DOCSLIB.ORG

The Last Gentleman's

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Last Gentleman's 01-cover_00_COVER_1.qxd 10/5/2015 5:53 PM Page 1 `100 AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2015, VOL 7 ISSUE 12 www.salute.co.in 1965 THE LAST GENTLEMAN’S WAR Maj. Gen. Sarup Singh Kalaan, MVC, MC, GOC 19 Inf Div stands below the National Flag, flying majestically at Haji Pir Pass. Lt Col (later Maj. Gen.) H.S. Kler, MVC, AVSM,the then GSO1 of the division, is seen second from right. 02-IFC_00_COVER_1.qxd 10/5/2015 5:51 PM Page 1 SALUTING THE GUARDIANS OF THE INDIAN SKIES The Indian Air Force’s Hawk advanced jet trainer is a compelling story of success, providing the new generation training to the next generation air warriors and delivering our commitment to Make in India in partnership with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited. On the 83rd Indian Air Force Day, we are excited to witness the ‘Made in India’ Hawk take off for the new Surya Kiran Aerobatic Team, representing the speed, agility and precision of the Indian Air Force. Flown by a number of aerobatic teams, the Hawk is a remarkably exible aircraft meeting the demands of modern air forces for both training and operational missions. 03-Contents_03_EDIT.qxd 10/5/2015 6:42 PM Page 3 in this issue 04 A TIME FOR REDEMPTION I Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch 05 THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL I Lt Gen Sudhir Sharma 06 THE LAST GENTLEMAN’S WAR: 1965 INDO-PAK WAR: IN RETROSPECT I Maroof Raza 10 THE WAR IN KUTCH: DEFENCE OF SARDAR POST I Lt Col Keshav S. Puntambekar 12 THE CAPTURE OF HAJIPIR PASS I Maj Gen HS Kler, MVC, AVSM 15 A SUBALTERN REMEMBERS: MY DAYS IN CHHAMB I Lt Col Anil Heble 17 THE CAPTURE OF BARKI I Col Surinder Sagar Duggal 20 THE FATEFUL 72 HOURS: An Account of the Battle of Asal Uttar I Lt Col Naresh K. Rastogi 22 PHILLORA AND ASAL UTTAR: TWO HISTORIC TANK BATTLES OF THE WAR I Lt Col Anil Bhat 26 ROOKIE PILOT I Wg Cdr Vinod Nebb, VrC and Bar 28 37 RAISINA HILLS I Lt Col Anil Bhat LESSONS FROM THE 1965 WAR I Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch 30 38 VETERANS ALERT I Hony Capt Baldev Singh THE FRONTIER FORCES AND HARI SINGH OF BUNDI: A 39 PEEP INTO THE ARMY OF YORE I Brig Onkar S Goraya 31 BOOK REVIEW I Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch 40 SOLDIER OF FORTUNE: The Untold Special Forces Story I Col Subin Balakrishnan PESTO PASTA I Aditi Pathak 34 41 News DEATH ON INDIAN ROADS I Murad Ali Baig 36 42 NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH HOW INDIA RETALIATED I Maroof Raza Authors aspiring to publish their articles in Salute may send by email to [email protected] along with pictures, if any [email protected] >> August-September 2015 >> SALUTE TO THE INDIAN SOLDIER 03 04-Edit_14_19_ BEING A FLY GIRL.qxd 10/5/2015 5:58 PM Page 1 EDITOR’S NOTE A TIME FOR Publisher Maroof Raza REDEMPTION Editor MAJ GEN DHRUV C KATOCH Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch SM, VSM The commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of might, when the reality on the ground was quite the 1965 War against Pakistan has drawn a wide different. This brings into focus the importance Associate Editor range of comments, for the most part apprecia- of propaganda in war. Today, in the information Lt Col Anil Bhat tive, from across the country. The commemora- age, this aspect assumes added significance, as VSM (Retd) tion is essential, firstly, to apprise the youth of perception is as important as the physical win- Design this country, that peace can be achieved only ning of wars. Wartime preparations, as brought Moushumi through a strong military and secondly, to revisit out by various authors, were weak. It is hard to history, look into what went wrong, and analyse comprehend why the Indian Army did not have Publicity Manager whether we are better prepared to crush aggres- maps, when war broke out in September. It is Hony Capt (Retd) Baldev Singh sion from hostile neighbours. equally difficult to comprehend why two The war thrust on India in 1965 was not one decades later, the IPKF went into Sri Lanka, again Board of Advisers that India wanted, but once begun, both the without maps. This is but one of the lacunae fac- Lt Gen Sudhir Sharma political and military leadership, went about ing the armed forces - a lack of forethought in PVSM, AVSM, YSM ,VSM( Retd) their task doggedly, and the nation rallied administrative matters, which is a peace time around in support, ensuring that the basic war function. This must be overcome. Some of the Printed published by aims were achieved. Surprisingly, however, the major lessons have been highlighted in a sepa- Flags Media Pvt Ltd A-47 Hauz Khas (LGF) lessons from this war did not make it into the rate article in this issue. So who won the war? New Delhi 110016 official teaching manuals of the Armed Forces, as This question is often asked and the answer a result of which certain weaknesses which were obviously lies in how victory is defined. Pakistan