DOCSLIB.ORG

Visage, Figure: Reading Levinas's Totality and Infinity Author(S): Jill Robbins Source: Yale French Studies, No

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Visage, Figure: Reading Levinas's Totality and Infinity Author(s): Jill Robbins Source: Yale French Studies, No. 79, Literature and the Ethical Question (1991), pp. 135-149 Published by: Yale University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2930249 Accessed: 29-09-2015 09:34 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Yale University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Yale French Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS Visage,Figure: Reading Levinas's Totalityand Infinity* What would it mean to facewhat Derridahas called "the ethics ofethics"? That is to say,to confrontthe veryopening of the question of ethics-the groundsof both its possibilityand impossibility-priorto the production and elaboration of all moral rules or precepts?According to Emmanuel Levinas,the face of the other[le visage dAutrui]is the verysite and privi- legedfigure for such an opening.In theface-to-face encounter, responsibility in its most originalform of response, or language-response, arises. The pages thatfollow will considerboth the specificityof the ethical and the specific othernessthat Levinas identifiesin the face-to-face. Yetif the face is theprivileged figure for the opening of the question of the ethical,the question of the textual status of the face remain to be asked. Can therebe a figurefor the ethical? a figurefor the face?The veryquestion is problematicin that rhetoric,as a (derivative)science of figures,is incom- mensurablewith the more originarylevel of Levinas's description.Could *Abbreviations TI EmmanuelLevinas, Totality and Infinity,trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: DuquesneUniversity Press, 1969, 1979). Totalit6 et infini (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1961 ). FC EmmanuelLevinas, "Freedom and Command,"in CollectedPhilosophical Pa- pers,trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). "Libert6 et commandement,"Revue de metaphysiqueet de morale58 (1953). DL EmmanuelLevinas, Difficilelibert&: essais surle judaisme (Paris: Albin Michel, 1963,2d ed. 1967,1974). EI MauriceBlanchot, "L'Entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969). I wouldlike to thank Rebecca Conway for her helpful comments on an earlier version ofthis essay. YFS 79, Literatureand theEthical Question, ed. ClaireNouvet, ? 1991by Yale University. 135 This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 136 Yale French Studies the openingof the question of the ethical be markedwith a certainfigur- ality?And supposingthat one can speak about an alteritythat is rhetorical or textual,can the alterityof the otherand textualalterity be evenaddressed in one breath?Here again, the question of ethics and the question of lan- guage come into theirclosest possible proximity. THE FIGURE OF THE FACE "The alterityof the other,"writes Levinas in his 1961 Totalityand Infinity, "is not 'other'like thebread I eat,the land in whichI dwell,like, sometimes, myselffor myself" (TI, 33). A relationto this latter,finite alterity charac- terizeswhat Levinas calls the workof identification,that is, my abilityto absorbotherness "into my identity as thinkeror possessor" (TI, 33). (He also calls it the economyof the Same, and it refersto thehabitual exchanges that make up the self'sconcrete relationship with the world.)But the alterityof the otheris infinite.Encountered neither as a phenomenonnor as a being (somethingto be masteredor possessed), the other is encounteredas a face.It is in the encounterwith the face of the other[le visage d'Autrui]that the other'sinfinite alterity is revealed. The firstreference to the face in Totalityand Infinityreads as follows: Forthe presence before the face, my orientation toward the Other can lose the avidityof the gaze onlyby turninginto generosity, incapable of ap- proachingthe otherwith emptyhands. This relationship,established overthe thingshereafter possibly common, that is, susceptibleof being said, is the relationshipof discourse[discours]. The wayin which the otherpresents himself, exceeding the idea of the otherin me, we here nameface [nous 1appelons, en effet,visage]. [TI, 50] Levinas "names" the facehere accordingto the formalstructure of infinity as he has previouslydescribed it, "an ideatum that surpassesits idea" (TI, 49),a thoughtthat thinks more than it can contain.1But althoughhe names theface here, he will also insistthat the primordial