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IGNATUATURES SVOLUMEUME O NE Contents Chapter Author Title Editorial Signatures Information 1 Duncan Salkeld Preface: Descartes’ ghost 2 Jill Kraye The Immortality of the Soul in the Renaissance: Between Natural Philosophy and Theology 3 Richard Sugg Donne,Vesalius, and the Anatomy of Body and Soul 4 Carola Scott-Luckens The Broken Tabernacle:Bodily and Cosmic paradigms in Henry Jessey’s 1647 narrative of Sarah Wight 5 Christa Knellwolf The Mechanic Powers of the Spirit: Medicine and Mock-Heroic in Samuel Garth’s The Dispensary 6 Roy Porter The Soul and the English Enlightenment 7 Stephanie Norgate Percentages SIGNATURES About Signatures Signatures is a peer-reviewed electronic journal (issn 1472–2178) which publishes interdisciplinary studies in the humanities, espe- cially in the areas of literary and cultural history, literary criticism, theory and philosophy, and creative writing. It is published twice yearly and is freely available on the Internet. The journal welcomes articles relating to all aspects of the humanities. particu- larly items that demonstrate originality in focus, contribution to knowledge, and literary excellence. Signatures will allow scholars and writers rapid publication and distribution. The journal will provide a forum for debate on matters of scholarly interest. Submitted manuscripts will be ‘blind-reviewed’ by at least two readers. Articles will appear within less than one year of acceptance. Submissions: Articles for publication should be submitted in hard copy and spaced (quotations indented not tabbed – and single-spaced), on disk to 12 point Times New Roman, with italics for all titles and emphases. Notes should be numbered in conventional Arabic Dr. Duncan Salkeld, Signatures, numerals and collected as a separate file (not as ‘Word’ School of English and Media Studies, footnotes or endnotes). Application ‘Style Sheets’ should be University College Chichester, Chichester, avoided except for italics. 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Jonathan Woolfson (Chichester) Signatures Volume 1, Summer 2000 © 2000 Editorial matter and selection – University College Chichester © 2000 Individual chapters – the respective authors Typeset in Minion and Gill Sans by Paul Burt SIGNATURES Preface: Descartes’ ghost Duncan Salkeld (University College, Chichester) The influence of critical theory over the last twenty years has tracing the Cartesian project’s susceptibilities to both logical led to an absorption of radical accounts of self-hood into the and empriricist objections, but go on to find Descartes’ ghost mainstream of academic teaching and research. Subjectivity still haunting the machinery of contemporary critical theory. theory now constitutes so plural and varied a field of enquiries In an effort towards reconsidering the ‘subject’ of human inte- that any singular concept of personal identity seems as out- riority, I shall outline the different accounts of personal moded an idea as dephlogisticated air. The direction of recent identity presented by Peter Strawson and Charles Taylor, thinking about ‘the subject’ has been to reverse the process of taking Shakespeare’s sonnets (27–39) as an illustrative case for philosophic introspection and turn the inner outward, such re-thinking. My point is not that theory is somehow construing identity as something ‘constructed’ by the material hopelessly misguided or redundant; merely that other ways of powers of language, ideology and institutions. A particular thinking about ‘the subject’, which seek to clarify rather than concern of such theories has been to ‘decenter’ the Cartesian break with its cultural and philosophical history, may help to Cogito, famously summarised in the phrase first published in avoid such circularities. 1637 ‘I think therefore I am’, a phrase which has been taken as the historical moment par excellence when singularity in the In one of his earlier writings, entitled A Treatise on Man concept of human identity was established for subsequent (c.1633), Descartes promised a separate treatise on the soul philosophical reflection. It has long been suspected that in this which was either never written or remains lost.[1] Yet the phrase, Descartes argues in a circle, assuming his conclusion concept of the soul was to become at once the most significant within his premise(s). The ‘I’ that thinks is already precisely and problematic element in his work. In a later study, A the ‘I’ that is. In this essay, I want to highlight two specific Discourse on Method, published in 1637, Descartes had arrived respects in which recent attempts to re-think identity have at what he believed was a certain knowledge of the thinking remained caught in an equivalent circularity by assuming essence of man via a procedure of radical scepticism: doubt what they have been taken to demonstrate. I shall begin by the existence of everything and one may discover an Ch1.1 SIGNATURES undoubtable certainty. Descartes’ indubitable certainty was he would develop more fully in his last work, The Passions of that he was, if nothing else, a doubter, a thinker: and so a the Soul (1649). In this hypothesis, he suggested that very fine startling realisation struck him with all the obviousness of a fluids, the animal spirits, could well convey the influences of truism, that there must be a something that is doing the the soul into the body. The Princess was not impressed: she doubting – a self or soul.[2] accused him of absurdity in using the simile of gravity to explain the motions of the soul, finding in this again a One of Descartes’ more influential admirers (and there were confusion about material and immaterial forces. She pressed several) was Princess Elizabeth of the Low Countries who the objection home: ‘it is easier to ascribe matter and engaged in an epistolary dialogue with the philosopher on the extension to the soul than to ascribe to it the power of moving subject of the soul. Specifically, Elizabeth wanted to know how a body and being moved by it without having any matter’.Out- the soul stood in relation to the body. In an exchange of letters manoeuvered, Descartes could only respond with speculative between 6 and 16 May 1643, she asked Descartes to explain how distinctions suggesting that the ‘matter’ she ascribes to the ‘human soul can determine the movement of the animal consciousness ‘is not itself the consciousness; and that the spirits in the body so as to perform voluntary acts’. Descartes extension of the matter is essentially different from the had posited this thinking soul as an immaterial entity but, as extension of consciousness’.[4] Notwithstanding the powerful the Princess pointed out, ‘contact seems to me incompatible intellect of Princess Elizabeth, what substantially eroded with a thing’s being immaterial. I therefore ask you for a more confidence in Cartesian egotism was the rise of empiricism. specific definition of the soul than you give in your meta- William Harvey had already ruled out in the plainest terms physics: a definition of its substance, as distinct from its any need to postulate the existence of ‘medical spirits’ through activity’. These were tricky questions but Descartes responded which the soul might give life to the body. And it would not be by setting out what he saw as two essential facts about the soul long before Thomas Sydenham, physician and amanuensis to – one that it is conscious, and the other, that it is able to act, Locke, would express bafflement at the dissecting table, but he acknowledged that ‘of the second fact, I said almost observing in 1668: ‘Now it is certaine and beyonde controversy nothing’.[3] Three years earlier, Descartes had mentioned in a that nature performs all her operations on the body by parts so letter to his friend Mersenne that the pineal gland, or minute and insensible that I thinke noe body will ever hope or ‘Conarion’, in the brain might be the seat of the soul, an idea pretend, even by the assistance of glasses or any other Ch1.2 SIGNATURES invention, to come to a sight of them’.[5] Belief in an immortal separate entities. Entry into language – into the Symbolic – soul persisted, but aside from speculations about the status of enables the speaker to take up a subject position yet renders the mind in dreams, this tended to be grounded largely in this identity an effect of language, of the signifier ‘I’ which is metaphysical conjecture and unsupported by rational misrecognised as fixed, unified and essential: a soul or essence.