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Sowing Discord, Countering Fear: Force Protection and Resilience to Disinformation
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CAN UNCLASSIFIED Sowing Discord, Countering Fear: Force Protection and Resilience to Disinformation
Abstract: Disinformation has long played a pivotal role in war and continues to do so. From nation-states to extremists, state and non-state actors seek to leverage the resulting fear and anxiety to strategic benefit. As a result, military decision-makers must contend with a bewildering threat landscape. Often targeted at civilians, disinformation also represents a pressing threat to force protection. Today’s military members are more closely tied to the wider world than any preceding generation. Even on deployment, they can be reached and influenced.
This paper examines how adversarial actors have historically used disinformation to mislead military populations and whether there are recognizable patterns in these campaigns. Secondly, it looks at how targeted countries have generally responded to falsity. Growing evidence indicates the best way to protect audiences from disinformation is to educate them to recognize it. Therefore, it will also examine if and how armed forces have educated personnel to distinguish fact from fiction and what current initiatives are underway in key NATO countries, like the US and Canada. Disinformation played a particularly prominent role during the Cold War (1945-1989). As such, this paper focuses on reviewing these years and looks at both periods of open war and what would now be described as ‘grey zone’ conflict. Therefore, it will principally look at disinformation spread by the West’s primary adversary during this period, Russia. The paper concludes with preliminary observations on lessons we can derive from the past and vital gaps still to be addressed.
Introduction: “The neatest trick of the devil is to persuade you that he does not exist.”1 Charles Baudelaire, 1869
Propaganda and disinformation are tested weapons of war. For centuries, adversarial actors have used lies and dissimulation to target civilians and those in uniform. Throughout the 20th century, they gained even greater significance as tools to seize strategic advantage on and off the battlefield. As US President Harry S. Truman recognized in a speech in April 1950, “this is a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men.”2 With the rise of the internet, adversaries can spread disinformation further and faster and reach directly into the social networks of target populations, including military members and their families. Adversaries like Russia have already targeted western troops deployed as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Enhanced Forward Presence (NATO eFP) in Eastern Europe and continue looking for ways to undermine the Alliance. In light of these challenges, what can we learn from how military forces have responded to propaganda and disinformation in the past?
This paper examines how adversarial actors have used propaganda and disinformation to target militaries and identify if there are recognizable patterns in these campaigns. Second, it will look at how nations have generally responded to this falsity. Growing evidence suggests the best way to protect audiences from disinformation is to educate them to recognize it in the first place. Consequently, it will also examine if and how armed forces have educated their personnel to distinguish fact from fiction and what current initiatives are underway in key NATO countries, like the US and Canada. Given the prominence of disinformation during the Cold War (1945- 1989), the paper primarily reviews these years and looks at both periods of open war and what would now be described as ‘grey zone’ conflict. Therefore, it will principally focus on
1 disinformation spread by the West’s primary adversary during this period, Russia. The paper concludes with preliminary observations on lessons we can derive from the past and the gaps still to be addressed.
Propaganda and Disinformation Targeted at Western Militaries (1945-1989): Propaganda and disinformation have always been important tools in the arsenal of the modern nation-state. The arrival of advanced communications and advertising in the early 20th century only underlined the power of both to influence friends, allies, adversaries and enemies alike. The word now carries overwhelmingly negative connotations but propaganda is simply the, “deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”3 According to historian Nicholas Cull, there are three principal types: white, grey and black.4 White includes materials attributed to a source, such as a leaflet dropped from an aircraft encouraging opposing forces to surrender. Grey is not as easily linked to a particular author and can include material funded but not attributed to the original propagandist, like a radio broadcast. Meanwhile, black is “deliberately constructed to deceive, such as a fake edition of a military newspaper altered to include news of impending disaster.”5 Disinformation fits neatly into this category and refers to, “a deception technique…based on the dissemination of untrue information with the intention to deceive, manipulate, and mislead.”6 The ultimate goal is to sow division and discord by playing on human fear and anxiety.7
Propaganda’s importance reached a new zenith during the Second World War. Indeed, many historians argue the information war the Allies unleashed was vital to ultimate victory. Consequently, the chief belligerents were skilled practitioners of propaganda on the eve of the Cold War, which put the West and the Soviet Union on an ideological collision course that would play out over the next four decades.8 The Korean War (1950-1953) represented the first major clash between the two. 9 Erupting on 25 June 1950, North Korea’s invasion of its neighbour to the south came as a shock to the international community. The responding American-led United Nations (UN) coalition took early losses in the first year of a conflict that became a protracted war of attrition.10 For over three years, UN forces faced an alliance of North Korea, China and their Soviet backers in a war that was as much about dominating the information space, as it was about the battlespace. Communist propaganda was initially aimed at undermining the morale of Western troops, many of whom were WWII veterans called up again to fight in the Far East.11 Appealing to their homesickness, leaflets, posters and radio broadcasts all accused the West of starting the war and aimed to convince rank and file soldiers they were being exploited by their commanders, political leadership and greedy financial interests. While the war was increasingly unpopular back home, these attempts at manipulation largely fell on deaf ears. Badly translated, early Communist narratives were poorly constructed and tone deaf to the culture and motivations of the target audience.12
