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Force Protection and Resilience to Disinformation

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Force Protection and Resilience to Disinformation CANUNCLASSIFIED SowingDiscord,CounteringFear:Force ProtectionandResiliencetoDisinformation MeghanFitzpatrick DRDC–CentreforOperationalResearchandAnalysis InternationalCommandandControlResearchandTechnologySymposium SouthamptonUK DateofPublicationfromExtPublisher:November2020 ThebodyofthisCANUNCLASSIFIEDdocumentdoesnotcontaintherequiredsecuritybannersaccordingtoDNDsecurity standards.However,itmustbetreatedasCANUNCLASSIFIEDandprotectedappropriatelybasedonthetermsandconditions specifiedonthecoveringpage. DefenceResearchandDevelopmentCanada ExternalLiterature(P) DRDC-RDDC-2020-P238 December2020 CANUNCLASSIFIED CANUNCLASSIFIED IMPORTANTINFORMATIVESTATEMENTS ThisdocumentwasreviewedforControlledGoodsbyDefenceResearchandDevelopmentCanadausingtheScheduletothe DefenceProductionAct. Disclaimer:ThisdocumentisnotpublishedbytheEditorialOfficeofDefenceResearchandDevelopmentCanada,anagencyofthe DepartmentofNationalDefenceofCanadabutistobecataloguedintheCanadianDefenceInformationSystem(CANDIS),the nationalrepositoryforDefenceS&Tdocuments.HerMajestytheQueeninRightofCanada(DepartmentofNationalDefence) makesnorepresentationsorwarranties,expressedorimplied,ofanykindwhatsoever,andassumesnoliabilityfortheaccuracy, reliability,completeness,currencyorusefulnessofanyinformation,product,processormaterialincludedinthisdocument.Nothing inthisdocumentshouldbeinterpretedasanendorsementforthespecificuseofanytool,techniqueorprocessexaminedinit.Any relianceon,oruseof,anyinformation,product,processormaterialincludedinthisdocumentisatthesoleriskofthepersonso usingitorrelyingonit.Canadadoesnotassumeanyliabilityinrespectofanydamagesorlossesarisingoutoforinconnection withtheuseof,orrelianceon,anyinformation,product,processormaterialincludedinthisdocument. Templateinuse:E20-0622-03791-coverdcd.dotm © HerMajestytheQueeninRightofCanada(DepartmentofNationalDefence),2020 © SaMajestélaReineendroitduCanada(MinistèredelaDéfensenationale),2020 CANUNCLASSIFIED Sowing Discord, Countering Fear: Force Protection and Resilience to Disinformation Abstract: Disinformation has long played a pivotal role in war and continues to do so. From nation-states to extremists, state and non-state actors seek to leverage the resulting fear and anxiety to strategic benefit. As a result, military decision-makers must contend with a bewildering threat landscape. Often targeted at civilians, disinformation also represents a pressing threat to force protection. Today’s military members are more closely tied to the wider world than any preceding generation. Even on deployment, they can be reached and influenced. This paper examines how adversarial actors have historically used disinformation to mislead military populations and whether there are recognizable patterns in these campaigns. Secondly, it looks at how targeted countries have generally responded to falsity. Growing evidence indicates the best way to protect audiences from disinformation is to educate them to recognize it. Therefore, it will also examine if and how armed forces have educated personnel to distinguish fact from fiction and what current initiatives are underway in key NATO countries, like the US and Canada. Disinformation played a particularly prominent role during the Cold War (1945-1989). As such, this paper focuses on reviewing these years and looks at both periods of open war and what would now be described as ‘grey zone’ conflict. Therefore, it will principally look at disinformation spread by the West’s primary adversary during this period, Russia. The paper concludes with preliminary observations on lessons we can derive from the past and vital gaps still to be addressed. Introduction: “The neatest trick of the devil is to persuade you that he does not exist.”1 Charles Baudelaire, 1869 Propaganda and disinformation are tested weapons of war. For centuries, adversarial actors have used lies and dissimulation to target civilians and those in uniform. Throughout the 20th century, they gained even greater significance as tools to seize strategic advantage on and off the battlefield. As US President Harry S. Truman recognized in a speech in April 1950, “this is a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men.”2 With the rise of the internet, adversaries can spread disinformation further and faster and reach directly into the social networks of target populations, including military members and their families. Adversaries like Russia have already targeted western troops deployed as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Enhanced Forward Presence (NATO eFP) in Eastern Europe and continue looking for ways to undermine the Alliance. In light of these