AGAINST ALL ODDS? THE EFFECT OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS: A CASE STUDY OF VOTERS IN NAIROBI
Stephanie Plata
2016 AGAINST ALL ODDS? THE EFFECT OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS: A CASE STUDY OF VOTERS IN NAIROBI
by
STEPHANIE PLATA
(Student number 208094576)
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of
DOCTOR PHILOSOPHIAE
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND MANAGEMENT
in the Faculty of Arts
at the
NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY
SUPERVISOR: DR. G.J. BRADSHAW
i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To my twin brother Christopher. My gratitude for his love, encouragement and support throughout my study knows no bounds.
To my whole family who always believed in me.
To all my friends and colleagues, especially Ninnia and Claudia, for their tireless help and support. I owe you a lot.
To my employer, GESIS – Leibniz-Institute for the Social Sciences, especially its former President, Prof. Dr. York Sure-Vetter. Your support contributed tremendously to the success of the study.
To my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Gavin J. Bradshaw, who inspired me to further investigate into electoral conflict.
To my NGO-contacts and interpreters who guided and supported me during my field work in Kenya.
To my Kenyan interview partners. I dedicate this work to you. May your voices be heard.
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AGAINST ALL ODDS? THE EFFECT OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS: A CASE STUDY OF VOTERS IN NAIROBI
Table of contents
1 General Introduction ...... 1
1.1 Background to the Study ...... 1
1.2 Problem Statement ...... 4
1.3 Research Questions ...... 5
1.4 Aims and Objectives to be Achieved ...... 5
1.5 Significance of the Study ...... 7
1.6 Related Research ...... 9
1.7 Motivation for the Study ...... 16
1.8 Limitations of the Study ...... 17
2 Theoretical Background ...... 19
2.1 Introduction ...... 19
2.2 What is Political Participation? ...... 20
2.3 Theory of Human Empowerment ...... 23
2.4 Theory of Trauma Response ...... 29
2.5 Conclusion ...... 31
3 Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis ...... 32
3.1 Introduction ...... 32
3.2 Research Design ...... 32
3.3 Research Methodology ...... 37
3.3.1 Data Collection ...... 37
3.3.2 Sampling Procedures ...... 39
3.3.3 Research Instrumentation ...... 43
3.3.4 Why Qualitative Research? ...... 45 iv
3.3.5 Quality in Qualitative Research ...... 47
3.4 Epistemological Approach ...... 54
3.5 Sources of Data ...... 57
3.6 Case Selection ...... 58
3.7 Ethical Considerations ...... 59
3.8 Data Analysis ...... 60
3.8.1 The Transcripts ...... 63
3.8.2 Computer Assisted Analysis of Qualitative Data ...... 64
3.8.3 Conclusion ...... 64
4 The Democratization Process in Africa ...... 66
4.1 Introduction ...... 66
4.2 Defining Democracy ...... 66
4.3 Defining Democratization ...... 72
4.4 The Role of Elections for Democracy: Contradictory Findings ...... 73
4.5 The Democratization Process in Africa in the 1990s: Between Autocracy and Democracy ...... 76
4.6 The Limits of Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Developments since 2000 . 83
4.7 Conclusion ...... 92
5 Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know? ...... 94
5.1 Introduction ...... 94
5.2 What is Social Conflict? ...... 94
5.3 Protracted Social Conflict ...... 99
5.4 Political Conflict ...... 100
5.5 Towards a Definition of Violent Electoral Conflict ...... 101
5.5.1 Causes of Violent Electoral Conflict ...... 106
5.5.2 The Consequences of Violent Electoral Conflict in Africa ...... 113
5.5.3 The Quantitative Dimension of Violent Electoral Conflict in Africa ...... 114 v
5.5.4 Conclusion ...... 118
6 Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya ...... 119
6.1 Introduction ...... 119
6.2 Kenya – A Suitable Case Study for Analyzing Violent Electoral Conflict ...... 120
6.3 A short Introduction to the Political System of Kenya ...... 121
6.4 Kenya’s Democracy After the Implementation of the New Constitution ...... 128
6.5 Conclusion and Implications ...... 135
6.6 Conflict in Kenya ...... 136
6.6.1 General Remarks ...... 136
6.6.2 Social Conflict ...... 137
6.6.3 Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya ...... 149
6.7 Kenya’s Elections at a Glance ...... 166
6.7.1 The 1992 Elections ...... 166
6.7.2 The 1997 Elections ...... 167
6.7.3 The 2002 Elections ...... 169
6.7.4 The 2007 Elections ...... 170
6.7.5 The 2013 Elections ...... 172
6.7.6 Conclusion ...... 181
7 Data Analysis: Presentation of Data ...... 184
7.1 Introduction ...... 184
7.2 Determination of Material ...... 184
7.3 Analysis of Inception ...... 186
7.4 Descriptive Details of Interview Partners ...... 186
7.5 Procedure of the Coding Process ...... 189
7.5.1 Getting to Know the Data ...... 189
7.5.2 Building a Coding Frame ...... 190
7.6 Trying the Coding Frame: a Pilot Phase ...... 192 vi
7.7 The Main Coding Phase ...... 194
7.8 Conclusion ...... 195
8 Research Findings ...... 197
8.1 General Remarks ...... 197
8.2 Year and Form of Experience ...... 198
8.3 The Perpetrators ...... 203
8.4 Sexual Violence ...... 214
8.5 The Impact of Violent Electoral Conflict on Participants’ Lives ...... 232
8.5.1 Psychological Changes ...... 233
8.5.2 Economic impairment ...... 240
8.5.3 Change in Family Life and Change in Sexual Life ...... 242
8.5.4 Physical Impairment ...... 244
8.5.5 Change in Social Life ...... 246
8.6 Coping Strategies and Defense Mechanisms ...... 246
8.6.1 Active Coping Strategies ...... 250
8.6.2 Passive Coping Strategies ...... 255
8.7 The Effect of Violent Electoral Conflict on Participants’ Political Participation ... 270
8.7.1 Form of Political Participation Practiced ...... 270
8.7.2 Change in Political Participation ...... 273
8.7.3 Individual Motives for Participants’ Changed/Unchanged Political Participation 280
8.7.4 Conclusion ...... 287
8.8 Citizen- and Voter-Typology for 34 Victims of Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya 288
8.8.1 The Voting Citizen ...... 289
8.8.2 The Resigned Citizen ...... 301
8.8.3 The Passive Citizen ...... 305
vii
8.8.4 The Active Citizen ...... 308
8.8.5 Interim Conclusion ...... 311
9 Conclusion and Recommendations ...... 313
Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………...320
Addendum …………………………………………………………………………………..361
viii
Abstract
Competitive national elections can play a significant role in the consolidation process of developing and established democracies alike. Nevertheless, if not handled adequately, they have the potential to bring long-existing, existential conflict lines to the surface. This electoral conflict, becoming manifest in election violence, has the potential to shy people off from voting and negatively affect their attitude towards elections and democracy in general.
The present study examined the ways in which violent electoral conflict affected the political participation and the personal attitudes towards democracy of ordinary Kenyan citizens. Kenya has experienced violent electoral conflict repeatedly since the re-introduction of competitive elections in 1992 and became one of its prime examples due to the devastating 2008 post-election clashes.
In order to answer the research questions, 32 semi-structured interviews with 34 victims of electoral violence coming from four main ‘hotspot areas’ of the 2008 post-election violence as well as four expert interviews were conducted.
The study finds that the experience of violent electoral conflict led to diametrically opposed reactions in the behaviour of political participation among respondents. About two-thirds of them indicated a change in their behaviour of political participation. With 33% of the respondents found to be “participating more”, this group even outnumbers its “participating less” counterpart (30%). This finding is rather surprising as the experience of electoral violence is usually associated with the tendency to shy off from political participation, not only in Kenya.
Based on their attitudinal dispositions towards democracy in general and towards democracy in Kenya more specifically, as well as towards Kenyan elections, politics and politicians, a fourfold typology of Kenyan citizens was developed from the sample. It includes: the voting citizen, the resigned citizen, the passive citizen, and the active citizen. The voting citizen with no further interest in politics or political participation was found to be the most prevalent type of citizen in the sample. Attention needs to be taken towards the resigned citizen, which could, in case of further violent electoral conflict and the continuing marginalization of specific ethnic groups, cause a threat to the stabilization process of Kenya’s democracy.
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List of Acronyms
ACHPR = African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights
ADR = Alternative Dispute Resolution
AFP = Agence France Presse
AFRICOG = African Centre for Open Governance
AP = Associated Press
APA = American Psychiatric Association
ART = Article
AU = African Union
BVR = Biometric Voter Registration
CCAPS = Climate Change and African Political Stability
CMS = Conflict Management System
CSES = Comparative Study of Electoral Systems
DP = Democratic Party
EAC = East African Community
ECK = Electoral Commission of Kenya
GST = General Strain Theory
ICC = International Criminal Court
IDP = Internally Displaced People
IEBC = Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IEMD = Index of Electoral Malpractice Dataset
KANU = Kenya African National Union
KEDOF = Kenya Elections Domestic Observation Forum
KNC = Kenya National Congress
Ksh = Kenyan Shilling
LDP = Liberal Democratic Party x
MRC = Mombasa Republic Council
NARC = National Rainbow Coalition
NDI = National Democratic Institute
NELDA = National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy
NGO = Non Governmental Organisation
NMMU = Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
ODM = Orange Democratic Movement
OMO = Operation Moi Out
OMW = Operation Moi Win
PNU = Party of National Unity
POA = Party of Action
QED = Quality of Elections Data
SC = Security Council
SCAD = Social Conflict Analysis Database
TNA = The National Alliance
UDF = United Democratic Forum Party
UN = United Nations
UNHCR = United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
URP = United Republican Party
WDM = Wiper Democratic Movement
YK ’92 = Youth for KANU
xi
List of Tables
TABLE 1. RELEVANT SITUATIONS FOR DIFFERENT RESEARCH STRATEGIES ...... 33
TABLE 2. FOUR CATEGORIES OF SCIENTIFIC PARADIGMS AND THEIR ELEMENTS ...... 56
TABLE 3. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CODING AND QCA...... 62
TABLE 4. LONGITUDINAL DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL RIGHT - AND CIVIL LIBERTY VALUES OF 38 COUNTRIES IN SUB -SAHARA AFRICA
BETWEEN 1972 AND 1999...... 82
TABLE 5. GLOBAL STATUS BY COUNTRY IN SUB -SAHARAN AFRICA IN 1972, 1990 AND 1999...... 82
TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF THE POLITICAL RIGHT VALUES OF FOUR AFRICAN COUNTRIES BETWEEN 1990 AND 2013...... 84
TABLE 7. COMPARISON OF CIVIL LIBERTY VALUES OF FOUR AFRICAN COUNTRIES BETWEEN 1990 AND 2013...... 84
TABLE 8. LONGITUDINAL DEVELOPMENT OF AVERAGE POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTY VALUES FROM 1993 TO 2012 OF 48
COUNTRIES IN SUB -SAHARAN AFRICA ...... 85
TABLE 9. SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN 18 COUNTRIES IN SUB -SAHARAN AFRICA DEVELOPED ON THE BASIS OF THE AFROBAROMETER
ROUND 5 DATA ...... 89
TABLE 10. DEVELOPMENT OF THE VARIABLE “SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY” IN 18 COUNTRIES IN SUB -SAHARAN AFRICA TAKEN FROM
THE AFROBAROMETER ROUND 3 TO 5...... 90
TABLE 11. VALUES FOR THE VARIABLE “H OW MUCH DO YOU FEAR POLITICAL INTIMIDATION OR VIOLENCE ?” FROM THE
AFROBAROMETER ROUND 4/2008 FOR 18 COUNTRIES , PERCENTAGES OF THE TOTAL ...... 91
TABLE 12. AN OVERVIEW FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING ELECTION -RELATED VIOLENCE ...... 107
TABLE 13. FREQUENCY OF HIGH LEVELS OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT ...... 117
TABLE 14. SCATTER PLOT FOR THE NUMBER OF CONFLICT EVENTS AND THE NUMBER OF DEATHS IN SOCIAL CONFLICT PER YEAR ...... 141
TABLE 15. SHAPIRO -WILK AND SHAPIRO -FRANCIS TEST OF THE VARIABLES NUMBER OF PEOPLE BEING KILLED IN SOCIAL CONFLICT PER
YEAR (NDEATH ) AND THE NUMBER OF CONFLICT EVENTS PER YEAR (NE VENTS )...... 142
TABLE 16. SPEARMAN -TEST FOR CORRELATION AND SIGNIFICANCE ...... 142
TABLE 17. POISSON -REGRESSION FOR THE NUMBER OF CONFLICT EVENTS PER YEAR (NE VENTS ) AND THE NUMBER OF DEATHS PER YEAR
(N DEATH )...... 143
TABLE 18. EVENT TYPES OVER TIME ...... 147
TABLE 19. ISSUES CAUSING SOCIAL CONFLICT , KENYA 1990-2013...... 150
TABLE 20. ISSUES FOR SOCIAL CONFLICT IN KENYA , COMPARISON OF THE 1990 S, 2000 S, AND 2010 –2013...... 151
TABLE 21. TOTAL NUMBER OF DEATHS, AND DEATHS CAUSED BY VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT , COMPARED BY DECADE ...... 153
TABLE 22. NUMBER OF CONFLICT EVENTS AND NUMBER OF DEATHS IN KENYA SORTED BY YEAR ...... 156
TABLE 23. NUMBER OF CONFLICT EVENTS AND NUMBER OF DEATHS PER ELECTION YEAR ...... 157
TABLE 24. SHAPIRO WILK TEST AND SHAPIRO FRANCIA TEST FOR NORMALITY OF VARIABLES , NUMBER OF DEATHS (NDEATH ), AND
NUMBER OF CONFLICT EVENTS (NE VENTS )...... 157
TABLE 25. POISSON REGRESSION OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN ELECTION YEAR (ELECTIONYEAR ) AND THE NUMBER OF CONFLICT
EVENTS (NE VENTS ) PER YEAR ...... 158
TABLE 26. POISSON REGRESSION OF THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VARIABLES ELECTION YEAR (ELECTIONYEAR ) AND THE NUMBER OF
DEATHS (NDEATH ) PER YEAR ...... 159 xii
TABLE 27. DEFINING ELECTION PERIODS FOLLOWING STRAUS & TAYLOR (2012)...... 160
TABLE 28. CONFLICT EVENTS (ELECTION TIME AND NON-ELECTION TIME ) SORTED BY ISSUE FOR CONFLICT ...... 161
TABLE 29. APPLYING STRAUS AND TAYLORS ’ OPERATIONALIZATION OF ELECTION TIME ...... 162
TABLE 30. NUMBER OF CONFLICT EVENTS DURING AND OUTSIDE ELECTION TIMES AS DEFINED BY STRAUS AND TAYLOR (2012). .... 162
TABLE 31. SHAPIRO WILK TEST AND SHAPIRO FRANCIA TEST FOR NORMALITY OF VARIABLES —NUMBER OF DEATHS (NDEATH ) AND
NUMBER OF CONFLICT EVENTS (NE VENTS )...... 163
TABLE 32. POISSON REGRESSION FOR ELECTION TIME —APPLYING STRAUS AND TAYLOR ’S OPERATIONALIZATION FRAME —AND THE
NUMBER OF CONFLICT EVENTS (NE VENTS )...... 163
TABLE 33. POISSON REGRESSION FOR ELECTION TIME —APPLYING STRAUS AND TAYLOR ’S OPERATIONALIZATION FRAME —AND THE
NUMBER OF DEATHS (NDEATH )...... 164
TABLE 34. ELECTIVE POSITIONS AT A GLANCE ...... 173
TABLE 35. 2007 AND 2013 PRESIDENTIAL ALLIANCES /CANDIDATES AT A GLANCE ...... 176
TABLE 36. ASSUMED MOTIVATION OF THE PERPETRATORS OF THE 2008 POST -ELECTION VIOLENCE BY THE VICTIMS OF THIS VIOLENCE ...... 213
xiii
List of Figures
FIGURE 1. A THEMATIC APPROACH TO ELECTION CONFLICT AND SELECTED RESPONSES ...... 13
FIGURE 2. THE HUMAN EMPOWERMENT MODEL ...... 24
FIGURE 3. THE CHAIN OF PROCESSES PROMOTING HUMAN EMPOWERMENT ...... 27
FIGURE 4. LAZARUS ’ DESCRIPTION OF THE COPING PROCESS WITH A STRESSFUL SITUATION ...... 30
FIGURE 5. BASIC TYPES OF DESIGNS FOR CASE STUDIES ...... 35
FIGURE 6. LEVEL OF INVESTIGATION AND LEVEL OF ANALYSIS ...... 36
FIGURE 7. HELIX STRUCTURE OF A THEORETIC QUALITATIVE CONTENT ANALYSIS (QCA)...... 63
FIGURE 8. THE LIBERAL DEMOCRACY MECHANISM ...... 72
FIGURE 9. SOCIAL CONFLICT EVENTS IN KENYA OVER TIME ...... 139
FIGURE 10. SOCIAL CONFLICT EVENTS AND DEATHS IN KENYA OVER TIME ...... 140
FIGURE 11. EVENT LOCALITIES 2007, 2010, AND 2013...... 144
FIGURE 12. EVENT TYPE WITH FREQUENCIES FOR KENYA , 1990 –2013...... 145
FIGURE 13. ISSUES CAUSING SOCIAL CONFLICT IN KENYA , COMPARED BY DECADE ...... 154
FIGURE 14. LONG QUEUES AT THE POLLING STATION AT THE “O LYMPIC PRIMARY SCHOOL ” IN KIBERA (N AIROBI ). SOURCE : TAKEN BY
S. PLATA , MARCH 4, 2013...... 178
FIGURE 15. DESCRIPTIVE DETAILS OF THE INTERVIEW PARTNERS ...... 188
FIGURE 16. MAIN CATEGORIES OF THE FINAL CODING FRAME ...... 195
FIGURE 17. EXPERIENCED FORMS OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE (MULTIPLE MENTIONS POSSIBLE )...... 198
FIGURE 18. CODE MATRIX BROWSER FOR CODED SUB -CATEGORIES OF ASSAULT...... 202
FIGURE 19. CODE RELATION MATRIX FOR THE FORMS OF EXPERIENCED VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT ...... 203
FIGURE 20. TYPES OF PERPETRATORS FROM THE MEMORIES OF THE INTERVIEWEES ...... 204
FIGURE 21. CODE -RELATION -BROWSER FOR TYPES OF PERPETRATORS IN THE 2008 POST -ELECTION VIOLENCE ...... 208
FIGURE 22. ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE MOTIVATION OF THE PERPETRATORS OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT EXPRESSED BY THE
INTERVIEWED VICTIMS ...... 209
FIGURE 23. CODE RELATION MATRIX FOR FORMS OF NEGATIVE FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS ...... 223
FIGURE 24. CODE MATRIX BROWSER FOR CODED SUB -CATEGORIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS ...... 224
FIGURE 25. CODE -RELATIONS -BROWSER FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS FACED BY WOMEN VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE ...... 227
FIGURE 26. COMBINATION OF APA DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER AND SUB -CODES FOUND IN THE PRESENT
PHD-PROJECT ...... 228
FIGURE 27. CODE -MATRIX -BROWSER FOR THE PREVALENCE OF MDD CLINICAL CRITERIA AMONG WOMEN VICTIMS OF SEXUAL
VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENT STUDY ...... 228
FIGURE 28. CODE MATRIX BROWSER FOR OTHER IMPAIRMENTS OF WOMEN VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN 2008...... 229
FIGURE 29. CODE MATRIX BROWSER FOR CODED COPING STRATEGIES OF VICTIMS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN 2008...... 231
FIGURE 30. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF CODED FORMS OF CHANGES IN VICTIMS ’ LIVES ...... 233
FIGURE 31. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF CODED PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN VICTIMS ’ LIVES ...... 235
xiv
FIGURE 32. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF CODED NEGATIVE FEELINGS OF VICTIMS AFTER THE EXPERIENCE OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL
CONFLICT ...... 236
FIGURE 33. LAZARUS ’ DESCRIPTION OF THE COPING PROCESSES INVOLVED IN A STRESSFUL SITUATION ...... 246
FIGURE 34. COPING STRATEGY TYPOLOGY ...... 247
FIGURE 35. DEFENSE MECHANISMS ...... 250
FIGURE 36. ACTIVE COPING STRATEGIES CODED IN 32 INTERVIEWS WITH VICTIMS OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT IN KENYA ...... 251
FIGURE 37. PASSIVE COPING STRATEGIES CODED IN 32 INTERVIEWS WITH VICTIMS OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT IN KENYA . .... 255
FIGURE 38. GENDER AND REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS CODED IN THE CATEGORY FORGIVENESS ...... 259
FIGURE 39. COMBINING CARVER ET AL .’ S (1989) ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK ON CODING STRATEGIES WITH THE CODINGS FOUND IN THE
PRESENT STUDY (IN BLUE BRACKETS )...... 268
FIGURE 40. COMBINATION OF WEITEN AND WAYNE ’S (2007) ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK OF DEFENSE MECHANISMS WITH THE
CODINGS OF COPING STRATEGIES FOUND IN THE PRESENT STUDY (IN BLUE BRACKETS )...... 269
FIGURE 41. PRACTICED FORMS OF ACTIVE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ...... 271
FIGURE 42. PRACTICED FORMS OF PASSIVE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ...... 272
FIGURE 43. DOCUMENT VARIABLES FOR 24 INTERVIEWEES , INCLUDING THE VARIABLE CHANGED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ...... 274
FIGURE 44. DOCUMENT VARIABLES FOR 24 INTERVIEWEES SORTED BY THE VARIABLE CHANGED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION ...... 278
FIGURE 45. MOTIVES FOR DECREASED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AS CODED WITHIN 32 INTERVIEWS OF THE PRESENT STUDY ...... 283
FIGURE 46. MOTIVES FOR UNCHANGED POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AS CODED WITHIN 32 INTERVIEWS OF THE PRESENT STUDY ...... 286
FIGURE 47. THE TYPOLOGY OF CITIZENS AS DEVELOPED FROM 32 INTERVIEWS WITH VICTIMS OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT IN
KENYA ...... 289
FIGURE 48. SOCIO -DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDINAL DISPOSITIONS OF THE VOTING CITIZEN AS CODED IN THE SAMPLE
OF 34 KENYAN VICTIMS OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT ...... 291
FIGURE 49. SOCIO -DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC OF THE RESILIENT VOTERS OF THE PRESENT SAMPLE...... 294
FIGURE 50. SOCIO -DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC OF THE DEMANDING VOTERS OF THE PRESENT SAMPLE...... 296
FIGURE 51. SOCIO -DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTIC OF THE RATIONAL VOTERS OF THE PRESENT SAMPLE...... 298
FIGURE 52. VOTER TYPES IDENTIFIED WITHIN THE INTERVIEW MATERIAL OF THE PRESENT STUDY ...... 300
FIGURE 53. SOCIO -DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDINAL DISPOSITIONS OF THE RESIGNED CITIZEN AS CODED IN THE
SAMPLE OF 34 KENYAN VICTIMS OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT ...... 302
FIGURE 54. SOCIO -DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDINAL DISPOSITIONS OF THE PASSIVE CITIZEN AS CODED IN THE
SAMPLE OF 34 KENYAN VICTIMS OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT ...... 307
FIGURE 55. SOCIO -DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTITUDINAL DISPOSITIONS OF THE ACTIVE CITIZEN AS CODED IN THE SAMPLE
OF 34 KENYAN VICTIMS OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT ...... 309
FIGURE 56. COMPARING THE SOCIO -DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF “L EVEL OF SCHOOLING ” AND “I NCOME ” BETWEEN THE FOUR
TYPES OF CITIZENS IDENTIFIED IN THE PRESENT STUDY ...... 310
xv
List of Addenda
ADDENDUM 1. SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW GUIDE (ORIGINAL VERSION DATED MARCH 01 ST 2013)………………………………….362
ADDENDUM 2. INFORMED CONSENT FORM ……………………………………………………...... 370
ADDENDUM 3. SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH PROJECT …………………………………………………………………………………….372
ADDENDUM 4. FREEDOM IN THE WORLD COUNTRY RATINGS 1972, 1980, 1990, AND 1999 FOR SUB -SAHARAN
AFRICA …………………………………………………………………………….……………………………………………………………..……..373
ADDENDUM 5. FREEDOM IN THE WORLD COUNTRY RATINGS 1972, 1990, AND 1999 FOR COUNTRY
STATUS ………………………………………………………………….………………………………………………………………………………...376
ADDENDUM 6. POLITICAL RIGHT VALUES AND CIVIL LIBERTY VALUES FOR CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC , GHANA , LESOTHO , AND MALI
FROM 1990 TO 2013 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………..………….……………377
ADDENDUM 7. LONGITUDINAL DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL RIGHT AND CIVIL LIBERTY VALUES OF 48 COUNTRIES IN SUB -SAHARAN
AFRICA BETWEEN 1999 AND 2013 ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..378
ADDENDUM 8. QUANTITY AND QUALITY EVALUATION OF COUNTRY VALUE DEVELOPMENT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS 2005-2013 IN
48 COUNTRIES IN SUB -SAHARAN AFRICA …………………………………………………………………………….…………………………..379
ADDENDUM 9. QUANTITY AND QUALITY EVALUATION OF COUNTRY VALUE DEVELOPMENT FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES 2005-2013 IN
48 COUNTRIES IN SUB -SAHARAN AFRICA ………………………………………………………………………………………………...... 382
ADDENDUM 10. FREEDOM IN THE WORLD COUNTRY RATINGS BY FREEDOM HOUSE (F REE , PARTLY FREE , NOT FREE )……………….385
ADDENDUM 11. AFRICAN ELECTIONS 1990-2008, BY LEVEL OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE ……………………………………………………..386
ADDENDUM 12. FREQUENCY OF HIGH LEVELS OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT … ………………………………………………………….388
ADDENDUM 13. STATA DO FILE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PEI DATA (P ERCEPTION OF ELECTORAL INTEGRITY ) IN CHAPTER 6……………389
ADDENDUM 14. STATA DO FILE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SCAD DATA (S OCIAL CONFLICT ANALYSIS DATABASE ) IN CHAPTER 6 ………392
ADDENDUM 15. LIST AND FREQUENCY OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN SOCIAL CONFLICT ……………………………………………………………..394
ADDENDUM 16. DESCRIPTIVE DETAILS OF INTERVIEW PARTNERS ………………………………………………………………………………..….400
ADDENDUM 17. CODING SHEET USED DURING TRIAL CODING ……………………………………………………………………………………….404
ADDENDUM 18. COMPARATIVE CODING SHEET FOR DIMENSION 1 …………………………………………………………………………………404
ADDENDUM 19. THE FINAL CODING FRAME ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………405
ADDENDUM 20. VICTIMS OF VIOLENT ELECTORAL CONFLICT AND THEIR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ETHNIC MOTIVATION OF
PERPETRATORS ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….442
ADDENDUM 21. THE FOUR TYPES OF KENYAN CITIZENS IDENTIFIED IN THE PRESENT STUDY IN DIRECT COMPARISON …………………444
ADDENDUM 22. ETHICS CLEARANCE FORM ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………445
xvi 1. General Introduction
1 General Introduction
1.1 Background to the Study
Established research shows that competitive national elections can play a significant role in the consolidation process of democracies (see, for example, O’Donnel/Schmitter 1986; Diamond 1993, 1996; Linz/Stephan 1996; Bratton/van de Walle 1997; Bratton 1998; Herbst 2000; Altman/Pérez-Linán 2002; Foweraker/Landmann 2002).
On one hand, elections may lead to strengthening the democratic process, which is why to authors like Lindberg, elections not only “...signify democracy, they breed democracy, through the self-reinforcing, self-improving quality of repetitive elections” (Lindberg 2006, p. 144). In theory, free and fair elections represent the peaceful succession or distribution of political power alongside the expressed will of an electorate, and thus are an ideal type of instrument to manage conflict adequately (see, for example, Höglund 2009). Generally speaking, with respect to achieving governance, they are a peaceful alternative to violence (Fischer 2002, p. 7).
On the other hand, elections often deepen political cleavages and may even result in violent conflict (see Teshome-Bahiru 2009; Daxecker 2012; Höglund 2009). As a consequence, some political scientists doubt the positive effects of elections as a conflict management tool, especially in the context of post-war countries, and point to their “potentially negative and conflict-generating aspects” (Höglund 2009, p. 535). This is not to say that elections generally produce violence or conflict, or that elections and violence are causally linked. Nevertheless, they have the potential to bring long-existing, existential conflict lines to the surface (see Höglund 2009). If not handled adequately, these conflicts can lead to violent confrontations.
Between 50 and 80 per cent of all elections in Sub-Saharan Africa are affected by electoral conflict, 1 which includes all acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process, and that often result in the internal displacement, destruction of property, and physical and psychological harm of a population or specific social groups. Although the extent of electoral conflict (not only) in Sub-Saharan Africa is alarming, our knowledge concerning electoral conflict has received scant scrutiny over time.
1 According to Straus and Taylor (2012), 50 per cent of all elections are impacted, whereas Lindberg (2006) suggests that 80 per cent are affected.
1 1. General Introduction
This assumption has been endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2010 in a statement that said:
Until recently, there has been little academic research on the specific subject of election violence. While there has been a tremendous amount of writing on elections generally, and on political violence generally, there has been little on the intersection of these two fields (UN General Assembly 2010, p. 6).
The academic interest in electoral conflict started to gain ground in the mid-2000s when a broad variety of disciplines recognized its dimension and significance. Political scientists, sociologists, historians, economists, psychologists, ecologists, conflict managers, and many others focused their attention on the phenomenon. They were joined by practitioners and national and international organizations that added their efforts to finding adequate mechanisms to prevent, adequately manage, and transform electoral conflict 2.
Lindberg’s (2006) comprehensive and empirically rigorous analysis of elections and the democratization process in Africa was a milestone in the field of electoral conflict and international democratization. It indicated that repetitive elections, whether flawed or not, are “one of the important causal factors in democratization” in Africa (Lindberg 2006, p. xii). Elections were found to contribute positively to the democratization process by initiating liberalization and fostering the expansion and deepening of democratic values within societies. To date, his findings—that even elections that suffer from manipulation, corruption, and systematic violence actually produce more democratic regimes in Africa—still appear counterintuitive and remain highly contested. Even Lindberg himself expressed astonishment when he stated that “authoritarian regimes running flawed elections are not usually associated with improvements in the rule of law, religious and associational freedoms, and absence of economic exploitation and protection from unjustified imprisonment” (Lindberg 2006, p. 121). However, for two thirds of the cases he examined, he found sufficient empirical evidence to support his overall hypothesis.
If violent elections advance democratic values within a society, do people who suffer from violence during elections also develop democratic values? How do people react to the experience of electoral violence? Is it true that although having experienced negative, sometimes traumatizing experiences during one or several electoral processes in a row, people
2 More information about the scientific adaptation of the topic is provided in the literature review. 2 1. General Introduction
continue to participate politically within their countries, or do they develop a negative attitude towards voting and democracy as a whole?
Unfortunately, Lindberg didn’t explicitly highlight any flawed or violent elections in his survey; rather, he integrated these specific cases in his broader analysis of 232 African elections from 1989 to 2003.
In the studies that follow, the consequences of violent electoral conflict on individuals did not receive the attention it deserved. Thus, this research project aims at broadening our knowledge concerning the consequences of electoral conflict. Acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process may have significant and manifold impacts on victims’ lives. Effects on their physical and psychological wellbeing, economic situation, social interaction, family life, health, level of interpersonal and political trust or political participation are conceivable. Thus, the present study focuses on how violent electoral conflict affects the political participation of ordinary Kenyan citizens, meaning all the citizens who did not hold a political office or did not run for election during violent electoral conflict, and what motivated their individual behaviour. So far, no satisfying answer has been given to the question about when, and even more importantly, why people continue or discontinue to participate in the political process of their country after experiencing election-related conflict.
This study follows Coleman’s (1994) Macro-Micro-Macro model (Coleman Boat, Coleman Bathtub), according to which societal developments are explained by the behaviour of its elements (actors). A central element of Coleman’s theory is the assumption that societal phenomena (macro-level) affect actors’ behavior (micro-level), and thus influence societal development again (macro-level). The so called “Coleman Boat” has become one of the most useful and accepted vehicles for explaining multi-level phenomena in the social sciences. 3 Following Coleman’s assumptions, an explanation of the influence of electoral conflict on political participation in Africa must include the micro-level. Hence, this study aims to contribute to this missing research component.
3 The research question also can be formulated within the broader frame of complexity theory in which a complex system can be described by the various interactions between many different components (for more information, see, for example, Byrne 2005).
3 1. General Introduction
1.2 Problem Statement
The Republic of Kenya has experienced violent electoral conflict repeatedly since the re- introduction of competitive elections in 1992. Although varying in the dimension, motivation, and parties involved, this violent electoral conflict has victimized hundreds of thousands of Kenyan citizens. Thus, to date, Kenya is known as one of the prime examples of violent electoral conflict on the African continent. The 2007 elections constituted the most disastrous incident of violent electoral conflict in the country’s history. On December 30, 2007, after the announcement of the presidential results, massive violence arose in five areas of Kenya— Western Province, Rift Valley Province, Nyanza Province, Nairobi Province, and the Coastal Province (Waki 2008, p. 305). The presumed rigging of the presidential election by the electoral commission of Kenya (ECK) led to the deaths of 1,133, about 3,500 people were injured, and about 350,000 people displaced 4 (see The Republic of Kenya 2008). Seven years after this post-election violence, many Kenyans are still living in informal settlements, struggling to re-achieve their previous living standard, or suffering from physical or psychological impairments. Many claim they have not received adequate compensation, if any, to rebuild their homes and businesses. Perpetrators of violent electoral conflict, often identifiable members of a community, have very rarely been taken to court, and even fewer have been jailed for their crimes. If the experience of violent electoral conflict actually affects the political participation of citizens and their attitudes towards democracy, these effects should be detectable among the victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya. Considering all these aspects, Kenya is a relevant and important case study to examine.
From an academic point of view, it is crucial to investigate how victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya cope with their experiences and how they position themselves within their political system. If a significantly large group of citizens associate violence and state-failure with elections, and thus refuse to participate in any political activity, the stabilization process of a democracy as a whole could be at stake.
From a humanistic point of view, victims of any kind of conflict should be the focus and motivation for the actions of all actors involved.
The advantage of the present study is that its researcher was allowed to go into the field and directly speak with the victims of electoral conflict about 5 years after their experiences. As Babbie (2007) emphasizes, it is “one of the key strengths of field research (…) how
4 Other sources suggest that 600,000 people were displaced (see for example Barkan 2013). 4 1. General Introduction
comprehensive a perspective it can give researchers” (p. 286). This access allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the topic within its natural setting, which could not be achieved by analyzing survey data.
1.3 Research Questions
Having described the initial situation of violent electoral conflict in Kenya and the challenges the victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya are facing, it is possible to formulate a clearly demarcated research question for this treatise:
In what ways does violent electoral conflict affect the political participation of ordinary Kenyan citizens and their attitude towards democracy?
The principal questions of concern for the study are the following:
• When and what kind of electoral conflict did the participants experience?
• What major changes did the experience of violent electoral conflict cause in the lives of the participants?
• Did the experience of violent electoral conflict make the participants change their political participation behaviour? Do they participate less, more, or equally compared to the time before their experience of violent electoral conflict?
• What is their personal understanding of political participation?
• Did their attitude towards democracy change?
1.4 Aims and Objectives to be Achieved
The primary objective of this study is to produce findings that are both scientifically and politically relevant. By contributing to a profound understanding of the effects of violent electoral conflict on its victims in Kenya, new knowledge is made available to the scientific community. Changes in political participation may create awareness within the political elite as to the importance of the phenomenon and the necessity of managing it adequately.
To answer the outlined research questions, qualitative interviews were conducted with ordinary Kenyan citizens affected in the four ‘hot spot’ areas of the 2007/2008 electoral violence. 5 1. General Introduction
The aims of the study are the following:
• To compare the 2013 elections to previous elections in the country
• To explore the major effects of directly experienced violent electoral conflict on victims’ lives in general
• More specifically, to determine the effects of directly experienced violent electoral conflict on the political participation and democratic attitudes of ordinary Kenyans
• To determine the subjective notions of political participation and democracy of ordinary Kenyans
The existing literature on elections and the concept of political participation was examined to ensure an adequate definition of the major concepts. Furthermore, the existing literature on the key criteria of electoral conflict, its magnitude, lethality, motives, and actors involved was examined based on the existing quantitative data to adequately justify the selection of Kenya as the case study for this research project. The existing data was researched and included in the present study to evaluate the status of electoral democracy in Kenya and to highlight the weaknesses of the five general election processes in Kenya. Furthermore, quantitative data was reviewed to examine the correlation between electoral violence and the number of conflict events and the number of deaths caused during these specific time episodes.
