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Russian Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Rates and Storage Site Capacity: Implications for the Implementation of START II

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Russian Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Rates and Storage Site Capacity: Implications for the Implementation of START II Nuclear START Russian Nuclear \Varhead Dismantlement Rates and Storage Site Capacity: Implications for the Implementation of START II and De-alerting Initiatives Joshua Handler Woodrow Wilson School Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544 ph. 609-258-5692 fax. 609-258-3661 [email protected] CEES Report No. AC-99-01 February 1999 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . 1 2. The Storage Space Crunch . 3 a. The Nuclear Weapons Storage Barrel . 6 Stockpile Size . 8 Numbers of Stored Weapons . 11 Nuclear Warhead Dismantlement Rates . 12 Overloaded Storages? . 15 b. The Eliminated-Weapons Storage Barrel . 16 3. Conclusions . 20 a. Stockpile Size, Storage Space, and Dismantlement Rates . 20 b. Impact on Implementation of Current and Future Strategic Arms Control Agreements . 22 c. National- vs. Service-level Storage Space . 23 Nuclear Weapons Transport . 25 d. Implications for U.S. Policy . 27 Transport, Dismantlement and Storage . 27 Security of Warheads in Storages . 28 Fissile Material Container Storage . 29 Transparency . 30 Openness . 30 Appendix A: Dates and Pace of Warhead Withdrawals and Reductions . 34 1. Eastern Europe . 35 2. The Soviet Republics . 39 3. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus . 43 a. Tactical Weapons . 43 b. Strategic Weapons . 45 (1) Ukraine . 47 (2) Kazakhstan . 49 (3) Belarus . 51 4. Russia . 52 a. Tactical Weapons . 56 b. Strategic Weapons . 59 Appendix B: Stockpile Sizes and Numbers of Warheads Withdrawn . 60 1. Overall Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Estimates . 60 a. Russian information . 60 b. U.S. estimates . 61 2. Numbers of Warheads Consolidated into Russian Storages . 65 a. Overall Estimates of Strategic and Tactical Warheads Returned to Russia . 65 .1 b. From Ukraine . 68 c. From Kazakhstan . 71 d. From Belarus . 71 e. From Russia . 73 (1) Strategic Weapons in Russia . 73 (2) Tactical Weapons in Russia . 78 Appendix C: Russian Nuclear Warhead Storages and Overloading . 80 1. Types, Numbers and Loc ations of Nuclear Weapons Storages . 80 Early History . 80 12th GUMO and Service Control of Nuclear Weapons Storages . 80 Types and Numbers of Storages . 85 Numbers and Locations of National-level Storage Sites . 88 Size and Cap acity of the Nation al-level Storage Sites . 91 Number s and Locations of Service-level Storage Sites . 92 Size of Service-level Storage Sites . 93 Capacity of Service-level Storage Sites . 95 2. Reports of Overloading of Storages ......... .......... ... .. .. .... 102 Appendix D: Dismantling and Eliminating Warheads . .... .. ... ... 104 1. Definitions of Dismantling and Elimination .. .. .. ... ........ .. .. .. l 04 2. Elimination Facilities . .... .. .. .. ... .......... ....... 105 3. Estimates of Dismantlement Rates ..... .... .. ................... 107 a. General comment s about total number of weapons to be dismantled . 108 b. U.S . Statements about dismantlements and dismantlement rates .. ......... 110 c. Russian Statements . I 13 4. Summary of the Numbers of Dism antled Weapons . .. .. ... ..... .. .. 12 1 Appendix E: Eliminated Warhead Storage .. .... ...... .. ..... .. ....... 123 I . The Mayak Fissile Material Container Storage Facility .. .................. 123 2. HEU Deal and the Numbers of Fissile Material Containers .. ... .. ... .. .. 126 Appendix F: The Corona Program, Maps and Figures . ....... .. .......... 129 Map 1: National-level Nuclear Weapons Storages, Western/Ural region Russia . Map 2: National-level Nuclear Weapons Storages, Eastern Russia. Map 3: ICBM, Bomber and SSBN Bases in Western Russia. Map 3a: MIRVed ICBM Bases and National-level Storages , Western Russia. Map 4: ICBM , Bomber and SSBN Bases in Eastern Russia. Map 4a: MIRVed ICBM Bases and National-level Storages, Eastern Russia. Map 5: Soviet Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites in Eastern Europe circa 1979. Corona Satellite and U-2 Imagery of National-level Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites : Figure 1: Mozhaysk, near Moscow . Figure 2: Bulyzhino, near Latvia and Byelorussia. Figure 3: Zhukovka, near Bryansk. JJ Figures 4-5: Golovchino, near Ukraine. Figure 6: Borisoglebsk, western Russia. Figure 7: Krasnoarmeyskoye, near Saratov. Figure 8: Karabash Storage Site, Ural region. Figures 9-10: Malaya Sazanka, near Svobodnyy, Russian Far East. Figure 11: 1958 U-2 image of Malaya Sazanka. Corona Satellite Imagery of Service-level RTB Nuclear Weapons Storage Sites: Figure 12: Ukrainka Strategic Bomber Base and Associated Nuclear Weapons Storage Site, near Svobodnyy, Russian Far East. Figure 13: Surovatikha SRF regional RTB Nuclear Weapons Storage Site, near Nizhniy