Printed at noticeable then, still remain. Equally unfortu- failed miserably in its attempt to grab Kashmir by JK Offset Graphics (P) Ltd nate was the fact that the political leadership too, force in Operation Gibraltar. It had an opportu- C-21,DDA Shed, did not imbibe in full measure, the corrective nity to take Akhnur, but poor Pakistani leader- Okhla Phase -1 actions that were required to be taken. A notice- ship and a gritty Indian defence put paid to those New Delhi -110020 able exception was in foreign relations, wherein hopes. Its offensive in Khem Karan ended in dis- the need for having support of one of the super aster, with the destruction of its 1 Armoured RNI Registration powers was catered for through a ‘Treaty of Peace Division. Pakistan, as the aggressor, had set for DELENG/2008/26923 and Friendship’ with the Soviet Union, before we itself, certain war time aims and it failed to Certified that the views went in to war in 1971. However, the issue of inte- achieve any one of them. Pakistan’s claims of expressed and suggestions gration of the Ministry of Defence and three winning the war thus ring hollow. made in the articles are made Services still languishes. What of India then? The Army defeated by authors in their personal In this issue, we have put together a series of aggression in J&K and thus achieved its immedi- capacity and do not have any articles of the 1965 War, written by those who ate war time aim. However, the Pakistan Army official endorsement fought the war and had a ringside view of battles was not defeated, though it suffered very heavy as they unfolded. Some of these articles have losses in battle, especially with respect to its been extracted from the forthcoming book of the offensive capability. But perhaps, the question 1965 War, titled ‘Honour Redeemed” which is need not be looked at in those terms. For India, it under publication by Bloomsbury and is being was a time for redemption, after the humiliation released in October 1965. From the various first of 1962. For Pakistan, it was a realisation that it hand accounts in the book, told with remarkable could no longer match Indian military might, candour, emerge a clear and honest picture of and had to look into other options to achieve its what actually happened in those exciting times. military aims. It is those options which Pakistan It is surprising that Pakistan touted the Kutch is exercising now, which we need to counter. skirmishes as a success of Pakistan’s military Happy Reading. 04 SALUTE TO THE INDIAN SOLDIER << August-September 2015 << [email protected] 05-General_14_19_ BEING A FLY GIRL.qxd 10/5/2015 5:58 PM Page 1 GENERAL SPEAK THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL Lt Gen Sudhir Sharma Ayub Khan)besides Shuja Nawaz, give us an insight into the Pakistani perception Whilst posted at the High Commission in and facts of the war as it unfolded in London, a respected British historian Pakistan. As per them, Operation remarked to me, tongue in cheek, that Gibraltar, the flawed plan to annex Pakistan and India are perhaps the only Kashmir by sending in Pakistani soldiers two countries in the world who disguised as infiltrators, was a closely commemorate and celebrate victory day guarded secret, divulged to just a chosen for the same battle and even war! For a few. The Air Force and Navy were kept true professional this is an anomaly. Seen out out of the loop as was most of the objectively, there can only be one victor army. So confident was Ayub Khan and in war, and at best, on rare occasions, one his hawkish minister ZA Bhutto of could in fairness of things call it a draw. success, that they had not bargained or The 1965 Indo-Pak war aptly fits into this planned for its failure. Furthermore, so category because both sides on the poor was the strategic reading of Indian occasion of the fiftieth anniversary, response, that they did not make any fervently celebrated victory over each significant plans for an Indian riposte in other. The distortion/dilution of history the IB sector. Even Operation Grand is so profound that revered war heroes Slam, the race to Akhnur, was supposed look like men of straw if one were to celebrated with much pride as ‘Defence to be in support of the fall of Kashmir.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Operation Gibraltar.Docx