But a more insidious effort was underway behind enemy lines. From 1950-1953, nearly 75,000 UN and South Korean servicemen were captured as prisoners of war (POWs) and subjected to a continual diet of disinformation and re-education.13 The disinformation they faced was similarly designed to convince them the West had started the war and troops were a pawn of capitalist interests. In addition, the Chinese and North Koreans used POWs to legitimize false allegations of germ warfare against the United States and bolstered these accusations by broadcasting the
2 testimony of over twenty US airmen, who claimed to have participated.14 At the end of the war, several high profile defections of American and British soldiers lent the story further weight and ensured it had an immediate global impact.15 Despite this, it appears to have once again had little effect on the POWs themselves. Post-war studies conducted by the British and American armed forces concluded only around 12-15% of prisoners had actively collaborated with the enemy or acted as propagandists during their imprisonment.16 And they did so to improve their own living conditions, rather than out of a genuine conviction in the disinformation they were fed.17 Having said that, what happened in Korea did have a significant impact on the militaries of which these men were members. For years, rumours of brainwashing stoked institutional paranoia.18
Korea also established a pattern of Communist propaganda and disinformation campaigns that would last for decades to come. For the rest of the Cold War, Communist disinformation targeted at western militaries shared three key goals. Similarly to Korea, it was intended to break the morale of the troops, undermine faith in the military as an institution, and fracture alliances like the UN coalition and NATO. In doing so, Soviet Russia and its allies worked to degrade the West’s strategic advantage. This was one of a host of ‘active measures’ or “overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behaviour in foreign countries” that the USSR used to achieve its aims.19 In 1980, the American Central Intelligence Agency estimated the Soviets spent $3 billion USD annually on such activity.20 Disinformation narratives universally portrayed the West as an aggressor willing to use military might to exploit other countries for strategic and financial gain. This theme was oft repeated as Britain lost control over its former colonies and territories (e.g. Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus) and America’s involvement in Southeast Asia escalated.21 Indeed, former military intelligence officer Stanislav Lunev claimed the Soviets spent nearly $1 billion USD on the antiwar propaganda effort in Vietnam alone.22 To make matters worse, stories were generally grounded in some element of truth to lend the story veracity and sought to amplify existing tensions in the targeted society.23 The US military’s increasingly brutal tactics in Vietnam, including carpet bombing, proved useful fodder for atrocity stories and renewed allegations of germ warfare.24
This pattern continued in the 1980s when the USSR launched an extensive disinformation campaign alleging the US Army created Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) as a bioweapon targeting homosexuals and the black population. As they did repeatedly, Soviet intelligence disseminated this claim in a developing nation, where the press was perceived as friendlier to influence. In this case, the AIDS rumour originally appeared in a little known Indian newspaper. Over time, it reached more developed countries, including in the British newspaper The Sunday Express and on American TV network, CBS News.25 The contention may seem absurd to modern audiences but was intended to appear plausible to targeted parties. Like earlier allegations, the story contained a grain of truth. Fort Detrick was, in fact, the site of the US military’s biological warfare program and congressional investigations at the time had revealed covert government experimentation programs.26 Equally important, the AIDS story was repeatedly endorsed by multiple doctors and scientists. All of the relevant parties were later discovered to have ties to the Soviet Union but it did not stop the story from taking root.27 As late as 2005, a study by the RAND Corporation and Oregon State University revealed roughly 50% of African Americans surveyed believed the US government had manufactured AIDS.28
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Besides repeated claims of germ warfare, the USSR actively worked to fracture NATO by undermining America’s relationship with its partners through disinformation portraying the US military and political apparatus as willing to exploit allies. This meant capitalizing on moments of tension, like when the US refused to share nuclear technology with France and when active opposition grew against placing American nuclear weapons in Western Europe in the late 1970s.29 Soviet intelligence used doctored evidence and forgeries to support these disinformation initiatives, alongside other established operating methods. As Alexander Perkins of the US Naval Postgraduate School notes:
One of the more well-known and sophisticated forgeries was the forgery known as Army Field Manual 30-31B, which reappeared more than 20 times from 1967-1982. The intent…was for this forgery to look like a supplement to the real US Army Field Manual 30- 31. The fake supplement contained instructions for US military specialists to interfere with a host nations’ domestic politics to ensure that countries implemented anti-leftist and anti- communist policies.30
Like most Soviet disinformation, it aimed to undermine the legitimacy of America’s defence establishment, and by extension the basis of its security relationships globally.
