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Analysis of Two Different Pacifist Concepts Under the Second Abe Administration from a Role Theory Perspective

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Analysis of Two Different Pacifist Concepts Under the Second Abe Administration from a Role Theory Perspective International Relations and Diplomacy, June 2019, Vol. 7, No. 06, 245-257 D doi: 10.17265/2328-2134/2019.06.001 DAVID PUBLISHING Analysis of Two Different Pacifist Concepts under the Second Abe Administration from a Role Theory Perspective Tatsuro Debroux Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain This article examines a concept ‘pacifism’ described by Japanese prime minister and Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) president Abe Shinzo and the New Komei Party's (NKP) leader Yamaguchi Natsuo through a lens of role theory to understand what roles they think Japan should play. First, how the concept 'pacifism' is used in statements (speeches, interviews, and remarks on the press) of Abe, Yamaguchi and other related materials, which are assumed to give a clue about their ideas of Japan's role in the world related to pacifism, is examined because this comparison enables to expose accord and discord between them. Second, national role conception or NRC (an actor’s subjective understanding of the country’s appropriate role in the world and the perception of domestic and foreign expectations) about Japan's role and the worldview of each party is discussed in connection with the issue of the revision of the Japanese Constitution which stipulates a general framework of Japan's foreign policy. The LDP aims to play more proactive roles by revising the constitution and Abe dismisses the current constitution as it makes only 'one-country pacifism' possible. On the other hand, the NKP tries to maintain the constitution as it is to protect traditional non-military pacifism. Keywords: Foreign policy, Security, the Japanese Constitution, The Liberal Democratic Party, The New Komei Party, Role theory Introduction This article attempts to clarify the difference in the concept of pacifism the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to which prime minister Abe Shinzo belongs and the New Komei Party (NKP) have and how the latter affects the former in policy-making by analyzing statements (speeches, interviews, and remarks on the press) by political leaders of the two political parties. Although they have formed a coalition government since 1999 except for the Democratic Party of Japan’s ruling period (September 2009-December 2012), they have expressed different viewpoints on pacifism concepts on numerous occasions. The LDP pursues pacifism through amending the Japanese Constitution, namely Article 9, to expand the Self Defense Forces (SDF)’ roles and through countering China by force. By contrast, the NKP opposes the revision of Article 9, which will lead Japan to renounce its non-military pacifist stance, cornerstone of its foreign policy, since the end of the Second World War. This difference between the two coalition parties disturbs Abe’s plan to amend the constitution now regardless of the favorable situation for him where two-thirds seats (The Mainichi, 2016)1 in the House of Tatsuro Debroux, Ph.D., law department, Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, Spain. 1 Achieving two-thirds majority votes in both chambers of the Diet is necessary to propose an amendment to the constitution. Next, the majority of the total votes in a national referendum are required. 246 ANALYSIS OF TWO DIFFERENT PACIFIST CONCEPTS Representatives and the House of Councilors in the Diet were occupied by pro-revision camp composed of the LDP, the NKP (The Japan Times, 2016)2, and the Osaka Restoration Party for the first time as a result of the House of Councilors election in July 2016. Abe wants to revise Article 9 to facilitate the use of the defense capability and to deepen security ties with the United States (US) and other like-minded countries to counter perceived threats came from China and North Korea but he cannot complete this task because the NKP hinders it. The NKP is not against the amendment to the constitution itself or the existence of the SDF but the party is based on the Buddhist group named the Soka Gakkai (literally “Value Creating Society”) which supports non-military pacifism. Therefore, the impact on role formulation by the NKP cannot be ignored. As some researchers already indicate (Sakaki, 2015; Fisker-Nielsen, 2016; Akimoto, 2016), it can be said that the NKP is not just a junior coalition partner of the LDP but rather has largely taken the initiative in the debate of the amendment to the constitution and the security policies during the second Abe administration. To make this view more persuasive, it is necessary to consider in detail what the NKP has expected of the Abe government and how the latter has reacted. In this line of thought, this article explains the interactive process between the two parties by role theory as a theoretical framework in answering the question “how different notions do the LDP and the NKP have about Japan’s pacifism?”