relationship to theface is not one of naming: "Autruiis not only named, but invoked.To put it in grammaticalterms, the otherdoes not appearin the nominative,but in the vocative" (DL, 21), or as he also says, "in the dative." These grammaticalterms, which are only provisionaland which will later be abandoned, do indeed seem to illuminate the-passageabove, in 1. TheCartesian idea of infinity is a guidingnotion of Levinas's work and one of the privilegedmoments in his history of philosophy. The first reference tothe face in Totality andInfinity, cited above, introduces itas "a deformalizationorthe concretization ofthe ideaof infinity." This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS 137 particularthe transformationthat vision undergoesin the encounterwith the face. Forin "the presencebefore a face,"the avariciousgaze turnsinto generosity["l'avidite du regardse muant en generosite"]and language ["discours"].The (ethical) necessity for this transformationstems from Levinas's assertionsthat vision is a violentway of relatingto the other.It "immobilizesits object as its theme."As a formof adequation (TI, 34), it is unable to respectwhat is infinitelyother. It seeks to absorbthat alterity, to drawit into the play ofthe Same. In this way,vision is just one instanceof theself's habitual economy,an economythat always fails to do justiceto the other.Other possibilities within this habitual economyinclude represent- ing the other,recognizing him, knowinghim, understandinghim, or any formof the theoreticalrelation. All would be unjust,for they would attempt to appropriatethe other,to reducehim to the (self-)Same. That is why,in the passage above, vision, a relationshipof adequation, turnsinto generosityand a certainkind of language,relationships of non- adequation. This transformationthat the gaze undergoesis, precisely,eth- ical in the sense thatLevinas gives it: "we name thiscalling into question of my spontaneityby the presenceof the otherethics" (TI, 43). Thus the (eth- ical) encounterwith the otherinterrupts the self'shabitual economy and its tendencyto conceive of the world as a space of possibilities and power [pouvoir].2It interruptsthe play of the Same. And let us also notein passing: the ethical transferis a figuraltransfer as well. The turnfrom vision to generosityand language,and ultimately,to voice,resembles a synesthesia,a crossing of sensoryattributes. Moreover the verb se muer, "to turn,to moult,to metamorphose,"implies a break,within the figuralturn, in phe- nomenality.We will come back to thesereflections. For now, suffice it to say thatin Levinas's account,the primordialrelationship to the otherthat one facesis "discourse."The nontotalizingrelationship to theface of the other is accomplished"in a discourse,in a conversation[entre-tien] which proposes the world.This propositionis held between(se tienentre) two pointswhich do not constitutea system,a cosmos,a totality"[TI, 96]. Thus, discourseis a relationshipwith the otherthat maintainsthe distanceof infinitesepara- tion "yet without this distance destroyingthis relationand withoutthis relation destroyingthis distance: (TI, 41). And thus, as Alphonso Lingis 2. ThroughoutTotality and Infinity,Levinas plays on pouvoir'sinterchangeable sensesof possibility and power, as partof an ongoingpolemic with Heidegger's description ofthe world as a spaceof possibilities for Dasein. This readingis problematicinsofar as it seemsto confusepossibility, an Existential,with power (a relationbetween already con- stitutedentities). By contrast, Levinas's use ofthe term, "spontaneity" is notontic and not at all psychological:it is partof his readingof the Heideggerian"being-in" as joyous possessionof the world which ignores the other. See thereading of Levinas and Heidegger byJacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics,"in Writingand Difference,trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:University of ChicagoPress, 1978), 134ff. Henceforth cited in the text. This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 138 Yale French Studies comments: "To face someone is both to perceivehim and to answer to him."3One facesthe otheras interlocutor.One facesthe otherin language. Yet let us not take forgranted that we know what we mean here by language. For the parole that ensues in response to the face of the other cannot be understoodaccording to hermeneuticmodels of "conversation" or "dialogue."It is a founding"conversation," a discoursebefore
Recommended publications
  • 1 Adieu to Levinas Ronald C. Arnett “...The Meaning of Death Does Not