Therefore, this doctoral thesis is divided into nine main chapters. Chapter 1 serves as a general introduction to the research study, and provides the motivation for the choice of topic and its relevance, which is followed by the research aims and objectives to be achieved.
Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical backgrounds that guided the design, the interview phase, and analysis of this thesis. In total, three theoretical approaches are presented to provide insight into the theory of political participation, the theory of human empowerment, and the theory of trauma response. All three theories are of high relevance for answering the research questions and for conducting the analysis.
Chapter 3 explains the research methodology, the research design, and the data analysis of the study. The methods of data collection, sampling procedures, and research instrumentation, as well as ethical considerations, are described briefly.
Chapter 4 provides a general overview of the democratization process in Africa, with a special focus on elections and political participation, and their importance for democratization in
6 1. General Introduction
general. Some definitional clarification and a short justification on the concentration on Africa as the analytic subject is provided. Findings of existing (quantitative) data are presented.
Chapter 5 provides insight into the academic knowledge on social conflict and the distinctive features of electoral conflict in Kenya by means of an overview of its magnitude, lethality, motives, duration, and parties involved. This study considers electoral conflict to be a specific type of social conflict that has its own characteristics and patterns.
Chapter 6 is an introduction to the case of Kenya, its democratic development, and experiences with violent electoral conflict. The motivation for choosing Kenya as the case of analysis is provided in this section as well. Necessary knowledge about the political system, its democratic development, as well as insights into five general elections (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2013) also are provided.
Chapter 7 outlines the chosen procedure of data analysis, including the determination of material, the analysis of inception, descriptive details of interview partners, and the procedure of coding.
Chapter 8 sets out the actual findings of the data analysis of the project. The research questions are answered by using a theoretical qualitative content analysis approach for the data analysis, and creating main categories for the interpretation of the results.
Chapter 9 is the conclusion to the study, including a summary of the findings in the previous chapters.
1.5 Significance of the Study
Undoubtedly, one of the most daunting challenges facing democratic governance on the [African] continent today relates to the extent to which elections promote democracy, stability, peace and security, all of which are so crucial to socio-economic development (Matlosa et al. 2010, p. 1).
The chosen research topic is highly relevant and up-to-date, since the majority of African elections, not only those in Kenya, suffer from electoral conflict. Thus, electoral conflict is a prevalent phenomenon on the African continent. Bekoe (2010) confirms this finding by stating that “conflict and tensions during elections have been common in Africa’s new democracies—coming into existence in the 1990s during the third wave of democracy” (p. 1). Thus, Bardall (2010) is supported in his request to treat electoral conflict as a “unique form of
7 1. General Introduction
conflict [that] requires specifically designed responses for effective prevention, mitigation and resolution” (p. 15).
The justification of this dissertation is fourfold. First, this research study will contribute to gaining insight into the general consequences of violent electoral conflict in Kenya. Without a full understanding of the consequences of violent electoral conflict on victims, adequate coping strategies cannot be developed, leaving victims with unsolved trauma. As Häglund and Jarstad (2011) warn “without coping mechanisms to deal with the trauma created by electoral violence, victims may themselves become perpetrators, contributing to the seemingly endless cycle of violence” (p. 52).
Second, additional information about the consequences of violent electoral conflict on the political participation of Kenyan victims will be gained. So far it remains unclear whether the experience of violent electoral conflict, regularly appearing during elections in Kenya, has an enhancing or lowering effect on political participation. Victims of violent electoral conflict may develop a general antipathy towards all political experience “thus hampering the consolidation of peace and democracy” (Höglund and Jarstad 2011, p. 52).
Third, it is the goal of this study to broaden our understanding of the political participation of victims of violent electoral conflict and their attitudes towards democracy. This knowledge is important, since a decrease in political participation as a consequence of the experience of electoral conflict might, in the long run, bring the democratization process of a democracy to a halt (see Mc Allister & White 2009, p. 199). In a relatively young and unstable democracy such as Kenya, the withdrawal of a considerably large group of citizens from the political processes could become a de-stabilizing element. Moreover, an increase in political participation could be an important pillar in the stabilization process of Kenyan democracy.
Fourth, since the phenomenon of violent electoral conflict is well known in other African countries— more or less comparable to the Kenyan case—findings about the consequences of violent electoral conflict in Kenya can serve as a starting point for further discussion and research in other areas of the continent. We need to learn more from people who have gone through the experience of electoral conflict to gain an understanding of the mechanisms to safeguard democracy and democratization in African democracies. This concrete study will not produce generalizable findings, but its results for Kenya can serve as a starting point for further research in other areas in Africa and around the world.
8 1. General Introduction
1.6 Related Research
Electoral malpractice or fraud , defined as “clandestine efforts to shape election results” (Lehoucq 2003 as cited in Fortin-Rittberger 2012, p. 1) are up to date and well represented topics in the academic literature. Following are the topics that have shaped the academic debate during recent years, which include the evaluation (Levitsky & Way 2002; Merkel 2004; Kelley & Kolev 2010) and measurement (Bosin 2007; Koelble & Lipuma 2008; McHenry Jr. 2000) of electoral contests; the incentives (Schaffer 2007; Simpser 2008; Donno & Roussias 2012) that motivate candidates and incumbents to invest in electoral fraud; the role of the infrastructure to do so (Fortin-Rittberger 2012; Hartlyn, McCoy, & Mustillo 2007; Mozaffar 2002; Uddhammar, Green, & Söderström 2011; Schwarzmantel 2010); different types of electoral fraud (Schedler 2002; Birch 2009; Basedau, Erdmann, & Mehler 2007) and its consequences (Howard & Roessler 2006; Lindberg 2006, 2009; Moehler & Lindberg 2009; Thompson & Kuntz 2009).
Compared to the literature on fraud and malpractice in democratic elections, the phenomenon of electoral conflict has received less attention. Electoral conflict, especially in its visible occurrence of violent electoral conflict, also referred to as electoral violence, is a frequent attendant of flawed or manipulated elections, especially on the African continent. Khadiagala (2010) states that: “Electoral violence has featured in Africa’s democratization and various forms of violence have occurred at different stages of the electoral process” (p. 17). Atuobi (2008) agrees when suggesting that “election related violence may take place at different stages of the electoral process: before, during or after elections” (p. 10). Concerning the extent of election violence in Africa, he goes as far as to say that: “The incidence of election-related violence in Africa is so high that even an election considered to be free and fair in electoral outcome may not have been free of violence before, during or after the election” (Atuobi 2008, p. 11).
Whereas a broad consensus concerning the extent of electoral conflict on the African continent exists, its causes are more contested. Within the literature, two main explanations have been identified for the emergence of violent electoral conflict, which do not necessarily need to be mutually exclusive.
The first is that violent electoral conflict is the outcome of broader political, social, ethnic, or socio-economic conflicts that are smoldering under the surface of a society. Elections often trigger pre-existing conflicts or enable them to widen societal fissures, which permits parties
9 1. General Introduction
to use violence to influence electoral outcomes (Khadiagala 2010, p. 17). Or as Bradshaw (2010) puts it, elections put the system under stress (p. 72).
The other path of explanation stresses the role of the structural capacities or incapacities of democracies. To make democracy work as a peaceful system of power distribution, with free and fair elections as the means of operation, effective electoral management systems and impartial judiciaries need to be in place to guarantee the working of the system. In societies where these institutions have limited or no function, power is allocated through violence, and democracy loses its meaning as the instrument for the peaceful distribution of power.
Khadiagala (2010) felicitously contrasts these two alternatives:
In the first order of causes, electoral violence is the outcome of events and circumstances that emanate from broader political conflicts, particularly in societies that are beset by ethnic, communal, and sectarian fissures. (…) In the second category, electoral violence is a consequence of imperfect electoral rules; imperfections that allow some parties to manipulate elections through electoral fraud, vote buying, and rigging (p. 17). What factors impact the high level of violent electoral conflict in Africa? According to Atuobi (2008), the main structural reasons for elections to become violent are structural weaknesses in election management, and the election management bodies; the nature of the electoral system (majoritarian or proportional); abuse of incumbency (access to state resources, manipulation of electoral rules); identity politics; heavy-handedness of the security forces during elections; and inefficiencies in election observation and reporting (p. 12).
As was indicated earlier, both explanations—the pre-existence of other conflict lines within a society and structural deficits—often go hand in hand. In the case of Kenya’s 2007 elections, smoldering ethnic and regional conflicts (fueled by exclusion from economic and political power) were intertwined with an inefficient election management body, an unfavorable electoral system, a ruling party that contributed to the escalation, and an illegitimate use of violence by police forces and militant groups (see, for example, Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero 2011; Githinji & Holmquist 2008; Mueller 2008; Bradshaw 2010; Khadiagala 2010; Baregu 2010).
The triangle of elections, institutions, and violence has been discussed earlier in the scientific literature, within the context of liberal peacebuilding operations. With the end of the East- West confrontation at the end of the 1980s, the UN operations to maintain international peace
10 1. General Introduction
and security increased remarkably in number but also underwent dramatic developments concerning their general complexity (Druckman et al. 1997). To meet the changing conflict situation in the world after the decades of political paralysis of the Security Council (SC), the UN had to shift its strategic approach away from classical peacekeeping missions— concentrating on military tasks such as the observation and safeguarding of peace processes in post-conflict areas—towards peacebuilding operations that followed a much broader agenda. According to Last (2003), peacebuilding can be defined as “work to remove the causes of violence and build relationships that will make its recurrence unlikely” (p. 1). It is obvious that a wide range of tasks and enterprises can be subsumed under this definition, thus giving peacebuilding operations their multidimensional, multicomplex, and long-lasting character. The measures subsumed under the label of peacebuilding have been named the democratic reconstruction model by Ottaway (2003), which inter alia schedules the first post-conflict elections 2 years after the end of the beginning of a peacebuilding mission and fosters the implementation of a neoliberal economic system. To date, the efficacy of the democratic reconstruction model for the political transition process in post-conflict societies remains highly contested. After the disastrous outcome of peacebuilding missions such as those in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, the stabilizing character of elections and the new market system were questioned and countered with a call for more institutionalism before liberalisation (Paris 2004; Gromes 2009; and for the opposite opinion, see Lindberg 2006). Bradshaw (2010) agrees with Paris, since he argues that the rush for an election to be accepted by the international community and the implementation of a neoliberal economic system can contribute to the exacerbation of conflicts (p. 76). Considering the latest work of Lindberg (2006) and his findings regarding the positive effect of even flawed elections for the democratic transition process of new and developing democracies, the debate surrounding the triangle of elections, institutions, and violence has been fuelled once again.
Although the number of comparative studies on electoral conflict is growing, reliable data on the course of electoral conflict and its systematics is only gradually making its way into the scientific community. Obviously, it is not easy to generate data (comparative) on a topic such as electoral conflict, since it involves fieldwork within conflict-ridden countries.
Referring to the timing of violent electoral conflict, Laakson (2007) finds that it:
(…) relates to the chosen modes: displacement of voters taking place before elections and violent riots contesting the results after the elections. Before the elections, voters and candidates can be intimidated in order to affect their choices: they might face 11 1. General Introduction
rather similar techniques as punishments after the elections. Quite paradoxically the actual polling day, which is the most keenly monitored phase of elections, is often the most peaceful period (p. 228).
To specify the precise dynamics of violent electoral conflict, more data from single case studies or comparative data is necessary. If different cases show similar or different patterns (triggers, parties involved, escalation and de-escalation processes, etc.), the actions of national, regional, and international conflict management actors can be programmed.
Taking a closer look at the conflict management propositions to address violent electoral conflict, some early initiatives can be identified. For example, with respect to violent election- related conflict, Bradshaw (2010) has called for alternative dispute resolution (ADR), instead of a long-lasting legal process. Existing literature, such as Deffains (2001) has shown that ADR “is faster, produces more satisfactory results, and tends to preserve relationships to a greater extent than legal processes” (Bradshaw 2010, p. 79). Although ADR has been restricted to conflicts within organisations, Bradshaw (2010) cites the example of the South African National Peace Accord as an example of successful state-wide ADR. He describes a constructive conflict management system (CMS) that could help conflict-ridden societies to deal with their cleavages, interest-based as well as non-interest based conflicts:
A conflict management system is a permanent, rather than a once-off intervention, which is substantially “owned” by the parties to the conflict. It includes structures or institutions, and ongoing activities in pursuit of peace. It should be self-sustaining and accessible to the community at the point of need. Because conflicts shift and change, the CMS [conflict management system] needs also to change and grow, constantly adapting to the needs of the changing conflict. The system should have in-built procedures for accessing resources, especially expertise, and opportunities for planning (Bradshaw 2010, p. 77).
Bradshaw’s promising initiative should be discussed further, and an effort should be made to develop a concrete management scheme that concretizes the idea of a CMS for violent electoral conflict. It would need to consider the different motives for conflict (interests, values, identities), different parties involved, different dimensions of conflict (ethical, geographic, economic, societal), and the history of the specific conflict of interest (time dimension).
12 1. General Introduction
Conflict management practitioners, working on the ground, have identified a weak point in their approach to violent electoral conflict, which Bardall and White (2010) describe:
Although practitioners readily support the holistic approach to enhancing electoral management, they have traditionally not been as quick to adopt holistic conflict cycle approaches to address election violence. Instead, electoral support providers often revert to limited, sector-specific responses that fall short of addressing the broader issues and full range of stakeholders involved (p. 15).
To close this gap, electoral practitioners have started to use, as Bardall and White suggest, the conflict cycle perspective to violent electoral conflict, which includes elements of conflict prevention, management and mitigation, conflict resolution, and conflict analysis (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. A thematic approach to election conflict and selected responses. Source: Bardall and White (2010, p. 15).
Although it appears to be an asset to include a holistic approach to the management of violent electoral conflict that helps to develop conflict responses from “sector-specific options (…) towards a thematic approach that addresses the roles of the full range of stakeholders over the entire conflict cycle” (Bardall & White 2010, p. 16), the issues of the lack of time and
13 1. General Introduction
financial resources to implement this approach are legitimate concerns, which are being raised by some.
Scientists and conflict management practitioners must work together to share their theoretical and practical know-how of violent electoral conflict. This cross fertilization could be a fruitful approach to actualize Bradshaw’s suggestion for a conflict management system for violent electoral conflict.
What do we know about the consequences of violent electoral conflict? Who is mostly affected by it, and how do people cope with that experience? Most existing studies on violent electoral conflict have either focused on cross-country comparisons, which have considered the macro-effects of the conflict, i.e., the national economy or the total amount of destruction or people killed or injured; or on small scale analysis, mainly with a descriptive character. Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero’s (2011) micro-quantitative study on conflict, which assessed the individual and local factors that increased the risk of being a victim of electoral violence, provided answers to these questions. They collected quantitative and qualitative data in two panel waves—one shortly before the 2007 elections and one half a year later—which enabled them to draw nationally representative conclusions for their research questions. Of special interest to the present study was their goal “to investigate the profile of victims of violence, and some of the key consequences of the violence” (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2011, p. 742). Their clearest finding was the general deterioration of trust and social capital across ethnic groups and communities (p. 738). After the post-election violence, 50% of respondents declared that their trust towards people of other ethnic groups had worsened compared to their pre-election levels. Besides its practical social consequences, this loss of trust could generate economic consequences for the country, since many trading activities in Kenya are based on trust, rather than formal arrangements. Their data further revealed a significant rise in their respondent’s distrust of elections as the method for choosing leaders. Dercon and Gutiérrez- Romero’s (2011) data further showed that those respondents who reported having had land disputes in the years prior to the 2007 elections had an 18% increased probability of becoming victims of violent electoral conflict. Living in an urban area increased the probability of violent electoral conflict by 7%; organized gangs connected to politicians operating in their communities before the elections increased the potential for violent electoral conflict by 13%. Surprisingly, the factors of wealth and ethnicity did not have significant correlations with the increased probability of becoming a victim of violent electoral conflict.
14 1. General Introduction
The path of Africa’s democracies is yet to be clear. The so-called second independence or “virtual miracle” (Joseph 1991, p. 11) of the early 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa brought about a massive transition from authoritarian or military regimes to multi-party systems. According to Decalo (1992), a mostly unexpected but nevertheless “(…) powerful backwash of popular demonstrations for ‘re-democratization’ flooded all corners of Africa (…) transforming the political map of the continent” (p. 7). Up to the early 1990s, the political landscape in Africa was dominated by authoritarian, often military regimes. With the deposition of long-lasting, pillaging patriarchs—such as Mathieu Kérékou of Benin, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, and Daniel arap Moi of Kenya—democratic structures and multi-party competition returned to the continent. As Joseph (1997) indicates correctly, in 1995 almost all African countries had introduced some measures of democracy and liberalisation, which was in many cases, the introduction of competitive elections (for more details, see section 4.5). Unfortunately, this democratic boost did not last long. Considering Freedom House Data, a North American think tank, the average scores for political rights and civil liberties during the first decade of the 21 st century, a rather pessimistic picture of the democratization process in Sub-Saharan Africa can be drawn. Although consecutive elections have been held, good governance programmes have been installed, and African citizens have expressed their continuous approval for democracy, the average values for political rights and civil liberties have stagnated at a poor level between 1999 and 2013. Thus, the picture of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa is a mixed one, with some very positive outlier such as Mauritius, Botswana, Ghana and South Africa and some dratatically negative ones, such as Mali, Equatorial Guinea, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
A great an important asset for democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa is the broad support base of its citizens. Inglehart and Welzel (2005 and 2013), Linz and Stepan (1996) and Mattes and Bratton (2007) have shown that sustainable and stable democracies need the support of ordinary citizens. They must see democracy as “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 15). As quantitative studies indicate, “Democracy enjoys a significant base of popular support” (Mattes and Bratton 2007, p. 194) in Africa. The two authors surveyed 12 African countries in the year 2000 using Afrobarometer data. They further found that “more than two out of three citizens (70%) say that they prefer democracy to other forms of government” (Ibid 2007, p. 194). Same holds for citizens’ support for democracy in Kenya (see Afrobarometer data round 6 2014/2015 for Kenya)5. In Kenya, 65% of surveyed citizens
5 For more information on the status of electoral democracy in Kenya, see section 6.4. 15 1. General Introduction
in Afrobarometer’s round 6 (2014/2015) supported the statement, that Democracy was preferable to any other kind of government. Furthermore, the majority of Kenyans (34.9% considered the last general elections as completely free and fair. Yet, the political culture in Kenya shows many characteristics, engangering democratic values, such as “long-standing ethnic rivalries and inequalities (which erupted into violence most recently in 2008), high levels of intolerance and distrust, and relatively low levels of citizen engagement with the political process” (Finkel and Smith 2011, p. 418; see also Barkan 2008; Gugerty & Kremer 2008). Unfortunately, no Afrobarometer data about citizens’ support of democracy is available for the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, Dschibuti and Eritrea) in order to compare Kenya’s results. With its east African neighbours. Yet, with 57.2% of citizens considering Democrac as the preferable form of government, Tanzania reveals a far lower support level for democracy. Uganda and Kenya match to a great extent (64.1% compared to 65%) and Burundi outpaces all other coutries considered here, with a support base of 86% for democracy.
The repeated experience of violent electoral conflict could contribute to boost these negative charcteristics and impede on the further stabilization process of democracy in the country. Thus, the present study seeks to carry forward the thematic focus that Dercon and Gutiérrez- Romero (2011) followed in their study on the consequences of electoral violence. However, in contrast to their study, the present study is able to investigate the long-term effects of violence as well.
1.7 Motivation for the Study
As students in the field of conflict management and transformation, we are not only concerned with theoretical debates or intellectual games about conflict; rather, we are confronted with its consequences every day, and thus attempt to contribute to its successful management.
In the context of violent electoral conflict, the world has been facing a tragedy par excellence on the African continent. Since independence has been achieved by many countries, elections have been the catalyst for both democratic stabilization and violence.
The 2007/2008 dramatic clashes between conflicting ethnic groups in the aftermath of the Kenyan general elections were a striking wake-up call for both academics and practitioners to invest more effort into this long-ignored type of conflict. Since then, efforts have been made to learn more about this type of conflict, its dynamics, the actors involved, and its triggers. 16 1. General Introduction
Knowledge has been generated with respect to how to efficiently manage violent electoral conflict (Matanga et al 2012), how to avoid its escalation, and how early warning systems can work and should be implemented.
This present study approaches the phenomenon of violent electoral conflict from a somewhat different angle. As has been laid out in detail, it is interested in examining the consequences of violent electoral conflicts, especially the effects that go beyond the short-term experiences of victims. Seven years after the 2007/2008 violence, victims’ voices should be heard again, and their political participation and democratic attitudes tested for the sake of the future democratic stability of Kenya.
1.8 Limitations of the Study
The researcher would like to note that this study will not analyse the effects of violent electoral conflict on political participation in general; rather, this study will focus on first- hand knowledge via chosen cases in Kenya in their rich complexity. This strategy will permit an in-depth understanding of the attitudes and behaviours of participating interview partners in Kenya, which may be valid for other people and societies as well. However, this assumption needs further testing. To put it briefly, this qualitative dissertation is not an appropriate means for “arriving at statistical descriptions of a large population” (Babbie 2007, p. 313); it does not produce generalizable findings.
Furthermore, the researcher is aware that data collection in a foreign country—characterized by a different culture, language, and history—might cause a bias in the study. Pryzborski and Wohlrab-Sahr (2008) describe this difficulty:
The understanding turns out to be increasingly difficult the more distant we are towards our communication partners with respect to biography and culture, the looser our connections are in terms of interaction and experience. Contrariwise, the explanation of this understanding, of this intuitive knowledge that is necessary in research practice, becomes even more difficult the closer we are to our object of research in terms of biography and culture (Pryzborski & Wohlrab-Sahr 2008, p. 30).6
By pointing to the disadvantage of cultural and bibliographical distance, Pryzborski and Wohlrab-Sahr (2008) counter the argument with an advantage resulting from this situation. When coming from a similar cultural background, interview partners tend to assume a certain
6 Translation is from the German original to English provided by the author of this study. 17 1. General Introduction
pre-existing knowledge about phenomena, whereas the latter are described in more detail to a foreigner. The limitation resulting from cultural difference is thus attended by the advantage of a more detailed description.
The basis for a fruitful interview is the existence of trust and mutual appreciation between interviewer and interviewee. Speaking about possibly traumatising life-events is a difficult thing to do. Doing interviews on violent electoral conflict requires a trained interviewer who is aware of the ethical limitations of his/her research. In the present study, the most important concern for the researcher was to prevent interviewees from possible harm resulting from the interview. This is why interviewees were recruited either with the support of NGOs that had experience in the topic or through a current interviewee’s recommendation of another victim. 7 Although this sampling procedure gradually might have excluded those victims who have never spoken about their experiences and who have decided not to seek support through a local NGO, it seems to have been the right decision from an ethical point of view.
To get the conversation started in a comfortable atmosphere, the researcher provided a translation service through an interpreter, if requested. Thus, victims of violent electoral conflict were free to speak about their experiences and to express their feelings in their own native language. Although all four interpreters were trained how to translate during the interviews, the process of translation always involves the reduction of the complexity of the interview material. As the researcher herself does not speak Swahili fluently, possible interpreter effects to the translation cannot be entirely precluded. Since the original answers and translations were taped during the interviews, any systematic shortening or lengthening of the translations will be checked. In critical cases, in which a wrong translation is assumed, the passages will be excluded from the data analysis.
Next, we consider the three theoretical approaches that were applied to answer the outlined research questions that provide insight into the concept of political participation.
7 For more details on the sampling process, see Chapter 3. 18 2. Theoretical Background
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the goal of this treatise was described in detail. The overall research question for this treatise is: In what ways does violent electoral conflict affect the political participation of ordinary Kenyan citizens and their attitude towards democracy?
Since this research question is broad in purpose, a single theoretical approach to finding an answer would be counterproductive. So, the research questions will be answered with the help of the insights of the different theoretical approaches, which include a theory on political participation, a theory of trauma response, and Inglehart’s and Welzel’s concept of human empowerment. The next section is an introduction to political participation. The political participation approach and the concept of human empowerment represent a political science perspective, whereas the theory of trauma response clearly represents a psychological perspective. Although theoretical approaches from other disciplines could have been utilized as well, such as Maslow’s human needs pyramid or Burton’s Basic Human Needs Theory (1979, 1984, 1990), the three chosen theoretical approaches were considered the most fruitful and most applicable to the research questions. With regard to the feasibility of the task, no other approaches were employed.
For case studies, in sharp difference to studies based on the assumptions of grounded theory, “theory development as part of the design phase is essential, whether the ensuing case study’s purpose is to develop or to test theory” (Yin 2003, p. 35). Whereas in grounded theory, the researcher is thought to be able to enter the field open-mindedly, without the pre-development of specific theoretical assumptions about the phenomenon of interest, the situation is different with case studies. Theory development needs to occur “prior to the conduct of any data collection” (Yin 2003, p. 35) and considerably influences the research design, data collection, and data analysis process of a study. Yin (2003) emphasizes that “a good case study investigator should make the effort to develop this theoretical framework, no matter whether the study is to be explanatory, descriptive, or exploratory” (p. 40).
The present study has followed this advice and positions the research questions in the theoretical nutshell of the concept of political participation, supplemented by the assumptions of human empowerment theory developed by Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2008) and the theory of trauma response by Lazarus (1981).
19 2. Theoretical Background
2.2 What is Political Participation?
Since the concept of political participation is included in the theory of human empowerment, more details should be provided about its development, definition, and conceptualization. As has been said before, the political participation of citizens constitutes an elementary necessity for democracy and the democratization process. The phenomenon of political participation has been investigated intensely since the 1940s, especially in the United States and Europe. Since then, many scholars have emphasized the special importance of participation for democracy (see for example Gabriel 2000; Verba et al. 1995; Schlozman 2002; Lindberg 2006), since “…the notion of political participation is at the centre of the concept of the democratic state” (Kaase and Marsh 1979, p. 28). Indeed, democracy is unthinkable without participation, through which citizens make politicians accountable and air their grievances and demands. To put it briefly, “citizen participation is at the heart of democracy” (Verba et al. 1995, p. 1) and is an integral part of the democratization process. Without political participation, “democracy might end up being no more than an empty shell, devoid of substance” (Krishna 2002, p. 437).
Scholars have developed manifold definitions of participation, none of which is universally accepted. Participation generally means involvement, interaction, attendance, contribution, codetermination, admission or inclusion, whereas the term political participation describes, generally speaking, “civic engagement aiming at influencing political decisions” (van Deth 2003, p. 169). Moreover, the term political participation hasn’t been static over the last decades; rather, it has undergone a significant expansion process (see van Deth 2003). During the 1940s, when the phenomenon first entered the scientific scene, it was limited to the act of voting and to engagement in election campaigns (see for example Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Berelson et al. 1954; or Lane 1959). Only slightly broadened in the 1950s by the element of personal contact with executives and politicians on different government levels, these activities were later classified as conventional forms of political participation (see for example van Deth 2003, p. 172; and Campbell et al. 1960). In the late 1960s, this term had a remarkable expansion in two directions. First, the category of conventional political participation was amplified by its new counterpart—unconventional political participation (see Barnes et al. 1979). Political participation was no longer limited to generally accepted forms and orderly activities. According to Van Deth (2003), “Protest and refusal become clear forms of expression of civil interests and opinions and should therefore not be suspended
20 2. Theoretical Background
from the scientific field of political participation” 8 (p. 172). New social movements, student revolutions, the women's movement, and the peace movement count as examples of unconventional political participation. Second, the new category was further split into two separate parts—legal and illegal, unconventional political participation. Violent forms of protest, illegal demonstrations, and sit-down strikes are examples of this category. The next important expansion was affected during the 1990s when definitions of political participation started to include elements of social engagement and civil activities for the first time. Political participation is no longer limited to the political sphere; henceforth, values such as the community, social engagement, and volunteerism are subsumed under the definition of political participation. 9
In this sense, the observation of Huntington and Nelson (1976, p. 14) seems credible when they write that “political participation is an umbrella concept, a label for a whole set of variables,” which accommodate various forms of action for which it is necessary to look for explanations of a different nature. Analogous to the expansion of the concept, definitions of political participation followed the trend and became broader over time. For a long time, Verba and Nye (1972) provided the standard definition for many important empirical studies in the field, arguing that political participation refers to those “activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and /or the actions they take” (p. 2). Although this definition constituted an important contribution to the scientific debate—by broadening it from a mainly electoral understanding (choice of political personnel) to a multidimensional, non-electoral repertoire by explicitly including the efforts to affect the choices made by political personnel (see Teorell et al. 2007: 335)—Verba and Nye’s definition remains too narrow for this present study. Unconventional political participation, in its legal or illegal forms, is completely suspended in the Verba and Nye definition, aside from the fact that all acts of political activity are restricted to activities channelled to a political authority. 10
8 Translated from the German original by the author of this present study. 9 Van Deth speaks of the reactivation of the communitarian approach during the 1990s, which lead to an expansion of political participation in democratic societies (see van Deth 2003, p. 173). Soss (2002) even goes as far as claiming that the application for, and claiming of, welfare programs in the United States constitutes acts of political participation. 10 Verba and Nye themselves are aware of this constraint in their definition: “Actually, we are interested more abstractly in attempts to influence the authoritative allocations of values for a society, which may or may not take place through governmental decisions. But, like most political scientists who start out with such an abstract concern, we shall concentrate on governmental decisions as a close approximation of this more general process” (Verba and Nye 1972, p. 2). 21 2. Theoretical Background
For the purpose of the present study, a definition of political participation needs to be adequately broad to allow for the inclusion of different forms (conventional and unconventional, legal and illegal) of political participation, since the act of voting might be impeded by the occurrence of violence during the course of a concrete election. As the first empirical studies on political participation in Africa have shown, electoral participation might not be the most common way of participating (Isaksson 2005, p. 8), which highlights the importance of including different forms of political participation. Furthermore, the element of voluntariness is crucial for the definition, since political participation might be imposed or staged by any party running for or holding political office, and might not reflect the actual opinions and attitudes of the participants. The question whether or not to count illegal political activity as political participation is not easy to decide. Although opposed to the fundamental values of democracy— such as the rule of law, human rights, equality, and freedom, which makes democracy the opposite of a tyranny or a dictatorship—unconventional illegal forms of political participation have often played some role in the democratic transformation processes (i.e., in France, Great Britain, Germany, and lately in South Africa) and is widely accepted in the scientific literature. Thus, the present study includes unconventional, illegal forms of political participation in the definition of political participation. As a last component, the definition chose needs to address ordinary citizens, non-elites that contribute to the implementation, stabilisation, or endurance of democratic values within the society of their country.
Instead of following the classic view of Verba and others, the author of the present study subscribes to a modern definition of political participation used by Teorell, Torcal, and Montero (2007, p. 336) that goes back to Brady (1999): “ action by ordinary citizens directed toward influencing some political outcomes .” This definition consists of four crucial components. First, it focuses on any sort of action , meaning observable behaviour, which includes different forms of political participation. Second, ordinary citizens, rather than a political elite, is the focus of the analyses. According to Welzel (2009, p. 83), the mobilization of the masses is a crucial element of a successful democratization process. Therefore, it is decisive to know whether ordinary people participate in a democratic regime. Third, citizens’ action is intended to have an influence, which excludes all passive forms of participation, such as political debates with family and friends or following the news on TV, radio, the Internet, or in the newspapers. According to Teorell et al. (2007, p. 36), something more is required to count as participation: “the willingness to
22 2. Theoretical Background
affect decisions taken by someone else.” Fourth, marking the sharpest difference with the classic definitions, this “someone else” doesn’t necessarily need to be a politician, a government official, or a civil servant. The addressee of citizens’ action is any “political outcome,” meaning “any decision over the authoritative allocation of values for society” (Teorell et al. 2007, p. 336).
During the qualitative interviews it was determined which forms of political participation were used by the interview partners since their experience of violent electoral conflict. Instead of presenting a fixed set of indicators to the interviewees, the qualitative character of the interviews enabled an open approach to the topic, which may be useful as a basis for creating a definition and a cluster of political participation in Kenya. Furthermore, the qualitative approach allows for the analysis of changes in individual participation after an experience of violent electoral conflict.
The following section describes the theory of human empowerment and its benefits as a theoretical background for the present study.
2.3 Theory of Human Empowerment
What is the most important driving force for an effective democracy? For Inglehart and Welzel (2005, 2008, see also Welzel 2007, 2009; and Haerpfer et al. 2009), the answer to this question is human empowerment . Inglehart and Welzel (2008) have repeatedly emphasized the role of ordinary people in the emergence and survival of effective democracy all over the world, arguing that effective democracy does not emerge or survive because elites concede it to the masses, but because “ordinary people become increasingly capable and willing to place effective mass pressure on the elites” (p. 1). What makes ordinary people become more powerful so that they can put pressure on existing elites? According to Inglehart and Welzel (2008), human empowerment is based on three pillars: democratic freedoms and institutions, self-expression values, and action resources.
23 2. Theoretical Background
Figure 2. The Human Empowerment Model. Source: Inglehart and Welzel (2008, p. 129).
Democratic freedoms entitle people to shape their private and public life the way they please through civil and political rights. The right to life, liberty, and security of the person, as well as protection from discrimination on grounds of race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion, disability, etc. often are cited as examples for internationally recognized civil rights (United Nations, 1966). Political rights include inter alia the right to vote, freedom of association, the right to assemble and petition, natural justice, and the freedom of political opinion (United Nations, 1966). Taken together, the exercise of political and civil rights form a powerful element of every democracy, which is citizenship (see Inglehart & Welzel 2008, p. 3). 11 Furthermore, political institutions must grant civil and political rights to citizens to make democracy work. Without the effective institutionalization of civil and political rights, a citizen’s role becomes void and the democratic character of a state must be denied. Therefore, in working democracies, the rule of law guarantees and controls the use of power in accordance with the constitution and in obedience to the law. For that reason, Inglehart and Welzel (2008) summarize the role of democratic institutions as to “provide the civil and political rights that allow people to shape public life as well as their private lives” (p. 130).
11 For more information about the role of citizenship in a democracy, see, for example, Miller (2012) or Münkler (1997). 24 2. Theoretical Background
In contrast, self-expression values motivate people to govern their own lives as well as to influence public life. In contrast to the values of survival (the satisfaction of basic human needs), which are dominant in agrarian and industrial societies, self-expression values are more characteristic of post-industrial societies. In the latter case, values such as gender equality, equal participation, orientation toward society and politics, tolerance and interpersonal trust come to the fore. The rise of self-expression values in a society reflects the change process from an industrial society to a post-industrial society in which its members aspire towards the attainment of higher-ranking, superior values beyond the satisfaction of simple materialistic needs. 12 Inglehart’s and Welzel’s description of self-expression values comes close to Rokeach’s definition of an open belief system (see Rokeach 1960 as cited in Inglehart & Welzel 2008):
This belief system holds that ordinary people are: (1) to be entitled to make their views count in shaping public life; (2) active in expressing their preferences in public; (3) to be tolerated in their lifestyle choices; (4) efficacious in shaping their lives; (5) to be generally trusted (Inglehart & Welzel 2008, p. 5).
Self-expression values and democratic freedoms are complemented by the last pillar of human empowerment: action resources. Action resources enable people to govern their lives by achieving a sufficiently satisfying level of basic needs such as food, clothing, shelter, education, health, and employment. Inglehart and Welzel (2008b) distinguish two forms of material needs that are equally important for people to govern their lives: material resources such as food, clothing, and shelter; and cognitive resources, including education and skills (p. 129). As people’s living conditions improve, their struggle to satisfy their most pressing physical needs decreases in importance, which opens the door to the development of action resources. The latter enable people to question existing power situations and to engage in elite-challenging collective actions to implement or extend democracy, a behaviour that is not within the realm of possibility when basic human needs are unsatisfied and demand full attention.
Thus, human empowerment is the distillate of people being entitled, motivated, and able to govern their lives and to become an active citizen in a democratic state:
12 Inglehart’s and Welzel’s description of self-expression values and their role in the democratization process are based on previous work by Inglehart, which describes the shift in values that occurs in post-industrial societies. For more information about Inglehart’s theory, see Inglehart (1971, 1977). 25 2. Theoretical Background
Only when people support democracy for the freedoms that define it, are they ready to mount pressure on elites to introduce these freedoms when they are denied, to defend them when they are challenged, or to advance them when they stagnate (Welzel 2009, p. 85).
