to various factions of the United Front, or alternatively to engage in the opium trade as a courier or farmer. Since the Islamic State of Afghanistan did not have a remotely viable economy, people became dependent upon whatever offered a means of cash revenue. Thus, a shift from the production of wheat to that of opium, from the trade of animals to the trade of drugs became characteristic of all levels of Badakhshi society in the last stages of Rabbani's Presidency (see Goodhand 2000:277). 68 The harsh and often inhospitable living conditions of Badakhshan are further compounded by its poorly developed internal infrastructure. Major thoroughfares that were built during previous regimes dating back to President Daoud (1973-1978), deteriorated with the beginning of motorised trade over twenty years ago (see Raunig 1978:559, 572n14). Since neither the Islamic 67 After a second major earthquake hit Badakhshan in May 1998, many international NGOs started to set up offices and programs throughout the province. 68 As a result of the widespread insecurity in Badakhshan, peasants were not able to sell livestock in Kabul or other large bazaars. Badakhshan: Social and Cultural Context 87 State of Afghanistan nor the local government had the means to allocate funds for roadworks, the main motorable transport artery (Keshem-Argu-Faizabad­ Baharak-Warduj-Zebak-Ishkashim) was fragile and suitable only for all-wheel­ powered vehicles and trucks. Whilst there was no telecommunication system during the time of my research in 1998 and 1999, several satellite phones existed in Faizabad and an old telephone line serviced a few government buildings as well as some NGO offices.69 Electricity was virtually non­ existent.70 A diesel-powered generator in Faizabad's Shahr-e Kohna district operated very infrequently, while in Dasht-e Islam a somewhat more efficient diesel-generator more regularly supplied electricity to residences near the inner city.71 Whereas. all NGOs used diesel-powered generators, no other settlements had access to public electricity. However, in Buz Dara in the Pamir region as well as in Bagh-e Zard in western Badakhshan, I saw some ingeniously designed generators comprised of parts stripped from Soviet military vehicles and driven by local irrigation canals. In spite of its extreme isolation and poverty, Badakhshan has historically had one of the best provincial education systems available in Afghanistan. The province was well known for its Sunni religious institutions (see Shahrani 1984:152). Secular education for both girls and boys was also relatively well supported by national and provincial governments from the 1950s to 1990s.72 During my research, Sheghnan district in the north-east of the province was singled out by virtually all Badakhshi informants as a centre of learning and for producing some of the best male and female teachers of the province.
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