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Rationality and Oppression: a Defence of the Obligation to Resist RATIONALITY AND OPPRESSION : A DEFENCE OF THE OBLIGATION TO RESIST OPPRESSION DISSERTATION Presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University BY CAROL HAY , M.A. THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY 2008 Approved by DISSERTATION COMMITTEE Professor Timothy Schroeder, Advisor Professor Louise Antony Advisor Professor Sigrún Svavarsdóttir Graduate Program in Philosophy Professor Richard Samuels COPYRIGHT BY CAROL HAY 2008 ABSTRACT In this dissertation, I argue that people who are oppressed have an obligation to resist their own oppression. While this argument is intended to hold for all people who are oppressed, I focus specifically on the obligation that women have to resist sexist oppression. I argue that this obligation is an instance of a larger species of obligation: to respect and protect some morally important feature or features of persons. In particular, I argue that Kant’s notion of humanity captures these morally important features of persons and that his arguments for the claim that humanity must be respected can be used to show that there is an obligation to protect one’s rational nature. I give an account of how oppression can harm people’s rational nature and show how resisting oppression is an instance of fulfilling the obligation to respect and protect one’s rational nature. And I emphasize how the obligation to protect rational nature applies in a special way to one’s own rational nature and thus that the obligation to resist one’s oppression is an obligation to the self. ii For Scott. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I’m grateful to the members of my dissertation committee for their feedback and their encouragement. Thanks to Louise Antony for being the first to encourage me to pursue the ideas I develop in this dissertation, and for sticking with me until the end. Thanks to Tim Schroeder for coming on board when I most needed it, and for helping me—nay, compelling me!—to see this project through to completion. Thanks to Sigrún Svavarsdóttir for reading so many drafts of this dissertation so very carefully, and for the careful and thoughtful advice that always resulted. Thanks to Richard Samuels for stepping in at the very last minute. In 2008, I presented some of the ideas found in Chapters 3 and 5 at the Society for Analytical Feminism’s conference at the University of Kentucky, at the University of Dayton’s Richard R. Baker Colloquium on the topic of “Building Coalitions Across Difference,” and to audiences at Chicago State University, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Iowa State University, the University of Kentucky, the University of Massachusetts-Lowell, the University of Minnesota-Moorhead, The Ohio State University, and the University of Tennessee. I published a preliminary exploration of some of the main issues that motivate this dissertation as “Whether to Ignore Them and Spin: Moral Obligations to Resist Sexual Harassment,” Hypatia 20 (2005): 94-108. I presented earlier versions of that paper, in 2004 and 2005 respectively, at the Society for Analytic Feminism’s iv conference at the University of Western Ontario and the 32nd Conference on Value Inquiry at Louisiana State University. I owe additional thanks to Don Hubin and Dan Farrell for reading early versions of many of the ideas I’ve presented here. Thanks to Alison Kerr and Debbie Blickensderfer for helping me jump through some last-minute administrative hoops. Thanks to Ben Caplan for many helpful suggestions. Thanks to Anita Superson for being an early champion of this work, and for showing a continued interest in the progression of my ideas. Thanks to Joan Callahan, Ann Cudd, Jean Harvey, and Sally Haslanger for helpful feedback on some of the ideas found in Chapters 3 and 5. Thanks to Zac Cogley for countless discussions, and for being a darn fantastic roommate. Thanks to Kate Moran for several helpful discussions about Kant’s views on education, and to Ryan Muldoon for several helpful discussions about rationality. And thanks to Andy Arlig, Eric Carter, Jesse Duarte, Timmy Fuller, Dai Heide, Alison Kerr, David Merli, Cristina Moisa, Cathy Muller, Kevin Scharp, and Kelly Trogdon for all that time working together at coffee shops. Thanks to Karen HayDraude for taking such good care of me and for spoiling me absolutely rotten while I wrote this. Thanks to Jeremy HayDraude for making sure I had both the computers and the music I needed to write this. Thanks to Brian Hay for being proud of me (even though I didn’t turn out to be a dentist or a lawyer). Thanks to Kim Werker for her heroic bailout during the financial crisis. Thanks to Greg, Kim, and Cleo Werker, and to Pete Edgar, for always having a home for me in Vancouver. And thanks most of all to my partner, Scott Edgar. For being so fiercely certain that I could do this. And for not putting up with me thinking otherwise. v VITA September 30, 1977 …………….