Explaining Russia’s Foreign Policy after Ukraine and Syria: Liberalism, Constructivism, Realism and the Security Dilemma.
MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam
Name Hasar Demnati Student number 6206565 Main supervisor A.M. Kalinovsky Second supervisor M.M. Lok Date July 2016
Hasar Demnati 6206565 Content
Preface ...... 3
List of abbreviations ...... 4
Introduction ...... 5
Chapter 1: Theoretical Approach ...... 9
Liberalism ...... 11
Social Constructivism ...... 13
Realism ...... 15
Chapter 2: Theories as guides for policymakers ...... 17
Realpolitik ...... 17
Liberal internationalism ...... 20
Chapter 3: Russia’s shift from a liberal worldview to realism and the pursuit of security ...... 23
The Security Dilemma ...... 24
Chapter 4: The road to the Ukrainian conflict ...... 27
The source of Russia’s aggression: Fighting for security ...... 27
Ukraine, Russia’s last frontier ...... 32
Crimea...... 37
Chapter 5: Russia-Syria allies or illusions? ...... 42
The cradle of Russian-Syrian cooperation ...... 42
Nostalgia and Minimal Interests? ...... 45
Russia’s biggest Security threat ...... 51
Conclusion ...... 57
Bibliography ...... 61
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Preface
Even before I began my Master European Studies I was intrigued by the Russian President Vladimir Putin and his course of actions regarding the past five years. However, from a layman’s perspective it was hard to understand what the basis was for the contemporary upheavals in Ukraine and Syria. During the last year of my Bachelor European Studies I followed the course Putin’s Russia, but I still seemed to be missing the point and my curiosity remained unsatisfied. Nevertheless, as I started my Master degree I followed an eye-opening course, Geopolitics by dr. Luiza A. Bialasiewicz in which I got to learn more about inspiring and influencing geopolitical figures, such as Sir Mackinder and Alexander Dugin. At this point a new world had opened for me and I was dedicated to find out what drove world leaders into pursuing certain approaches. This thesis, is the product of my curiosity and the beginning of a new adventure in my life. Nevertheless, this amazing journey contained both ups and downs, but still I have never stopped from attempts to confront any occurred challenges and accomplish the objectives I have set. Luckily, I have had a great supervisor who really believed in me and the analysis I was dedicated to produce. Therefore, I would like to express many thanks to Professor dr. Artemy M. Kalinovsky who seemed to be able to encourage me every time I felt lost, and I can promise you that this occurred a few times. Besides, he managed to get me on the right track every time I struggled to comprehend delicate issues and provide me with the right advice. Other people who also greatly influenced my performance during my research is my brainstorm buddy Tijana Vojnovic, my inspiring and patient husband Rachid el Hassani and my beautiful little girl, Amber who gave me the strength to pursuing my dreams even when I thought I could not. And last but not least I would also like to express my appreciation to the rest of my family, my friends, including Fadoua Rahhou and Karima Bouchatoui for their contribution and moral support that helped me in writing this thesis. I am extremely honored to have had such a proficient supervisor, loving and supporting family and friends. And if I forgot to mention anyone that should be mentioned I hereby apology as I undoubtedly appreciate any contribution from anyone.
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List of abbreviations
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EU European Union
IMF International Monetary Fund
IR International Relations
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nation
UNSC United Nation Security Council
US United States of America
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WWII Second World War
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Introduction ussian foreign Policy, particularly in Ukraine and Syria is vexing scholars, pundits and politicians in the West. Many of whom are relying, overtly or not, on one of several R dominant International Relations (hereinafter: IR) paradigms to try to understand Russia’s behavior. These dominant paradigms are among others realism, liberalism, constructivism, and functionalism. While all have their explanatory value, this thesis will argue that the explanatory value of liberalism is limited by the fact that the way leaders believe the world works, has changed over time. Leaders themselves turn to different paradigms to guide their approaches. In the case of Russia and the West, a liberal approach after 1991 was gradualy replaced by a realists perspective, which sees the acumulation of power and the preservation of its national security as its most significant interests. However, Russia’s behavior has also put it into the position of a security dilemma, which is a situation in which the actions taken by states to guarantee their own security are considered to be a threat to the security of other states. Therefore, I will be applying the notion of the security dilemma to the present situation concerning Russia’s behavior in Ukraine and Syria. With this I will try to demonstrate the relative explanatory value of three specific theoretical frameworks: liberalism, constructivism, and realism. Liberalism, begins with the premise that humans are naturally good and the individual is self-sufficient. Liberalism in IR advocates public and political autonomies, supervision by law in harmony with the ruled, and security from autocratic power (Beavis, 2015). In economics, as well as in politics liberalism’s emphasis on the collective results of individual actions leads to the analysis of markets and policies, market and policy failure, and institutions to correct such failure. In traditional IR theory it implies attempts to reconcile state sovereignty with the reality of strategic interdependence. Constructivism approaches IR as rooted in creations of history and society. Constructivist theory condemns the basic hypothesis of realism that the state of anarchy is a structural situation characteristic to the structure of states. Rather, they argue that the world is made up of social constructions (i.e. ideas, or meanings people attach to objects) – that is, that material forces do not have any fundamental significance only that what actors define as their meaning (Webber, 2013, 43-4). Thus, anarchy is a situation of the system of countries, since (heads of) states choose to create it a certain way. Anarchy is therefore, the outcome of a process that builds the norms that administer the collaboration of countries rather than an
5 Hasar Demnati 6206565 intrinsic element of state-to-state affairs. Thus, in constructivism one would argue that it is possible to alter the anarchic essence of states’ structure (Jørgensen, 2010, 160-3). Nevertheless, in the case of liberalism the conventional liberal assumptions stating that economic interdependence between states reduces conflict, seem to be contested ever since the conflicts arose in Ukraine and Syria. Constructivism, while offering an alternative to explaining Russia’s behavior in the past five year; that is, that Russian leaders have been developing a certain kind of domestic consensus around ideas of stability, tradition, and their approach to foreign policy emerges from that and while putting great emphasis on historical process, constructivism still fails to analyzing how realistic and cautious leaders handle possible future issues of uncertainty, as leaders do not have the capacity to read the minds of other leaders. Besides, the fact that social constructs and human beings are alterable and if these alteration were to happen independent of diplomatic collaboration this could create uncertainties and generate a security dilemma (Copeland, 2000, 210). In realism, states are the main actors and characteristically hold some sort of power, which could cause them to be a possible threat to each other. States fear that a lack of security makes them vulnerable to domination, exploitation, and subjugation (Herz, 1950, 157). This fear exists due to the fact that leaders will never be able to foresee what goes on in the heads of other state-leaders, and as their goal is to preserve their sovereignty and survive in security, they are required to think strategically. As a result, states seek power to overcome this fear and uncertainty, which in turn sets the ball rolling towards “the vicious circle of security and power accumulation” (Ibidem.). This process in which states seek more power to overcome the security dilemma is referred to as the ‘security dilemma’. The security dilemma is the final effect of uncertainties and fear between opposing sides. While each side sees its efforts to reinforce national interests – diplomatically, or militarily - as protective precautions, the other side interprets these attempts as a subjective threat which needs an instant reaction. Their response to the threats from those other states, such as setting up more of their own military services, as a counteract can than again be considered to be a threat to the prior state (Mearsheimer J. J., 2006, 75). The dilemma is a key source of arms races in which states spend large amounts of money on equally threatening weapons that in the end does not even offer the security that is needed. The contemporary situation concerning the West – the United States (hereinafter: US), European Union (hereinafter: EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter: NATO) - and Russia, which led to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis, is fed and maintained by a past of endemic and shared distrust, which seems to be an exemplary case of the security dilemma.
6 Hasar Demnati 6206565 In addition, the security dilemma, also offers valuable insight into the ongoing conflicts in Syria. While, Putin was concerned about US, EU and the NATO’s increasing involvement in former Soviet-controlled Europe and the possible NATO and EU expansion into Ukraine, in the case of Syria, the Russian president seems to be more concerned about the growing influence of Islamist extremists in the Arab Middle East. The fear and uncertainty of these extremists taking over Syria and expanding eastward and southward into Muslim regions in Russia, causes more than just external security concerns for Putin. Russian elites believe that these Islamists expansions could lead to turmoil, security threats and possible separatism within Russia itself and thus, these concerns need to be eliminated directly by the Russian government. For that reason, Putin’s concerns in the case of Syria could not only be explained by the security dilemma, as it also involves another dilemma referred to, by Brian L. Job1 as the ‘insecurity dilemma’. Knowing that Russian leaders are concerned about the increasing involvement of Islamist extremists, such as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Quada, and Ahrar al-Sham, they are likewise concerned about Russian fighters for these organizations returning home and causing turmoil and a rise of extremist movements on Russian soil, such as in Chechnya, and the Volga and Urals region, where the biggest Muslim populations live. For that reason the ‘insecurity dilemma’, which unlike the security dilemma - where states are exposed to the threat of the international anarchic order and thus have to protect themselves from what might occur outside their borders – perceives the surrounding areas as the basis of security instead of threats, seems appropriate as well. Job argues that the concept of the “insecurity dilemma” is capable of capturing Russia’s current problems, since its state weakness and insecurity have led the Russian leaders to try to find external support to improve their own security position. The increased Russian involvement in the Arab Middle East, in particular Putin’s support for the Syrian Al- Assad regime, and the increased security threat from Islamist extremists appears, thus, to be a good example of Job’s insecurity dilemma. However, Russia has not always pursued a realist posture and principle. After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the former Russian President Boris Yeltsin turned to the West for post-war aid. Nevertheless, as a precondition of support the West demanded Russia to abandon the communistic principles and adopt the liberal world order. For a while this worked, until Yeltsin felt deceived and felt that he was relying too much on “fictitious Western assistance”. He changed his course and pursued a more self-centered and assertive approach. After twenty-
1 Brian L. Job (PhD, Indiana University) is a specialist in Political Science and a resident Faculty Associate of the Liu Institute.
7 Hasar Demnati 6206565 five years it appears as if the liberal democratic policies has failed for Russia. The conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, that both seem to contests the conventional perceptions of liberal theories about the relationship between economic interdependence and conflict, further deepened this perception among Russian leaders. While liberal democratic policies seem, thus to be failing in the case of Russia, the security dilemma is, in fact able to demonstrate the value of an explanatory theoretical framework: realism. I will argue that the main reason for Putin’s course of actions with regard to both of my case studies, Ukraine and Syria, is the security threat Russia is experiencing. The results advocate that security concerns about the conservation of the sphere of influence over Ukraine and the protection of Russia from Islamist extremists from the Arab Middle East, influenced to a great extent Russia's course of actions in the past five years. Besides, as will be evident later on this thesis, the EU and NATO expansion process towards former Soviet- controlled Europe, caused the Russian-Western (i.e. US and its European allies) relationship to deteriorate over the past several years. This thesis will analyzing Russia’s course of actions with respect to Ukraine and Syria. The emphasis will particularly be on the issues that generated the security dilemma for Russia, causing President Putin to pursue his national interests and safeguard Russia’s own security. This thesis will thus start with a more detailed discussion of Liberalism, Constructivism, and Realism. This will be followed by an analysis of two theories, realism (or realpolitik) and liberal internationalism, as political approaches to foreign policy rather than as IR theories. Furthermore, I will continue by exploring what led to Russia’s course of actions with regard to the two case studies, Ukraine and Syria, and show how the concept of the security dilemma best explains Russia’s current behavior and predicament. Finally, I will close with a brief analysis of the “insecurity dilemma” that also seemed to be generated among Russian elites as a consequence of the growing Islamist extremists in Syria.
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Approach n this chapter I will start demonstrating why I believe that the main reason behind Putin’s course of actions with regard to both of my case studies, Ukraine and Syria, is the security I threat Russia is experiencing. Therefore, the emphasis will be put on the security dilemma within realism. Two alternative theories that might help us understand Russia’s behavior are liberalism - though not in the case of Ukraine - where the emphasis will be put on cooperation and peacekeeping due to the close interdependence of states, and social constructivism. In addition to providing liberalism, constructivism, and realism as explanatory theories, two of these theories (realism and liberalism) will be analyzed as guiding ideas for policymakers, as they are often used by politicians, including Russian President Vladimir Putin. Rather than looking at Putin’s course of actions with regard to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis from an empirical perspective, this chapter will provide a theoretical analysis. It will analyze to what extent theories in the discipline of IR can explain Russia’s course of actions in the past five years with respect to Ukraine and Syria. This discussion will help substantiate the primary argument of this thesis, that the contemporary situation concerning the West – the US, EU, and NATO - and Russia, which led to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis, is fed and maintained by a past of ubiquitous and shared distrust, and is an exemplary case of the security dilemma within theoretical frameworks: realism. However, as mentioned before another possible alternative theory (constructivism) for Russia’s behavior will also be briefly discussed. Realism (also known as political realism) is a school of thought that explains IR in terms of power (J.S. Goldstein, 2014, 43). Realism is marked by actors acting out of self-interest and the accumulation of power and security is the main driving force behind the rhetoric of realism. Like many other scholars, including Andrej Kreutz2, I argue that ever since Putin’s alliance with Syria, the rest of the Arab World have been characterized by self-interested rationality and therefore, it is only logical to use the realist framework in understanding Russia’s course of actions with regard to Syria. The following chapters will expand on the arguments provided by scholars and politicians on both Ukraine and Syria, to see whether these fit within the assumptions of a realist framework and thus whether realism would be able to explain Russia’s course of actions in these two countries. Academics seem to consider theories in IR to be the key tool for guiding a research. It is true that these theories are outstanding tools to compete with prejudices, conventional world
2 Kreutz, a specialist on Russia’s policy in the Middle East and the author of the book Russia in the Middle East: Friend or Foe?