But how do the three components of human empowerment play together?13 Do they need to emerge together or do they occur at different times? According to Welzel and Inglehart (2009), the latter view is correct. In fact, the causal explanation takes the following form. First, the rise of action resources (material resources and physical security) leads to the development of an increasing level of self-expression values in a society. When the level of action resources is rising, the possibility of an increasing level of self-expression values is higher: “Self-expression values emerge where resources are widespread: knowing how widespread action resources are in a given society explains 80% of the cross-national variation in how strongly that country’s people emphasize self-expression values” (Welzel & Inglehart 2008, p. 5). Second, the emergence of self-expression values fosters the emergence of effective democratic institutions, since it stimulates the priority of freedom of choice. Since democracy reflects the desire for freedom of choice at best, a society emphasizing self- expression values will mobilize for the inauguration of a democracy, a democracy that is effective in the best sense. From an empirical point of view, Inglehart and Welzel (2008b) have shown that “in regression analyses controlling for the impact of a society’s level of economic development, income inequality, educational level, ethnolinguistic factionalization, and religious tradition, a society’s level of self-expression values emerges as the strongest predictor by far of effective democracy” (p. 131). A more complex description of the inherent processes of human empowerment can be found in Figure 3.
13 By combining the components of resources and values, Welzel and Inglehart bring together formally separate theoretical approaches to explain the development and stabilization of democracies. The material approach was used in modernization theory (see for example Diamond 1992; Lipset 1959; Lipset et al. 1993; Przeworski & Limongi 1997), whereas the value approach was used in political culture theory (see, for example, Almond & Verba 1989). 26 2. Theoretical Background
Figure 3. The chain of processes promoting human empowerment. Source: Welzel and Inglehart (2008, p. 135).
27 2. Theoretical Background
As is visible in Figure 3, Welzel and Inglehart do not answer the question about how exactly human empowerment leads to the strengthening of democratic institutions. This step implies active participation from ordinary people. They must be willing to actively support the formal adoption of democratic institutions or, in existing democracies, they need to support the increase of their efficiency. In the latter case, ordinary people increase their engagement in, and support for equal opportunity activities. In non-democracies, Welzel and Inglehart point to the growing engagement in, and support for civil and political rights activities as the consequence of rising self-expression value levels and the basis for the formal adoption of democratic institutions in a country. But can this be enough? It can be assumed that the mass mobilization and political activism that Welzel and Inglehart cite as a necessity for a transition of power in a country must include further elements of engagement. Unfortunately, this point is hardly examined. In a negative definition of mass support, they negate the importance of endorsement of democracy. Welzel and Inglehart (2008b) make this point very clearly:
Endorsement of democracy is not necessarily accompanied by the interpersonal trust, tolerance of other groups, and political activism that are core components of self- expression values, and empirical analysis demonstrates that these are far more important to the emergence and survival of democratic institutions than is mere lip service (p. 132).
This gap in the theory of human empowerment can be closed using the theory of political participation as a complement. Political participation is a behavioural expression of human empowerment and an essential part of mass mobilisation. For newly developing democracies, political participation is an essential element of a successful transition process (McAllister & White 2009, p. 186). Nevertheless, its importance does not end with the installation of a democratic regime via founding elections. According to McAllister and White (2009), “the most serious risks to the new system come in the period of democratic consolidation” (p. 187) when a lack of accountability and responsibility towards citizens’ needs and wishes could result in a decrease of political participation. Although the best level of participation for a stable democracy is yet to be defined, Mc Allister and White (2009) agree that “a decline in electoral participation has the potential to harm democratic stability” (p. 199). Thus, from a theoretical point of view, the role of ordinary citizens for both the transformation and the stabilization of democracies is of crucial importance. Their system of values (self-expression)
28 2. Theoretical Background
as well as their behaviour (political participation) shape the political system and contribute to its democratic future.
A decrease in the political participation of ordinary citizens would thus mean a serious threat to the stability of a democratic system. Yet, for the present study, which hypothesis can be drawn from the theory of human mobilisation? Welzel’s and Inglehart’s theory argues that if people hold enough action resources and self-expression values, their tendency to actively support democratic institutions and to participate in politics increases. If the preconditions for the mobilisation of the masses are altered, for example, by the negative experience of violent electoral conflict, the equation changes. If the experience of violent electoral conflict results in an enduring decrease of action resources, people will show a decreased level of self- expression values than before their experience of violent electoral conflict, and will thus participate less in politics (Hypothesis 1). If the level of action resources is only temporarily decreased and returns to its previous level after a manageable period of time, and self- expression levels remain at the same level, no change is to be expected in the political participation level compared to its level before the experience of violent electoral conflict (Hypothesis 2). If the citizens concerned show a constant (or increased) level of action resources and an increased level of self-expression values, one would expect the level of political participation to increase as well (Hypothesis 3). Now that the human empowerment approach and its benefits for the present study have been described in detail, the following section addresses the theory of trauma response in a similar manner.
2.4 Theory of Trauma Response
Violent electoral conflict is often accompanied by the experience of violence, which can be directed towards a person’s physical or psychological well-being. The intensity of this experienced violence varies for different people as does their individual coping processes. People react differently to similar situations. Nevertheless, the experience of violence during the course of an election definitely counts as a potentially trauma-causing event.
From a linguistic perspective, the experience of a trauma is defined as an “emotional shock following a stressful event or physical injury, which may be associated with physical shock and sometimes leads to long-term neurosis” (Oxford Dictionaries 2013). Providing a more specialist social psychological definition, the American Psychiatric Association (2001) notes that a traumatic event requires that “the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to
29 2. Theoretical Background
the physical integrity of self or others” (p. 467). Furthermore, the definition includes the necessity that “a person’s response has to involve intense fear, helplessness, or horror (p. 467). The experience of violent electoral conflict in its various forms can be subsumed under this definition. To shed light on the question of whether victims of violent electoral conflict change their political participation behaviour, the coping strategies of trauma victims are analysed in brief. How do victims of trauma react to their experience?
In the psychological literature on trauma, three main responses to traumatization can be identified: the proactive response, reactive response, and passive response. The first response describes the attempt of a person to address and correct a stressor before its effects manifest in victim behaviour. The reactive response manifests after a traumatisation has occurred and thus describes the attempts of a traumatised person to cope with these experiences, to correct or minimize the damage caused by the stressful event. The passive response describes an emotional numbness towards or the ignorance of a stressor. This reaction is often an immediate response to a stressful event, but it must be distinguished from continuous passive responses at a later stage of the coping process (see for example Gahleitner 2005).
According to Lazarus (1981; see also Lazarus and Launier 1981), the process of examining a traumatising event as a whole includes five basic steps. Ulrich et al. (1985) take up Lazarus’ findings and present a simplified model of the coping process:
Strain; Re- Assessment Coping Stressor psychological Assessment of Situation Attempts effects of Situation
Figure 4. Lazarus’ description of the coping process with a stressful situation. Source: Ulrich et al. (1985, p. 69).
Although this model appears to be linear, Lazarus and Ulich et al. (1985) emphasize its process character and that a traumatised person might have to go through it several times (p. 69). Applying these assumptions to the present research study, one can say that the experience of electoral conflict—in the form of violent electoral conflict —may lead to psychological impacts on the person concerned (Hypothesis 1). Furthermore, the experience of violent electoral conflict may lead to diametrically opposed reactions. On the one hand, one can 30 2. Theoretical Background
imagine that victims might want to withdraw from electoral activity or, even more broadly, from political events completely (Hypothesis 2). In an attempt to avoid the memory of a stressful situation, victims might ignore elections, political campaigns, or even media coverage to avoid triggering flashbacks or an inner re-living of the trauma. On the other hand, victims who take a reactive response might increase their interest in elections or politics as a whole (Hypothesis 3). Participating in politics might be part of their active attempts to cope with their experienced violent electoral conflict; being politically informed might also work as a guarantee to be prepared for the next potential outbreak of violent electoral conflict.
Now that all three theoretical approaches to the present study have been discussed in detail, the following section summarizes the important findings.
2.5 Conclusion
Following Yin’s (2003) recommendations about the development of theoretical assumptions “prior to the conduct of any data collection” (p. 35) for case studies, three theoretical approaches have been described in Chapter 2. All of these approaches are suitable for investigating the consequences of violent electoral conflict on the political participation of Kenyan citizens, and will be utilized during the data analysis.
The following chapter adds to the theoretical background of the study by providing an in- depth description of the research design, methodology, and data analysis employed for the study. Chapter 3 also examines the issues raised by the epistemological approach, the sources of data, and the ethical considerations.
31 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
3 Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
3.1 Introduction
After a field of research has been laid out and research questions have been formulated, a suitable methodology to achieve the stated goals needs to be chosen. The research questions form the basis on which to choose a suitable methodology and methods. Research questions, methodology, and research design further influence the type of analysis to be used in later stages of the research (see Yin 2003). The current study, like all research studies, needs to answer questions concerning a suitable choice of methodology, design, and analysis that will achieve the cited aims and objectives of the research. The following sections provide an in- depth examination of the chosen approach to research design, methodology, the epistemological approach, sources of data, case selection, ethical considerations, and data analysis.
3.2 Research Design
According to Yin (2003), “In the most elementary sense, the [research] design is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research question and, ultimately, to its conclusions” (p. 20). The research design for the present study can be classified as a qualitative case study analysis that uses semi-narrative face-to-face interviews to produce interview material on the possible consequences of violent electoral conflict on the political participation of ordinary Kenyan citizens. The purpose of this study is to explore the ways in which violent electoral conflict affects the political participation of ordinary Kenyan citizens and their attitudes towards democracy. As has been outlined in the previous chapter, different theories can be used to examine these concerns, which will be controlled for in the analysis. The exploration will be considered successful if the analysis reveals an answer to the research question and discloses one or more motives for the participants’ behaviour.
A case study in general is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2003, p. 13).
Case studies thus focus on contemporary phenomena such as unemployment, youth poverty, drug abuse, and violent electoral conflict in their contemporary occurrence. In contrast, history focuses on non-contemporary events such as the French Revolution or the consequences of the Black Death in the 14 th century. The second element of this definition
32 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
refers to the characteristic of case studies to deliberately examine contextual conditions due to their importance for the analysis of a phenomenon. In direct opposition to laboratory situations in which contextual factors are painstakingly controlled to reduce the complexity of an experiment to the variables of interest, case study research is embedded in a context and cannot be torn from it. In the present study, the consequences of violent electoral conflict on the political participation of ordinary Kenyan citizens had to be investigated in the country of interest itself. A phenomenon such as violent electoral conflict cannot be simulated or investigated in a laboratory situation; rather it needs to be grounded in a natural setting. Since the boundaries of a phenomenon and context cannot always be distinguished easily in real-life settings (as Yin’s definition points out), case study research needs to be understood as a comprehensive research strategy, which “comprises an all-encompassing method—covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis” (Yin 2003, p. 14).
Yin (2003) further refers to the type of research question as another important consideration for choosing a case study approach. According to Yin (2003), when a how or why question is asked about a contemporary event over which an investigator has little or no control, a case study has a distinct advantage with respect to producing suitable research findings (p. 9). In contrast, survey research often answers who , what, and how much/how many questions. History often asks similar questions to case studies but does not focus on contemporary events. A summary of the characteristics of the different approaches is provided in Table 1.
Table 1. Relevant situations for different research strategies. Source: Yin (2003, p.5, as cited in COSMOS Corporation 2005).
Strategy Form of Requires Control of Focuses on Research Question Behavioural Events? Contemporary Events? Experiment how, why? Yes Yes
Survey who, what, where, how No Yes many, how much?
Archival who, what, where, how No Yes/No Analysis many, how much?
History how, why? No No
Case study how, why? No Yes
33 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
Taking Yin’s characteristics as a definitional basis, the present research study clearly qualifies as a case study.
The present study has an open explorative character towards the consequences of violent electoral conflict, without an intention to falsify any pre-formulated hypotheses. The exploratory character and the complexity of the chosen subject suggest a qualitative approach to the topic. Qualitative interviews are a suitable and adequate setting for possibly (but not necessarily) traumatised people to talk about their experiences with violent electoral conflict and its possible consequences on their political participation. A micro-level analysis tells us a good deal about subjective motives of people’s actions, which cannot be produced by a macro-level approach. To improve the validity of the study, existing quantitative data on the political participation of Kenyan citizens, preferably allowing for a comparison of findings over time, was consulted. Data from Quality of Elections Data (QED) (Kelley 2012; Kelley & Kolev 2010), National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) (Hyde & Marinov 2012), and the Index of Electoral Malpractice Dataset (IEMD) (Birch 2009) provided by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) were used to test the correlation between elections—even when flawed—and democratization in Kenya and other African countries on the macro-level.
An explorative multiple case study design can further be characterized as holistic , since it allows for the consideration of the contextual information of different cases (see for example Baxter & Jack 2008). According to Yin (2003), a holistic design is “advantageous when no logical subunits can be identified or when the relevant theory underlying the case study is itself of a holistic nature” (p. 45). In the present study, both conditions are to the point. No further subunits of individuals can be, or have been, chosen, and all the three theories described earlier actually possess a holistic scope. Figure 5 summarizes the possible attributes of single or multiple case studies with a holistic or embedded character.
34 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
Figure 5. Basic types of designs for case studies. Source: Yin (2003, p. 40).
The level of analysis specifies whether the level of investigation will focus on organisations, groups, institutions, decision making processes, individuals, and so forth (see for example Neuman 2006). Individuals form the primary level of analysis in the present study. Information about each relevant individual was collected and included in a multiple-case study. As a specific geographical area, Kenya was chosen as the country of interest, since it has had many waves of violent electoral conflict since its general elections in 1992. 14 Four Kenyan regions, the so-called ‘hotspots’ of violent electoral conflict, were chosen to find suitable interview partners. These regions are Nairobi Province, the Rift Valley Province, the Coastal Province, and Nyanza Province. One interviewee also experienced violent electoral conflict in Western and further on in Uganda. Within these areas, people from different neighbourhoods participated in the study. The unit of analysis is thus divided into three units as illustrated in Figure 6.
14 A more detailed explanation for the choice of Kenya as the geographic area of interest is provided in Section 3.6. 35 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
Level of investigation Level of analysis
Country Kenya
Rift Valley Province, Provinces Nairobi Province, Nyanza Province, Coastal Province
Victims of Violent Individuals Electoral Conflict
Figure 6. Level of investigation and Level of analysis. Source: Developed on the assumptions of Yin (2003) and Phondej et al. (2011).
The interview partner’s experience with violent electoral conflict had to occur within the time range of 1992 until 2013. The sample consists of 36 cases in total.
Due to the sensitivity of the topic, personal interviews were chosen to be the appropriate interview form. Only in the cases in which interviewees asked to be interviewed in groups, was the interview form accordingly adapted. Before the interviews were conducted, an interview guide for semi-structured interviews had been worked out in the context of a multi- disciplinary workshop on qualitative interviewing. Different mechanisms were employed to improve the validity of the data collected. 15 The interviews were transcribed as soon as possible, partially during the fieldwork. The interviews were transcribed following the conversation analytic transcription systems GAT 2, developed by Selting and colleagues (Selting et al. 2009). For the analysis and interpretation of the data collected, a computer- assisted content analysis approach was chosen. As such, each transcribed interview initially was accompanied by a written memo that highlighted the central terms, concepts, and argumentation lines and that identified any passages that helped to answer the research questions. In a second step, the main categories for the analysis were developed using a
15 The following sections provide a detailed description of the data collection process, sampling, the research instrumentation used, and the quality in qualitative research. 36 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
hybrid development process that included deductive and inductive mechanisms to develop the coding frame. All the material collected was finally coded using this differentiated category system. The data analysis software called MaxQDA was used to enable the data analysis process at all stages .
3.3 Research Methodology
Research methodology refers to a body of methods employed in a scientific discipline, i.e., the social sciences. The most common distinction in research methods is between quantitative and qualitative methods. The present study is a qualitative, multiple case study with an explorative, holistic character. The sample size is 36 cases. The following sections provide details about the data collection, sampling procedures, and research instrumentation, followed by a discussion about quality standards in qualitative research.
3.3.1 Data Collection The interview partners were 38 ordinary Kenyan citizens in total who were currently living in Nairobi Province, the Coastal Province, the Rift Valley Province, or Nyanza Province, and who were entitled to vote (older than 18 years) and had personally experienced violent electoral conflict during one of the general elections between 1992 and 2013 16 . The interviews were conducted shortly after the March 2013 election, between March and May 2013. Since the 2013 elections remained largely peaceful, the focus of the data analysis was on the consequences of previous election conflicts. In total, 33 of the 34 interviewed victims of violent electoral conflict experienced it in the aftermath of the 2007 clashes.
Members of the political elite were not interviewed, since their role in the elections may have varied from victim to perpetrator. The intention of this study was to interview the victims of violent electoral conflict. During the selection process of the interview partners, no further distinction was made between different forms of violent electoral conflict that had been experienced. This decision was consistent with the overall research goal of this study to explore the possible effects of violent electoral conflict on the political participation of ordinary Kenyan citizens. During the interviews, participants were asked to describe their personal experiences of violent electoral conflict and the impact it had on their lives. If the impact levels varied, the variation was considered in the data analysis.
16 One additional interviewee experience post-election violence of 2008 in the Western Province and Uganda. 37 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
As Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2010) found in their study, the post 2007 electoral violence in Kenya “affected one out of three Kenyans in terms of personal injury, being displaced from home, destruction of property, loss of jobs or earnings or having a friend or relatives that died in the elections” (p. 4), regardless of their ethnicity and wealth. Nevertheless, the results of the present study take into account the ethnic affiliation, gender, and income group of the participants, which were identified at the end of the semi-narrative interviews (see interview manual in Addendum 1).
The qualitative interviews were conducted from a complete observer perspective, meaning that the interviewer did not engage in social interaction with her interview partners and was not involved in the world being studied. This approach provides the advantage that the interview partners do not assume common knowledge (i.e., social norms, cultural habits, etc.) but are animated to explain their ideas and points of view to the interviewer. By asking open questions, the problem of reactivity should be reduced. Nevertheless, the author of the present study was well aware of a possible interview effect in the proposed constellation, which needed to be controlled in the later analysis of the data.
Respondents were given the time and opportunity to present their systems of relevance without the intervention of the interviewer’s relevance system or presuppositions. Therefore, the first part of the interview was designed as an open, narrative interview in which respondents talked about their experience of violent electoral conflict. The narration was stimulated by an open question (stimulus), after which the narrative monopoly was assigned to the respondent. As Babbie (2007) puts it: “Ideally, the respondent does most of the talking” (p. 306). In such a qualitative setting, the answers were evoked by the initial stimulus and not by a pre-established invariable questionnaire that might have shaped the subsequent course of the interview. Maintenance questions, such as How come? How is that? In what ways? How do you mean that? and What would be an example of that? stimulated the further narration of the interviewee without subtly biasing the answers of the interview partners.
As the interview progressed, the interviewer picked up important topics and thereby slowly increased the structuring of the interview. At this stage of the interview, questions were guided by an interview manual, which was developed with the support of fellow PhD students during an interdisciplinary workshop on qualitative interviews at the University of Münster, Germany.
38 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
3.3.2 Sampling Procedures For the purpose of this study, a non-probability, purposive sampling—also known as judgmental or selective sampling—was chosen (Boehnke et al. 2011; Ezzy 2002; Liamputtong & Ezzy 2005). This sampling type is typical for qualitative research but not limited to it. As Boehnke et al. (2011) emphasize: “Its [purposive sampling] uses are by no means limited to the qualitative research paradigm where it originated but extend to all empirical studies in which representativeness of the sample cannot be achieved (…)” (p. 110). The existence of the particular characteristic of the topic of interest and its effects—e.g., experienced violent electoral conflict—outweighed the interest in a randomly selected sample. Thus, the case selection was guided by the relevance of a case for the given research topic (Quinn-Patton 2002). The total sample size was 36 interviews. Kenyan citizens older than 18 years of age represented the population observed. Individuals within this population functioned as the units of analysis.
The most common classification criterion for purposive samples refers to the type of cases included in a study (Boehnke et al. 2011). For the present study, an intensive case sampling was used that exemplifies the phenomenon of interest, violent electoral conflict, to a considerable extent. Although the correlation between violent electoral conflict and political participation cannot be specified at the moment, and thus no hypotheses have been formulated, the choice of intensive cases ensures that if a correlation does exist, the stimulus is strong enough to trigger an effect. In the language of quantitative research, one could say that in an assumed—but so far unspecified correlation between X and Y—X1 holds considerable values relative to a univariate distribution (see Gerring 2009). As a consequence, only such persons who considered herself or himself affected by violent electoral conflict were included in the sample. They had been physically injured, had to watch as relatives or friends were injured or killed, had been psychologically affected, or suffered from a mixture of these factors.
A second criterion of sampling refers to the sample composition , which provides the possibility of including similar (homogenous sample) or contrasting (heterogeneous sample) cases. The present study made use of a heterogeneous sample (maximum variation) that included participants who widely differed in their general characteristics but matched in their direct experience of violent electoral conflict. Consequently, greater insight into the effects of violent electoral conflict was gained. As the consequences of violent electoral conflict on political participation constitute a rather unexplored field of research, this approach allows for
39 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
the more explanatory power of the study’s results. Various people may react to violent electoral conflict in different ways. Thus, a heterogeneous sample enables the exploration of these different reactions, whereas in a homogenous sample, these results would remain undetected. Using a homogenous sample would have limited the scope of the findings to a specific group, whereas the chosen heterogeneous approach distinguishes between several different groups of participants, allowing for more detailed conclusions.
How then were these different groups defined? This question refers to the procedure of sample selection , which is twofold. In a first step factors that are most likely to affect the phenomenon of interest need to be determined. As a general rule, these factors derive from the previous knowledge of the researcher, i.e., other empirical studies or theoretical knowledge. In the present study, the three factors most likely to be important for analyzing the effects of violent electoral conflict were chosen based on theoretical pre-knowledge and the findings of previous studies on violent electoral conflict: ethnic group affiliation, gender, and socio- economic situation. With the repetition of electoral cycles, Kenya has regularly experienced ethnic clashes between its more than 40 different ethnic groups. Although the conflicts between specific groups have alternated from one election to another, ethnic segregation and confrontation is a central characteristic of Kenya’s electoral conflict processes. Thus, the inclusion of the factor of ethnic adherence appears to be crucial for a study on the effects of violent electoral conflict in Kenya. To keep the study achieveable, the four biggest ethnic groups (Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba, and Luhya) were included in the sample. From the understanding gained from other conflict situations, women have been found to be more vulnerable than men to any kind of conflict situation. Women are more vulnerable in terms of physical or sexual abuse, and thus very often become victims of violent attacks. Furthermore, in traditional African societies, women are held responsible for the well-being of the family, even in a conflict situation. If for example, if a child is injured or killed, the mother is blamed for the loss by the broader family, a situation which might cause different, more long-term effects of a conflict experience, compared to their male counterparts. Thus, differentiating between female and male interviewees was an important factor for increasing the quality of this study. Socio-economic status was the third factor included in the sample selection. Citizens with a high socio-economic background have more possibilities to protect themselves and their families from the experience of violent electoral conflict and from its consequences on their lives. They might even have the financial means to hire guards to protect their belongings and family members. When confronted with economic consequences, it is far
40 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
more likely that economically strong individuals and families will be able to compensate for their economic losses, compared to economically vulnerable people. The latter are more likely to become the victims of a conflict situation and of the long-term negative effects of their economic situation. In the interview guide, interviewees were asked to name their category of income: Group 1 (0–10.000 KSh per month), Group 2 (10.001–20.000 KSh per month), or Group 3 (20.001–30.000 KSh or more per month).
The following general characteristics also were used as selection characteristics for choosing interview partners:
a. Twenty-one years of age or older
b. Currently living in Kenya
c. Contact with organizations such as EISA, KAS, CHRISC, etc.
d. Willingness to participate in the study
After the factors most likely to influence the phenomenon of interest were laid out, cases had to be selected that best exemplified the combination of these factors (step two). The chosen procedure of defining different factors to be included in the sampling selection followed by the actual case selection resembles a stratified or quota sampling in which in a first step, the composition of the sample relates “to the strata and the proportion in which they should be represented in the sample; a second step involves selecting members from each stratum” (Boehnke et al. 2011, p. 110). In contrast to classic (quantitative) stratified sampling, the stratified purposive sampling applied in the present study includes only a few cases per combination, sometimes only one. This characteristic is common to a stratified, purposive sampling that aims for a deep, in-depth examination, compared to the broad, generalizable approach used in quantitative stratified sampling. Nevertheless, the researcher managed to include at least several cases in each category combination to allow for a comparison of similar cases (logic of literal replication).
For the second step of sample selection , the procedure of snowball sampling was used “in which one member of the population [of interest] refers the researcher to other members, who in turn name still more members until a sample of sufficient size has been achieved” (Boehnke et al. 2011, p. 111). During the contacting of the interview partners, the Kenyan non-profit organizations already assisting victims of violent electoral conflict participated in the selection process as gatekeepers. Organisations such as the Electoral Institute for
41 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), the Christian Sports Contact (CHRISC), and Red Cross Kenya were informed about the research goals and methodological procedure of this study and agreed to assist in the sample selection process. Based on the given information, they provided the researcher with a list of potentially appropriate interview partners (including their characteristics and contact details) or they invited suitable candidates to a meeting with the researcher. If these potential candidates were willing to participate in the study, an interview followed this meeting.
In total, 38 individuals took part in the study. Taking into consideration that qualitative samples are usually small, a total of 36 interviews produced sufficient working grounds for a profound data analysis. Kruse (2011, p. 86) agrees with this conclusion when he suggests that a sample of 10 ≤ n ≤ 100 is one necessary condition for qualitative representation.
The use of qualified organizations as gatekeepers to gather information and the contact details of interview partners considerably facilitated the selection process of finding appropriate interview partners. Nevertheless, the author of the present study is well aware that the use of gatekeepers might have disadvantages for the sample quality; thus, the concrete choice of interview partners remained in the hands of the researcher, who made sure that no one was forced to participate in the study, a given danger when working with gatekeepers, and that candidates were suitable for the underlying sample.
Some candidates invited by the organizations did not fit the criterion of personal involvement in a violent electoral conflict or didn’t consider themselves to be a victim of the phenomenon. For these cases, the researcher had to make sure that the chosen research sample was followed.
Using a snowball sampling procedure entails the risk of a sample bias, since it might disproportionately include people from the same socio-economic background, status, or similar set of values. In the present case, standard variables such as socio-economic background, education, place of residence, family status, etc. were controlled.
The one factor that may have negatively influenced the sample, and which will be controlled in the analysis, is the routine that the participants used to speak about their experience. In contrast to other victims, who might never have spoken about their experiences, the interview partners in the present study received a different kind of support from the named organizations. Most of them have spoken at least once about their experience with violent
42 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
electoral conflict during one of Kenya’s elections, or have received encouragement to do so by NGO members or other victims.
Although the author of the present study was aware of this possible bias at all times, she decided to attach greater weight to ethical considerations and the well-being of victims than to the purity of her sample. Approaching victims who haven’t spoken about their experiences directly might cause a recurrence of a trauma, which was to be avoided at all times. Thus, the snowball procedure was given priority.
In the relevant literature, the problem of potential biases in snowball or sequential sampling has been discussed at length. Its negative implications are countered with the argument that these sampling strategies are extremely useful with hard-to-reach populations, such as victims of violence. Some authors include, for example, drug users, elites, or homeless people (see Boehnke et al. 2011) in the category of hard-to-reach populations. Without the use of gatekeepers, these communities would most likely be unreachable for scientific research.
3.3.3 Research Instrumentation Developing a research instrument that is appropriate to one’s research aims and objectives is a crucial step. For the purpose of this research study, an interview guide for semi-structured interviews with ordinary Kenyan citizens was developed in the context of a multi-disciplinary workshop on qualitative interviewing.
Semi-structured interviews provide the necessary flexibility to combine open questions with the more problem-oriented, structured questions about a specific phenomenon of interest. This structure has proven to be specifically useful for sensitive topics such as violent electoral conflict, since it allowed interviewees to speak their minds freely when asked about their experiences but also enabled the researcher to narrow the conversation step-by-step to a specific point of interest.
An interview guide as opposed to a questionnaire—used in quantitative research—does not constitute a list of questions that are read out consecutively during the course of an interview. In a semi-structured interview setting, the interviewer is interested in following the interviewee in his answers by asking follow-up questions and probes.
As Berg (1995) puts it:
These questions [predetermined questions and/or special topics] are typically asked of each interviewee in a systematic and consistent order, but the interviewers are
43 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
permitted (in fact expected) to probe far beyond the answers to their prepared and standardized questions (p. 70).
The questions noted in the interview guide provide some orientation for the researcher but nevertheless enables him or her to be responsive to the given answers. As such, a dynamic conversation is stimulated between an interviewer and interviewee. The interview guide used in the field respected these concerns.
The interview guide for the present research study was developed following Helfferich’s (2005) method of interview guide generation, using the so-called SPSS system. This method, which must not be confused with the popular data analysis software for quantitative data, combines four working processes: Sammeln (collecting), Prüfen (checking), Sortieren (sorting), and Subsumieren (subsuming).
In a first 20 minute session, a team of four PhD students, with a multi-disciplinary background, collected research questions concerning the topic of violent electoral conflict and its possible consequences on the political participation of Kenyan citizens. The workshop participants were given only a basic description of the project to keep their minds open to the different aspects of the topic. Equipped with sheets of paper and markers, the participants were asked to write down as many questions as possible that came to mind within the given time frame. They were not allowed to communicate with each other but could listen to the questions formulated by the other participants.
After 20 minutes, about 100 questions had been piled up on a table. The next step was to check the suitability of these questions to the research goals. Inapplicable questions were sorted out. In a third step, the group members sorted all the remaining questions with regard to content for potential categories and for their functional characteristics, i.e., tell questions, follow-up questions, throw-away questions, essential questions, etc. (see Berg 1995).
In a last step, the researcher subsumed the sorted and reviewed questions within an interview guide. After repeating step two to four several times, the preliminary interview guide to be used in the field started to take shape. 17 It consisted of the following themes: elections and conflict experienced, political participation, support for democracy and self-expression values, consequences of violent electoral conflict, victim/perpetrator relationship, demographic details, and open questions at the end of the interview.
17 A copy of the interview guide can be found in Addendum 1. 44 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
After conducting the first interviews, the order of these themes was shifted to the following: elections and conflict experienced, consequences of violent electoral conflict, victim/perpetrator relationship, political participation, support for democracy, demographic details, and open questions at the end of the interview. Some questions were added/replaced likewise so to include the interesting comments or concerns of previous interview partners. This approach is recommended and even expected in a grounded theory approach (see Charmaz 2006).
The questions were also formulated according to the educational and social level of the subjects (Berg 1995, p. 74). As is common in qualitative research, the researcher constitutes the research instrument him/herself. Further training on conducting interviews is a precondition for gathering meaningful material. This is especially true for sensitive topics such as the experience of violent electoral conflict.
3.3.4 Why Qualitative Research? An overlong discussion has been carried out about the differences between quantitative and qualitative research—their particular goals, methods, similarities, differences, limitations, and shortcomings (see, for example, Smith 1983; Bryman 1984; Firestone 1987; Bauer & Gaskell 2007). For a very long time, quantitative and qualitative research methods have been considered diametrically opposed, leading to scientists speaking of a “paradigm war” (Muijs 2004, p. 11) with incommensurable fractions and incompatible worldviews separating the scientific community into quantitative or qualitative sides.
Whereas quantitative research aims at “explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data that are analyzed using mathematically based methods (in particular statistics)” (Aliaga & Gunderson 2006, p. 11), qualitative social research is centered on “interpreting social realities” (Bauer & Gaskell 2007, p. 7) and gathering an in-depth understanding of the “ whys and hows of human behavior, opinion, and experience” (Guest et al. 2013, p. 1). In the tradition of valued representatives of qualitative research such as Goffman (1971) and Mannheim (1964), qualitative research shall be defined as “understanding the meaning people have constructed, that is, how people make sense of their world and the experiences they have in the world“ (Merriam 2009, p. 13).
In today’s methodological debate, a more pragmatic approach has been established, which legitimizes the use of an appropriate methodology—quantitative, qualitative, or mixed- methods—depending on the nature of the research of interest and the concrete research
45 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
questions. Rather than generally side with one of the approaches, the research interest and the concrete research questions determine all subsequent methodological decisions.
In 1989, Mayring declared a “qualitative Wende” [a qualitative rebound], and for Denzin and Lincoln (2003), qualitative research has become “a field of inquiry in its own right” (p. 3). This must not be misinterpreted in the sense that there is such a thing as the qualitative research methodology. The latter is rather represented by a variety of different traditions of theoretical paradigms (postpositivism, constructivism, feminism, critical theory, etc.), research strategies (study design, case study, grounded theory, phenomenology, etc.) and methods (observation, interviewing, participatory inquiry, visual methods, etc.), which all claim their role in the qualitative research family (see, for example, Denzin and Lincoln 2003, pp. 17ff, 32ff).
From a general point of view, four assets of qualitative research can be identified in the literature. First , qualitative research is said to be especially interested in the description, interpretation, and understanding of social processes, interactions, and meanings, rather than the analysis of the causal relationships between them. Thus, qualitative research is a specific field of research that is a wonderland of possibilities for all those researchers interested in its topics.
Second , qualitative research is said to be not only qualified, but highly qualified, for explorative research in scientific fields that have had little attention from the scientific community. It is suitable to generate classifications, typologies, and hypotheses that later on can be re-tested with quantitative, deductive, falsification-based research, and thus nurses the scientific process as a whole. Quantitative research often remains silent about how theories are developed before they can be tested and falsified, or theories are indirectly and unconsciously included. Thus, qualitative studies often provide detailed illustrations and develop hypotheses and concepts instead of specifying them (see Babbie 2007).
The third asset of qualitative research is its sensitivity to the pluralistic, undetermined, and inter-personal meaning of concepts, processes, and events that are only constructed in the social interaction of people and within the system of other concepts. This sensitivity is called the indexicality of language (see for example Garfinkel 1973; Nöth 2002; Lutzeier 2002; Linke et al. 2004). Considering the life stories of two women, one who grew up in Western Europe and the other in India, easily reveals different understandings of social phenomena such as marriage, childhood, and gender roles.
46 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
These examples show that the meaning of a phenomenon does not exist independently of time and space (positivist approach), but is context-dependent and interrelated. Whereas quantitative research risks willingly or unwittingly ignoring such differences in the meaning of things, it is the asset of qualitative research to reveal them. As Babbie (2007) summarizes: “The kinds of comprehensive measurements available to the field researcher tap a depth of meaning in concepts (…) that are generally unavailable to surveys and experiments” (p. 313). Quantitative and qualitative research are both “interested in the individual’s point of view” (Denzin and Lincoln 2003, p. 16). Nevertheless, qualitative investigators claim to “get closer to the actor’s perspective through detailed interviewing and observation” (p. 16).
The fourth asset of qualitative research is its greater extent of validity 18 compared to quantitative approaches, such as survey and experimental measurements (see for example Babbie 2007, p. 313). Qualitative researchers either approach their phenomenon of interest in the field through direct observation, interviews, discussions, etc.; or by studying the reconstructions of those phenomena via the interpretation of pictures, paintings, videos, narration, etc. Thus, qualitative research is characterized by its closeness to a phenomenon by the nature of its measurement. In contrast to this approach, quantitative researchers study a social phenomenon by measuring its intensity, interrelation, and interaction via indicators, i.e. other social constructs. They settle questions of theory and constructs prior to their standardized data gathering that later “determine and structure (…) the construction of measuring instruments” (Przyborski and Wohlrab 2008, p. 36). The use of indicators as a means to measure a specific social phenomenon is said to fall behind the direct measurement approach used by qualitative researchers.
3.3.5 Quality in Qualitative Research Quality is an indispensable necessity for all research. But what is good quality research in the social sciences? What criteria have been defined to count as good quality work?
A negative definition is provided by Seale et al. (2010), for whom:
… good-quality research does not depend on the adoption of a particular philosophical or theoretical position, or on the commitment to particular political goals. Consideration of all of these things is relevant for research practice, but it is a mistake to allow any one of them to over-determine practice (p. 387).
