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The Netherlands and Afghanistan Conflict Policy Research Project (CPRP) The Netherlands and Afghanistan Dutch Policies and Interventions with regard to the Civil War in Afghanistan Luc van de Goor Mathijs van Leeuwen Conflict Research Unit November 2000 Desk top publishing: Birgit Leiteritz Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ Clingendael 7 2597 VH The Hague P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague Phonenumber: #-31-70-3245384 Telefax: #-31-70-3282002 Email: [email protected] Website: http://www.clingendael.nl/cru © Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyrightholders. Clingendael Institute, P.O. Box 93080, 2509 AB The Hague, The Netherlands. © The Clingendael Institute 3 Contents Abbreviations and Glossary 5 Executive Summary 7 1 Introduction 9 1.1 Research Objective 9 1.2 Conceptual Aspects 9 1.3 Methodology 12 2 An Outline of the Conflict in Afghanistan 13 2.1 Background and Causes 13 A Country of Diversity 13 A Short History of State Formation 15 Socialist Afghanistan 18 On the Threshold to a New Phase of Conflict 19 2.2 The Parties Involved and their Objectives 19 The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) / Watan 20 The Mujahideen 20 Junbish 22 The Taliban 23 Pakistan 24 Iran 26 Saudi Arabia 27 The Soviet Union, Russia and the Central Asian Republics 27 The United States of America 28 2.3 The Dynamics of the Conflict 29 The Ousting of Najibullah 29 The Interim Government and Continued Factional Competition 30 The Coming to Power of the Taliban 32 The Present 34 2.4 Recapitulation 37 Historical Weakness of the State and the Struggle against State Control 37 Control over the State and the Ethnic Factor 38 Outside Interference 39 Contest over the Nature of Society 40 4 © The Clingendael Institute 3 International Efforts to Bring the Conflict to an End 43 3.1 Diplomatic Efforts 44 Efforts to Establish an Interim Government 44 Efforts to come to an Agreement in the Factional War 46 Diplomacy and Negotiation with the Taliban 47 3.2 Military Force and Restrictions in Military Assistance 49 3.3 Humanitarian and Development Assistance 50 Coming to Common Programming 51 The Afghanistan Support Group (ASG) 53 Common Programming in Practice 54 3.4 Assessment of International Policies and Interventions 56 4 Dutch Policies and Interventions 59 4.1 Dutch Diplomacy and Bilateral Relations with Afghanistan 59 New Conceptions of Aid 60 Dutch Analysis of the Conflict and the Possibilities for Intervention 61 4.2 Dutch Political Interventions at the International Level 63 Diplomatic Contacts 64 Dutch Involvement in Donor Meetings 64 4.3 Conflict Prevention, Development Aid and Emergency Assistance 67 Characteristics of Dutch Aid to Afghanistan 67 Shifts in Attention in Dutch Assistance 68 Characteristic Development-for-Peace Projects 70 4.4 Assessment of Dutch Policies and Interventions 72 5 Major Findings and Lessons Learned 73 5.1 Analysis of the Conflict 73 5.2 Analysis of International Interventions 74 5.3 Analysis of the Dutch Interventions 76 5.4 Lessons Learned 76 Bibliography 79 Annexe 1 Political Dossiers Consulted 83 Annexe 2 Map of Afghanistan 88 Annexe 3 Afghan Political Leaders since Independence, and Major Parties and Factions 89 Annexe 4 Net ODA Flows of the Most Important OECD Donors to Afghanistan; in Millions of US$ per Year 92 Annexe 5 Overview of International Meetings concerning Aid of Afghanistan 94 Annexe 6 Overview of Dutch Diplomatic Visits to Afghanistan 96 Annexe 7 List of Conflict-related Projects Financed by theDutch Government 99 Annexe 8 Gross Dutch Government Aid to Afghanistan in NLG, Divided per Character of the Aid, with Conflict-related Aid split out per DAC Sector Category 105 Annexe 9 Distribution of Dutch Government Aid, in NLG 107 About the Authors 111 © The Clingendael Institute 5 Abbreviations and Glossary ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief AIG Afghan Interim Government ASG Afghanistan Support Group CAP Consolidated Appeal CHA Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance CPRP Conflict Policy Research Project DAC Development Assistance Committee of OECD DANIDA Danish Agency for Development Assistance DCH Directie Crisisbeheersing en Humanitaire Hulp (Dutch Directorate for Crisis Management and Humanitarian Aid) DCH/CP DCH/ Section for Conflict Prevention DCH/HH DCH/ Section for Humanitarian Aid DMP Directorate of Multilateral Development Cooperation and Special Programmes DMP/NH DMP/ Section for Emergency Aid DMV Directie Mensenrechten en Vredesopbouw (Dutch Directorate for Human Rights and Peace-building) DMV/HH DMV/ Section for Humanitarian Aid DMV/MR