Visage, Figure: Reading Levinas's Author(s): Jill Robbins Source: Yale French Studies, No. 79, Literature and the Ethical Question (1991), pp. 135-149 Published by: Yale University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2930249 Accessed: 29-09-2015 09:34 UTC

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This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS

Visage,Figure: Reading Levinas's Totalityand Infinity*

What would it mean to facewhat Derridahas called "the ofethics"? That is to say,to confrontthe veryopening of the question of ethics-the groundsof both its possibilityand impossibility-priorto the production and elaboration of all moral rules or precepts?According to ,the face of the [le visage dAutrui]is the verysite and privi- legedfigure for such an opening.In theface-to-face encounter, responsibility in its most originalform of response, or language-response, arises. The pages thatfollow will considerboth the specificityof the ethical and the specific othernessthat Levinas identifiesin the face-to-face. Yetif the face is theprivileged figure for the opening of the question of the ethical,the question of the textual status of the face remain to be asked. Can therebe a figurefor the ethical? a figurefor the face?The veryquestion is problematicin that rhetoric,as a (derivative)science of figures,is incom- mensurablewith the more originarylevel of Levinas's description.Could

*Abbreviations TI EmmanuelLevinas, Totality and Infinity,trans. (Pittsburgh: DuquesneUniversity Press, 1969, 1979). Totalit6 et infini (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1961 ). FC EmmanuelLevinas, "Freedom and Command,"in CollectedPhilosophical Pa- pers,trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). "Libert6 et commandement,"Revue de metaphysiqueet de morale58 (1953). DL EmmanuelLevinas, Difficilelibert&: essais surle judaisme (Paris: Albin Michel, 1963,2d ed. 1967,1974). EI MauriceBlanchot, "L'Entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969). I wouldlike to thank Rebecca Conway for her helpful comments on an earlier version ofthis essay.

YFS 79, Literatureand theEthical Question, ed. ClaireNouvet, ? 1991by Yale University. 135

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 136 Yale French Studies the openingof the question of the ethical be markedwith a certainfigur- ality?And supposingthat one can speak about an alteritythat is rhetorical or textual,can the alterityof the otherand textualalterity be evenaddressed in one breath?Here again, the question of ethics and the question of lan- guage come into theirclosest possible proximity.

THE FIGURE OF THE FACE "The alterityof the other,"writes Levinas in his 1961 Totalityand Infinity, "is not 'other'like thebread I eat,the land in whichI dwell,like, sometimes, myselffor myself" (TI, 33). A relationto this latter,finite alterity charac- terizeswhat Levinas calls the workof identification,that is, my abilityto absorbotherness "into my identity as thinkeror possessor" (TI, 33). (He also calls it the economyof the Same, and it refersto thehabitual exchanges that make up the self'sconcrete relationship with the world.)But the alterityof the otheris infinite.Encountered neither as a phenomenonnor as a being (somethingto be masteredor possessed), the other is encounteredas a face.It is in the encounterwith the face of the other[le visage d'Autrui]that the other'sinfinite alterity is revealed. The firstreference to the face in Totalityand Infinityreads as follows: Forthe presence before the face, my orientation toward the Other can lose the avidityof the gaze onlyby turninginto generosity, incapable of ap- proachingthe otherwith emptyhands. This relationship,established overthe thingshereafter possibly common, that is, susceptibleof being said, is the relationshipof discourse[discours]. The wayin which the otherpresents himself, exceeding the idea of the otherin me, we here nameface [nous 1appelons, en effet,visage]. [TI, 50] Levinas "names" the facehere accordingto the formalstructure of infinity as he has previouslydescribed it, "an ideatum that surpassesits idea" (TI, 49),a thoughtthat thinks more than it can contain.1But althoughhe names theface here, he will also insistthat the primordial relationship to theface is not one of naming: "Autruiis not only named, but invoked.To put it in grammaticalterms, the otherdoes not appearin the nominative,but in the vocative" (DL, 21), or as he also says, "in the dative." These grammaticalterms, which are only provisionaland which will later be abandoned, do indeed seem to illuminate the-passageabove, in

1. TheCartesian idea of infinity is a guidingnotion of Levinas's work and one of the privilegedmoments in his history of . The first reference tothe face in Totality andInfinity, cited above, introduces itas "a deformalizationorthe concretization ofthe ideaof infinity."