Novgorod. Figure 14: Kholm AB RTB Nuclear Weapons Storage Site, near Arkangelsk. Figure 15: Ground Forces RTB Nuclear Storage Facility near Berlin in Eastern Gennany. Corona Satellite Imagery of Nuclear Weapons Production Plants and Associated National ­ level Stora ge Sites Figures 16-17: Nizhnyaya Tura/Sverdlovsk-45 Nuclear Weapons Production Plant and Associated National-level Nuclear Weapons Storage. Figure 18: Yuryuzan/Zlatoust-36 Nuclear Weapons Production Plant and Associated National-level Nuclear Weapons Storage. Figure 19: Sarov/Arzamas-16 and Avangard Nuclear Weapons Production Plant. Figure 20: Fissile Material Storage Containers. Acknowledgements: The author would like to thank Frank von Hippe! for his insightful comments, encouragement and patience, and Oleg Bukharin, Dino Brugioni, Carroll Lucas, Charles Tuten and Hal Feiveson for their very helpful input. Special thanks are due to: Phil Schuler and Rachel Schmidt for critical logistical support; Bob Matthews for lessons on the enlarger; Taylor Photo of Princeton, New Jersey, for stepping in when the Princeton U. photo lab stepped out; Joe Goodhouse for help with the microscopes; Costi, Kevin and Kirk for computer support; and the Federation of American Scientists Fund for support at the initial stage of this project. 111 1. Introduction The safety and security of Russian nuclear weapons have been a matter of widespread international concern. START I and ST ART II deactivations or de-alerting proposals that involve the removal of warheads from launchers may lead to over 3,000 additional strategic nuclear warheads being removed from ICBMs and SLBMs and placed in storages during the next five years . Some have argued such deactivation or de-alerting proposals are impossible because Russian nuclear weapons storages would not be able to safely hold the offloaded warheads. Two factors, however, that are intrinsic to solving this problem -- the rate of dismantlement of Russian nuclear weapons and Russian nuclear weapons storage capacity -­ have received little attention. A high rate of dismantlement or a sufficiently large warhead storage capacity may mean Russian nuclear weapons storages will have enough room to accommodate warheads removed from Russian strategic systems under a ST ART II or a de­ alerting initiative. A low rate of dismantlement or a small warhead storage capacity may mean removing warheads from launchers may exacerbate any safety or storage space problem the Russians may have . The rate of dismantlement and the status of Russian nuclear weapons storages also have significant ramifications for the security of Russian nuclear weapons. The faster the rate of dismantlement, the smaller the remaining number of weapons available for theft and the greater the ease in guarding and tracking them. A small number of larger nuclear weapons storages may provide greater security and may simplify the warhead accounting problem compared to a large number of small, dispersed storage sites. Also, the U.S. CTR program will find it easier to provide security upgrades if there are a few dozen nuclear storage sites rather than hundreds. Finally, the Russian warhead dismantlement rate could effect efforts to implement a warhead stockpile transparency regime to insure the irreversibility of U.S .-Russian nuclear weapons reductions. A high Russian warhead dismantlement rate may mean that by the time an agreement is reached the majority of warheads to be dismantled will have been taken apart, making the verification of the dismantlement of thousands of previously dismantled warheads difficult. A slow Russian warhead dismantlement rate compared to a high U.S. dismantlement rate will create a reciprocity problem, which may also lead to problems in creating a transparency regime. Russia may be very reluctant to acquiesce to a regime where the United States gets to verify the destruction of thousands of Russian warheads, while Russia only will be able to verify the destruction of hundreds of U.S. warheads. This paper attempts to estimate Russia ' s warhead dismantlement rate and nuclear weapons storage capacity to determine if Russian nuclear weapons storages can accommodate planned and possible off-loading of nuclear warheads from strategic launchers. It examines existing information on the size of the Soviet/Russian arsenal, Russian warhead dismantlement rates, and the numbers and types of nuclear weapons storages in Russia to 1 understand how rapid was and is the flow of warheads into Russian storages and how fast warheads were and are being dismantled. Since one potential bottleneck to this process is the lack of storage for the fissile components from dismantled warheads, this paper also addresses the adequacy of efforts to store the fissile material from dismantled warheads or convert it into reactor fuel. There is a large amount of information relating to all these questions, but much of it is imprecise, unofficial or contradictory. Public statements by U.S. and Russian officials, information
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