DOCSLIB.ORG

Irungu Adequacy of Post-2007 Constitutional Mechanisms In

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Irungu Adequacy of Post-2007 Constitutional Mechanisms In ADEQUACY OF POST 2007 CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS IN ADDRESSING ETHNIC CONFLICT IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN KENYA BY IRUNGU KANG’ATA G80/51463/2017 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PHD) IN LAW, SCHOOL OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 2020 i DECLARATION I hereby declare that all work contained in this thesis is my original work and has not been submitted to any university for the conferment of any academic award. All sources have been duly cited and acknowledged.No external editorial services were sought. Signature……………………………. Date………………………….. IRUNGU KANG’ATA REG NO. G80/51463/2017 SUPERVISION I hereby certify that the thesis herein which is hereby presented for examination has been duly supervised by the undersigned. Signature……………………………. Date………………………….. Dr. Scholastica Omondi- Supervisor Signature……………………………. Date………………………….. Dr. Duncan Ojwang'- Supervisor Signature……………………………. Date………………………….. Dr. Lois Musikali-Supervisor ii DEDICATION This is dedicated to my late dad Joseph Irungu and late mum Margret Wangeci.Your humility and push for tenacity was such a great inspiration .Special thanks to my wife Mary and my three daughters –Rita ,Una and Etana.You have been my very good cheerleaders . To all Kenyans (and other non-Kenyans ) that have suffered political ethnic conflict including my uncles in Riftvalley (Uncle Gatweci and late Wamahiu).I hope ideas that I have generated herein can birth a peaceful solution. To Reggae which has inspired my pursuit of Justice for everyone ,I remember words of Marcus Mosiah Garvey , “Up ye mighty race,you can accomplish what you will”. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I acknowledge support and guidance from my supervisors Dr. Scholastica Omondi, Dr. Duncan Ojwang and Dr. Lois Musikali in the course of writing the thesis. Their support and patience was of immense value. I highly acknowledge the University of Nairobi for giving me the opportunity to carry out my studies in the institution. iv ADEQUACY OF POST 2007 CONSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS IN ADDRESSING ETHNIC CONFLICT IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN KENYA ABSTRACT This study was guided by four objectives : (i) examining the linkage between ethnic conflict and Presidential elections in Kenya; (ii) evaluating adequacy of post-2007 constitutional mechanisms in addressing ethnic conflict in presidential elections in Kenya; (iii) examining what lessons Kenya can draw from constitutional mechanisms of other select countries, and ( iv) making recommendations. Since 1992, cyclic ethnic conflict in presidential elections has caused deaths and loss of property. Prior to 2007, enforcement of criminal law was viewed to be the remedy. However, ethnic conflict in 2007 presidential elections led to the view that constitutional reform was the solution. In 2008 Kenya amended Constitution of Kenya of 1969 and applied consociationalism. New Constitution of 2010 dropped consociationalism and introduced devolution, nation-building measures and centripetalism. Despite these mechanisms, the problem persisted in 2013 and 2017 presidential elections hence this study. Literature on constitutional design for divided societies prescribe either accommodation (consociationalism and devolution ) or integration (centripetalism and nation-building) of ethnic groups into a state’s power structures. The main gap in this literature is failure to consider importance of electoral data in designing constitutional presciptions. This research took an explanatory and indepth approach unlike past studies that took comparative and descriptive methods. The methodology used was qualitative: interviewing key informants, experts and focus group discussions. By gathering data from the field and studying national vote electoral data from 1992 elections, it uncovered a theory that shows the higher the margin of votes between a winner and best loser in national votes in Kenya, the lower the chances of ethnic conflict. Ensuring a margin of about 18 per cent between the two main contestants constitutionally boosts chances of ethnic peace. Among other proposals, the study recommended that article 138 (4) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 be reviewed to increase the margin of victory of a winner. The law used and analysed by this study was as at 1st February 2020. v LIST OF CASES Kenyan cases 1) Al Ghurair Printing and Publishing LLC v Coalition for Reforms and Democracy & 2 Others [2017] eKLR. 2) Commissioner for the Implementation of the Constitution v Attorney General & 2 others [2013] eKLR Civil Appeal 351 of 2012. 3) Community Advocacy and Awareness Trust & 8 Others V Attorney General Interested Party National Gender and Equality Commission & 5 Others [2012] eKLR. 4) Council of Governors & 3 others v Senate & 53 others [2015] eKLR. 5) Francis Gitau Parsimei & 2 Others v The National Alliance Party & 4 Others 6) IEBC v Maina Kiai & 4 Others [2017] eKLR. 7) Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission (IEBC) v Maina Kiai, Khelef Khalifa, TiropKitur, Attorney-General, Katiba Institute & Coalition for Reforms & Democracy [2017] eKLR. 8) Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) v National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya & 6 Others [2017] eKLR. 9) John Harun Mwau& 2 others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 2 others [2017] eKLR. 10) Judges &Magistrates Vetting Board & 2 Others v Centre for Human Rights & Democracy & 11 Others(supra) (2014)eKLR. 11) National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission [2017] eKLR. 12) Peter Solomon Gichira v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & another [2017] eKLR. 13) Raila Amolo Odinga & Another v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 4 others & Attorney General & another (Petition no.1 of 2017) e KLR. vi 14) Raila Odinga &5 Others v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission &3 Others eKLR [2013]. 