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS 137 particularthe transformationthat vision undergoesin the encounterwith the face. Forin "the presencebefore a face,"the avariciousgaze turnsinto generosity["l'avidite du regardse muant en generosite"]and language ["discours"].The (ethical) necessity for this transformationstems from Levinas's assertionsthat vision is a violentway of relatingto the other.It "immobilizesits object as its theme."As a formof adequation (TI, 34), it is unable to respectwhat is infinitelyother. It seeks to absorbthat alterity, to drawit into the play ofthe Same. In this way,vision is just one instanceof theself's habitual economy,an economythat always fails to do justiceto the other.Other possibilities within this habitual economyinclude represent- ing the other,recognizing him, knowinghim, understandinghim, or any formof the theoreticalrelation. All would be unjust,for they would attempt to appropriatethe other,to reducehim to the (self-)Same. That is why,in the passage above, vision, a relationshipof adequation, turnsinto generosityand a certainkind of language,relationships of non- adequation. This transformationthat the gaze undergoesis, precisely,eth- ical in the sense thatLevinas gives it: "we name thiscalling into question of my spontaneityby the presenceof the otherethics" (TI, 43). Thus the (eth- ical) encounterwith the otherinterrupts the self'shabitual economy and its tendencyto conceive of the world as a space of possibilities and power [pouvoir].2It interruptsthe play of the Same. And let us also notein passing: the ethical transferis a figuraltransfer as well. The turnfrom vision to generosityand language,and ultimately,to voice,resembles a synesthesia,a crossing of sensoryattributes. Moreover the verb se muer, "to turn,to moult,to metamorphose,"implies a break,within the figuralturn, in phe- nomenality.We will come back to thesereflections. For now, suffice it to say thatin Levinas's account,the primordialrelationship to the otherthat one facesis "discourse."The nontotalizingrelationship to theface of the other is accomplished"in a discourse,in a conversation[entre-tien] which proposes the world.This propositionis held between(se tienentre) two pointswhich do not constitutea system,a cosmos,a totality"[TI, 96]. Thus, discourseis a relationshipwith the otherthat maintainsthe distanceof infinitesepara- tion "yet without this distance destroyingthis relationand withoutthis relation destroyingthis distance: (TI, 41). And thus, as Alphonso Lingis

2. ThroughoutTotality and Infinity,Levinas plays on pouvoir'sinterchangeable sensesof possibility and power, as partof an ongoingpolemic with Heidegger's description ofthe world as a spaceof possibilities for Dasein. This readingis problematicinsofar as it seemsto confusepossibility, an Existential,with power (a relationbetween already con- stitutedentities). By contrast, Levinas's use ofthe term, "spontaneity" is notontic and not at all psychological:it is partof his readingof the Heideggerian"being-in" as joyous possessionof the world which ignores the other. See thereading of Levinas and Heidegger byJacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics,"in Writingand Difference,trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:University of ChicagoPress, 1978), 134ff. Henceforth cited in the text.

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 138 Yale French Studies comments: "To face someone is both to perceivehim and to answer to him."3One facesthe otheras interlocutor.One facesthe otherin language. Yet let us not take forgranted that we know what we mean here by language. For the parole that ensues in response to the face of the other cannot be understoodaccording to hermeneuticmodels of "conversation" or "dialogue."It is a founding"conversation," a discoursebefore discourse, which is, Levinas says,"established over the thingshereafter possibly com- mon, thatis, susceptibleof being said." A conversationrigorously without communality,it makes lieux communs possible. Rather than being a searchingtogether for consensus, it is what makes possible the difference between consensus and disagreement. Nor is thisto be mistakenfor any form of communication. It is "prior"to language understoodas an exchange of signs. The face signifiesin a dis- tinctivemanner which Levinas calls expressionkath' auto, ["accordingto itself"],or thatwhich signifiesonly relative to itself.Expression is the way in which the face,which is not reducibleto my vision,exceeds and breaks out ofthe phenomenon.It breaksthrough what Levinas calls the form,the plastic image with its look: This wayfor a beingto breakthrough its form, which is itsapparition, is, concretely,its look,its aim.There is notfirst a breakthrough,and thena look; to breakthrough one's form is preciselyto look; theeyes are abso- lutelynaked. A facehas a meaningnot byvirtue of the relationships in whichit is found,but out ofitself; that is whatexpression is. [FC,20] The lifeof expression consists of undoing the form in whichthe existent, exposingitself as a theme,in this way dissimulatesitself. The face speaks. The manifestationof the face is alreadydiscourse. [Le visage parle. La manifestationdu visageest deja discours.](TI, 66] Wewill not enterinto the extent to whichLevinas's discussion of expression kath' auto, "over and above the disclosure and dissimulationproper to forms,"is partof a polemic againstHusserl and Heidegger.What concerns us hereis, firstof all, that"my" gaze undergoesnot just a transformationin the encounterwith the face, but also a reversal.The face,which is notreducible to my vision of it, looks back. It talks back [le visage parle]. To see a face means thatthe facelooks and talks back. (This reversalwas alreadyimplied in the wordvisage. Visage- fromthe Latin visum, "a thingseen"-is not just a thingseen or intended.It is also that which intendsme, as Levinas etiologizesit: "Regarderun regard,c'est regarderce qui ne s'abandonnepas, ne se livre pas, mais qui vous vise: c'est regarderle visage," DL, 21.) Sec-

3. AlphonsoLingis, Translator's Introduction to Emmanuel Levinas, Collected Philo- sophicalPapers, op. cit.,xxx. Henceforth cited in thetext.