challenges, what can we learn from how military forces have responded to propaganda and disinformation in the past? This paper examines how adversarial actors have used propaganda and disinformation to target militaries and identify if there are recognizable patterns in these campaigns. Second, it will look at how nations have generally responded to this falsity. Growing evidence suggests the best way to protect audiences from disinformation is to educate them to recognize it in the first place. Consequently, it will also examine if and how armed forces have educated their personnel to distinguish fact from fiction and what current initiatives are underway in key NATO countries, like the US and Canada. Given the prominence of disinformation during the Cold War (1945- 1989), the paper primarily reviews these years and looks at both periods of open war and what would now be described as ‘grey zone’ conflict. Therefore, it will principally focus on 1 disinformation spread by the West’s primary adversary during this period, Russia. The paper concludes with preliminary observations on lessons we can derive from the past and the gaps still to be addressed. Propaganda and Disinformation Targeted at Western Militaries (1945-1989): Propaganda and disinformation have always been important tools in the arsenal of the modern nation-state. The arrival of advanced communications and advertising in the early 20th century only underlined the power of both to influence friends, allies, adversaries and enemies alike. The word now carries overwhelmingly negative connotations but propaganda is simply the, “deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”3 According to historian Nicholas Cull, there are three principal types: white, grey and black.4 White includes materials attributed to a source, such as a leaflet dropped from an aircraft encouraging opposing forces to surrender. Grey is not as easily linked to a particular author and can include material funded but not attributed to the original propagandist, like a radio broadcast. Meanwhile, black is “deliberately constructed to deceive, such as a fake edition of a military newspaper altered to include news of impending disaster.”5 Disinformation fits neatly into this category and refers to, “a deception technique…based on the dissemination of untrue information with the intention to deceive, manipulate, and mislead.”6 The ultimate goal is to sow division and discord by playing on human fear and anxiety.7 Propaganda’s importance reached a new zenith during the Second World War. Indeed, many historians argue the information war the Allies unleashed was vital to ultimate victory. Consequently, the chief belligerents were skilled practitioners of propaganda on the eve of the Cold War, which put the West and the Soviet Union on an ideological collision course that would play out over the next four decades.8 The Korean War (1950-1953) represented the first major clash between the two. 9 Erupting on 25 June 1950, North Korea’s invasion of its neighbour to the south came as a shock to the international community. The responding American-led United Nations (UN) coalition took early losses in the first year of a conflict that became a protracted war of attrition.10 For over three years, UN forces faced an alliance of North Korea, China and their Soviet backers in a war that was as much about dominating the information space, as it was about the battlespace. Communist propaganda was initially aimed at undermining the morale of Western troops, many of whom were WWII veterans called up again to fight in the Far East.11 Appealing to their homesickness, leaflets, posters and radio broadcasts all accused the West of starting the war and aimed to convince rank and file soldiers they were being exploited by their commanders, political leadership and greedy financial interests. While the war was increasingly unpopular back home, these attempts at manipulation largely fell on deaf ears. Badly translated, early Communist narratives were poorly constructed and tone deaf to the culture and motivations of the target audience.12 But a more insidious effort was underway behind enemy lines. From 1950-1953, nearly 75,000 UN and South Korean servicemen were captured as prisoners of war (POWs) and subjected to a continual diet of disinformation and re-education.13 The disinformation they faced was similarly designed to convince them the West had started the war and troops were a pawn of capitalist interests. In addition, the Chinese and North Koreans used POWs to legitimize false allegations of germ warfare against the United States and bolstered these accusations by broadcasting the 2 testimony of over twenty US airmen, who claimed to have participated.14 At the end of the war, several high profile defections of American and
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