The Vice President in the U.S. Senate: Examining the Consequences of Institutional Design. Michael S. Lynch Tony Madonna Asssistant Professor Assistant Professor University of Kansas University of Georgia
[email protected] [email protected] January 25, 2010∗ ∗The authors would like to thank Scott H. Ainsworth, Stanley Bach, Ryan Bakker, Sarah A. Binder, Jamie L. Carson, Michael H. Crespin, Keith L. Dougherty, Trey Hood, Andrew Martin, Ryan J. Owens and Steven S. Smith for comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript. Madonna also thanks the University of Georgia American Political Development working group for support and comments, and Rachel Snyder for helpful research assistance. All errors remain the authors. Abstract The constitutional designation of the vice president as the president of the United States Senate is a unique feature of the chamber. It places control over the Senate's rules and precedents under an individual who is not elected by the chamber and receives no direct benefits from the maintenance of its institutions. We argue that this feature of the Senate has played an important, recurring role in its development. The vice president has frequently acted in a manner that conflicted with the wishes chamber majorities. Consequently, the Senate has developed rules and precedents that insulate the chamber from its presiding officer. These actions have made the Senate a less efficient chamber, but have largely freed it from the potential influence of the executive branch. We examine these arguments using a mix of historical and contemporary case studies, as well as empirical data on contentious rulings on questions of order.