Uva-DARE (Digital Academic Repository)
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Northern Flank
Click here for Full Issue of EIR Volume 14, Number 43, October 30, 1987 N orthem Flank by Goran Haglund The spy who went back into the cold incompetence and absurdity at the Justice Minister Wickbom is but one victim of the intelligence sAPO, typified by their keeping Palme warfare now raging in Sweden. on a "black list" of people who might be unreliable during a crisis. Pravda cites the now-deposed Wickbom say ing it's time to investigate the sApo. Months of intelligence warfare in guard accompanies the prisoner away When Bergling's prison guard, as Sweden have begun to take their toll fromand back to the prison, but leaves per an "agreement" with Bergling, ar of high-level govemment officials.The him unwatched during the night. rived at 12:45 p.m. on Oct. 6 to pick most prominentvictim so far is Justice Third, Bergling was given leaves him up at his wife's house, both Ber Minister Sten Wickbom, forced to re despite his known desire to escape. In gling and wife were gone, to every sign on Oct. 19. Wickbom's demise October 1985, a letter intercepted from body's alleged surprise. It then took was followed by the firing of three of Bergling revealed a plan to escape. until 10:45 a.m. before a nationwide his underlings at the Justice Depart Nonetheless, he was again granted a search warrantwas issued, perhaps 24 ment, among them the number-two leave in January 1986. His former hours after the escape. man, Harald Fiilth, and the resigna lawyer stated, "He is a very dangerous At first, the Social Democratic of tion of Director General VIf Larsson and experienced spy and has all the ficials of the Prisons Board, all cham of the Swedish Prisons Board, which time aimed at getting out one day." pions of "humanization of prison runs the nation's prisons. -
ON the EFFECTIVE USE of PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 © 2021 Andrew Peek All Rights Reserved
ON THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 2021 Andrew Peek All rights reserved Abstract This dissertation asks a simple question: how are states most effectively conducting proxy warfare in the modern international system? It answers this question by conducting a comparative study of the sponsorship of proxy forces. It uses process tracing to examine five cases of proxy warfare and predicts that the differentiation in support for each proxy impacts their utility. In particular, it proposes that increasing the principal-agent distance between sponsors and proxies might correlate with strategic effectiveness. That is, the less directly a proxy is supported and controlled by a sponsor, the more effective the proxy becomes. Strategic effectiveness here is conceptualized as consisting of two key parts: a proxy’s operational capability and a sponsor’s plausible deniability. These should be in inverse relation to each other: the greater and more overt a sponsor’s support is to a proxy, the more capable – better armed, better trained – its proxies should be on the battlefield. However, this close support to such proxies should also make the sponsor’s influence less deniable, and thus incur strategic costs against both it and the proxy. These costs primarily consist of external balancing by rival states, the same way such states would balance against conventional aggression. Conversely, the more deniable such support is – the more indirect and less overt – the less balancing occurs. -
Wh Owat Ches the Wat Chmen
WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN WATCHES WHO WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN WATCHES WHO I see powerful echoes of what I personally experienced as Director of NSA and CIA. I only wish I had access to this fully developed intellectual framework and the courses of action it suggests while still in government. —General Michael V. Hayden (retired) Former Director of the CIA Director of the NSA e problem of secrecy is double edged and places key institutions and values of our democracy into collision. On the one hand, our country operates under a broad consensus that secrecy is antithetical to democratic rule and can encourage a variety of political deformations. But the obvious pitfalls are not the end of the story. A long list of abuses notwithstanding, secrecy, like openness, remains an essential prerequisite of self-governance. Ross’s study is a welcome and timely addition to the small body of literature examining this important subject. —Gabriel Schoenfeld Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Author of Necessary Secrets: National Security, the Media, and the Rule of Law (W.W. Norton, May 2010). ? ? The topic of unauthorized disclosures continues to receive significant attention at the highest levels of government. In his book, Mr. Ross does an excellent job identifying the categories of harm to the intelligence community associated NI PRESS ROSS GARY with these disclosures. A detailed framework for addressing the issue is also proposed. This book is a must read for those concerned about the implications of unauthorized disclosures to U.S. national security. —William A. Parquette Foreign Denial and Deception Committee National Intelligence Council Gary Ross has pulled together in this splendid book all the raw material needed to spark a fresh discussion between the government and the media on how to function under our unique system of government in this ever-evolving information-rich environment. -