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS 139 ondly,in the transformationplus reversalthat constitutes the (ethical)en- counterwith the face, it is notjust thatmy look becomes discourseand that I facethe face in language,but also, theface, which breaksthrough its form, looks back at me, and speaks. As Alphonso Lingis also remarks:"the face faces in language" (Linguis,xxx). To encountera face is to encountera speakingface. As Levinas writesabove, "the face speaks" [le visage parle]. Derrida has remarkedin "Violence and Metaphysics"that it may be "tempting"to considerthis discourseon the face a prosopopeia( Derrida: Violence and Metaphysics,101). It is temptingparticularly for literary crit- ics, because when Levinasgives the face as voice here,he in a sense de-faces it,gives it a figure.At timesit is as iffiguration performs the desired (ethical) breakin phenomenality,the turnaway from the optical.Yet while this,like the earliertransformation or ethico-figuraltransfer ["l'avidite du regardse muant en generosite"]seems tropological,prosopopoeia or any otherrhe- toricalterm is simplyinapplicable here, again because of the level of Levi- nas's description,which is writtenboth within and againstthe traditionof Husserlian phenomenologyand Heideggerianontology, and because, in short,of the founding status of the encounterdescribed. Perhaps one would want to speak ofthe tensionbetween the figuraltransfers operating within the sequential narrativeof Levinas's descriptionand the anteriorityof the foundingexperience that is described.In the passage above we read: "The face speaks. The manifestationof the faceis already discourse."While the sequential narrativeproceeds forward, the (quasi-transcendental)descrip- tionproceeds backwards. The "already"here belongs to an immemorialpast that is accessible to no present. The face,as Derridaremarks, is givenas "theoriginal unity of glance and speech" (Derrida: Violence, 100). At stake in Levinas's discussion of ex- pression(which seems verymuch grounded in theexperience of actual faces) is the way in which, in contradistinctionto othermodes of signification, facial expressionssignify only themselves.They do not referto something other,even to states of mind or feeling.4Their autosignificationis priorto language conceived as a system of signs or as knowledgethat could be available to a consciousness.It is a primordialspeaking that is an invitation to speak. Levinas writes: For expressiondoes not consistin presentingto a contemplativecon- sciousnessa signwhich that consciousness interprets by going back to whatis signified.What is expressedis notjust a thoughtwhich animates

4. Compare,in thiscontext, Augustine's account of how the face signifies in Confes- sions 4:8. Thereis coincidencebetween "the movementof the heart"and "the signs revealedin theface," and thus these signs have, in effect,a necessary rather than arbitrary link to theirreferent.

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 140 Yale French Studies theother; it is also theother present in thatthought. Expression renders presentwhat is communicatedand theone whois communicating;they are bothin the expression.But thatdoes not mean thatexpression pro- videsus withknowledge about the other. The expressiondoes not speak aboutsomeone, is not informationabout a coexistence,does not invoke an attitudein additionto knowledge;expression invites one to speakto someone.The mostdirect attitude before a beingkath' auto is not the knowledgeone can have abouthim, but is social commercewith him. [FC 20-21] Derridaand Blanchothave bothpointed out the phonocentricmoments of Levinas's descriptionand thus its complicitywith what Derrida has called the metaphysicsof presence. Such turnsof phrase as "expression renderspresent what is communicatedand theone who is communicating," or as we can read elsewhere in his work,that expressionmeans "being behind the sign,"or that "he who manifestshimself comes, accordingto Plato's expression,to his own assistance" (TI, 66),all seem partof a privileg- ingof oral discourseas "plenitude"(TI, 96),as a presenceto oneself(Derrida: Violence,101-02). As Blanchotremarks, it is at just thesemoments that the discourse,the entretienthat Levinas describes"becomes a tranquilhuman- istic speakingagain" (EI, 81). This is largelya resultof the privileging of oral discoursein Levinas. (ForLevinas rarely uses theword "man." The visage,as we recall,is definedas the wayin which the otherpresents himself, exceed- ingthe idea ofthe otherin me. The visageis man in his infinitealterity, man insofaras he is infinitelyother. Visage is not a descriptionadded on to the conception of "man"; it is priorto it.) But that the Levinasian entretien would revertto a humanisticconversation is also due to a faultof the lan- guage ("our" language),which is weightedtowards the hermeneuticaland the dialectical. (We mightrecall again, that the face's speaking,which be- longs to the "already,"does not take place in thepresent and is accessible to no present.) Thus let us not forgetthe radicalityof the Levinasian entretien,of the languagerelation with the other,especially as Blanchothas elaboratedit in L'Entretieninfini. In thisencounter, the asymmetrybetween discussants is absolute.The otheris describedalternately by Levinas as theMost-High and the weak one. At times he seems the overlord,and at times the utterly helpless and destitute.He is, as we shall see, theone who commandsme and the one to whom I am infinitelyobligated. Thus, despitethe seemingsym- metryof the exchangeof glances and speech,despite the formalsymmetry of the phrases "face-to-face,"and despite,in Blanchot'sphrase, "l'affronte- mentde deux figures"that it invariablysuggests, the face-to-face encounter has nothingsymmetrical about it. Blanchot comments: "I neverface the one who faces me. My mannerof facingthe one who faces me is not an equal

