Visage, Figure: Reading Levinas's Totality and Infinity Author(s): Jill Robbins Source: Yale French Studies, No. 79, Literature and the Ethical Question (1991), pp. 135-149 Published by: Yale University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2930249 Accessed: 29-09-2015 09:34 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Yale University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Yale French Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS Visage,Figure: Reading Levinas's Totalityand Infinity* What would it mean to facewhat Derridahas called "the ethics ofethics"? That is to say,to confrontthe veryopening of the question of ethics-the groundsof both its possibilityand impossibility-priorto the production and elaboration of all moral rules or precepts?According to Emmanuel Levinas,the face of the other[le visage dAutrui]is the verysite and privi- legedfigure for such an opening.In theface-to-face encounter, responsibility in its most originalform of response, or language-response, arises. The pages thatfollow will considerboth the specificityof the ethical and the specific othernessthat Levinas identifiesin the face-to-face. Yetif the face is theprivileged figure for the opening of the question of the ethical,the question of the textual status of the face remain to be asked. Can therebe a figurefor the ethical? a figurefor the face?The veryquestion is problematicin that rhetoric,as a (derivative)science of figures,is incom- mensurablewith the more originarylevel of Levinas's description.Could *Abbreviations TI EmmanuelLevinas, Totality and Infinity,trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: DuquesneUniversity Press, 1969, 1979). Totalit6 et infini (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1961 ). FC EmmanuelLevinas, "Freedom and Command,"in CollectedPhilosophical Pa- pers,trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). "Libert6 et commandement,"Revue de metaphysiqueet de morale58 (1953). DL EmmanuelLevinas, Difficilelibert&: essais surle judaisme (Paris: Albin Michel, 1963,2d ed. 1967,1974). EI MauriceBlanchot, "L'Entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969). I wouldlike to thank Rebecca Conway for her helpful comments on an earlier version ofthis essay. YFS 79, Literatureand theEthical Question, ed. ClaireNouvet, ? 1991by Yale University. 135 This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 136 Yale French Studies the openingof the question of the ethical be markedwith a certainfigur- ality?And supposingthat one can speak about an alteritythat is rhetorical or textual,can the alterityof the otherand textualalterity be evenaddressed in one breath?Here again, the question of ethics and the question of lan- guage come into theirclosest possible proximity. THE FIGURE OF THE FACE "The alterityof the other,"writes Levinas in his 1961 Totalityand Infinity, "is not 'other'like thebread I eat,the land in whichI dwell,like, sometimes, myselffor myself" (TI, 33). A relationto this latter,finite alterity charac- terizeswhat Levinas calls the workof identification,that is, my abilityto absorbotherness "into my identity as thinkeror possessor" (TI, 33). (He also calls it the economyof the Same, and it refersto thehabitual exchanges that make up the self'sconcrete relationship with the world.)But the alterityof the otheris infinite.Encountered neither as a phenomenonnor as a being (somethingto be masteredor possessed), the other is encounteredas a face.It is in the encounterwith the face of the other[le visage d'Autrui]that the other'sinfinite alterity is revealed. The firstreference to the face in Totalityand Infinityreads as follows: Forthe presence before the face, my orientation toward the Other can lose the avidityof the gaze onlyby turninginto generosity, incapable of ap- proachingthe otherwith emptyhands. This relationship,established overthe thingshereafter possibly common, that is, susceptibleof being said, is the relationshipof discourse[discours]. The wayin which the otherpresents himself, exceeding the idea of the otherin me, we here nameface [nous 1appelons, en effet,visage]. [TI, 50] Levinas "names" the facehere accordingto the formalstructure of infinity as he has previouslydescribed it, "an ideatum that surpassesits idea" (TI, 49),a thoughtthat thinks more than it can contain.1But althoughhe names theface here, he will also insistthat the primordial relationship to theface is not one of naming: "Autruiis not only named, but