Russia's Strategy for Influence Through Public Diplomacy
Journal of Strategic Studies ISSN: 0140-2390 (Print) 1743-937X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20 Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case Martin Kragh & Sebastian Åsberg To cite this article: Martin Kragh & Sebastian Åsberg (2017): Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case, Journal of Strategic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830 Published online: 05 Jan 2017. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 32914 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fjss20 Download by: [Anna Lindh-biblioteket] Date: 21 April 2017, At: 02:48 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830 Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case Martin Kragha,b and Sebastian Åsbergc aHead of Russia and Eurasia Programme, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm; bUppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden; cRussia and Eurasia Studies, Swedish Institute of International Affairs ABSTRACT Russia, as many contemporary states, takes public diplomacy seriously. Since the inception of its English language TV network Russia Today in 2005 (now ‘RT’), the Russian government has broadened its operations to include Sputnik news websites in several languages and social media activities. Moscow, however, has also been accused of engaging in covert influence activities – behaviour historically referred to as ‘active measures’ in the Soviet KGB lexicon on political warfare. -
Stuck in Neutral
STUCK IN NEUTRAL The reasons behind Sweden’s passivity in the Raoul Wallenberg case Susanne Berger 4793 Williamsburg Blvd Arlington, VA 22207 USA [email protected] 22 August, 2004 1 I. Introduction II. The Swedish Definition of the Raoul Wallenberg Case 1. The Swedish public a. The not-so-favorite son b. “Proper” c. The dangers of simplification 2. The Swedish government and the Swedish Foreign Office a. A strange creature b. “Moral courage is our only secret weapon” c. Hidden motives d. Old mindsets III. Other Definitions 1. The U.S. a. Swedish diplomat with an American task b. The general definition of the Budapest Mission c. Intelligence aspects of the Budapest Mission d. Lack of Swedish - American coordination 2. The Wallenbergs a. Curious passivity b. Distant relation? c. Wallenberg business interests in Hungary d. Wallenberg interests and their political effect e. Wallenberg Intelligence connections f. Signs of doubt 3. Russia a. The Soviet legacy b. The current Russian view c. Early definitions 2 d. More relevant records have to exist e. Different possibilities f. A possible watershed IV. Deeper Problems 1. The Limits of the Eliasson Report a. Question of motives and limited areas of inquiry b. Need for a more specific analysis of the historical context c. Focus on early years d. Lack of systematic analysis e. Consequences of failure to conduct a systematic analysis 2. Current Definitions a. Sweden today b. The neutrality dilemma 3 “In the minds of responsible government officials it is a far smaller evil to leave a missing person case unsolved than to seriously question the foundations of the state.” (Arvid Fredborg) I. -
Wildflowers, Nationalism and the Swedish Law of Commons
Wildflowers, Nationalism and the Swedish Law of Commons GUDRUN DAHL Department of Social Anthropology Stockholm University ABSTRACT In post-war Sweden, overt demonstrations of political nationalism have been considered bad taste. In middle-class culture, the construction and emotional charging of Swedishness have instead taken place in terms of an idiom of love for nature. Conceptions of freedom and equality are by this idiom tied up with symbolic references to childhood and to the flora of forests and meadows. The Swedish 'Every Man's Law' regulating access to flowers and berries and mobility in the natural landscape in this context comes to stand as a central national symbol. 1. 'NATURE-LOVING' AS NATIONALISM In his book on Banal Nationalism Billig ( 1995) argues that in order to understand nationalism, social scientists have concentrated too much on its extreme expres- sions. They have disregarded in their analyses the everyday processes that maintain ideas and feelings of national identity during periods when the survival of the nation is not directly at stake, when the fervour of nationalist feeling has turned into routine (op.cit.: 41 ). In the present paper I want to take Billig' s notion of 'Banal Nationalism' as my point of departure and reflect on my own cultural environment - as somebody who grow up in the modernist 'folkhem' culture of Sweden in the fifties and sixties. In particular, I want to deal with the issue of Swedish Nature as a neutral focus of nationalism in a setting where explicit nationalism was not just 'routinised' but even socially disapproved and where the use of conventional symbolism was constrained. -