18 The meaning of validity and other quality standards in qualitative research will be explained at a glance in the following section. 47 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
The quality of qualitative research often has been questioned, sometimes even denied (see for example Lundberg 1929; Bain 1929; King, Keohane, & Verba 1994). It has been, and sometimes still is, argued that sampling efforts have been neglected for the use of non- probabilistic samples, which leads to non-representative results that cannot be generalized (see, for example, Gobo 2010, p. 405f),. The attempt to overcome the gap of clearly defined quality standards in qualitative research has been multifaceted:
Explicit discussions of quality in social research, though, began from concerns designated with words such as validity and reliability , developed within the quantitative or scientific tradition, and then moved on under the pressure of critique from the qualitative research community (Seale 1999, p. 465).
Looking back, referring to validity and reliability as quality standards for qualitative research appears to be a daring venture, given their positivist image and long tradition in the quantitative paradigm. Unsurprisingly, their introduction into the qualitative research market provoked considerable refusal and led to the genesis of new terms, and the proliferation of new concepts (see Seale 1999, p. 467ff; also Golafshani 2003; Davies & Dodd 2002; Stenbacka 2001; Creswell & Miller 2000; Johnson 1997; Altheide & Johnson 1994; Maxwell 1992; Kirk & Miller 1986; Lincoln & Guba 1985). With postmodernist perspectives on the rise, the whole project of the definition of quality in qualitative research came into question (Seale 1999, p. 465). Unfortunately, a solution to this jumble of proposed criteria and concepts as the quality standard(s) in qualitative research has yet to be found.
However, from the 1990s on, the two concepts of reliability and validity “have become detached from the label of positivism and imported into qualitative paradigms” (Seale et al. 2010, p. 377). Few, but steady, efforts have been made to come to an agreement about common research standards within the qualitative and the quantitative paradigm (see Przyborski & Wohlrab-Sahr 2008). Given their significance as quality standards in the social sciences, the discussions in the following sections will provide explanations for validity and reliability at a glance, which is followed by a summary of the specific qualitative research criteria that guided the present study.
Given the huge dispute about quality standards in the scientific literature, the decision to highlight these two criteria needs to be considered a strategic choice in favor of a more strict understanding of research in general. In the interest of a broader acceptance of qualitative research, an “anything goes” approach (Feyerabend 1978)—that refuses any evaluation
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criteria for research—is rejected in favour of a more realistic position as is offered by Seale’s (1999) subtle realism. It is important to emphasize that every effort was made to ensure the highest quality in research design, methodology, and analysis. The formulation of appropriate quality standards, as well as the precise description of analytical methods, should lead to a rise in the traceability and credibility of this research study.
3.3.5.1 Validity Validity generally refers to “the extent to which an empirical measure adequately reflects the real meaning of the concept under consideration” (Babbie 2007, p. 146).
From a quantitative point of view, validity has two objectives. First, it asks to what degree a measurement tool does what it is supposed to do—to measure what it is designed to measure. As Stenbacka (2001) puts it: “The basic validity question is whether ‘the intended object of measurement actually is measured’” (p. 551). Second, validity is an indicator of the accuracy of a correlation assumed (x explains y), whose conclusions correspond accurately to the real world.
Validity thereby is not considered a single-dimensional construct. Many sub-forms of validity have been carved out steadily, including face validity, criterion-related validity also referred to as predictive validity, construct validity, content validity, internal and external validity, just to name a few. 19 All these sub-categories are used to evaluate the adequate work of a measurement. In spite of its great heterogeneity, validity has become an established quality indicator for quantitative inquiry.
From a qualitative perspective, applying the concept of validity is not easy. Even Babbie (2007) himself indicates that his definition of validity in social research (see above), strictly speaking, does not apply to qualitative research, since “the real meaning of the concept” (p. 146) simply does not exist. The positivist hypothesis of a reality that needs to be discovered and measured is rejected by qualitative researchers for whom reality is socially constructed and thereby context-specific. The same criticism applies to Stenbacka’s (2001) definition of validity—which includes the criteria of whether the “intended object of measurement actually is measured” (p. 551)—because of the simple fact that qualitative research does not measure anything (see Eneroth 1984, as cited in Stenbacka 2001).
19 A detailed description of all these sub-types of validity can be found in Babbie (2007). For more information, see, for example, Martin and Bridgmon (2012), Kramer et al. (2009), or Campbell and Stanley (1966). Schreier (2012) provides an interesting insight into the differences between latent and manifest content for validity. 49 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
Qualitative researchers have responded by denying the relevance of the quantitative paradigm for what they do, or they have developed their “own procedures for attaining validity” (Maxwell 1992, p. 280) that fits with their qualitative background.
Stenbacka (2001) provides a practical solution by attaching a distinct meaning to validity within the context of qualitative research:
The understanding of the phenomenon is valid if the informant is part of the problem area and if he/she is given the opportunity to speak freely according to his/her own knowledge structure. Validity is therefore achieved when using the method of non- forcing interviews with strategically well-chosen informants (p. 552).20
Her understanding of validity refers to the quality of the research instrumentation, especially the interview conduct. As will be shown later, all informants for the present study have been selected carefully by considering different criteria. During all the interviews, participants were given the opportunity to present their knowledge structure without pressure by the researcher. A thick description (Geertz 1973) of the interview situations is provided in Section 3.8 of the data analysis.
Maxwell (1992) brings in another element of instrument validity, which he calls descriptive validity , which refers to the factual accuracy of the data. It is supposed to reflect whether the “produced materials,” to use the qualitative expression for data (see Stenbacka 2001), accurately reflect what the informant has said and done during the process of generating material. To respond to the principle of descriptive validity, the transcription process of the digital voice recordings was conducted with particular care. Not only were statements transcribed truthfully, but also the non-verbal behavior, which includes emotional reactions (laughter, tears, sobbing, etc.) or unconscious actions (clapping of hands, movement of hands and feet, etc.). When the transcript was based on the answers of a translator, an assessment of the respondent’s voice and non-verbal behavior was documented wherever possible. 21
As a matter of course, validity does not refer to the instrument of data collection alone—in this case, the conduct of the interview; it also includes the instrument built for the data
20 Stenbacka’s (2001) solution is consistent with Gaskell and Bauer’s (2007) concept of internal validity in qualitative research, which asks “whether the design of the research and ways of gathering data, the experimental arrangements, are such as to allow conclusions to be drawn with confidence” (p. 339). 21 In his comprehensive study, Maxwell (1992) provides an alternative to the adaption of typologies developed for experimental and quantitative research. He makes the point that validity is relative to purpose and circumstance, meaning that “data in themselves cannot be valid or invalid; what is at issue are the inferences drawn from them” (1992, p. 2839). On the basis of what other qualitative researchers have used as validity criteria in their work, he develops five categories along which validity in qualitative research should be judged: descriptive validity, interpretive validity, theoretical validity, generalizability, and evaluative validity. 50 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
analysis, namely the coding frame. Schreier (2012) provides a clear and hands-on definition of validity in this regard: “An instrument is considered valid to the extent that it captures what it sets out to capture. A coding frame is valid to the extent that the categories adequately represent the concepts under study” (p. 175).
By saying that an instrument is considered valid to a certain extent , Schreier (2012) stresses that validity is not a criterion of “all-or-nothing” (p. 175) in which a coding frame is either valid or invalid. Rather, validity is a matter of degree, and thus a coding frame is valid to a certain degree.
Schreier (2012) distinguishes four types of validity that are commonly distinguished in the literature: face, content, criterion, and construct validity (p. 185ff) (also see Neuendorf 2002, p. 115ff). Face validity , she writes, is most useful to assess the validity of data-driven coding frames, and refers to the “extent to which your instrument gives the impression of measuring what it is supposed to measure” (Schreier 2012, p. 185). What seems rather simplistic at first glance is not easily achieved. To arrive at an analysis instrument with high face validity, a thorough preparation and a cleanly executed data analysis is required. Three signs can help to identify low face validity in data-driven coding frames: high coding frequency for residual categories, high coding frequency for one subcategory compared to the other subcategories on that dimension, 22 and a high level of abstraction of the coding frame as a whole. A coding frame with too high a level of abstraction lacks sufficiently numerous main and subcategories, and thus loses too much information. Face validity is specifically useful for data-driven coding frames, since they aim at an exact description of the collected material, and that is exactly what face validity is about.
In contrast, content validity is most useful for concept-driven coding frames, since it helps to assess the adequate representation of a particular concept in a research instrument. It is “assumed to be present to the extent that an instrument covers all dimensions of a concept” (Schreier 2012, p. 185). Concept-driven content analysis starts with a certain (theoretical) concept in mind, which should be reflected in the categories of the coding frame as well. Therefore, concept-driven coding frames should make use of content validity to evaluate the adequate representation of a concept within the categories. Content validity is best assessed either by including an expert (expert evaluation) or by calculating the agreement of the coding
22 This criterion needs to be considered with special care, since a high frequency in the coding of a specific subcategory may simply reflect a given distribution in the material, and thereby does not indicate a shortfall in face validity. 51 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
between the researcher and a coding partner (see Früh 2007; Lissmann 2008). The latter suggestion is highly linked to inter-coder reliability, which is discussed in the following section.
So far, the discussed types of validity—face and construct—are mainly interested in evaluating an in-depth and adequate description of the underlying interview material. In contrast, criterion and construct validity have a different aim. They are quality indicators in studies conveying information about the situation in which they were produced, about the communicator, and/or about the effects on the recipient, based on the collected information material (cf. Schreier 2012, p. 181ff). As such, they are relevant to those content analyses that go beyond the actual content, by making inferences beyond the actual content. Thereby, the latter always require external validation, i.e., in the form of reception studies, cross-checked with statistics or other available quantitative data, etc.
Criterion validity determines the “relationship between your instrument and another indicator of the concept in question whose validity has already been established” (Schreier 2012, p. 185). Construct validity takes into consideration the relationship between a concept under study and other relevant concepts: “You derive hypotheses about the relationships between the indicators of these constructs from a theory and test them” (Schreier 2012, p. 185).
Since the present research study is interested in describing (analyzing) the collected material that already includes statements on the communicator, the situation they are in, and the effects that violent electoral conflict has had on them, criterion and construct validity was not further considered. To assess the validity of the present research instrumentation, the focus was on face and content validity . Their assessment will be described in Section 7.6.
Besides these validity procedures, the technique of triangulation was used to further safeguard the validity of the research results (cf. Denzin 2006).
Data triangulation , the “use of multiple data sources with similar foci to obtain diverse views about a topic” (Kimchi et al. 1991, p. 384), was used in the present study. Triangulation is used in social science research to “search for convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form themes or categories in a study” (Creswell & Miller 2000, p. 124). The present research project combines self-generated interview material with an intensive literature search, which includes the findings of studies that already have been conducted on the topic, existing quantitative data, and additional information gathered by interviewing experts in the field.
52 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
Following Denzin (2006), three subtypes of data triangulation can be distinguished—time, space, and person. The applied data triangulation type used in the present study was space triangulation , since the interviewees were selected according to where they experienced the violent electoral conflict (Coastal Province, Nairobi Province, Nyanza Province, or the Rift Valley Province). During the data analysis, the results from these four ‘hotspot’ regions of violent electoral conflict were compared.
Furthermore, method triangulation was used, since the collected interview material was to be combined and compared to observations made in the field—such as during visits at the interviewees work place, home, or IDP camps (for internally displaced persons)—or with observations made during the conduct of the fifth general election in Kenya in 2013. By using this strategy, methodological deficiencies “that flow from one investigator or method” (Babbie & Mouton 2001, p. 275) were controlled.
3.3.5.2 Reliability Reliability in general is concerned with the consistency of a measurement (see, for example, Gaskell and Bauer 2007, p. 340f). According to Stenbacka (2001), “the basic reliability issue concerns a measurement method’s ability to produce the same research result over and over again” (p. 552).
In quantitative research, a research instrument is said to be reliable if it produces similar results under consistent conditions. One researcher repeating the same experiment with the same method and the same testing conditions is expected to obtain the same test scores as the previous test, for example, when measuring the body weight, intelligence, or personality of a person. This form of reliability test is called test-retest-reliability . Further, two or more different raters are expected to obtain similar test results when doing the same experiment by using the same methods under the same testing conditions ( interrater-reliability ). 23 Compared to the regular use of reliability tests used in quantitative studies, its advantage for qualitative research is highly contested.
23 A more distinct introduction to reliability in the quantitative paradigm is provided by Golafshani (2003).
53 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
Stenbacka (2001), for example, makes short work of the construct of reliability by stating that:
It is obvious that reliability has no relevance in qualitative research, where it is impossible to differentiate between researcher and method. The basic distinction that makes reliability irrelevant is the notion of “measurement method”, which is not relevant in qualitative research (p. 552).
Gaskell and Bauer (2007) agree with this assessment by pointing to the reliability-validity dilemma:
Take classical content analysis of a corpus of text. Two coders might have reliability in the use of a coding frame. However, that does not mean that they have a valid interpretation of the text. The connotation of a word may change with the context. Equally, the absence of agreement between coders may be diagnostic in two ways. On the one hand it may indeed demonstrate poor training of the coders, (…). But it may also show that the text does not lend itself to a consensual interpretation (p. 341).
In contrast, Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr (2007) emphasize the importance of reliability for qualitative research, which is understood as the replicability of both results and the research process (p. 39). According to these two researchers, reliability in the qualitative sciences is achieved through the reconstruction of the common standards of “communication and interaction” and through the “proof of reproductional standards in the case structure” (Przyborski & Wohlrab-Sahr 2007, p. 39). Both principles mainly refer to biographical studies, which makes their applicability to other qualitative research questionable.
By studying the scientific literature on reliability in the qualitative social sciences, one gets the impression that no agreed-upon definition for reliability or its appropriate operationalization for qualitative studies currently exists. Nevertheless, the present research project follows Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr (2007) in their appraisal of the reliability standards in qualitative research. To achieve interrater reliability, two other researchers participated in the trial coding (see Section 7.6). The developed coding frame was revised and expanded until a high interrater reliability was achieved.
3.4 Epistemological Approach
Social science research is, consciously or unconsciously, influenced by the researcher’s paradigm assumptions and worldviews (see Guba & Lincoln 1994). Scientific research
54 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
paradigms refer to a “conceptual framework” (Healy & Perry 2000, p. 118), a “set of linked assumptions about the world which is shared by a community of scientists investigating the world (Deshpande 1983, p. 101).
According to Guba and Lincoln (1994), three paradigms exist—(post)positivism, constructivism, and critical theory.
The (post)positivist researcher assumes that there is an existing reality, an objective truth that can be measured via standardized methods and numeric inquiry. Thus, research is meant to approach reality via inter-subjective, value-free statistical or experimental procedures. The knowledge gained is generalizable and can be reproduced by any other researcher. As Healy and Perry (2000) put it: “Essentially, positivism predominates in science and assumes that science quantitatively measures independent facts about a single apprehensible reality” (p. 119). However, the (post)positivist paradigm is not limited to quantitative research. Its supporters in qualitative social research emphasize the use of “rigorous methods and systematic forms of inquiry (Creswell & Miller 2000, p. 125; Maxwell 1996).
In contrast, constructivism negates the existence of an objective truth, and instead emphasizes the contextualized, pluralistic, socially-constructed character of reality. Thus, reality depends on the subjective belief system that a person holds in a particular context. Simply put, our thinking about the world is influenced by our experiences and imprinting, our values and ideologies. Since we grow up differently, people develop different understandings about what reality really is; people can even hold multiple realities in their minds (Healy & Perry 2000). This subjective understanding of reality implies the need for different research methods as applied in the (post)positivist paradigm. Scientific knowledge is produced via the reconstruction of the subjective realities that occur through the interaction between the informant and researcher. To achieve his/her research goals, the researcher has to assume the role of “passionate participant” during his/her field work (Healy & Perry 2000, p. 120; Guba & Lincoln 1994). By means of observation, interviewing, or other methods of qualitative material generation, the informant’s personal value system and individual definition of concepts or events can be unfolded.
Critical theory, such as constructivism, operates on the understanding that ideologies, values, and social contexts shape reality, but they also include historically-situated structures to substantiate their research. In contrast to both (post)positivism and constructivism, the assumptions of critical theory—highly subjective and value-driven—try to uncover the hidden
55 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
structures and processes of the modern state (Creswell & Miller 2000). According to Healy and Perry (2000), “Critical theory researchers aim at critiquing and transforming social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic and gender values” (p. 119). They assume the role of the “transformative intellectual who changes the social world within which participants live” (Healy & Perry 2000, p. 119).
Table 2 summarizes the main characteristics of each paradigm. 24
Table 2. Four categories of scientific paradigms and their elements. Source: Healy and Perry (2000, p. 119).
The present study follows the epistemological tradition of constructivism, which has practical implication for the research design and methodology. It acknowledges the specific problem of constructed realities and the problem of understanding (Verstehen), which is especially relevant for research being done in a foreign country with different traditions, culture, language, and history. The attribution to the constructivist approach does not come along with the negation of quality standards in qualitative research, as has been described in previous sections.
24 Table 2 includes a fourth scientific paradigm: realism. Since it hasn’t been cited as often as positivism, critical theory, and constructivism in the relevant literature, realism has not been included in this section. 56 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
3.5 Sources of Data
The in-depth qualitative interviews conducted from March to May 2013 are the heart of the present study. Thirty-two semi-structured interviews conducted with Kenyan victims of violent electoral conflict and four expert interviews were the primary data that enabled the researcher of the present study to answer the outlined research questions and objectives. The interviews were conducted in four of Kenya’s eight provinces—the Coastal Province, Nairobi Province, Nyanza Province, and the Rift Valley Province (northern and southern areas). Massive violence has occurred in all four areas during election periods, especially during the post-election clashes of 2008 (Waki 2008).
The generated primary data was flanked by the secondary analysis of the existing quantitative data in two different fields. First, with respect to the election-related violence, Lindberg’s (2008) dataset as well as the Social Conflict Analysis Database (Salehyan et al. 2012) have proven to be extremely valuable sources. Second, survey data about Kenya—such as the Afrobarometer data (Afrobarometer 2014) and the democracy evaluation data from Freedom House (2012a, 2012b, 2013) and Polity IV (Marshall & Cole 2011)—was re-analyzed for the purpose of the present study. Additionally, the Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) project data (Norris et al. 2015) was accessed to identify the deficits in Kenya’s electoral democracy in direct comparison to 24 other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. The statistical analysis software STATA was used as the data analysis tool.
An examination of the relevant literature on Kenyan survey data and other quantitative data was undertaken by the researcher to increase the validity of the analysis produced through the triangulation procedure. According to Babbie and Mouton (2001), triangulation increases the quality of a study and thus was used in the present study.
To write an authentic conflict mapping of the 2013 general elections, the author of the present study used the participating observation method. By visiting several polling stations in Nairobi—including the slum areas of Kibera—over the entire election day, first-hand insights into the conduct of the elections and people’s participation were gained. An in-depth media analysis about the ongoing counting process and the later judicial litigation was additionally conducted to provide evidence concerning the political atmosphere and the potential for outbursts of violence.
Since the present study focuses on the consequences of violent electoral conflict, an extensive literature review, particularly on the literature focused on Kenya, was undertaken. The non-
57 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
partisan organization Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA) has recently edited an interesting book “When Elephants Fight” that considers the state of the art of knowledge on violent electoral conflict in Africa (Matlosa et al. 2010). It has been of special value to the present study. Lindberg’s (2006) book Democracy and Elections in Africa has been another outstanding source of information and inspiration for the present study. Although not directly focused on the phenomenon of violent electoral conflict itself, this book provides deep insights into the role of elections in Africa and the role they play in stabilizing the democratic process. By bringing a new vitality to sometimes deadlocked perceptions, Lindberg animated the revival of this topic during the mid-2000s. .
A review of the latest journal articles on elections, violent electoral conflict, and Kenyan democracy further added the latest findings of researchers from across the world to the present study. Journals such as Democratization , the Journal of Democracy , Comparative Politics , African Affairs , and the International Journal of Peace Studies were particularly valuable.
3.6 Case Selection
Kenya is considered a suitable case to answer the research interests of the present study, since it has experienced violent electoral conflict during every single election since 1992. The 1992 elections were classified as significantly violent in Lindberg’s (2009) dataset. The extent of violence was reduced during the 1997 and 2002 elections, and although violence still occurred, it did not reach a significant level; however, violence increased again with the 2007 éclat.25 Laakso (2007) also has pointed to a repetition of violent elections in a detailed description of the pre-2007 electoral conflict in Kenya. As the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) has revealed, the 2013 general elections in Kenya were plagued by an increase in the number of conflict events, and surprisingly, by a decrease in lethal violence (Salehyan et al. 2012).
Kenyan citizens have therefore experienced repeated violent electoral conflict in their country. The long-term effects of this violence, if they exist, will be revealed by this present study. The findings of this case study can form the basis “for the development of more general, nomothetic theories” (Babbie 2007, p. 298).
25 For detailed information on the 2007 violent electoral conflict and its consequences, see, for example, CIPEV (2008), BBC News (2008 and 2010), Gettleman (2007), Kimani (2008), and OHCHR (2008). 58 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
3.7 Ethical Considerations
According to Babbie (2007), “anyone involved in social scientific research […] needs to be aware of the general agreements shared by researchers about what is proper and improper in the conduct of scientific inquiry” (p. 62). This awareness seems of special importance in research with possibly traumatised persons who may have experienced political violence, intimidation, or severe economic loss. Therefore, the author of the present study has internalised the ethical criteria regarding human behavioural research, including informed consent, voluntary participation, the right to privacy, protection from harm, as well as anonymity and confidentiality. Voluntary participation in the interviews and data capture processes is the basis for each and every wealth of new knowledge, and must never lead to the disadvantage of the respondent.
Ethical considerations have been internalized within several stages of this project. All participation was completely voluntary, and the participants were informed of this from the first moment of contact. They were able to withdraw their declaration of consent at any time. All participants received the contact information of the researcher to clarify upcoming questions or doubts, even after the conducted interview. No participant was forced to answer any question at any time. Furthermore, all the interviews were conducted anonymously. Prior to the interview, all the participants received a short description of the project, which provided basic information about the research goal and the contact details of the researcher. This information remained with the participant. They further received an informed consent form, which summarized all the rights granted to them as participants and provided information about the institutional context of the research project, such as the contact information of the Ethics Committee of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University. 26 On the second page of the informed consent form, the participants indicated their voluntary participation with their signature. This document remained with the researcher. All the documents were available in English and Swahili, and were translated directly by the interpreter in case other languages were needed. In some cases, participants were neither able to read the given information nor to sign the letter of consent, so all information was read aloud to them, and their agreement to participate was recorded.
All the interviews were conducted in a safe environment, either at an NGO’s office, a church, or in the participant’s premises. When speaking to a woman, the researcher brought a female
26 Copies of the informed consent form and the short description are provided in the Addendum 3 and 4. 59 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
interpreter so that the female participant was able to speak freely and without fear about her experience of sexual violence.
The author is well aware of the fact that an in-depth interview might provoke processes of self-reflection and self-awareness that force a participant “to face aspects of themselves that they don’t normally consider” (Babbie 2007, p. 63). During the interview process, it was possible that the interview partners might be reminded of traumatic experiences and might be confronted with blocked emotions related to their coping process. To prevent harm from befalling any of the participants, all the interviews included a reference to counselling centres or advice centres to help them cope with their difficult experiences if they desired.
3.8 Data Analysis
In the literature, numerous definitions of data analysis can be found. An introductory version by Candle (2004), referring to qualitative data analysis , reads: “Qualitative analysis means making sense of relevant data gathered from sources such as interviews, on-site observations, and documents and then responsibly presenting what the data reveal” (p. 417).
The definition emphasizes the process of winning results, scientific findings through the process of qualitative data analysis, but leaves the how to do it unanswered.
Jorgensen’s (1989) definition, to provide a more comprehensive example, reads:
Analysis is a breaking up, separating, or disassembling of research materials into pieces, parts, elements, or units. With factors broken down into manageable pieces, the researcher sorts and sifts them, searching for types, classes, sequences, processes, patterns or wholes. The aim of this process is to assemble or reconstruct the data in a meaningful or comprehensive fashion (p. 107).
The emphasis of Jorgensen’s definition is on the activities of segmenting and reassembling. Segmenting refers to the researcher’s first visit to the data after the transcription process. By reading intensively through transcripts, memos, field notes, and other collected documents, relevant topics for the research question can be identified. Quite unsurprisingly, the same topic can appear at different places within the same interview or within different interviews due to the characteristics of semi-structured or open interviews. Interviewees often use another structure for their answers than the one the interviewer anticipated. Segmenting thus needs to include all documents at length.
60 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
Reassembling is considered to be the looking for “patterns in data—recurrent behaviour, objects, phases, or ideas” (Neuman 2006, p. 467) and the relationship between these patterns. Once these patterns have been identified, reassembling aims at finding explanations for them in terms of a theory or the setting in which the patterns occurred (Neuman 2006; Boeije 2010). According to Boeije (2010), “Both activities, segmenting and reassembling, are carried out from the angle of the research questions and research purpose” (p. 76) within the framework of a theoretical approach.
The segmenting and reassembling of data entails developing different groups of data, each of which is subsumed under one label. The latter could be any heading, category, or title that holds the different groups of data together like a bracket. These headings, categories, or titles are called codes ; the process of segmenting and reassembling is called coding . In some research projects, codes are developed directly from the data by reading through it and comparing it repeatedly (inductive approach). In other examples, codes might exist from the beginning of the analysis; they have been defined a priori , based on previous knowledge or theoretical assumptions (deductive approach). In yet other cases, a mixed mode of these two procedures is used. The latter approach has been used in the present study, since it is very suitable for research projects in which an interview guide is being used. The interview guide identifies important aspects of the conversation, which almost certainly play a role in answering the research questions, and also structures them. These units are used as a priori defined codes (deductive codes) and later are complemented by others developed from the data (inductive codes).
The analysis strategy used in this study qualifies as a theoretical qualitative content analysis , which is especially suitable for projects with descriptive research questions, an a priori worked out sampling process, and semi- or totally-structured interviews. Thereby, this strategy contrasts with another prominent method of qualitative data analysis—coding in grounded theory (see Schreier 2012).
In general, qualitative content analysis (QCA) and coding have many similarities, since both use categories in the process of data analysis and try to create new links between the data. However, by taking a closer look, one can see that these similarities in terminology and process have their limits. Coding is always an analytic process that aims at generating theory based on an iterative, cycling review of the data. In contrast, qualitative content analysis is more of a descriptive method that aims at summarizing data, segmenting and reassembling it to answer pre-defined research questions. It has no ambition to develop a new theoretical 61 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
approach but rather applies an already established theoretical approach. Furthermore, in the coding process, categories or codes are developed purely inductively, closely from the data, whereas in QCA, a mixed inductive-deductive approach is used. Table 3 summarizes the main differences between coding and QCA.
Table 3. Differences between Coding and QCA. Source: Schreier (2012, p. 41).
Coding QCA
Analytic: How do categories relate? Descriptive: How do data relate? Codes are mostly data-driven. Codes are part data-driven and part concept- driven. Iterative/cyclic procedure Linear procedure with cyclic elements Focus on trustworthiness and credibility Focus on consistency - Creating and applying codes are one - Creating and applying codes are step. different steps. - Focus on code definitions is on the - Focus on code definitions is on how conceptual level. to recognize instances of the concept in the data. - Codes are not mutually exclusive. - Subcategories for the same main category are mutually exclusive. - Segmentation is not necessary. - Before coding, material must be divided into units of coding.
The theoretical QCA is a specific type of qualitative analysis and follows a helix structure as is shown in Figure 7.
62 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
Initiating textwork
Development of Analysis main coding categories
2nd round of Coding of the coding existing material
Inductive Assembling of all development of text passages other main subsumed under categories one main categorie
Figure 7. Helix Structure of a theoretic Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). Source: Kuckartz (2012, p. 78).
Step 1 includes the data preparation, which consists of reading intensively through the data, making notes about the information in the data or its form, highlighting important aspects, and writing memos. Based on previous knowledge, theoretical assumptions, and the structure of the interview guide, Step 2 develops and carefully defines the main categories of the coding system. Step 3 is the first coding process of a heterogeneous sample based on this preliminary coding system. In Step 4, all text passages belonging to one main category are reassembled. After this first coding process is accomplished, the coding system needs to be refined, which is done in Step 5. Sub-categories are worked out inductively, remembering that they need to be mutually exclusive. Step 6 codes all the data by applying the refined coding system. Step 7 draws assumptions from the data and makes them public.
This described structure has guided the data analysis process of the present study.
3.8.1 The Transcripts The process of data analysis started with the full transcription of the 36 collected interviews. All interviews were transcribed following the conversation analytic transcription systems GAT developed by Selting and colleagues in 1998 and revisited in 2009 (Selting et al. 2009).
63 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
GAT has become the standard transcription system in German speaking countries; its transcription conventions are comparable to an Anglo-American transcription system such as Jefferson 2004 (Jefferson 2004; Hepburn & Bolden 2013). As a helpful tool for transcription, the software program F4 27 was used.
As a rule, conversation analysis insists on “capturing not only what is said but also details of how something is said, including interactants’ visible behaviours” (Hepburn & Bolden 2013, p. 1). Consequently, behaviours like aspiration; laughing; leg, arm, or head movements; full body movements; and so on were included in the transcripts.
The transcripts used a standard layout with four key features that were automatically provided by the transcription software F4: speakers can be identified easily, which is crucial in speaker transitions or simultaneous talk situations; the lines are numbered continuously to allow for easy citation at any time; talk is represented as it is produced; and “a fixed width font is used to align overlapping talk and/or visible behaviour” (Hepburn & Bolden 2013, p. 2).
The chosen transcription system was detailed enough to describe the interview situation, to adequately describe its verbal and non-verbal communications, and to facilitate a solid interpretation for the data analysis.
3.8.2 Computer Assisted Analysis of Qualitative Data The data analysis was conducted with the assistance of the data analysis software programme MaxQDA. This software facilitated all the steps of the QCA: the accentuation of important text passages, the integration of memos, the comparison of passages, the development and use of an advanced coding system, as well as the comparison of codings.
In contrast to the sometimes cited danger of losing connection to the data through the use of analysis software, the contrary can be stated for the present project. MaxQDA links all important data, allocates all the necessary analysis tools, and thus enables a more systematic and coordinated analysis process than does the classic paper version. 28
3.8.3 Conclusion This chapter has outlined the research processes that have been employed for conducting the research project. After the research design of the treatise was elaborated, an in depth description of the research methodology, the quality standards applied, and the
27 F4 provides helpful, timesaving tools, such as the automatic windback of three seconds whenever the tape is stopped, and the automated numbering of lines. It is usable for all standard mp3 audio files. 28 A user-friendly introduction to the analysis work with MaxQDA can be found in Kuckartz (2013). 64 3. Research Design, Methodology and Data Analysis
epistemological approach was outlined. Issues surrounding the sources of data and the selection of the research case were addressed, followed by a discussion of the ethical concerns surrounding the treatise. Finally, the chapter concluded with an in depth description of the data analysis procedures that were employed for the execution of the research and the interpretation of the collected data.
The following chapter considers the democratization process in Africa, the role of elections in democracy, and the limits of democratization in Africa.
65 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
4 The Democratization Process in Africa
4.1 Introduction
Over the last century, the world witnessed the rise of democracy as the “standard form of government for humankind” (Zakaria 2003, p. 13). According to the latest Polity IV Global Report published by the Center for Systemic Peace in late 2011, 95 countries were classified as democratic (Marshall & Cole 2011, p. 12). The 2012 Freedom House Report classified 117 of the 195 existing countries in the world as electoral democracies, comprising 60% of all the countries in the world (Puddington 2012, p. 29).
But what exactly does democracy mean? What is democratization ? What role do elections play in it and how can the democratization process be described in Africa? This chapter provides brief definitional clarifications on democracy and democratization, and further insights into the role of elections for democracy and the general democratization process. The overview provided is crucial to understanding better the broader context of violent electoral conflict and the consequences it might have for young African democracies and their path of democratization. Furthermore, the democratization process in Africa since 1990 is described and evaluated based on the Freedom House and Afrobarometer data.
4.2 Defining Democracy
Before entering into the project of analysing the democratization process in Africa, it is essential to formulate a suitable definition of democracy for this purpose. To understand what democracy actually means, it is wise to take a closer look at existing definitions, their efforts, merits, and shortcomings. Without any doubt, the list of existing definitions of democracy is very long, meanwhile “we are still far from consensus on what constitutes ‘democracy’ and we still struggle to classify ambiguous regimes” (Diamond 2002, p. 21; see also Haerpfer et al. 2009). Rather than going into detail, this section aims at providing a more general overview of the existing trends in defining democracy and the challenges that have developed over time. Furthermore, this section lays down the working definition of democracy for the purpose of this present study.
The study of democracy has been, and continues to be, a core concern within comparative politics and international relations (see, for example, Munck & Verkuilen 2002). With the growing number of democracies during the so called third wave of democratisation,
66 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
researchers intensified their efforts to define democracy and so better classify the heterogeneous regimes huddling under that label.
The literal definition of democracy is rule by the people , deriving from the Greek words demos , meaning people, and kratia , meaning rule, power, or strength. The two terms were first amalgamated to describe the political system of Ancient Greece, mainly Athens, in the 4 th and 5 th century BC. Although this definition is too vague and imprecise for determining how people are meant to rule in the 20 th and 21 st century, it has served many scholars well as a first approach to a further examination of the topic.
With the end of the Second World War, the first modern definitions of democracy were formulated, which focused mainly on the political systems of the Western hemisphere. Often, they possessed a procedural understanding of democracy and focused on the role of elections. For a long time, Joseph Schumpeter’s (1943) minimalist definition of democracy was the state of the art, declaring a regime democratic if there was “free competition for a free vote” (p. 271). According to his understanding, democracy was organized similar to a marketplace in which political parties and candidates competed against each other for peoples’ votes. The people’s role was limited solely to an electoral one, the choice of political leaders, but not to decide what government does (see, for example, Rose 2009, p. 12). No other polity, politics, or policy factors, such as effective checks and balances, basic civil liberties, or effective government power made it into Schumpeter’s definitions. As a result, his definition had the advantage of high generality, with only one defining attribute, and thus was applicable to many political regimes at the time. Yet, his definition never allowed for a fine-grained distinction between different forms or degrees of democraticness of political regimes and was replaced by more detailed versions, which contributed to an increase in conceptual differentiation. 29
A slightly broader definition was provided by Bernhagen (2009). According to Bernhagen (2009), a political system is considered democratic to the extent that its government is held accountable to citizens by means of free and fair elections (p. 25).
Accountability , the first dimension of the definition—meaning the obligation of elected governors to act in the interests of the people—is directly linked to the principle of “rule by
29 For more information about the correlation of generality and differentiation, see Satori (1970) or Collier and Levitsky (1997). 67 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
the people” and thereby constitutes a core principle of democracy. 30 Political power is attributed to governors only for a limited period of time by the means of free and fair elections. The threat of being punished for bad policy decisions within the next electoral turn compels politicians to respond to voters’ interests (see Adserà et al. 2003, p. 445). Thus, control over the produced political output is executed by citizens by holding free and fair elections in a fixed rhythm. Thereby, we must not forget that democratic systems may differ in the way the principle of accountability is implemented, as they also may differ in the implementation of their electoral systems (majoritarian or proportional) or the institutions maintaining the rule of law.
By focussing attention on the instrument of elections (2 nd dimension), the definition comes close to Schumpeter’s minimalist ideal type described above. However, unlike Schumpeter’s definition, Bernhagen’s definition allows for countries with flawed or partly free elections to be taken into account. Bernhagen’s definition explicitly enables researchers to differentiate between the different degrees of accountability and democraticness of elections, rendering a systematic order of cases along a scale from non-democratic to fully democratic political systems. Yet, the limitation of Bernhagen’s definition on two dimensions soon became too narrow for the increasing number of new democracies (see Huntington 1991).
A wide array of new post-authoritarian regimes in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the former communist world emerged with the third wave of democratization (see Wigell 2008), “differing profoundly both from each other and from the democracies in advanced industrial countries” (Collier & Levitsky 1997, p. 430). Not surprisingly, researchers put a lot of effort into mapping these regimes and developing different classificatory schemes. All these political regimes amalgamated aspects of democracy and authoritarianism to various degrees, which made their political classification a challenging task.