15) Republic v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) Ex Parte National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya & 6 Others eKLR [2017]. 16) Republic v Kenya Revenue Authority Ex-Parte Stanley MomboAmuti [2018] eKLR. 17) Dr. Timothy M. Njoya and 6 others v Honourable Attorney General and Another[2004] eklr. 18) Speaker of the Senate & Another vs. The Hon. Attorney-General & Others [2013] eKLR. 19) Tom Luusa Munyasya & another Governor, Makueni County & another [2014] eKLR. 20) Virginia Edith Wambui Otieno v Joash Ochieng Ougo& Another eKLR [1987]. 21) In Re Matter of Zipporah Wambui Mathara KLR (2010). Foreign cases 1. Guyana 1) Attorney General of Guyana v. Cedric Richardson (2018) CCJ. 2. Nigeria 1) Attorney General of Abia State & 2 Others v Attorney General of the Federation and 33 Others ( Revenue Monitoring case) 2) Attorney General of Lagos State v Attorney General of the Federation &35 Others (Urban Planning case). 3) Attorney-General of Ondo State v Attorney-General of the Federation and 35 others (2002) 6 S.C. (Pt. I) 1. 3. United Kingdom 1) The case of R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 . 2) Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke [1969] 1 AC 645: 4. South Africa 1) Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). vii LIST OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 2) The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, 1981. 3) The Basic Education Act No.14 of 2013. 4) The Charter of the United Nations, 1948. 5) The Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 6) The Constitution of Guyana of 1980. 7) The Constitution of Nigeria of 1963. 8) The Constitution of Nigeria of 1979. 9) The Constitution of Nigeria of 1999. 10) The European Convention on Human Rights, 1950. 11) The Good Friday Agreement of 1998(United Kingdom). 12) The Government of Ireland Act of 1927(United Kingdom). 13) The Kenya Information and Communication Act of 1998. 14) The National Accord and Reconciliation Act no 4 of 2008. 15) The National Cohesion and Integration Act No 12 of 2008. 16) The National Accord and Reconciliation Act No. 4 of 2008. 17) The Repealed Constitution of Kenya of 1969. 18) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998. viii OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS 1) Centripetalism : - A set of legal rules that aim to achieve stability and peace in ethnically divided societies by enhancing political rewards for moderation. This is by adopting electoral rules that require winning candidates to seek cross-ethnic support. In Kenya, Article 138(4) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 is an example of a centripetal rule. It indicates that, “A candidate shall be declared elected as President if the candidate receives (a) more than half of all the votes cast in the election; and (b) at least 25 per cent of the votes cast in each of more than half of the counties”. 2) Consociationalism: – A set of legal rules, usually established in states with major internal ethnic conflict, that aim to maintain stability and peace by co-opting into state’s power structures, elites of all major ethnic groups. In Kenya, The National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 (Act no.4 of 2008), which established a Government of National Unity comprised of major elites from various ethnic groups in Kenya after 2007/08 ethnic conflict, is an example of a consociation law. 3) Ethnocracy: – A type of governance structure where the state is appropriated by an ethnic group(s) to cement its power and interests. 4) Immobilism : - A governance stalemate caused by resistance to change and or inertia by leaders and policy makers. 5) Welfarism : - Policies
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Kenya's Supreme Court
    Kenya’s Supreme Court: Old Wine in New Bottles? By Special Correspondent As the six Supreme Court judges were adjudicating Kenya’s first presidential election petition in March 2013, Justice Kalpana Hasmukhrai Rawal was waiting for a new president to take office and the newly elected National Assembly to convene so that her nomination as Deputy Chief Justice could move forward. The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) had settled on her appointment after interviewing a shortlist of applicants in February 2013. The Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board had earlier found her to be suitable to continue serving as a Court of Appeal judge. Justice Rawal eventually joined the Supreme Court on 3 June 2013. Two years later, Justice Rawal became the second Deputy Chief Justice (after Nancy Baraza, who resigned after she was heavily criticised for abusing her authority by threatening a security guard after the guard demanded to search her at a mall) to be embroiled in controversy. In 2015, Rawal challenged a notice that she retire at the age of 70. Around the same time, the then Chief Justice, Dr Willy Mutunga, would announce that he wanted to retire early so that the next Chief Justice would be appointed well ahead of the next election. In May 2014, Justice Philip Kiptoo Tunoi and High Court judge David Onyancha challenged the JSC’s decision to retire them at the age of 70. They argued that they were entitled to serve until they reached the age of 74 because they had been first appointed judges as under the old constitution. What seemed like a simple question about the retirement age of judges led to an unprecedented breakdown in the collegiate working atmosphere among the Supreme Court judges that had been maintained during the proceedings of the presidential election petition.
