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A Global Strategy for Combating al Qaeda and the Islamic State By Mary Habeck with James Jay Carafano, Thomas Donnelly, Bruce Hoffman, Seth Jones, Frederick W. Kagan, Kimberly Kagan, Thomas Mahnken, and Katherine Zimmerman AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE A Global Strategy for Combating al Qaeda and the Islamic State MARY HABECK WITH JAMES JAY CARAFANO THOMAS DONNELLY BRUCE HOFFMAN SETH JONES FREDERICK W. KAGAN KIMBERLY KAGAN THOMAS MAHNKEN KATHERINE ZIMMERMAN DECEMBER 2015 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE © 2015 by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. All rights reserved. The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, 501(c)(3) educational organization and does not take institutional positions on any issues. The views expressed here are those of the author(s). Executive Summary he United States faces a fundamental challenge Although the ongoing US-led airstrikes in Iraq Tto its way of life. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State and Syria demonstrate increased American resolve, (ISIS), two groups that have already killed thousands the United States needs a new strategy to stop ISIS, of Americans and tens of thousands of Muslims, are al Qaeda, and affiliated groups: a counterinsurgency waging war on the United States, our allies, and our with ideological, security, diplomatic, economic, and friends as part of a general strategy to create a global political components. This comprehensive population- caliphate. As evidenced by their gains in Syria, Iraq, centric strategy must confront ISIS and al Qaeda on Libya, Yemen, and South Asia, the extremists are no a regional basis, rather than in independent under- longer on the run and arguably are winning. Al Qaeda, takings. The first effort must focus on the Levant, an in particular, has expanded its control and influ- area that includes Syria and Iraq, as well as on the Ara- ence in the past few years, with affiliates and linked bian Peninsula, which acts as a crucial support for the groups present in more than 20 countries. Whereas extremists’ main fight. Beyond these two areas, the US these organizations were limited mostly to terror- will also need to engage in South Asia, which provides ist activities in 2011, today they are playing leading al Qaeda, in particular, with its main command node. roles in a dozen active insurgencies and, along with The objectives of this strategy are clear: al Qaeda, ISIS, are beginning to demonstrate conventional war- ISIS, and the jihadist or Islamist movements close to fare capabilities in places like Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. the group must be defeated decisively, the territory and ISIS, meanwhile, has control of large swaths of terri- people that they control must be freed, and extremist tory in Syria and Iraq and is performing all the func- ideology must be so discredited that few Muslims will tions of governance in these areas. Perhaps even more feel attracted to its arguments. Given the size of the important, the extremists currently have momentum: problem, the United States needs capable partners with expanding the territory under their influence, increas- responsive, legitimate governments to help degrade and ing their access to safe havens, spreading their ideol- defeat ISIS and al Qaeda militarily and ideologically. ogy, and raising their capabilities. For the purposes of this strategy, victory will mean In seeking to counter these threats, the United States reducing al Qaeda and ISIS back to the original ter- faces significant strategic challenges. American leaders rorist group that they were in the late 1980s: small still have not recognized the nature of this war and have and incapable of carrying out mass-casualty terrorist a dangerous misconception of the threat. At the same attacks. This can happen only when we have degraded time, our global position is materially worse than it was the extremists’ capabilities until they are once again just three years ago. We have fewer allies, fewer capable unable to recruit enough followers to replace lead- partners, fewer forward bases, fewer available resources, ers lost, to hold territory or enforce their version of and fewer forces to deal with the threat. The policies sharia, and to carry out anything but minor and local the United States has adopted to confront al Qaeda and terrorist attacks. None of this is possible without capa- ISIS are also reactive, rather than proactive, ceding ini- ble partners. tiative to the extremists. All these developments create The global and comprehensive nature of this coun- the perception that the United States is no longer win- terinsurgency strategy leads to an especially difficult ning the fight against al Qaeda and ISIS. challenge: this will not be an easy or short conflict, 1 A GLOBAL STRATEGY FOR COMBATING AL QAEDA AND THE ISLAMIC STATE and the country must be