To respond to this challenge, scholars developed different approaches (sometimes integrating several). First, in the wake of the third wave of democratization, “the discipline has seen the need for more detailed definitions in order to capture the variety among democratic regimes” (Storm 2008, p. 217). These broader definitions incorporated more and more complex dimensions, such as the active participation of citizens in the political decision making process, and elements of political liberalism, social justice, or security issues (Bernhagen
30 Instead of speaking of accountability, Lindberg identifies self-government, the freedom of individual citizens to rule over themselves through a concerted collective process, to be the most fundamental of the democratic values (Lindberg 2006, p. 30). 68 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
2009, p. 30). A good example of a broad definition of democracy is the popular Freedom House Index, which includes political rights and civil liberties as two overarching dimensions for measureing the democracy level of a political system. These two dimensions are each subdivided into several sub-dimensions, including indicators such as academic freedom, socioeconomic and property rights, social freedom, and freedom from war (Puddington 2012, pp. 34 –35). Today, Freedom House is one of the most popular data sources for scientists to classify political systems based on a seven-scale index (see Freedom House 2014a; Giannone 2010; Puddington 2012).
Another prominent example is Robert Dahl’s (1989, 1998) ideal type definition of democracy that has gained much attention and remains a vital point of reference for many scholars in the field of democracy research and democratization. According to Dahl, political systems aiming to reach an ideal of democracy must meet five criteria: effective participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda, and inclusion (Dahl 1989, pp. 106 –131).
Second, since the classic definitions of democracy no longer were applicable to the great diversity of post-authoritarian regimes, scholars sought to avoid the effect of the conceptual stretching that arises when “the concept of democracy is applied to cases for which, by relevant scholarly standards, it is not appropriate” (Collier & Levitsky 1997, p. 430). Consequently, they developed a remarkable number of alternative conceptual forms of democracy (see Collier & Levitsky, 1997)—middle categories, often referred to as sub-types of democracy, that mirrored the heterogeneous features of these “hybrid regimes” (Levitsky & Way 2002). Labels such as virtual , electoral , semi-democratic , partly-free , delegative , illiberal , façade, or defective democracies circulated, complemented by their authoritarian counterparts such as electoral , contested , or competitive authoritarianism (see, for example, Levitsky & Way 2002; Schedler 2002; Diamond 2002).
All these sub-types refer to political regimes with both democratic and authoritarian elements of various degrees (see, for example, Zakaria 2003; Merkel 2003; O’Donnell 1994; Storm 2008). Without a doubt, as the number of definitions constantly grew, the analytic differentiation between cases and degrees of democraticness increased. However, this increase in number had a price which was the decreasing level of the applicability and generality of these definitions, limiting their scope to sometimes very few cases (see, for example, Collier & Levitsky 1997, p. 430).
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Lise Storm (2008) illustrates the consequences of this proliferation:
With hundreds of different definitions of democracy in use today, it has become almost impossible to gauge what is meant by the term when it is applied in the academic literature, unless, that is, the author specifies exactly what democracy denotes in the publication in question (p. 215).
Third, concurrent with the ongoing debate about conceptual validity, scientific controversy was sparked regarding the question of whether democracy was to be defined in a sortal or a scalar manner , an important differentiation especially for empirical studies. The sortal or dichotomy approach is concerned with regime classification, and only distinguishes between democratic and non/less-democratic states (two ends of a continuum) with clear-cut criteria for either one of the two options. Giovanni Sartori (1987), one of the prominent supporters of the dichotomy approach, strictly opposed the idea of dealing with political systems beyond the threshold of minimal democratic criteria. In his view, political systems are “bounded wholes” that can be classified only as either democratic or non-democratic “without any room left for intermediate state of affair” (Sartori, as cited in Bernhagen 2009, p. 26). Like Sartori, Alvarez et al. (1996), Huntington (1991), Geddes (1999), Linz (1975) and Przeworski et al. (2000) passionately opposed the “degreeism” (Sartori 1987, p. 184) in the classification of political regimes so as to prevent the maceration of the democratic concept by authoritarian regimes. In their view, democracy is a theoretically grounded, precisely defined, and empirically testable phenomenon with particular “cut-off points” (Lindberg 2006, p. 25) that provide a clear separation between democratic and authoritarian systems.
In contrast, the scalar or degree approach allows for a more differentiated definition by measuring the degrees of democratic qualities, even among the less than full democratic political systems. Using the degree approach, all political systems in the world can be classified along a scale, even if not fully democratic, and thus can be compared to each other. Kenneth Bollon (1980) used a scalar approach to define democracy as “the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized and that of the nonelites is maximized” (p. 372). Using this definition, Bollon developed a continuum open to all political systems in the world that ranges from one ideal point—where all power is located in the hands of a monarch, dictator, or single party—to another ideal point where all power is executed by the people. Advocates of the degree approach argue that it brings “more information to bear on the theory than does the dichotomous approach and it is also more sensitive to the shades of grey that always exist in the real world” (Lindberg 2006, p. 27). Elkins (2000) goes as far as calling 70 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
dichotomous measures (the sortal approach) as both “methodologically regressive and lacking in face validity” (p. 293). For him, “looking for traces of democracy in seemingly ‘nondemocratic’ regimes makes good theoretical and methodological sense” (2000, p. 299).
Although the scientific debate seems to be drifting slightly in favour of a scalar concept of democracy, a general agreement about how democracy should be defined is yet to be achieved. The latest studies have tried to combine the classification and degreeism of democracy to address the conceptual challenges in mapping post-authoritarian regimes (see, for example, Levitsky & Way 2002; Storm 2008; Wigell 2008). This became necessary, since:
[s]cholars have stressed the importance of re-thinking key concepts found in the literature on political regimes in order to allow for typologies that can better describe these new political practices and serve as a better basis for cross-national comparison of political regimes (Wigell 2008, p. 230).
For the purpose of this this present study, democracy is defined in a two-dimensional, scalar approach that follows the approach of Mikael Wigell (2008). According to Wigell, a political regime is considered a liberal democracy the higher it scores on the dimensions of political liberalism and democracy (2008, p. 234). The goal of democracy for Wigell is popular government, which is implemented by means of elections. Thus, electoralism is the mechanism through which the citizens ensure representation of their interests” (Wigell 2008, p. 234). In contrast, the goal of liberalism is “limited government” (p. 234), meaning the limitation and control of the exercise of power through executive authority. The means of limited government power is constitutionalism , the mechanism “through which the rule of law is upheld, preventing popular government from degenerating into majority tyranny, or outright anarchy” (p. 234).
Following Wigell (2008), liberal democracy is “the synthesis of two processes: The insertion of popular power into the state through the means of elections, on the one hand, and the limitation of this power through the means of a constitutional order based on a rule of law, on the other hand (p. 234).
The concepts of democracy and political liberalism have synergies and interact with each other. Yet, for Wigell (2008), they are “conceptually and practically distinct” (p. 234). Figure 8 is a simplified model of Wigell’s model of liberal democracy.
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Figure 8. The liberal democracy mechanism. Source: Wigell (2008, p. 234).
Based on this two-dimensional conceptualization of liberal democracy, Wigell (2008) developed a regime typology that enabled a nuanced classification of all kinds of hybrid regimes in which all created sub-types are logically related to each other and are based on a clear set of defining attributes (liberalism and democracy). At the same time, the typology enables the ordering of political regimes—even if flawed—according to their degree of democraticness by arranging them logically on a scale from fully authoritarian to liberal democratic.
Wigell’s (2008) typology combines insights from both the dichotomous (classification) as well as the scalar or graded approach (degree of democraticness) and offers “considerable analytical advantage over the conventional uni-dimensional regime typologies that hitherto have come to dominate the field of comparative regime analysis” (p. 248). Thus this typology is the analytical basis for the case study analysis of Kenya in section 6.4.
4.3 Defining Democratization
In accordance with the chosen scalar, two-dimensional definition of democracy, democratization is defined as “the process of making a political system more democratic— regardless of whether that system should be classified as a democracy, an autocracy, or something in between” (Bernhagen 2009, p. 25). The scalar definition of democratization enables the inclusion of political systems that have been described as partly-free, semi- democratic, or virtual, as is the case with Kenyan democracy (see, for example, Diamond 2002).
It is important to understand that the process by which political regimes are becoming more democratic is not a given (universal) pattern. In the last 25 years, democratization has taken various forms with different sequences, speeds, and success rates. The present study thus consciously breaks with the traditional transition paradigm of the democracy promoters of the 1990s by stating that democratization starts with “elections, then comes respect for basic civil liberties, then comes an empowered government and, in the end, additional features associated
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with established industrial democracy” (Storm 2008, p. 219; for a more detailed description see Carothers 2002). Many countries of the third wave of democratization, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, have proven this paradigm wrong. Carothers (2002) is right when stating that giving up the traditional transition paradigm:
(…) does not mean denying that important democratic reforms have been occurred in many countries in the past two decades (…) [Nevertheless] It does mean (…) assuming that what is often thought of as an uneasy, precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is actually the most common political condition today of countries in the developing world and the postcommunist world. (…) It is a state of normality (…) (pp. 17 –18).
The assumption here is that although paths of democratization vary between countries and regions of the world, these paths often have common components. The term democratization is not equivalent to a fixed transition paradigm; rather, it must be considered individually for every case or region of interest.
The following section provides some light on the role of elections in the process of democratization.
4.4 The Role of Elections for Democracy: Contradictory Findings
Within the context of political processes, elections usually are defined as “the formal process of selecting a person for public office or of accepting or rejecting a political proposition by voting” (Encyclpoedia Britanica Online n.d.).
Yet, within the broader context of democracy and democratization, elections are far more than just the selection of political personnel or policies. Free and fair elections are a key institution for every democratic system. They are the means to holding democratic governments accountable to the will and the interests of (the majority of) its citizens and—if credibly conducted—to providing legitimacy to this government and its policies.
Brahms (2005) assigns a positive conflict managing role to elections, since they:
(…) have been part of nearly every negotiated settlement of a civil war in the post- Cold War period. Where secession or partition are not an option (…), conventional wisdom is that democratic elections are the most effective means of channeling competition to peaceful means (p. 3).
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His assertion does not come without the warning that elections as part of a broader liberalization process might lead to renewed violence if norms and institutions are not installed properly, especially prior to electoral competition (cf. Brahms 2005, p. 4). Deng (2009) further adds that the incentives and opportunities that develop with a calling of elections “encourage warring factions to shift their strategies from violence to electoral politics” (p. 92).
Even in non-democratic states, where elections are held to vest the political establishment with the outward appearance of democratic legitimation—the so called “fallacy of electoralism” (Bernhagen 2009, p. 26)—elections can contribute to the development of democratic values and a democratic political culture in the long run, even though they may be charged with fraud and manipulation (cf. Lindberg 2006).
Elections generate legitimacy, give voice to the people and their political will, and help to define what priority issues are before a community (cf. UNPD 2005). Elections are a “cornerstone of democracy” (Brahms 2005, p. 1), and therefore their importance cannot be overestimated for the establishment and stabilization of a democracy.
From a conceptional point of view, elections have a strengthening and breeding effect for democracy. On the other hand, electoral processes can catalyse conflict and thereby increase the likelihood of violence, as has occurred during many elections in Africa during the last decade. According to the UNDP (2005), “(…) precisely because election processes are contests through which political power is retained or pursued, and social differences are highlighted (…), they can often generate vulnerabilities for the escalation of conflict into violence” 31 (p. 1).
Brancati and Snyder (2011) have argued that the first post-conflict elections all too often serve “as a revolving door casting them [the post-conflict countries] back toward war and authoritarian rule“ (p. 470).
This phenomenon has created the contradictory situation of elections potentially contributing to both peace and democratization on the one hand, and instability and conflict on the other. Although elections might catalyse violent electoral conflict, they should not be mistaken as its source. Elections do not cause confrontations, threats, or violence. Rather, in the course of balloting, the existing social, political, economic, religious, or ethical cleavages of a society
31 Social tensions may only be one source of violent electoral conflict. Here, these tensions are referred to illustrate only the escalating effect of elections. 74 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
break open easily, since the access to and distribution of political power and resources in the long run are at stake. The violence applied in the context of elections might be an instrumental attempt to advance specific group interests fostered even further by opacity, mismanagement, or electoral manipulations.
The divergent views on elections and their role in democratization have been moulding the scientific debate for at least 30 years. Lindberg’s (2006) findings about the role of elections on democracy changed the then existing paradigm on the effect of elections on the democratization process in Africa. Elections are no longer considered to be the simple outcome of liberalization or an indicator for it, as has been argued by many previous studies (see, for example, Diamond 1993, 1996; Diamond & Plattner 1999; Linz & Stephan 1996; Adejumobi 2000), but rather are a causal factor of both (cf. Lindberg 2006).32
Since then, many researchers have taken up Lindberg’s findings and developed scientific knowledge about the role of (flawed) elections. Some have tried to shed light on the phenomenon of vote rigging and large scale electoral manipulation (see, for example, Kuntz & Thompson 2006; Calingaert 2006; Schaffer 2007; Schaffer & Schedler 2007; Simpser 2008; Hyde 2010; Donno & Roussias 2012). Others have paid special attention to the increasing number of countries holding elections since the 1990s. The increase in number, however, is not predicative of the quality of elections and has not always resulted in the development of democratic processes. In countries like Zimbabwe, Iran, Burma, and Turkmenistan, the manipulation of elections has become a persistently occurring phenomenon, which has degraded the act of voting to an empty shell. The effects of vote buying, their different inter-cultural meanings and consequences, as well as the incentives behind such behavior have concerned scientists all over the globe.
The discussion about the role of elections in authoritarian regimes, another priority issue in the scientific debate (see, for example, Mainwaring, Brink & Perez-Linan 2001; Diamond 2002; Levitsky & Way 2002; Kuntz & Thompson 2006; Ghandi & Lust-Okar 2009), is strongly related to the scientific debate between the supporters of the sortal and scalar approaches to democracy (see Section 4.2). The core question remains whether authoritarian
32 Within his analysis, Lindberg (2006) examined 203 elections in total, including 87 presidential and 116 parliamentary elections, of which 24 were held before 1990, 82 between 1990 and 1995, and 97 between 1996 and 2001. He found: “Of sub-Saharan Africa’s 48 states, 44 have conducted so-called ‘founding’ elections, out of which 38 moved on to second elections and as many as 21 countries had completed three uninterrupted electoral cycles as of June 2003. Seven countries have managed at least four polls in a row” (2006, p. 74).
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regimes, even if repressive in character, have some democratic characteristics, and therefore need to be placed somewhere on the continuum of democracy and autocracy.
Philipp Kuntz and Mark Thompson (2006) have studied elections and their roles for the democratization process in electoral autocracies. According to their findings, stolen elections , defined as “polls in which the regime hinders an (actual or perceived) opposition victory at the ballot box through blatant manipulation of the vote count or by annulling the electoral result itself” (2006, p. 5), play a significant role as triggers for revolutionary movements in electoral authoritarian regimes. They have shown that stolen elections have not only been triggers for revolutionary movements but also have shaped the revolutionary outcome by bringing to power opposition parties denied victory.
Since the beginning of the 2000s, scholars have been using the term violent electoral conflict to describe the phenomenon of rising tensions during elections. The term is used regardless of whether it occurs within authoritarian or transition states, post-conflict societies, or long- standing democracies. Chapter 5 examines more closely the characteristics, triggers, and players of violent electoral conflict.
4.5 The Democratization Process in Africa in the 1990s: Between Autocracy and Democracy
The spread of third wave democratization that began to roll across sub-Saharan Africa after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War has been the most significant political development since the independence process with its anticolonial movement in the 1960s (cf. van de Walle 2000). Based on Freedom House data and Afrobarometer data for the 1990s and years 2000, the following two sections provide insight into the democratization process of sub-Saharan Africa.
Freedom House, based in Washington D.C., is an international non-governmental organization that advocates for the spread of democracy and conducts research on democracy (Freedom House 2014a). Its annual Freedom in the World report, on which the following section is based, is an assessment of political freedom and civil liberties for 195 countries. It was first published in 1972 and thus enables a long-term evaluation of national and regional developments. It assesses the annual state of political rights and civil liberties on a seven point scale, ranging from 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). Consequently, when the Freedom in the
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World values for a country increases, its democratization level actually decreases. 33 The country ratings are:
(…) determined by the total number of points (up to 100) each country receives on 10 political rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions; countries receive 0 to 4 points on each question, with 0 representing the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of freedom. The average of the political rights and civil liberties ratings, known as the freedom rating, determines the overall status (Freedom House 2014b, p. 2).
States achieving a value from 1 to 2.5 are considered free in their overall status. Those reaching a value between 3.0 and 5.0 are considered partly free , and those with values between 5.5 and 7 not free . Freedom House’s objective assessment of the democratic quality of a political regime has been challenged both for methodological and political reasons. 34 Nevertheless, it has become one of the most successful indices for democracy measurement worldwide and provides one of the rare databases for longitudinal inter- and intra-state research. 35
The so-called second independence or “virtual miracle” (Joseph 1991, p. 11) of the early 1990s in sub-Saharan Africa brought about a massive transition from authoritarian or military regimes to multi-party systems. According to Decalo (1992), a mostly unexpected but nevertheless “(…) powerful backwash of popular demonstrations for ‘re-democratization’ flooded all corners of Africa (…) transforming the political map of the continent” (p. 7).
Up to the early 1990s, the political landscape in Africa was dominated by authoritarian, often military regimes. With the deposition of long-lasting, pillaging patriarchs—such as Mathieu Kérékou of Benin, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, and Daniel arap Moi of Kenya—democratic structures and multi-party competition returned to the continent. As Joseph (1997) indicates correctly, in 1995 almost all African countries had introduced some measures of democracy and liberalisation, which was in many cases, the introduction of competitive elections. In 1997, only four of the existing four dozen states had failed to hold competitive elections. Nigeria and Zaire (today: the Democratic Republic of Congo) caught up in 1999 and 2006,
33 The scale produces counterintuitive results. The reader has to keep in mind that an increase in values is equivalent to a decrease in democratization. A graph showing increasing Freedom House values indicates a decrease in the level of democratization. 34 Freedom House is partly financed by the U.S. government. 35 As an alternative source of data, the Polity data series could have been used in the present study (Center for Systematic Peace 2014a). The author of the present study chose to abstain from the Polity data, since only independent states with greater than a 500,000 total population are considered in the sample. This restriction might have methodological advantages, but it excludes many small African countries. 77 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
while Somalia and Swaziland remain the only two non-electoral exceptions (cf. Diamond & Plattner 2010, p. x). Thus, it is not presumptuous to declare the 1990s as turning point in the democratization process of sub-Saharan Africa.
The worldwide democratic movement certainly triggered upheavals on the African continent whose origins are in the African countries themselves. After the struggle for independence in the 1950s and 1960s, high expectations for democracy were turned into a farce by an often corrupt political elite, mismanagement, continuing poverty, and a collapsing economy, which became the breeding ground for a second democratic upheaval.
For most African countries that fought for independence in the 1950s and 1960, the hope for democracy “had crashed and burned” (Diamond & Plattner 2010, p. ix). According to Peter Meyns (2006), the conditions for this upcoming change had their origins in a long-lasting economic mismanagement and egomaniac patriarchy. Richard Joseph (1997), however, stresses the importance of three significant factors for the transformation:
(…) the weakening of most African states by a prolonged fiscal crisis, the increasing control of international financial institutions and the allied bilateral agencies of the industrialized nations in determining economic policy, and the shift of western powers (especially the United States) after the end of the cold war from tolerance of and alliance with authoritarian regimes to liberalization of their systems (p. 368 f).
In contrast to his colleague Meyns, Joseph (1997) remained pessimistic about the impact of African citizens and their notion of change. Although private individuals might have been inspired by the international development and spread of democratic ideas all over the world, “were it not for these three factors [mentioned above], advocates of political reform would have been brushed aside with impunity” (Joseph 1997, p. 369).
The process of upheaval, although unique in every African country, often followed a similar pattern, as Bratton and van de Walle (1997) explain: “Transitions in Africa usually began with spontaneous popular protests against a political-economic crisis, evolved through struggles over the rules and resources of political liberalization and ended with the installation of some kind of new regime” (p. 98).
Since authoritarian regimes did not provide peaceful established procedures for citizens to articulate their dissatisfaction with the political elite and the political and economic conditions of their country, popular protest was their method of choice. Although not directed at political aims initially, but rather at achieving relief from economic hardships, protests quickly 78 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
broadened. Students, workers, trade union members, businessmen, and former politicians joined the protests and general strikes in numerous African countries, such as Benin in 1989; Nigeria, Kenya, and Côte d’Ivoire in 1990; and Cameroon and Mauretania in 1991 (for detailed information, see Bratton & van de Walle 2007). Confronted with heavy-handed government responses, the motives of protesters developed from an economic to a political character: “For the first time, narrow economic interests were superseded by widespread calls for the ejection of national leaders and the reintroduction of plural politics” (Bratton & van de Walle 1997, p. 104).
Wherever claims for political change were brought forward, the first reaction of the incumbents was to protect the status quo. However, with growing domestic tensions combined with pressure from the international donors, “most African heads of state embarked on a course of political liberalization” (Bratton & van de Walle 1997, p. 108).
The concept of political liberalization is not to be confounded with democratization in this context, since African leaders continued to refuse democratic changes in their countries. According to Bratton and van de Walle (1997), liberalization in this sense can be understood as the political process of reforming authoritarian rule, but not of introducing democratic elements, such as the separation of powers within a system of checks and balances. Due to the continuing increase of internal and external pressure on the African incumbents, long-denied civil and, with some reservations, political rights were granted. As an acknowledgement to the protesters, the incumbents loosened restrictions on their opponents, the bans on political groupings were loosened (as in South Africa), exiles were allowed to return to their country, government media monopolies were loosened, and some political reforms of core political institutions were started. Needless to say, African autocrats did not turn into liberal reformers overnight. Rather, their willingness to give in to some of the protesters’ claims was a rational calculation based on internal and external pressure.
According to Bratton and van de Walle (1997), “In almost all African countries, a similar set of constitutional reforms was introduced in quick succession” (p. 113), including the re- legalization of political parties (as in Kenya); the establishment of the constitutionally codified separation of powers, including the upgrading of the legislative power; a limitation of political terms for African Presidents; and the establishment of multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections. Internally, the development of so-called national conferences, which brought together the elites from civil society in an open forum to propose solutions for the
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country’s socioeconomic and political crisis, increased the pressure on African leaders, especially in Western (francophone) Africa.
Furthermore, with the ratification of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights by 1990 by 40 African states, the normative pressure on African leaders to obey fundamental rights increased even further. 36 In addition, as Western donor countries and foreign investors put increased pressure on African leaders, their political options diminished.
It is important to note that this democratic development occurred to the great surprise of most experts of the field (see, for example, Joseph 1997). For example, Giuseppe Di Palma (1990) declared the general prospects for democracy in Africa to be “bleak” (p. 2). Also, Samuel Huntington and Robert Dahl, two heavyweights in the field of democracy research, agreed to the African blues. Huntington (1984) wrote that:
(…) with a few exceptions, the prospects for the expansion of democracy to other societies are not great (…), a significant increase in the number of democratic regimes in the world is unlikely. (…) Most African countries are by reason of their poverty or the violence of their politics unlikely to move in a democratic direction (pp. 218, 216).
His colleague, Robert Dahl (1971), did not expect “any dramatic changes in the number of polyarchies within a generation or two” (p. 208). Despite these rather pessimistic predictions, almost all countries in Africa developed multi-party systems during the 1990s and were holding elections on a regular basis. Although the democratic character of these elections had to be doubted in many cases, van de Walle (2000) speaks of a “more open political climate” (p. 2) in Africa during the 1990s, in which a free press, opposition parties, independent unions, and civic organizations emerged.
An evaluation of the democratic development in Africa up to the end of the 1990s clearly includes both light and shadow. Undeniably, Africa had made some improvement concerning its average level of freedom, but nevertheless, they were serious differences between and within countries over time. In 1972 37 , when the Freedom House index first surveyed 39 countries, the average score in sub-Sahara Africa was at a level of 5.8 out of 7 (7 being the
36 By 1997, 51 of the 53 member states of the OAU had ratified the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, also known as the Banjul Charter (see African Union 2010). For the original text of the Charter, see ACHPR (1981). 37 In 1972, 39 countries were surveyed: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, The, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 80 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
worst and 1 being the best level to be achieved) for political rights, and 5.3 out of 7 38 for civil liberties (Freedom House 2012a; see Addendum 4).
This pessimistic evaluation of the African continent—on the edge between partly free and not free—improved considerably until the end of the 1990s, proving the re-democratization initiative of this time period. The average level for political rights in 1999 39 for the 48 countries surveyed climbed up to a score of 4.5, and civil liberties rose to a level of 4.4 (Freedom House 2012a; see Addendum 4). The author of the present study is well aware that the levels for political rights and civil liberties are not directly comparable between the years 1972 and 1999, since additional countries were added to the sample during that time period. Nevertheless, the average levels of political rights and civil liberty can be compared cross- sectionally (not longitudinally) at different points in time. In those cases where the comparison of values and years is based on a persistent sample, the author of the present study speaks of a longitudinal comparison.
Between the survey years 1972 and 2013, a longitudinal comparison of the average political rights and civil liberty values is possible for 38 countries 40 that constantly have been represented in the Freedom House Index. An extract for the years 1972 to 1999 is shown in Table 4. Within these 26 years, the average political rights and civil liberties values decreased moderately, with the most improvement occurring between 1990 and 1999. 41
38 These values were developed on the basis of the Freedom House Country Ratings and Status, 1972 –2014 (Freedom House 2012a) and can be found in part in Addendum 4 of the present study. 39 In 1999, 48 countries were surveyed: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 40 They include: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 41 As has been described earlier, the graph needs to be interpreted counterintuitively: as the Freedom House values decrease, the actual level of democratization increases. 81 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
Table 4. Longitudinal development of political right- and civil liberty values of 38 countries in sub- Sahara Africa between 1972 and 1999. Source: Freedom House (2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
7 6,5 6 5,8 5,7 5,4 5,5 5 5,3 5,3 4,7 5,1 4,5 4,6 4
Level Level 1-7 3,5 3 2,5 2 1,5 1-2.5Free; 3-5 Partly Free; 5.5-7 Not Free 1 1972 1980 1990 1999
Political Rights Civil Liberties
Between 1990 and 1999, the average value for political rights decreased by 1 point (5.7 to 4.7) and 0.5 points for civil liberties (5.1 to 4.6).
Likewise, the percentage of countries rated not free in sub-Saharan Africa declined from 72% in 1972 to 33% in 1999. Conversely, as indicated in Table 5, countries considered partly free and free increased from 23% and 5% in 1972 up to 50% and 17% in 1999 (Freedom House 2012a; Addendum 5 and 10).
Table 5. Global status by country in sub-Saharan Africa in 1972, 1990 and 1999.
Source: Freedom House (2012a), adapted by the author of the present study.
1972 1990 1999 3 countries 4 countries 8 countries
9 countrie s 15 countries 28 countries 24 countries 16 countries 27 countries
Not Free Partly Free Free Not Free Partly Free Free Not Free Partly Free Free
In summary, the democratic development between 1972 and 1999 was considerable but most apparent within the 1990s. The 1990s marked a turning point in favour of re-democratization 82 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
and regime transition, a trend needed to be continued within the next decade. With 33% of the surveyed countries labelled non-free and 50% partly free , a large number of Africa’s sub- Saharan states needed a further improvement of their democratic performance.
The next section provides a closer look at the democratization trends in sub-Saharan Africa during the 2000s.
4.6 The Limits of Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Developments since 2000
Despite different results and speeds, the 1990s was a turning-point in the development of democracy in Africa. The following years, however, need to be considered even more differentiated. For some few Sub-Saharan states, the positive trend of the 1990s continued, a success that is outstanding considering the overall trend in the region. According to Freedom House (2012), among these states were Ghana (from 3/3 42 in 1999 to 1/2 in 2012), Lesotho (from 4/4 in 1999 to 2/3 in 2012), Senegal (from 4/4 in 1999 to 2/3 in 2012, and 2/2 in 2013), Sierra Leone (from 3/5 in 1999 to 2/3 in 2012, and 3/3 in 2012) and Tanzania (from 4/4 in 1999 to 3/3 in 2012). Although they started from rather low levels, these countries managed to improve their Freedom House ratings. In other countries democratic development has reversed—in the Central African Republic (from 3/4 in 1999 to 5/5 in 2012, and 7/7 in 2013), Guinea-Bissau (from 3/5 in 1999 to 6/5 in 2012), Madagascar (from 2/4 in 1999 to 6/4 in 2012), and very significantly, in Mali (from 3/3 in 1999 to 7/5 in 2012, and 5/4 in 2013) (all from Freedom House 2012). Mali experienced a military coup and an Islamist take-over of its northern parts in 2012, taking the country to the brink of chaos. Still today, some of the worst rated countries are found in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Somalia (a failed state), Sudan and South Sudan (the latter sliding into civil war), Equatorial Guinea, “a highly corrupt regime with one of the worst human rights records in Africa” (Puddington 2013, p. 6), and Eritrea (with its ever increasing human and political rights violations).
Tables 6 and 7 illustrate the disparate developments of the Central African Republic, Ghana, Lesotho, and Mali concerning political rights and civil liberties between 1990 and 2013 (see also Addendum 6). While all four countries started at a weak level for both political rights (6 out of 7) and civil liberties (5 out of 7), they followed different paths. Ghana and Lesotho represent the group of good performers who have been able to constantly pursue their
42 All states have been assigned two numerical ratings in the Freedom House Index—one for political rights and one for civil liberties—based on a 1 to 7 scale, with 7 being the worst and 1 being the best possible rating. Ghana achieved a rating of 3 both for political rights and civil liberties in 1999. The levels improved to a top score of 1 for political rights and a level of 2 for civil liberties in 2012. 83 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
democratization path. In contrast, the Central African Republic and Mali belong to the group of main concerns, whose democratization process has fallen behind.
Table 6. Comparison of the political right values of four African countries between 1990 and 2013. Source: Freedom House (2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
7 7 7 7
6 6 6 6 6
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
4 44 4 4 4 4 4 4
Level Level (1-7) 3 3 3 33 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 2 2 2 2 2222222222222 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1-2.5Free; 3-5 Partly Free; 5.5-7 Not Free 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central African Republic Ghana Lesotho Mali
Table 7. Comparison of civil liberty values of four African countries between 1990 and 2013. Source: Freedom House (2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
7 7
6 6
5 5 55 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 55
4 44444444444444 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Level Level (1-7) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3333333333333 3 3 3 3 3 3
2 2 222222222222 2 2 2
1-2.5Free; 3-5 Partly Free; 5.5-7 Not Free 1 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Central African Republic Ghana Lesotho Mali
Considering the average scores for political rights and civil liberties during the first decade of the 21 st century, a rather pessimistic picture of the democratization process in Sub-Saharan Africa can be drawn. Although consecutive elections have been held, good governance 84 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
programmes have been installed, and African citizens have expressed their continuous approval for democracy, the average values for political rights and civil liberties have stagnated at a poor level between 1999 and 2013. The average rate for political rights scatters around the level of about 4.5 (4.5 in 1999 and 4.5 in 2013; see Table 8). Between 1999 and 2013, the civil liberty rates had an insignificant decrease, falling from 4.4 to 4.3 (Freedom House 2012a; Addendum 6). 43
Comparing the last decade alone would be misleading, since it would hide an even more alarming, short-term trend that originated in 2005. Since 2005, Freedom House has measured “declines in each of the topical subcategories” (Puddington 2012, p. 8) for Africa as a region, with particularly substantial declines for the rule of law and freedom of association. Political right scores steadily decreased from 4.2 in 2005 to 4.5 in 2013 (Freedom House 2012b; see Addendum 7). Civil liberty values have shown the same tendency: from 2005 to 2013, the average level decreased by 0.3 points from 4.0 to 4.3. Both top scorers, such as South Africa, and more repressive states such as Ethiopia or Gambia, have contributed to this setback, rendering this development even more startling.
Table 8. Longitudinal development of average political rights and civil liberty values from 1993 to 2012 of 48 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Source: Freedom House (2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
5 4,8 4,7 4,7 4,8 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,6 4,6 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,5 4,5 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,4 4,4 4,4 4,2 PR 4,3 4,3 4,3 4,3
Level Level (1-7) 4,2 4,2 4,2 CL 4 4,1 4,1 4 4 4 4 1-2.5Free;; 3-5 Free;Partly 5.5-7Not Free 3,5
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
What caused this negative trend in recent years? According to Freedom House, civil conflicts and the increasing influence of violent Islamist groups have contributed to the downward
43 Thus, Lindberg’s 2006 theory of the positive effect of elections has received a sensible dent. 85 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
spiral since 2005 (Puddington 2013, p. 6). Mali and Nigeria are both examples of African countries that have been plagued by violent Islamist groups trying to extend their power. The drop in freedom has been considerably dramatic in the Central African Republic. With a coup d’état by the Muslim rebel group Séléka in March 2013, violent confrontations between these Islamic groups and Christians has escalated, which has caused the deaths of thousands of civilians. Guinea-Bissau went through a military coup in April 2012, which caused “the removal of the interim president, the suspension of the national legislature, the halting of the electoral process, and increased repression of civil liberties (Puddington 2013, p. 7).
Overall, the first 10 years of the new millennium can be called a lost decade for democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa, since the average values for political rights and civil liberties today are comparable to those of 1999/2000. Even when paying particular tribute to the success stories and democratic breakthroughs in some African countries and the positive development since 2005, the picture remains that of both light and shadow.
The Freedom House assessment for Sub-Saharan Africa for 2012 is a mixed picture too:
Despite being home to several of the world’s worst performing countries in terms of respect for human rights, the region saw overall if uneven progress toward democratization during the 1990s and the early 2000s. However, recent years have seen backsliding among both the top performers, such as South Africa, and the more repressive countries, such as The Gambia and Ethiopia. Lack of adherence to the rule of law, infringements on the freedoms of expression and association, widespread corruption, and discrimination against women and the LGBT [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual und Trans] community remain serious problems in many countries (Puddington 2012, p. 10).
In summary, the turnover movement of the 1990s resulted in some significant political improvements, such as the increase in political competition, the limitation of the political power of African presidents, term limitations, and the adoption of numerous new constitutional contracts. Nevertheless, these improvements gained force only in some countries, and in others, the previous advances were reversed, which is why Lynch and Crawford (2011) have identified a “picture of complexity and contradictory trends” (296) in their assessment of the key trends of democratization in Africa over the last two decades. When considering the development of the average values for political rights and civil liberties determined by the Freedom House Index (2012), it is obvious that the positive trend of the
86 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
1990s continued until about 2005. Importantly, 2005 was the most successful year in the longitudinal comparison of political rights and civil liberty values of 48 countries since 1993. Since then, both categories clearly have declined.
Is this decline the result of all countries going through a slightly negative development since 2005 or did some outliers change the whole picture? Addendum 8 provides an answer to this question with respect to political rights. The table indicates the number of changes in ratings occurring per year for all 48 countries 44 considered. Although the number of changes in the country ratings (for example, from 2 to 3 or 5 to 4) peaked between 2005 and 2006, these changes had only a slightly negative influence on the average value of political rights, since the number of deteriorations only slightly exceeded the number of improved ratings. In contrast, considerable negative development occurred at three points in time—2008, 2009, and 2012. Compared to 2007, six countries had decreased rankings for political rights in 2008, while only one case improved. In one country, the deterioration consisted of two units (Mauritania from 4 to 6). This negative trend continued at an even stronger rate in 2009. Between 2008 and 2009, again the ratings for six countries deteriorated, while only one improved. This time, two country ratings decreased by two units (Madagascar 4 to 6 and Niger 3 to 5). In short, the clear negative development in average values for political rights between 2007 and 2009 can be explained by a simultaneous drop of 12.5 % for all countries for both years. Between 2008 and 2009, the negative trend peaked because the intensity of the deteriorations exceeded all previous developments. Whereas the negative trend between 2007 and 2009 was based on the drop in Freedom House values for a rather large amount of countries, the 2012 drop was caused by the dramatic deterioration of only two countries— Guinea-Bissau dropped from value 4 to 6, and Mali experienced a free fall from 2 to 7.
We next look at the situation in respect of civil liberties. By looking at Addendum 9, it becomes clear that both the number of value deteriorations and the intensity of these value changes in the Freedom House ratings for civil liberties are less dramatic than those for political rights. The highest value change detectable in 2012 was a drop of two units (Mali) and again in 2013 a drop of two units (Central African Republic). The negative development of average values for civil liberties peaked in 2009 and 2012. Both developments can be
44 As has been described earlier, these countries are: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Kinshasa), Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 87 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
explained by the simultaneous loss in value of 7 countries between 2008 and 2009 (14.5 % of all countries) and in 6 countries between 2011 and 2012 (12.5 % of all countries).
