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Afghanistan Study Group Final Report

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Afghanistan Study Group Final Report Afghanistan Study Group Final Report FEBRUARY 2021 AFGHANISTAN STUDY GROUP Members of the Afghanistan Study Group Co-chairs Senator Kelly A. Ayotte General Joseph F. Dunford Jr. (Ret.) Ms. Nancy Lindborg Study Group Members Ms. Nisha Biswal Ms. Susan Gordon Mr. David Miliband Ambassador James Dobbins Ambassador Mark Green Ms. Lisa Monaco Senator Joe Donnelly Ambassador Marc Grossman Dr. Meghan O’Sullivan Ms. Michèle Flournoy Mr. Stephen J. Hadley General Curtis Scaparrotti (Ret.) This report, which was drafted in December 2020 and January 2021, represents the consensus of a bipartisan and independent Study Group with diverse expertise and affiliations. No member may be satisfied with every formulation and argument in isolation. The findings of this report are solely those of the Afghanistan Study Group. They do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Institute of Peace or the senior advisers who contributed their time and expertise to the deliberations of the Group and the content of this report. All members and senior advisers participated in their personal capacity and on a volunteer basis. Cover includes artwork by Pyty/Shutterstock. Maps on pages 5 and 7 created by Lucidity Information Design. United States Institute of Peace 2301 Constitution Avenue NW Washington, DC 20037 Phone: 202.457.1700 Fax: 202.429.6063 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www . usip.org Making Peace Possible Afghanistan Study Group Final Report A Pathway for Peace in Afghanistan FEBRUARY 2021 Contents Letter from the Co-chairs ........................................ 2 Recommendations ................................................ 47 1. Clarify the End State .................................................... 47 Executive Summary ................................................. 4 2. Reinforce the Conditionality of a Final U.S. National Interests and Afghanistan ......................... 6 U.S. Troop Withdrawal ................................................ 47 A New Pathway for Peace ................................................. 8 3. Clarify the U.S. Commitment to Alternative Pathways ......................................................... 9 the Current Afghan State ............................................ 49 Conclusion ........................................................................ 10 4. Work Diplomatically to Promote the Success of the Negotiation Process ............................ 51 Introduction ............................................................ 11 5. Design an Overarching Regional Diplomatic Strategy .... 52 Interests and Key Judgments ............................... 13 Alternative Pathways ............................................ 56 U.S. National Interests and Afghanistan ....................... 13 Key Judgments .................................................................. 15 Conclusion ............................................................. 59 Analytical Assessments ........................................ 19 Annexes .................................................................. 60 Status of the Peace Process .............................................. 19 1. Afghanistan Study Group Enabling Legislation ...... 60 Evolution of the Terrorist Threat from Afghanistan ... 22 2. Members of the Afghanistan Study Group Afghanistan’s Economic Dependency ........................... 24 and Senior Advisers ..................................................... 61 Politics and the State ........................................................ 30 3. Consultations ................................................................ 63 Civil Society, Rights, and Social Gains .......................... 34 4. Methodology ................................................................. 66 The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces..... 36 5. Policy Pathways ............................................................ 70 The Taliban: Organization and Objectives ................... 38 6. Text of the Doha Agreement ...................................... 77 Regional Stakeholders and Dynamics ........................... 40 7. Text of the Joint Declaration ....................................... 80 The Strategic Logic behind a New Approach ..... 44 Notes ...................................................................... 83 Letter from the Co-chairs We submit this report with a sense of humility gained from efforts that have created this pathway, we believe a signif- confronting over the past nine months a problem of historic icant revision of U.S. policy is required to make the most complexity, as well as with guarded optimism that we have, of this opportunity. The main elements of this revision are: for the first time since 2001, an opportunity and framework to achieve a just and durable peace in Afghanistan if we • An immediate diplomatic effort to extend the current make the hard choices to align our efforts and resources to May 2021 withdrawal date in order to give the peace the current peace process. process sufficient time to produce an acceptable result. This report is provided to, and at the request of, those in • A recognition that, in addition to conducting coun- Congress who oversee American foreign policy and provide terterrorism operations and supporting the Afghan the resources to ensure that our national interests are met. National Defense and Security Forces, a key objective of the ongoing U.S. military presence is to help create The Afghanistan Study Group began its Congressionally conditions for an acceptable peace agreement. The mandated work in April 2020, just weeks after the United February 2020 Doha agreement and the subsequent troop States and the Taliban signed an agreement (the “Doha reductions clearly demonstrated that the United States is agreement”) on the conditions for a U.S. troop withdrawal prepared to withdraw from Afghanistan. It should not, that would end our long military engagement in Afghanistan. however, simply hand a victory to the Taliban. This framework for a negotiated peace informed our recom- mendations, which are based on recognizing the imperative • Continued basic support, with other donors, for the of a negotiated conclusion to this long conflict while safe- essential institutions of the Afghan state, including guarding our long-term interests. security institutions, while continuing to message our Afghan partners that this support is not open-ended Early in its efforts, the Study Group concluded that the and is conditioned on progress in the peace talks. A United States continues to have significant interests in key consideration of the Study Group was that while we Afghanistan. We have an interest in Afghanistan not be- support the values of the Afghan government and rec- coming again a safe haven for terrorists who can threaten ognize that its collapse could create significant problems us. We have an interest in a stable Afghanistan that is for the region and beyond, U.S. decisions about America’s not a threat to its region. And we have an interest in an presence in Afghanistan cannot be held hostage to the di- Afghanistan that respects basic human rights. We do not, visions, ineffectiveness, corruption, and shortsightedness however, believe that securing these interests requires a that the Afghan government has too often displayed. permanent U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. • Continued support for courageous members of On the contrary, a pathway now exists that can allow the Afghan civil society who have been instrumental return of our men and women in uniform under conditions in securing essential gains in rights, education, and that honor the sacrifices that have been made and that health and who have been and will continue to be protect our interests. While we commend the diplomatic key in supporting a sustained peace. 2 Afghanistan Study Group | Final Report • A reemphasis on diplomacy and negotiation, including need to be made about the existing peace process. President a regional diplomatic strategy implemented over the Biden in the first weeks of his term will need to make a longer term. There is broad regional support for a U.S. decision on whether to remove all troops from Afghanistan withdrawal that is responsible rather than precipitate by May 1, 2021, as indicated in the Doha agreement, or and chaotic. Many countries in the region, especially insist that conditions also indicated in that agreement are Pakistan, have influence over the Taliban and other clearly met before withdrawing our troops. There will sure- participants in the peace process. They should actively ly be more important issues of domestic and foreign policy use this influence to make the peace process successful facing the new administration, but few will be more urgent. because they will ultimately benefit from its success. Throughout our internal deliberations and our consulta- • The harnessing and coordination of international tions with outside stakeholders, we have been aware of the support for a post-agreement Afghan state. Donors international community’s, and America’s, ardent desire who, with us, have helped rebuild Afghanistan over to see an end to the long Afghan conflict. Whatever its the past twenty years are willing, based on certain flaws, the current peace process provides the best frame- conditions, to also sustain support for a post-agreement work to bring that about. Afghan state. These efforts must be unified and coherent. We extend our deepest thanks to those who made our This report presents a series of detailed recommendations
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