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Les Politiques De Développement Régional D'une Zone Périphérique
Les politiques de développement régional d’une zone périphérique chinoise, le cas de la province de Hainan Sébastien Goulard To cite this version: Sébastien Goulard. Les politiques de développement régional d’une zone périphérique chinoise, le cas de la province de Hainan . Science politique. EHESS, 2014. Français. tel-01111893 HAL Id: tel-01111893 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01111893 Submitted on 31 Jan 2015 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution - NonCommercial - NoDerivatives| 4.0 International License ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES Thèse en vue de l‟obtention du Doctorat en socio-économie du développement Sébastien GOULARD Les politiques de développement régional d’une zone périphérique chinoise, le cas de la province de Hainan Thèse dirigée par François GIPOULOUX, directeur de recherche au CNRS Présentée et soutenue publiquement à l‟École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales à Paris, le 18 décembre 2014. Membres du jury : François GIPOULOUX, directeur de recherche, -
The CCP Central Committee's Leading Small Groups Alice Miller
Miller, China Leadership Monitor, No. 26 The CCP Central Committee’s Leading Small Groups Alice Miller For several decades, the Chinese leadership has used informal bodies called “leading small groups” to advise the Party Politburo on policy and to coordinate implementation of policy decisions made by the Politburo and supervised by the Secretariat. Because these groups deal with sensitive leadership processes, PRC media refer to them very rarely, and almost never publicize lists of their members on a current basis. Even the limited accessible view of these groups and their evolution, however, offers insight into the structure of power and working relationships of the top Party leadership under Hu Jintao. A listing of the Central Committee “leading groups” (lingdao xiaozu 领导小组), or just “small groups” (xiaozu 小组), that are directly subordinate to the Party Secretariat and report to the Politburo and its Standing Committee and their members is appended to this article. First created in 1958, these groups are never incorporated into publicly available charts or explanations of Party institutions on a current basis. PRC media occasionally refer to them in the course of reporting on leadership policy processes, and they sometimes mention a leader’s membership in one of them. The only instance in the entire post-Mao era in which PRC media listed the current members of any of these groups was on 2003, when the PRC-controlled Hong Kong newspaper Wen Wei Po publicized a membership list of the Central Committee Taiwan Work Leading Small Group. (Wen Wei Po, 26 December 2003) This has meant that even basic insight into these groups’ current roles and their membership requires painstaking compilation of the occasional references to them in PRC media. -
Title Eating, Drinking, and Power Signaling in Institutionalized Authoritarianism: China's Antiwaste Campaign Since 2012 Autho
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by HKU Scholars Hub Eating, Drinking, and Power Signaling in Institutionalized Title Authoritarianism: China’s Antiwaste Campaign Since 2012 Author(s) Zhu, J; Zhang, Q; Liu, Z Citation Journal of Contemporary China, 2016, v. 26 n. 105, p. 337-352 Issued Date 2016 URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/228739 Postprint: This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in [Eating, Drinking, and Power Signaling in Institutionalized Authoritarianism: China’s Antiwaste Campaign Rights Since 2012] on [2016], available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2016.1245 899; This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. EATING, DRINKING, AND POWER SIGNALLING IN INSTITUTIONALIZED AUTHORITARIANISM The Antiwaste Campaign of Xi Jinping Jiangnan Zhu* Qi Zhang Zhikuo Liu **A final updated version of this article has been accepted by Journal of Contemporary China (Impact Factor 1.085, Ranking 5/66 in area studies) . Immediately after Xi Jinping assumed the position of party secretary general (PSG), he launched a large-scale top-down antiwaste campaign amongst the Chinese cadre corps. Compared with similar policies announced by Xi’s predecessors, this campaign has distinct features that entail substantial political costs for the PSG. Why did Xi choose this risky strategy? Drawing on recent literature on authoritarian regimes, we argue that, amongst all possible objectives, an authoritarian leader such as Xi can use this type of policy campaign to demonstrate his power. In particular, the inherent importance of informal politics, the recent developments in Chinese politics, and Xi’s personal background have increased his incentive and capacity to signal power by implementing this seemingly risky campaign. -
Local Leadership and Economic Development: Democratic India Vs