. Role Theory Role theory originates from social psychology and sociology. The evolving intersubjective process between a decision-maker and others shapes National Role Conception (NRC), which can be defined as such: A national role conception includes the policy-makers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. (Holsti, 1970, p. 245-246) NRC consists not only of this ego-part but also of alter-part referring to expectations held by external actors (Le Prestre, 1997) and both affect formation of NRCs to generate specific role performances. In other words, decision-makers have to accommodate demands of both domestic and international actors and this social interaction (including confrontation) can induce role changes. If they fail in accommodating different roles, it will cause role conflict. It can be assumed that now Japan has had two main non-partisan NRCs in the postwar period: reliable security partner of the US and like-minded countries and non-military pacifist country. Biddle (1986, p. 82) defines role conflict as the “concurrent appearance of two or more incompatible expectations for the behavior of a [state]”. Sakaki (2011, p. 31) distinguishes two main types of role conflicts: ego/alter role conflict when there is a divergence between ego-part and alter-part about a role conception and “endogenous role conflict” where the decision-maker faces different expectations of a role concept that are incompatible or extremely difficult to reconcile within the ego-part. If a compromise can be found, both role conflicts can be avoided. In this article, Japan is supposed to be a pluralist state in which ego-part consists not only of the Japanese government but also of the NKP to emphasize that the decision-maker has to find a meeting ground with important domestic actors. The interaction between the Abe administration and the NKP is interesting to observe because the two parties have different views on what Japan should do in the world and how roles should be played and thus it is possible that Abe’s NRCs are incompatible with the NKP’s ones. 2 The NKP argued to add clauses on the people’s privacy and right to a healthy environment to the constitution (The Japan Times, 2016). ANALYSIS OF TWO DIFFERENT PACIFIST CONCEPTS 247 The Abe Administration’s NRC The LDP has advocated the amendment to the constitution drafted in 1946 under the US occupation era since 1955 when the political party was established. Abe is in this line of thought as he states that “constitutional revision has been among the fundamental thinking underlying the policies of the LDP ever since the party was founded” (Abe, 2017). He thinks that the constitution drafted by the Occupied Forces was unilateral and also does not suit the current era. As seen above he is especially averse to Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution in which it is stipulated that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized” (The Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 1946), putting strong constraints on Japan’s security activity regardless of the fact that Japan is a member of the United Nations (UN) who has the right to both individual and collective self-defense as explicitly stated in Article 51 of the UN Convention. Also, the Supreme Court has not judged the SDF’s constitutionality yet. Abe’s viewpoint is that such constraint deprives Japan of a fundamental right of an independent country. Abe’s desire to change the 2nd clause of Article 9 is clear in the LDP’s draft of its new constitution in April 2012 (Fisker-Nielsen, 2016) in which Article 9 explicitly clarifies that the constitution does not prevent Japan from having a right to “self-defense” including collective self-defense in the name of “peace and security of international society”, by “National Defense Forces” (Liberal Democratic Constitutional Reform Promotion Headquarters, 2012). The 2012 draft indicates that the new forces can theoretically participate in combats around the world with the US, Japan’s ally, unless the Diet disallows the activity. During a snap election in December 2014, he reconfirmed his intention to revise the constitution and erase the military restrictions (Carr & Wallis, 2016). Leaders’ images of the appropriate direction or functions of their country in the world are included in NRC (Holsti, 1970, pp. 245-246). As such, it is assumed that Japan’s contribution must be reinforced by making laws and building institutions. Abe’s desire of the enactment of the law allowing the exercise of collective self-defense reflects his concern that the country’s continued self-imposed ban on exercising its right to collective self-defense will adversely affect the Japan-US alliance.
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