Countering Disinformation and Increasing Psychological Resilience (1945-1989): Over the past seventy-five years, Western nations have employed many strategies to counter the onslaught of propaganda and disinformation aimed at them. Early on, the US and its major allies established a robust communications/media infrastructure to spread their own message and counter Soviet propaganda. As the authors of a 2017 London School of Economics report argue, it was a “comparatively simple--and compelling message,” that was, “based fundamentally around freedoms; freedom of speech, artistic (and individual) expression and democracy all went hand- in-hand.”31 They disseminated this narrative through media platforms that grew to have global reach, including the British Broadcasting Corporation’s World Service, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.32 Throughout the 1950s, Western leaders worked diligently to debunk Soviet disinformation. For example, US military officials actively denied allegations of germ warfare lodged against them in Korea and submitted to an investigation by the International Red Cross and World Health Organization to prove the claims were spurious.33 However, the Americans and their partners on both sides of the Atlantic had abandoned this proactive approach by the 1970s, in an effort to encourage détente with the Soviet Union.34 The West only resumed a more aggressive posture, following the election of US President Ronald Reagan in 1981. During his tenure in office, the United States and NATO confronted Russia by continually exposing and disproving disinformation, like the AIDS story.35 This included the work of the US interagency Active Measures Working Group (AMWG), which represented the first “attempt to respond comprehensively to disinformation.”36 The AMWG perfected a strategy of only confronting the most blatant instances of disinformation, for which they could provide the public with air-tight, undeniable evidence of deception.37
During the Cold War, it appears that western militaries did not participate in counterpropaganda efforts outside of active theaters of war. There is also little evidence to suggest that they educated service personnel how to specifically recognize the propaganda and disinformation of which they were so often the prime targets. Instead, armed forces aimed to increase the overall psychological
4 resilience of soldiers, sailors and airmen, as a form of force protection. For the purposes of this paper, resilience is defined as, “the capacity to adapt, resist and thrive in the face of the stress imposed by…life in garrison, training and operational environments.”38 Fostering this quality was especially vital in the ideological war between democracy and communism. They did so by leveraging the latest research findings in the human sciences, including industrial and organizational psychology.39 For example, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom all imposed systematic screening and selection measures for new recruits for the very first time outside of a period of total war.40 Intelligence and personality testing measures were intended to weed out potential candidates, who did not fit ideal models of service and citizenship. This meant anyone who exhibited ‘deviant’ behaviour or might prove vulnerable to outside influence or disinformation.41 A 1951 Canadian military report noted this included anyone with, “extremely odd or eccentric attitudes, mannerisms, habits or appearance,” and sexual deviations like, “overt homosexuality.”42 These viewpoints helped drive the ‘lavender scare,’ of the 1950s and 1960s during which homosexual recruits and military members were actively rejected for service.43 While homosexuality was illegal in the Soviet Union, military and government leaders widely feared that these men and women could be blackmailed, more easily influenced by adversarial propaganda and disinformation, or act as Communist propagandists themselves.44 As well-known German-American writer R.G. Waldeck argued in 1952, “There is one reason why so many homosexuals went from being enemies of society in general…[to] become enemies of capitalism...Without being necessarily Marxist they serve the ends of the Communist International in the name of their rebellion against the prejudices, standards, [and] ideals of the ‘bourgeois’ world.”45
In addition to these screening efforts, western militaries poured extensive resources into research on how to further bolster resilience from the 1950s to the 1970s.46 The United States alone spent nearly a billion dollars a year on experiments in psychology and the behavioural sciences.47 As renowned historian and educator Alfred McCoy has pointed out, “at the dawn of the Cold War, the human mind became a covert battleground for [the] deployment of new weapons for mass persuasion.”48 This included research into brainwashing and the conditions under which human beings are most likely to accept mis- and disinformation. Born out of the Korean War, this obsession drove scientific enquiry at universities and research institutes across the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and West Germany, to name but a few. By the early 1970s, there were well over 1,000 peer reviewed papers on the subject.49 More importantly, this work led armed forces on both sides of the Atlantic to implement enhanced deployment and conduct-after-capture instruction. Informed by Communist re-education and disinformation practices, this training was available to any personnel likely to find themselves behind enemy lines or taken prisoner, including aircrew and special forces.50
Throughout the 20th century, the military has also been an important provider of education. Initially, educational efforts focused on increasing the literacy and numeracy of recruits, to improve their overall trainability. This grew to include civic education during the interwar years and WWII. Indeed, the British Army Educational Corps was formed in 1918 to foster a sense of citizenship amongst serviceman and guide political discussion and debate. This came on the heels of the Russian Revolution, in which servicemen had played a key role.51 From 1939-1945, educational initiatives and information programs were intended to motivate troops, while “reinforcing patriotism and inducing animosity towards the enemy.”52 This continued in the post-