The average values reached in 2013 are comparable to those of 2000 for political rights, and those of 1998 and 2002 for civil liberties. It also should be noted that although some countries have had continuous success stories (such as Ghana, Sao Tome & Principe, and Namibia), these deteriorations in average values have undermind the previous achievements of Sub- Saharan Africa. Efforts will have to be made to reverse the direction of this negative path.
As has been indicated earlier, the support for democracy by African citizens cannot be used to explain the negative spiral in recent years. African citizens’ support for democracy is examined a bit further on the basis of the Afrobarometer data (cf. Afrobarometer 2014).
The Afrobarometer is a comparative series of public opinion surveys that measure public attitudes toward democracy, governance, the economy, leadership, identity, and other related issues. Its results are comparable over time, since the instrument asks a standard set of questions. The first round of data collection was carried out from 1999 to 2001 and included 12 countries. Round 2 was conducted from 2002 to 2003, with 16 countries participating. Round 3 already included 18 countries and was conducted from 2005 to 2006. Round 4 surveys started in 2008 and included 20 countries. Round 5 was conducted in 35 countries between 2011 and 2013. Round 6 surveys are currently in the field (cf. Afrobarometer 2014). To allow for a longitudinal comparison of results, the sample of countries of Afrobarometer Round 3 was kept when working with the Afrobarometer Round 4 and 5 data. Results can only be truly comparable when the same countries and the same instrument of questions are used.
Data from the last three rounds of the Afrobarometer (Round 3 –5/2005 –2011 available in Afrobarometer 2014) clearly indicate a solid support base for democracy among African citizens.45 In round 5 (2011), 74 % expressed the opinion that democracy is preferable to any other kind of government while only 11% preferred a non-democratic government in some circumstances. Another 11% declared that the kind of government in office does not matter to them (see Table 9).
45 To make the Afrobarometer Round 3, 4, and 5 comparable, the sample of Afrobarometer Round 3 was retained while working with Round 4 and 5 data. As a consequence, the same 18 countries have been used in all three rounds. These countries were Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 88 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
Table 9. Support for democracy in 18 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa developed on the basis of the Afrobarometer Round 5 data. Source: Afrobarometer (2014).
74% 80%
64%
48% % 32% 11% 11% 4% 16%
0% Statement C: For Statement B: In Statement A: Don´t know someone like me, it some Democracy is doesn't matter what circumstances, a preferable to any kind of government non-democratic other kind of we have government can be government preferable Values in percentages over total base = 32,407; weighted results
Since 2005, when the third round of the Afrobaromter was conducted, the percentage values for the variable support of democracy remained widely stable (see Table 10). Statement C “For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.” reached 12% of the answers in 2005 (Round 3) and has been stable at 11% since 2008 (Round 4). The support base for statement B “In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.” increased minimally from 10% in 2005 (Round 3) to 11% since 2008 (Round 4).
89 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
Table 10. Development of the variable “support for democracy” in 18 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa taken from the Afrobarometer Round 3 to 5. Source: Afrobarometer (2014).
74% 80% 70% 62% 64%
48% % 32% 16% 12% 11%11% 11% 11% 16% 10% 8% 4%
0% Statement C: For Statement B: In some Statement A: Don´t know someone like me, it circumstances, a non- Democracy is doesn't matter what democratic preferable to any other kind of government we government can be kind of government have preferable
Round 3 (2005) / %/Total Round 4 (2008) / %/Total Round 5 (2011) / %/Total
The support for statement A “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.” seems to have increased unexpectedly rapidly between 2005 and 2008 (between Round 3 and 4). However, this interpretation might be misleading, since the number of “don’t know” answers for the same period dropped by half, and the percentages for the other answer options remained stable. It might be the case that an unusually high percentage of the 2005 interviewees (16%) chose the “don’t know” option instead of statement A because the interviewers didn’t explain adequately the question or answer options. It is possible that the interviewees didn’t dare to choose the democracy option in statement A (i.e., due to fear of political repression), or they didn’t dare to express their preference for a non-democratic government in statement B (social desirability effect).
Another explanation could be that interviewees didn’t have enough information about the difference between the different kinds of political systems addressed in the statements (knowledge basis), and therefore preferred the “don’t know” option. 46 This argument can be applied to the 2008 –2011 (Round 4 to 5) values as well. The increase in the approval for
46 The latter option, however, would lead to the question how and why the interviewees in Round 4 were able to answer the question, and thus were in possession of an adequate knowledge base to distinguish between the different political systems addressed. 90 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
statement A of 4% is accompanied by a decrease in support for the “don’t know” option by 4%.
As a consequence, the author of the present study has interpreted the increasing development of the variable support for democracy between 2005 and 2011 with caution and would prefer to speak of a stable tendency rather than the developement of the other answer options.
Does the fear of political intimidation or violence influence the support for democracy? Does it have an effect on peoples’ support for democracy? Is there a significant relationship between the two variables and, if yes, what is its strength?
Table 11 shows the percentage values for the variable “How much do you fear political intimidation or violence?” Forty-three percent of all interviewees answered that they have no fear at all, whereas 54% declared they feared political intimidation or violence a bit, a lot, or somewhat.
Table 11. Values for the variable “How much do you fear political intimidation or violence?” from the Afrobarometer Round 4/2008 for 18 countries, percentages of the total. Source: Afrobarometer (2014).
43% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 21%
% 18% 20% 15% 15% 10% 3% 5% 0% A lot Somewhat A little bit Not at all Don´t know Values in percentages over total base = 27,688; weighted results
To test the significance and the strength 47 of a possible association between fear of political intimidation or violence (ordinal value) and support for democracy (nominal value), first a chi² test and second a Cramer’s V calculation were done. The relationship between the two
47 The form of the association cannot be indicated, since the variable “support for democracy” only has a nominal level. Since Cramer’s V is always positive, providing a direction of association is impossible. 91 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
variables is highly significant χ² (20, N = 27713) = 7213923 and P < 0.001, yet Cramer’s V only suggests a weak association between the two V = 0.0930.
Thus, the trend in ordinary citizens’ support for democracy clearly opposes the decreasing democracy ratings found by Freedom House since 2005. This discrepancy can be explained in two different ways, which need to be addressed in further research. One possible explanation could be the lack of support for democracy by other actors than African citizens, such as local politicians, heads of states, the judiciary, economic and social players, or international investors.
Lynch and Crawford (2011) take up this argument by stating that:
More worrying however, is how minimal this commitment to democratization among local political elites and international donors continues to be, and how swiftly officials adopt quick-fix solutions, such as power sharing, despite the fact that power-sharing is likely to have very different trajectories in different contexts (p. 297).
Measuring democracy values among these players is a challenge, since their response behavior is highly likely to be affected by social-desirability. Only a minority will honestly express their disfavor of democracy and democratization.
A second explanation of these contradictory developments could be the need for actual hands- on support for democracy, instead of paying mere lip service to it. As Welzel and Inglehart (2008) have suggested, ordinary citizens must be willing to put effective mass pressure on elites. If this pressure fails to appear, the political elites have no incentive to change a non- democratic power structure or, in case of existing democracies, to restrain their hunger for power. The conducted interviews with victims of violent electoral conflict will show whether their understanding of support for democracy is rather passive, and limited to formal voting.
Since the reviewed quantitative data did not allow for further testing of the relationship between support for democracy and fear of political intimidation or violence, further research is necessary. As the causal linkage between the two options remains unclear, it might be fruitful to invest in qualitative research as well.
4.7 Conclusion
Chapter 4 has shed light on the definition of democracy and democratization and the path the latter has been taken in Sub-Saharan Africa since the 1990s. In addition, the role of elections
92 4. The Democratization Process in Africa
in democracy and their significance for the democratization process in Africa was considered in detail.
The consideration of Freedom House quantitative data showed that the 1990s constituted the booming years of democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa as the time when the values for political rights and civil liberties significantly increased. However, this trend could not be maintained during the 2000s. The level of democratization mainly stagnated at the level of the previous decade. The Afrobarometer data clearly showed a solid support base of ordinary African citizens for democracy as the preferred form of government. The present study will examine the weak but significant relationship found between the fear of political violence and support for democracy, and will try to shed some further light on this relationship.
The next chapter takes a closer look at the phenomenon of violent electoral conflict, its propinquity with other forms of conflict, as well as its causes, consequences, and quantitative dimension.
93 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
5 Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
5.1 Introduction
The scientific discussion of the issue of electoral conflict needs to be embedded in the broader context of conflict research, and the scope and role of conflict as an omnipresent social phenomenon. Within the present study, violent electoral conflict is considered to be a sub- type of political conflict, the latter being a sub-type of social conflict. This structural assumption sets the structure of the following sections, providing an introduction to the concept of conflict, protracted social conflict, political conflict, and violent electoral conflict. The specifics of violent electoral conflict will be contextualized, including its causes, consequences, and quantitative dimensions in sub-Saharan Africa.
5.2 What is Social Conflict?
Conflict is a social phenomenon that has accompanied human mankind since its very beginning. History always has been marked by struggles and wars, fought for various reasons, sometimes based on noble and sometimes on lower motives. Since all people have their own interests, goals, and ambitions to achieve, conflict seems to be the logical result of cohabitation and almost an inevitable phenomenon of human interaction. Landau et al (2001) make this very clear when they say that “conflict exists in all human relationships” (p. 3). In everyday life, we continually experience conflict, within our family, with neighbours, the community, our colleagues, and almost all people with whom we come into contact. Therefore, conflict can be described as “a ubiquitous social phenomenon” (Bradshaw 2008, p. 15).
Even though social conflict has existed for time immemorial and is the concern of all human beings, most people fear its presence and associate it with negative feelings. Furthermore, societies have not developed a “broad range of strategies and skills for dealing with it” (Landau et al. 2001, p. 4). Landau et al (2001) speak of a “fight-or-flight” (p. 4) mentality towards social conflict, offering the option of confronting the opponent aggressively or just escaping from an unpleasant situation by one way or another. In modern times, both strategies—fight or flight—are inadequate to deal with complex conflict situations. This is why new and successful managing strategies for social conflicts need to be worked out and applied.
94 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
Inevitably, most individuals feel uncomfortable when faced with any kind of conflict situation. Rushing and Zald (1976) go as far as deducing “a popular preoccupation with morale, human relations, and co-operation, and the general value [in societies] that peace is good and conflict bad” (p. 23). As a logical consequence, people try to avoid conflicts in their lives, or they are stimulated to solve an unpleasant situation as soon as possible. Therefore, everyone has an individual comfort level with conflict, which determines his/her personal approach to handling a conflict situation (Landau et al. 2001, p. 5). No doubt, the fear of conflict or hiding from conflict can quickly generate immense costs in people’s private and professional lives. However, conflict also motivates people to escape from unpleasant situations, encourages them to find the courage and pressure needed to manage a situation differently, motivates them to speak their minds, and influences them to organize things in a different and hopefully better way. Conflict can thus be the necessary cause of friction, the “engine of social evolution” (Bradshaw 2008, p. 15) that is needed for change.
In recent years, the perception of conflict has started to change as people see both its negative and stimulating characteristics. Scholars, managers, and individuals have started to look at conflict from a realistic perspective, recognizing it as a necessary source of social movement and development. George Simmel (as cited in Luthans 1973) amalgamates the two sides of social conflict in his classic essay by saying that:
Groups require disharmony as well as harmony, dissociation as well as association; and conflicts within them are by no means altogether disruptive factors. Group formation is the result of both types of processes. Far from being necessarily dysfunctional, a certain degree of conflict is an essential (p. 462).
Consequently, in the recent conflict management literature, social conflict is considered neither positive nor negative; rather, it is neutral.
What additional elements does the concept of social conflict include? How can it be defined? A good way to approach a social concept in general is to consult the existing definitions and identify their important elements.
A workaday definition of social conflict that is valid for all kinds of everyday situations could be: “a real or perceived divergence of interests, beliefs and values among two or more people (parties to the conflict)” that might lead to (violent) confrontation in the case that party A can only achieve the realisation of its interest at the expense of party B and C (Matlosa et al. 2010, p. 2).
95 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
By having a closer look at the scholarly literature about social conflict and conflict management in general, it is obvious that the term conflict has been used almost exclusively in an inflationary manner, instead of as a multi-aspect, multi-dimensional, multi-faceted, and highly complex social phenomenon. Nevertheless, a generally accepted definition of social conflict has not been found yet. Additionally, existing definitions dramatically differ in their range and conceptualization.
Some scholars focus on a narrow understanding of social conflict. According to Rhoodie (1991), for example, social conflict occurs around competitions between individuals over resources and material, and normally leads to conflict “where groups of people compete for scarce resources” (p. 21). Similarly, Pruitt and Kim (2004) have defined conflict as “perceived divergence of interest, a belief that the parties’ current aspirations are incompatible” (p. 7).
Himes has a slightly broader definition of social conflict: “… as [referring] to purposeful struggles between collective actors who use social power to defeat or remove opponents and to gain status, power resources and other scarce values” (Himes as cited in Bradshaw 2008 , p. 16).
On the other side of the spectrum, overwhelmingly broad definitions of social conflict can be identified in the scientific debate. As early as 1976, Thomas defined conflict as “the process which begins when one party perceives that another has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concern of his” (1976, p. 891), which he used to differentiate his definition from the less precise definitions of his colleagues (such as Pondy 1967) by providing a beginning point for the conflictual processes.
In 2002, Rahim (2002) defined social conflict as “an interactive process manifested in incompatibility, disagreement, or dissonance within or between social entities (i.e., individuals, groups, organizations, etc.)” (p. 207), including both an intra- and an inter- individual approach. Going into a similar direction, Sandole (1998) described conflict as a process characterized by stages of initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, de- escalation, and some kind of termination 48 , and also explicitly made distinctions between latent conflicts, manifest conflict processes, and aggressive manifest processes.
On the basis of these rather broad approaches to social conflict, Anstey (2008) defined social conflict in the following way:
48 L. R. Pondy also sees conflict as a dynamic process. For more information, see Pondy (1967, pp. 296 –320). 96 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
Conflict exists in a relationship when parties believe that their aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously, or perceive a divergence in their values, needs or interests (latent conflict) and purposefully employ their power in an effort to eliminate, defeat, neutralise, or change each other to protect or further their interests in the interaction (manifest conflict) (p. 6).
Anstey’s definition will be used as the working definition of social conflict in the present study.
Even though social conflict can be understood as a necessary means for social development, creative conflict management or resolution strategies need to be implemented to restrict its range. Over the last decades, an ever growing literature on conflict theory, conflict management approaches, and conflict resolution has developed. 49 Conflict resolution and conflict management describe different mechanisms. According to Matanga et al. (2012), conflict resolution “involves the reconciliation or elimination of fundamental differences and grievances underlying a conflict” (p. 10) and occurs when the incompatibility between the preferences of the parties disappear or when the sources of the conflict are removed. By contrast, conflict management does not have the aim of eliminating a conflict but of managing it in the sense of making its consequences less destructive or violent. With conflict management, conflict behavior should be limited, controlled, or contained (see also Ryan 1990).
Social conflict has many bases or causes. Bradshaw (2008) has distinguished six main causes, including “value differences, clashes of interests, unfulfilled needs, misinformation, past relationships, and structural situations, or any combination of these” (p. 18). Value-based conflicts occur when people with different value systems clash with one another. These values might be religious, political, or ideological in nature. Many of the current conflicts in the world are value-based, such as ISIS- and al-Qaeda terror, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (at least in its religious aspects), or the clash of communism and capitalism. Value-based conflicts often persist over long periods of time and are “notoriously difficult to manage” (Bradshaw 2008, p. 18). In contrast, interest-based conflicts are found in situations when people compete over scarce resources such as money, land, jobs, or powerful positions. Often, it occurs between individuals or in organizations. The source of needs-based conflict is the complete denial or the frustration of basic human needs, as defined in the theories of Maslow (1943, 1954) and Burton (1972, 1990, 2001). According to these authors, all human beings
49 A consolidated overview is provided by Thomas (1992). 97 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
have physical and psychological basic human needs whose satisfaction is the intrinsic motivation for human action. Physical basic human needs include, for example, the need for air, water, food, and shelter, whereas psychological needs include, for example, safety, belongingness, and identity. An ongoing denial of basic human needs is a high risk for all human beings and thus leads to the outbreak of deep-rooted social conflict. In contrast, data- based conflict is based on the assumption that individuals perceive so-called reality in very selective ways. Information is filtered through our own system of understanding that often causes misunderstanding, misperception, and/or miscommunication (cf. Bradshaw 2008), which can trigger social conflict. Structural conditions—political, social, or economic—can cause social conflict as well. According to Bradshaw, structural conflict often occurs in the workplace or in civil institutions. Interestingly, structural circumstances may lead to conflict in one particular setting, whereas the same structures have no effect in another area. Last, social conflict often is based on past relationships that continue to influence the present in a negative manner. Social conflict persists when past relationships such as previous feuds, power struggles, or clashes have caused ongoing mistrust among the parties that persists although the actual confrontation is long gone.
Social conflict is a highly-complex and evolving phenomenon that rarely has one single cause. Very often, it is based on a number of causes that obviously aggravates its management and transformation. A good example of a multi-based conflict is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It has a value-based component since Jewish, Muslim, and (to a lesser extent) Christian parties are involved. This conflict is waged for money, land, and power in the region (interest basis) and touches upon basic human needs, such as security, food, water, and freedom of movement. Miscommunication, misinformation, and misperception are elemental strategies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which can be illustrated exemplarily in the presentation of the respective parties in school books and the media. Social, political, and economic structures fuel the conflict even further, since, for example, Arab-Israelis feel mistreated in their everyday lives and the political arena. In contrast, Jewish-Israelis fear the growing numbers of Arabs in the country, which leads to a growing feeling of insecurity and mistrust. This distrust is transported from one generation to the next for all the conflict parties, which perpetuates the tensions based on past relationships.
The following section takes a closer look at a specific type of social conflict that is a protracted or deep-rooted conflict.
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5.3 Protracted Social Conflict
The particular type of social conflict that is at the focus of the present study is extremely difficult to be resolved or managed, and often lasts for decades. It is called a deep-rooted or protracted social conflict. 50 Familiar examples of this conflict type are the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Northern Ireland conflict, Cyprus, Sudan, Iran, Nigeria, and South Africa (see, for example, Miall et al. 1999, p. 71).
For Edward Azar (1991), who influenced the concept of protracted social conflict , this concept represented “the prolonged and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institutions and economic participation” (p. 93).
The first thing that attracts attention in this definition is the fact that in contrast to conflicts known prior to the end of the Cold War, protracted social conflict is located within rather than between states. Communal groups of one state are struggling over so-called basic communal or even human needs. In radical contrast to the Realist and Neo-Realist approaches to international relations—which focus their full attention on states and their relations of power and international law—protracted social conflict theory puts the domestic level of conflict into the spotlight. The role of the state remains limited to depriving or satisfying basic needs and thus engenders or prevents protracted social conflict (see Azar 1990, p. 11). 51 Communal groups thereby refer to “politicized groups whose members share ethic, religious, linguistic or other cultural ‘identity’ characteristics” (Azar 1990, p. 7). Individuals form identity groups because they share at least one of the named identity characteristics and because they strive to fulfill their specific basic needs.
The fulfillment of basic needs, such as effective participation in a political system, physical security, and acceptance of a communal identity by state authorities (political pluralism) is the central motivation for all human behavior. Contrary to mere interests that influence human behavior as well, basic needs are the fundamental basis of every human existence, and therefore cannot be negotiated or denied.
50 Bradshaw (2008) has provided an overview of the most important different conflict types, such as organizational conflict, social conflict, ethnic conflict, and international conflict. 51 Burton and Azar (1986) go so far as to say that the difference between domestic and international politics is artificial and should thus be rejected. Both form two parts of one social environment, with the former being the more compelling (p. 33).
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John W. Burton (1984; 1990; 2001), another pioneer in the field of conflict management, supports Azar’s assessment saying that basic human needs can never be treated like ordinary interests to make them applicable to the negotiation process. Only interests are negotiable, whereas basic human needs and values demand other conflict solving approaches, like conflict provention. They simply cannot be dealt with via traditional methods (conflict negotiation or mediation). Fisher (1997) further has argued that traditional conflict mediation techniques such as negotiation or mediation can make a deep-rooted conflict worse, since they only concentrate on the conflict’s surface by dealing with the parties’ interests, and simply ignore the underlying needs and values (p. 32).
In societies composed of different communal identity groups, a protracted social conflict is more likely to occur. Rivalry between different groups that might lead to the oppression of one or several specific groups and an unresponsive state can create an increased probability of protracted social conflict. Azar (1990) summarizes the coincidence of the different preconditions of protracted social conflict:
In brief, protracted social conflicts occur when communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of their communal identity. However, the deprivation is the result of a complex causal chain involving the role of the state and the pattern of international linkages. Furthermore, initial conditions (colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, and the multicommunal nature of the society) play important roles in shaping the genesis of protracted social conflict (p. 12).
The previous section elucidated the meaning and the role of conflict in everyday life and as a social phenomenon in everyday life. After having taken a closer look at the meaning and significance of social conflict and protracted social conflict as a source of violent confrontation, the special characteristics of political conflict, as a sub-type of social conflict, are examined in the following section.
5.4 Political Conflict
Political conflict is understood as a sub-type of social conflict that focuses on political purposes. What exactly does political stand for? According to David Easton (1965), a political system describes “the authoritative allocation of value within a society” (p. 32). A political system thus defines values that in turn have to be accepted by as many members of a society as possible at best. A political system can be distinguished further as having three main elements, including polity (form, structure), policy (content), and politics (processes). 100 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
Although many researchers have referred to the concept of political conflict in their publications, its definition is hard to find (see, for example, Matlosa et al. 2010, p. 3 or Atuobi 2008). Straus and Taylor (2012) have defined the manifest form of political conflict — political violence —as the “deliberate use of physical harm or the threat of physical harm for a political purpose” (p. 19). Following up on their definition of political violence , political conflict , for the purposes of this present study, is defined as any conflict directly tied to a political purpose, including questions on polity, policy, and politics.
5.5 Towards a Definition of Violent Electoral Conflict
Free and fair elections are a crucial element of any democratic system. They are a peaceful means to recruit political office holders (politics/polity) and to hold them accountable to the interests of citizens and the general good (policy). As such, free and fair elections are a crucial but not sufficient instrument for every democracy. Credibly conducted elections “imbue the government with legitimacy garnered by the consent of the people (…) [and] create legitimate governments that enjoy popular support for programs and policies” (UNDP 2005, p. 1).
Thus, electoral conflict constitutes a sub-form of social and political conflict and can take various manifest forms, such as beatings, torture, and (mass) murder. It also includes latent forms, such as the mere threat or menace of violence, which is coercive intimidation (see, for example, Straus & Taylor 2012, p. 19; Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus 2013, p. 13).
On the one hand, elections contribute to the strengthening of the democratic process, if they are conducted properly, by fulfilling the requirements of freedom and fairness. On the other hand, the experience of many African countries with elections has been that of violence. In spite of some democratic gains, violent electoral conflict has been a constant companion of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. 52 Straus and Taylor (2012) have confirmed this assumption:
The overall democratic gains mask an important empirical regularity, however (…). The experience of many African democratic transitions, especially during electoral periods, has been violent. Especially in recent years, the risk that elections may produce political violence has been all too apparent (p. 16).
Clearly, the reintroduction of democracy by multi-party elections has resulted in an increase of violence in Sub-Saharan Africa (see Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus 2013). Although elections never cause conflict directly, their mere announcement can generate disequilibrium in a
52 For more information on the democratic development of Sub-Saharan African states, consult the previous chapter. 101 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
country and destabilise their power constellations. Referring to Anstey’s (2008) general definition of social conflict mentioned previously, elections evoke a situation in which two or more parties (political protagonists, youth groups, support groups, etc.) believe that their aspiration for political power cannot be achieved simultaneously. They may perceive a divergence in their winning potential, political positions, values, or interests and thus may be motivated to employ undemocratic means in an effort to influence the election outcome in their own favour. With respect to Anstey’s definition, elections can thus constitute a latent conflict situation between political opponents. Moreover, electoral conflict becomes manifest if the means employed to gain political power fall outside the legal sphere of the electoral process.
Although the phenomenon of violent electoral conflict –has gained increasing attention from scholars all around the world, it is still highly undertheorised and still lacks a solid basis in empirical data. Only a few books and articles have broached the issue of violent electoral conflict as a specific phenomenon (Bekoe 2012a). Until the present, “neither ‘violence’ nor ‘electoral violence’ is a concept with a consistent social-science definition” (Straus & Taylor 2012, p. 19), although they are ongoing challenges for Sub-Saharan Africa (see Sisk 2012). This definitional inconsistency makes a comparison between different studies difficult (see Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus 2013). So far, scholars studying conflict have focused their attention on the broader forms of political conflict, such as war, mass killing, or genocide, which is the reason why Straus (2012) has advocated for more attention to be paid to violent electoral conflict and localized conflict, in particular over land and water (p. 14).
Several researchers in the field of conflict and democratization have agreed that electoral conflict is a specific form of political conflict, with specific timing , perpetrators, victims, objectives , and methods (see Bekoe 2012b; Straus & Taylor 2012; Höglund & Jarstad 2011). What does this mean?
The objectives of electoral conflict constitute a tactic to secure victory (see Taylor, Pevehouse & Straus 2013, p. 9). Violence is used as an instrument to safeguard electoral success and thereby political power in general. This objective clearly distinguishes violent electoral conflict from other forms of political violence such as genocide or civil war. Electoral conflict is primarily abour securing electoral victory by “any means necessary.” Often, it risks escalating into protracted social conflict or civil war, as more and more groups get caught up in the spiral of conflict escalation.
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As overt forms/methods of violent electoral conflict, Dorina Bekoe (2012b) names the clashes between two opposing sides, the state security services’ violent suppression of demonstrators, as well as political assassinations, deaths, and injuries. She also has pointed out four less overt forms of violent electoral conflict, including harassment and intimidation, confiscation of newspapers, disqualification of candidates, and short-term arrests of political opponents (Bekoe 2012b; Adolfo et al. 2012). 53
The latter forms of violent electoral conflict need to be distinguished from the forms of electoral manipulation and fraud, such as vote buying, manipulation of the vote count, flawed registration processes and voter lists, etc. (see, for example, Schaffer 2007; Simpser 2008; and Kuntz & Thompson 2006). Violent electoral conflict in general constitutes a form of electoral manipulation, since it is perpetrated to affect an electoral outcome. What distinguishes violent electoral conflict from mere electoral manipulation is the element of force or its very threat. Electoral manipulation constitutes a form of electoral conflict, only when it takes the form of (real or threat) coercion, intimidation, or physical harm to another person. Vote buying, for example, constitutes a form of electoral conflict when it is perceived as an act or threat of intimidation to influence the casting of an individual’s vote for a specific candidate or party. 54
The question about the perpetrators of violent electoral conflict is an ongoing debate. In his pioneering study on violent electoral conflict from 2002, Jeff Fischer ascribed a “mercurial character” to the phenomenon of violent electoral conflict, since its perpetrators, victims, and motives varied “from country to country and election to election” (p. 8). This internationally comparative study identifies political rivals, voters, and the state as the main drivers of violent electoral conflict. Fischer identified conflict between political rivals for political gain as the most frequent source of conflict (72% of the cases). Voter motivated conflict—in which voters engage in conflict with the state due to a perceived unfairness of an electoral process— and state motivated conflict, in which the state stomps on voters’ protests occurred in about 14% of the cases. Although Fischer’s findings marked the starting point for internationally comparative analyses of violent electoral conflict, his conclusions about perpetrators needed
53 It is obvious that the named forms of electoral conflict overlap with other forms of political violence. A differentiation —although highly fluent —could be drawn considering the objectives of the violence used. If violence is used for general political reasons, it falls into the category of political conflict . If it is used to safeguard the victory of a specific candidate or a specific outcome of an election, it can be subsumed under the category of electoral conflict . 54 The decision about whether or not electoral manipulation represents electoral conflict needs to consider institutional and cultural contexts. For more information, see Kuntz and Thompson (2006).
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more specification. By differentiating between different context scenarios during which violent electoral conflict occurs, Kristine Hoeglund has contributed a more complex explanation of the behaviour of key electoral conflict actors in war-torn societies (Hoeglund, Jarstad, & Södberg Kovacs 2009; Hoeglund 2009). Within these different scenarios, Hoeglund, Jarstad, and Södberg Kovacs (2009) have identified established political parties— both government and opposition—other state actors, rebel groups, and other armed organizations as the key players in the dynamics of violent electoral conflict (p. 537ff). The inclusion of the latter two groups represents a notable expansion of Fischer’s perpetrator category. Liisa Laakso (2007) further expands and specifies Höglund’s perpetrator categories by including hired thugs, the violent youth wings of government and opposition parties, and spontaneous perpetrators to her list:
The perpetrators of electoral violence vary from government forces (i.e. the police and army) and supporters of the government to opposition groups, spontaneous demonstrators and even rebel organizations that cannot or do not want to take part in the formal political life at all. Both the ruling party and the opposition might use hired thugs and youth wings of their parties (p. 228).
Perpetrators and victims are “defined as including those in clashes between rival political supporters” (Bekoe 2012b, p. 3). Consequently, victims are those people who are affected by violent electoral conflict. The author of the present study does not follow Fischer’s definition of victims of violent electoral conflict as including “voters who conflict with the state and disagree with the results of the elections” (Fischer as cited in Bekoe 2012b, p. 3). Fischer’s definition focuses solely on politicized citizens who actively participate in the challenge of an election, and therefore, the author of the present study considers it to be too narrow. It excludes uninvolved men, women, and children who are victimized by violent electoral conflict through no fault of their own. The present study considers both political actors and civilians as victims of violent electoral conflict. Although this differentiation is not commonly used in the scientific literature, it accommodates the definition of victims used by international organizations, NGOs, and independent commissions that investigate violent electoral conflict retrospectively.
The separation between victims and perpetrators is not easily drawn. Perpetrators can become victims, and victims can become perpetrators in acts of revenge, for example. Bekoe (2012b) gives the example of the 2007/2008 post-electoral violence in Kenya, when the Kikuyus were “first persecuted by the Kalenjin before resorting to reprisal attacks” (p. 3). Although the 104 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
frontiers are fluid, perpetrators and victims can be identified by their objectives (see Bekoe 2012a)—by who wants to alter an election outcome and who is affected when this goal is pursued.
Another characteristic of violent electoral conflict that distinguishes it from other forms of political conflict is its specific timing . Violent electoral conflict is a brief, time- and event- bound event directly associated with an election (cf. Bekoe 2012b). Violence can be evoked during all phases of the electoral cycle—during the pre-election phase, on election day, and after the announcement of an election result (see, for example, Adolfo et al 2012). Although this definition seems clear, in reality it is rather difficult to decide whether or not the outbreak of violence is directly associated with an electoral contest. To solve this problem, Straus and Taylor (2012) have suggested “to consider any politically related violence that occurred from six months before an election until three months after an election to be electoral violence” (p. 19f). This hands-on (coding) definition is certainly appealing especially for quantitative, comparative, large-N studies. Nevertheless, it risks ignoring deviant cases that are outstandingly important for all research by breaking the patterns of usual cases. Lahra Smith (2012) gives the example of the post-2005 violent electoral conflict in Ethiopia that started 5 to 6 months after the electoral contest (p. 182). To make these deviant cases fruitful, an individual check of all characteristics (timing, perpetrators, victims, objectives, and methods) of violent electoral conflict is certainly advisable. This hands-on definition provides true hands-on guidance about the time-frame of when the violent electoral conflict will most probably erupt.
In the meantime, the first comparative studies have shown that election days remain usually peaceful even in high stake elections (see Taylor, Pevehouse, & Straus 2013). Concerning the timing of violent electoral conflict, these authors argue for the differentiation between pre- election and post-election episodes, since both periods have different conflict dynamics.
It has become clear that electoral conflict is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that needs to be respected and reflected on by means of a comprehensive definition that includes timing, forms, motivation, and aims of electoral conflict. The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) definition of electoral conflict comes close to this objective and will be used—within the context of Straus and Taylor’s (2012) suggested time frame—as a working definition for this present study.
Electoral conflict is defined as:
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Acts or threats of coercion, intimidation or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence may be employed to influence the process of elections—such as efforts to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll—and to influence the outcomes: the determining of winners in competitive races for political office or to secure approval or disapproval of referendum questions (UNDP 2005, p. 4).
Electoral conflict will be considered violent when actual means or the threat of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm are applied. It is considered systematic when the coercion, intimidation, or physical harm occurring effectively affects the outcome (result) of an election and is perceivable to the citizens of the country. 55 Although elections at all constitutional levels can be affected by violent electoral conflict, the approach in the present study is to focus on national presidential or parliamentarian elections in which violent and systematic electoral conflict occurred.
5.5.1 Causes of Violent Electoral Conflict The causes of violent electoral conflict are multifaceted and varied. By comparing various incidences of violent electoral conflict, four main drivers of its occurrence have been identified so far, often emerging in combination: stumble in the state formation/democratization process, state capture and economic inequalities, structural and institutional weaknesses, and electoral mismanagement . This is not to say that this list of categories is exhaustive, nor that if they are present in a country an outbreak of violence is an inevitable consequence. Their existence only increases the possibility of violent electoral conflict. In an attempt to structure the different causes and driving forces of violent electoral conflict, Timothy Sisk (2012) developed an overview framework (see Table 12) to evaluate election-related violence.
55 Staffan Lindberg (2006) has delineated the freedom and fairness of an election by four ordinal categories: 1) “No, not at all”, when elections were wholly unfair and obviously a charade orchestrated by the incumbent regime; 2) “No, irregularities affected outcome” when the elections had a legal and practical potential to be free and fair but there were numerous flaws and serious fraud that affected the result; 3) “Yes, somewhat” when there were deficiencies either unintended or organized but they did not impact the outcome of the election; and 4) “Yes, entirely” when elections were free and fair although there might have been human errors and logistical restrictions on operations (p. 37). 106 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
Table 12. An overview framework for evaluating election-related violence. Source: Sisk (2012, p. 48).
An Overview Framework for Evaluating Election-Related Violence The Democratization Context • How does the historical context of state formation and national integration set the stage for violent elections? • How did the political process or sequencing affect vulnerabilities to violence?
Political Economy of State Capture • What are common mobilization narratives about the nature of conflict that directly relate to the stakes, incentives, and outcomes of electoral competition? • How did institutional incentives – particularly those created by the electoral system – affect perceptions of stakes and expectations?
Structural and Institutional Drivers of Conflict • What social, political, and economic/resource conditions are argued to bee root causes of vulnerability to conflict? • What effect do underlying social and economic conditions have on the context in which electoral conflict turns violent?
Election Management Capacities • How did the administration of state authority – particularly the role of the electoral management body and the security forces – affect the perception of a credible election?
Within his framework, Sisk (2012) raises questions that further concretizes his four categories of “the democratization context,” “political economy of state capture,” “structural and institutional drivers,” and “election management capacities” (p. 48). Sisk’s framework as well as the work of Adolfo and his colleagues (Adolfo et al 2012) have inspired the following section.
Challenges in the state formation/democratization process With a long tradition of authoritarian or military leadership, many Sub-Saharan countries have struggled on their path to democratization and “have yet to resolve basic questions of national identity and state formation” (Sisk 2012, p. 43). Many of these countries have had outbreaks of violence when peaceful, periodic, and credible elections were supposed to function as a purely democratic, nonviolent mean of government selection.
Sisk (2012) describes the instability of these fragile states:
In many ‘fragile’ states in Africa, violence has accompanied electoral processes during transitions from an autocratic past or civil war (in some countries, both) toward a stable system of regular, credible elections in which social interests and differences are reconciled non-violently through democratic institutions and concomitant electoral processes (p. 41).
