Making up Knowers: Objectivity and Categories of Epistemic Subjects By
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Making Up Knowers: Objectivity and Categories of Epistemic Subjects by Jennifer Jill Fellows B.A. University of Calgary 2003 M.A. University of Calgary 2005 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in The Faculty of Graduate Studies (Philosophy) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Vancouver) August 2011 © Jennifer Jill Fellows, 2011 ii Abstract The aim of this dissertation is simple: to defend the epistemic concept of objectivity as one that has done and continues to do good ethical and epistemic work for some communities. Because of this good work, I argue, in contrast to philosophers like Richard Rorty and Lorraine Code, that objectivity should not be removed from epistemic discourse—it is a valuable ideal to have. Relying on work from Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, I will identify objectivity as a concept with a layered and changing history. There are multiple different conceptions of the concept of objectivity currently identified, and more new conceptions being suggested. So, when I claim that objectivity is a valuable ideal to hold, what I mean is that specific conceptions of the concept of objectivity have had ethical and epistemic virtues in their times and places, and there are current suggested conceptions of objectivity that also seem to have ethical and/or epistemic virtues. These virtues are a result of the effect that the role of objectivity as an ideal has on epistemic subjects who adopt it. I will defend objectivity as an ideal, not as an attainable epistemic perspective. I argue that all conceptions of objectivity share a structure that unifies them under the concept of objectivity. All conceptions of objectivity aim at overcoming something identified as problematically subjective (What this thing is will vary in given times and places). This recognition of the relationship between objectivity and subjectivity allows me to give an analysis of how different conceptions of objectivity yield different conceptions of the epistemic subject. Relying on work done by Ian Hacking, I will argue that the ideal iii of objectivity serves as a mechanism for making up knowers. Self-reflection and self- policing are at the heart of this method by which categories of knowers are created. Using the examples of the U.S. suffrage movement and Marine-Protected Areas, I will demonstrate that the ideal of objectivity obligates self-reflective persons which has been and continues to be both ethically and epistemically beneficial. iv Table of Contents Abstract...........................................................................................................................ii Table of Contents...........................................................................................................iv Acknowledgements........................................................................................................vi Dedication....................................................................................................................viii Chapter 1: The Path Ahead............................................................................................1 1.1. Introduction.........................................................................................................2 1.2. What is Objectivity?............................................................................................6 1.3. The Plan and Objective.....................................................................................19 1.3.1. Chapter Summary.....................................................................................20 Chapter 2: Objectivity in Question................................................................................25 2.1. Introduction.......................................................................................................25 2.2. Why Not Objectivity?.........................................................................................29 2.2.1. Rorty's Objections and Alternatives...........................................................29 2.2.2. Code's Charges Against Objectivity..........................................................44 2.3. Standpoint Theory and Sandra Harding...........................................................51 2.4. Problems with Rorty's Alternative.....................................................................58 2.4.1. Rorty and Habermas.................................................................................59 2.4.2. Objectivity, Truth, and Minority Opinion.....................................................65 2.5. Caricature and Change.....................................................................................76 2.6. Conclusion........................................................................................................81 Chapter 3: Making Up Knowers...................................................................................84 3.1. Introduction.......................................................................................................84 3.2. The Objective/Subjective Distinction................................................................86 3.3. Daston and Galison and the History of Objectivity...........................................94 3.3.1. Truth-To-Nature to Mechanical Objectivity................................................99 3.3.2. Aperspectival Objectivity..........................................................................106 3.3.3. Max Weber and Value-Freedom..............................................................111 3.4. The Subject and Community...........................................................................116 3.4.1. What is a Community?.............................................................................116 3.4.2. Community-Constrained Possibilities of Persons...................................123 3.5. Subjects and Objectivity.................................................................................131 3.6. Conclusion......................................................................................................138 Chapter 4: Objectivity, Ethics, and Minority Opinion..................................................140 4.1. Introduction.....................................................................................................140 4.2. Objectivity and The Suffrage Movement.........................................................143 4.2.1. The Response.........................................................................................152 4.2.2. Ethical Benefits of Objectivity in the Suffrage Movement.......................157 4.3. The Bias-Stalemate........................................................................................161 4.3.1. Moving Past Biases and the Problem of Community..............................165 4.4. The Next Stalemate?......................................................................................176 4.4.1. Empiricism and Standpoint Theory.........................................................186 4.5. Stalemates and Objectivity.............................................................................191 v 4.6. Conclusion......................................................................................................194 Chapter 5: Trust, Downwind of the Expert.................................................................197 5.1. Introduction ....................................................................................................197 5.2. The Reconceptualization of Objectivity..........................................................199 5.2.1. Longino, Wylie and Inter-community Dialog............................................201 5.2.2. Objectivity and Trust-building..................................................................206 5.2.3. Trust-building Through Knowledge-Sharing............................................217 5.3. The Appearance of Trust-building in MPA's....................................................222 5.3.1. MPA's and the Stakeholder.....................................................................224 5.3.2. Lessons From Knowledge-Sharing in MPA's..........................................230 5.3.3. Ethical and Epistemic Benefits................................................................234 5.3.4. Concerns with the Current MPA Collaboration........................................239 5.4. Possible Solutions to the Problem of Trust.....................................................244 5.4.1. Rhetoric and Trust...................................................................................244 5.4.2. Humour and Trust-building......................................................................252 5.5. The New Objective Ideal.................................................................................259 5.5.1 The Epistemic Subject to be Overcome...................................................260 5.5.2 The Regime for Overcoming ...................................................................261 5.6. Conclusion......................................................................................................264 Chapter 6: Mind the Gap............................................................................................267 6.1. Introduction.....................................................................................................267 6.2. Questioning Objectivity...................................................................................268