AFGHANISTAN Detention and Killing of Political Personalities

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AFGHANISTAN Detention and Killing of Political Personalities AFGHANISTAN Detention and killing of political personalities 1. Introduction Up to 200 Afghan political personalities have been arrested in the past year apparently on account of their peaceful political activities and opposition to the continued armed conflict in the country. Those arrested include Afghan intellectuals, community leaders, former army officers or civil servants. The vast majority of the detainees are reportedly non-combatants arrested solely for their activities in support of peace and a broad based government in Afghanistan. Most of these detainees have reportedly been severely tortured. Over a dozen of them have been killed after their arrest. Some of the detainees have been released but as of February 1999, around 100 still remain in detention. This report covers the period between early 1998 and early 1999 and deals specifically with human rights violations against Afghan political personalities in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Amnesty International has dealt with human rights violations in other parts of the country in earlier reports. The information in this report is from interviews with former detainees or those with detailed personal knowledge of these arrests and killings. Amnesty International wishes to reiterate that it neither supports nor opposes any of the warring factions, that its concerns about human rights abuses in Afghanistan is based on its mandate and the principles of international human rights and humanitarian law. Amnesty International has highlighted human rights violations in Afghanistan for more than two decades, including throughout the Soviet invasion and as well as under the respective administrations of Zahir Shah and of former presidents Davoud, Taraki, Amin, Karmal, Najibullah, Mujaddedi, and Rabbani. It has reported on human rights abuses committed by members of all warring factions including Jamiat-e Islami, Hezb-e Islami, Jonbesh-e Melli Islami and Hezb-e Wahdat. These abuses include the killing of more than 25,000 civilians in Kabul between 1992 and 1995 in deliberate or indiscriminate attacks against residential areas, shops, streets and public places; they also include torture, rape and other abuses against women. Amnesty International continues to hold the leaders of all warring factions accountable for the human rights abuses committed by their members or sanctioned by themselves. It urges that all perpetrators of human rights abuses against the Afghan people should be brought to account and that no one should be allowed impunity. Amnesty International strongly urges all parties in Afghanistan to take the protection of human rights seriously and to respond to calls for an end to the cycle of abuses. To this end, Amnesty International is interested in dialogue with all faction leaders with regard to the concerns raised in its documents and on the practical steps they can take to end these abuses. 2. Current political background Amnesty International March 1999 AI Index: ASA 11/05/99 2 Afghanistan: Detention and killing Factional fighting continues between the Taleban militia led by Mullah Mohammad Omar and the opposition militia led by Ahmad Shah Masood while neighbouring countries are reportedly continuing to supply weapons to their favoured warring factions. Despite renewed UN efforts, the prospect for peace has so far remained remote. So far, only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates have recognized the Taleban as a government, although relations between Saudi Arabia and Taleban appear to be strained. In recent years, the Taleban movement has found itself isolated internationally because of its discriminatory policies on grounds of gender, the perception that it allows Afghanistan territory to be used as a base for the so-called international terrorism and the concern over the reported production and export of illegal drugs from Afghanistan. Access by independent monitors to various parts of the country continues to be severely limited. Foreign journalists - with the exception of several Pakistani journalists - have rarely been given permission to go to Kandahar. For many months, even Pakistani journalists were not given permission to visit Mazar-e Sharif where thousands of Taleban members taken prisoner by the Northern Alliance were reportedly executed in May 1997 and thousands of ethnic Hazaras were reported to have been massacred by the Taleban in August 1998. No journalists were allowed to visit Bamyan in late 1998 after the Taleban captured this province. There are fewer restrictions in Kabul, but even there, journalists have to operate within strict limits. For instance, photography is forbidden and journalists have been warned not to identify the ethnic background of the Afghans they interview. On many occasions, journalists have been stopped from making contact with people. At the same time, severe restrictions, particularly those related to discriminatory policies against women, have prevented the UN agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from providing immediate humanitarian assistance to destitute families. In 1998, pressure on humanitarian NGOs to move their offices to a designated area despite serious security concerns forced them to leave the country pending assurances of security and unfettered access to people in need. In November 1998, the Security Council approved the establishment within the United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan of a unit to monitor and deter violations of human rights and humanitarian law, but this project has not yet begun. The past two years have been marked by a resurgence of political activity in the Afghan diaspora. Many seminars and conferences have been organized by Afghans in Europe and other parts of the world in which options for peace and the establishment of a broad-based government through negotiation have been explored. Several associations have emerged among Afghan intellectuals from different political or ethnic backgrounds, including Rah-e Sevom (third AI Index: ASA 11/05/99 Amnesty International March 1999 Afghanistan: Detention and killing 3 way) or Qowat-e Sevom (third force) to promote dialogue within the community on possibilities for a political settlement. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, a number of Afghan parties have assumed a higher profile in advocating an end to the ongoing war and the establishment of a broad-based government. These include Da Solh Ghorzan (Peace Movement Party) and Afghan Mellat (Afghan Nation). In addition, a number of new parties and associations seeking a political solution to the war have emerged in recent years including Shura-e Islami Azadi va Democracy (Islamic Council for Freedom and Democracy). At the same time, the more established associations such as Shura-e Tafahom va Wahdat-e Melli Afghanistan ( Council for Understanding and National Unity of Afghanistan), RAWA (Revolutionary Association of Women of Afghanistan) and the Afghan Women Council continue with their activities in support of peace and in defence of human rights in Afghanistan. 3. Recent detentions Up to 200 Afghan personalities or local community leaders have reportedly been arrested in southern and eastern Afghanistan within the past year for what appears to be their activities in support of peace and a broad-based government in Afghanistan. The majority of them were reportedly arrested in October 1998 mainly in the city of Jalalabad on accusation of plotting a coup against the Taleban. A Taleban official said they would be tried but reportedly admitted that no arms or ammunition had been recovered from the detainees. So far, the Taleban have not provided the families of the prisoners with any evidence of their involvement in the alleged coup, nor have they made public any such evidence. Among the detainees are locally recruited staff of international organizations, and at least three Afghan staff members of the United Nations who, as of October 1998, were reportedly held without charge. Some of the detainees are teenaged boys whose families have been told they would only be released if their fathers were produced to the Taleban authorities. Most detainees were reportedly taken to the various detention centres in Jalalabad and Kandahar. A number of these detainees are reported to have been released after being subjected to severe beatings and ill-treatment, but - as of February 1999 - around 100 of them are believed to be still in detention. The authorities have reportedly sought to arrest scores of others but those wanted have already fled to other countries. The arrests took place amid reports of a series of measures by the Taleban in early 1998 taken against some of their senior officials and commanders on suspicion that they might be favouring the formation of a broad based government including representatives of rival factions Amnesty International March 1999 AI Index: ASA 11/05/99 4 Afghanistan: Detention and killing and other political groups. A number of high ranking officials and commanders were believed to have been summoned to Kandahar and were questioned about their support and loyalties to the Taleban. Some were thought to have been removed from positions of authority.1 These developments coincided with a number of meetings organized by Afghan political figures in Western Europe to explore the possibility of a broad based government in Afghanistan. In one such meeting in Germany, representatives of all parties had been invited, but as the Taleban authorities did not attend a number of Afghan personalities left the conference because it was not fully representative.
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