BETWEEN PATRONAGE and REBELLION 1. the 1960S and 1970S

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BETWEEN PATRONAGE and REBELLION 1. the 1960S and 1970S AFGHANISTAN RESEARCH AND EVALUATION UNIT Briefing Paper Series Dr Antonio Giustozzi February 2010 BETWEEN PATRONAGE AND REBELLION Student Politics in Afghanistan Contents Introduction 1. The 1960s and Student politics is an important aspect of politics in most countries 1970s ...................1 and its study is important to understanding the origins, development and future of political parties. Student politics is also relevant to elite 2. Post-2001: A different formation, because elites often take their first steps in the political arena environment .......... 4 through student organisations. In Afghanistan today, student politics 3. Post-2001: moves between two poles—patronage and rebellion—and through its Patronage and study we can catch a glimpse of the future of Afghan politics. Careerism ............. 6 Student politics in Afghanistan has not been the object of much 4. Post-2001: Rebellion scholarly attention, but we know that student politics in the 1960-70s Surging................12 had an important influence on the development of political parties, which in turn shaped Afghanistan’s entry into mass politics in the late 5. Conclusion and 1970-80s. The purpose of this study is therefore multiple: to fill a gap Implications ..........15 in the horizon of knowledge, to investigate the significance of changes Annex: Summary of in the student politics of today compared to several decades ago, and Cited Organisations ...16 finally to detect trends that might give us a hint of the Afghan politics of tomorrow. The research is based on approximately 100 interviews About the Author with students and political activists in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif and Jalalabad, as well as approximately 12 interviews with former Dr Antonio Giustozzi is student activists of the 1960-70s. research fellow at the Crisis States Research Centre (LSE). He has 1. The 1960s and 1970s authored a variety of articles, papers and The roots of modern politics in Afghanistan sink to the 1960-70s, books, including 2009’s when many of the political movements that became protagonists Empires of Mud: War and in the civil wars and today’s political scene started taking shape. Warlords in Afghanistan In particular, this was the time when Afghanistan’s educated class and Decoding the New started growing numerically, due to the expansion of Kabul University, Taliban, which he which was established in 1947. The expansion of university education edited. Dr Giustozzi is was a priority for Afghan governments from the late 1940s; higher currently researching education attracted a rising share of the education budget, until it issues of governance in reached over 40% in 1969, an impressive percentage by most standards Afghanistan, including (see Table 1).1 However, the ruling monarchical elite had no plans to focus on the military, actually share power with the new educated class it was forming; police, intelligence and subnational systems. 1 For a comparison with regional countries, see Antonio Giustozzi, The Politics of Education (Kabul: Afghanistan Analysts Network, forthcoming), Table 7. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit the experiment of the “Decade of Democracy” (1963-72) went rapidly awry as the increasingly Afghan student politics: Who is who? frustrated intelligentsia started clamouring for more influence, and soon turned against the Please refer to the annex on page 16 for a ruling elite. The radicalisation of the educated description of each political party and student class in the 1960-70s was arguably one of the organisation mentioned in this report. causes of the crisis of the Afghan state from 1973 onwards. some Kabul high schools; the more open climate in universities favoured political debates, which Already, in 1950, an attempt by the pro- soon resulted in the formation of discussion groups government Klup-i-Milli (National Club) to set that later coagulated into political parties. At the up a student union backfired when during early universities, particularly the Islamic law faculties, meetings strong sympathies for opposition groups, Islamist texts in Arabic started circulating too. such as Wish Zalmiyan (Awakened Youth), emerged One of the first organisations to emerge was among members. The union became rapidly the Sazman-i-Dimokratik-i-Zanan (Women’s politicised, despite attempts by the government Democratic Organisation), a leftist group with a to ban political activity within it. The students strong student component. The Hizb-i-Dimokratik- soon started spreading their activities among the i-Khalq (HDKh, People’s Democratic Party) was general population, even sometimes travelling to the first party to be launched and several others the provinces. After a few months the union was followed. Students were actively involved in the banned.2 campaign for both parliamentary elections in the 1960s.3 Several later protagonists of Afghan Table 1: Percentage share of education politics cut their teeth during this period, including budget going to higher education Mohammad