9 Hasar Demnati 6206565 perspectives and/ or wisdom. Moreover, theories harvest interesting issues to examine and they allow the analysis of inherent conventions and outlooks. This is equally true in the case of both Ukraine and Syria, where many observers consider marginal and pragmatic issues to be at the heart of Russia’s behavior. However, the intervention and increasing Russian involvement in both cases revealed profounder Russian concerns. In addition, theories make the comprehension of complex political issues easier, as they lay out possible ways of analysis, clarify compound issues, and conceptualize the world (Jørgensen, 2010, 6). And last but not least theories can contribute to the evaluation of political performance. However, the goal of this is not to evaluate every possible explanation or theory, but rather those that are used most frequently in debates about Russia’s behavior.
10 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Liberalism Liberalism is a prominent political discipline in IR that dates back to the 17th and 18th century and can be branded by the fact that liberalist have strong trust in human reason. In the course of the 20th century liberalist theorists managed to establish the theory in the discipline of IR and position the worldview as one of the most significant theories in IR. It is therefore often associated with Western civilization with determined obligations to individual liberties. The political liberal worldview strongly values free markets and marginal state interference with regard to economics. Moreover, it advocates public and political autonomies, supervision by law in harmony with the ruled, and security from autocratic power (Beavis, 2015). However, liberalism in the study of IR comprises a large range of outlooks varying from the democratic peace thesis to the Wilsonian Idealism. Unlike in realism, liberal theories argue that states are merely one of the actors in world politics, and that states might collaborate via institutional mechanisms (Beavis, 2015). Besides interdependent states, other actors like multinational corporations, NATO, International Monetary Fund (hereinafter: IMF) and United Nations (hereinafter: UN) play a vital role as well. That is why after WWII, when the US and its European allies adopted liberalism as their world order, such organizations were established. The functions of such organizations was to act as overarching organizations to preserve a liberal world order in an otherwise anarchic system. According Adrew Moravcsik3, liberalism as a social science theory strives to clarify what states should do rather than what states do and is therefore often perceived as a normative approach rather than an explanatory one. Nevertheless, as argued previously liberalism beholds a large variety of outlooks, but even within liberalism as a social theory Moravcsik distinguishes liberalism in four categories, 1) republican liberalism, 2) pluralist liberalism, 3) commercial liberalism and 4) regulatory liberalism. He states that the first category is when liberal democracy tends to be more soothing in contrast to other forms of administration. The second category argues that incentives for international conflict are produced by maldistribution of social power, or the presence of endemic social segmentation. The third category argues that economic interdependence clears the way for peace and collaboration. Whereas the forth category opposes that international institutions and law stimulate international accommodation (Moravcsik, 1992, 2).
3 He is a politician and the author of many articles concerning liberalism, including Liberalism and International Relations Theory.
11 Hasar Demnati 6206565 For the sake of my argument, it might be convenient to consider liberalism as a theory (a study of social “IN ECONOMICS, LIBERALISM’S EMPHASIS ON THE COLLECTIVE reality) that begins with individuals as RESULTS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS its significant actor, but also a theory LEADS TO THE ANALYSIS OF that tries to understand how groups of MARKETS, MARKET FAILURE, AND individuals make shared decisions and INSTITUTIONS TO CORRECT SUCH how organizations made up of FAILURE; IN TRADITIONAL individuals cooperate. Furthermore, it INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS is a theory that encloses this study in a THEORY IT IMPLIES ATTEMPTS TO perspective that stresses individual RECONCILE STATE SOVEREIGNTY rights and that implements a WITH THE REALITY OF STRATEGIC beneficial view of evolution in human INTERDEPENDENCE” affairs. As argued by Robert Keohane, (Keohane, 2002, 45) “In economics, liberalism’s emphasis on the collective results of individual actions leads to the analysis of markets, market failure, and institutions to correct such failure; in traditional IR theory it implies attempts to reconcile state sovereignty with the reality of strategic interdependence” (Keohane, 2002, 45). In addition, much of the literature on interdependence argues that increased economic interdependence reduces the possibility of conflict between states4. As opposed to realism, liberalism is not devoted to any striving and parsimonious fundamental theory, which is often perceived as vaguely identified and incompatible to produce determinate outcomes. However, constructivism might in fact have the capacity to explain Russia’s course of action in Ukraine and Syria.
4 Solomon W. Polachek, ‘Conflict and Trade’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1980), pp. 55 – 78; William Domke, War and the Changing Global System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988); Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Michael W. Doyle, ‘Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 99, No. 3 (August, 2005), pp. 463 – 6; John R. O’Neal and Bruce Russett, ‘Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace’, International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2 (2001), pp. 469 – 85; Zeev Maoz, ‘The Effects of Strategic and Economic Interdependence on International Conflict across Levels of Analysis’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53, No. 1 (2009), pp. 223 – 40.
12 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Social Constructivism Compared to all the theories that will be discussed in this section, constructivism is the latest participant in the discipline of IR. Constructivism is an approach that believes that vital aspects of IR, are a construct of history and society (Jørgensen, 2010, 160). Social constructivists consider the behavior of states to be formed by power, emotions and subjective beliefs. Besides, they agreed on the fact that the anarchical character and power of IR exclusively, failed to outline the national interests and policies of states, declaring that power is a tool rather than an ambition of social acts (Tsygankov, 2012, 19). Despite the fact that constructivists recognize the importance of state power, security, and status, in realism, they argue that in understanding Russia’s foreign policy it is key to acknowledge that a policy cannot emerge without due concern for the prevailing framework of the international structure. Moreover, realism tends to underrate the contribution of ideas and culture of a country’s assertive international behavior (Tsygankov, 2012, 7). Constructivist theorists argue that without discovering the values and emotions behind IR, one is not likely to effectively explain and forecast state’s course of actions. What is more notable is that constructivism focusses on how external issues influence the behavior of a state, but also how internal issues contribute to a state’s behavior. For example, Andrei Pavlovich Tsygankov5 in his book Russia and the West From Alexander to Putin, argues that the ‘sense of honor’ of states is essential for their behavior (Ibidem). Russia’s sence of honor is that it wishes to be a significant player on the world stage, and also Russia wants the West to consider the state to be a vital player of the Western world. Yet, internally it wishes to be observed as a great power, and a strong and stable state. In other words, the logic of honor is a social construction of Russia’s past experiences and its relations with other states (Ibidem, 19). Therefore, constructivists claim that when a state is (internaly) weak and does not form a strong unity, state leaders will seeks to bind the state together by allying themselves with surrounding states that might be capable of supporting the weaker state in its internal battle. Looking to Russia’s history, having had several conflicts in the last 25 years in the Southern regions within its own periphery6, it might not be far fetched to claim that, from a constructivist perspective, Russia is seeking for alliances that could offer support if internal conflicts occur in the future. Russia’s alliances with Arab Middle Eastern states and support for the al-Assad regime in Syria, who are already fighting the enemy, namely Sunni Islamist extremists, could
5 He is a Russian Political Scientist and specialist of IR 6 A few of the examples are the Chechen War in 1994 and 1999, the War of Dagestan in 1999, the North Caucasus insurgency in 2009 and more.
13 Hasar Demnati 6206565 thus be preparatory work for the unlikely upcoming conflict with Islamist extremists in Russia. Therefore, Russia’s behavior towards Syria is not quite surprising, as Russian analysts are noticing an increase in Islamist extremists movements and study groups in Russia, with in particular in the North Caucasus regions, such as the Volga and Urals regions. Although these observations make the internal instability and growing division within Russia undeniable, and make it seem as if constructivism might be able to help analyse Russia’s support for Syria in their battle against Islamist extremists, it is does not have the capacity to offer as much in terms of explanation as realism and the security dilemma. This does not mean that constructivism is useless, on the contrary, as constructivism is argued not to be an absolute theory it is an approach that goes hand in hand with dominant traditional theories. In other words, it is not a theory that is similar to conventional theoretical traditions like liberalism and realism, rather it can be amalgamated with all theoretical conventions to provide a more complete and broader understanding of complex issues (Jørgensen, 2010, 21). Nevertheless, while some scholars, such as Robert Jervis an International Affairs scholar at Colombia University7 consider constructivism to be opposed to realism, others such as Henry Nau a Political Science and International Affairs scholar, argue that realist and constructivist approaches concerning power and identity can be perceived as harmonizing approaches. Moreover, they have the capacity to be combined effectively within one and the same analytical framework (Jørgensen, 2010, 161). Thus, even though constructivist and realist approaches might be based on contrasting conventions and might deliver contrasting visions, their relation is not by definition opposing, or incompatible. However, I consider realism and the security dilemma to be more capable of providing a comprehensible and complete explanation of Russia’s course of actions in the past five years with regard to Ukraine and Syria. Stated differntly, the fact that the Russian government fears NATO and EU expansion into more regions of former Soviet-controlled Europe, including Ukraine that trigged Russia’s behavior, and also Russia’s fear of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (hereinafter: ISIS) and its affiliates spreading from Syria into the North Caucasus and other surrounding regions on Russian soil, cause Russia’s behavior to be a textbook case of the security dilemma.
7 He holds the Adlai E. Stevenson Chair, and one of the main representatives of (neo)realism within the discipline of IR
14 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Realism This IR theory as we know it now emerged in the1930s and was developed by the realists John H. Herz, E. H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, who are thus regarded as the school’s founding fathers. Since Second World War (hereinafter WWII), realists have blamed idealists for looking too much at how the world should be instead of how it really is. The notion was therefore established as a challenge to the idealistic international politic of the 1920s and was derived from the German word ‘Realpolitik’8. Realists are disposed to see political power detached from, and predominant over, ideals such as morality, ideology, and other social and economic features of life. For them, ideologies are factors that should not be considered in IR, nor should religions, or other cultural features with which states may legitimize their actions. Realists regard states with dissimilar religions, philosophies, or economic structures as relatively akin in their actions with regard to national power (Jørgensen, 2010, 78). Realism is thus a theory used to clarify social phenomena’s in societies described as a specific theoretical approach (a.k.a a paradigm) defined by revolutionary international territories, which are made up of independent political components, i.e. states. These states are the main actors and characteristically hold some sort of power (offensive military capability) which could cause them to be a possible threat to each other. In addition, states fear that a lack of security makes them vulnerable to domination, exploitation, and subjugation (Herz, 1950, 157). This fear exists due to the fact that leaders will never be able to foresee what goes on in the head of other state-leaders, and as their goal is to preserve their sovereignty and survive in security, they are required to think strategically. As a result, to overcome this fear states begin to seek power, which in turn sets the ball rolling towards "the vicious circle of security and power accumulation" (Ibidem.). Professor Mearsheimer stated in his chapter of the book International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, realists believe that power is the currency of international politics. According to realists, the structure of the international world order, forces states to care sincerely about the balance of power and forces them to either gain power at the expense of others, or at least to make sure they do not lose power and all this just in order to survive (Mearsheimer, 2006: 77-8). Consequently, realists argue that IR is (partly) best elucidated by the actions of rational actors aimed at maximizing their self-interests in an international system of sovereign states without a central authority. This sounds quite similar to what Kreutz argues to be the fact in the case of the Russia-Syria relation. He argued that “during the past five years, Putin’s relations with Syria and the rest of the Arab World have been cautious and marked by
8 Politics of the real possible.
15 Hasar Demnati 6206565 self-interested pragmatism.” (Kreutz, 2007, 25). Remarkable is that this logic can also be observed in the case of Ukraine. Mikhail Suslov, a researcher at Uppsala University wrote an article “Crimea Is Ours!” Russian popular geopolitics in the new media age, where he examines how the annexation of Crimea has been embodied and discussed on Russian social media. Many Russian observers, i.e. participants of Russian social media forums, consider the annexation of Crimea to be plain geopolitics. One Russian participant even said that Ukraine should not be offended, since it was nothing personal. He claimed that Russia was required to annex Crimea, as it is a great power, and great powers have to pursue their great national interests (Suslov, 2014, 598). It is evident that many regard Russia’s course of action, especially with respect to Ukraine – but also Syria – as a textbook case of the security dilemma. Moreover, such expressions indicate that the influence of these scholarly theories extends beyond tenure organizations and universities. Policymakers invoke features of realism and liberalism as well, when laying down solutions to global security dilemmas and therefore, these theoretical approaches are often reflected in international politics. However, it is important to make a clear distinction between scholarly theories, realism and liberalism, and theories as guidance for policymakers, realpolitik and liberal internationalism (a.k.a. liberal world order). So in order not to be confused, a short reiteration: the philosophy of political realism and liberalism is aimed on the explanations, descriptions and predictions of events in IR, and is thus a descriptive paradigm, whereas realpolitik and the liberal internationalism are designed to guide politicians in the making of their foreign policy. We will explore the latter two concepts in more detail in the following section.
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Chapter 2: Theories as guides for policymakers he end of the Cold War had profoundly changed international politics and a new, postnational order, liberal internationalism, had substituted the realist rationality that T used to administer Europe. The US was not only the “indispensable nation,” as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright put it; it also took on the role of a benign leader and thus, the US was unlikely to be regarded as a threat in Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014, 7). Since, the fall of the Soviet Union the new Russian Federation, led by former President Boris Yeltsin has been operating within the liberal world order and trying to integrate into the West, but as soon as he felt cheated by the actors of this liberal order, he pursued a more self-centered direction for Russia. Having observed former President Yeltsin, and served as an advisor his successor Vladimir Putin, followed his lead, and is therefore often referred to as a realpolitiker. As will be evident, Russia changed its direction over the years from liberal world order to realpolitik, for that reason it is useful to see where this deflection of direction was based on, and whether it will help us understand Russia’s contemporary course of actions with respect to Ukraine and Syria. What follows in the next section is, thus an introduction of the two worldviews in question, realpolitik and liberal internationalism.