    1 Adieu to Levinas Ronald C. Arnett “...The Meaning of Death Does Not

    Adieu to Levinas Ronald C. Arnett “. the meaning of death does not begin in death. This invites us to think of death as a moment of death’s signification, which is a meaning that overflows death. We must note carefully that ‘to otherflow death’ in no sense means surpassing or reducing it; it means that this overflowing has its signification, too.”1 Signification is stronger than death—the Other continues to interrupt and awaken the living, calling the “I” into responsibility. When one experiences the death of another, one is jarred by the face of the Other who continues to demand of “me” responsibility. As long as one responds to the face of another, death cannot eclipse the power of the Other upon me. Evoking a call from beyond death does not lessen weeping and raw lament for the loss of another who no longer physically walks among us. A definition of a meaningful life is that a face continues to speak from the grave with the demand of responsibility from a particular Other. As if it was just yesterday, I remember the death of my mother and the depth of pain that penetrated to the core of my soul. As I stood outside my parent’s house, I was confused. I wondered why the world had not stopped with the death of my mother. Cars still moved. Branches tossed in the wind. Small children were still playing. How could such commotion continue after the death of my mother? Yet, somehow my mother continued to demand responsible action from me.
  • The 10 Commandments

    The 10 Commandments

    FAMILY GUIDE BIBLE STORYLINE The 10 Commandments Hey kids and parents! Fill in the blanks as you talk Big Idea about this week’s lesson together. Have fun! God’s rules help us to love him and others Key Points Key Question • God gave ___ ________________ for the people Why does God care how we treat others? to follow. Exodus 20:1-17 Memory Verse • The first four commandments are Matthew 22:40 “The entire law and all the demands of the about ___ and _______. prophets are based on these two commandments.” • The last six commandments are about ____ and ____________. • The whole point is to love ______ and love __________! Matthew 22:38-40 Talk About It 1. What’s your favorite part of the video? What’s one thing you learned from it? 2. If you were in charge in your house, what would your rules be and why? 3. How many commandments did God give Moses? 4. What was the real point of God’s rules? 5. Read Matthew 22:37-39. What do you think it means to love God with your whole heart? What do you think it means to love others like you love yourself? 6. How will you apply this lesson to your life this week? ACTIVITY PAGE #2 Teacher instructions: Choose an activity for your classroom. OPTION 1: MEMORY VERSE GAME Instructions: ● Divide the class into groups of 4. Give each group a set of Memory verse words (page 5-6). ● Have them place the words face down on the ground or table.
  • Exodus 20:1-17

    Exodus 20:1-17

    CHILDREN'S VERSES FOR 3RD QUARTER (SEPTEMBER, OCTOBER, NOVEMBER) EXODUS 20:1-17 KJV NASB ESV Week 1—Exodus 20:1-2 (to be quoted on September 7) 1 And God spake all these words, 1 Then God spoke all these words, 1 And God spoke all these words, saying, saying, saying, 2 2 2 I am the LORD thy God, which I am the LORD your God, who I am the LORD your God, who have brought thee out of the land brought you out of the land of brought you out of the land of of Egypt, out of the house of Egypt, out of the house of slavery. Egypt, out of the house of slavery. bondage. Week 2—Exodus 20:3 (to be quoted on September 14) 3 Thou shalt have no other gods 3 You shall have no other gods 3 You shall have no other gods before me. before Me. before me. Week 3—Exodus 20:4 (to be quoted on September 21) 4 Thou shalt not make unto thee 4 You shall not make for yourself 4 You shall not make for any graven image, or any an idol, or any likeness of what is yourself a carved image, or any likeness of any thing that is in in heaven above or on the earth likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the beneath or in the water under the heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the earth. earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth.
  • 55 Fateful Images ALPHONSO LINGIS the Pennsylvania State University

    55 Fateful Images ALPHONSO LINGIS the Pennsylvania State University

    Fateful Images ALPHONSO LINGIS The Pennsylvania State University Reality and its Appearances Phenomenology, Jean-Paul Sartre wrote, reduced the reality of things to the totality of their appearances. It is because something appears that we can assert that it exists. It belongs to the essence of a real thing to generate appearances. And the appearances are appearances of things. Appearances do not flow by, a drifting fog of tones and hues; they separate into identifiable units, gestalten. To be outside our minds belongs to the things, and their appearances are outside. We do not see patterns suspended in the inner space of the mind, but the colors, sizes, shapes of outside things. The real thing itself-the chair or the building caught sight of in its fragmentary appearances- is not something invisible, or conceptual, not an identity-term posited by the mind; it is the totality as sketched out in any of its appear- ances. Any of its appearances implicate further appearances: we see how the surface exposed in front of us implicates and is continued by a back side, an underside. The chair or a building exists in a wave of duration across which it evolves perspectival profiles of itself. Yet not all the appearances a thing generates show it as it really is. Natural perception itself, Maurice Merleau-Ponty pointed out, distin- guishes between the real properties of things and their perspectival deformations, appearances distorted by the intervening medium or obscured by the distance, colors seen in dim or colored light, shapes 55 56 set askew. The real properties appear in the thing when the thing itself is within reach, set at the right distance and position, accessible to our multiple sensory and motor powers.
  • Facing Nature: the Infinite in the Flesh