No. 24 | 2010 China Papers Local Leadership and Economic Development: Democratic India vs. Authoritarian China Bo Zhiyue China Papers ABSTRACT What is the impact of the type of political regime on economic development? Does democracy foster economic growth? Or is an authoritarian regime in a better position to promote material welfare? The conventional wisdom, as detailed in Adam Przeworski et al (2000), is that the regime type has no impact on economic growth. Democracy neither fosters nor hinders economic development. However, the cases of India and China seem to suggest otherwise. In the past three decades, India—the largest democracy in the world—has sustained a moderate rate of economic growth while China—the largest authoritarian regime— has witnessed an unprecedented period of economic expansion. Using data on economic growth at the state/provincial level from India and China, this study attempts to understand the impact of political regimes on economic development. The chapter will review the literature on regimes and economic development, highlight the contrast in economic growth between India and China in the past six decades, examine the two countries at the state/provincial level, and explore the impact of local leadership on economic development in a comparative framework. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Zhiyue BO is a Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore. China Papers Local Leadership and Economic Development: Democratic India vs. Authoritarian China Bo Zhiyue I. Introduction What is the impact of the type of political regime on economic development? Does democracy foster economic growth? Or is an authoritarian regime in a better position to promote material welfare? The conventional wisdom, as detailed in Adam Przeworski et al (2000),1 is that the regime type has no impact on economic growth. -
Homophily in the Career Mobility of China’S Political Elite
Social Science Research 54 (2015) 332–352 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Social Science Research journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssresearch Homophily in the career mobility of China’s political elite ⇑ Sonja Opper a, , Victor Nee b, Stefan Brehm c a Lund University, Department of Economics, Scheelevägen 15B, 22007 Lund, Sweden b Cornell University, Department of Sociology, 312/330 Uris Hall, 14853 Ithaca, NY, United States c Lund University, Center for East and South-East Asian Studies, Scheelevägen 15B, 22370 Lund, Sweden article info abstract Article history: We argue that leadership promotion in China’s political elite relies on homophily for signals Received 9 August 2014 of trustworthiness and future cooperative behavior more than on economic performance. Revised 12 June 2015 We first point to the limitation of the economic performance argument from within the Accepted 24 August 2015 framework of China’s specific M-form state structure, and then we proffer a sociological Available online 28 August 2015 explanation for why higher-level elites in China rely on homophilous associations in recruit- ing middle-level elites to the top positions of state. Using a unique dataset covering China’s Keywords: provincial leaders from 1979 to 2011, we develop a homophily index focusing on joint origin, Political elite joint education and joint work experience. We trace personal similarities in these respects Promotion Homophily between provincial leaders and members of China’s supreme decision-making body, the China Politbureau’s Standing Committee. We then provide robust evidence confirming the persist- ing impact of homophilous associations on promotion patterns in post-reform China. -
Kirchberger-Informelle Regeln Der Politik in China
D1374 - veröffentlicht unter Creative Commons Lizenz - urheberrechtlich geschützt [c] Verlag Dr. Kovač GmbH č GmbH Kova Dr. Verlag [c] D1374 - veröffentlicht unter Creative Commons Lizenz - urheberrechtlich geschützt [c] Verlag Dr. Kovač GmbH č GmbH Kova Dr. Verlag [c] D1374 - veröffentlicht unter Creative Commons Lizenz - urheberrechtlich geschützt [c] Verlag Dr. Kovač GmbH Schriftenreihe POLITICA Schriftenreihe zur politischen Wissenschaft Band 61 ISSN 1435-6643 Verlag Dr. Kovač č GmbH Kova Dr. Verlag [c] D1374 - veröffentlicht unter Creative Commons Lizenz - urheberrechtlich geschützt [c] Verlag Dr. Kovač GmbH Sarah Kirchberger Informelle Regeln der Politik in China und Taiwan Verlag Dr. Kovač č GmbH Kova Dr. Verlag [c] D1374 - veröffentlicht unter Creative Commons Lizenz - urheberrechtlich geschützt [c] Verlag Dr. Kovač GmbH VERLAG DR. KOVAČ Arnoldstraße 49 · 22763 Hamburg · Tel. 040 - 39 88 80-0 · Fax 040 - 39 88 80-55 E-Mail [email protected] · Internet www.verlagdrkovac.de Bibliografische Information Der Deutschen Bibliothek Die Deutsche Bibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliographie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.ddb.de abrufbar. ISSN 1435-6643 ISBN 3-8300-1374-4 Zugl.: Dissertation, Universität Hamburg, 2004 © VERLAG DR. KOVAČ in Hamburg 2004 Printed in Germany Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Nachdruck, fotomechanische Wiedergabe, Aufnahme in Online-Dienste und Internet sowie Vervielfältigung auf Datenträgern wie CD-ROM etc. nur nach schriftlicher Zustimmung des Verlages. Gedruckt auf holz-, chlor- und säurefreiem Papier Munken Book. Munken Book ist č GmbH alterungsbeständig und erfüllt die Normen für Archivbeständigkeit ANSI 3948 und ISO 9706. Kova Dr. Verlag [c] D1374 - veröffentlicht unter Creative Commons Lizenz - urheberrechtlich geschützt [c] Verlag Dr. -