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS 141 confrontationof presences. The inequalityis irreducible"(EI, 89). And this is why at the close of Totalityand Infinity,Levinas offersa formulationto describe the relation to the other that both Blanchot and Derrida have pickedup on, namely,"the curvature of intersubjective space whichinflects distance into elevation,"or simply,"the curvatureof space" (TI, 291). The speakingrelation to the otherin the face-to-faceis not,then, "l'af- frontementde deux figures";it is, as Blanchotcomments further, "the ac- cess to man in his strangenessby speech" (EI, 89). How can such a speaking maintain "the strangenessof this strangeness"and not "repatriateit"? (EI, 97). As in the Levinas passage cited earlier,this will be a kind of speaking that is not a knowledgeabout or speaking about the other,but rathera speakingto him, an invocation.And a questionthat surely haunts much of Levinas criticism,and thathas been treatedby both Lyotard and Derrida,is, how to speak about this invocationof the otherwithout neutralizing the relation,transforming it into a formof knowledge?How to speak about Levinas's discourse without renderingits performativedimension con- stative,assimilating it to the denotativelanguage of the same? How,for that matter,to speak to the otherwithout comprehension (a formof "repatria- tion")?Would this not occasion the grossestof misunderstandings?5 If this speaking to the other is "to maintain the strangenessof this strangeness," it must be characterized by nonreciprocityand non- comprehension."Parole sans entente et a laquelle je dois cependantre- pondre" (EI, 92), writesBlanchot. Such a speech, is thus, in an important sense, impossible.Parler sans pouvoir is what Blanchotcalls it, thatis, to speak withoutpower (for the otherhas interruptedmy pouvoir de pouvoir), to speak withoutbeing able (to speak),to speak withoutability.6 This is a strangespeech, this speech that is "the access to man in his strangeness."It is a foundingspeech, not speech betweentwo alreadycon- stitutedentities, but speech thatfounds the rapport,and thatis the rapport (withoutrapport). In this entretien,as Blanchotwrites, the entredesignates an intervalheld up over a void, as abyss. This speech with the visage is a speech with the outside (althoughLevinas generallyuses the term"exteri- ority"),for Autrui is "always coming fromthe outside" (EI, 80). A speech with the outside, it is speech with, the "stranger,the destitute,the pro- letarian"(TI, 75),or, in theBiblical locution that Levinas frequently invokes, "The stranger,the widow,the orphan."The otheris "always,in relationto

5. See Jean-FrancoisLyotard, "Levinas's Logic," in Face to Face withLevinas, ed. RichardA. Cohen (Albany:State Universityof New YorkPress, 1986): 117-58, and JacquesDerrida, "En ce momentmeme dans cet ouvrageme voici,"in Textespour Em- manuel Levinas,ed. FrancoisLaruelle (Paris: Editions Jean-Michel Place, 1980): 21-60 6. For a discussionof the inabilityin responsibility,see Ann Smock,"Disastrous Responsibility,"L'Esprit Createur 24 (1984):5-20.

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 142 Yale French Studies me, withoutcountry, stranger to all possession,dispossessed and without dwelling,he who is as if 'by definition'the proletarian... "(EI, 80).

AND CAIN SAID TO ABEL The beingthat expresses itself, that faces me, saysno to me byhis very expression.(FC, 21)