    Facing Nature: the Infinite in the Flesh

    Facing Nature: The Infinite in the Flesh Robert Daniel Victorin-Vangerud, B.A., M.Div. This thesis is presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of. Murdoch University Perth, Western Australia 2004 I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research. ------------------------------------- Robert Daniel Victorin-Vangerud i Abstract “Facing Nature: The Infinite in the Flesh” by Robert Victorin-Vangerud This thesis explores the relation between two interpretations of chôra, drawn from a reading of Plato’s Timaeus. The first I label the elemental chôra. The second, I call the social chôra. The first chapter addresses the elements in Ionian philosophy, with an eye toward the political and social backdrop of the important cosmological notion of isonomia, law of equals. Here social and elemental are continuous. Chapter two looks at the next phase of Presocratic thought, Elea, specifically Parmenides and his influence on later thought, then turns to Heidegger’s reading of Parmenides’ through the key word of alêtheia. Finally, I offer a reading of Parmenides through a different key word— trust. The third chapter examines Plato’s cosmology in the Timaeus, focusing on the way the beginning of this dialogue inflects the dialogue in a political/social direction, putting the social chôra in tension with the elemental chôra that the body of the Timaeus’ discusses. In the fourth chapter, which examines the Phaedrus, this tension is inverted, since this dialogue on writing and justice set in what proves to be the mesmerizing and erotic elemental milieu of the world outside the walls of the polis. The second half of the dissertation turns to some modern thinkers within the phenomenological tradition or its wake who write about elementals.
  • The Sixth Commandment “Thou Shalt Not Kill”

    The Sixth Commandment “Thou Shalt Not Kill”

    The Sixth Commandment “Thou Shalt Not Kill” (Exodus 20:13 KJV) in the context of Bill C-14 (An Act to amend the Criminal Code of Canada to allow for assisted dying) July 31, 2016 By: Rev. Dr. Eric Bacon It was a few months ago that John mentioned to me that he was planning to present a series of sermons on the Ten Commandments which are now well in progress. At that time he asked whether I would be willing to participate. The assignment was the Sixth Commandment: “You shalt not kill.” (Words from the King James Version). I have to admit that my initial head reaction was “Are you serious?” But being a willing associate and team player my heart said yes knowing that this subject would certainly be a challenge. Following that conversation I began to consider the recurring and necessary question of which we as clergy have to remind ourselves which is: “Given the subject matter, and in this case one of the ten commandments, what message or approach might be of interest or helpful to the congregation, specifically in the here and now of our lives and place in society?” Or preferably, is there a relevant current issue or development within the scope of the selected scripture that deserves our attention and discernment. My answer came on June 16th with the passing of Bill C-14 by the Parliament of Canada, an Act to amend the Criminal Code to allow for assisted dying. Although there is a school of thought that suggests the pulpit is not the place to touch on things political, I believe that the subject matter of Bill C-14 goes far beyond political implications.
  • Maurice Merleau-Ponty,The Visible and the Invisible

    Maurice Merleau-Ponty,The Visible and the Invisible

    Northwestern University s t u d i e s i n Phenomenology $ Existential Philosophy GENERAL EDITOR John Wild. ASSOCIATE EDITOR James M. Edie CONSULTING EDITORS Herbert Spiegelberg William Earle George A. Schrader Maurice Natanson Paul Ricoeur Aron Gurwitsch Calvin O. Schrag The Visible and the Invisible Maurice Merleau-Ponty Edited by Claude Lefort Translated by Alphonso Lingis The Visible and the Invisible FOLLOWED BY WORKING NOTES N orthwestern U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1968 EVANSTON Northwestern University Press www.nupress.northwestern.edu Originally published in French under the title Le Visible et l'invisible. Copyright © 1964 by Editions Gallimard, Paris. English translation copyright © 1968 by Northwestern University Press. First printing 1968. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America 15 14 13 12 11 ISBN-13: 978-0-8101-0457-0 isbn-io: 0-8101-0457-1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data are available from the Library of Congress Permission has been granted to quote from Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1956). @ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence o f Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi Z39.48-1992. Contents Editor’s Foreword / xi Editorial Note / xxxiv T ranslatofs Preface / xl T h e Visib l e a n d t h e In v is ib l e : Philosophical Interrogation i Reflection and Interrogation / 3 a Interrogation and Dialectic / 50 3 Interrogation and Intuition / 105 4 The Intertwining—The Chiasm / 130 5 [a ppen d ix ] Preobjective Being: The Solipsist World / 156 W orking N otes / 165 Index / 377 Chronological Index to Working Notes / 279 Editor's Foreword How eve r e x p e c t e d it may sometimes be, the death of a relative or a friend opens an abyss before us.
  • Draft Version 5-4-10 Please Do Not Quote Or Circulate the Politics of Logic