Realpolitik Realist politics (i.e. Realpolitik) are based on real and physical factors rather than theoretical, or moral objectives. It is a notion first introduced in 1853, by the German publicist Ludwig von Rochau, in his Grundsätze der Realpolitik. In this publication he explained the notion as followed:
“The study of the forces that shape, maintain and alter the state is the basis of all political insight and leads to the understanding that the law of power governs the world of states just as the law of gravity governs the physical world. The older political science was fully aware of this truth but draw a wrong and detrimental conclusion - the right of the more powerful. The modern era has corrected this unethical fallacy, but while breaking with the alleged right of the more powerful one, the modern era was too much inclined to overlook the real might of the more powerful and the inevitability of its political influence.” (von Rochau, 1853, p)
17 Hasar Demnati 6206565 However, it only became popular in the time Otto von Bismarck was Minister President of Prussia, as his policy towards the unification of Germany seemed to be comparable with the principle of Realpolitik. His foreign policy was aimed on re-uniting Germany and growing economically and therefore his actions were described as, “a scrupulous attention to what is possible, a shrewd estimation of what one’s opponent really wants, rather than what he says he wants, and a preparedness to assert force when necessary” (Scruton, 2007). The notion of Realpolitik is also known as Machiavellianism, which refers to the Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli, who argued that the main goal of a prince is to seek power, irrespective of ethical and/or religious concerns. The policies, or politics that Realpolitik conceives are considered to be amoral, coercive and pragmatic (in the context of politics). As von Bismarck said: “Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day decided... but by blood and iron.” Although it had existed for almost a century it was formally introduced in the US by the political scientist Henry Kissinger during the presidency of Richard Nixon and had been deployed ever since. However, after WWII the US, United Kingdom (hereinafter: UK), and their alliances were searching for a new order that would help them keep peace and security. Leaders and scholars were convinced that the interdependence of states, with shared norms and values, such as democracy would eliminate conflicts and war they shifted to the liberal world order with all the commitment they could muster. This flawed view of international politics has been the reason why they were frequently bushwhacked by events. He states that foreign politicians, mistakenly, tended to underplay the importance of realpolitik (Mearsheimer, 2014, 2). On the other hand, Keohane argues that, a lot of what liberals seek to explain about world politics firstly, is able to indicate the nature and actions of world capitalism and, secondly, the character of political-military rivalry (Keohane, 2002, 46). Senator John Kerry during the 2004 presidential campaign, for instance, said that US’s foreign policy has achieved greatness only when it has combined realism and liberalism (Snyder, 2004, 54). There are many other advocates for an amalgam of the theories, such as the pundit Charles Krauthammer who backed the Middle East policy imposed by Bush’s administration by arguing for an assertive combination of liberalism and realism, which he called: democratic realism (Ibidem). Nonetheless, the American political scientist and political economist Francis Fukuyama9 replied on Krauthammer’s argument by saying that the use of force and the feasibility of
9 Francis Fukuyama is the author of The End of History and the Last Man, which is one of the key works in the liberal tradition.
18 Hasar Demnati 6206565 democratic change in Iraq blinds him to the war's lack of legitimacy, a failing that "hurts both the realist part of our agenda, by diminishing our actual power, and the idealist portion of it, by undercutting our appeal as the embodiment of certain ideas and values"(Ibidem). While Robert Keohane condemns that liberal theories are not able to meet social scientific standards of parsimony10 set, if not always attained, by realism, he did claim that an amalgam would in fact be benificial (Moravcsik, 1992, 3). Many current great world leaders pursue a liberal world order in theory, but in practice they seem to be pursuing the state’s national and private interests. This state of affairs arguable describes the relationship between Russia and the US.
10 Parsimony refers to the law of parsimony (i.e. Ockham's razor) which prescribes that a theory should deliver the simplest imaginable (feasible) explanation for a phenomenon.
19 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Liberal internationalism As was mentioned earlier, after WWII the US and UK had introduced a new world order, liberal internationalism, also known as the liberal world order. The WWII had severe impact on Western European states, leaving one state more devastated than the other. The aftermath of the war caused fear and consternation to be the dominating feelings among the Western population and their leaders. In addition to these bitter emotions, was the terrible economic situation of these states, which did not only need a onetime financial boost, but a solid approach on which state heads could rely. This postwar situation was an excellent opportunity for the new liberal world order, championed by the US, to play its part. The trademarks of liberal internationalism, which were openness and rule-based relations, human rights, and democratic solidarity protected by big institutions, such as the UN, and IMF and standards, such as multilateralism, were going to bring prosperity and security and were to become the new guide for foreign policymakers. And alongside these institutions, common security alliances and regional institutions were founded (Ikenberry, 2011, 450). As a consequence of war and settlement, the great powers learned the right way to function within a multipolar balance-of-power system (Ibidem). The US had advocated its ideas, such as liberal democracy, free markets, alliances, and the tolerability of US military power, ever since 1940s, resulting to many leaders of western and non-western countries wanting to be part of this new world order, as they firmly believed that it would likewise provide their states the benefits of prosperity and security. US President Franklin Roosevelt’s government devoted their time and effort to building a liberal world order, which incorporated the idea of an open trading system and a collective security alliance in which the great powers would collaborate in order to be able to overcome the ‘security dilemma’ in IR, that was perceived to be the reason behind many great wars in history (Russett, 2013, 95). Due to the severe economic and social impact the war had on global level, international diplomacy was needed. Leaders of the affected countries established cooperation organizations in order to overcome the security threat that could produce warfare, as they believed that, from a liberalist perspective, high level of interdependence between states decreases the possibility of political conflict (Doyle, 2005, 465). The US took the initiative to become the hegemonic leader, by taking on the rights and responsibilities to organize and run the liberal world order, in the years that followed WWII. The US led and controlled a wide- ranging hierarchical liberal order, which was arranged around alliances, multilateral organizations and special partnerships (Ikenberry, 2011, 450).
20 Hasar Demnati 6206565 In line with the post-Cold war, the idea that a liberal world order would provide prosperity and security, leaders were convinced that the new liberal world order was the Holy Grail, which would consequently lead to the expansion of liberalism into the rest of the world. Western leaders firmly thought that staying behind, or failing to adopt the liberal world order would cause exclusion, which would be unbearable for any country. In order for a non-liberal state to compete with the US and its European allies, a state would need to become like them. However, to become like them, a state would need to turn into “the kind of wishy-washy, pacifistic milquetoast society” (Mead, 2014, 71-2). The only possible threats could be from states, such as North Korea which might be willing to challenge actors within the liberal world order, but this was a minimal threat since they were too weak to do anything, as a result of their non-liberal system. Thus, choices needed to be made: you [non-liberal states] either join and turn into an open and pacifistic liberal system, or you could stick to your guns and your culture as the world passed you by. Initially, it all seemed to be working properly (Ibidem, Mead, 2014, 72). As the US, along with the other four victors11 of WWII, created the UN, including its Security Council (hereinafter: UNSC), which was aimed at taking away all possible concerns about security matters and providing peace and security; Europe founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), from 1992 on known as the European Union, to avoid further war between Germany and France. As Robert Schuman, one of its founding fathers, stated my aim is to “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible” (Europa, sd). The liberal world order has been dominating over the years, as a result of its diverse rules and organizations that not only preserved open markets and trade, but provided tools for its governments to achieve security and economic interdependence as well (Ikenberry, 2011, 453). And yet, the liberal world order had minor flaws as it was a creation of the Western world and did not esteem upcoming non-Western states, such as China, India and Brazil. Due to the fact that these states had different sets of cultural, political, and economic knowledge, and they perceived the world through their own pasts – be it communism, anti-imperial, or anything in that order – the trademarks of this order have been pushed to the limits. Many scholars argue that its western design is one of the reasons why the ‘old’ liberal order is not suitable for the globalizing world. Nevertheless, the liberal world order rests on open rule-based relations, which are kind of the basic principles for liberal internationalism. Whereas openness involves the capacity of states to participate in exchange and trade – of thoughts, capital, merchandises, etc. – rule-based relations involve the relations between states that are arranged confirming to
11 China, USSR, France and the United Kingdom
21 Hasar Demnati 6206565 general values and arrangements. These general values and arrangements together with institutions turn into a multilateral structure (Ikenberry, 2011, 451). Thus, even though liberal internationalism may have failed in accounting non-western states and in explaining the behavior of states, it has been a guide to how both Russian and western leaders tried to structure their relations after 1991, and up until now the basic principles of liberal order, openness and ruled-based relations, are not being contested. On the other hand however, it needs to be visibly spelled out that, while the liberal institutions, UN and EU, were established to overcome the security dilemma in IR, other organizations simultaneously established for the same reason seemed to generate the security dilemma. For instance, NATO that was established to “safeguard the freedom and security of its (Western) members through political and military means” (NATO, sd) caused the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (hereinafter: USSR) to estalish the Warsaw Pact in reaction to NATO. This vicious circle created by fear and uncertainty is called the ‘security dilemma’. Despite the fact that Russia is often accused for pursuing policies of assertiveness towards the West, it is incontestable that fear and uncertainty are often the driving force behind these policies and actions. Therefore the security dilemma allows us to understand concequences of Russia’s actions over the past five years with respect to Ukraine and Syria.
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Chapter 3: Russia’s shift from a liberal worldview to realism and the pursuit of security ussia’s opposing and hostile attitude towards NATO in the past 25 years proves that the military alliance organization poses a serious threat to the security and sphere of R influence of Russia. This conflicting perspective towards NATO, as well as towards the EU deteriorated even further in the course of events, causing these organizations to form a serious threat to Russia and even led to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Nevertheless, over the years many other arguments have been mentioned for the Ukrainian upheavals in 2014, ranging from a holy war to Putin’s secrete-service background and personality being the driving force behind the conflict. And whereas the West blames Russia, Russia blames the West for the turmoil caused by its military intervention, pointing them on Russia’s actions being a counteract against their violation of international law. However, I will argue in this chapter that Russia’s course of actions regarding Ukraine could be explained through the lens of a realist theory, with in particular the security dilemma. With this lens the focus will be put on three important factors, namely the increasing EU involvement in the East of Europe (i.e. former Soviet-controlled Europe); Ukraine’s geographical position; and the pro-western angle of Ukraine’s new regime. These three factors combined give Russia a good motive to pursue a self-assured policy towards Ukraine (Götz, 2015, 3). Given Ukraine’s strategical situation, it is of utmost importance to Russia, thus not only Putin, but any other Russian leader will try to avoid Ukraine joining a ‘collective security alliance (i.e. NATO), or geopolitical blocs. If they do not succeed in pursuing this goal, Russia will continue to try to create a forward security zone along its western border (Ibidem, 4). As Putin once argued, “Russia should protect its own interests and act flexible in the pursuit of its goal.” I will justify my argument, which is, that the generated security dilemma will be best capable of providing us a clear and comprehensible explanation of Russia’s course of action regarding the conflict in Ukraine (and Syrian), by using the ongoing eastward NATO expansion process, which went almost simultaneously with the eastward EU expansion, into former communist states as the most significant reason for the current upheaval with respect of Ukraine. Another thing this chapter will show, is that Putin has been highly capable of playing the games needed to regain his power position on the world stage and secure Russia from external threats. Both scholars and politicians argue that his strategies in pursuing Russia’s national interests correspond with a traditional realpolitik approach. However, first the ‘security
23 Hasar Demnati 6206565 dilemma’ will be elucidated, before we continue to display that the course of history has resulted in Russia pursuing this realist’s strategy.
The Security Dilemma Realists argue that the actors in IR frequently generate a security dilemma —a situation in which the actions taken by states to guarantee their own security (such as setting up more military services) are considered to be a threat to the security of other states (Mearsheimer J. J., 2006, 75). Their responses to the threats from those other states, such as setting up more of their own military THE GREATEST WAR IN HISTORY services, as a counteract can than COULD BE PRODUCED WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION OF ANY GREAT again be considered to be a threat to CRIMINALS WHO MIGHT BE OUT TO the prior state (Ibidem). The dilemma DO DELIBERATE HARM IN THE is a key source of arms races in which WORLD. IT COULD BE PRODUCED states spend large amounts of money BETWEEN TWO POWERS BOTH OF on equally threatening weapons that WHICH WERE DESPERATELY in the end does not even offer the ANXIOUS TO AVOID CONFLICT OF security that is needed. ANY SORT.” The ‘security dilemma’ was H. Butterfield, 1951 articulated by one of the founding fathers of realism, John H. Herz and was perceived as an undesirable result of anarchy in the international system. This model is now probably the furthermost used and cited model in textbooks of IR. The notion of 'security dilemma' is not a new one in IR, as it was first introduced in 1951 in Herz’s book Political Realism and Political Idealism (Herz, 1951). In that very same year the British historian, Herbert Butterfield also described a situation in his book History and Human relations, which was similar to ‘the security dilemma’ nonetheless, he used other words to describe it12. Ever since, the model has become one of the most significant theoretical ideas in IR. Herz and Butterfield shared the same main argument, namely that a ‘security dilemma’ arises when two actors, none of them actually attempting to harm the other, wind up going to war, their understandings of the notion differed from each other. Butterfield argued that, “The greatest war in history could be produced without the intervention of any great criminals who might be out to do deliberate harm in the world. It could be produced between two powers
12 Unlike Herz, Butterfield referred to ‘the security dilemma’ as the 'absolute predicament and the irreducible dilemma' (Butterfield, 1951: 19)
24 Hasar Demnati 6206565 both of which were desperately anxious to avoid conflict of any sort” “BECAUSE NO STATE CAN EVER FEEL (Butterfield, 1951, 19-20). Thus even ENTIRELY SECURE IN SUCH A WORLD if men were up to no harm the fear OF COMPETING UNITS, POWER and uncertainty that is genarted by COMPETITION ENSUES, AND THE precautionary measures functions as a VICIOUS CIRCLE OF SECURITY AND vicious circle. Butterfield listed six POWER ACCUMULATION IS ON.” indication, which according to him John H. Herz, 1951 define the ‘security dilemma’ in the best way, with on number one fear, derived from the “universal sin of humanity”13; number two is the uncertainty over others’ intentions; number three is the unintended nature; number four is the tragic results the security dilemma produces; number five is the possible intensification by psychological aspects; and last but not least is the essential source of all human conflicts (Butterfield, 1951, 19-22). Herz did in fact agree with Butterfield when stated that the key to understanding how the security dilemma can occur is ‘fear’ and ‘uncertainty’. In 1966 in his book International politics in the Atomic Age, Herz notes that: 'it is one of the tragic implications of the security dilemma that mutual fear of what initially may never have existed may subsequently bring about what is feared the most' (Herz, 1966, 241). In other words, it is a tragedy when state leaders never having any intentions to causing a conflict with another nations, are taken over by concerns and uncertainty about the intentions of the other nations, which eventually leads to the production of men’s greatest fear, namely a conflict. This fear created by uncertainty with regard to the future of Syria and Ukraine is expressed very often by the Russian President Vladimir Putin in his speeches and interviews, however this will be further addressed in the following chapters. To continue with the analysis of Butterfield’s indications of the security dilemma, Professor Shiping Tang of the school of IR in Shanghai, rightly criticized, in his article The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis, that Butterfield’s first indication of the ultimate source of security dilemma, the “universal sin of humanity” is logically incompatible with his other theses, which argue that the security dilemma is unintentional in origin and that conflicts driven by the security dilemma are tragic (Tang, 2009: 590). This would mean that if the “universal sin of humanity,” causes us to be preset to harm each other there should be no
13 With “universal sin of humanity” Butterfield refers to the ‘will to power’ or Machiavelli’s ambizione, and Hans Morgenthau’s “lust for power.”