[TheOther] opposes to me nota greaterforce . . . butprecisely the infini- tyof his transcendence.This infinity,stronger than , already re- sistsus in his face,is his face,is the primordialexpression, is the first word:"thou shalt not kill."[TLM 199] The face,it is inviolable;these eyes absolutely without protection, the mostnaked part of the humanbody, offer, nevertheless, an absolutere- sistanceto possession,an absoluteresistance in whichthe temptation of murderis inscribed:the temptation of an absolutenegation. The Otheris thesole beingthat one can be temptedto kill.This temptationof murder andthis impossibility of murder constitute the very vision of the face. To see a faceis alreadyto hear: "Thou shaltnot kill."[DL, 22] Levinas had describedexpression as an autosignificationand as an invita- tion to speak, withinthe originarylanguage encounter with the face ofthe other.It is only in his analysis of murderthat the face'sspeaking is givena particularcontent, albeit negative.In the passages above we discoverthat the expression"says no," thatthe "primordialexpression," "the first word" is a prohibition,"thou shalt not kill," that "to see a faceis alreadyto hear: 'thou shalt not kill."' How are we to understandthe "primordialex- pression"?Does it markthe fact that the (im-)possibilityof murder inhabits the languagerelation to the otherat its origin,as Blanchotwould have it? "Such would be the speech that measures the relationof man face-to-face with man,when thereis no choice but to speak or to kill. A speech as grave, perhaps,as the death of which it is the detour.The speech/murderalter- native is not the tranquil once and forall between good speech and bad death . . . in thissituation, either to speak orto kill,speech does not consist in speaking,but firstof all in maintainingthe movement of the either/or;it is what foundsthe alternative"(El, 88). Justas thisparole is preciselynot partof a dialogue in the usual sense, not a humanisticword that keeps the peace, but a "grave"word-in both senses-a wordwhich maintains the very violence ofthe alternative,so too the primordialexpression which Levinas describesis not a mere speaking, forit takes place on the level ofdistress, nudity, and exposureto violence.In the above descriptions,the face is both utterlydefenseless- "naked,"that

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS 143 is, "withoutcovering, clothing, or mask" (FC, 21),naked because ofits eyes, its look whichbreaks through form, and causes it to be "divestedof its form" (FC, 20)-and also that which challengesmy powers,"inviolable," saying "no," opposingme, offeringresistance. We have seen this double aspect of the face before,at once as the destituteone and as overlord.We have seen thischallenge as well when theencounter with the face of the other is said to interruptthe self'shabitual economyand its pouvoir de pouvoir. These powersare, at the limit,murderous. Vision is a violence; it would possess the other;it is even "byessence murderous."The faceresists posses- sion insofaras it is not reducibleto myvision; it breaksout ofthe form that would encapsulate it. Yet to the extentthat the face does presentitself as form,the temptationof murderis "inscribed"there. The temptationof murderis inscribedin the face's phenomenalization,inscribed in the sen- suous moment of expression(ex-primere, to press out). Expressionthus invitesboth speaking and murder.The veryambiguity of the face's presenta- tion,as thatwhich lodges itself within form and is also beyondform, renders it absolutelyvulnerable. In Levinas's account,it rendersit absolutelyre- sistantas well: "This temptationof murder and thisimpossibility of murder constitutethe very vision ofthe face." This ambiguityof the face's presenta- tion is one of the reasons why murderis, as Levinas says, "impossible": "Murderexercises a powerover what escapes power.It is stilla power,for the faceexpresses itself in the sensible,but it is alreadyimpotency, because the face rends the sensible" (TI, 198). Murderwants to kill the other,who is beyondthe sensible.Yet in murderingthe other,it arrivesonly at the sensi- ble. In this way,murder always misses its mark. No doubt it effectsan annihilationof the otherin his being. But it therebymisses the genuine alterityof the other, namely that which in himgoes beyondthe sensible (and thatwhich in him is beyondbeing). If the face is vulnerable to violence insofaras it expresses itself in the sensible,and resistantto violence insofaras it is beyondthe sensible, how are we to understandLevinas's assertionthat the face offers"an ab- solute resistancein which the temptationof murder is inscribed,"namely, thatthe resistance itself is thetemptation? As Levinasexplains the nature of thisresistance, the face is "totalresistance without being a force"(FC, 19).In murder,however, "one identifiesthe absolute character of the other with his force" (FC, 19). In otherwords, one mistakes the other'sresistance for a force.7Or as Blanchotputs it, murdertakes the infinityby which Autrui

7. "Violenceconsists in ignoringthis opposition, ignoring the face of a being,avoiding thegaze, and catching sight of an anglewhereby the no inscribedon a faceby the very fact thatit is a facebecomes a hostileor submissive force. Violence is a wayof acting on every beingand everyfreedom by approaching it froman indirectangle" (FC, 19).