5 war era, in which character education and civic literacy lectures served the dual purpose of inculcating military members with accepted values and stressing the superiority of democracy over Communism. It was not as vital to educate personnel to explicitly recognize propaganda and disinformation, as it was to teach them to reject the entire political and philosophical foundations of Communism itself.53 This would help inoculate them against attempts at influence or manipulation. British and Commonwealth forces had a long history of such indoctrination and continued to do so in the Cold War and the US military looked to their allies to design similar programming.54 For example, all new recruits to the US Army in the 1950s and 1960s had to attend four hours of character guidance sessions during basic training. This was followed by additional advanced training and monthly classes administered by individual units. Lectures included “The Nation We Serve,” which characterised the United States and its partners as nations founded on moral and religious principles and freedoms.55 Moreover, it aimed to “expose the nature and threat of communism and explained how Americans could defend their country against it.”56 Classes were explicitly intended to encourage “a desire to live in accordance with moral principles as the best defense against the aggression of a totalitarian system.”57
Recognizing and Countering Disinformation Today: Propaganda and disinformation remain important weapons. Like their Cold War predecessors, today’s adversarial actors employ both to great effect. However, the “birth of the internet, the removal of centralized and shared information sources, and the increase in the number of [platforms] involved in information dissemination,” has created an even more challenging environment.58 Social media has become “one of the main channels through which people connect and communicate,” including military members and their families.59 Russia remains a major practitioner of information warfare. The Kremlin has adopted an increasingly aggressive foreign policy over the last decade, of which disinformation aimed at the West plays a significant role. They employ many of the same techniques as their forebearers but with one key difference. They are no longer committed to simply countering the West’s narrative but chose to amplify the many discordant voices online to the point where all sources of information appear unreliable.60 Western troops deployed as part of NATO’s eFP have been and will continue to be major targets for this disinformation. In keeping with past patterns, this material aims to undermine morale, the reputation of the targeted force and fracture established security relationships. During the 2017 Canadian deployment to Latvia, stories circulated that soldiers were billeted in luxury apartments paid for by Latvians themselves.61 When the Royal Netherlands Army arrived in Lithuania, they were subjected to rumours that Dutch personnel had visited prostitutes in the area.62 In both cases, disinformation was intended to demoralise military members and sour relations with the local population.
As this paper has demonstrated, western militaries have historically not trained personnel to actively recognize disinformation. Instead, they invested in initiatives intended to boost resilience, including screening and selection methods, many of which proved misguided. In addition, they implemented enhanced training for those who might be exposed to Communist re-education and indoctrination. This included hyper-realistic conduct after capture exercises that subjected students to the disinformation and influence they could expect on the modern battlefield and in the interrogation room. They also maintained programs of education that stressed the superiority of democracy over communism. Improving resilience remains a vital and an important part of overall force protection. Bolstering mental health and the ability to endure psychological distress will
6 always be fundamental. However, this is arguably not enough anymore to address disinformation. In contrast to the Cold War, the information space is not just filled with Russian voices but other nation-states like China and numerous non-state actors.
Growing scientific evidence suggests the best way to prepare audiences for exposure to disinformation is to inoculate them against it. As the authors of a 2019 ICCRTS paper argue, “teaching and encouraging effective information practices,” is critical.63 Over the last five years, military decisionmakers have responded by introducing training and resources on cyber security and the proper use of social media. Many of the nations involved in NATO’s eFP have started to address disinformation in pre-deployment briefings and additional education for those engaged in trades directly impacted (e.g. PSYOPS, Influence Activities, Public Affairs etc.).64 The establishment of NATO’s Strategic Communication’s Centre of Excellence is also a sign of growing awareness of the Information Environment across the Alliance.65
Despite advancements, an examination of the literature and preliminary consultation with military subject matter experts in several key states (e.g. Canada, UK, US) suggests there is significant room for expansion of these initiatives. Education specifically geared to teach all military personnel to recognize fact from fiction online remains far from systematic across the Alliance. Training is generally limited to those in particular trades or preparing for a single deployment and not yet fully incorporated as part of basic training.66 Notably, it appears largely confined to the military member, rather than his or her family. This is problematic in an era where the internet has blurred the lines between homefront and front line. In 2017 former Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., “approved the designation of information as the seventh joint warfare function.”67 If information is another domain of military activity, armed forces must prepare personnel to be as familiar with the online space, as they are with other aspects of their profession. Like their predecessors, military leaders must continue to encourage resilience but cannot expect modern personnel to achieve this without a consistent level of digital literacy.