25 Hasar Demnati 6206565 exception to this rule; thus, making this attribution incompatible with Butterfields’ second indication of ‘uncertainty’ as well. This flaw within Butterfield’s definition was addressed by Herz and Robert Jervis when they attributed the final source of the security dilemma to the anarchical structure of international politics. Herz, described it as follows: “Groups and individuals who live alongside each other without being organized into a higher unity . . . must be . . . concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attacks, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the effects of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Because no state can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on.” (Herz, 1951, 157). The way the security dilemma is generated among Russia’s government by uncertainty and fear, and the desire of states to preserve their power in order to be able to protect one’s state is an important issue. Russia’s biggest fear is losing its great power position and consequently be subject to a security threat. Besides it seems as if NATO is doing its best to exclude Russia from all the important security issues, and with this Russia is being removed out of the great power sphere of influence by NATO. Moreover, although Russia possesses a significant regional power position in the Middle East, Europe and Europe, these regions are in their own turn extreme strategically important regions, this again leads to severe security concerns and substantial temptations for Russia to accumulate more power (Braun, 2008, 56). We might be able to conclude that Russia’s course of action with regard to both Syria and Ukraine can thus be explained under the banner of ‘fear’ and ‘uncertainty’, compatible with the security dilemma of realism, since Russia’s in the case of Ukraine fears NATO and EU expansion into more former communist regions and in the case of Syria fears the expansion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (hereinafter: ISIS) and its affiliates into the North Caucasus and other surrounding regions on Russian soil. But how is it that an institutions like NATO, established to overcome the security dilemma, which existence is also acknowledged within liberalism and constructivism, seems to generate rather than overcome a security dilemma among Russian leaders. The answer to this question will be addressed in the following chapter, in which I analyze my first case study, Ukraine.
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Chapter 4: The road to the Ukrainian conflict
The source of Russia’s aggression: Fighting for security hroughout the Cold War the West maintained strong diplomatic relations with Russia. Russia has been and still is an important country for the West, since the role T of Russia was read as a threat to security in Europe’s neighborhood and it was thus considered to be, to a certain extent, partly responsible for global stability and security (Galantino & Freire, 2015, 283). Although Russia was never considered to be complying with the Washington approved model of liberal democracy, it generally had similar interest as the West. Nevertheless, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, it seemed as if former President Yeltsin mistakenly depended too much on the “fictitious Western assistance”, where the West promised Russia all kinds of aid that was never received, if they would abolish communism and adopt a liberal world order. Therefore, Russia was committed to change its foreign policy by publishing a document called ‘The Fundamental Principles of Russia’s Foreign Policy Conception’ in April 1993, which stimulated three main goals for Russian Foreign Policy. The document stated a realist approach for Russia, its main goals was to revive, uphold its private interests and regain it great power status (Xia Yishan, 1997, 22). The striving towards these goals have recently been very visible, as the national interests of Russian leaders have changed, as well as the Western “collective security alliances as means to overcome the security dilemma of the international system” (Russett, 2013, 95). The NATO– Ukraine relation, more than any other, confirmed that NATO did not view the former Soviet periphery as a separation line. Every step that Ukraine took towards NATO was affectionately recompensed. When the current Russian President Vladimir Putin, came to power in 1999 – first as prime minister and then as president - a more realistic perspective on international order was created. Rather than distancing Russia from a multipolar world order, it was reconsidered into a more practical alternative which was beneficent for Russia (MacFarlane, 2008, 42). Instead of focusing on the West, Putin pursued allies all over the world who shared common interests on ‘matters of significance’, which however did not always meant that these allies corresponded with the liberal framework of the West , like its alliance with Iran (Ibidem). Moreover, it was exactly this collective security alliance, i.e. NATO’s process of expansion that created the security dilemma for Russia in the first place. Even though Russia frequently tried to cast vetoes with respect to the UNSC draft Resolutions and was not amused by NATO expansion into former communist states (such as
27 Hasar Demnati 6206565 the first NATO expansion into the three former Soviet regions, Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic), for quite a long time it was not strong enough to raise objections to vital interests of the West, or protect its own interests (Mearsheimer, 2014, 2). However, as the country started to stabilize economically, cooperate with another great power, China, it regained its great power status and Russia was dedicated to letting the West know that is was no longer weak and that it was going to pursue its realists approach that it had created shortly after the fall of the USSR. Russia has, from the start, truly appreciated its permanent membership of the UNSC14 with its power to veto and it seemed that it was finally coming to great use. Given Russia’s enduring opposition to external (military) intervention on the basis of humanitarian support – as it claims that these interventions are just an elaborate smokescreen to topple any regime not complying with the Washington approved model of liberal democracy – combined with its support to countries viewed as important potential international partners for Russia, its power to veto has frequently been circumvented. Such as the constraint of NATO military intervention in 1999 in Yugoslavia by Russia with the support of China. Followed by Russia preventing the UN from issuing a mandate for the incursion of Iraq by the US. Furthermore it prevented severe sanctions to be taken against the nuclear explosions of North Korea, President Mugabe’s dictatorship in Zimbabwe15, and Iran’s nuclear program (Oldberg, 2010, 32) Although it had achieved these successes, Russia had a lot to endure subsequent to the fall of the USSR, according to many scholars amongst whom are Roger Kanet and Joseph Black NATO’s first eastward expansion into former USSR states in 1999 was a matter that elevated the most serious Russian concerns at this time, and remained a significant matter till this day (Kanet, 2010, 208). In January 1999, former member of the Duma Defense Committee Vladimir Volkov said during a press conference that Russia preceived the NATO’s new strategic concept to be a “geostrategic threat to peace” which would result into “adequate measures”. Besides that Putin, later repeatedly claimed that NATO’s expansion is a severe provocation that needs to be taken seriously by Russia as diminishing common trust would be perceived as a serious threat to the security of Russia. Despite Russia’s attempt to oppose this eastward expansion by offering three conditions for the membership of the three former Soviet states to overcome the security dilemma. First of all membership of these countries had to be according to the ‘French model’, meaning that they were allowed to join the political organization without being involved in the military cooperation
14 With the power to cast vetoes 15 The genocide in Darfur
28 Hasar Demnati 6206565 of NATO. The second conditions was that NATO was not allowed to position its forces in regions close to the Russian borders, neither was NATO allowed to place military, or nuclear bases in Central Eastern Europe. Thirdly and last, NATO was to be limited in its further enlargements signifying that no expansion into Baltic states were tolerated, since this would be interpreted as a direct challenge to Russia’s national security interests (Xia Yishan, 1997, 24) Nevertheless these conditions were never taken into consideration and Russia failed to prevent NATO expansion by Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. During its 50th anniversary in Washington in the same year NATO announced a new strategic doctrine, which stated that in case of a regional crisis, for instance, at the border of the Alliance, NATO would response with force without permission from the UNSC. And since the borders of some of its Alliances were, due to its enlargement, likewise borders of Russia this strategy meant a direct threat to a region which Russia believed to be inside its rightful sphere of influence (Light & Allison, 2006, 5). From Russia’s point of view this implied that NATO provided itself with a carte blanche to act with military force wherever it considered to be needed and that it wanted Russia to be excluded from decision taking on security matters in Europe. This was confirmed when, in accordance to its new strategy doctrine, NATO launched its first airstrike against Serbia in response to the Kosovo crisis (Ibidem). Following these developments, the eastward expansion of NATO, weakening of international security mechanisms (such as UN and the OSCE), Russia seemed to be facing several external threats. In the end, with the threat of global terrorism lurking after 9/11 and the creation of a security dilemma, President Putin decided to change its security perception in that terrorism, separatism, border security and military conflict were now regarded as the primary threats and resume its cooperation with NATO (Li, 2008, 151-2). Nevertheless, Russia was not alone in changing its strategy after 9/11, apparently so did NATO. Subsequently to 9/11, NATO dedicated itself to further enlargement in both geographical as well as functional matters. Although it appeared as if NATO expansion was put on hold and for a little while relations between Russia and the West looked to be moderately improving, it did not however, result into compromises on strategic matters that involved Russia (Light & Allison, 2006, 11). As NATO started to engage in US-led missions in regions that were subject to the Russian sphere of influence, such as the Caucasus, and Central Asia the earlier concerns voiced by Russia turned out to be completely justified (Simon, 2008, 98). Consequent to the broadened NATO commitments and the supposed ‘global terrorism threat’ a US-led
29 Hasar Demnati 6206565 invasion toppled the Sadam Hussein regime in Iraq16. Although, some members of the UNSC were opposed to the US-led invasion and subsequently former UN secretary general Kofi Annan even announced that the invasion was not in conformity with the UN Charter and thus illegitimate (MacAskill, 2004), the US proceeded with the invasion on Iraq. Along with plans for the EU’s first eastward expansion and NATO second, whereas the former expansion made Russia slightly nervous the latter gave Russia real security challenges to worry about and once again generated the security dilemma. Many Russians regard the EU as a “Trojan horse” for NATO expansion (Götz, 2015, 4). This fear may be unfounded, but it can hardly be denied that the second expansion of NATO – into seven former Soviet-controlled sates - went almost simultaneously with EU enlargement as is illustrated by table 2.1. This evidently led to an increasing lack of trust in the West from Russia’s perspective. Clearly NATO’s expansion process was perceived by Russia as a blunt threat, which is perfectly logical, since from a realist perspective, the enlargement of the North Atlantic Alliance deteriorates Russia’s position in Europe (MacFarlane, 2008, 39). Despite Russia’s resistance and its direct and indirect threats, it failed to stop the inclusion of these states as they joined in March 2004. Although Russia had previously faced several western intimidations, it had now changed its willingness to accept a position of weakness, or dependence in Russian relations with the West (Kanet, 2010, 208). Nevertheless, the desire and effort of former Soviet-controlled states, such as Ukraine to join the western democracy, which they believed would flourish their economy and would provid them protection and security under NATO, grew bigger. These efforts ultimately led to the so-called Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004. This nonviolent campaign, supported by the West, lasted two months and resulted into a repeat run-off election which led to the election of pro-Western President Yushchenko. This loss from the West made the revolution a hard pill to swallow and became the next matter to elevate serious Russian concerns. Followed by a Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict in 2006 and again one in 2009, it appeared that the fight against Western democracy in Ukraine was about to be a high-profile task of the CIS17, where most states are either authoritarian, or dictatorial (Oldberg, 2010, 37).
16 According to the US government diplomacy failed in Iraq and therefore it would carry on with a coalition16 to free Iraq from weapons of mass destruction –which the US claimed Iraq obtained. 17 Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and Ukraine are associate member states (Georgia who was a member since 1993, withdrew as a result of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008)
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Table 2.1 Simultanious enlargement processes Date NATO Enlargement Date EU Enlargement March 1999 Czech Republic Czech Republic Hungary Hungary
Poland Poland March 2004 Estonia May 2004 Estonia Latvia Latvia Lithuania Lithuania Slovakia Slovakia Slovenia Slovenia Malta Cyprus Bulgaria January 2007 Bulgaria Romania Romania April 2009 Croatia July 2013 Croatia Albania (Albania is an official candidate of the EU since 2009)
Elaborating on the Orange Revolution the following section will concentrate on explaining why Ukraine is of utmost importance to Russia and why earlier NATO and EU expansion were of marginal interest to Russia, but when it came to Ukraine it generated the highest security threat one might imagine. Furthermore, the next section will briefly discuss other developments that played a significant role in generating a security dilemma for Russia that led to the Ukrainian crisis and ultimately to the annexation of Crimea.