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 144 Yale French Studies presentshimself as if it were a propertyof Autrui and wishes to rejectit absolutely.Thereby it missesAutrui; "it changeshim into absence, but does not touch him" (EI, 87). Thus the one who murdersis caught in a sub- stitutivestructure; he is like a man who mustaim at his target(infinity) over and over again, and always miss it. (That is why he cannot kill his victim enough times.) The infinitealterity of the speakingface is "incommensu- ratewith a powerexercised"; there is a "disproportionbetween infinity and my powers" (TI, 198). And it is in this sense that while murderis a real possibility,it is what Levinas calls an "ethical impossibility." But by ethical impossibilityLevinas also means the cessation of my murderouspowers, of mypouvoir de pouvoir.This cessation ofpouvoir is inauguratedand markedby the face's primordialexpression, which "says no," whose "firstword" is "thou shalt not kill." "To see a faceis alreadyto hear: 'thou shalt not kill."' The encounterwith the faceof the otherinter- ruptsthe "imperialismof the same" (TI, 39). This interruptionis emblem- atic of the ethical movement.At times Levinas calls it a "conversion"or "reversal"of our nature.9 At stakeis thevery birth of ethics or responsibility. As we have seen elsewherein Levinas'swork, this interruption is marked by an ethico-figuralturn of speech, a quasi-synestheticturn from my vision to the other'svoice, or fromthe sense of seeingto thatof hearing: "to see a faceis alreadyto hear 'Thou shalt not kill."' But is thisa matterof hearing, with its connotationof self-coincidence,at all? The face's primordialex- pressionis a citation,that is, it is characterizednot by phenomenality,but by the structureof the mark,with the constitutiveabsence that that im- plies. Moreover,the "voice" deliversa commandmentfrom an immemorial past, accessible to no present:"To see a faceis already to hear: 'thou shalt not kill."' This "already" rupturesself-coincidence. Thus when Levinas gives the face as voice here, again he gives the face as (nonphenomenal) figure.He gives the face as a figurefor, one mightadd, the literal,for the originarydonation of the law. But that the face (visage) could be a figure (figure)was always possible within the semantic destinationof the word. And if the face can indeed be a figure,are we sure thatwe know what we mean by"figure"?Is not "figuration"itself transformed by such a usage? How are we to evaluate the factthat the commandmentthat the face

8. "Ifthe impossibility of killing were a realimpossibility, ifthe alterity of the other wereonly the resistance of a force,his alterity would be no moreexterior to me than that of naturewhich resists my energies, but which I cometo accountfor by reason; it wouldbe no moreexterior than the world of perception which, in thefinal analysis, is constituted by me. The ethicalimpossibility of killing is a resistancemade to me, but a resistance whichis notviolent, an intelligibleresistance" (FC, 21-22).

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS 145 deliversto me is, afterall, one of God's commandments,the sixth com- mandment, "thou shalt not kill"? First,let us remark on the basis of Levinas's 1953 essay,"Freedom and Command,"that there is a generalway of understandingcommandment that is more or less independentof any theologicalcontext. In that essay,Levinas explains that the "no" that the face opposes to me is "not the no of a hostile forceor threat. .. it is the possibilityof encountering a beingthrough an interdiction"(FC, 21). Unlike repression,interdiction signals a positivepossibility, or better,an ethical relationship.Interdiction is inseparablefrom the asymmetrywhich charac- terizesthe face-to-face encounter and fromthe distinctiveway in which the facesignifies. The veryfact that expression breaks thrudgh form is, in effect, its imperative:

The beingthat is presentdominates, or breaksthrough its own appari- tion,it is an interlocutor.Beings which present themselves to one an- othersubordinate themselves to one another.This subordinationcon- stitutesthe firstoccurence of a transitiverelation between freedoms, and,in thisvery formal sense, a command.(FC, 21]

And as he concludes a fewpages later,"speech in its essence,is command- ing" (FC, 23). But the question concerningthe natureof this commandmentremains. Does its presenceimply that Levinas's ethics are dependenton the revealed moralityof positive religion? Apparently not, for Levinas's sense ofreligion is as removedfrom ordinary understanding as is his sense of ethics. In Totalityand Infinityhe writes,"we proposeto call religionthe bond thatis establishedbetween the same and theother without constituting a totality" (TI, 40). Yet Levinas does, nevertheless,cite one of commandments, which are at the center of the revealed moralityof the Judeo-Christian tradition.In thiscontext, one wouldhave to notethat while Levinasrespects many aspects of the Christianreligion, he is not concernedwith a unitary Judeo-Christiantradition. His concern is primarilywith the Judaic,and

9. EmmanuelLevinas, Interview with Richard Kearney in Face to Face withLevinas, ed. RichardA. Cohen (Albany:State Universityof New YorkPress, 1986), 25. Robert Bernasconidescribes it as an intentionalityin reversein "Levinasand Derrida: The ques- tion of the Closureof Metaphysics,"in the same volume.See also Bernasconi's,"De- constructionand the Possibility of Ethics," in JohnSallis, ed. Deconstruction and Philoso- phy:The Textsof (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987): 122-39, and "FundamentalOntology, Metontology, and the Ethics of Ethics," Irish Philosophical Journal4 (1987):76-93.