PRC Official Activities Ple’S Construction Bank of China Since 1989
CHINA aktuell/Official Activities - 319/1 - Mai/May 1991 dustrial Bank of Japan Ltd., the Norin- chukin Bank, the Chiba Bank and the Kinki Bank, is to be the first tax-free Ioan from Japanese banks to the Peo PRC Official Activities ple’s Construction Bank of China since 1989. With a term of five years, the preferential commercial Ioan will be invested in key state projects in light industry, the textiles industry, and the machinery, electronics and raw materi als industries. (XNA, May 29,1991) AGREEMENTS WITH Nuclear Power Station. The agreement signed today is viewed as a further Mongolia (May 30) FOREIGN COUNTRIES development of Sino-French co-opera- Airline Cooperation minutes between tion in the field of nuclear energy. Civil Aviation Administration of China Wolfgang Bartke (XNA, May 28,1991) (CAAC) and its Mongolian counter- part. Under the minutes, China will Chile (May 23) Gabon (May 20) open, beginning from August, two Minutes of tue 12th meeting of the Agreement under which China will routes, Beijing - Ulan Bator, Huhhot - China-Chile Economic and Commer- provide a Ioan (no details). Ulan Bator, each two flights a week. cial Joint Committee. (XNA, May 20, 1991) The signing of the minutes marks the (XNA, May 24,1991) resumption of CAAC’s flights to Mon Gambia (May 09) golia after a lapse of 30 years. Mongo- Chile (May 31) Agreement under which China will lia reopened its airiine Service from Executive program for cultural ex- provide a Ioan (no details). Ulan Bator to Beijing in 1986 and now change in 1991-93. -
Holding China Together Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era Edited by Barry J
Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-83730-9 - Holding China Together Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era Edited by Barry J. Naughton and Dali L. Yang Index More information Index administrative systems, 8 bandwagoners, 86 bureaucratization, 81 banking system, 17, 126–127, 267 cadres and. See cadre system bureaucratism, 81 centralized. See centralized government Burns, J., 52–53 elites and. See elites, system of hierarchies and, 11, 13, 71–73 cadre system, 81, 101, 116 institutionalization of, 14 appointment/promotion in, 82 national unity and, 11 cadres, defined, 109 personnel systems and. See personnel Central Committees and, 102–103 systems evaluation for, 101–103, 106 vertical, 17 exchange regulations, 62 See also specific organizations experimental basis for, 102–103 agriculture, 108–109 Interim Regulations, 77–78 arable acreage, 163 local level and, 106 dams, 264 movement within, 85 drought vs. flood, 264 Organization Department, 104 famines and, 194 performance criteria for, 106 farmers, 149, 151 policy implementation and, 112 food processing, 284 principle-agent theory, 101 grain, 273, 289–290 reform of, 102 grasslands, 273 Shanghai and, 106 Three Gorges Dam, 270 Cantonese separatists, 65 See also environment Cao Jianming, 41 Anti-Japanese War, 34 Cao Zhi, 51–52 Asian financial crisis, 4, 17, 149 CCA. See China Consumer’s Association fiscal policies and, 260–261 Central Committees, 31–32, 38, 75 Guangzhou and, 153, 166, 177–178 evaluation system for, 102–103 regulation/supervision and, 129–130 Organization Department, 51 Shenyang and, 153, 166 quota for, 59 autocracy, 8 representation in, 36–38, 59 avoidance rule, 15 Shanghai Gang and, 45 interest-conflicts and, 84–85 Chen Liangyu, 34–35 origins of, 49 Chen Xitong, 97 provincial heads and, 62 Chen Zhili, 40, 59, 66–67 reform era and, 49–50 Cheng Li, ix, 11–13 297 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-83730-9 - Holding China Together Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era Edited by Barry J. -
The Promotion Mechanism of Political Elites in Reforming China
The Promotion Mechanism of Political Elites in Reforming China Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Rongrong Lin School of East Asian Studies August, 2015 Contents ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ 4 LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................... 6 LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................ 8 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................. 12 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. 15 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 16 CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE................................................................................ 31 2.1 HUMAN CAPITAL AFFECTING CAREER MOBILITY OUTCOMES ..................................................... 32 2.1.1 Education in Career Mobility ................................................................................. 33 2.1.2 Work Experience in Career Mobility ...................................................................... 36 2.1.3 Summary of Human Capital ................................................................................... 39 2.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL -
PRC Official Activities 10.1990)