    Operation Gibraltar Operation Gibraltar was code name for a military operation launched by the Pakistani military in the Indian administered part of Kashmir. The objective was for Pakistani commandos to infiltrate the Line of Control and instigate the local population to revolt against the Indian government. The operation was a disaster as the local population did not revolt and the infiltration was discovered. This led to the outbreak of the 1965 Indo-Pak war. Operation Gibraltar was an important topic in the Modern Indian History segment of the IAS exam. Background of Operation Gibraltar The Indo-Pakistan war of 1947 resulted in Indian gaining two-thirds of Kashmir. However Pakistan kept looking for opportunities to gain the rest. That opportunity would come following the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict (Began on October 20, 1962). The defeat at the hands of the Chinese military led to major changes in the Indian army in terms of men and equipment. Pakistan, despite being outnumbered, would use its qualitative edge to balance the scales of power before India completed its defence build up. The Rann of Kutch clash (April 9th 1965) in the summer of 1965, where Indian and Pakistani forces clashed, resulted in some positives for Pakistan. Moreover, in December 1963, the disappearance of a holy relic from the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, created turmoil among the people in the valley, which was viewed by Pakistan as ideal for revolt. These factors bolstered the Pakistani command's thinking: that the use of covert methods followed by the threat of an all out war would force a resolution in Kashmir Thus Pakistani Military command opted to send in both its regular army and an auxiliary force of Kashmiri locals on their side of the border towards Jammu and Kashmir.
    [Show full text]
  • The India–Pakistan Conflict an Enduring Rivalry Edited by T. V. Paul
    This page intentionally left blank ii ii The India–Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry The India–Pakistan rivalry remains one of the most enduring and unre- solved conflicts of our times. It began with the birth of the two states in 1947, and it has continued ever since, with the periodic resumption of wars and crises. The conflict has affected every dimension of interstate and societal relations between the two countries and, despite occasional peace initiatives, shows no signs of abating. This volume brings together leading experts in international relations theory and comparative politics to explain the persistence of this rivalry. Together they examine a range of topics including regional power distribution, great power politics, territorial divisions, the nuclear weapons factor, and incompatible national identities. Based on their analyses, they offer possible condi- tions under which the rivalry could be terminated. The book will be of interest to scholars of politics and international relations, as well as those concerned about stability and peace in South Asia. T . V . PAUL is James McGill Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at McGill University, Montreal, Canada. His previous publications include Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (2000) and India in the World Order: Searching forMajorPowerStatus(with Baldev Raj Nayar, 2002). The India–Pakistan Conflict An Enduring Rivalry Edited by T. V. Paul McGill University camʙʀɪdɢe uɴɪveʀsɪtʏ pʀess Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cʙ2 2ʀu, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521855198 © Cambridge University Press 2005 This publication is in copyright.
    [Show full text]
  • A Golden Opportunity for South Asia
    A Golden Opportunity for South Asia Stanley Wolpert Professor of History, University of California at Los Angeles stan, offers South Asia's most powerful nations a golden opportunity for This golden enlightened jubilee change. With year Prime Ministerof India's Inder Kumar independence Gujral now at and of the birth of Paki the helm of New Delhi's polity, and Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif enjoying great popular support in Islamabad, South Asia may at last be ready to end half a century of mortal conflict and enter the next millennium at peace. Fifty years of war and terror, causing chaos and economic dislocation, have been the bitter legacies of a hasty, inept Partition that tore apart British India's breadbasket of Punjab and its most populous province of Bengal in mid August 1947. Deep-rooted religious differences and competing political ambi tions conspired to disrupt British India's stability with periodic communal riots during the last four decades of that Raj. All three of the major parties of the Partition, Britain's Government of India, the Indian National Congress, and the Muslim League, share historic blame for the bloody transfer of power that left more than a million fleeing Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs to die violently in the Partition's immediate aftermath. The end of World War II found Great Britain so sick of imperial respon sibilities and in such deep Sterling debt to India that its new Labour Government could barely wait to extricate itself from South Asia. Prime Minister Attlee sent the King's handsome young cousin, "Dickie" Lord Mountbatten, to New Delhi to put the best British ceremonial face on that final act of the Raj, with pomp and pageantry enough on the eve of Partition for the world's press almost to blot out the Hindu-Muslim-Sikh bloodbath of a civil war that ravaged the subcontinent Summer/Fall 1997 - Volume IV, Issue 2 209 This content downloaded from 128.148.254.57 on Tue, 06 Feb 2018 20:59:33 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Stanley Wolpert in its wake.