Conclusion: Western militaries have been a target of disinformation for over a century now. During the Cold War, they faced on onslaught of disinformation. Moreover, disinformation has remained a potent weapon over the subsequent decades in theatres from Bosnia in the 1990s, to the Middle East in the early 2000s and today’s digital environment. The purpose remains undermining morale, the reputation of the target force and degrading the viability of defensive alliances. In the past, militaries poured investment into overall resilience. In addition, they relied on the strength of the West’s ideological narrative to bolster personnel against disinformation. As author Larry Wentz similarly observed of information operations in a 1998 Command and Control Research Program paper on the subject, “motives…need to be equally clear and simple, but also compelling, so that citizens and allies alike will want to be part of the operation while our adversaries will feel powerless to escape the inevitable outcome if they oppose our goals.”68
Resilience remains fundamental to force protection but the online world has made it impossible to trust that troops will be able to so readily distinguish the lies from the truth. NATO countries have begun recognizing this through social media and cyber security training but preliminary research suggests more systematic initiatives are required. As a 2016 study for the UK’s Ministry of Defence recognized, there is still a distinct “disconnection between military policy and social
7 media use, with a clear generation gap.”69 Keir Giles of Chatham House and Anthony Seaboyer of the Royal Military College of Canada echo this in a 2019 report in noting many military personnel remain unaware of the risks in theater and how their own information can be used to fuel disinformation campaigns.70 This suggests research and training is needed to fill the gap, as well as resources to help military families understand the issue at hand. As a century of experience demonstrates, propaganda and disinformation are powerful forces to resist.
1 Charles Baudelaire, as quoted in, Steve Abrams, “Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia,” Connections 15.1 (Winter 2016), p. 5. 2 Harry S. Truman, Address on Foreign Policy, Luncheon of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, 20 April 1950, Harry S. Truman Library and Museum. 3 Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell, Propaganda & Persuasion, 6th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2015), p. 7. 4 Nicholas J. Cull, Vasily Gatov, Peter Pomerantsev, Anne Applebaum and Alistair Shawcross, Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda: How the West Fought Against it: An Analytic History, with Lessons for the Past (London, UK: London School of Economics Consulting, October 2017), pp. 16-17. 5 J. Pamment, H. Nothhaft, H. Agardh-Twetman and A. Fjallhed, Countering information influence activities: The state of the art (Sweden: Department of Strategic Communication, Lund University, 2018). 6 Matthew Duncan, Meghan Fitzpatrick, Ritu Gill and Suzanne Waldman, Coronavirus and Disinformation: Narratives, Counter-strategies and the Inoculation of Audiences, (Ottawa, ON: Defence Research & Development Canada, April 2020), p. 1. 7 Meghan Fitzpatrick, Pandemics and Prophylaxis: Lessons Learned from Past Pandemics on Countering Mis- and Disinformation (1918-2020) (Ottawa, ON: Defence Research & Development Canada, May 2020), p. 7. 8 Haroro J. Ingram, A Brief History of Propaganda During Conflict: Lessons for Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications (Netherlands: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism--The Hague, June 2016), pp. 18-20. 9 Matthew Andrew Thompson, “Information Wars: The Government, the Media and the People, 1941- 1991” (PhD Thesis: Rice University, May 2000), p. 199. 10 Richard Whelan, Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953 (London: Faber & Faber, 1990), p. 373; Tim Carew, The Commonwealth at War (London: Cassell & Company Limited, 1967), pp. 13, 27, 71; and Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p. 172. 11 Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, p. 39. 12 Mark R. Jacobson, “Minds Then Hearts: US Political and Psychological Warfare During the Korean War,” (PhD Thesis: Ohio State University, 2005), pp. 4-7, 87. 13 Communist Treatment of Prisoners of War: A Historical Survey. Prepared for the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1972); Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966); and Notes on behaviour of British and Allied Prisoners of War in KOREA, c. 1957, The British National Archives at Kew (Hereafter cited as TNA): WO 32/20493; S.P. Mackenzie, British Prisoners of the Korean War (UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 34; and C. Cunningham, No Mercy, No Leniency: Communist Mistreatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea (Barnsley, 2000), pp. 23-24. 14 Robert Gentner, “Understanding the POW Experience: Stress Research and the Implementation of the 1955 US Armed Forces Code of Conduct,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 51.2 (Spring 2015), p. 143. 15 Mackenzie, British Prisoners of the Korean War, p. 147; and Neville Wylie and James Crossland, “The Korean War and the Post-war Prisoner of War Regime, 1945-1956,” War in History 23.4 (2016), p. 455.