    [Show full text]
  • Kenya Election History 1963-2013
    KENYA ELECTION HISTORY 1963-2013 1963 Kenya Election History 1963 1963: THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS These were the last elections in pre-independent Kenya and the key players were two political parties, KANU and KADU. KADU drew its support from smaller, less urbanized communities hence advocated majimboism (regionalism) as a means of protecting them. KANU had been forced to accept KADU’s proposal to incorporate a majimbo system of government after being pressured by the British government. Though KANU agreed to majimbo, it vowed to undo it after gaining political power. The majimbo constitution that was introduced in 1962 provided for a two-chamber national legislature consisting of an upper (Senate) and lower (House of Representative). The Campaign KADU allied with the African People’s Party (APP) in the campaign. KANU and APP agreed not to field candidates in seats where the other stood a better chance. The Voting Elections were marked by high voter turnout and were held in three phases. They were widely boycotted in the North Eastern Province. Violence was reported in various parts of the country; four were killed in Isiolo, teargas used in Nyanza and Nakuru, clashes between supporters in Machakos, Mombasa, Nairobi and Kitale. In the House of Representative KANU won 66 seats out of 112 and gained working majority from 4 independents and 3 from NPUA, KADU took 47 seats and APP won 8. In the Senate KANU won 19 out 38 seats while KADU won 16 seats, APP won 2 and NPUA only 1. REFERENCE: NATIONAL ELECTIONS DATA BOOK By Institute for Education in Democracy (published in 1997).
    [Show full text]
  • The Kenya General Election
    AAFFRRIICCAA NNOOTTEESS Number 14 January 2003 The Kenya General Election: senior ministerial positions from 1963 to 1991; new Minister December 27, 2002 of Education George Saitoti and Foreign Minister Kalonzo Musyoka are also experienced hands; and the new David Throup administration includes several able technocrats who have held “shadow ministerial positions.” The new government will be The Kenya African National Union (KANU), which has ruled more self-confident and less suspicious of the United States Kenya since independence in December 1963, suffered a than was the Moi regime. Several members know the United disastrous defeat in the country’s general election on December States well, and most of them recognize the crucial role that it 27, 2002, winning less than one-third of the seats in the new has played in sustaining both opposition political parties and National Assembly. The National Alliance Rainbow Coalition Kenyan civil society over the last decade. (NARC), which brought together the former ethnically based opposition parties with dissidents from KANU only in The new Kibaki government will be as reliable an ally of the October, emerged with a secure overall majority, winning no United States in the war against terrorism as President Moi’s, fewer than 126 seats, while the former ruling party won only and a more active and constructive partner in NEPAD and 63. Mwai Kibaki, leader of the Democratic Party (DP) and of bilateral economic discussions. It will continue the former the NARC opposition coalition, was sworn in as Kenya’s third government’s valuable mediating role in the Sudanese peace president on December 30.