prepared politically, fis- As these conditions worsen, al Qaeda and/or ISIS cally, militarily, and mentally for a long war. Given will carry out a mass-casualty attack against the home- the long-term and continuous effort inherent in this land: it is a question of not if, but rather when. Even strategy, building domestic support and bipartisan more worrisome is our assessment that, if we fail to stop agreement is vital. The risks of action seem clear and the extremists from taking territory and undermining overwhelming, but the risks of inaction—including states, al Qaeda or ISIS will obtain weapons of mass the loss of key terrain to both groups, the creation of destruction; then it will be too late to act. Preventing multiple safe havens for the extremists to plot against these outcomes will require a serious and prolonged us, and the undermining of states around the globe— effort, but it is an effort that is well worth the costs and are even more dire. risks for the United States and our allies and partners. 2 A Global Strategy against al Qaeda and the Islamic State The Current Situation the attitudes of the local population, the capacity of the host government in the particular area of concern, The United States faces a fundamental challenge to its and many other factors. There can be no one-size-fits- way of life. Al Qaeda and ISIS, two groups that have all approach. Yet each campaign must be nested in a already killed thousands of Americans and tens of thou- global framework rather than functioning as an inde- sands of Muslims, are at war with us as part of a general pendent undertaking. Indeed, there is no prospect for a strategy to create their global caliphate. We need to rec- lasting or decisive outcome if the individual campaigns ognize the depth of the problem that we face, acknowl- are not synchronized with this larger strategy; aligning edge the magnitude of effort that will be needed to the United States with Russia, Iran, Syria, and Hezbol- confront it, and steel ourselves for a long fight if we lah in an effort to defeat ISIS would be an example of wish to emerge victorious. this penny-wise, pound-foolish approach, as wasteful as We must equally avoid the temptation of defeatism. it is strategically counterproductive. This is a conflict we can and must win, sooner rather We must also take the long-run view in allocating than later. And while victory in the long term is inev- resources, particularly military resources, to this effort itable because the Muslim world will eventually reject and to each campaign. Because of the global scope and the hateful ideology of al Qaeda and ISIS, our chal- complexity of the conflict, there is no way to achieve lenge is to minimize the damage to our own people, the rapid, decisive operations so beloved of US military our way of life, and the world and to avoid the calam- leaders and policymakers. Moreover, at this point, we ities that could befall us if these groups or their allies do not have sufficient forces, especially land forces, to acquire weapons of mass destruction. This task is hard prosecute the war to the fullest extent in many places. but not hopeless. Our strategy must reflect our diminished means and Success requires a new grand strategic approach that the realities of current domestic opinion in the United views the enemy as the global, interconnected system States and elsewhere. Campaigns should be designed that it is. Fourteen years of attempting to decapitate al in part to build American and allied confidence that Qaeda have failed—the group now has greater military success is possible while acknowledging our commit- power and territory than ever before. Yet large-scale inva- ment must be sustained over time. Our allies, in partic- sions of countries where al Qaeda and its affiliates oper- ular, must be convinced we will not again leave them in ate cannot be our first option. They allow the enemy the lurch. Given the worsening balance of power across to impose high costs on the US and its allies in return the Middle East, some circumstances—acute threats, for partial successes in individual theaters. The better the need to buttress a failing ally, or even the opportu- solution is a coordinated series of regional counterin- nity to deliver a locally decisive blow—may demand surgency campaigns to combat al Qaeda and ISIS. This the direct commitment of a substantial American force. population-centric and phased approach must organi- And although we must have a durable and comprehen- cally include a robust stabilization effort and combine sive strategy, we must remember that no plan survives diplomatic, political, security, and informational efforts. contact with the enemy or events. This strategy pro- These campaigns must be tailored for each specific vides a framework for campaign planning, not a step- fight according to the nature and strength of the enemy, by-step recipe for victory.

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