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 146 Yale FrenchStudies particularly,with the rabbinictradition as a "source" forhis ethics.More- over,Levinas distances the Judaicfrom the interpretationit has received withinthe unitary Judeo-Christian tradition, an interpretationthat is often negativeand privative.He offersinstead a reinscriptionof the Judaic.For example,as he states in a recentinterview, It is oftensaid 'God is love'. God is the commandmentof love. 'God is love' meansthat He lovesyou. But this implies that the primary thing is yourown salvation. In myopinion, God is a commandmentto love.God is the one who saysthat one mustlove theother.'0

At work here is a critiqueof the Christianeconomy of salvationwith its habitualignoring of the other.The legalismof the Judaic religion, its preoc- cupationwith ,is herereinterpreted as a fundamental orientationtoward the other.This reinscriptionof the Judaicin Levinas's workis foundprimarily in whathe calls his "non-philosophical"or "confes- sional" writings,his readingsof the and his essays on Judaism."l Althoughsuch an explanationwould seem to make Levinas'sethics de- pendent,once again, on the revealedmorality of a positivereligion, in this instanceJudaism, this is not the case. Forone thing,the explicitreferences to Judaismin Levinas's work are found mostly in the nonphilosophical writings.Secondly, we cannottake forgranted that we knowwhat we mean by "Judaism"in Levinas's work.The Judaismin question is a reinscribed "Judaism"that is equivalentneither to the determinationsit has received withinthe dominant"Greco-Christian" conceptuality nor to Judaismas a historicalor positive religion, although it necessarilytakes offfrom there.12 Finally,and stillwith reference to positivereligion, when Levinaswrites thatthe facecommands me, "thou shalt not kill,"he seems to suggestthat the law is revealednot by God, as in theBiblical claim,but in theface of the other(man), and thatthis relationship is priorto anyrelation between man and God. This is indeed the case, but it need be the case only if that rela- tionshipbetween man and God is conceivedof as a theology,a discourseon God's attributes,or a thematization.As Levinas implies in the interview cited above, the relationshipto God is, however,not a credo,nor is it any kindof ontological assertion. It is theprimacy of doing for the other.That is

10. Levinas,"The Paradoxof Morality: an Interviewwith Emmanuel Levinas," trans. AndrewBenjamin and TamraWright, in The Provocationof Levinas: Rethinkingthe Other,ed. RobertBernasconi and David Wood(London: Routledge, 1988), 177. 11. See,in additionto Difficilelibert6, Levinas's Quatre lectures talmudiques (Paris: Minuit,1968), particularly the reading of Sabbath 88a-88b there. 12. I developthis in a chapteron Levinasin my ProdigalSon/Elder Brother: In- terpretationand Alterityin Augustine,Petrarch, Kafka, Levinas (Chicago: University of ChicagoPress), forthcoming.

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS 147 the sole relationshipbetween man and God. In manyways this "Judaism"is closer to an atheism. But one mightstill ask, what is the "religious"meaning of the command- ment "thou shalt not kill?" Withinhistorical Judaism, according to one commentator,the concept of murderis "enlarged"to include even "the omissionof any act bywhich a fellow-mancould be savedin peril,distress or despair."'13With all due caution,such a referencemay help to illuminatethe spiritof Levinas's murderanalysis.'4 But Levinas's phenomenologicalde- scriptionsof the relationto the otheralready make the "religious"meaning (in his sense) ofthe commandmentquite explicit,without further reference to religionin the traditionalsense. Its "religious"meaning is theimperative ofresponse or responsibility that arises in theencounter with the other, who faces,in language. What did Cain say to Abel immediatelybefore he murderedhim? In Genesis 4:8, thereis a lacuna in the text(preserved in the Masoretic tradi- tion),where the verse is incomplete:"And Cain said to Abel his brother... ". "The Hebrewvayommer means not 'told' or 'spoke to' but 'said unto',and thewords said oughtto follow."''5The textof Genesis 4, verses3-8, in Everet Fox's translation,reads,

It was, afterthe passing of days that Kayin brought, from the fruit of the soil,a giftto YHWH, and as forHevel, he toobrought-from the firstborn ofhis flock,from their fat parts. YHWH had regardfor Hevel and his gift, forKayin and his gift he hadno regard.Kayin became exceedingly enraged andhis facefell. YHWH said to Kayin:Why are you so enraged?Why has yourface fallen? Is it notthus: If you intend good, bear-it-aloft, but if you do notintend good, at theentrance is ,a crouching-demon,toward you his lust-but you can rule over him. Kayinsaid to Hevel his broth- er ... Butthen it was,when they were out in thefield, that Kayin rose up againstHevel his brotherand he killedhim.'6

In numerousversions of the Bible (such as theSamaritan, Greek, Syriac, Old Latin, and ),and consequently,in most translations,the missing phrase is supplied: "let us go outside." This metonymicresponse seeks to providea bridgeto the place of the action thatfollows. The midrashicre-

13. Pentateuchand Haftorahs,ed. J.H. Hertz(London: Soncino Press, 1978), 299. 14. Thatthe murder situation should be "paradigmatic"at all withinLevinas's ethical discoursehas to do withthe difficult sense in whichthe ethical becomes visible through theviolation of the ethical. 15. HarryM. Orlinsky,ed. Noteson theNew Translationof The (Philadelphia: The JewishPublication Society, 1969), 68. 16. In the Beginning: A New English Rendition of the Book of Genesis, trans. with Commentaryand Notes byEverett Fox (New York:Schocken, 1983).