Najibullah, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ahmad Shah Massoud, and many others. Some, 2010 1959-60 1962-63 1969 like Babrak Karmal, had been active in student (planned) politics during an earlier period (he was elected Higher 23.7 28.4 43.6 10.7 head of the student union at Kabul University in education 1950).4 All others 76.3 71.6 56.4 89.3 Source: Central Statistics Organisation The new political parties formed in those days, targeting the intelligentsia for recruitment, had Table 2: Enrolment at higher education characteristics markedly different from that of institutions the previous generation of parties. The second 1960 1,694 generation of Afghan political parties was clearly 1970 7,832 characterised by its roots in the university (and 1980 18,000 high school) student body. They were parties of 1990 24,333 the educated class. After its foundation in 1965, 2003 31,203 HDKh did well in student union elections, but then 2004 39,514 competition started building, and it split into two 2005 39,354 main and several smaller factions, weakening 2006 41,892 its appeal and dividing its vote. The Maoists of Source: Central Statistics Organisation the Sazman-i-Jawanan-i-Mutarraqi (Organisation of the Progressive Youth) had their moment of The new generation that was undergoing training popularity before also splitting into several rival in the 1960-70s also became politicised in the groups.5 The Islamist Jawanan-i-Muslimun was universities. Leftist political texts smuggled from the next to dominate the scene; its internal splits Iran or India were being read clandestinely in into groups such as Hizb-i-Islami, Jamiat-i-Islami 2 Thomas Ruttig, Zur Bedeutung der bürgerlichen 3 Interview with Soraya Parlika, Kabul, March 2009. Oppositionsbewegung der 50er Jahre unseres Jahrhunderts 4 für die Formierung progressiver politischer Kräfte in Personal communication with Thomas Ruttig, January 2010. Afghanistan (Berlin: Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 5 On the Maoists and their vicissitudes, see N. Ibrahimi’s 1985). forthcoming paper on Afghan Maoists. 2 Between Patronage and Rebellion: Student Politics in Afghanistan and Ittihad-i-Islami during the late 1970s and the activists who were placing themselves at odds with 1980s came too late to affect its performance their families by joining radical groups of various in student elections. Other groups active among kinds. This was often the case of Khalqi activists students included the nationalist Afghan Millat and even more so with the Maoists, who were as well as a few smaller centrist groups, such as often coming from conservative rural families. former Prime Minister Maiwandwal’s group and The anti-clerical attitude of many Islamist Zabibullah Esmati’s Seda-i-Armanan (Voice of the activists might also have placed them in contrast Ordinary People). According to interviewees, in with the attitudes of their fathers. However, the late sixties the composition of the student some of the activists were the sons of the liberal union council was four Maoists, three Parchamis, intelligentsia of the 1940-50s (Wish Zalmiyan and one Khalqi, two Islamists, and one member of a other groups) and in this case there was a strong small centrist group. The Maoists were becoming degree of continuity, which was acknowledged.9 the new, big story in town and for some time Some leaders of the non-jihadi parties forming attracted the greatest attention. By the early in the 1960s bridged the gap, because they had 1970s, they were able to send 25 members to started their careers in the 1940-50s as liberal the elected council of the student union,6 but reformists and became gradually radicalised, such the Islamists were also gathering strength as the as the aforementioned Babrak Karmal (among university expanded recruitment and attracted the founders of HDKh and Parcham) and Abdul the more conservative youth from the provinces. Rahman Mahmudi, who introduced Maoist ideas Jawanan-i-Muslimun had eight members elected, to Afghanistan. Similarly, many of the Jawanan- equalling the seats gained by Parcham. Khalq also i-Muslimun activists were not really breaking benefited from the growing presence of students with their fathers; in a sense, the attitude of from the provinces and gained seven seats. The the Jawanan could be described as an attempt students of the eastern provinces contributed to to modernise the religious-conservative attitudes elect four members of Afghan Millat as well. The that were predominant within Afghan society at Islamists took the lead and gained a majority in that time. the last student union elections before Daoud came to power and they were ended.7 With the exception of daughters of the ruling elite, Afghan girls only slowly gained access Overall, the sympathies of the student body to university education during the 1960-70s. fluctuated widely, as is to be expected from During the 1950s, female students remained a student electorate with high turnover, and a small minority at Kabul University; indeed, ideological fashion was a major factor (pro-Soviet, during most of the 1950s their share of the Maoist, Islamist, nationalist, etc.).
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