    [Show full text]
  • Theo-Political Dominance of Afro- Pentecostalism in the 21St Century: Lessons from the Kenyan Socio-Ecclesial Context
    THEO-POLITICAL DOMINANCE OF AFRO- PENTECOSTALISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: LESSONS FROM THE KENYAN SOCIO-ECCLESIAL CONTEXT Julius Gathogo The article seeks to build the case for the rise of afro-Pentecostalism, as the dominant ecclesiastical paradigm in the Kenya of the 21st century; which has now surpassed the traditional ecclesiological axis (refer to Catholics, Anglicans, Methodists, Presbyterian and other mainline churches). Their social influence can no longer be underestimated as they have also abandoned their traditional exclusivist approach to inclusive and holistic approaches in dispensing their spirituality discourses. Following Kenya’s independence from the British, in 1963, the mission churches continued with their holistic and socially influential ministries to the last half of the 20th century. In the twenty-first century however, the article argues, Pentecostalism, which has repackaged itself as the “real” guardians of the African heritage and spirituality has however taken over some of the critical socio-political roles previously dominated by some of the mainline churches. In its methodology, the article surveys the changing patterns of Pentecostalism wherein its ability to capture African ethos of wholeness where religion provides solution to every life problem, such as disunity, health and economy among others—is now manifest. Does afro- Pentecostalism have any relevance in the post August 2010 Kenyan national referendum which ushered in a new socio-political dynamics following the promulgation of the new constitution? Addressing cutting- edge issues facing the African society, without necessarily losing their gospel constituency makes the emerging Christianities become afro- Pentecostalism. The article covers a wide range of issues, scholarly literature and reports (including newspaper articles and blogs etc.), and other background materials.
    [Show full text]
  • An Evaluation of Moderators' Performance And
    AN EVALUATION OF MODERATORS’ PERFORMANCE AND PERCEPTIONS ON COVERAGE OF ISSUES IN 2013 PRESIDENTIAL DEBATE IN KENYA BY CITIZEN TELEVISION BY LIBWEGE MACDONALD OVIYO A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA STUDIES. DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA TECHNOLOGY MASENO UNIVERSITY © 2017 DECLARATION This research project is my original work and has not been submitted for academic award in any other university …………………………… …………………….. Signature Date Candidate: LIBWEGE MACDONALD OVIYO PG/MA/0069/2012 This research project has been submitted for examination with my approval as university supervisor …………………………… ………………………….. Signature Date Supervisor: Dr. ABIGAEL MASASABI Lecturer: Department of Music and Theatre Studies Maseno University ii ACKNOWLEGMENTS I greatly acknowledge my research supervisor Dr. Abigael Masasabi for her encouragement and support toward completion of this research project. You repeatedly and promptly made time available to critically evaluate drafts, tireless guiding and strengthening this study. Your kindness, patience and dedication have been immeasurable, invaluable and inspirational. I am really greatly indebted for your contribution. Without it, this study would not have seen the light of the day. I would also like to thank the chairman of communication and media department Dr. Charles Nyambuga of Maseno University for helping me to lay the groundwork for this project. I am also grateful to other members of Maseno University media department for their meticulous professional guidance during this study. My heartfelt thanks also go to my family. It supported me in every way possible. Their love and encouragement has shaped who I am today. Finally I would like to thank my mother Anitter Kangashi and my late dad Nathan Oviyo for unending devotion to my education from an early age as it has been instrumental in my career both inside and outside academics.
    [Show full text]
  • Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
    Responses to Information Requests - Immigration and Refugee Board of... https://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/country-information/rir/Pages/index.aspx?... Kenya: The Mungiki group, including organizational structure, leadership, membership, recruitment and activities; the relationship between the government and the group, including protection offered to its victims (2016-April 2018) 1. Overview For information on the Mungiki group for the period of 2010 to 2013, see Response to Information Request KEN104594 of November 2013. Sources describe the Mungiki as an "outlawed religious Kikuyu Kenyan sect" (M&G Africa 15 July 2016) or an outlawed sect "which originally stems from members of Kenya's influential Kikuyu tribe" (FPA 14 Apr. 2016). According to sources, the Kikuyu are the largest ethnic group in Kenya (IRIN 26 Oct. 2017; The Washington Times 11 May 2017). The Washington Times reports that the Kikuyu comprise an "estimated 20 percent of the total population of 46 million" and has "produced three out [of] Kenya's four presidents since independence," including President Uhuru Kenyatta (The Washington Times 11 May 2017). Freedom House refers to the Mungiki as an "ethnically affiliated gan[g]" (Freedom House 2017). Sources refer to the Mungiki as a pro-government "gang" (The Washington Post 28 Nov. 2017) or "militia" (Human Rights Watch 25 Feb. 2018). A 2017 report by the International Federation for Human Rights (Fédération internationale des ligues des droits de l'homme, FIDH) and the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) [1] states, without providing further details, that the Mungiki group "seems to have rebranded as Eminants of Mungiki" (FIDH and KHRC July 2017, 29).