    Draft Version 5-4-10 Please Do Not Quote Or Circulate the Politics of Logic

    Draft Version 5-4-10 Please do not quote or circulate The politics of logic: On the consequences of formalism Introduction: An Inquiry into Forms of Life I begin with a formulation of Wittgenstein‘s, as enigmatic today as it was when written fifty years ago, which nevertheless captures the central problem on which a post-―analytic‖ philosophical reflection on language and a critical theory of politics in the ―continental‖ mode are today converging: What has to be accepted, the given, is -- so one could say -- forms of life.1 In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein uses the term Lebensform (or Lebensformen) only a handful of times. But in these few cases, Wittgenstein employs the term in a positively assertoric voice that is rare within a text dedicated almost wholly to criticizing what we may otherwise take to be the ―givens‖ of our language and everyday world. Contemporary interpretations oscillate between two ways of understanding Wittgenstein‘s elliptical invocation of forms of life as ―the given.‖ One line of interpretation understands it as indicating a conventionalist anthropologism of practices or cultures. This is a doctrine of the communal determination of meaning by means of shared practical conventions and norms ―implicit in practice.‖ Another takes it to suggest a biologism of adaptive forms, a ―naturalist‖ reduction of language and meaning to broadly natural-scientific facts.2 I shall argue, however, that Wittgenstein here gestures toward a different problematic altogether, one that actually tends to undermine the very terms in which this decision between culturalist and naturalist readings is normally couched. Indeed, as I shall argue, the problem posed by Wittgenstein‘s invocation of forms of life is not located simply either in the question of the nature of lives or of their forms, but rather in what lies between these two terms: in what it is, roughly, for a form to be a form of life, what it means that something like form or forms shape a (human) life at all.
  • Divine Illusions Alphonso Lingis Pennsylvania State University - State College, Allingis@Hotmail.Com

    Divine Illusions Alphonso Lingis Pennsylvania State University - State College, [email protected]

    Fordham University Masthead Logo DigitalResearch@Fordham Hermeneutic and Phenomenological Philosophies Research Resources of Science 2005 Divine Illusions Alphonso Lingis Pennsylvania State University - State College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_research Part of the Continental Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Lingis, Alphonso, "Divine Illusions" (2005). Research Resources. 29. https://fordham.bepress.com/phil_research/29 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Hermeneutic and Phenomenological Philosophies of Science at DigitalResearch@Fordham. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Resources by an authorized administrator of DigitalResearch@Fordham. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DIVINE ILLUSIONS ALPHONSO LINGIS David Allison says to his readers that Nietzsche writes for you — you and him and me. In his book he tells of what of Nietzsche’s thoughts he has, with long years of research and penetrating and generous reflection, made his own. The lucidity of this book enables us to see if these thoughts can also become ours. Nietzsche’s thoughts are not only extremely complex but hard thoughts which we cannot make our own without a struggle. The finest virtue of a philosophical book on Nietzsche is that it provokes this struggle. Here I am only going to recount a little of my struggle with a couple of those thoughts, in the expectation that David Allison will shed more light on them. Nietzsche’s insists on the illusory nature of art. Apollonian art — plastic art, poetry, sculpture, and architecture — is the art of forms, perfect, self- contained, radiant forms.
  • The Horizons of Continental Philosophy Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library Volume 30

    The Horizons of Continental Philosophy Martinus Nijhoff Philosophy Library Volume 30