CHINA aktuell/Offlcial Activities - 890/2 - November/November 1990 North Korea (Nov 08) Plan for Cooperation in agricultural science and technology 1991-92. (KCNA, Nov 8, 1990; cit. SWB, Nov PRC Official Activities 10.1990) North Korea (Nov 15) Agreement on Cooperation between the Korean and Chinese medical asso- ciations. (KCNA, Nov 15, 1990; cit. SWB, Nov Congo (Nov 25) 17.1990) AGREEMENTS WITH A Document on additional Ioans to FOREIGN COUNTRIES Congo; North Korea (Nov 27) B Document on rescheduling the debt Agreement on China providing econ Wolfgang Bartke that Congo owes China; omic assistance. C Document on the Provision of agri (XNA, Nov 27,1990) Argentina (Nov07) cultural goods by China. Accord of the 7th Meeting of the Ar- (XNA, Nov 25,1990) Nicaragua (Nov 09) gentina-China Commercial and Econ- Chinese Statement on Suspension of omic Cooperation Joint Committee: Japan (Nov 02) the diplomatic relations in response to A Agreement on mixed Companies; Documents concerning Japan’s 36.5 Nicaragua’s announcement that it had billion yen loan to China. Under them B Loan accord between Argentina’s restored diplomatic relations with Tai Japan will issue its third round of Central Bank and the Bank of Chi Ioans, totaling 810 billion yen, to Chi wan. (XNA, Nov 9,1990) na; na beween 1990 and 1995. The money C Letter of intention on grain trade. from this particular loan will be used in (XNA, Nov 7,1990) Philippines (Nov 23) constructing a hydropower Station, a Protocol on scientific and technological reservoir, water supply projects, chem- Cooperation 1991-93. -
Hainan – State, Society, and Business in a Chinese Province
Hainan – State, Society, and Business in a Chinese Province This book examines the complex relationship between the state, society, and business in China, focusing on the experience of the island province of Hainan. This island, for many years a provincial backwater, was given pro- vincial rank in 1988 and became the testing ground for experiments of an economic, political, and social nature that have received great attention from Beijing, in particular the “small government, big society” project. This book provides a full account of this transition, showing how Hainan casts important light on a number of highly topical issues in contemporary China studies: central–local relations, institutional reform, state–society relations, and economic development strategies. It provides detailed evidence of how relations between party cadres, state bureaucrats, businesses, foreign in- vestors, and civil society play out in practice in China today. It argues that despite the liberalization of recent years, especially in the economic sphere, the party state remains the most powerful actor in Chinese society, and that path-breaking reform experiments such as in Hainan remain highly vulner- able due to the central government’s hesitation to commit the resources and unequivocal political support needed for the experiments to be successfully realized. Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard is Professor and Director at the Asia Research Center, Copenhagen Business School. He has held visiting research appointments in China, Singapore, and the US, and is a member of the Advisory Board of the EU-China Academic Network (ECAN). His most recent publications in English include The Chinese Communist Party in Reform (2006) and Bringing the Party Back In: How China is Governed (2004). -
The China Quarterly Empowering the Police: How the Chinese Communist Party Manages Its Coercive Leaders
The China Quarterly http://journals.cambridge.org/CQY Additional services for The China Quarterly: Email alerts: Click here Subscriptions: Click here Commercial reprints: Click here Terms of use : Click here Empowering the Police: How the Chinese Communist Party Manages Its Coercive Leaders Yuhua Wang The China Quarterly / Volume 219 / September 2014, pp 625 - 648 DOI: 10.1017/S0305741014000769, Published online: 26 August 2014 Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0305741014000769 How to cite this article: Yuhua Wang (2014). Empowering the Police: How the Chinese Communist Party Manages Its Coercive Leaders. The China Quarterly, 219, pp 625-648 doi:10.1017/ S0305741014000769 Request Permissions : Click here Downloaded from http://journals.cambridge.org/CQY, IP address: 130.91.165.128 on 07 Oct 2014 625 Empowering the Police: How the Chinese Communist Party Manages Its Coercive Leaders* Yuhua Wang† Abstract How does the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secure the loyalty of its coer- cive leaders, and its public security chiefs in particular, in the face of numer- ous domestic protests every year? This article presents the first quantitative analysis of contemporary China’s coercive leaders using an original data set of provincial public security chiefs and public security funding during the reform era. I demonstrate that the CCP, owing to its concern for regime sta- bility, has empowered the public security chiefs by incorporating them into the leadership team. Empowered public security chiefs then have stronger bargaining power over budgetary issues. I rely on fieldwork, qualitative interviews and an analysis of Party documents to complement my statistical analysis. The findings of this analysis shed light on the understanding of regime durability, contentious politics and the bureaucracy in China.