    [Show full text]
  • Africa Watch Overview
    AFRICA WATCH OVERVIEW Human Rights Developments In Africa, the year 1991 proved momentous. Several despotic governments lost power, others were belatedly forced to concede the principle of democratic accountability, and two major long-running civil wars came to an end. The "winds of change" that had become noticeable in 1990 were blowing more strongly still. However, human rights violations continued in all parts of the continent, in some places reaching unprecedented levels. Africa Watch faced increased demands for its work, and was continually faced with new challenges. Without doubt, the most important and hopeful development in 1991 was the rapid spread of demands for democratization. Following the end of the Cold War, dictators who had previously relied on the unquestioning support of the United States, the Soviet Union or France suddenly found themselves as clients in search of a patron. As the value of these dictators as pawns in a global chess game diminished, the former patrons were unwilling to continue underwriting authoritarian, warlike and abusive governments. The withdrawal of international support forced these dictators to confront internal pressures for change. Many Africans who had courageously struggled for years to secure human rights and civil liberties began to see the prospect of success. Movements for multiparty democracy, civil liberties and human rights blossomed and gained confidence throughout the year. The most auspicious change in 1991 was the election in Zambia, in which President Kenneth Kaunda, who had ruled the country since independence, was defeated in a fair multiparty election. Kaunda gave his successor a tour of the State House, handed over the keys and left peacefully for his farm, setting an important precedent for the peaceful transfer of power in Africa.
    [Show full text]
  • Kenya: Post Election Analysis, Iposos
    Post-Election Analysis: Prepared by Ipsos Synovate Kenya Release Date: 15th March 2013 © 2012 Ipsos. All rights reserved. Contains Ipsos' Confidential and Proprietary information and may not be disclosed or reproduced without the prior written consent of Ipsos. Contents . Objectives . County outcomes: how close were the results of the last Ipsos poll, and what explains the difference? . Presidential race outcome: how close was the outcome to the last Ipsos poll, and what explains the difference? 2 Objectives The key objectives of this presentation is as follows: To show the difference between the last (22nd February) Ipsos poll and the IEBC election results To explain the differences between the two 3 Key Assumption That the IEBC figures with regard to both turnout and results are accurate (in light of the pending court petition) 4 National / Presidential Ipsos Poll vis a vis IEBC Results 5 Opinion Polls Trends from April 2012 Ipsos last poll (Released 22nd February 2013) 100% Raila Odinga Kalonzo Musyoka Uhuru Kenyatta William Ruto Martha Karua Musalia Mudavadi 80% Eugene Wamalwa Peter Kenneth Prof James Ole Kiyapi Others None/Undecided 60% Upward trend for Uhuru and Raila from April 2012 but steep rise from December 2012 46% 44.4% 40% 36% 34% 34% 44.8% 33% 33% 40% 30% 26% 27% 22% 23% 22% 20% 13% 12% 13% 8%9% 9%8% 9% 8%9% 7% 7%6% 5% 4% 5% 4% 5% 5% 5.3% 3% 3% 2% 2%3% 2% 3.1% 0% 0% 1% 0% 0%1% 0%1% 0%1% 0.1%0.8% April 2012 Jul 2012 Sept 2012 Nov 2012 Dec 2012 Jan 2013 Feb 2013 6 IEBC Results vis a vis Final Ipsos poll (Released 22nd February
    [Show full text]
  • Justice Under Siege: the Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law University at Buffalo School of Law Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2001 Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya Makau Mutua University at Buffalo School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles Part of the Judges Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons Recommended Citation Makau Mutua, Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya, 23 Hum. Rts. Q. 96 (2001). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/569 Copyright © 2001 The Johns Hopkins University Press. This article was first published in Human Rights Quarterly 23.1 (2001), 96–118. Reprinted with permission by Johns Hopkins University Press. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya Makau Mutua* I. INTRODUCTION Constitutionalism and the rule of law are the central features of any political democracy that respects human rights. An independent judiciary,
    [Show full text]
  • Kenya General Elections, 4 March 2013