    [Show full text]
  • Last Post Indian War Memorials Around the World
    Last Post Indian War Memorials Around the World Introduction • 1 Rana Chhina Last Post Indian War Memorials Around the World i Capt Suresh Sharma Last Post Indian War Memorials Around the World Rana T.S. Chhina Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research United Service Institution of India 2014 First published 2014 © United Service Institution of India All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior permission of the author / publisher. ISBN 978-81-902097-9-3 Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research United Service Institution of India Rao Tula Ram Marg, Post Bag No. 8, Vasant Vihar PO New Delhi 110057, India. email: [email protected] www.usiofindia.org Printed by Aegean Offset Printers, Gr. Noida, India. Capt Suresh Sharma Contents Foreword ix Introduction 1 Section I The Two World Wars 15 Memorials around the World 47 Section II The Wars since Independence 129 Memorials in India 161 Acknowledgements 206 Appendix A Indian War Dead WW-I & II: Details by CWGC Memorial 208 Appendix B CWGC Commitment Summary by Country 230 The Gift of India Is there ought you need that my hands hold? Rich gifts of raiment or grain or gold? Lo! I have flung to the East and the West Priceless treasures torn from my breast, and yielded the sons of my stricken womb to the drum-beats of duty, the sabers of doom. Gathered like pearls in their alien graves Silent they sleep by the Persian waves, scattered like shells on Egyptian sands, they lie with pale brows and brave, broken hands, strewn like blossoms mowed down by chance on the blood-brown meadows of Flanders and France.
    [Show full text]
  • Battle of Asal Uttar: 1965 Indo-Pak War
    scholar warrior Battle of Asal Uttar: 1965 Indo-Pak War P K CHAKRAVORTY Introduction India has fought three wars with Pakistan. All these wars have been initiated by Pakistan, and India has responded with alacrity and military precision. Out of the three wars, the war of 1971 was a classical victory for India. It also witnessed the dismemberment of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Pakistan ceased to be in the same league as India after this war. Prior to the 1971 War and after the Sino-Indian debacle of 1962, a major war was initiated by Pakistan in 1965. It commenced with operations in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965, followed by Operation Gibraltar which witnessed Pakistani irregulars trying to capture Kashmir by infiltration and gaining a few areas in Uri, Tithwal and Poonch, while India captured the strategic Haji Pir Pass. To continue the operations Pakistan launched Operation Grand Slam to capture Akhnoor and cut off the communications in the Jammu region on September 1. The Indian Army also launched operations in the Sialkot sector as also on to the eastern banks of Ichogil canal which brought it to the doorsteps of Pakistan’s second biggest city, Lahore. Pakistan launched its ultimate offensive with its 1 Armoured Division and 11 Infantry Division in the Khemkaran sector to reach the bridges on the Beas river and thereafter threaten Amritsar, Jullundur, or as visualised by President Ayub Khan, onwards to Delhi. It was in these operations that the one of the biggest tank battles was fought at Asal Uttar.