invoked.To put it in grammaticalterms, the otherdoes not appearin the nominative,but in the vocative" (DL, 21), or as he also says, "in the dative." These grammaticalterms, which are only provisionaland which will later be abandoned, do indeed seem to illuminate the-passageabove, in 1. TheCartesian idea of infinity is a guidingnotion of Levinas's work and one of the privilegedmoments in his history of philosophy. The first reference tothe face in Totality andInfinity, cited above, introduces itas "a deformalizationorthe concretization ofthe ideaof infinity." This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions JILL ROBBINS 137 particularthe transformationthat vision undergoesin the encounterwith the face. Forin "the presencebefore a face,"the avariciousgaze turnsinto generosity["l'avidite du regardse muant en generosite"]and language ["discours"].The (ethical) necessity for this transformationstems from Levinas's assertionsthat vision is a violentway of relatingto the other.It "immobilizesits object as its theme."As a formof adequation (TI, 34), it is unable to respectwhat is infinitelyother. It seeks to absorbthat alterity, to drawit into the play ofthe Same. In this way,vision is just one instanceof theself's habitual economy,an economythat always fails to do justiceto the other.Other possibilities within this habitual economyinclude represent- ing the other,recognizing him, knowinghim, understandinghim, or any formof the theoreticalrelation. All would be unjust,for they would attempt to appropriatethe other,to reducehim to the (self-)Same. That is why,in the passage above, vision, a relationshipof adequation, turnsinto generosityand a certainkind of language,relationships of non- adequation. This transformationthat the gaze undergoesis, precisely,eth- ical in the sense thatLevinas gives it: "we name thiscalling into question of my spontaneityby the presenceof the otherethics" (TI, 43). Thus the (eth- ical) encounterwith the otherinterrupts the self'shabitual economy and its tendencyto conceive of the world as a space of possibilities and power [pouvoir].2It interruptsthe play of the Same. And let us also notein passing: the ethical transferis a figuraltransfer as well. The turnfrom vision to generosityand language,and ultimately,to voice,resembles a synesthesia,a crossing of sensoryattributes. Moreover the verb se muer, "to turn,to moult,to metamorphose,"implies a break,within the figuralturn, in phe- nomenality.We will come back to thesereflections. For now, suffice it to say thatin Levinas's account,the primordialrelationship to the otherthat one facesis "discourse."The nontotalizingrelationship to theface of the other is accomplished"in a discourse,in a conversation[entre-tien] which proposes the world.This propositionis held between(se tienentre) two pointswhich do not constitutea system,a cosmos,a totality"[TI, 96]. Thus, discourseis a relationshipwith the otherthat maintainsthe distanceof infinitesepara- tion "yet without this distance destroyingthis relationand withoutthis relation destroyingthis distance: (TI, 41). And thus, as Alphonso Lingis 2. ThroughoutTotality and Infinity,Levinas plays on pouvoir'sinterchangeable sensesof possibility and power, as partof an ongoingpolemic with Heidegger's description ofthe world as a spaceof possibilities for Dasein. This readingis problematicinsofar as it seemsto confusepossibility, an Existential,with power (a relationbetween already con- stitutedentities). By contrast, Levinas's use ofthe term, "spontaneity" is notontic and not at all psychological:it is partof his readingof the Heideggerian"being-in" as joyous possessionof the world which ignores the other. See thereading of Levinas and Heidegger byJacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics,"in Writingand Difference,trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:University of ChicagoPress, 1978), 134ff. Henceforth cited in the text. This content downloaded from 193.108.160.146 on Tue, 29 Sep 2015 09:34:58 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 138 Yale French Studies comments: "To face someone is both to perceivehim and to answer to him."3One facesthe otheras interlocutor.One facesthe otherin language. Yet let us not take forgranted that we know what we mean here by language. For the parole that ensues in response to the face of the other cannot be understoodaccording to hermeneuticmodels of "conversation" or "dialogue."It is a founding"conversation," a discoursebefore