Congressional Record—House H11137

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Congressional Record—House H11137 October 28, 1999 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Ð HOUSE H11137 proposing. We are proposing that Russia's economic problems, we must During his tenure as the chief archi- Americans have the right to advise still be engaged but be engaged in a dif- vist, there was a decision made in Mos- their banks to provide them banking ferent way. cow to relocate the central files of the services but not to allow the use of I rise tonight, however, Mr. Speaker, KGB from downtown Moscow to one of those banking services for marketing to discuss a security issue relative to the Ring Road sites. Since Mitrokhin purposes against them by some other Russia based on a set of hearings that was in charge of the archives, his job affiliate or third party. That should I have conducted on my subcommittee was to monitor these archives and al- not be too much to ask. over the past 5 years. Two years ago, ways keep them under his control. In So, Mr. Speaker, in closing, I would Mr. Speaker, I had the highest ranking fact, he oversaw the move of the files like to say that we are on the cusp of GRU defector ever from the former So- had to be checked out of the Moscow a new dawn when it comes to financial viet Union, Stanislav Lunev come be- site and then checked in at the new services. We are at the eleventh hour, fore our Committee on Armed Services, site, both of which were done by this is last chance we are going to have and in a hearing that was open to the Mitrokhin and people who worked for to ensure Americans their privacy. And public, but in which hearing we had to him. while this bill, H.R. 10, may have sort hide his identity because he is in a wit- Now, he had been recognized during of corralled one horse, the one horse ness protection program in this coun- his career as an outstanding public that is involved in raiding our privacy, try, he testified about his role as a servant in the Soviet Union. In fact in it has left 5 to 500 out of the corral. Be- GRU agent and what his responsibil- the book, there is a photograph of the cause while it has helped on third- ities were. documentation awarded to him signed party privacy protection, it is going to During that testimony, besides giv- by the chief of the KGB praising him create a whole new host of financial or- ing us an insight into the mindset of for the outstanding work he did on be- ganizations. And they are going to be Soviet intelligence, he talked about half of the Soviet Union. given the opportunity to violate our what he thought may in fact continue But because Mitrokhin privately did rights of privacy, to telemarket us at 7 to be some problems with our relation- not like many of the practices of the o'clock at night. ship with Russia today. One of the KGB, especially those individual at- Mr. Speaker, I am here to stand for more troubling things that Lunev tacks on people and the attacks on eth- any American in the next decade that spoke of was when he was assigned to nic groups, he secretly during his ca- gets a call at the dinner hour when the Washington embassy of the former reer of over 2 decades on a daily basis they are trying to sell them a product Soviet Union, under the cover of being copied down in his own handwriting as using their checking account, their a Tass correspondent, one of his pri- many of the KGB files as he could. credit card, their Social Security num- mary responsibilities was to identify Each day during his tenure as the head ber or other information. And I hope and locate potential sites for the drops archivist of the KGB, he would then they do not call me at 6 o'clock to and the location of sensitive Soviet place these handwritten notes inside of complain, because I am here tonight military equipment and hardware that his clothing, would sneak them out of trying to get the U.S. Congress to pro- could be accessed in time of a conflict the KGB headquarters, and on a daily hibit that practice. in the United States. basis put them under the flooring of his f Now, we had no separate way of cor- dacha. He did this for a number of roborating the testimony of Mr. Lunev years, assembling a huge file of hand- FURTHER MESSAGE FROM THE at that time, yet these comments were SENATE written notes that basically were cop- made on the public record and were ob- ied from the KGB archives. A further message from the Senate viously of great concern to us. Well, In 1992, after the reforms took place by Mr. Lundregan, one of its clerks, an- this past summer something new hap- in Russia, Mitrokhin emigrated nounced that the Senate had passed pened, Mr. Speaker, and that was that through one the three Baltic states. He without amendment a joint resolution the Cambridge scholar Christopher An- initially went to an American embassy of the House of the following title: drew, who has written over 10 books, and told them who he was and the kind H.J. Res. 73. Joint Resolution making fur- very scholarly books on intelligence of information he had. For some rea- ther continuing appropriations for the fiscal operations around the world, and who son, he was not able to link up with the year 2000, and for other purposes. has specialized in the intelligence of American Government to allow him to f the former Soviet Union and the cur- emigrate to the West. He then went to SECURITY ISSUES RELATING TO rent practices of the current intel- the British Embassy, and the Brits of- RUSSIA ligence operations inside of Russia, fered him complete asylum for himself Christopher Andrew was able to get ac- and his family. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. cess to a series of files that have been In fact, since 1992, he has been living FLETCHER). Under the Speaker's an- given to the British Government. nounced policy of January 6, 1999, the along with his family under a secret gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. b 2000 identity in Great Britain. He brought WELDON) is recognized for 60 minutes. For 6 years he worked on the files in the files with him, the handwritten Mr. WELDON of Pennsylvania. Mr. a way that allowed him to produce a notes that he had copied from the KGB Speaker, as I have done frequently in book last month which was the basis of archives. the past, I want to just talk this the hearing that I chaired. I want to go Obviously, there was a huge wealth evening about a situation that oc- through that because the testimony of of information about actions that went curred in a hearing this week relative Christopher Andrew reinforces what on within the Soviet Union by their in- to our relations with Russia. Stanislav Lunev had said in our com- telligence services. The Brits, when The last time I addressed this body it mittee hearing 2 years prior. Some they got this cache of information, re- was to focus on a new direction in our very troubling information came out of alized they had something that was in- relations with Russia, a new set of that, and there is, I think, reason for valuable because it gave the West the eight principles that the factions of the us to move quickly. first complete insight into what kinds state Duma had agreed with, allowing I have written to Secretary Albright of actions and activities the KGB was us to continue to provide investment and hope tonight to dwell upon why I involved in, what kinds of things and economic opportunity in Russia think it is important for the adminis- against America and the West. but to set some new guidelines. That tration to act on the findings of Chris- There were some other startling bill, which I dropped approximately topher Andrew in his book. pieces of information in those files. one month ago, had 25 Democrat and 25 It seems as though, Mr. Speaker, The British Government, in getting Republican sponsors when I introduced that the head archivist for the KGB these files, wanted them to be thor- it. We have now gotten additional sup- files in Moscow for a period of over 20 oughly examined, reviewed, and trans- port and, in fact, we are hoping to con- decades by the name of Mitrokhin did lated by someone that they had con- tinue to grow the kind of movement in not like the kind of activities the KGB fidence in. And because of Christopher the Congress that says that in spite of was involved in in the Soviet era. Andrew's reputation as a Cambridge VerDate 12-OCT-99 03:43 Oct 29, 1999 Jkt 079060 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 7634 Sfmt 0634 E:\CR\FM\K28OC7.198 pfrm02 PsN: H28PT1 H11138 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Ð HOUSE October 28, 1999 scholar and Russian intelligence ex- with bombs that would go off if some- in Belgium, national papers reported pert, they brought him in and gave him one attempted to dig up the cache of Wednesday. The caches were found in complete access to the Mitrokhin files. weapon materiel. forests in the center of the country and For 6 years, Mr.
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