An Analysis of the Japanese Constitutional Revision Debate: from the Eclectic Perspectives of IR Theory Daisuke Akimoto
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An Analysis of the Japanese Constitutional Revision Debate: From the Eclectic Perspectives of IR Theory Daisuke Akimoto I. Introduction II. Dichotomy in the Constitutional Revision Debate: Constitutional Protectors vs. Constitutional Revisionists III. Analytical Eclecticism and IR Theory I V. Eclectic Analysis of Constitutional Revision 1. Classical Liberalism: A Pacifist State or a Non-violent State? 2. Neo-liberalism: From a UN Peacekeeper to a UN Centrist State? 3. Classical Realism: Toward a Complete Normal State or a Militarist State? 4. Neo-realism: Will Japan Become an Equal US Ally or Seek Autonomy? V. Conclusion I. INTRODUCTION The Japanese constitutional revision issue has been one of the most controversial debates throughout postwar Japanese constitutional politics. Several reasons exist for why the Japanese Constitution needs to be modified. For example, it can be argued that new human rights, such as privacy and environmental rights, need to be added to the current Constitution. The essential argument is that the 1947 Constitution is outdated and has to be modified so that it matches the current political and legal practices. However, the main reason why Japan’s constitutional revision has been a focus of fierce political debate is because constitutional reform, especially revision or deletion of Article 9, has the potential to drastically transform Japan’s security policy. In particular, there has been a fear among the Japanese people that constitutional revision would lead to the return of an aggressive militarist state. Moreover, it is believed that Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is special in terms of renunciation of war. Most Japanese constitutional scholars support the interpretation that the Japanese Constitution prohibits any use of force including self-defense. Despite this legal interpretation, the Japanese government has regarded self-defense as well as the Self- Defense Forces (SDF) as constitutional. This gap between the ideal of the Peace Constitution and the reality of politics has been a cause of longstanding nationwide controversy and a catalyst for passionate debate. This paper points out that arguments put forward in the Japanese constitutional revision debate tend to end up with a dichotomy of constitutional protection and revision. The dichotomy, however, lacks balanced viewpoints and possible future 224 DAISUKE AKIMOTO ZJAPANR / J.JAPAN.L scenarios. In order to overcome this research gap, this study employs “analytical eclecticism” proposed by Peter Katzenstein in 2008, combining orthodox theories and an approach of international relations (IR) (classical liberalism, neo-liberalism, classical realism, neo-realism, and constructivism) to investigate possible future scenarios after constitutional revision. In addition, this research attempts to eschew taking sides in the debate in order to provide an academically neutral analysis. Finally, arguments in the eclectic analysis will be visualized with conclusive comments. II. DICHOTOMY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION DEBATE: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTORS VS. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISIONISTS Those who try to protect the Japanese Constitution (constitutional protectors or goken-ha) tend to regard Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution as a special “peace clause” compared to other countries’ constitutions.1 Constitutional protectors also regard the current Constitution as “self-created” rather than being “imposed”. For instance, Takamichi Mito observed that Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara in his book Gaikō Gojū-nen (Fifty Years of Diplomacy) made it clear that no one imposed the Constitution on Japan.2 Most Japanese constitutional lawyers can be categorized as constitutional protectors, and they have accepted an interpretation that Article 9 prohibits possession of military power even for the purpose of self-defense.3 Yasuo Hasebe argued that the Japanese Peace Constitution stems from the historical fact that the Imperial Japanese Army 1 A countless number of scholarly works on constitutional protection can be raised, but for a variety of academic arguments by several leading constitutional protectors, see, e.g., T. FUKASE / Y. SUGIHARA / Y. HIGUCHI / K. URATA, Kōkyū sekai heiwa no tameni: nihon- koku kenpō kara no teigen [In Quest of World Peace for All Time: Proposals Based on the Constitution of Japan] (Tokyo 1998); KENPŌ SAISEI FORUM (ed.), Kaiken wa hitsuyō ka [Is Constitutional Revision Necessary?] (Tokyo 2004); T. MITO, Japan’s Constitutional Revision Debate under Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and Its Implications for Japan’s Foreign Relations, in: Japanese Studies 28 (2008) 59-71. For political opinions, see JCP official home page, available at http://www.jcp.or.jp. See also SDP Official Home Page, available at http://www5.sdp.or.jp. Some constitutional protectors advocate that Article 9 should become world heritage. See, e.g., H. ŌTA / S. NAKAZAWA, Kenpō kyūjō o sekai isan ni [Let’s Make Article 9 World Heritage] (Tokyo 2006). For the analyses by the Japanese constitutional scholars against the Second Abe Cabinet’s stance on constitutional revision, see Sekai (March 2013). 