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16 Communist Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea, Paper by AI9, Air Ministry, n.d., TNA: WO 32/20490); and Julius Segal, Factors Related to the Collaboration and Resistance Behaviour of US Army PWs in Korea, HumRRO Technical Report 33, December 1956, Defense Technical Information Center (Hereafter cited as DTIC): AD 116845. 17 Communist Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea, Paper by AI9, Air Ministry, n.d., TNA: WO 32/20490. 18 Major H.S. Cousens, Deputy Director of Intelligence (Security), Repatriated Allied PW to AI9, 4 December 1953, TNA: WO 32/20495; and Ivan Coates, “Enforcing the Cold War Consensus: McCarthyism, Liberalism and the ‘Manchurian Candidate,’” Australasian Journal of American Studies 12.1 (July 1993), p. 50. 19 Cull et. al., Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda, p. 6. 20 Alexander M. Perkins, “Soviet Active Measures Reborn for the 21st Century: What is to be Done?” (MA Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, December 2018), p. 29. 21 Walter Alan Levin, “The Efficacy of Propaganda in Global Conflict During the Twentieth Century: When is Propaganda Likely to be Effective?” (PhD Thesis: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy), p. 325. 22 Stanislav Lunev, as quoted in, Walter Alan Levin, “The Efficacy of Propaganda in Global Conflict During the Twentieth Century: When is Propaganda Likely to be Effective?” (PhD Thesis: Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy), p. 325. 23 Fitzpatrick, Pandemics and Prophylaxis, p. 6. 24 Anton Weiss-Wendt, A Rhetorical Crime: Genocide in the Geopolitical Discourse of the Cold War (NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2018), p. 104. 25 Cull et. al., Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda, pp. 32-34. 26 For instance, the US Public Health Department financed the Tuskegee Syphilis Study (1932-1972), “in which [400] African American men who had syphilis were studied to follow the natural course of the disease, without being given any information about it, nor any treatment even after antibiotics became available.” Jon D. Lee, “SARS and Illness Narratives: An Examination of an Epidemic” (PhD Thesis: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2008), p. 148. 27 Thomas Boghardt, “Soviet Bloc Intelligence and its AIDS Disinformation Campaign,” Studies in Intelligence 53.4 (December 2009), pp. 7-13. 28 Laura M. Bogart and Sheryl Thorburn, “Are HIV/AIDS Conspiracy Beliefs a Barrier to HIV Prevention Among African Americans,” Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 38.2 (February 2005), pp. 213–218. 29 John David Brickey, “An Examination of the Soviet-led= campaign to split NATO,” (University of Texas at Arlington: MA Thesis, 1991), p. 5. 30 Alexander M. Perkins, “Soviet Active Measures Reborn for the 21st Century: What is to be Done?” (US Naval Postgraduate School: MA Thesis, December 2018), p. 36. 31 Cull et. al., Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda, p. 13. 32 Ingram, A Brief History of Propaganda During Conflict, p. 21. 33Jeanne Guillemin, Biological Weapons: From the Invention of State-sponsored Programs to Contemporary Bioterrorism (NY: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 99-105. 34 Perkins, “Soviet Active Measures Reborn for the 21st Century” p. 1. 35 Ingram, A Brief History of Propaganda During Conflict, p. 22. 36 Cull et. al., Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda, p. 7. 37 Megan Ward, Shannon Pierson and Jessica Beyer, Formative Battles: Cold War Disinformation Campaigns and Mitigation Strategies (Wilson Center: August 2019), p. 2. 38 It is important to note that the literature on psychological resilience is a rich one that derives from an extensive body of research. The definition employed throughout this paper reflects decades of military thinking on this subject and is intended to provide a broad understanding of the ‘resilience concept.’ Canadian Army Integrated Performance Strategy (Ottawa: ON, National Defence Headquarters, 24 November 2015).