    [Show full text]
  • The Other Battlefield Construction And
    THE OTHER BATTLEFIELD – CONSTRUCTION AND REPRESENTATION OF THE PAKISTANI MILITARY ‘SELF’ IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVE PRODUCTION Inauguraldissertation an der Philosophisch-historischen Fakultät der Universität Bern zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde vorgelegt von Manuel Uebersax Promotionsdatum: 20.10.2017 eingereicht bei Prof. Dr. Reinhard Schulze, Institut für Islamwissenschaft der Universität Bern und Prof. Dr. Jamal Malik, Institut für Islamwissenschaft der Universität Erfurt Originaldokument gespeichert auf dem Webserver der Universitätsbibliothek Bern Dieses Werk ist unter einem Creative Commons Namensnennung-Keine kommerzielle Nutzung-Keine Bearbeitung 2.5 Schweiz Lizenzvertrag lizenziert. Um die Lizenz anzusehen, gehen Sie bitte zu http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ch/ oder schicken Sie einen Brief an Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, Suite 300, San Francisco, California 94105, USA. 1 Urheberrechtlicher Hinweis Dieses Dokument steht unter einer Lizenz der Creative Commons Namensnennung-Keine kommerzielle Nutzung-Keine Bearbeitung 2.5 Schweiz. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ch/ Sie dürfen: dieses Werk vervielfältigen, verbreiten und öffentlich zugänglich machen Zu den folgenden Bedingungen: Namensnennung. Sie müssen den Namen des Autors/Rechteinhabers in der von ihm festgelegten Weise nennen (wodurch aber nicht der Eindruck entstehen darf, Sie oder die Nutzung des Werkes durch Sie würden entlohnt). Keine kommerzielle Nutzung. Dieses Werk darf nicht für kommerzielle Zwecke verwendet werden. Keine Bearbeitung. Dieses Werk darf nicht bearbeitet oder in anderer Weise verändert werden. Im Falle einer Verbreitung müssen Sie anderen die Lizenzbedingungen, unter welche dieses Werk fällt, mitteilen. Jede der vorgenannten Bedingungen kann aufgehoben werden, sofern Sie die Einwilligung des Rechteinhabers dazu erhalten. Diese Lizenz lässt die Urheberpersönlichkeitsrechte nach Schweizer Recht unberührt.
    [Show full text]
  • JCC: East Pakistan Crisis Indian Cabinet Chair: Prateek Swain Crisis Director: Alex Fager
    asdf JCC: East Pakistan Crisis Indian Cabinet Chair: Prateek Swain Crisis Director: Alex Fager JCC: East Pakistan Crisis – India PMUNC 2016 Contents Letter from the Chair…….………………………...……………………...…..3 Introduction………..…….………………………...……………………...…..5 The Situation in the Indian Subcontinent……............……………..……..……7 Setting the Stage…...………………………..……………………….……….…………7 A Brief History of Modern India..…………..……………………….……….…………9 Indo-Pakistani Relations………...…………..………………...….….……….………...10 Domestic Affairs………………………………………………………………….…...12 Current Situation……………………………………….……………………………...13 Committee Positions………..…….………………………...………………..16 2 JCC: East Pakistan Crisis – India PMUNC 2016 Letter from the Chair Dear Delegates, Namaste! I welcome you to the magnum opus of this year’s PMUNC, The JCC: East Pakistan Crisis. My name is Prateek Swain and I will be your chair for the India committee. First, I’ll introduce myself; I will be starting my sophomore year at Princeton and will be majoring in Economics or Woodrow Wilson School of Public Policy (depending on my mood when I have to declare) with a certificate in computer science. I have been debating as well as participating/chairing MUNs since my sophomore year of high school, and have carried on with these endeavors in college. Last year I was the Director for the Korean Reunification Committee at PMUNC, so I’m naturally extremely excited to be chairing this committee and have full faith that it will be a great experience for both you and me. This is certainly not my first crisis, but perhaps the one closest to my heart. Last semester, I took one of those eye opening classes at Princeton on Human Rights with Rebecca (Chair of the Pakistan committee) which set the foundation for this JCC to come into existence.
    [Show full text]
  • Jihadist Violence: the Indian Threat
    JIHADIST VIOLENCE: THE INDIAN THREAT By Stephen Tankel Jihadist Violence: The Indian Threat 1 Available from : Asia Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20004-3027 www.wilsoncenter.org/program/asia-program ISBN: 978-1-938027-34-5 THE WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, established by Congress in 1968 and headquartered in Washington, D.C., is a living national memorial to President Wilson. The Center’s mission is to commemorate the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson by providing a link between the worlds of ideas and policy, while fostering research, study, discussion, and collaboration among a broad spectrum of individuals concerned with policy and scholarship in national and interna- tional affairs. Supported by public and private funds, the Center is a nonpartisan insti- tution engaged in the study of national and world affairs. It establishes and maintains a neutral forum for free, open, and informed dialogue. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center. The Center is the publisher of The Wilson Quarterly and home of Woodrow Wilson Center Press, dialogue radio and television. For more information about the Center’s activities and publications, please visit us on the web at www.wilsoncenter.org. BOARD OF TRUSTEES Thomas R. Nides, Chairman of the Board Sander R. Gerber, Vice Chairman Jane Harman, Director, President and CEO Public members: James H.