31 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Ukraine, Russia’s last frontier Many scholars argue that the presidential elections that were held in October 31, 2004 in Ukraine was one of the triggers for the current Ukrainian upheavals. Russia perceived the elections as quite challenging since the run-off was between the popular pro-Western candidate, Viktor Yushchenko and Russia’s favorite, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Ever since Ukraine18 expressed its aspiration to anchor itself to the EU and NATO, as it was attracted by the prosperity that the EU assured and the security that NATO’s Article 5 common defense commitment provided, Russia has been more aware of the threats that pro-Western sentiments of the populace and the elites pose to it (Rogov, 2015, 83)(Joseph, 2014). As Elias Götz argued, given Ukraine’s geopolitical location, the Russian government will go to great lengths to maintain some form of control over Kiev’s foreign and defense policy (Götz, 2015, 3-4). Thus, the risk of a pro-western candidate becoming the new president needed to be eliminated at any cost, besides Putin repeatedly warned that NATO expansion toward Ukraine would mean that Ukraine as we now know it would cease to exist (Mearsheimer, 2014, 3). Russia’s increased activism in the presidential elections in Ukraine had its roots months before the build-up to the elections, as Putin visited Ukraine several time showing support for Yushchenko’s opponent Yanukovych (Karatnycky, 2005, 49). This was necessary as pro- western Yushchenko voters dominated central Ukraine and the city of Kyiv, which were the regions that decided the faith of the elections (Kuzio, 2005, 507). However, it did not stop with marketing of Yanukovych, as Yushchenko became the target of a series of harassments19, such as his illness that made him out of the running for almost a month, which later turned out to be dioxin poisoning. In addition to the harassments, the incumbent president, Leonid Kuchma, had personally chosen Yanukovych as his successor. And finally on the day of the elections, at some polling sites where support for Yushchenko was high, observers found out that the ink of pens had been replaced by disappearing ink, so that ballots would turn out blank after they were cast (Ibidem, 37) Nevertheless, the political party of Yanukovych was still losing popular support as Yushchenko was gaining support by a united opposition, thus when the elections yielded no victor20 most opposition groups already suspected fraud. The revolt against the suspected election fraud, went down in history as the “Orange Revolution”, which was the campaign color of Yushchenko. The evidence of ballot
18 And Georgia 19 Yushchenko was subject to negative press and misrepresentations by government-controlled national television. Besides personal attacks Yushchenko's campaign faced other barriers as well as sometimes his plane was denied landing privileges minutes before major rallies. Road barriers slowed his travel and, once, a truck tried to force his car off the road (Karatnycky, 2005, 36) 20 Each candidate receiving about 40% of the votes
32 Hasar Demnati 6206565 manipulation caused Yushchenko’s supporters to protest in large-scale on November 22, resolute to protect their right to free elections and to appoint the fair victor. These demonstrators gathered in Kiev’s main square, the Maidan (Rennebohm, 2011). Finally, former President Kuchma and his successor Yanukovych decided to hold a new run-off vote, on the condition that Yuschenko and the parliament would agree to measures limiting the future president’s power. When they agreed the new run-off was held on December 26, 2004. To prevent fraud from occurring again the election were supervised by observers from around the world and when the votes had been counted they revealed that Yushchenko won, 52% to Yanukovych’s 44%, causing the Ukrainian Orange Revolution to be a success (Karatnycky, 2005, 46). The victory of Ukraine’s pro-western and democratic leader was a humiliating defeat for Putin and a setback for Russia’s hegemonic inclinations and thus caused the Russian elites to become more suspicious of NATO and EU expansion and their increased activism in Ukraine (Ibidem, 50). Yushchenko victory was dangerous to national unity, due to the East-West split it creates in the country, besides Ukraine was becoming a serious security issue for Russia. Russia needed to eliminate this security issue therefore, State Duma speaker Boris Gryzlov claimed in December 2004 that Ukraine faced a simple choice either it will split up, or it will go down into a civil war (Kuzio, 2005, 507). Russian concerns augmented further when on January 13, the European Parliament voted 467 in favor, 19 against for a resolution calling on Ukraine to be given "a clear European perspective, possibly leading to EU membership." Although the vote was nonbinding, The Financial Times declared that it "was the clearest sign to Kiev that the door to the European Union is open” (Karatnycky, 2005, 50). However, although Ukraine had a clear aspiration to join the West as an NATO and EU alliance, at that moment there seemed to be little interest for this from the West. Nevertheless, according to John J. Mearsheimer21, for Russia “the illegal overthrow of Ukraine’s democratically elected and pro-Russian president was the final straw” (Mearsheimer, 2014, 1). Therefore, Russia’s course of actions with regard to Ukraine should not have come as a surprise to the West, as they’ve been moving into Russia’s sphere of influence and threatening its main strategic interests (Ibidem). As negotiations started between the US, Poland, and the Czech Republic, former soviet-controlled states which were drawn into Western alliances (EU and NATO) in 1999 only a few years prior to the US’s plans for a Ballistic Missile Defense system (hereinafter: BMD) in these regions, they antagonized and threatened Russia and evoked an even stronger response.
21 is an American political scientist and an advocate of the theory of offensive realism
33 Hasar Demnati 6206565 The plans to deploy a US missile defense generated a typical security dilemma as the Russian Security Council declared that it was to revise its military policy so that Russia would be able to angle US efforts to reinforce its military alliances, i.e. NATO (Braun, 2008, 187). In fact, Putin discussed the arm race in his annual speech in 2006 and assured that Russia would not fall behind, but would keep pace with the US in nuclear weaponry (Shearman, 2010, 19). This emerged a Russian threat on November 14, 2007 warning that it was to locate short-range nuclear missiles in a second location on the EU's periphery if the US declines to abandon its plans to deploy a missile defense system (Blomfield, 2007). The Russian concerns were real and it was evident, as in a speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference Putin fired his strongest criticism on the US posing the question to whom this expansion was aimed, since ensuring Europe’s security was obviously not the purpose.
“I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself, or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them.” (Putin, 2007)
Furthermore, he criticized the USA for using “an almost uncontained force in IR” besides the US had “overstepped its national borders in every way” (The Associated Press, 2007). Before the tide seemed to be turned, NATO began planning further eastward expansion. During the 2008 summit in Bucharest, NATO took the admission of Georgia and Ukraine into consideration. However, although the Bush government was in favor of this, France and Germany were not, since they rightly feared that Russia would be extremely provoked by this. In the end, all members of NATO agreed that although it was not going to begin the formal process at that moment, it approved the Georgian and Ukrainian ambitions and thus confidently proclaimed, “These countries will become members of NATO” (Mearsheimer, 2014, 3). With the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, Putin’s respond to this promise seemed to be a clear message for Russia’s opposition to the accession of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO and proved the German and France fear to be justified. Besides, this was not the only Western project that seemed to be on hold, in 2009, partly due to Polish and
34 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Czech Republican opposition activity groups and other oppositions the BMD project was also abandoned by the US government. Nevertheless, this did not mean the end of a NATO threat for Russia, as its third expansion towards Eastern Europe took place in April 2009. The accession of Croatia and Albania into NATO caused the already antagonized Russia to perceive the expansion as hostile to its national security and country’s interests, as it once again diminished its sphere of influence in the former Soviet-controlled Europe. Russian reaction to this expansion seemed to demonstrate that the central element of growing Russian antagonism was eastward NATO and EU expansion. Former Russian Foreign Minister even accused the EU for attempting to build a Western sphere of influence within the Eastern periphery (Mearsheimer, 2014, 3). The following statement by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov neatly captures this accusation: “We [the Russians] are accused of having spheres of influence. But what is the Eastern Partnership, if not an attempt to extend the EU’s sphere of influence.” (as cited in Pop, 2009) It is not unlikely to assume that a Western orientated government in Ukraine will – eventually – develop closer relations with NATO and in fact lead to an NATO expansion into this region, as was evident in the past with eastward EU and NATO expansion practically going simultaneously (Götz, 2015, 4). Nonetheless, when pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych, who initially was supposed to be the successor of Ukraine’s third President Leonid Kuchma in 2004, finally became president of Ukraine in 2010, Russia seemed to be able to score out the threat of a pro-western Ukrainian regime leaning further to the West. Russian leaders have been trying to pull Ukraine into its sphere of influence since the fall of the Soviet Union, and with Yanukovych as Ukraine’s president, Putin appeared to have secured that ambition. The pro- Russian Viktor Yanukovych had good ties with Russian President Putin and resulting into the abandoning of all plans to chase NATO membership by Yanukovych’s government. Moreover, Ukraine established a closer relationship with Russia, particularly in security and military matters, as the Kharkiv agreement22 was extended for another 25 years beyond its expiration in 2017 (Götz, 2015, 4). Furthermore, Ukraine and Russia exacerbated defense trade and intelligence collaboration. Indeed, President Yanukovych and his government shifted towards Russia and the West’s grander strategy to drag Ukraine out of Russia’s sphere of influence and to integrate the country to West appeared to be on hold again. However, the EU kept on trying to persuade the new Ukrainian government under Yanukovych by offering him financial support and an association agreement. Developing economic and political steadiness in Ukraine and integrating Ukraine into its markets (preferably into both Europe’s as Russia’s
22 The Russian lease of naval installations on Crimea
35 Hasar Demnati 6206565 markets) is crucial for Europe. Nevertheless, neither Brussels, nor Moscow can politically afford to let one another fully incorporate Ukraine (Schubert, Pollak, & Brutschin, 2014, 5). The importance of Eastern Ukraine to Russia goes beyond national identities, thus when Putin learned of EU’s persuasion package, he used a stick and carrot approach to draw Ukraine back to Russia. He first responded in the summer of 2013 by launching a trade war against Ukraine, in which Russia blocked many Ukrainian merchandises from being imported23. This trade war deteriorated the already poor Ukrainian economy. And simultaneously Russia responded by offering Ukraine a package of economic and financial support, which contained 15 billion US dollars in low-interest loans and a sharp reduction on Russian gas delivery, provided that Yanukovych fulfilled Russia’s demands and refused the EU association agreement (Götz, 2015, 5). This approach seemed to have worked in Yanukovych’s account, as he turned down EU’s association agreement. However, it did not consider the response of the Ukrainian population. Ever since the Orange Revolution the Ukrainian citizens have learned that the voice of the people was strong if united. The turndown of the agreement provoked a political revolution amongst the predominantly pro-western Ukrainian population. This revolt was the beginning of what went down in the annals of history as Putin’s ‘Hitler-style’ land grab in Europe since the WWII (Kralova, 2014). Nonetheless the following section will prove that the annexation of Crimea in 2014 is anything from unusual and even a quite logical and predictable response from the perspective of realpolitik.
23 Goods such as chocolate
36 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Crimea According to the perception of the Western media and politicians the upheavals in Ukraine can be blamed almost exclusively on Russian aggression. The assertiveness and aggression of the Russian government resulted into numerous accusations namely by the US, EU, for violating both legal and political obligations under the Geneva Conventions (Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), Council of Europe instruments, OSCE human dimension etc. (MacFarlane, 2008, 40). In addition, they have claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea out of an enduring longing to restore the Soviet realm. It is unlikely that Putin will, sooner or later, go after the remaining parts of Ukraine, including other East European regions. However, the bigger picture, I have argued is the Russian security concerns and the loss of Russia’s sphere of influence. This, again has been the case with the annexation of Crimea as will be evident in this section. Ukraine, as I have argued before, is of great importance to Russia for its strategical position. It is the only region that divides Russia from NATO and EU- controlled Europe, thus it is often referred to as Russia’s last frontier. Over time, Russia has tried several times to incorporate Ukraine within its sphere of influence, with the Commonwealth of Independent States (hereinafter: CIS), and the Common Economic Space (Mychajlyszyn, 2008, 32) and with the election of Yanukovych it seemed as if Putin’s mission, to draw Ukraine to Russia, was completed. Neverteheless, many Ukrainians were fed up with their corrupt and incompetent government that was not able to deal with the economic problems of Ukraine. As a consequence of former President Yanukovych pulling back from the EU association agreement, many Ukrainians took to the streets to demonstrate against his decision. The aftermath of this demonstrations is well known, and was, unfortunately not as peaceful as the Orange revolution in 2004. After almost three months of increasingly violent protests on Kiev’s Maidan Square, former President Yanukovych agreed not to stand for elections after his term expired in 2015, nevertheless, the Ukrainian protestors wanted him to resign immediately. When demonstrations became worse, representatives of the US and its European allies went down to Ukraine to mediate, and they managed to close a deal, which permitted President Yanukovych to remain in control until new elections were held. However, this deal did not stand for long, as he was overthrown on February 22, and fled to Russia (Götz, 2015, 5). For President Putin, the illegal topple of the democratically elected Ukrainian President Yanukovych, which he referred to as a ‘coup d'état’ was the last straw. Russian leaders have obsessively been against NATO expansion, and Putin made it very clear that he was not about
37 Hasar Demnati 6206565 to stand by while Ukraine, which is Russia’s strategically important neighbor, converted into a NATO, or EU stronghold (Mearsheimer, 2014, 1). The concerns of the Russian president were exaggerated, since the newly appointed Ukrainian government was pro-Western and anti-Russian to the core. Besides the new government consisted of four eminent members who could rightfully be labeled neo-fascists (Mearsheimer, 2014, 5). For Putin, and many others it was evident that the coup was backed by the increasing US and EU involvement, even though the complete level of their involvement has not yet clear. Before and after Yanukovych was overthrown American political figures, such as Senator John McCain, contributed to antigovernment protests, to the extent that US ambassador to Ukraine, Geoffrey Pyatt, declared that the ousting of Yanukovych was “a day for the history books” (Ibidem). With Russia’s national security and interest being at stake it is no wonder that Putin felt it was time to respond to the increased EU, NATO and US involvement in its strategically important neighbor, Ukraine. In addition, a leaked telephone recording between Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland24 and Geoffrey Pyatt revealed that they had encouraged regime change and preferred Arseniy Yatsenyuk, an anti-Russian Ukrainian politician to become the new prime minister of Ukraine, which he did on February 27 (BBC News, 2014). As a result of the ‘coupe d’état’, Putin commanded Russian forces to seize Crimea from Ukraine, a region where a Russian naval base is located, and of which Putin feared would accommodate a NATO naval base if Ukraine was drawn into the EU and consequently into NATO. However, as Richard Feinberg argues, it was no forced seizure as the Crimeans, who are predominantly ethnic Russians, became anxious, particularly as the new government voted for regulation to subdue the use of the Crimean language (Feinberg, 2014). Even though the regulation was annulled, the harm was done and the Crimeans expected Russian support and protection as they claimed independence. On March 16, 2014, the Crimean Supreme Court held a referendum asking, whether Crimea should join Russian Federation as a subject of Russia, or restore the 1992 Crimean constitution, and Crimea’s status as part of Ukraine, which the Ukrainian government had formerly invalidated (Yuhas & Jalabi, 2014). Over ninety-five percent voted to join the Russian Federation as a subject of Russia, thus Putin would have undermined its credibility both in Russian and Crimeans eyes if he was to be a passive onlooker and fail the Crimean people who are being subjected to repression. Therefore, on March 18, he acted by annexing Crimea.