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39 Commonwealth Advisory Committee on Defence Science (CACDS), Purpose and Principles of Defence Operational Research, Memorandum by the United Kingdom Delegation, 11 May 1950, TNA: DEFE 10/11. 40 J.C. Penton and I.R. Haldane, Army Operational Research Group Memorandum No. D20: A Study of the Evidence Upon Which The Psychiatric Element of Other Ranks is Based, November 1955, TNA: WO 291/1401; and Lt. Col. W.R.N. Blair, Identification of Incipient Misconduct Problems, 18 March 1958, Library and Archives Canada (Hereafter cited as LAC): R112, Box 822900, File No. C-2076-2; and James N. Butcher, Clinical Personality Assessment: History, Evolution, Contemporary Models, and Practical Applications. Oxford Handbooks Online (2012), DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195366877.013.0001. 41 Superintendent Canadian Defence Research Medical Laboratories, M.G. Whillans to Chairman, Defence Research Board (DRB), Attention: Human Resources Research Section—Dr. Cook, Radar Observer (Fighter Navigator) Training Policy, 18 June 1953, LAC: DRBS 68-153-301. 42 F.C.R. Chalke, Preliminary Report No. 1, DRB Contract No. DRB HQ/Dev/5, Project No. D50-94-25- 05: Psychiatric Aspects of Manpower Conservation I: Psychiatric Screening of Recruits, n.d., LAC: Box 7564, DRBS 9425-05. 43 Final Report of Committee on Morale Problems, 5 April 1951, LAC: R112, Vol. 32174, File C-3077-8, Part 1, HQC 3077-8 (Org 3). 44 Naoko Shibusawa, “The Lavender Scare and Empire: Rethinking Cold War Antigay Politics,” Diplomatic History 36.4 (September 2012), pp. 723-752. 45 R.G. Waldeck, “Homosexual International,” Human Events 9.16 (16 April 1951), Reading Files of Director Samuel D. Boykin, Box 5, RG 59, US National Archives and Records Administration (Hereafter cited as NARA). 46 J. E. Driskall and B. Olmstead, “Psychology and the Military: Research Applications and Trends,” American Psychologist (January 1989), p. 43; M. H. Maier, Military Aptitude Testing: The Past Fifty Years. Defense Manpower Data Center Report (June 1993), p. 27; and T.J. Prociuk, “Applied Psychology in the Canadian Armed Forces: An Overview of Current Research,” Canadian Psychology 29.1 (1988), pp. 95- 96. 47 C. Simpson, Science of Coercion: Communication research & psychological warfare, 1945-1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 9. 48 Alfred W. McCoy, “Science in Dachau’s Shadow: Hebb, Beecher, and the Development of CIA Psychological Torture and Modern Medical Ethics,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 43, No. 4 (Fall 2007), p. 402. 49 John Zubek Papers, University of Manitoba Special Collections, No. MSS 85, Box 3 of 7, Folder 20. 50 Chairman’s Amendments to draft Report (PWP/P(55)8) for discussion at the meeting of the Panel, 16 May 1955, TNA: WO 32/20493; App to AC 8/2/362B, Report by Lieutenant R.A.M. Seeger, Royal Marines on Combat Survival Course No. 2, 4 July 1961, TNA: ADM 201/126; and Susan L. Carruthers, Cold War Captives: Imprisonment, Escape and Brainwashing (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2009), 210-212. 51 Penelope Summerfield, “Education and Politics in the British Armed Forces in the Second World War,” International Review of Social History 26.2 (August 1981), p. 135. 52 Janet G. Valentine, Review of Political Indoctrination in the US Army from World War II to the Vietnam War by Christopher S. DeRosa. Journal of Military History 71.4 (October 2007), p. 1306. 53 Anne C. Loveland, “Character Education in the US Army, 1947-1977,” Journal of Military History 64.3 (July 2000), p. 797. 54 Valentine, Review of Political Indoctrination in the US Army, p. 1306. 55 Loveland, “Character Education in the US Army,” pp. 797-798. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., pp. 798-799. 58 Ward et. al, Formative Battles, p. 2. 59 Juris Benkis, ed. New Trends in Social Media, NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (Riga, Latvia: NATO StratCom CoE, December 2016), p. 4.