    Texte GENERAL ELECTIONS IN KENYA ELECTION OBSERVATION DELEGATION 2-6 March 2013 REPORT BY KRZYSZTOF LISEK, CHAIR OF THE DELEGATION Annexes: I. List of participating MEPs II. Declaration of Mr Krzysztof Lisek, Chair of the EP Delegation EN EN INTRODUCTION Following an invitation on 11 April 2012 from the Chair of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) of Kenya and the decision of the High Representative and Vice-President of the Commission Mrs Catherine Ashton on the deployment of an EU Election Observation Mission (EU EOM), the Conference of Presidents of the European Parliament authorised on 17 January 2013 the sending of a delegation to observe the presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in Kenya. The European Parliament has always attached the greatest importance to the development of the democratic process in Kenya. Though holding elections since 1962 and a multiparty democracy since 1992, the country had serious institutional problems which made it hard for elections to be completed smoothly. After the violent clashes following the Kenyan elections in December 2007, the 2013 General elections - which took place under a completely new legal framework - were of vital importance for the country. The EU Election Observation Mission, present in Kenya since 19 January 2013, was led by Chief Observer Alojz PETERLE, a former Prime Minister of Slovenia and a Member of the European Parliament. Altogether the EOM deployed 65 observers (from 26 different EU Member States, as well as from Norway and Switzerland) in the country. A delegation of the European Parliament joined the EU EOM on 2 March. The delegation, led by Mr Krzysztof LISEK, was also composed of Mr Eduard KUKAN, Ms Eleni THEOCHAROUS, Mr Enrique GUERRERO SALOM, Mr Patrice TIROLIEN, Mr Jan MULDER, and Mr Jacek WŁOSOWICZ.
    [Show full text]
  • AFRICOG-Pre-Election
    Pre –election Public poll February 26th 2013 Methodology The poll was sponsored by Africog and conducted by Infotrak Research & Consulting between 24th to 26th February, 2013 A sample of 3244 respondents was interviewed to represent the Kenyan BVR registered voters of 14,337,399 translating into a minimum margin of error of -/+ 1.7 at 95% degree of confidence. The survey was conducted in 44 counties of the 47 counties of Kenya. For questions related to voter intention, only the answers of persons intending to vote were used (n=3230). Using preliminary BVR voter register as the sample frame, the sample was designed using Population Proportionate to Size (PPS) and mainly entailed; • Use of stratification, random and systematic sampling in drawing regions to be covered • Ensuring further distribution by area, age and gender • Using the Constituencies as the key administrative boundary • Ensured that every person in the sampled area had a known chance of being selected Fieldwork was using face to face interviews • 25% of the interviews were back checked for quality control purposes Data processing & analysis was carried using IBM SPSS 20.0 The questions asked of respondents are highlighted for each graphic presentation Margin of Error explained Margin of error decreases as the sample size increases, but only up to a certain point. A very small sample, such as 50 respondents, has about a 14 percent margin of error while a sample of 2,000 has a margin of error of 3 percent. By doubling the sample to 2,000, the margin of error only decreases from +/-3 percent to +/- 2 percent and +/-1.8 percent for a sample size of 4000.
    [Show full text]
  • Human Rights Abuse in Kenya Under Daniel Arap Moi, 1978-2001
    HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE IN KENYA UNDER DANIEL ARAP MOI, 1978-2001 Korwa G. Adar and Isaac M Munyae INTRODUCTION Jomo Kenyatta, the founding president of Kenya, passed away in August 1978 after fourteen years as head of state. His successor, Daniel Arap Moi, served as Kenyattas vice-president from 1966 - 1978. During Kenyatta's presidency, the political realm was dominated by a small Kikuyu elite, the so-called Kiambu Mafia, from Kenyata's home district. This group undermined Kenyatta's nationalist and populist background, alienating other ethnic groups, as well as many non-conforming Kikuyus. Although Moi was loyal to Kenyatta, he was never accepted into Kenyatta's inner circle. He also came from a small community--the Kalenjin. He was regarded by Kenyans to be the right candidate to steer the country towards a more accommodating human rights era, without ethnic dominance. This general perception of Moi by Kenyans was reinforced by the decisions and promises he made immediately he took over the presidency. In December 1978 Moi released all twenty-six political detainees across the ethnic spectrum, most of whom had been languishing in jails for years.1 He also reassured Kenyans that his administration would not condone drunkenness, "tribalism", corruption, and smuggling, problems already deeply entrenched in Kenya.2 His administration also took quick actions against top civil servants accused of corruption, culminating in the resignations of officials including the Police Commissioner, Bernard Hinga. These actions were interpreted by Kenyans as an indication of the dawn of a new era, a conducive environment for adherence to democracy and human rights.
    [Show full text]