24 Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the United States Department of State
38 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Many scholars argue that Putin has never had the intention to launch a full-size incursion of Ukraine, from the start Putin’s strategy has been to destabilize Ukraine until it abandoned its efforts to join the West. Being well-aware of the fact that, according to NATO’s guidelines, countries tarnished by ethnic struggles and unsettled territorial disagreements cannot be part of the Western collective security alliance (Götz, 2015, 7). Rather, Putin’s goal is to regain its control over the pro-western angle of Ukraine’s new regime and play it safe by spreading turmoil in Eastern Ukraine. Russia’s behavior, we can conclude, is mainly motivated by geopolitical imperatives (Götz, 2015, 7). Nevertheless, the annexation of Crimea seemed to be planned well ahead as it proved to be rather simple, yet the reason may be due to the Russian troops already stationed at the Crimean port of Sevastopol’s naval base. In addition, the annexation, as evident by the mostly pro-Russian votes of the Crimean status referendum, was with the consent of the majority of the Crimean population. Besides, Mearsheimer claims that Putin had put enormous strain on the new pro-western Ukrainian government to deter it from teaming up with the West. Moreover, Putin ensured that he would rather ruin Ukraine as a functioning state than allow it to turn into a Western bastion on Russia’s doorstep (Mearsheimer, 2014, 5). In the wake of destabilizing Ukraine, the Russian government provided the Russian separationists in Eastern Ukraine with advisers, arms, and diplomatic support to lead the country toward civil war. And with an army awaiting on the Ukrainian periphery, Putin threatened to attack Ukraine if protestors were attacked vociferously. Furthermore, Putin raised the Ukrainian gas price and required pay off of past exports debts (Ibidem). Although it seems as if Putin is aggressive and heartless, the annexation of Crimea was merely a defensive response to Western attempts to drag Ukraine into its own sphere of influence. As it was worried that after the toppling of the Yanukovych government the new Ukrainian leader would be determined to sign the EU’s association agreement. For the Russians, this was unacceptable due to Ukraine’s immensely geostrategic importance, especially that of Crimea. One of the most dominant versions of the “geopolitical” role of Crimea for Russia was delivered in Aleksander Dugin’s book of 1997, in which he emphasized that if Russian leaders would lose control over Crimea this would generate a direct geopolitical threat to Russia, in other word: “whoever controls Crimea controls the Black Sea”25 (Suslov, 2014, 597). With this in mind, Putin’s behavior should appear more than logical. Throughout history Ukraine appeared to be of immense importance to Russia as it served as a buffer zone
25 Direct reference to Dugin 1997, 380 and Shirokorad 2014a
39 Hasar Demnati 6206565 that Napoleonic France, imperial Germany, and Nazi Germany all tried to traverse, ineffectively, to attack Russia (Mearsheimer, 2014, 5). As argued earlier, not only Putin but any other Russian leader will try to prevent Ukraine from joining a ‘collective security alliance (i.e. NATO), or geopolitical blocs. Neither would any other Russian leader be a passive onlooker while the West encouraged the regime to be changed in favor of an anti-Russian government that was dedicated to incorporate Ukraine into the EU, and – sooner or later- NATO. Nevertheless, most leaders of the US and its European allies continue to refute that Putin’s behavior could be driven by genuine security concerns. In response to Russian annexation of Crimea, which according to US and EU leaders was a violation of international law and will, thus, not be recognized, Western leaders have sanctioned Russia to discourage any additional violence. On the other hand, neither the US, nor its NATO allies were willing to use military power in order to protect Ukraine, even though Kerry claimed that “all options are on the table” (Mearsheimer, 2014, 9). Instead, the West is still depending on economic sanctions26 to pressure Russia into ending its backing of the protestors in Eastern Ukraine. Conscious of the fact that such measures will have little effect, there are advocates and opponents for the sanctions, however none of them will contest that these sanctions will further irritate Putin and arouse a stronger response from Russia (Götz, 2015, 10). Even if severer sanctions are endorsed, it would almost certainly not change Putin’s decision-making, as the past demonstrates that countries will bare massive sanctions to protect their core strategic interests. There is no reason to think Russia represents an exception to this rule (Mearsheimer, 2014, 10). Besides, as Guriev27, rightly observed, the Crimean escapade has revealed that Russia does not put its priorities in economic improvement and its incorporation into the global economy and can, therefore undoubtedly be abandoned if the government believed it is threatened (Guriev, 2015, 20). This Russian commitment should set an example for US and EU leaders, in the sense that, if the US and EU decide to expand into Eastern Europe, they should end the making of empty promises28 and back up their words with action29 (i.e. stop
26 The West sanctioned Russia for the use of aggression by freezing their business accounts, stopping the equipment of military tools and innovative solutions and technologies for Russia and the Western countries stopped renewing loans of Russian banks. Nevertheless, the sanctions carried out by them had little to no effect on the government itself, while they did heavily effect the Russian population. 27 Sergei Guriev, is a political economist who was the director of the Moscow New Economic school until he flew to France in April 2013 after frightening and humiliating interrogations by government investigators, who focused on Guriev’s contribution to a panel of professionals that directed an independent analysis of the Mikhail Khodorkovsky affair (Lipman, 2013). 28 NATO agreed that it approved the Georgian and Ukrainian ambitions and thus confidently proclaimed, “These countries will become members of NATO” (Mearsheimer, 2014, 3).
40 Hasar Demnati 6206565 making promises which they are either unwilling, or unable to fulfil). As Götz rightly argues: “Poking the Russian bear with a stick in the eye and letting smaller neighboring countries take the swipe of his paw is the worst policy of all” (Götz, 2015, 10).
29 Götz advises that: “Brussels and Washington should provide substantial diplomatic, economic and military support to countries that summon the courage to strengthen their ties with the West in the face of Russian pressure.”(Götz, 2015, 10)
41 Hasar Demnati 6206565
Chapter 5: Russia-Syria allies, or illusions? ver since the crisis in Syria emerged in 2011, the discussion about the ambiguous relationship between Russia and Syria have been filling both newspapers as well as E academic journals. However, the situation is different than many may know, first in the case of Ukraine, Putin was concerned about US, EU and NATO’s increasing involvement in former Soviet-controlled Europe and possible NATO and EU expansion in Ukraine, whereas in the case of Syria, he seems to be more concerned about the growing influence of Islamist extremist in the Arab Middle East. Second, while surprising to many observers, the intervention and increasing Russian involvement in Syria revealed a profounder bilateral relationship. Nevertheless, this relation, as will be evident in the next section, has not always been as strong and stable one. Thus, to understand why Putin, this time, opted to present himself as a reliable and strong ally by backing Syria throughout this period a short historical background might be useful. I will therefore start with some history and continue this chapter by stating some of the frequently mentioned arguments and conclude with what I consider to be the most vital arguments for understanding the current situation in Syria and Russia’s role in this turmoil.
The cradle of Russian-Syrian cooperation Let us say that it all started with the recognition of the Syrian Arabic Republic as an independent state by the USSR in 1944. Unlike the West, which only formally recognized Syria as an independent state in April 17, 1946. Already in the time of the USSR, Syria’s role in the Russia’s security became evident, as the USSR acknowledge the independency of the Syrian Arabic Republic in 19944. It is argued, by Kreutz, that two important motives lay in the core of this deliberate strategic move by the USSR. First of all one of geopolitical nature, since for the USSR having Syria as its ally meant the ability to by-pass Turkey and Iraq who were both considerably leaning towards the Western camp. The loss of these two countries to the West created a security issue for Russia, as accessibility to the Mediterranean Sea is immensely important for a country surrounded by landmass. Therefore, Russia needed to find itself another strong ally in the Arab regions with access to the Mediterranean Sea to continue to safeguard its national security. Syria seemed to be perfectly fit for the job, since it not only compensated the loss of Iraq and Turkey it also almost immediately after being recognized by the USSR establishing its military and economic structure according to the Soviet model (Aghayev & Katman, 2012, 2067).
42 Hasar Demnati 6206565 The second motive was more strategical in nature, as the choice to “IN THE OCCURRENCE OF ally with Syria was partly based on the SITUATIONS JEOPARDIZING PEACE influence that was already gained by AND SECURITY FOR EITHER the largest Communist Party in the PARTY, THE TWO PARTIES Arab world (Kreutz, 2013, 13). At the WOULD PROMPTLY CONTACT same time, Syria had significant oil EACH OTHER TO COORDINATE and gas reserves, which offered the POSITIONS AND COOPERATE TO Soviets an opportunity to provide ELIMINATE EMERGING THREATS technological support to its energy SO THAT PEACE CAN BE ventures (Knight, 2015). RESTORED” Although relations did not (Sputnik news, 2015) always went so smooth, throughout history Syria and Russia always appeared to resume their cooperation and support for each other. As time passed by the Russo-Syrian ties enhanced and the mutual benefit of their alliance was starting to become visible. When the relationship with Egypt went sour within years after the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1970 and the new regime in Egypt led by President Anwar Sadat began leaning more towards the West, the USSR had once again good reasons for strengthening its relation with Syria. The rise of the Ba’ath regime in 1971, led by Hafiz al-Assad, appeared to be advantageous for the elites of the USSR. The new Syrian leaders saw mutual political, strategical, and security benefits in the intentions Russia had towards the Middle East, which included a naval and air base and listening station and managed to raise the Russian-Syrian relation to the next level. It seemed as if Hafiz al-Assad saw mutual benefits This ameliorating cooperation resulted in the signing of an agreement in 1971 between both parties that allowed the USSR to use Syria’s deep-water port at Tartus. This port would not only benefit Syria, as export from the USSR would go via the port, but also provided the USSR access to the Mediterranean Sea allowing the security of both states to enhance. Shortly after the establishment of the Russian naval base, their relation led to yet another important moment for the intensification of the Russo-Syrian cooperation, namely the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and cooperation in October 1980. In this treaty the Soviet Union and Syria promised “to build up universal peace and security of nations, to facilitate détente and embody it in specific forms of cooperation, to resolve contentious issues by peaceful means and to eliminate hegemonism and aggression from international relations” (Sputnik news, 2015).
43 Hasar Demnati 6206565 The treaty contained a clause that stated that, “in the occurrence of situations jeopardizing peace and security for either party, the two parties would promptly contact each other to coordinate positions and cooperate to eliminate emerging threats so that peace can be restored” (Ibidem). The Treaty served as a tool to further guarantee their mutual security and emphasized once more the benefits both countries gained from their alliance. This was becoming a source of concern for the US and this concern was further confirmed by a yearbook about the World’s Armament and Disarmament published in 1987 by The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). According to this yearbook the USSR had provided Syria with large amounts of combat equipment and therefore one could argue that the cooperation is mainly based in strategic interdependence rather than on other grounds, such as ideology, or economy. Although the cooperation between the two parties has not always been as strong and stable as it should have been, it managed to survive and remain in force these days, even when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and introduced his glasnost and perestroika policies. For a little while, it seemed as if the cooperation between the two parties would indeed vanish, however this rather ambiguous security based relationship was not only able to endure the fall of the Soviet Empire in 1991, it has been one of the reason for Russia to support the al- Assad regime in the turmoil that has been going on for over five years now. This observation raises the question: What might be the arguments that could explain the steadfast Russian course of action regarding the crisis in Syria? For that reason, the next section will consist of an analysis of arguments made by various academics, which will help provide an explanation that comprehends all the factors and help us elucidate Russia’s course of actions with regard to the current situation of its Syrian ally. Furthermore we will finish off this chapter by discussing whether, or not these arguments fit within a realist framework as described in the first chapter.
44 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Nostalgia and Minimal Interests? Since the historical background is now briefly elucidated, it is time to move on to the arguments provided by different academics that could be useful in understanding and explaining Russia’s course of action with regard to the Syrian conflict. An important argument brought up by Roy Allison30 is that the relationship is considered to be the only Soviet residue in the Middle East, for that reason, Russia is not eager to erupt this continuing political relations with the security elite of al-Assad (Allison, 2013, 802-3). Although this argument is rather vague and could by itself never explain the main reason for Putin to stand by his Middle Eastern ally, Syria. The line, which Russian leaders and policy analysts unconsciously and frequently find themselves crossing is a rather fine one, considering the capacity of a profounder Soviet and Russian tradition of geopolitical and realist thought. For instance, Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, remarked in an interview that:
Assad has been turned into a bogeyman. But, in reality all of these groundless charges—that he is to blame for everything—are a cover for a big geopolitical game. The geopolitical map of the Middle East is once again being reformatted as different players seek to secure their own geopolitical positions. Many are concerned more about Iran than Syria. They are saying bluntly that Iran should be deprived of its closest ally, which they consider Assad to be. (Vorobyov 2012)
In this interview, Lavrov was claiming that the Syrian crisis beheld more profound (geo) strategical security issues that might not always be so obvious for the majority of the observers. While the West alleges that the al-Assad regime is to blame for the contemporary turmoil in Syria, this assumption seems rather unjustified. It was exactly this quote that got me so curious about the underlying reasoning behind the Russian support for the al-Assad regime in Syria. Another argument that is often quoted, is the Russian naval base situated in Syria’s port at Tartus. Despite the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow has managed to keep its naval base manifested at Tartus, this was accomplished by former Russian Minister of Finance, Aleksei Kudrin. In May 2005, he settled an agreement with former Syrian Minister of Finance, Muhammad al-Hussein that deducted 73 percent of Syria's Soviet-era debt which rose to $13.4 billion largely due to the purchasing of arms31. This deal guaranteed Russia’s base rights at Tartus under the 1971 treaty. In addition to this, it enabled Syria to buy more armaments from
30 Is a scholar specialized in Russian and Eurasian IR and Director of the Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre 31 Moscow Writes off 73% of Syria’s Debt,” Interfax, 25 January 2005.