Konsum Och Kommunismen Kapitalism I U-Land Joseph Mccarthy
nr 3 2007 (nr 193 från starten) årgång 33 Pris 25:- Konsum och kommunismen Kapitalism i u-land FRIHETENS RÖST JosephCONTRA 3/2007 McCarthy www.contra.nu –för västerländsk9 demokrati–770347 647008 oberoende borgerlig tidskrift utges sex gånger årligen Contra-vän överfallen och svårt misshandlad ISSN 0347-6472 Per-Olof Nilsson, ”Billingesnickaren” och ”Boven 1758”, som vi genom åren Copyright Stiftelsen Contra skrivit en hel del om i Contra, blev i februari i år överfallen och svårt misshandlad. Eftertryck endast efter överenskommelse Per-Olof Nilsson, som tidigare drabbats av sjukdom, men var på bättringsvägen, Ansvarig utgivare hade varit och ätit på ett kommunalt åldringsboende. Han träffade där en yngling Tommy Hansson som bad om skjuts, vilket utlovades. En bit på väg överfölls Per-Olof av ynglingen, kastades ur sin egen bil och blev av biltjuven med berått mod överkörd. Per-Olof Adress hann inte skydda sitt ena ben som blev brutet på två ställen. Han lyckades med Box 8052, 104 20 STOCKHOLM mobiltelefon kalla på hjälp och hittades liggande i en snödriva. Han har vistats Telefon 08-720 01 45 ända till maj på sjukhus. Ynglingen, som försörjt sig på småbedrägerier under de E-post [email protected] Internet hemsida http://www.contra.nu senaste åren, greps och dömdes i början av maj av Eslövs tingsrätt till fängelse på Sluten del endast för prenumeranter: två år och 80.000 kronor i skadestånd. Ynglingen var åtalad för mordförsök, men http://www.contra.nu/prenumerant/ domen blev bara grov misshandel. Skadeståndet är enligt Contras förmenande löj- oversikt.html ligt lågt. Men det är tydligen vad svenska domstolar värderar svåra fysiska plågor Användarnamn och lösenord finns endast i den tryckta versionen av Contra. -
Raoul Wallenberg: Report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group
Raoul Wallenberg Report of the Swedish-Russian Working Group STOCKHOLM 2000 Additional copies of this report can be ordered from: Fritzes kundservice 106 47 Stockholm Fax: 08-690 9191 Tel: 08-690 9190 Internet: www.fritzes.se E-mail: [email protected] Ministry for Foreign Affairs Department for Central and Eastern Europe SE-103 39 Stockholm Tel: 08-405 10 00 Fax: 08-723 11 76 _______________ Editorial group: Ingrid Palmklint, Daniel Larsson Cover design: Ingrid Palmklint Cover photo: Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest, November 1944, Raoul Wallenbergföreningen Printed by: Elanders Gotab AB, Stockholm, 2000 ISBN: ISBN: 91-7496-230-2 2 Contents Preface ..........................................7 I Introduction ...................................9 II Planning and implementation ..................12 Examining the records.............................. 16 Interviews......................................... 22 III Political background - The USSR 1944-1957 ...24 IV Soviet Security Organs 1945-1947 .............28 V Raoul Wallenberg in Budapest .................32 Background to the assignment....................... 32 Operations begin................................... 34 Protective power assignment........................ 37 Did Raoul Wallenberg visit Stockholm in late autumn 1944?.............................................. 38 VI American papers on Raoul Wallenberg - was he an undercover agent for OSS? .........40 Conclusions........................................ 44 VII Circumstances surrounding Raoul Wallenberg’s detention and arrest in Budapest -
Russia's Strategy for Influence Through Public Diplomacy and Active
Journal of Strategic Studies ISSN: 0140-2390 (Print) 1743-937X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20 Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case Martin Kragh & Sebastian Åsberg To cite this article: Martin Kragh & Sebastian Åsberg (2017): Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case, Journal of Strategic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830 Published online: 05 Jan 2017. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 20943 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fjss20 Download by: [95.43.25.137] Date: 11 January 2017, At: 10:08 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES, 2017 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2016.1273830 Russia’s strategy for influence through public diplomacy and active measures: the Swedish case Martin Kragha,b and Sebastian Åsbergc aHead of Russia and Eurasia Programme, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm; bUppsala Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden; cRussia and Eurasia Studies, Swedish Institute of International Affairs ABSTRACT Russia, as many contemporary states, takes public diplomacy seriously. Since the inception of its English language TV network Russia Today in 2005 (now ‘RT’), the Russian government has broadened its operations to include Sputnik news websites in several languages and social media activities. Moscow, however, has also been accused of engaging in covert influence activities – behaviour historically referred to as ‘active measures’ in the Soviet KGB lexicon on political warfare. -
SPIONJÄGAREN SOM KOM HEM TILL KYLAN Jag Intervjuade Olle