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 148 Yale FrenchStudies sponse to this lacuna in BereshithRabbah 22:16 is freelyembellishing. It interpolatesan extendeddiscussion between Cain and Abel. This response, like thatof Philo, assumes thatthe brothers had a quarrel.Philo evenwrites: "the plain is a figureof contentiousness."17And althoughthe midrashex- plains alternatelythat the two quarreledabout material possessions, re- ligious ideology,and sexual jealousy,the face of the quarrel seems more importantthan its content.'8 Consideringthe episode as a whole, the contemporarycommentator AndreNeher remarksCain's silence in responseto God's question, "Why has yourface fallen?"'19 This silence is not entirelyunreasonable, given the notorious obscurity,indeed, the near unintelligibilityof the admonitory verse that follows, "If you intend good, bear-it-aloft... "1.20 But, writes Neher,"in place ofGod, he chose his brotheras the recipientof his answer: 'Cain said unto Abel his brother '."21 And thus,as Elie Wiesel remarks, he turnedhis quarrelagainst God againsthis brotherinstead.22 What did Cain say to Abel here?For Neher, the initial "rupturein communication" betweenCain and God underscoresthe failureof dialogue that is centralto the episode as a whole: "Abel does not speak,whereas Cain speaks all the time" ("incessantly,"as Wiesel notes)."Thus dialoguewas swallowedup in silence and death." Neher concludes: "it is as if the obliterationof the dialogue were the cause of murder"(Neher, 95). The "dialogue" of which Neher speaks, based on an ideal of symmetryand an understandingof lan- guageas communication,is derivativeof the Blanchotian "speech or death," the asymmetricalparole thatfounds not only the possibilityof "dialogue" in such a sense, but also the veryspeech/murder alternative. Yet Neher's commentgives pause: it is as if the textualgap or lacuna in its verymate- rialitywere the cause of the murderthe episode recounts.

17. Philo,vol. 2, withan Englishtrans. by F. H. Colson (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1929), 205. 18. See the discussionby Nehama Leibowitzin Studiesin BereshitGenesis, trans. AryehNewman (Jerusalem: World Zionist Organization, 1972), 38-45. 19. As Claus Westermannnotes, "J" understands Cain's reaction to the rejection of his giftas "psychosomatic.""He becameinflamed . . . his facefell." Genesis 1-11: A Com- mentary,trans. John J. Scullion (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1984),297. EverettFox reminds us that"the text is punctuated... bychanging connotations of the word'face."' In theBeginning, 19. 20. Commentatorsagree that the Hebrewof this verseis obscure,and its textual difficultiesirresolvable. 21. AndreNeher, The Exile of the Word: From the Silence of the Bible to the Silence of Auschwitz,trans. David Maisel (Philadelphia:The JewishPublication Society, 1981), 97- 98. See also the relateddiscussion by Neherin L'Existencejuive: solitudeet affronte- ments(Paris: Seuil, 1962),34-36. Henceforthcited in thetext. 22. Elie Wiesel,Messengers of God: Biblical Portraitsand Legends,trans. Marion Wiesel(New York:Pocket Books, 1977), 54.

This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS 149 Whatdid Cain sayto Abel? Perhaps,as Nehersuggests, he simplyrepeat- ed God's wordsto him "in all theirfearful ambiguity." These wordswere not only obscure,but as Elie Wiesel comments,"cruel": "Repudiatedby God, Cain sank into a black depression.Whereupon God, with a crueltyas star- tlingas it was unprovoked,asked whyhe looked so crestfallen,why he was so depressed.As thoughHe did not know,as thoughHe was not the cause!: (Wiesel,58). Perhaps,Wiesel continues,Cain wantedto unburdenhimself to Abel, who did not listen. And Cain said to Abel, "Let us go outside."Why did he directhim toward the outside?" "Outside,where there were no witnesses,"says one commen- tator(Westerman, Genesis 1-11, 302). Blanchotwrites, "as ifhe knew that the outside is the place ofAbel, but also as ifhe wished to lead him back to thatpoverty, to thatweakness of the outside where every defense falls away" (EI, 87).

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