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Thus, the outbreak of violent electoral conflict highly correlates with the regime type of a country. New democracies or countries currently undergoing the transition process to democratization are considerably vulnerable to political conflict in general and violent electoral violence in particular (cf. Bekoe 2012a, p. 43). This is true for different reasons. Very often, democracy does not bring peace immediately, since in many cases, the transition process is accompanied by violent electoral conflict. All too often, political leaders benefit from the violence in a political system because their malpractice has no consequences (Bekoe 2012a; Mueller 2012). Generally speaking, elite behaviour within the mobilization process of electoral competition is a crucial element of peace or conflict in Africa. Without a doubt, elites are “critical players in the emergence and sustainability of violence at the local level” (Sisk 2012, p. 43; also Hoeglund 2009). Since many African countries are multi-ethnic and multi-religious in character, mobilization along these religious or ethnic lines by political stakeholders considerably increases the risk of violent electoral conflict. Furthermore, an effective system of checks and balances to control and regulate executive power is rather underdeveloped and uncommon in Africa. Thus, a president or government does not feel any need to perform adequately. The political decision making process often is dominated by a strong President (or a dominant party) who concentrates political power in her/his own hands. The problems of a “highly personalized and centralized presidency” (Mueller 2012, p. 146), also called the big-man policy, is widely-recognized in Africa
Moreover, new democracies with weak institutions have difficulties in accommodating the various social forces and movements existing in multi-ethnic or multi-religious societies. In the worst case scenario, without lasting political coalitions and a noticeable representation of a cross section of society, each democracy, even established ones, faces potential social riots and conflict (cf. Mansfield & Snyder 2007, p. 163). Bekoe (2012b) has confirmed that “without the attendant institutions to allow for tolerance of opposing views and the mitigation of outbreaks of violence, nascent democracies cannot sufficiently accommodate and manage the diverse new political interests that emerge when the political system opens up” (p. 5f). Furthermore, in countries, where access to power and resources had for a long time been in the hands of the few, and organised according to segregating lines, it can take decades to overcome these ingrained traditions. Ordinary people may still adhere to the old social organizations, and yet direct their expectations to their current political leader. This is a realistic scenario in many African countries where expected political and socio-economic improvements through democratization have yet to yield fruit. Disappointment and frustration
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about the lack of improvements under democracy foster a call for the return of the old power structures, exclusive decision making processes, and patronage. Again, the transition to democracy requires a steady political elite that does not foster old patronage politics and instead mobilises the diffusion of democratic values and economic benefits to the general public.
A lack of democratic tradition within a society might be a complementary explanation for the tolerated or even legitimate use of violence as a means to achieve one’s goals in an electoral contest. In post-war societies, the use of violence has long been an instrument of goal- achievement. Decisions have been made according to the law of the strongest. When stakes are high and peaceful means of decision making remain underdeveloped, political competition risks deteriorating into violent conflict.
Young democracies also lack a deeply-anchored national identity. With a comparatively short history of independence and an ongoing process of democratization, the state does not provide a solid base for identity making at all. As African societies often mix multi-ethnic, multi- religious, multi-lingual, and multi-cultural groups, identity making is a difficult task and thus takes time and effort to develop.
State capture and economic inequalities First and foremost, Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the poorest regions in the world, in which millions of people are suffering from hunger, disease, and miserable living conditions. Following Burton (1992), the constant frustration of basic human needs must lead to the eruption of violence at some point. This is true for any kind of social conflict, including protracted social conflict, ethnic conflict, political conflict, and electoral conflict.
In addition to the general problem of dire poverty, many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa must confront problems with corruption, state capture, and other economic malpractice. State capture describes the use of illicit, illegitimate, and non-transparent forms of influence by members of the private sector (individuals, groups, firms, etc.) on the decision-making process of state institutions, including the executive, ministries and state agencies, legislative branch, and the judiciary (cf. World Bank 2000). 56 In Sub-Saharan Africa, the use of state capture is rampant and often goes hand in hand with other forms of corruption,
56 State capture is a special type of political corruption by which members of the private sector capture state institutions to make them regulate businesses in accordance with the private interests of the regulated as opposed to the public interest. It “is a broader concept in that it encompasses the formation of laws, rules, and decrees by a wider range of state institutions (…). At the same time, state capture has a narrower definition in that it focuses exclusively on illicit, illegitimate and non-transparent forms of influence” (World Bank 2000, p. 3). 109 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
neopatrimonialism, and “predatory elites” (Sisk 2012, p. 44). In an atmosphere of sell-out of public services such as housing, health care, and infrastructure construction to the highest bidder, the trust in members of the political elite decreases as social disaffection rises. Sisk (2012) further explains that on the one hand in Africa “elections are often seen as opportunities to engage in corruption and economic rent-seeking” (p. 44). Successful candidates in turn are expected to influence policy and law-making as well as judicial verdicts according to the bidders’ interests. On the other hand, campaigning candidates tend to mobilise their electorate according to ethnic, religious, or social class lines, wooing them with the promise of economic and social benefit. The mobilisations with election pledges and state capture during elections lead to “(…) highly factionalized politics, often along religious, sectarian, or ethnic lines or party-political divisions, where control of the state leads to the reinforcement of class divisions or of economic opportunity along lines of social difference” (Sisk 2012, p. 44). This situation provides fertile ground for political, social, and electoral violence.
Catherine Boone and Norma Kriger (2012) provide an example of land rights and land access in Zimbabwe and Cote d’Ivoire to illustrate the use of state capture in Africa. In both countries, 57 political leaders have promised to relocate land-rights from so called foreigners to their supporters. As a classic case of state capture, these “political struggles over land found expression in the introduction of new laws”, “constitutional changes”, “state-orchestrated displacements” and grassroots-level violence” (Boone & Kriger 2012, p. 75).
The risk of violent electoral conflict is further increased by the character of an election itself. The more an election is truly competitive, with two or more political parties having a realistic chance of gaining power, the higher the risk of violent electoral conflict. In uncontested elections with one party dominating the pre-election polls, the mobilisation of opposing party members is more of a challenge. Yet, with an election victory potentially close, political players may take all sorts of actions to achieve their goal in the zero-sum-game called elections. Adolfo et al. (2012) support this argument: “The risk of electoral violence may therefore be higher in situations where there is real political competition between various parties and genuine possibilities to change existing power relations” (p. 2).
57 Both Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo have had similar experiences since the 1990s. 110 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
Structural and institutional weaknesses Concerning structural and institutional causes of violent electoral conflict, it is important to understand that democracy does not have a long tradition in all African countries. Many of them only recently have (re)implemented a democratic form of government, replacing long- lasting authoritarian, sometimes even military, regimes. The implementation of elections has been a first benchmark on their path to democratization. Since the democratic character of implemented elections did and does vary across countries, so does the velocity of their democratic transformation process as a whole. In other words, elections do not automatically transform the political system as a whole, although they may improve its quality in the long run. The underlying structures might take longer to achieve a fully democratic status, such as the governance structures, polity structures, decision making processes, etc. Adolfo et al. (2012) have described the discrepancy between the implementation of elections and the democratic transformation process:
Democratic institutions and procedures, including elections, have been introduced or reinforced [in sub–Saharan Africa], while the underlying structures of power in society and the norms governing the political system have often not yet been transformed. (…) As a result politics is often exclusive, intolerant of opposition and sometimes militarised, not least in post-war states (p. 1).
On the one hand, elections might thus be exploited by a political regime to conceal democratic deficits and pitfalls. On the other hand, they might raise expectations for the political system of a country as a whole, whose nonfulfillment may cause frustration within the electorate. According to Lindberg (2008), elections improve the quality of a democracy (p. xi) because they expand and deepen democratic qualities within a society. People develop a broader understanding of their political rights and the meaning of democracy, which they want to see fulfilled. If a government does not support these democratic expectations, elections are interpreted as a farce. Different forms of protests including boycotts, demonstrations, or sabotage might be a consequence. Elections might further be exploited as a platform for protest against a regime that ignores democratic governance structures. The short period of international media attention during elections might be used to illustrate the meaninglessness of elections in a non-democratic regime.
Other structural factors might also increase the probability of violent electoral conflict. For example, a first-past-the-post voting system in which one winning party takes over all government power increases the stakes for all the competing parties involved. Under such 111 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
circumstances, elections are perceived to be a zero-sum game whose result becomes a matter of survival for a political leader, a political party, and an entire community (cf. Adolfo 2012). Therefore, a first-past-the-post system fuels the competition between the competing actors and may encourage political leaders to mobilise and further radicalise their followers. In the case of Kenya, several political leaders mobilised violent youth groups or militias to intimidate supporters of the opposing party and to terrorize civil society. Losing an election is a highly risky undertaking, since it is not only associated with the loss of political power but also with the economic descent of whole communities or ethnic groups as well.
In any society, elections are conflictual processes per se. Nevertheless, the risk of violent electoral conflict is higher in situations where elections tie in with pre-existing conflict lines, divisions, and cleavages. According to Adolfo et al. (2012), this is especially the case “in societies, where historically, political or socio-economic inequalities have caused violent conflicts. In such cases elections may mean the return, or a turn, to violence” (p. 2). Undoubtedly, numerous examples of these violent conflicts —as divergent as they might be — can be found on the African continent, such as in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and South Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Central African Republic, South Africa, Zimbabwe, etc. Although not all of these current or post-conflict states have experienced violent electoral conflict during their democratization process, the pre-existence of polarising cleavages and conflict lines were fertile soil for its outbreak. In some cases of violent electoral conflict, existing cleavages were opened up, which led to renewed confrontations between earlier conflict parties (as in the case of Kenya, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe). In other cases, conflict lines are shifting, which leads to new conflicting parties in different polls (as in the case of Kenya).
Electoral mismanagement In societies with conflict-instigating structures, pre-existing cleavages, or a lack of democratic traditions, the actual management of an election can tilt the balance in a direction of violence or peace. Election mismanagement can be the trigger for violent conflict or a decisive tool to manage the elections peacefully. As Adolfo et al. (2012) put it: “the institutional and administrative arrangements in place for regulating the electoral contest can play a key role in either mitigating or instigating election-related violence” (p. 2). This is the case for all phases of the election process, be it the preparations of elections, the actual polling day, the period of vote counting, or the announcement of an election result. Electoral commissions need to be fully independent and adequately equipped with the necessary resources to organize elections
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efficiently. In times of scarce resources, political pressure, and multiple manipulation attempts on the African continent, the latter task is not an easy one. In the case of the 2007 Kenyan elections, the mood shifted to aggression and rage with the awkward management of the electoral commission during the vote count and the sudden announcement of the re-election of Mwai Kibaki as the Kenyan president. The electoral commission was perceived to have functioned as a lackey for mismanagement and manipulation, turning the country to chaos. The Kenyan incidents have illustrated the decisive role of a qualitatively unobjectionable election management for peaceful elections. The way elections are handled is taken as an example of the treatment of democracy as a whole. Election results will be respected by the people only when the election process is conducted under full democratic standards. The mere suspicion of irregularities, manipulation, or fraud can be enough to trigger violence.
5.5.2 The Consequences of Violent Electoral Conflict in Africa The consequences of violent electoral conflict are as manifold and complex as its causes. The costs of violent electoral conflict are high, including humanitarian, political, and economic dimensions, which can be devastating for a country, depending on the length and violence- intensity of the conflict. Africa often has experienced low-intensity violence during its electoral processes, for example, in Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, and Uganda. Although less frequent, high-intensity violence has also erupted during elections in Kenya, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe. Thousands of civilians have lost their lives in these clashes and even more are still struggling with physiological, psychological, economic, and social impairments that manifested in the wake of the clashes. In other examples, violent electoral conflict has caused economic, material damage when fields and houses were burnt, cattle were stolen, and families were displaced from their land. Thus, the intensity of the damage varies considerably between and within cases.
The direct and short-term consequences of violent electoral conflict in Africa are being documented by international NGOs, UN- or AU-organizations, the media, and/or national reconciliation commissions (i.e., in South Africa and Kenya). In contrast, the long-term effects have been rarely researched. To the author’s best knowledge, no systematic comparative evaluation of the long-term effects of violent electoral conflict exists.
Undoubtedly, violent electoral conflict has had negative consequences in Africa and in the rest of the world. Lindberg’s (2008) study, although not intended for that, emphasizes the so- called constructive effect of flawed or violent elections, which contributes positively to the democratization process within societies. Although the experience of violent electoral conflict 113 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
can be traumatic and undoubtedly painful for a country, it can be an opportunity to address and manage fundamental cleavages. Violent electoral conflict creates a situation of discomfort and pressure to address simmering problems and to prevent further violent eruptions.
Whether violent electoral conflict contributes to the reformation of a country or leads it further into protracted social conflict often depends on its conflict dynamics, causes, triggers, players, and management attempts.
5.5.3 The Quantitative Dimension of Violent Electoral Conflict in Africa Now that a definition of violent electoral conflict, its distinctive timing, actors, causes, and consequences have been pointed out, the current section focuses on the quantitative dimension of violent electoral conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa. How often does violent electoral conflict occur? Is it a singular or repetitive event, and does it always take a highly destructive character?
These questions will be answered on the basis of existing quantitative data, mainly the African Electoral Violence Database (AEVD) provided by Straus and Taylor (2012). It focuses on violent electoral conflict that occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2008 in 48 countries and is one of the very few “existing and published cross-national data sets that focuses specifically on violent electoral conflict in Africa and that measures electoral violence across nearly two decades” (Straus & Taylor 2012, p. 17). 58 Unfortunately, the data set is unavailable for secondary analysis. 59 Due to unavailability of this data, the findings presented in the present study are based on the research of Straus and Taylor (2012).
To determine how often violent electoral conflict has occurred within the 48 countries in Sub- Saharan Africa, Straus and Taylor (2012) developed a frequency table that distinguishes between elections with no violence (coded as 0), violent harassment (coded as 1), violent repression (coded as 2), and large-scale violence (coded as 3) (see Addendum 11). One of the central findings deriving from this division is that violent harassment constitutes the most frequent level of violent electoral conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.
At the most general level, the group with the highest frequency of occurrence is that of no violence at all (coded as 0). In 42% of all elections (N=92) between 1990 and 2008, no reported violent electoral conflict occurred. Slightly below this value follows the category
58 South Sudan is excluded from the sample (see Straus & Taylor 2012, p. 15, Footnote 1). The data set is based on Lindberg’s coding of African elections between 1990 and 2003 (see Straus & Taylor 2012, p. 17). 59 The author of the present study checked ICPSR and the GESIS data archive to gain access to the data, and contacted the authors of the data set, which unfortunately did not produce any results. 114 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
violent harassment (coded as 1) with about 38% of all cases (N=84). This category comprises all cases in which limited violence occurred but did not become a central feature of an electoral period. In contrast to these two categories, elections with violent repression and large-scale violence (coded as 2 and 3) were relatively rare. Both categories only account for about 10% each of all elections. Twenty-two elections between 1990 and 2008 resulted in “repressive violence involving targeted assassinations and long-term high-level detentions combined with occasional cases of torture” (Straus & Taylor 2012, p. 23). In twenty-three elections, the highest level of violent electoral conflict (coded as 3 in the data set) occured, resulting in generalized killings and violence directly tied to the electoral contest.
Three important assumptions can be drawn from these findings. First, these results support the general assumption that violent electoral conflict has been a frequent phenomenon in Sub- Saharan Africa during the years 1999 and 2000. Taken together, the majority of all elections had at least some violent electoral conflict (58%, N = 129). Its frequent occurrence justifies special attention to its further investigation, conflict management, and transformation strategies.
Second, although violent electoral conflict has been frequent, extreme or repressive violence —although dominant in the media coverage —was a rare occurance. If electoral violence occurs, “it will most likely be at the level of harassment, intimidation, and disruption, rather than at the level of eviscerating the opposition leadership or at the level of generalized killing” (Straus & Taylor 2012, p. 24). It is somewhat surprising that generalized killings and violent repression occurred in about the same number of elections. Following the logic of the decreasing probability of increasing levels of violence, one would have expected to see fewer cases of generalized killings compared to violent repression.
Third, the occurrence of violent electoral conflict varies considerably between and within countries. As Straus and Taylor (2012) have put it: “there is consistent cross-national variation —some countries rarely have significant electoral violence, other countries have occasional significant electoral violence, and still other countries almost always have significant electoral violence” (p. 32).
Can we identify a specific cluster of countries that show this cross-sectional variation? When looking at the group of states with no violence during the elections between 1990 and 2008 in Addendum 11, it is obvious that no clear cluster of conglomerating states exists. These states with no violence include a mixture of democratic heavyweights with a solid economic status,
115 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
such as Botswana, Namibia, Mauritius, and the Seychelles; reliable democracies with a weaker economic background, such as Benin, Ghana, Zambia, and Mali; and more authoritarian states, such as Mauritania, Niger, and Gabon.
A similar picture emerges with respect to a cluster of countries in which violent harassment occurs. These states include medium-sized stable democracies, such as Senegal and Ghana; authoritarian regimes such as Cameroun, Djibouti, and Gambia; and conflict-ridden countries like Rwanda, Central African Republic, and Chad.
A more coherent cluster can be found in the category of countries in which large-scale violence occurs. Medium- and large-scale violence occurs at a considerable rate in Sub- Saharan Africa’s largest and politically (and sometimes economically) most important states, such as South Africa, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Straus and Taylor (2012) can thus be supported in their assumption that violent electoral conflict varies considerably between countries. How about the variation within the states?
Table 13 provides a classification of countries with respect to the frequency of high level violent electoral conflict (source: Straus and Taylor 2012, p. 27; Addendum 12), which separates the sample into cases where high levels of violent electoral conflict never happens, cases where it occurs occasionally (defined as in no more than half the elections), and those cases where high levels of violent electoral conflict usually arise (defined as in more than half the elections).
116 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
Table 13. Frequency of high levels of violent electoral conflict . Source: Straus & Taylor (2012, p. 27), adapted by the author of the present study.
Never High Electoral Violence Occasional High Electoral Usual High Electoral Violence Violence Benin: 1991, 1995, 1996, 1999, Côte d'Ivoire: 1990, 1995, Angola: 1992* , 2008 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007 2000* Botswana: 1994, 1999, 2004 Burundi: 1993, 2005 DRC: 2006* Cameroun: 1992, 1992, Burkina Faso: 1991, 1992, 1997, Eq. Guinea: 1993, 1996, 1997, 1997, 2002, 2004, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2007 1999 , 2002, 2004, 2008 2007 Cape Verde: 1991, 1995, 1996, CAR: 1992*, 1993, 1998, Ethiopia: 1995, 2000, 2001, 2006 1999, 2005 2005* Comoros: 1990, 1992, Chad: 1996, 1997, 2001, 2002, Kenya: 1992*, 1997*, 1993, 1996, 2002, 2004, 2006 2002, 2007* 2006 Nigeria: 1992*, 1993* , Djibouti: 1992, 1993, 1997, 1999, Guinea: 1993*, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2003* , 2004, 2003, 2005 1998, 2002, 2003 2007* Gabon: 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, Lesotho: 1993, 1998*, South Africa: 1994*, 2001, 2005, 2006 2002, 2007 1999* , 2004 Gambia: 1992, 1996, 1997, 2001, Madagascar: 1993, 1997, Sudan: 1996, 2000 2002, 2006, 2007 1998, 2001*, 2002, 2007 Mauritania: 1992, 1996, Togo: 1993*, 1994 , 1998, Ghana: 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2006, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2005* , 2008 2007 2007 Zimbabwe: 1990, 1995, Guinea-Bissau: 1994, 1999, 2004, Niger: 1993, 1995, 1996, 1996, 2000*, 2002*, 2005, 2005, 2008 1996, 1999, 2004 2008* Rep. of Congo: 1992, Liberia: 1997, 2005 1993*, 2002, 2002, 2007 Senegal: 1993, 1998, 2000, Malawi: 1994, 1999, 2004 2001, 2007 Tanzania: 1995, 2000, Mali: 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 2005 Uganda: 1996, 2001, Mauritius: 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005 2001, 2006 Mozambique: 1994, 1999, 2004 Namibia: 1994, 1999, 2004 Rwanda: 2003, 2003 Sao Tomé & Princ. 1991, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2006 Seychelles: 1993, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2006 Sierra Leone: 1996, 2002, 2007 Swaziland: 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 Zambia: 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 Itablics: Sustantial (high) violence (categories 2 and 3) * Highest violence (category 3).
Table 13 indicates that within the majority of countries (n= 22), violent electoral conflict has never occurred within the time frame of 1990 to 2008. Nevertheless, in 14 countries of Sub- Saharan Africa, violent electoral conflict has occured occasionally, and in 10 states it occurred 117 5. Violent Electoral Conflict Explained—What Do We Know?
in more than half of the elections held. The latter cluster includes Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, and Zimbabwe. It shows that some of Africa’s largest and politically most important countries have experienced repeated substantial violent electoral conflict (categories 2 and 3) for over almost two decades. 60
The patterns in Table 13 suggest that “variation in the incidence of electoral violence occurs not only across countries but also, over time, within African states” (Straus & Taylor 2012 , p. 26). How can this situation be explained?
Straus and Taylor (2012) provide a useful but still cursory explanation:
Why do elections in some states tend to be highly (or rarely) violent? And why are elections in some states sometimes highly violent and sometimes not? The data suggest that the answer will lie in a combination of structural and historical factors: on the one hand, factors that recur across electoral periods and that consistently push some countries (but not others) toward mass violence; and, on the other hand, short- term dynamic factors that change every year or two (p. 26).
Since the variation across and within countries is considerable, more quantitative (comparative) country data on violent electoral conflict and qualitative case studies will need to be combined to find satisfactory answers for the questions raised about the outbreak of violent electoral conflict.
5.5.4 Conclusion While Chapters 4 and 5 have considered the region of Sub-Saharan Africa, the following chapter focuses attention on the Democratic Republic of Kenya, which is the basis of the analysis for the present case study.
60 Unfortunately, the author of the present study is unaware of any initiative to continue the data set for subsequent years. Some countries, such as South Africa, might be categorized differently after the peaceful conduct of democratic elections since 2008.
118 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
6 Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
6.1 Introduction
As Chapter 5 indicated, Sub-Saharan Africa is an extensively-quoted example of social conflict, which has taken the forms of electoral conflict, ethnic conflict, or more recently as international terrorism. It also is true that the Democratic Republic of Kenya has experienced violent electoral conflict with alarming regularity during all its electoral cycles since the early 1990s. It is a recurring phenomenon with latent and manifest phases that Kenyans have had to endure. Nevertheless, violent electoral conflict is only one facet of the social conflict in Kenya, which may involve different actors, causes, duration, or levels of destruction.
The following sections provide an in-depth analysis of the magnitude, actors, location, and motives of social conflict in Kenya. The chapter focuses on the analysis of the relationship between elections and the social conflict in Kenya by comparing the elections of 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2013 with each other and with non-election periods. The pressing question is whether a statistical correlation exists between the social conflict and the elections in Kenya. Based on the findings of section 5.5, the hypothesis is that elections increase the magnitude of social unrest and lead to higher death rates in Kenya.
To test this hypothesis, the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012) is used as the quantitative data resource. This data set provided by the universities of North Texas and Denver enables researchers to analyse social conflict and its specific characteristics both in Africa and Latin America. It is produced by Cullen Hendrix and Idean Salehyan for the program on Climate Change and African Political Stability (CCAPS) at the Robert Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas at Austin and includes protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal conflict, government violence against civilians, and other forms of social conflict not systematically tracked in other conflict data sets. SCAD currently includes information on social conflicts from 1990-2013 that covers all of Africa.
The chapter begins with a brief explanation of the selection of Kenya as a case study for violent electoral conflict, which is followed by a short overview of the political system of Kenya (Section 2) and its latest adaptations after its 2010 constitutional reform. Section 3 then assesses the democratic performance of Kenya and the conduct of the 2013 elections against this legal constitutional framework. This section, based on the latest data from the Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) project (Norris et al. 2015), identifies the deficits in Kenya’s electoral democracy in direct comparison to 24 other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
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Perception of Electoral Integrity data set by the Electoral Integrity Project evaluates the quality of elections held around the world. Based on a survey that collects the views of election experts, this research provides independent and reliable evidence to determine whether countries meet the international standards of electoral integrity. The third cumulative release covers 127 national parliamentary and presidential contests held worldwide in 107 countries from July 1st 2012 to December 31 st 2014. The survey includes assessments from 1,429 election experts, with a mean response rate of 29%. The study collects 49 indicators to compare elections. These indicators are clustered to evaluate 11 stages in the electoral cycle as well as to generate an overall summary Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) 100-point index and comparative ranking (for more information, see Norris et al. 2015).
Section 5, includes the quantitative analysis of social conflict in Kenya between 1990 and 2013 and takes a closer look at the phenomenon of violent electoral conflict in Kenya. As described above, the hypothesis will be tested as to whether elections have increased the magnitude of social unrest in Kenya and led to higher death rates. All five general elections held since the early 1990s in Kenya are described in more detail to support the quantitative findings in Section 6. In a last step, all the findings are summarized in a conclusion, which includes a critical reflection on the quantitative databases used.
6.2 Kenya – A Suitable Case Study for Analyzing Violent Electoral Conflict
Kenya is a suitable case study to explore the research interests of the present study, since it has experienced severe violent electoral conflict several times in a row. From the 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections until the present time, Kenya has experienced violent electoral conflicts during its election processes. The 1992 elections were classified as significantly violent in Staffan Lindberg’s (2009) data set and the SCAD data (cf. Hendrix & Salehyan 2015) as well. Although the extent of violence was reduced during the 1997 elections and especially during those held in 2002 when violence still occurred, but not at a significant level, it peaked in the 2007 éclat.61 Thus, Kenyan citizens have experienced repeated and significant violent electoral conflict in their country.
The findings from the Kenyan case study can serve as the basis “for the development of more general, nomothetic theories” (Babbie 2007, p. 298). Therefore, these findings needed to be
61 For detailed information about the 2007 violent electoral conflict and its consequences, see, for example, CIPEV (2008), BBC News (2008, 2010), Gettleman (2007), Kimani (2008), or OHCHR (2008). 120 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and undergo further quantitative large- scale testing.
6.3 A short Introduction to the Political System of Kenya
With the coming into force of Kenya’s latest constitution on August 4, 2010, a fundamental ideological step in the democratization process of Kenya was taken, which also implied important practical changes in its polity. As a consequence of the 2007/2008 post-election excesses, Kenya underwent a largely overdue constitutional revision process, which considered some of the most urgent conflict-issues the country has been confronting since independence. With the new constitution came major changes in the political system of Kenya. It redefined the political power structures, laid out a clear-cut Kenyan citizenship separated from ethnic affiliation, and inserted a new election management body—the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). The power of the President was limited, a new devolved level of government was implemented, the independence of the judiciary was increased, the Legislative branch evolved into a bicameral system, a bill of rights was introduced, civil rights and duties were defined, and the issues of nationality and land were addressed. These aspects will be addressed in detail in this section.
The new constitution, officially published on May 6, 2010, was approved by 67% of the Kenyan people with a peaceful referendum on August 4 th the same year (IEBC 2015). With the promulgation of the new constitution, the second republic of Kenya came into force.
In any democracy, major changes like these never come without opposition. For example, the Rift Valley Province strongly opposed the acceptance of the new constitution, fearing the regulations for land distribution might disadvantage them. The new constitution incorporates a whole chapter (Chapter 5) on the issue of land and environment, which includes the appointment of a National Land Commission (Art. 67), regulations on the minimum and maximum of land holdings for private land owners (Art. 68 No. c, i.), and the possibility of reviewing grants or dispositions of public land (Art. 68 No. c, v). William Ruto (2010), the current Deputy President of Kenya, criticized as follows:
The clause on maximum and minimum land an individual should own was not good for a capitalist country like Kenya. Setting land limits for Kenyans will disunite Kenyans when the country was yearning for a constitution that will unite them (as cited in Odunga 2010, p. 1).
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Ruto’s no-campaign to the new constitution of Kenya was joined mainly by all the Christian churches in the country, which resented the relaxed right to abortion regulation in Art. 26 No. 4. According to the BBC, the abortion clause “has also proved divisive, with religious leaders and politicians opposed to the draft arguing it provides a loophole for abortion in the future” (BBC News Africa 2010, p. 1).
Kenya was characterized by a semi-presidential democratic republic during the second term presidency of Mwai Kibaki (Party of National Unity [PNU]), lasting from 2007 to 2013, when Raila Odinga (Orange Democratic Movement [ODM]) was the Prime Minister of the republic. The positions of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister were created in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 violent electoral conflict in Kenya, which led to a power sharing agreement and the installation of a grand coalition, mediated by the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.
With the implementation of the new constitution and the holding of general elections in March 2013, the character of the Kenyan state changed. Most importantly, the political system was transformed, turning it into a purely presidential democracy. Nevertheless, the power of the President was limited in favour of increasing the power of the other constitutional branches. Furthermore, a new level of government that replaced the provincial administration was written into the constitution and implemented on the ground, which aimed at broadening the federalist character of the state at the county level.
At the national level, the traditional structure of the separation of powers into the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches prevailed. The executive branch is dominated by the Kenyan President, who simultaneously incorporates the function as head of state and head of government (Art. 131 No. 1a).62 His constitutional authority consists of the exercise of the executive authority of the Republic, together with the Deputy President and State Secretaries; the exercise of the role of Commander-in-Chief of the Kenyan Defence Forces; the chairperson of the National Security Council; and as a symbol of national unity (see Art. 131). The Executive’s authority is uncompromisingly bound to the provisions of the Constitution and the will and benefit of the Kenyan people.
In his role as head of government, the President directs and co-ordinates the function of ministries and government departments. He has the right to nominate and dismiss, with the approval of the National Assembly, all Cabinet Secretaries and other members of the Cabinet,
62 The Constitution deals with the President in Chapter 9, Part 2 in Art. 131 to Art. 147. 122 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
the Attorney General, and high commissioners, ambassadors, and other representatives of the Kenyan state (Art. 132 No. 2). The President further represents the Kenyan state nationally and internationally (Art. 131 in conjunction with Art. 132 No. 4b). In a constitutionally determined and codified interplay with the other branches, the President has the right to pass legislation (chapter 8 part 4), exercise the power of mercy (Art. 133), declare a state of emergency (Art. 132 No 4d), and declare war (Art. 132 No 4e).
Although discussed controversially in the developing process of the new Constitution, the new presidential electoral process has a strong majoritarian character (cf. Peters 2012). The Presidential candidate is voted into office by the registered voters of the 49 counties, if he or she garners an absolute majority (50% plus X) of all the votes among all the contestants nationwide, and also wins at least 25% of the votes in at least 24 counties. 63 This two-step electoral procedure is supposed to heal the deficits of a purely majority vote system by animating candidates to broaden their campaigning and their political statements towards a larger proportion of the population. However, if no candidate fulfils both requirements, voters are asked to go to the polls again for a runoff between the two most successful candidates. In this second round, the 25% in 24 counties requirement is abandonded (Art. 138 No. 5). For an ethnically divided society like Kenya, a combined electoral system is highly important, since a purely majoritarian system might cause civil unrest (cf. Reilly & Reynolds 1999; Reilly 2002; Lijphart 2004; Dryzak 2005). Furthermore, according to Peters (2012), the majority vote system animates presidential candidates to “play the ethnical card” (p. 2) and does not provide incentives “to address any other ethnical group than their own one, especially in a country like Kenya with many ethnically homogenous regions” (p. 2).
However, in practice, the electoral requirements of round two do not fit Kenya’s needs adequately. Since the re-implementation of competitive elections in 1992, Kenya has had repeated close battles brtween two strong presidential candidates. Since the county requirements are no longer in play, the electoral requirements of round two clearly fail to animate candidates to abandon their ethnic grounds and thus do not safeguard the representation of a broader range of voters. Even with the new Constitution in place, the 2013 election did not represent a major shift in the campaigning of the candidates. Instead of
63 The very wording of Article 138 No. 4 of the new constitution holds: “A candidate shall be declared elected as President if the candidate receives (a) more than half of all the votes cast in the election; and (b) at least twenty- five per cent of the votes cast in each of more than half of the counties” (National Council for Law Reporting 2010). 123 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
working out political programmes with specific content statements, presidential candidates focused on mobilising their supporters along ethnic lines.
After a president is elected into office, he or she appoints between 14 to 22 cabinet secretaries, representing the ethnic and regional diversity of the country (Art. 152 No. 1d). Together with the Deputy President and the Attorney-General, the Cabinet Secretaries and the President form the Cabinet of Kenya (Art. 152 No. 1).
The executive branch was not alone in undergoing serious reform. With the implementation of the new Constitution, the Parliament—called the Bunge—was transformed into a bicameral institution, consisting of the National Assembly and the new Senate (Art. 93). The latter 68- headed 64 new committee has been installed as part of a major power-shifting process from the national level to the counties and further sub-divisions. The role of the Senate is fourfold, which is laid out in Art. 96 of the Constitution. The Senate represents the counties on the national government level and functions as their stakeholder and participates in the law making process for bills concerning counties. It determines the allocation of national revenue among counties and exercises oversight for the national revenue allocated to the county governments. Further, it is involved in the removal process, by impeachment, of the President and Deputy President.
The National Assembly has increased not only in number with the 2013 elections, raising it up to a total of 350 members, but also has increased in its entire role in the political system of Kenya. The new Constitution safeguards a clear separation of power between the executive and the legislative branch, since the President and his cabinet are no longer Members of Parliament, and further the President does not possess the power to appoint 12 members to the National Assembly to represent special interests (Art. 33 No.1 of the 1969 Constitution). The composition of the National Assembly has a modern face as it supports the representation of minorities as well as gender equality. Besides the 290 members elected in the single-seat constituencies, the National Assembly is joined by 47 women elected from the counties and 12 members nominated by the political parties to represent special interest groups, such as young people or persons with disabilities (see Art.97). One ex officio member provides for a smooth and effective working process of the National Assembly (Art. 97 No. 1d in
64 Each of the 47 counties elects one senator (Art. 98 No. 1a); 16 women are nominated by the political parties according to their proportion of members of the Senate (Art. 98 No 1b). Furthermore, two representatives of youth (a male and a female) as well as two representatives of persons with disabilities (again a male and a female) are to be elected into the Senate (Art. 98 No. 1c and d). The Speaker of the Senate counts as an ex officio member of the Senate (Art. 98 No. 1e), making it a 68 member institution in total. 124 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
conjunction with Art. 106 No. 1b). Members of the National Assembly and the Senate are elected for a term of 5 years.
According to the new Constitution, the National Assembly has five specific functions: enacting legislation (Art. 95 No. 3), representing the Kenyan people (Art. 94 No.2 in conjunction with Art. 95 No 1), protecting the constitution (Art. 94 No. 4), administering the state budget (Art. 95 No 4), and controlling conduct in the office of the President, the Deputy President, and other state officers and state organs (Art. 95 No. 5a and b). In contrast, the President has lost the right to prorogue and dissolve Parliament at any time (Art 59 No 1 and 2 of the 1969 Constitution). Furthermore, the processes of impeachment for the President and his Deputy are also included in the Constitution. Taken together, all these measures constitute a major achievement in the revaluation of the Kenyan legislative branch. They have contributed to equaling the balance of power between the two branches and are a sound basis for an effective system of checks and balances.
The democratic republic of Kenya is a multi-party state (Art. 4 No. 2) that considers political parties to be more than simple utilities during elections. Parties are supposed to promote and uphold national unity and take their part in safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kenya. Stimulated by the experiences of previous violent elections, the Constitution sets out a code of conduct for political parties and their members. They are constitutionally prohibited from any engagement or encouragement of violence or intimidation, the building of paramilitary forces or the use of bribery and corruption (Art 90 No. 2). Further, they must feature an internal democratic structure and possess a national character. In fulfilling all these requirements, the constitution guarantees the equal treatment of all parties concerning media access and their financial allocations to run elections. The central status of political parties within the constitution emphasizes the importance of their proper democratic functioning and the role they play between the Kenyan people on the one hand and the political system on the other.