…. Born – Edmonton, AB, Canada 1999 ………….…………………… B.A. (Honours), Philosophy, University of Saskatchewan. 2000 …………………………….… M.A., Philosophy, Dalhousie University. 1999 - 2000 …………………….… Teaching Assistant, Dalhousie University. 2001 – 2004 …………………….… Teaching Assistant, The Ohio State University. 2004 – 2007 …………………….… Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University. 2007 – 2008 …………………….… Visiting Instructor, Bryn Mawr College. 2008 …………………….………... Sessional Instructor, University of British Columbia. 2009 ……………………………… Assistant Professor, University of Massachusetts, Lowell. PUBLICATIONS “On Whether to Ignore Them and Spin: Moral Obligations to Resist Sexual Harassment,” Hypatia , 20 (2005): 94-108. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Philosophy vi TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Abstract …………….…………………………….…………………………………. ii Dedication ...…………………………………….…………………………………. iii Acknowledgments ...…………………………….…………………………………. iv Vita ...…………………………………………….…………………………………. vi CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………… 1 CHAPTER 2 – Oppression and Rationality ……………………………………… 21 Analyzing Oppression: A Definition of Oppression …………………… 21 Unjust Group-Specific Harm …………………………………… 23 Structural and Systemic Harm …………………………………….. 34 The Historical Basis for this Account of Oppression …………………… 38 How Oppression Harms People’s Rational Nature ……………………….. 41 Oppression can cause practically significant self-deception. ……… 43 Oppression can damage capacities for instrumental deliberation. ...... 45 Oppression can damage capacities for teleological deliberation. ....… 47 Oppression can cause weakness of will. …………………………… 48 Conclusion ...………………………………………….………………….. 50 CHAPTER 3 – An Obligation to Resist One’s own Oppression ……...………….… 52 An Obligation to Respect Rational Nature …………...…………………… 53 What does this Obligation Require? ……………………………………….. 59 Why the Oppressed have an Obligation to Resist their Oppression ………. 63 Other Accounts …………………………………………………………... 71 The Very Possibility of Obligations to the Self …………………………… 83 Objection: This is an Obligation to Others, not the Self …..…….………….. 88 Another Possibility: This is an Obligation to Respect Rational Nature in General ....……………………………….. 99 Objection: This Account has things Exactly Backward …………………. 103 Conclusion ...………………………………………….………………... 107 INTERLUDE – A Feminist Defence of Kant ……………………………………... 108 CHAPTER 4 – Respect-Worthiness and Dignity …………………………………... 121 Respect-Worthiness and Dignity ……………………………………… 126 Humanity is an End in Itself ………………………………………... 128 vii Personality has Dignity ……………………………………………….. 130 Evidence for this Interpretation …………………………………………. 136 Some Textual Counterevidence ……………………………………….. 145 Competing Interpretations ………………………………………………. 150 Conclusion …………………………………………………………… 162 CHAPTER 5 – Imperfect Duties and Why the Duty to Resist Oppression is not too Demanding …………….…………….…… 165 Four Objections ………………………………………………………… 166 The Objection from Risk ……………………………………... 166 The Objection from Blaming the Victim ……………………....... 169 The Objection from Ought Implies Can ………………………… 171 The Objection from Supererogation ...…………………………… 173 Kant on Perfect and Imperfect Duties …………………………………… 176 The Obligation to Resist One’s Oppression as an Imperfect Duty ……… 185 Latitude in Which Action to Take ……………………………………….. 192 Latitude in Refraining from Action …………………………………… 200 Back to the Four Objections ……………………………………………. 207 The Objection from Risk ……………………………………... 207 The Objection from Blaming the Victim ……………………... 208 The Objection from Ought Implies Can ………………………… 211 The Objection from Supererogation …………………………….. 213 Conclusion ………………………………………….………………... 218 APPENDIX – The Division of Domestic Labour as a Case Study of Oppression … 220 BIBLIOGRAPHY ………………………………………………….…………… 235 viii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Let’s begin with some examples. In his essay “Getting Away from Already Being Pretty Much Away from It All,” David Foster Wallace describes his visit to the Illinois State Fair for Harper’s magazine. 1 While his friend—whom he calls Native Companion because she’s a local—is riding one of the fair’s rides the men operating the ride stop it as she’s upside down so that her dress falls over her head and they can “ogl[e] her nethers.” 2 What follows is the exchange that takes place between Wallace and Native Companion immediately after she gets off the ride. “Did you sense something kind of sexual-harassmentish going on through that whole little sick exercise?” “Oh for fuck’s sake … it was fun .” … “They were looking up your dress . You couldn’t see them, maybe. They hung you upside down at a great height
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