45 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Russia (Synovitz, 2012). Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that Russia has restricted economic benefits from Syria, as it represented merely 0.1% of Russia’s total trade in 2011 (Juneau, 2014, 47) and although Syria is an significant consumer of Russian armament, accounting 72% of its arms purchase from 2007 to 2011, it only represents 5% of Russia’s total arms deliveries abroad (Dannreuther, 2015, 88). Besides, Syria seems not to be paying for the Russian arms delivery, due to the severe impact the war has on Syria’s economy. And if one should believe media publications it will cost Syria 30 years to recover it economy to prewar standards (Baker, 2014). For that reason, Russian support of Syria on economic grounds could well be rejected. Nevertheless, since the shipment of armaments as well as the return of armaments for restoration go via the port at Tartus, which is perfectly linked with progressive systems of roads and highways, the preservation of this sea port is, thus more importantly for Syria. This is more in line with Samuel Charap’s32 argument, saying that Syria and Russia are mostly dependent on one another regarding support on issues such as, military, military-industrial, intelligence- sharing, arms and a diplomatic shield, i.e. self-interest (Charap, 2013, 35). Thus, according to Charap, Moscow could justify its motivations in keeping Assad in power from a realist’s point of view. In addition, Amy Knight, an American historian of the USSR and Russia, states that Russia could perceive a threat to its national interests as a threat to its structural international position, which causes the upheaval around the port at Tartus to perfectly fit within a realist perspective as well (Knight, 2015). In contradiction to the previous authors, Roy Allison33 argues that Tartus merely represents ‘strategic nostalgia’, since it only households three floating piers of which only one is in actual use, a repair vessel on loan from the Black Sea fleet, warehouses and barracks housing about 50 personnel (Allison, 2013, 807). Besides, the Russian government has been negotiating with Lebanon and reached a deal to shift port calls by Russian naval vessels to Beirut. (Military news agency Interfax-AVN Military news agency, 2013) Although Allison’s argument might be over-exaggerated the naval base’s historically restricted character makes it hard to argue that Putin regards the base to be so immensely crucial that a significant intervention was needed to protect it. Therefore, a more encompassing argument should be provided in explaining Russia’s position in Syria. One that might have to do with the gateway to the Mediterranean Sea that is indeed provided by the Russian naval base at Tartus. Additionally, the Russian Navy considers the Mediterranean gateway to be of immense importance for operations in the Mediterranean and surrounding regions. Particularly for the
32 Samuel Charap is the Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, based in the IISS–Americas office in Washington DC 33 Who is he?
46 Hasar Demnati 6206565 reason that Russia’s operational competences could improve by the base, since vessels based here are able to reach certain Seas and Oceans in only matter of days. Thus, although the eastern parts of the Black Sea’s seashore continues to be under Russia’s regulation, Russian elites endure to consider the states situated in the Eastern Mediterranean as necessary allies34, despite the fact that they are not Russia’s surrounding neighbors. From both a realist perspective as well as from a Russian perspective, this strategic access to the Mediterranean Sea, which is extremely valuable for Russia as a country largely enclosed by land, opens a fast way to the Indian Ocean and Red Sea through the Suez Canal and the Atlantic Ocean through the Straits of Gibraltar and thus it provides extra security to its southern borders. This once more confirms that the only relation that is to be found between Russia and Syria, is that of strategic dependence. On the other hand, the Russian government also finds it extremely important to come across as a reliable ally to its other international political relations35. According to the standards of these kind of credibility, Russia needs to be, at least supportive of Russia-friendly leaders and their associates and oppose any sort of western campaigns to change their regime by force (Allison, 2013, 800-5). With regard to Libya, that ship has sailed. For that reason, Russia needs prove itself again for being a steadfast ally. During a news conference in Copenhagen President Vladimir Putin, then Prime Minister, gave the impression that Russia needs to redeem for its abstention in accordance to UNSC Resolution 1973 and if it was up to him, he would have casted a veto against Resolution 1973 (Barry, 2011). The Russian elites regret the fact that the Medvedev administration abstained on UNSC Resolution 1973, which led to the approval of an intervention in Libya. These regrets emphasize the importance of deeply held values, rather than concrete regional interests, in Russian way of thinking (Charap, 2013, 37). Initially, Russia did not seek to privilege Libyan sovereignty over the need for ‘all necessary measures … to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack’, as it was under the belief that it was purely based on resolving the intensifying humanitarian crisis (Alison, 2013, 797). However, as soon as Russia discovered that humanitarian intervention under the banner of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was a smokescreen for ending the regime of Gaddafi, Putin’s accusation towards the West about the political validity of a leadership was confirmed (Alison, 2013, 797). Since that date, Russia has strongly been opposed to the George
34 Arab Mediterranean countries are situated nearby transportation lines crucial for Russian relations with the southern hemisphere, and they represent an important strategic interest to Moscow. 35 The commercial relationship and Russian Naval Base in Syria have been at stake together with the Russian image of being a steadfast ally seems important internationally for the credibility of Russia’s other political alignments. It is therefore important for Russia to stay loyal to Syria since it has already lost some credibility due to the 2011 situation in Libya.
47 Hasar Demnati 6206565 W. Bush administration’s interpretation of “democracy promotion” and “transformational diplomacy”, whereby it is justified to change a regime by force that does not comply with the Washington approved model of democracy (Lukyanov, 2016, 34). In contradiction to what many Western states claim, namely that Russia is against the need for radical reform in Syria and that Russia is just unconditionally supporting Asad, Putin elaborated himself during an interview on August 2013, saying that a naïve glorification of liberal democracy, supported and promoted by the West, was a key issue of the violence in the region (Dannreuther, 2015, 81)
In my opinion, this is happening because some people from outside believe that if the region were to be bought into compliance with a certain idea—an idea that some call democracy— then peace and stability would ensue. That’s not how it works. You can’t ignore the region’s history, traditions and religious beliefs, and you can’t just interfere (Putin, 2013)
Furthermore, since the start of the military offensive by the US and European countries to change the Gaddafi regime, which was far from what was agreed upon, both Russia and China felt misled. Therefore a similar situation like with Libya was not to happen again under the administration of Putin, as he referred to it as ‘a medieval call to crusade’ (Putin, 2011). Thus, instantly after his re-appointment, in May 2012 Moscow took a stand against UN in accordance to the Syrian upheaval. Both Russia and China stated that their goal was to guard against instability and with the help of each other they casted a veto against a resolution in October 201136, one in February 201237 and again in May 201438. They declared that they just cannot be certain that the intentions of the UN are purely humanitarian (Charap, 2013, 37). Severe suspicion and distrust of intervention by the West has also been an endless subject in post-Soviet Russian strategic philosophy, where interventions by the West, justified on humanitarian bases, into Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 were largely observed in Russia to be an elaborate cover for a calculated strategy of expansionism by NATO (Dannreuther, 1999, 152-3). According to Roland Dannreuther39, suspicions from Russian elite eventually went so far as to the belief that the West was using its ‘soft power’, predominantly through support of
36 A draft UN Resolution calling for a Syrian-led political process and condemned ‘grave and systematic human rights violations’ in Syria. 37 A draft UN Resolution calling for the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to step down. 38 A draft UN Resolution calling for the crisis in Syria to be referred to the international criminal court 39 Is of head of the Department of Politics and International Relations and Professor of International Relations at the University of Westminster and International Fellow at the Department of International Relations at Tbilisi State University in Georgia. His studies revolve around the area of security and IR with a particular focus on Russia, the Middle East and Central Asia.
48 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Western-oriented Non-Governmental Organizations, to foment domestic political opposition and to engineer ‘colored revolutions’ among the former Soviet states (Dannreuther, 2015, 82). Russia constantly fears the threat of stability that successes with the Arab Spring would create, giving the West more opportunities to participate in regime change through the justification of ‘humanitarian intervention’ led by the UN. Especially, since a national dissatisfaction and open hostility to the leading regime rose in 2011 and 2012, and blew out right to the heart of Moscow as large opposition demonstrations complained about the corruption and autocracy of Russia’s political structure (Ibidem). Safeguarding against such intervention was, for that reason, a crucial objective of Russian policy-making which resulted in Russia’s opposition to external military intervention in the Syrian situation and above all the casting of vetoes to all draft UN Resolutions as it claimed that they were just an elaborate smokescreen for regime change by force. As a countermeasure Russia equipped Syria with a diplomatic shield, arms, financial aid, and air forces. Yet, arguments for Russia’s course of actions vary from an act out of justice to prevent the Assad’s regime from being toppled, since this would be against international law, to a way for Russia to re-assure its place on the world stage, as doing nothing would mean another battle lost for Russia against the West. Georgy Mirsky, Professor at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics argued that, since Putin has been supporting the al-Assad regime for quite a while, letting him be toppled at this point would mean that Putin is withdrawing under US force, which is something Putin would not allow to happen (N.S., 2015). This is in line whit what Ronald Dannreuther argues, namely that there was an intentional implementation of self-control in Russia, which was to restrict Russia’s fulfillment and sense of schadenfreude that the approach of the Western world was not successful in realizing its main strategic goals. On the contrary, their goal to topple the al–Assad regime actually caused the regime to gain in power and attain a few military successes in 2014 (Dannreuther, 2015, 79). On the other hand Sergey Karaganov40 argued that it was to put a halt to Western expansionism with an “iron fist” (S. Karaganov, 2011). More controversial to the abovementioned arguments is Andrej Kreutz argument, stating that Russia needs to have a healthy relations with the centers of the Islamic World, since it inhabits Europe‘s largest Muslim population41. Besides, the Russian government and Russian
40 Sergey Karaganov is a Russian political scientist who leads the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, a security analytical institution founded by Vitaly Shlykov. Karaganov was a close associate of Yevgeny Primakov, and has been Presidential Advisor to both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. 41 According to the Pew Research Center report ―On Mapping the Global Muslim Population‖, as of 8 October 2009, Russia had 16,482,600 Muslim inhabitants, which represented 11.7% of its total population. However, the
49 Hasar Demnati 6206565 analysts considered the Arab Spring to be an enhancement and affirmation of Islamist extremism which was considered to undermine stability within the Middle East as well as (potentially) Russia (Dannreuther, 2015, 78). Therefore, the next section is dedicated solely on, what I consider to be one of Russia´s biggest security threats, extremist Sunni Islam.
real figures are difficult to establish. One needs to distinguish between practicing and cultural traditional Muslims, the latter number probably being much higher. As the peoples of the former USSR had been submitted to a long- lasting anti-religious campaign, the religious attachments often survived as a part of social traditions and popular culture.
50 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Russia’s biggest Security threat As shown in the previous sections, from the start of the Syrian crisis, in 2011 various media sources have persistently produced information on Russian arms sales to Syria, Russia’s desire to obstruct Western intervention in Syria, its naval facility at Tartus and Russia’s access to the Mediterranean Sea. A more noteworthy and plausible argument that is often less highlighted, and by way of which the security dilemma in realism could explain Russia’s course of actions with regard to Syria has been the concerns Russia has about the replacement of secular leaders in Syria (and other Arab states) by Sunni Islamist governments from the moment the Arab Spring began. To elaborate on this, Russia is worried that the complete breakdown of Syria would mean the termination of a decades-old cooperation and jeopardize Russia’s strategic position in the rest of the Middle East. Besides, the Syrian crisis has expanded the capacities of Islamist terror organizations, which implies that Islamic insurgents do not solely pose a threat to the al- Assad regime, but a potential threat to Russia as well and could therefore be perceived as a risk to Russia’s structural position. As illustrated by the map in the image below, image 3.1, Russia is directly surrounded by regions, such as the South Caucasus and Central Asia, where a threat of Sunni Islamists cannot be excluded.
Image 3.1. Russia and its neighbors
Figure 1. Russia and its neighbors. Reprinted from “Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are fighting for Isil?”, by A. Kirk, 2016, The Telegraph, Copyright 2016 by The Telegraph.
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From a Russian point of view, Russia has been part of a nearly constant battle against Islamist extremism ever since the late 1970s, which ranges from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, to the Islamist civil war in Tajikistan, and to the revolution in Chechnya in the North Caucasus, which in the late 1900s remarkably changed from being a primarily chauvinist separatist to a more fundamental Islamist battle (Dannreuther, 2015, 81). In addition to this, by early 2000, the Islamization of the Chechen revolution found a way to further transform into a more widespread Islamist revolution in the entire North Caucasus, which endures to threaten the stability of the North Caucasus region, first and foremost considering that Russia has already fought two civil wars and endures to fight the so-called Caucasus Emirate (Charap, 2013, 35-36). The escalation in Islamic extremism has, however not been restricted to the Caucasus Emirate. In the first decade of the 21st century, the formerly reasonably peaceful Volga Region, which is the industrial and political heartland of the Russian Federation, along with some other regions that inhabit large Muslim population experienced an increase in Islamists movements. In July 2012 extremists seriously wounded a prominent mufti of Tatarstan, Ildus Faizov, in a car bomb attack and on the exact same day his deputy the Muslim cleric of Tatarstan, Valiulla Yakupov, was shot and killed (Malashenko, 2013, 18). These attacks were similar to others attacks executed by extremists in the Caucasus, which caused this revolutionary period to be characterized by the visible increase of radical point of views, attacks, and radical organizations as well as study circles became vigorous. Soon the term “Caucasization of Tatarstan” arose to define the changes in the largest Muslim republic of the Volga basin and Urals region (Malashenko, 2015, 142). The March 2010 bombing attack in Moscow‘s metro, along with the abovementioned developments once more drew the attention of the world to the fact that Russia is still presently threatened by extensive terrorist threats and separatist movements in Northern Caucasus (Kreutz, 2010, 5). One must not forget that Russia households Europe’s largest Muslim populations which contains of over 20 million Russian Muslims, the majority of whom are Sunni and live in the North Caucasus (Charap, 2013, 35-36). For that reason, a security dilemma is generated, wherein Russia has valid motives for fearing the rise of Islamic extremism, even as engaging in activity against potential foes exposes it to greater security threats. Furthermore, the Russian government definitely considers Islamist extremist organizations, such as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and Ahrar al-Sham, which are the largest organizations and are all located in Syria, to be a threat to Russia’s national security. For the
52 Hasar Demnati 6206565 most part, this is due to the fact that hundreds of volunteers from the North Caucasus have joined and are still joining the positions of one of these organizations (Baev, 2015, 13). Besides, as shown by table 3.2, ISIS fighters from abroad, Russians are the fourth largest group of foreign volunteers that travelled to Syria to fight, many of whom joined extremist groups such as ISIS, whereas others formed their own groups that fought side-by-side with ISIS (Barrett, 2014, 16). These volunteers might cause security problems if they return to Russia, as Islamist organizations could destabilize Russia’s North Caucasus region (Barrett, 2014, 27-28). Notably since the spokesman of ISIS, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, made a territorial claim on the Southern of Russia, declaring it to be a ‘province’ of the emirate (Oliphant, 2015). According to realists approaches the actions of states, principally super powers, in IR could be generally understood regarding a logic of competitive behavior intended to increase the power and/or security of a state (Jackson, 2003, 1-2). To a certain extent it is thus logical that Putin worries about the possibility of the loss of the North Caucasus to ISIS, since he argued in an interview, in 2000 that ‘Russia as a state in its current form would cease to exist’ if that was to happen. In a series of interviews in 2000 Putin claimed that “the essence of the ... situation in the North Caucasus and in Chechnya ... is the continuation of the collapse of the USSR.... If we did not quickly do something to stop it, Russia as a state in its current form would cease to exist” (Hill, 2013). These kind of announcements strengthen the argument that for Russia a security dilemma is generated, as Putin implies the Russian government considers its security and hence its structural position is threatened by Islamist extremist groups.