    THE HORIZONS OF CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY MARTINUS NIJHOFF PHILOSOPHY LIBRARY VOLUME 30 For a complete list of volumes in this series see final page of this volume. The Horizons of Continental Philosophy Essays on Husser!, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty edited by Hugh J. Silverman State University of New York at Stony Brook Algis Mickunas Ohio University Theodore Kisiel Northern Illinois University Alphonso Lingis The Pennsylvania State University 1988 SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data The Horizons Qf continental phllosophy essays on Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty I editors, Hugh J. Silverman ... [et al. 1. p. cm. -- (Martinus Nljhoff phi losophy l ibrary ; v. 30) Inc ludes index. ISBN 978-90-481-8308-1 ISBN 978-94-017-3350-2 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-3350-2 1. Philosophy, Modern--20th century . 2. Husserl, Edmund. 1859-1938. 3. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. 4. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1908-1961. 1. Silverman, Hugh J. II. Series. B804.H726 1988 190--dc19 87-33798 CIP ISBN 978-90-481-8308-1 Copyright © 1988 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Origina11y published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1988 An rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permis sion of the publishers, Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V. PUBLICATIONS BOARD General Editor Hugh J. Silverman Volume Editors Algis Mickunas (Husserl Circle) Theodore Kisiel (Heidegger Conference) Alphonso Lingis (~lerleau-Ponty Circle) Publications Committee Members Theodore Ki s i e1 Alphonso Lingis Al gi s Mi ckunas John Sallis Hugh J.
  • PHIL 475 – Topics in Contemporary European Philosophy Mon & Wed 2:35-3:55 SH688 295

    PHIL 475 – Topics in Contemporary European Philosophy Mon & Wed 2:35-3:55 SH688 295

    PHIL 475 – Topics in Contemporary European Philosophy Mon & Wed 2:35-3:55 SH688 295 Dr. Erica Harris ([email protected]) Office hours: LEA 923, Wed 1:00 – 2:00 p.m. (or by appointment) Course topic and objectives Topic Fall 2017: Other Bodies A major concern of phenomenologists of the early twentieth century was the so-called ‘problem of the other’. These philosophers were concerned with questions like: how do I know that the object standing in front of me is another subject like myself (Husserl)? How does the freedom of others limit my own (Sartre and Beauvoir)? What, if anything, do I owe this strange person (Levinas)? How does encountering another person change the way I see myself? The existential philosophers – especially Sartre and Beauvoir – often described the encounter with the other as one filled with shame, and antagonism. In his play, No Exit, Sartre famously said “Hell is other people.” Merleau-Ponty, a phenomenologist who studied and worked alongside the existentialists, took a different approach to the encounter with others. His approach is grounded in the larger framework of his embodied phenomenology. In this course, we will consider how highlighting the importance of embodiment has changed the way that continental philosophy has approached the ‘problem’ of otherness. This course will be divided into two parts. In the first half of the course, we will juxtapose Merleau- Ponty’s embodied account of empathy with Sartre’s existentialist view. Students will read Sartre’s No Exit, followed by selections from Merleau-Ponty’s seminal work from the first part of his career, The Phenomenology of Perception.
  • The Torah and Self-Defense

    The Torah and Self-Defense

    Volume 109 Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 109, 2004-2005 6-1-2004 The Torah and Self-Defense David B. Kopel Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra Recommended Citation David B. Kopel, The Torah and Self-Defense, 109 DICK. L. REV. 17 (2004). Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol109/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Torah and Self-Defense David B. Kopel* I. Introduction The first five books of the Bible are sometimes called the Pentateuch. Jews call them the Torah, which means "teaching" or "instruction." 1 The Torah is by far the most important of Jewish scriptures. The Jewish Bible contains the same books as what Christians call the "Old Testament." Accordingly, the Torah is the foundation of Christian scriptures. This article surveys the Torah's teachings on the right and the duty to defend oneself and others. Part II examines the Book of Genesis, in particular, the "Jewish natural law" which was given to Noah, and the story of Abraham, the patriarch of the Jewish people. Part III studies Moses and the Exodus of the Hebrew people from Egypt. Part IV looks at Torah laws regarding home defense against burglars, and the duty of bystanders to rescue third parties who are being attacked by a "pursuer." The examination of the Torah laws includes analysis of the extensive Jewish scholarly commentary on the Torah.