2 MITO, supra note 1, 65-66; T. MITO, “Oshitsukerareta Kenpō” no seijiteki shinwa [Political Myth of “Imposed Constitution”], in: SHINDO / MITO, Sengo nihon seiji to heiwa gaikō: 21 seiki ajia kyōsei jidai no shiza [Postwar Japanese Politics and Peace Diplomacy: Perspective for Asian Coexistence Era in the 21st Century] (Kyoto 2007) 28 et seq.; K. SHIDEHARA, Gaikō gojū-nen [Diplomacy of Fifty Years] (Tokyo 2007) 213. 3 K. AIKYO, Kaiken mondai [Constitutional Revision Issue] (Tokyo 2006) 56, 191. Nr. / No. 35 (2013) CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION DEBATE 225 obstructed democracy and eventually led Japan into the Second World War.4 Likewise, Yōichi Higuchi insisted that if Article 9 is revised to legalize exercise of the right of collective self-defense, Japan would be directly involved in US-led wars.5 Moreover, some constitutional scholars believe that the existence of both the SDF and the Japan- US Security Treaty are unconstitutional.6 Politically, the Japanese Socialist and Communist parties have opposed constitutional revision. For instance, the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) proposed the policy of unarmed neutrality. Similarly, the political goals of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) are the abolition of the SDF and the Japan-US Security Treaty because the JCP believes these military powers and alliance are “unconstitutional.”7 The Social Democratic Party (SDP), as the successor to the JSP, expressed its objection to any kind of constitutional revision and contended that the SDF should be gradually diminished and transformed into an unarmed organization.8 As Richard Samuels noted, Japanese pragmatists also tend to avoid revising the current Constitution. Indeed, pragmatic Japanese prime ministers, such as Shigeru Yoshida, Hayato Ikeda, Eisaku Satō, and Kiichi Miyazawa, regarded Article 9 as a useful excuse to focus on economic development in spite of US pressure on Japan to rearm.9 Still, the pragmatists’ stance has been conditioned by the existence of leftist and pacifist politicians who held one-third of the seats in the Diet in the 1955 system. On the other hand, those who insist on constitutional revision (constitutional revisionists or kaiken-ha) argue that the 1947 Constitution needs to be amended because 10 most of them wish to normalize or maximize Japanese military power. Constitutional 4 Y. HASABE, Nihon no rikken shugi yo, doko e iku? [Where Is Japanese Constitutionalism Going?], in: RONZA HENSHŪBU (ed.), Liberaru kara no hangeki [Counterattacks from Liberals] (Tokyo 2006), 122, 125. 5 Y. HIGUCHI, Ima kenpō kyūjō o sentaku suru koto wa, higen-jitsuteki dewanai ka [Isn’t It Unrealistic to Choose Article 9 Now?], in: Kenpō Saisei Forum, supra note 1, 7. 6 See, e.g., A. MIZUSHIMA, Genjitsu to yūri shiteshimatta kenpō wa, genjitsu ni awasete aratameta hō ga ii no dewanai ka [Isn’t It Better to Revise the Constitution Which Became Detached from Reality to Adjust It to Reality?], in: Kenpō Saisei Forum, supra note 1, 151. 7 JCP, supra note 1. 8 SDP, supra note 1. 9 R. SAMUELS, Constitutional Revision in Japan: The Future of Article 9 (Washington, 2004) 6, available at http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/events/20041215.pdf, last retrieved on 5 June 2013. 10 Numerous publications on constitutional reform are available, but for a typical “normal state” debate that justifies revision of the Constitution, see I. OZAWA, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo 1994). For academic works written by a leading con- stitutional revisionist, see O. NISHI, Ten Days Inside General Headquarters (GHQ) (Tokyo 1989). For scholarly works by realist political scientists, see T. KATAOKA, The Price of a Constitution: The Origin of Japan’s Postwar Politics (New York 1991); T. INOGUCHI / P. BACON, Japan’s Emerging Role as a “Global Ordinary Power,” in: International Relations of 226 DAISUKE AKIMOTO ZJAPANR / J.JAPAN.L revisionists have two main reasons why the current Constitution should be revised. First, they believe that Japan should possess a “normal army” and therefore regard Article 9 as a hindrance to achieving this political goal. Second, they insist that the 1947 Con- stitution was imposed by the General Headquarters (GHQ) during the occupation period and extraordinarily limited Japan’s own decision-making process.11 Retrospectively, the original political platform of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was comprised of two pillars: constitutional revision and rearmament.12