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60 Jon White, Dismiss, Distort, Distract and Dismay: Continuity and Change in Russian Disinformation (Institute for European Studies Policy Brief 13, 2016), p. 2. 61 Rebecca Lindell, “Here’s how the Canadian military is battling fake news in Latvia.” Global News (10 July 2018). https://globalnews.ca/news/4322965/canadian-soldiers-fake-news-latvia/ 62 Ritu Gill, Judith van de Kuijt, Magnus Rosell and Ronnie Johannson, “Disinformation in the Cyber Domain: Detection, Impact and Counter-Strategies,” 24th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (2019), p. 8. 63 Ibid., p. 10. 64 “Social Media: Policies and Resources,” US Army, Last accessed 25 May 2020, https://www.army.mil/socialmedia/; “Social Networking and Your Online Identity,” US Department of Defense Cyber Exchange, Last Accessed 1 June 2020, https://public.cyber.mil/training/social-networking/; “Social Media Education and Training,” US Chief Information Officer, Last accessed 26 May 2020, https://dodcio.defense.gov/Social-Media/SMEandT/; British Army Media and Communication, British Army Digital Strategy (UK: Ministry of Defence, 2016); Military Family Services, “Practical Guidance to Social Media Use,” Canadian Forces Morale & Welfare Services, Last accessed 26 May 2020, https://www.cfmws.com/en/AboutUs/MFS/ResourcesMFRCs/Documents/Social%20Media%20Guidance %20for%20Family%20Services%20Community%20July%202015.pdf; Canadian Armed Forces Subject Matter Expert to Author, 1 May 2020; US Special Operations Command Subject Matter Expert to Author, 2 May 2020; Canadian Armed Forces Subject Matter Expert to Author, 4 May 2020; Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs), “Defence Public Affairs Learning Courses,” Last accessed 27 May 2020, https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/benefits-military/education- training/establishments/defence-public-affairs-learning-centre/projects-partners.html; and 31 Canadian Brigade Group, “Be careful what you share online.” Facebook, 30 May 2020, https://www.facebook.com/31CBG/photos/a.161001123940606/4128692997171379/?type=3 65 NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, “Major Products and Activities,” (Last accessed 20 May 2020), https://www.stratcomcoe.org/program-work 66 Canadian Armed Forces Subject Matter Expert, “Correspondence with Author,” 1 May 2020; US Special Operations Command Subject Matter Expert, “Correspondence with Author,” 2 May 2020; Canadian Armed Forces Influence Activities Subject Matter Expert, “Correspondence with Author,” 10 June 2020; Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs), “Defence Public Affairs Learning Courses,” (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, Government of Canada, 2018); and 31 Canadian Brigade Group, “Be careful what you share online.” Facebook, 30 May 2020, 67 General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., as quoted in, Linton Wells II, “Cognitive-Emotional Conflict: Adversary Will and Social Resilience. PRISM 7(2) (2017), pp. 4-17. 68 Larry K. Wentz, “Peace Operations and the Implications for Coalition Information Operations: The IFOR Experience,” (NDU/CCRP, 1998). 69 Tristram Riley-Smith, “Evidence Briefing: Social Media in the Armed Forces,” Economic, and Social Research Council (October 2016). 70 Keir Giles and Anthony Seaboyer, Russian Special Forces and Intelligence Information Effects (Ottawa, ON: Defence Research and Development Canada, March 2019), p. 39.
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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA *Security markings for the title, authors, abstract and keywords must be entered when the document is sensitive 1. ORIGINATOR (Name and address of the organization preparing the document. 2a. SECURITY MARKING A DRDC Centre sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, is entered (Overall security marking of the document including in Section 8.) special supplemental markings if applicable.) International Command and Control Research and CAN UNCLASSIFIED Technology Symposium Southampton UK 2b. CONTROLLED GOODS NON-CONTROLLED GOODS DMC A
3. TITLE (The document title and sub-title as indicated on the title page.) Sowing Discord, Countering Fear: Force Protection and Resilience to Disinformation
4. AUTHORS (Last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc., not to be used) Fitzpatrick, M.
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION 6a. NO. OF PAGES 6b. NO. OF REFS (Month and year of publication of document.) (Total pages, including (Total references cited.) Annexes, excluding DCD, covering and verso pages.) November 2020 11 70
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8. SPONSORING CENTRE (The name and address of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development.) DRDC – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis Defence Research and Development Canada Carling Campus, 60 Moodie Drive, Building 7S.2 Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2 Canada 9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable 9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under research and development project or grant number under which which the document was written.) the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.) 05cc
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12. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Use semi-colon as a delimiter.) Disinformation; Resilience 13. ABSTRACT/RÉSUMÉ (When available in the document, the French version of the abstract must be included here.) Disinformation has long played a pivotal role in war and continues to do so. From nation-states to extremists, state and non-state actors seek to leverage the resulting fear and anxiety to strategic benefit. As a result, military decision-makers must contend with a bewildering threat landscape. Often targeted at civilians, disinformation also represents a pressing threat to force protection. Today’s military members are more closely tied to the wider world than any preceding generation. Even on deployment, they can be reached and influenced. This paper examines how adversarial actors have historically used disinformation to mislead military populations and whether there are recognizable patterns in these campaigns. Secondly, it looks at how targeted countries have generally responded to falsity. Growing evidence indicates the best way to protect audiences from disinformation is to educate them to recognize it. Therefore, it will also examine if and how armed forces have educated personnel to distinguish fact from fiction and what current initiatives are underway in key NATO countries, like the US and Canada. Disinformation played a particularly prominent role during the Cold War (1945-1989). As such, this paper focuses on reviewing these years and looks at both periods of open war and what would now be described as ‘grey zone’ conflict. Therefore, it will principally look at disinformation spread by the West’s primary adversary during this period, Russia. The paper concludes with preliminary observations on lessons we can derive from the past and vital gaps still to be addressed.