SPIONJÄGAREN SOM KOM HEM TILL KYLAN Jag intervjuade Olle Frånstedt om hans tid som byråchef inom säkerhetspolisen och bråken med Olof Palme. Reaktionerna uteblev inte. Säkerhetspolisen ska få ytterligare 85 miljoner kronor för att, som justitieminister Beatrice Ask uttryckte det i förra veckan, ge den »ännu bättre förmåga till upptäckt och bedömning av hot och skydd av viktiga funktioner i samhället«. Aldrig har Säpo haft det så väl förspänt. Aldrig hörs ett kritiskt ord från Rosenbad. Aldrig har regering och Säkerhetspolisen stått så nära varandra. Annat var det förr. Olle Frånstedt, bondpojke från Jämtland, född 1930, handplockades till Säpo 1962 efter att ha utmärkt sig som orädd stadsfiskal i Luleå. Fem år senare utnämndes han till chef för byrå B som skötte den operativa verksamheten. Som ansvarig för kontraspionaget fram till 1978 kom han att bli djupt inblandad i händelser som fortfarande dyker upp som stoff för utredningar, debattböcker, deckare: IB-affären, tyska ambassaddramat, bordellaffären, sjukhusaffären i Göte borg, gripandet av Stig Bergling. Det var en tid då Säkerhetspolisen långsamt skiftade fokus från subversion till terrorism. Det var en tid av stora konflikter. Det här är hans berättelse. I diskussionerna om dagens terroristbekämpning har betonats vikten av ett ömsesidigt förtroende mellan regering och säkerhetstjänst … – Jovisst, i princip, ändå har jag en invändning. Om man driver det där för långt riskerar man ministerstyre. En regering ska inte blanda sig i säkerhetstjänstens operativa verksamhet. Politiker frestas alltid till att vilja saker som de sedan kan spela ut, vinna poäng på. Som till exempel? – Som till exempel när jag såg till att snabbt avvisa några japaner som smugit runt Stockholm och gjort anteckningar om vad vi antog var möjliga terroristmål. -
Chapter 10 Crisis and Policy Change
Chapter 10 Crisis and policy change A look at the Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking process to date clearly indicates that crises have affected policy outcomes in complex ways. It is for instance clear that terrorist experiences (domestic or foreign) have not been the only events affecting Swedish counter-terrorism policymaking. And not all ter- rorist events have been conducive to Swedish counter-terrorism policy change. We have examined three crisis cases in this study, two of which were terrorism related – the Bulltofta skyjacking in 1972 and the seizure of the West German Stockholm embassy in 1975 – and one with unclear origin and purpose – the murder of Prime Minister Olof Palme in 1986. The selection fell inductively: when organizing the material, separate or partially separate counter-terrorism policy processes were discernible following these three crises. In this regard it is striking that the most vivid and violent experience of terrorism on Swedish soil – the drama at the West German embassy – had such marginal effects on policy. Equally striking is the fact that a non-terrorism incident (as far as we know) – the Palme murder – produced substantial policy changes. The Palme murder, however, represents one of the most traumatizing crises in contempo- rary Swedish history. Political and criminal justice systems lost legitimacy and vitality as a consequence of not having prevented the deed, and for the shoddy search efforts and many mishaps and scandals that followed the assassination. The entire process was unsatisfying beyond comparison. The Palme murder was not only a decapitation of national leadership; it also represents a compound failure of the Swedish justice apparatus (Hansén and Stern 2001). -
Bildmanipulering
Styrelsen för PSYKOLOGISKT FÖRSVAR BILDMANIPULERING Rune Pettersson RAPPORT 181 BILDMANIPULERING Rune Pettersson Styrelsen för PSYKOLOGISKT FÖRSVAR 2 Utgiven av Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar ISSN 1401 2383 Stockholm 2001 Där inte annat anges har författaren svarat för teckningar och foton. Omslagsbild: Teckning, Brita Ellström, 1912. 3 INNEHÅLL SPFs förord ................................................................................................................................................5 Författarens förord ..............................................................................................................................6 Inledning ......................................................................................................................................................7 Fotografiet ..............................................................................................................................................10 Bilder och datorer..............................................................................................................................14 Bildmorfologi ............................................................................................................................................................................14 Bildpunkter........................................................................................................................................................................16 Synsinnet..............................................................................................................................................................................18