DMV/ Section for Human Rights DMV/VG DMV/ Section for Peace-building and Good Governance ECHA Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs of the UN ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office EU European Union FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN HH Humanitaire Hulp (Humanitarian Aid) IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IDP Internally Displaced Person IGO Inter-Governmental Organization IMF International Monetary Fund INGO International Non-Governmental Organization ISI Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistan) Jihad Holy War Jirga Decision-making body at the village level, made up of village elders and other notables, presumably based on consensual decision-making, mainly found in Pushtun traditional areas 6 © The Clingendael Institute KAP Klein Ambassade Project (Small Embassy Project) Madrassa Islamic religious school MFO Mede-financierings Organisatie (Co-financing Organization) MIDAS Management Inhoudelijk Documentair Activiteiten Systeem (Management Contents Documentary Activities System) MSF Médecins sans frontières Mujahideen Fighters in a holy war Mullah Traditional prayer leader NGO Non-Governmental Organization ODA Official Development Assistance OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development PCP Principled Common Programming PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan Shariah Islamic Law, based on the Koran, the Sunna (the practices of the Prophet), the ‘ijma (consensus of opinion among Islamic theologists) and the qiyas (reasoning by analogy) Shura Council of state-leaders; operates very much like the jirga, although its structure is looser Ulema Men of religious learning who interpret shariah law UNDHA United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNOCA United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Afghanistan UNOCHA United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance UNSMA United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan WFP World Food Programme WHO World Health Organization © The Clingendael Institute 7 Executive Summary This case study analyses Dutch foreign policies towards the conflict in Afghanistan since 1989. It investigates the efforts that the Dutch government has undertaken to contribute towards ending hostilities, the results of these efforts and the lessons that can be drawn from Dutch interventions in the conflict. Chapter 2 outlines the background and causes of conflict in Afghanistan, the major parties involved and the dynamics of the conflict. The analysis points to a multiplicity of factors underlying the conflict. From a historical point of view, the Afghan state lacked coherence and suffered from the struggle of traditional communities against state control. The Soviet invasion and continued infighting eroded the political balance among the various ethnic groups. At another level, the rise of the Taliban also resulted in a struggle over the nature of society. At the same time, regional factors also fuel(led) the conflict. Chapter 3 sketches the nature of interventions undertaken by external actors other than the Netherlands. Despite intense negotiations the conflict has continued. Efforts at mediation since the departure of the Soviets failed for several reasons. The Geneva Accords of 1988 were mainly an agreement to settle the external factors in the conflict and were not linked to a political settlement at the domestic level. Efforts to set up an interim government failed, because of limited interest by the international community to enable its implementation, a lack of commitment by the local parties, and the lack of basic state institutions to facilitate the process. The rise of the Taliban did not alter this situation. Mediation efforts failed, as, expecting a complete victory, the Taliban were not willing to negotiate. Secondly, they rejected interventions by external mediators who represented a contesting ideology of state and society. Due to support from neighbouring Pakistan, and the resources available to the Taliban through narcotics and arms smuggling, the international community has little leverage over them. To influence the situation in Afghanistan through assistance-related instruments, the donor community developed a new administrative structure for international assistance, which aimed to support peace through linking assistance with diplomatic and political instruments. It appears, however, that it was insufficiently linked with the context in Afghanistan, and posed moral dilemmas to donors. The analysis in Chapter 4 of Dutch policies and instruments as used vis-à-vis
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