53 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Figure 3.2. ISIS fighters from abroad
Figure 2. ISIS fighters from abroad. Reprinted from “Foreign Fighters in Syria,” by R. Barrett, 2014, The Soufan Group, p. 13. Copyright 2014 by The Soufan Group.
In addition to local security threats, Putin also justified Russia’s invasion in Syria as a battle against global terrorism, signaling that Islamist extremists who are fighting alongside with ISIS could come back home and execute terrorist attacks. Accordingly, the Russian government has implemented a law in November 2013 that forbids participation in an armed group in a foreign country opposing to Russian policy (Barrett, 2014, 27). Be that as it may, it seems far more plausible that Russia’s own contribution to the Syrian conflict will stimulate, instead of restrain, such threats (Knight, 2015). However, these kind of laws do not act as a restrain and instead purely complicate joint legal support between States (Barrett, 2014, 27). However, measures need to be taken to decrease the number of so-called ‘jihadist’ leaving and returning to Russia. Also, as discussed earlier Russia counts a large population of Sunni Muslims, and many millions more live in the former Soviet republics that surround Russia; and although Russia has a long history of rebellious and extremists attacks, up to this day, fortunately no incidents are connected to the Syrian conflict, or ISIS in general (Knight, 2015). Nonetheless, as have been argued Russia’s incursions on Sunni Islamist extremist in Syria might effect a radicalization and counterattack mainly from the Muslims that live in the North Caucasus (Knight, 2015). For the most part, since Russian analyzes are starting to perceive a serious threat from the old secular Arab nationalist structure, they claim that the moderate political Islam, like the Muslim
54 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Brotherhood are struggling with Sunni extremists organizations, like ISIS, al-Quada, and their associates. Dannreuther argues that this perceptions of a dichotomized civil war in Syria is profoundly entrenched in Russian thinking, saying that Russia’s philosophy is founded on Russia’s own experiences of dealing with the Muslim world (Dannreuther, 2010, 9). The Russian elites had emphasized the threat of a rise of Islamist extremist and used this threat to legitimize Russian intervention. Lavrov has characterized ISIS as Russia’s most important threat (Kozhanov, 2015). This is confirmed in several statements of the Russian president, Putin including one in which he stated that by the intervening in Syria he was acting out of precautions, fighting and destroying terrorists and militants in Syria before they come back home to Russia (BBC News, 2015). Since the expansion of Islamist extremists could lead to turmoil, more security threats and possible separatism within Russia itself, they need to be eliminated directly by the Russian government. Therefore, Putin’s concerns in the case of Syria do not only comply with the security dilemma, as it also involves another dilemma referred to, by Brian L. Job42 as the ‘insecurity dilemma’. Hence, in addition to the concerns of the Russian government about the increasing involvement of Islamist extremists, such as ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Quada, and Ahrar al- Sham, Russia is likewise concerned about Russian fighters for these organizations returning home and causing turmoil and a rise of extremist movements on Russian soil, such as in Chechnya, and the Volga and Urals region, where the biggest Muslim populations live. For that reason, the ‘insecurity dilemma’, seems appropriate as well. Opposed to the security dilemma, where states are exposed to the threat of the international anarchic order and thus have to protect themselves from what might occur outside their borders, the ‘insecurity dilemma’ perceives the surrounding areas as the basis of security instead of threats. Job argues that the insecurity dilemma is capable of capturing the security dilemma of Russia, since its state weakness and insecurity have led the Russian leaders to try to find external support to improve their own position. State weakness refers to the divided Russian regions and the various internal conflicts as a result of this strong division and insecurity in Russia. The state weakness and insecurity led the Russian elites to search for external support to enhance their own position (Fumagalli, 2011, 193-4). Russia’s increased involvement in the Arab Middle East, in particular Putin’s support for the Syrian Al-Assad regime, consequently of the augmented security threat from Islamist extremists appears, thus, to be a good example of Job’s insecurity dilemma. In the
42 Brian L. Job (PhD, Indiana University) is a Political Scientist and a resident Faculty Associate of the Liu Institute who wrote the book The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States.
55 Hasar Demnati 6206565 sense that, the battle against terrorism created a favorable circumstance for making a discursive connection between national upheaval and the international threat of terrorism (Ibidem). For all the above reasons, relations with Arab Middle Eastern leaders (states) might even be more important for Moscow than they might be for the U.S.A. and other Western powers. This makes the expansion and cultivation of these Middle Eastern relations more essential for Russia. Moreover, Moscow identifies itself as a possible negotiator between the Muslim Arab states and the West considering the history of cooperation Russia shares with the Islamic world, since the Soviet era and its own large Muslim population (Oliker, K. Crane, & Yusupo, 2009). Cooperation with the Islamic World might be useful in the battle against anti-Russian extremism and Caucasian separatism (Kreutz, 2010, 5).
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Conclusion In this thesis I have focused on explaining Russia’s behavior and the way its relationship with the West has changed over the past several years. Rather than trying to understand Putin’s course of actions with regard to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis from an empirical perspective alone, this thesis tried to do so by applying and testing several theoretical approaches. That is, it analyzed to what extent theories in the discipline of IR can explain Russia’s course of actions in the past five years with respect to Ukraine and Syria. The focus was put, in particular, on the contemporary situation concerning the west – the US, EU, and NATO - and Russia, which led to the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis. I argued that the situation between these parties is fed and maintained by a past of endemic and shared distrust, and was therefore an exemplary case of the security dilemma within theoretical frameworks: realism. This, however, does not mean that other theories might not be able to provide an explanation for Russia’s course of action with regard to Ukraine and Syria. That is why this thesis also briefly analyzed alternative theories, such as liberalism and constructivism, to discover to what extent these theories will be able to explain Russia’s behavior in the past five years, even though they are not at the heart of my theory. But, as with any explanation, choices need to be made and for that reason, one should be aware of the fact that such an undertaking could mean that some arguments were not included in the outline of this thesis, which is logical since some theories consider some factors substantially less important to prove their point. The point that this thesis wanted to prove was that while liberalism failed to analyze how world leaders handle possible future issues of uncertainty and fear, as leaders do not have the capacity to read the minds of other leaders, the security dilemma was indeed able to demonstrate the value of an explanatory theoretical framework: realism Nevertheless, liberalism is one of the traditional disciplines within IR that has been a guide to how both Russian and Western policymakers sought to structure their relationship after the Cold War. But due to the ever changing world, state leaders were obliged to change their track in order to compete within the globalizing world, the new balance of power and the global security threats, as is the case with Russia’s leaders, including President Vladimir Putin. Although Yeltsin started off embracing the Western world order and liberalism, his successor Putin saw the need to change to a more realist approach when he became the second president of the Russian Federation in 2000. The globalizing world unfortunately did not only create positive changes, as it also made terrorism a global issue. And although Russia was willing to fight terrorism with the West after 9/11 Putin was not going to allow the West to promote
57 Hasar Demnati 6206565 their democratic standards to the rest of the world, especially not in countries that are of vital importance to Russia’s sphere of influence and national security. What seems to vex Putin, is that Western leaders appear to believe that they possess such a successful formula for securing human rights and liberal democracy that they fail to see that this formula is not a one-size fits all approach. During a visit to the Middle East in 2007, Putin expressed his fairly realist approach and rightly argued that if a political system is not within the nature of a nation, and thus is imposed by external world leaders this could likely lead to disastrous consequences. Putin’s realpolitik approach was applauded by leaders of the Arab Middle East.
From the point of view of stability in this, or that region, or in the world in general, the balance of power is the main achievement of these past decades and indeed of the whole history of humanity. It is one of the most important conditions for maintaining global stability and security […] I do not understand why some of our partners (Europe and the U.S.).. see themselves as cleverer and more civilized and think that they have the right to impose their standards on others. The thing to remember is that standards that are imposed from the outside, including in the Middle East, rather than being a product of a society’s natural internal development, lead to tragic consequences, and the best example of this is Iraq (Cohen, 2007).
Nevertheless, I strongly believe that Western world leaders have also come to realize that imposing their liberal standards has not always been as fruitful as they would have want it to be. However, this did not lead to a change of track for the West as it did for Russia. Russia gradually turned into an aggressive and assertive great power that was dedicated to securing its national interests and security. Thus, when Western involvement further increased in former Soviet-controlled Europe reaching Ukraine, knowing the country expressed its vested interest in EU and consequently NATO membership Russia reacted in a way that went down in history as a ‘Hitler-style’ land grab. But before the West had time to recover from this unpleasant, unexpected and humiliating Russian response to a generated security dilemma, another security dilemma was lurking on Russia’s southern periphery. The growing influence of Islamist extremist organizations, such as ISIS and Al-Quada in Arab Middle Eastern states, resulting into the Arab springs was progressively approaching the Russian borders. After the North Caucasus had been declared a province of the caliphate of ISIS and Islamist extremist activities had increased resulting in some terrorist attacks on anti-
58 Hasar Demnati 6206565 extremist muftis, the security threat had to be taken seriously. According to Job there is a need to reconsider the conventional realist notions of states. Regardless of the rise of studies on Russian security issues, for the most part concerning the period of Vladimir Putin, security remains to be mostly incorporated within the wide-ranging literature on Russian foreign policy. (Kuhrt, 2014, 130). Consequently, these studies are designed to analyze external rather than internal security issues. However, in Russia’s case it is vital to deal with both internal and external security issues that it is experiencing, this approach is referred to as the “insecurity dilemma”. The fact that Russia is a weak and instable state causes Russia to seek support from outside its periphery to overcome both internal and external security threats from Islamist extremist (organizations). Regardless of Putin’s weak hand, he has been remarkably successful at vexing Western projects on former Soviet-controlled Europe and the Arab Middle East. He managed to end further eastward expansion by NATO and together with China Russia has been successful in interfering with the realization of a UNSC Resolution that would allow interference in Syria on ground of humanitarian support. Putin was able to dismember Georgia, annex Crimea and tightened his hold on other East Ukrainian regions. According to Western scholars, pundits and politicians, Putin seems to be sentencing Russia to a bleak future of poverty and exclusion (Mead, 2014, 76-7). However, the Crimean adventure has made it evident that Russia does not put its priorities in economic improvement and its incorporation into the global economy if its national interests and security are at stake. Putin considers Russia’s influence in the Arab Middle Eastern regions as a vital advantage in Russia’s competitiveness with the US. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Putin will automatically contradict U.S. objectives every time, but it does mean that Putin will try his best not to allow Western leaders, led by the US to propagate their Washington approved liberal democratic standards all over the world and force regime change under the banner of humanitarian aid. With Russia increasingly aligning itself with Arab Middle Eastern and Asian countries rather than the West, it might be possible that conflict in the European region increase. However, it is still too early to predict Russia’s future course of actions with regard to both the Ukrainian and Syrian crisis, as they are still ongoing at time of writing this thesis. Nevertheless, it is more than evident that Putin believes that Russia ought to protect its own interests and be flexible in the search of this goal. For the Russian president, this seems to be a rational conclusion, considering that it is a country largely enclosed by land with rich deposits of mineral resources, and surrounded by Western allies which could pose a security threats for Russia. In addition, Russia is threatened by growing separatism and the struggles with
59 Hasar Demnati 6206565 Chechnya, which are as reported by Russia provoked by the extremists that stood behind 9/11 as well. It should not come as a surprise that Putin therefore wishes to maintain and if not increase Russian-Syrian relations in order to preserve positive aspects of the former Russia- Middle Eastern relation. Moreover, Russian leaders want to verify Russia’s reputation as an approachable country toward Islam and its people (Dannreuther, 2010, 17). Nevertheless, Putin seems to know his limits in supporting Syria and opposing the West in its projects, as he does not want to completely undermine the possibility of cooperation with Washington and other western countries, which he sees as still being important power players. To conclude, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support to Syria as a reaction to the course of events of the past five years is more than logical from a realist perspective. Many realism theorists, including Mearsheimer and Götz argue that any state leader who might be experiencing a possible security threat is willing to go to extremes to guarantee the security of his nation. When Putin annexed Crimea to secure his nation’s periphery, this should not have come across as something unusual, or remarkable, as states have been doing this for centuries. As for Russia’s support for the upheavals in Syria, Putin not only seems to fear the expansion of ISIS into Russia, but he also seems to fear the threat of stability that successes with the Arab Spring would create. This would give Western leaders more opportunities to impose regime changes justified by the means of ‘humanitarian intervention’. Russian elites fear that their nation might be the next in line, especially since a national dissatisfaction and open hostility to the leading regime rose in 2011 and 2012. However, with the casting of vetoes by Russia and China to draft UN Resolutions concerning intervention in Syria, Western leaders hopefully have come to realize that liberal democracy is not the Holy Grail and imposing it randomly on any non-western nation is a recipe for failure. In general though, since many current great world leaders (including Russia and the US) already pursue a liberal world order in theory, but in practice they seem to be pursuing the state’s national and private interests, they should continue to walk this road. A mix of realpolitik and liberal internationalism might not be bad after all.
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Figures Figure 1. Russia and its neighbors. Reprinted from “Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are fighting for Isil?”, by A. Kirk, 2016, The Telegraph, Copyright 2016 by The Telegraph. Figure 2. ISIS fighters from abroad. Reprinted from “Foreign Fighters in Syria,” by R. Barrett, 2014, The Soufan Group, p. 13. Copyright 2014 by The Soufan Group
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