    [Show full text]
  • The Saga of Grit and Cold Courage
    THE SAGA OF GRIT AND COLD COURAGE TRIBUTE TO THE FIGHTERS OF 35 INFANTRY BRIGADE IN 1965 WAR: FIRST HAND ACCOUNT Maj Gen Yashwant Deva, AVSM (Retd) DEDICATED TO The forgotten martyrs of 35 Infantry Brigade, who sacrificed their sarvasva (the entire) — existence, even remembrance At Lord’s Beckoning Slain, thou shall achieve heaven; victorious, thou shall enjoy the earth. Therefore rouse O son of Kunti, resolve to fight. Bhaagvad Gita, Shalok 37, Discourse II i FOREWORD I recall Gen Deva, the author of this book when he was attending the Staff College. Posting as a Brigade Major after the course was indicative of the fact that the officer had done very well at the course. It was more so for a Signals officer, as normally officers from combat arms and not combat support arms got posted to this most important staff appointment for a Major. Nowadays with a Deputy Commander in the rank of Colonel and the Brigade Major upgraded to Lt Col, this has changed. After reading this book, I feel that the author has more than justified his selection as Brigade Major. He was blooded in battle like an infantry soldier and showed valour. He shouldered much responsibility in the operation of his Brigade in all the confusion connected with 1 Corps offensive in the Samba sector of Jammu and Kashmir. Tasks for his Brigade were changing at the drop of the hat and so was its grouping with formations. Yet the Brigade’s performance was creditable. 93 officers and soldiers of the Brigade got martyred in this war.
    [Show full text]
  • The Jihad Paradox S
    The Jihad Paradox S. Paul Kapurand Sumit Ganguly Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia Islamist militants based in Pakistan have repeatedly been involved in major terrorist incidents through out the world, such as the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington and the 2005 London subway bombings.1 They regularly strike government, coalition, and civilian targets in Afghanistan, hampering efforts to stabilize the country. Also, they frequently target India, threatening to incite an Indo-Pakistani conflict that could potentially escalate to the nuclear level. Pakistan-based militancy thus severely undermines regional and international security. Although this problem has received widespread international attention since 2001 and the advent of the United States' "global war on terror," the Pakistan-militant nexus is as old as the Pakistani state. From its founding in 1947 to the present day, Pakistan has used religiously motivated militant forces as strategic tools.2 How and why did this situation come about? How has S. Paul Kapur is Professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and a faculty affiliate at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. The arguments advanced in this article are solely his and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other in dividual or of the U.S. government. Sumit Ganguly is Professor of Political Science and holds the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington. He is also Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The authors thank International Security's anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
    [Show full text]
  • Counterinsurgency in Pakistan
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available CHILD POLICY from www.rand.org as a public service of CIVIL JUSTICE the RAND Corporation. EDUCATION ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT Jump down to document6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit NATIONAL SECURITY institution that helps improve policy and POPULATION AND AGING PUBLIC SAFETY decisionmaking through research and SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY analysis. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND Support RAND INFRASTRUCTURE Purchase this document WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore the RAND National Security Research Division View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see RAND Permissions. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Counterinsurgency in Pakistan Seth G. Jones, C. Christine Fair NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION Project supported by a RAND Investment in People and Ideas This monograph results from the RAND Corporation’s Investment in People and Ideas program.
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Gibraltar: an Uprising That Never Was P.K
    Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg Delhi Cantonment, New Delhi-110010 Journal of Defence Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.idsa.in/journalofdefencestudies Operation Gibraltar: An Uprising that Never Was P.K. Chakravorty and Gurmeet Kanwal To cite this article: P.K. Chakravorty and Gurmeet Kanwal (201 5): Operation Gibraltar: An Uprising that Never Was , Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 July-September 2015, pp. 33-52 URL http://idsa.in/jds/9_3_2015_OperationGibraltar.html Please Scroll down for Article Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.idsa.in/termsofuse This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re- distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Operation Gibraltar An Uprising that Never Was P.K. Chakravorty* Gurmeet Kanwal** Launched in early-August 1965, Operation Gibraltar was designed to infiltrate several columns of trained and well-armed Mujahids and Razakars, led by Pakistan Army Majors into Jammu and Kashmir. Under the cover of fire provided by the Pakistan Army deployed on the Cease Fire Line (CFL), the columns managed to infiltrate, but failed to create large-scale disturbances and did not receive support from the people. In fact, locals often provided information about the columns to the Indian Army, which led to their being captured or neutralised.
    [Show full text]