To make sure that all political parties adhere to the rules of the game during elections is one of the duties of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). The IEBC is the institution that takes care of the democratic electoral process and the delimitation of electoral units in Kenya. As such, its responsibilities are extensive. The IEBC is in charge of the entire organisation, conduct, and supervision of referenda and elections for Constitutional offices and bodies (Art. 88 No. 4), including voter education and registration, party funding, election monitoring, and the development of a code of conduct for electoral candidates and 125 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
political parties, to name just a few. Furthermore, it regularly reviews the delimitation of electoral units. The IEBC has the responsibility to review in detail, the names and boundaries of the 290 counties at least every 12 years 65 ; and must periodically assess the number, names, and boundaries of wards (Art. 89 No. 3). 66 Unlike its predecessor, the Electoral Commission, the IEBC is enabled and thereby required to fulfil its constitutional duties independently and free from the external exercise of influence of any political player. In contrast, the Electoral Commission suffered the loss of this status, since the Kenyan President appointed all its members and decided whether the discussion process for the deposition of one of its members ought to be installed (Art. 41 No. 7 of the 1969 Constitution). 67
The control of whether all branches adhere to the regulations of the Constitution is one duty of the Judiciary. With the implementation of the new Constitution in 2010, the Judiciary underwent a remarkable re-organization and clarification process. First and foremost, a Supreme Court has been written into the Constitution (Art. 162). Further, the different Constitutional courts were allotted clear duties and areas of responsibility, and a clear separation from other branches, especially the Executive. Under the Constitution of 1969, the President of Kenya alone appointed the Chief Justice as well as the puisne judges 68 with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. Clearly, this constellation left the door wide open for undemocratic political practices. Today, the Chief Justice and his/her deputy are chosen for office through an interplay of all three branches. The nomination by the President is based on propositions made by the Judicial Service Commission, which are further subject to the approval of the National Assembly (Art. 166a). As determined in Article 159, judicial authority now is derived from the Kenyan people only; its principles have been constitutionally codified and distinct qualifications have been set down for all Superior Court judges and Kadhi Court judges. 69
As indicated previously, subordinate courts have lacked a clear description of their duties and responsibilities within the old Constitution, and the interplay between the different court
65 In addition, this review must commence not earlier than 8 years (Art. 89 No. 2). 66 The IEBC’s delimitation of electoral units and its influence on electoral outcomes has been the subject of ongoing debates and scientific research. For more information, see, for example, Fox (1996), Barkan (2006), IFES (2009), Ziegfeld (2013). 67 For more information about the failure of the Electoral Commission in the 2007 election, see section 6.5.3.4 of the current chapter. 68 The term referred to all judges of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice (see Art. 60 No. 2 of the 1969 Constitution). 69 Art 166 No.2 sets out the general qualifications necessary for all superior court judges. Further conditions for each superior court are described in Art. 166 No. 3–5. The characteristics of persons unqualified to become a Kadhi Court Judge are laid out in Art. 170 No. 2. 126 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
hierarchies were rather fuzzy. Today, the Kenyan judicial system is divided into two main categories: the Superior Courts and the Subordinate Courts. The Superior Courts (Art. 162) consist of the Supreme Court as the highest judicial organ of Kenya, followed by the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The Supreme Court determines petitions concerning the presidential election process (Art. 163 No. 3a in conjunction with Art. 140) and functions as the last instance for appeals from the Court of Appeal (Art. 163 No. 3b, i). It is composed of the Chief Justice, whose role is to serve as President of the Court, the deputy Chief Justice, and five other judges. By constitutional law, the Court of Appeal includes no less than 12 judges who elect a President of the Court of Appeal from among their members. The Court of Appeal hears and determines appeals from the High Court, which has unlimited jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters and hears appeals concerning the interpretation of and consistency/inconsistency of constitutional laws. The Court of Appeal also deals with the appeals of tribunals appointed to consider the removal of a person—other than the President—from office.
The Subordinate Courts (Art. 169) consist of the Magistrates Courts, the Khadi Courts, and Courts Martials. Jurisdiction, functions, and power are conferred to these courts by ordinary legislation. Magistrates Courts deal with criminal and civil matters within their jurisdiction and area of responsibility. Khadi Courts determine questions of personal status, marriage, divorce, and inheritance by applying Muslim law in such cases, since “all parties profess the Muslim religion and submit to the jurisdiction of the Kadhi’s courts” (Art. 170 No. 5). No other religious courts are equipped with constitutional status.
The Constitution also acknowledges alternative dispute regulation mechanisms, such as negotiation mediation or arbitration, i.e., to settle inter-governmental disputes (Art. 189 No. 4), as long as these mechanisms respect the Bill of Rights and do not contravene justice or morality (Art. 159 No. 3b).
With the new Constitution, the existing horizontal separation of powers into Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary was supplemented by a new horizontal separation of powers—the county level (Art. 1 No. 4). The 47 new counties, replacing the former provincial administrations, consist of a county assembly and a county executive (Art. 176), each headed by a governor. In an on-going power-shifting process that is due to be completed by 2015, the counties will be equipped with “extensive and essential administrative tasks and responsibilities” (Peters 2012, p. 2). The new Constitution refers to the county level as a devolved government (Chapter 11, Art. 174 f) that has the responsibility to empower the 127 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
people, foster their political participation (Art. 174 c), and further improve communities’ development and service delivery through the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 174 c and f). The future will tell how the counties interpret their role within the political system of Kenya. If the central government allows for a substantial shift of power, they may function as independent players in county government isues and considerably improve the implementation of politics at the grass-roots level of governance.
6.4 Kenya’s Democracy After the Implementation of the New Constitution
With the coming into force of Kenya’s latest constitution on August 4, 2010, a fundamental ideological step in the democratization process of Kenya was taken, which also implied important practical changes in its polity. As a consequence of the 2007/2008 post-election excesses, Kenya underwent a largely overdue constitutional revision process, which considered some of the most urgent conflict-issues the country has been confronting ever since. With the new constitution came major changes in the political system of Kenya. It redefined the political power structures, laid out a clear-cut Kenyan citizenship separated from ethnic affiliation, and inserted a new election management body—the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). The power of the President was limited, a new devolved level of government was implemented, the independence of the judiciary was increased, the Legislative branch evolved into a bicameral system, a bill of rights was introduced, civil rights and duties were defined, and the issues of nationality and land were addressed. These aspects will be addressed in detail in this section.
The new constitution, officially published on May 6, 2010, was approved by 67% of the Kenyan people with a peaceful referendum on August 4 th the same year (IEBC 2015). With the promulgation of the new constitution, the second republic of Kenya came into force.
In any democracy, major changes like these never come without opposition. For example, the Rift Valley Province strongly opposed the acceptance of the new constitution, fearing the regulations for land distribution might disadvantage them. The new constitution incorporates a whole chapter (Chapter 5) on the issue of land and environment, which includes the appointment of a National Land Commission (Art. 67), regulations on the minimum and maximum land holdings for private land owners (Art. 68 No. c, i.), and the possibility of reviewing grants or dispositions of public land (Art. 68 No. c, v).
128 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
William Ruto (2010), the now Deputy President of Kenya, criticized:
The clause on maximum and minimum land an individual should own was not good for a capitalist country like Kenya. Setting land limits for Kenyans will disunite Kenyans when the country was yearning for a constitution that will unite them (as cited in Odunga 2010, p. 1).
Ruto’s no-campaign to the new constitution of Kenya was joined mainly by all the Christian churches in the country, which resented the relaxed right to abortion regulation in Art. 26 No. 4. According to the BBC, the abortion clause “has also proved divisive, with religious leaders and politicians opposed to the draft arguing it provides a loophole for abortion in the future” (BBC News Africa 2010, p. 1).
Kenya was characterized a semi-presidential democratic republic during the second term presidency of Mwai Kibaki (Party of National Unity [PNU]), lasting from 2007 to 2013, when Raila Odinga (Orange Democratic Movement [ODM]) was the Prime Minister of the republic. The positions of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister were created in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 violent electoral conflict in Kenya, which led to a power sharing agreement and the installation of a grand coalition, mediated by the former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan.
With the implementation of the new constitution and the holding of general elections in March 2013, the character of the Kenyan state changed. Most importantly, the political system was transformed, turning it into a purely presidential democracy. Nevertheless, the power of the President was limited in favour of increasing the power of the other constitutional branches. Furthermore, a new level of government that replaced the provincial administration was written into the constitution and implemented on the ground, which aimed at broadening the federalist character of the state at the county level.
At the national level, the traditional structure of the separation of powers into the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches prevailed. The executive branch is dominated by the Kenyan President, who simultaneously incorporates the function as head of state and head of government (Art. 131 No. 1a).70 His constitutional authority consists of the exercise of the executive authority of the Republic, together with the Deputy President and State Secretaries; the exercise of the role of Commander-in-Chief of the Kenyan Defence Forces; the chairperson of the National Security Council; and as a symbol of national unity (see Art. 131).
70 The Constitution deals with the President in Chapter 9, Part 2 in Art. 131 to Art. 147. 129 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
The Executive’s authority is uncompromisingly bound to the provisions of the Constitution and the will and benefit of the Kenyan people.
In his role as head of government, the President directs and co-ordinates the function of ministries and government departments. He has the right to nominate and dismiss, with the approval of the National Assembly, all Cabinet Secretaries and other members of the Cabinet, the Attorney General, and high commissioners, ambassadors, and other representatives of the Kenyan state (Art. 132 No. 2). The President further represents the Kenyan state nationally and internationally (Art. 131 in conjunction with Art. 132 No. 4b). In a constitutionally determined and codified interplay with the other branches, the President has the right to pass legislation (chapter 8 part 4), exercise the power of mercy (Art. 133), declare a state of emergency (Art. 132 No 4d), and declare war (Art. 132 No 4e).
Although discussed controversially in the developing process of the new Constitution, the new presidential electoral process has a strong majoritarian character (cf. Peters 2012). The Presidential candidate is voted into office by the registered voters of the 49 counties, if he or she garners an absolute majority (50% plus X) of all the votes among all the contestants nationwide, and also wins at least 25% of the votes in at least 24 counties. 71 This two-step electoral procedure is supposed to heal the deficits of a purely majority vote system by animating candidates to broaden their campaigning and their political statements towards a larger proportion of the population. However, if no candidate fulfils both requirements, voters are asked to go to the polls again for a runoff between the two most successful candidates. In this second round, the 25% in 24 counties requirement is abandonded (Art. 138 No. 5). For an ethnically divided society like Kenya, a combined electoral system is highly important, since a purely majoritarian system might cause civil unrest (cf. Reilly & Reynolds 1999; Reilly 2002; Lijphart 2004; Dryzak 2005). Furthermore, according to Peters (2012), the majority vote system animates presidential candidates to “play the ethnical card” (p. 2) and does not provide incentives “to address any other ethnical group than their own one, especially in a country like Kenya with many ethnically homogenous regions” (p. 2).
However, in practice, the electoral requirements of round two do not fit Kenya’s needs adequately. Since the re-implementation of competitive elections in 1992, Kenya has had repeated close battles between two strong presidential candidates. Since the county
71 The very wording of Article 138 No. 4 of the new constitution holds: “A candidate shall be declared elected as President if the candidate receives (a) more than half of all the votes cast in the election; and (b) at least twenty- five per cent of the votes cast in each of more than half of the counties” (National Council for Law Reporting 2010). 130 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
requirements are no longer in play, the electoral requirements of round two clearly fail to animate candidates to abandon their ethnic grounds and thus do not safeguard the representation of a broader range of voters. Even with the new Constitution in place, the 2013 election did not represent a major shift in the campaigning of the candidates. Instead of working out political programmes with specific content statements, presidential candidates focused on mobilising their supporters along ethnic lines.
After a president is elected into office, he or she appoints between 14 to 22 cabinet secretaries, representing the ethnic and regional diversity of the country (Art. 152 No. 1d). Together with the Deputy President and the Attorney-General, the Cabinet Secretaries and the President form the Cabinet of Kenya (Art. 152 No. 1).
The executive branch was not alone in undergoing serious reform. With the implementation of the new Constitution, the Parliament—called the Bunge—was transformed into a bicameral institution, consisting of the National Assembly and the new Senate (Art. 93). The latter 68- headed 72 new committee has been installed as part of a major power-shifting process from the national level to the counties and further sub-divisions. The role of the Senate is fourfold, which is laid out in Art. 96 of the Constitution. The Senate represents the counties on the national government level and functions as their stakeholder and participates in the law making process for bills concerning counties. It determines the allocation of national revenue among counties and exercises oversight for the national revenue allocated to the county governments. Further, it is involved in the removal process, by impeachment, of the President and Deputy President.
The National Assembly has increased not only in number with the 2013 elections, raising it up to a total of 350 members, but also has increased in its entire role in the political system of Kenya. The new Constitution safeguards a clear separation of power between the executive and the legislative branch, since the President and his cabinet are no longer Members of Parliament, and further the President does not possess the power to appoint 12 members to the National Assembly to represent special interests (Art. 33 No.1 of the 1969 Constitution). The composition of the National Assembly has a modern face as it supports the representation of minorities as well as gender equality. Besides the 290 members elected in the single-seat
72 Each of the 47 counties elects one senator (Art. 98 No. 1a); 16 women are nominated by the political parties according to their proportion of members of the Senate (Art. 98 No 1b). Furthermore, two representatives of youth (a male and a female) as well as two representatives of persons with disabilities (again a male and a female) are to be elected into the Senate (Art. 98 No. 1c and d). The Speaker of the Senate counts as an ex officio member of the Senate (Art. 98 No. 1e), making it a 68 member institution in total. 131 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
constituencies, the National Assembly is joined by 47 women elected from the counties and 12 members nominated by the political parties to represent special interest groups, such as young people or persons with disabilities (see Art.97). One ex officio member provides for a smooth and effective working process of the National Assembly (Art. 97 No. 1d in conjunction with Art. 106 No. 1b). Members of the National Assembly and the Senate are elected for a term of 5 years.
According to the new Constitution, the National Assembly has five specific functions: enacting legislation (Art. 95 No. 3), representing the Kenyan people (Art. 94 No.2 in conjunction with Art. 95 No 1), protecting the constitution (Art. 94 No. 4), administering the state budget (Art. 95 No 4), and controlling conduct in the office of the President, the Deputy President, and other state officers and state organs (Art. 95 No. 5a and b). In contrast, the President has lost the right to prorogue and dissolve Parliament at any time (Art 59 No 1 and 2 of the 1969 Constitution). Furthermore, the processes of impeachment for the President and his Deputy are also included in the Constitution. Taken together, all these measures constitute a major achievement in the revaluation of the Kenyan legislative branch. They have contributed to equaling the balance of power between the two branches and are a sound basis for an effective system of checks and balances.
The democratic republic of Kenya is a multi-party state (Art. 4 No. 2) that considers political parties to be more than simple utilities during elections. Parties are supposed to promote and uphold national unity and take their part in safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kenya. Stimulated by the experiences of previous violent elections, the Constitution sets out a code of conduct for political parties and their members. They are constitutionally prohibited from any engagement or encouragement of violence or intimidation, the building of paramilitary forces or the use of bribery and corruption (Art 90 No. 2). Further, they must feature an internal democratic structure and possess a national character. In fulfilling all these requirements, the constitution guarantees the equal treatment of all parties concerning media access and their financial allocations to run elections. The central status of political parties within the constitution emphasizes the importance of their proper democratic functioning and the role they play between the Kenyan people on the one hand and the political system on the other.
To make sure that all political parties adhere to the rules of the game during elections is one of the duties of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). The IEBC is the institution that takes care of the democratic electoral process and the delimitation of 132 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
electoral units in Kenya. As such, its responsibilities are extensive. The IEBC is in charge of the entire organisation, conduct, and supervision of referenda and elections for Constitutional offices and bodies (Art. 88 No. 4), including voter education and registration, party funding, election monitoring, and the development of a code of conduct for electoral candidates and political parties, to name just a few. Furthermore, it regularly reviews the delimitation of electoral units. The IEBC has the responsibility to review in detail, the names and boundaries of the 290 counties at least every 12 years 73 ; and must periodically assess the number, names, and boundaries of wards (Art. 89 No. 3). 74 Other than its predecessor, the Electoral Commission, the IEBC is enabled and thereby required to fulfil its constitutional duties independently and free from the external exercise of influence of any political player. In contrast, the Electoral Commission suffered the loss of this status, since the Kenyan President appointed all its members and decided whether the discussion process for the deposition of one of its members ought to be installed (Art. 41 No. 7 of the 1969 Constitution). 75
The control of whether all branches adhere to the regulations of the Constitution is one duty of the Judiciary. With the implementation of the new Constitution in 2010, the Judiciary underwent a remarkable re-organization and clarification process. First and foremost, a Supreme Court has been written into the Constitution (Art. 162). Further, the different Constitutional courts were allotted clear duties and areas of responsibility, and a clear separation from other branches, especially the Executive. Under the Constitution of 1969, the President of Kenya alone appointed the Chief Justice as well as the puisne judges 76 with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission. Clearly, this constellation left the door wide open for undemocratic political practices. Today, the Chief Justice and his/her deputy are chosen for office through an interplay of all three branches. The nomination by the President is based on propositions made by the Judicial Service Commission, which are further subject to the approval of the National Assembly (Art. 166a). As determined in Article 159, judicial authority now is derived from the Kenyan people only; its principles have been
73 In addition, this review must commence not earlier than 8 years (Art. 89 No. 2). 74 The IEBC’s delimitation of electoral units and its influence on electoral outcomes has been the subject of ongoing debates and scientific research. For more information, see, for example, Fox (1996), Barkan (2006), IFES (2009), Ziegfeld (2013). 75 For more information about the failure of the Electoral Commission in the 2007 election, see section 6.5.3.4 of the current chapter. 76 The term referred to all judges of the Supreme Court other than the Chief Justice (see Art. 60 No. 2 of the 1969 Constitution). 133 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
constitutionally codified and distinct qualifications have been set down for all Superior Court judges and Kadhi Court judges. 77
As indicated previously, subordinate courts have lacked a clear description of their duties and responsibilities within the old Constitution, and the interplay between the different court hierarchies were rather fuzzy. Today, the Kenyan judicial system is divided into two main categories: the Superior Courts and the Subordinate Courts. The Superior Courts (Art. 162) consist of the Supreme Court as the highest judicial organ of Kenya, followed by the Court of Appeal and the High Court. The Supreme Court determines petitions concerning the presidential election process (Art. 163 No. 3a in conjunction with Art. 140) and functions as the last instance for appeals from the Court of Appeal (Art. 163 No. 3b, i). It is composed of the Chief Justice, whose role is to serve as President of the Court, the deputy Chief Justice, and five other judges. By constitutional law, the Court of Appeal includes no less than 12 judges who elect a President of the Court of Appeal from among their members. The Court of Appeal hears and determines appeals from the High Court, which has unlimited jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters and hears appeals concerning the interpretation of and consistency/inconsistency of constitutional laws. The Court of Appeal also deals with the appeals of tribunals appointed to consider the removal of a person—other than the President—from office.
The Subordinate Courts (Art. 169) consist of the Magistrates Courts, the Khadi Courts, and Courts Martials. Jurisdiction, functions, and power are conferred to these courts by ordinary legislation. Magistrates Courts deal with criminal and civil matters within their jurisdiction and area of responsibility. Khadi Courts determine questions of personal status, marriage, divorce, and inheritance by applying Muslim law in such cases, since “all parties profess the Muslim religion and submit to the jurisdiction of the Kadhi’s courts” (Art. 170 No. 5). No other religious courts are equipped with constitutional status.
The Constitution also acknowledges alternative dispute regulation mechanisms, such as negotiation mediation or arbitration, i.e., to settle inter-governmental disputes (Art. 189 No. 4), as long as these mechanisms respect the Bill of Rights and do not contravene justice or morality (Art. 159 No. 3b).
77 Art 166 No.2 sets out the general qualifications necessary for all superior court judges. Further conditions for each superior court are described in Art. 166 No. 3–5. The characteristics of persons unqualified to become a Kadhi Court Judge are laid out in Art. 170 No. 2. 134 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
With the new Constitution, the existing horizontal separation of powers into Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary was supplemented by a new horizontal separation of powers—the county level (Art. 1 No. 4). The 47 new counties, replacing the former provincial administrations, consist of a county assembly and a county executive (Art. 176), each headed by a governor. In an on-going power-shifting process that is due to be completed by 2015, the counties will be equipped with “extensive and essential administrative tasks and responsibilities” (Peters 2012, p. 2). The new Constitution refers to the county level as a devolved government (Chapter 11, Art. 174 f) that has the responsibility to empower the people, foster their political participation (Art. 174 c), and further improve communities’ development and service delivery through the principle of subsidiarity (Art. 174 c and f). The future will tell how the counties interpret their role within the political system of Kenya. If the central government allows for a substantial shift of power, they may function as independent players in county government issues and considerably improve the implementation of politics at the grass-roots level of governance.
6.5 Conclusion and Implications
The analysis of the 2013 general elections in Kenya revealed both light and shadow. These elections—the first to be held after the devastating clashes of 2007/2008—were charged with the fear of further violence and high expectations for their democratizing impulse.
It is beyond doubt that many improvements have been achieved; first and foremost with regard to the peacefulness of these elections, for which all Kenyans deserve credit. Furthermore, positive developments were recorded regarding the successful implementation and application of new electoral laws, the reduced amount of hate speech in the media, the improved access of opposition candidates and parties in the electoral process, and the contestation of electoral results through the courts.
These were meaningful and promising steps that hopefully will be pursued in the future. Nevertheless, Kenya needs to intensify its efforts to improve electoral integrity, since the overall picture is still deflating. Latent and continuing sources of violent electoral conflict in Kenya are reflected in inefficient electoral procedures, fraud and manipulation during party and candidate nomination processes, the ongoing discrimination against women and other minority groups, and a lack of a badly needed finance regulation law.
135 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
The following section completes the picture of social conflict in Kenya in general and violent electoral conflict in particular by providing a detailed description of its magnitude, lethality, and the issues and actors involved.
6.6 Conflict in Kenya
6.6.1 General Remarks Conflict in Kenya is not new; rather, it has and continues to be a recurring phenomenon with latent and manifest phases, during which Kenyans have to suffer through deadly outbreaks of violence. Power structures, ethnicity, struggle over land, poverty, social exclusion, and patronage are only some of the frequently named driving forces of social conflict in Kenya. Violent electoral conflict is a sub-type of the social and political conflict that repeatedly and regularly occurs in Kenya. Social and violent electoral conflict are strongly interconnected not only in Kenya, and therefore are best analysed concertedly.
The following sections provide some insight into the social and violent electoral conflict in Kenya by shedding light on their respective magnitude, characteristics, sources, and parties. The analysis of the social conflict data taken from the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD) (Salehyan et al. 2012) enabled the testing of the correlation between social and violent electoral conflict in Kenya. A special focus on violent electoral conflict is provided in Section 6.6.3.
The SCAD data allows for the operationalization of violent electoral conflict in two different ways: first, by indicating that elections can be a motive for social conflict (motive approach), and second, by providing details about conflicts that occurred 6 months prior to an election and 3 months afterwards (time approach). Both the motive and time approach are analysed in the following sections.
The SCAD includes data on protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal conflict, government violence against civilians, and other forms of social conflict not systematically tracked in other conflict data sets. It is meant to augment the ability of policymakers and researchers to analyse conflict patterns and possible intervention strategies in Africa and Central America and the Caribbean, if the countries have a population larger than 1 million. Currently, SCAD includes information on over 10,300 social conflict events from 1990 to 2013, reported by the Associated Press (AP) and Agence France Presse (AFP).
136 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
Each event record included in the database contains information on the location, timing, and magnitude of the social conflict events, as well as the actors, targets, issues of contention, and government response. Each record in SCAD refers to a unique social conflict event. To define an event , the researchers determined the principal actor(s) involved, the target(s), as well as the issues at stake. A conflict is coded as a single event if the actors, targets, and issues are the same, and if a distinct, continuous series of actions occur over time. The project sources information from keyword searches in Lexis-Nexis using the AP and AFP news wires.78
While the SCAD database provides single conflict events as the unit of analysis, in the present study, the data was regrouped into election time and non-election time conflict events so to allow for testing the hypothesis of interest. Furthermore, conflict events were grouped by decades as well to make possible a comparison of the 1990s and 2000s. The years 2010 –2013 were considered with caution, since the decade is not yet complete. The comparison of decades is useful for detecting long-term effects, since they include two elections each, and for elaborating the particularities of each decade.
While other data sources contain rich information about armed conflict in Africa, the goal of the SCAD project is to provide researchers, journalists, NGOs, and the policy community with more detail about other forms of social conflict.
It is important to note that the following considerations make no claim to completeness; rather provide an overview of the quantitative dimension of the social and violent electoral conflict in Kenya in which the qualitative content analysis (Chapters 7 and 8) is embedded.
6.6.2 Social Conflict The following sections analyze the magnitude, lethality, duration, local ‘hotspots’, issues of social conflict, and involved parties in the violence between 1990 and 2013 based on the SCAD data 79 . As was discussed in Chapter 5, social conflict is defined as a situation in which:
… parties believe that their aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously, or perceive a divergence in their values, needs or interests (latent conflict) and purposefully employ their power in an effort to eliminate, defeat, neutralise, or change each other to protect or further their interests in the interaction (manifest conflict) (Anstey 2008, p. 6).
78 “The team sorted through thousands of articles and selected those that were related to social conflict events. When there was a discrepancy in reporting, the team took care to use the most widely reported figures and the most recent news coverage about an issue” (Hendrix & Salehyan 2015). 79 The stata do file worked out for the SCAD anaylsis can be found in Addendum 15. 137 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
As a special point of interest, the relationship between social conflict and elections in Kenya was tested statistically.80 The hypothesis is that Kenyan elections have increased the magnitude of social unrest and have lead to higher death rates in Kenya (see Section 6.6.3).
6.6.2.1 Magnitude Between 1990 and 2013, Kenya had 518 distinct events of social conflict, including protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal conflict, government violence against civilians, and other forms of social conflict. 81 As Figure 9 illustrates, 1990 had the lowest number of incidences (3 conflict IDs) compared to 2013, which is at the top with 61 incidences. In Kenya, not a single year has passed without a social conflict event. Quiet surprisingly, 2007—the year in which the country was flooded with a nationwide and systematic outbreak of violent electoral conflict —had only 20 incidences of social conflict, which is only one third of the number of incidences of social conflict compared to 2013, which in contrast, is said to have been a mostly peaceful election year.
When comparing decades, the 2000s are the most conflictual (number of conflicts) and lethal (number of deaths). In Kenya, the first 10 years of the first decade of the 21st century had 191 conflict events and 3,179 deaths caused by social conflict. In contrast, the 1990s had only 181 conflict events and 2,572 deaths (see Figures 9 and 10). 82
80 For a comparative overview of social conflict in Africa, see Salehyan and Linebarger (2013). 81 In some cases, the event had several phases or occurred in different areas at the same time. If the actors, targets, and issues involved remained the same over time, the events were subsumed under the same event label (event-id) (Hendrix & Salehyan 2015). 82 The years 2010 to 2013 are not included in this comparison of decades, since data is only available for 4 years. 138 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
Country Year No of Events (Event Ids) Kenya 2013 61 Kenya 2012 57 Kenya 1997 35 Kenya 1998 35 Kenya 2005 29 Kenya 1992 28 Kenya 2006 26 Kenya 2002 24 Kenya 1999 21 Kenya 2001 20 Kenya 2007 20 Kenya 2008 19 Kenya 2011 19 Kenya 2000 18 Kenya 1993 16 Kenya 1995 14 Kenya 2003 14 Kenya 1991 13 Kenya 2009 12 Kenya 1996 11 Kenya 2004 9 Kenya 2010 9 Kenya 1994 5 Kenya 1990 3
Figure 9. Social conflict events in Kenya over time. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
6.6.2.2 Death rates When comparing the conflict incident rates to the numbers of deaths caused by social conflict, it becomes clear that the most deadly years were not necessarily those with the most conflicts. By taking a closer look at Figure 10, one can see that the years 1991, 1998, and 2007 constitute the most deadly years in the near past of Kenya. 83 Surprisingly, in 1991, a very low number of 13 conflict incidences caused 824 deaths. This tendency is repeated in 1998, when 35 conflict incidences are accompanied by 695 deaths, and peaks in 2007, when 20 conflict incidences caused 1963 deaths. In short, the 3 most deadly years in the history of Kenya
83 The figures included in the table are conservative counts of the number of death rates per year. All cases for which the exact number of deaths caused by social conflict was unknown were filtered out. The data set for Kenya included four missings (three times “unknown but probably large” and one time “unknown but probably small”). The author of the present study is aware that this approach might underestimate the exact number of deaths caused by social conflict. Therefore, the calculations were rerun with an imputation model, including 10 deaths for the first unknown category and 5 for the second unknown category. The results did not show significant differences.
139 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
(1991, 1998, and 2007) only had a low to medium level of conflict incidents. An explanation for this phenomenon could be that all of the 3 years had specific and particular political events around which the conflicts developed. In December 1991, conflict arose when multi-party democracy was reintroduced, which stirred up the 30-year struggle “for the former white highlands between Kalenjin and those from other communities who had bought land there” (Hornsby 2013, p. 490). In January 1998, 120 Kenyans, mostly Kikuyus, were killed in post- election violence between the Kalenjin and Kikuyus, and the 2007 elections brought about a hitherto unknown level of electoral confrontations.
In 2012 and 2013, this tendency reversed as the numbers of conflict incidences considerably increased while the number of deaths remained at a constant high but not at extreme level as were recorded during earlier peak years (2012: 58/308; 2013: 62/261).
Country Year No of Events (Event Ids) Total No of Deaths Kenya 2007 20 1963 Kenya 1991 13 824 Kenya 1998 35 695 Kenya 2012 57 308 Kenya 1992 28 276 Kenya 1993 16 275 Kenya 1997 35 267 Kenya 2013 61 261 Kenya 2000 18 232 Kenya 2005 29 229 Kenya 2001 20 212 Kenya 2006 26 200 Kenya 2008 19 129 Kenya 2002 24 109 Kenya 1996 11 84 Kenya 1999 21 69 Kenya 2011 19 64 Kenya 1990 3 45 Kenya 2003 14 36 Kenya 2009 12 36 Kenya 2004 9 33 Kenya 1994 5 24 Kenya 2010 9 20 Kenya 1995 14 13
Figure 10. Social conflict events and deaths in Kenya over time. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012).
Thus, the first finding about the magnitude of social conflict in Kenya is that conflict events occur regularly over time; however, the peaks in death rates do not seem to always parallel the
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increase in conflict incidents. Rather, a few conflict incidents became extremely expansive in violence and caused high death rates (see Table 14).
Table 14. Scatter plot for the number of conflict events and the number of deaths in social conflict per year. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study. 1500 1000 No of deathsNoperof year 500 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 No of conflict events per year
(sum) ndeath Fitted values
The scatter plot of Table 14 indicates that a relationship between the number of conflict events (per year) and the number of people being killed in conflict (per year) is to be expected. This relationship seems to have a positive form, as the line of best fit assumes. The strength does not appear medium strong, since the data points are a small distance away from each other. To test the relationship statistically, the variables were tested for normality. As the results of the Shapiro-Wilk and the Shapiro-Francia-test indicated, both variables are not normally distributed (see Table 15), since all the p-values are below 0.05.
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Table 15. Shapiro-Wilk and Shapiro-Francis test of the variables number of people being killed in social conflict per year (ndeath) and the number of conflict events per year (NEvents). Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z
ndeath 24 0.57620 11.432 4.968 0.00000 NEvents 24 0.86455 3.654 2.642 0.00412
. sfrancia ndeath NEvents
Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
Variable Obs W' V' z Prob>z
ndeath 24 0.55336 13.378 4.690 0.00001 NEvents 24 0.85977 4.200 2.595 0.00473
To test the correlation between the two variables, a Spearman-Correlation—suitable for non- parametric variables—was calculated, showing the following results:
Table 16. Spearman-Test for correlation and significance. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
. spearman ndeath NEvents, stats(rho p)
Number of obs = 24 Spearman's rho = 0.6498
Test of Ho: ndeath and NEvents are independent Prob > |t| = 0.0006
With a p=0.0006, the result is significant, meaning that we can be 95% sure that a significant relationship exists between the number of conflict events per year and the number of deaths being caused, and so H0 must be rejected. A Spearman’s correlation coefficient of 0.65 is a strong positive correlation between the two variables.
In a last step, a Poisson-regression was calculated, again suitable for non-parametric data, to answer the question how many deaths an increase in a single conflict event produces (line of best fit).
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Table 17. Poisson-Regression for the number of conflict events per year (NEvents) and the number of deaths per year (Ndeath). Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
. poisson ndeath NEvents
Iteration 0: log likelihood = -4387.2709 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -4387.2672 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -4387.2672
Poisson regression Number of obs = 24 LR chi2(1) = 343.23 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Log likelihood = -4387.2672 Pseudo R2 = 0.0376
ndeath Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
NEvents .0150385 .0007761 19.38 0.000 .0135174 .0165596 _cons 5.237671 .023069 227.04 0.000 5.192457 5.282886
On the right-hand side of Table 17, the number of observations used in the analysis (24) is given, along with the Wald chi-square statistic with three degrees of freedom for the full model, followed by the p-value for the chi-square. With a p-value of 0.00, we can see that the model is statistically highly significant. Below the header, the Poisson-coefficient for NEvents is indicated by a .02 value. This means that the expected increase in the amount of deaths per year (ndeath) for a one-unit increase in conflict events (NEvents) is .02. The constant of the regression equation is 5.24. The complete regression equation is as follows:
Y = 5.24 + 0.02*X
NDeath = 5.24 + 0.02 * NEvents
The equation indicates that a significant, but weak positive correlation exists between the number of conflict events per year and the number of deaths per year in Kenya.
6.6.2.3 Duration The average duration of a conflict event in Kenya is 4.7 days (n=518; total sum of conflict days= 2,434), with a minimum of a 1 day event to a maximum of a 365 days event. The years 2007 and 1993, with the longest periods of ongoing social conflict, had 365 days and 304 days, respectively. Interestingly, the longest conflict (but not the most lethal one) did not occur after the 2007 democratic elections in Kenya were held, but in the January 2007 pre- election period when the political tension tightened because of the upcoming year-end
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elections. In 396 cases, the conflict lasted for only a single day. Moreover, single-day conflicts occurred most frequently in 2013 (59 times) and in 2012 (45 times).
6.6.2.4 Localities The event localities varied as well. In 32% of the cases, social violence in Kenya occurred in a rural setting, which included towns and villages with a population less than 100,000. The capital city ranked second with 27%, followed by other major urban areas with a population greater than 100,000 that ranked third with 16% of the cases. About 10% of the social conflict in Kenya was nationwide and thus affected several cities and rural areas at the same time. Not surprisingly in the 3 peak-years of death rates (2007, 1998, and 1991), the main areas of violence were scattered broadly, including nationwide, in major urban areas, in the capital city, and in rural areas.
In contrast, violence remained rather focused on rural areas or on the capital during the rather peaceful times with low death rates, such as in 2010 and 2011. Although in 2012 and 2013 the death rates did not reach extreme peaks, their conflict localities varied much more broadly than during relatively peaceful times, as in 2010 (see Figure 11).
Nr. Location 2007 2010 2013 1 Capital City 40.0% 66.7% 27.9% 2 Major Urban area 5.0% 0% 32.8% 3 Rural 25.0% 33.3% 31.2% 4 Multiple urban areas 0% 0% 1.6% 5 Multiple rural areas 0% 0% 1.6% Province/Region 6 listed, exact 20.0% 4.9% location unknown 0% 7 Nationwide 10.0% 0% 0% Total 100% 100% 100%
Figure 11. Event localities 2007, 2010, and 2013. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012).
The following sections provide more detail about event types, the parties involved, the issues at stake, and the relationship between elections and social conflict.
6.6.2.5 Event Type SACD distinguishes between 10 different types of events (etypes) during which social conflict occurs:
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No. Event Type Frequency Percent (%) Nature
Extra-Government 1 167 32.24% violent Violence
Spontaneous 2 103 19.88% violent Violent Riot
Spontaneous 3 57 11% peaceful Demonstration
Organized 4 49 9.46% peaceful Demonstration
5 Limited Strike 40 7.72%
Organized 6 35 6.76% peaceful Demonstration
Pro-Government 7 Violence 34 6.56% violent (Repression)
Organized Violent 8 30 5.79% violent Riot
9 General Strike 3 0.58%
Intra-Government 10 0 0% violent Violence Total 518 100%
Figure 12. Event type with frequencies for Kenya, 1990 –2013. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012).
The top three of these event types in Kenya are extra-government violence, spontaneous violent riots, and spontaneous demonstrations, which together account for 63% of all social conflict events in Kenya between 1990 and 2013.
The most frequent event type—extra-government violence with a total of 167 cases out of 518 (32%)—is defined as:
Distinct violent event waged primarily by a non-state group targeting individuals, or “collective individual,” members of an alleged opposition group or movement. As distinguished from riots, at least one actor must have a semi-permanent or permanent militant wing or organization. Government authorities are not listed as actors or targets (Salehyan & Hendrix 2014, p. 3).
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In contrast, the second most frequent event type neither includes military wings nor allows for the identification of a specific leadership actor. These spontaneous violent riots that occurred 103 times out of 518 (20%) are defined as: “Distinct, continuous and violent action directed toward members of a distinct ‘other’ group or government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property damage. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) cannot be identified” (Salehyan & Hendrix 2014, p. 3).
Spontaneous demonstrations , the third most frequent event type in Kenya (57 cases out of 518; 11%), share many similarities with spontaneous violent riots. Following Salehyan and Hendrix (2014), spontaneous demonstrations are defined as distinct, continuous actions directed toward members of another distinct group or government movement, which lack clear leadership or organization. The largely peaceful character of spontaneous demonstrations distinguishes them from their violent riot counterparts.
Clearly, conflict events in Kenya had a mainly non-governmental character (in 62% of the cases) and were of a violent nature (64%).
Unfortunately, the categorization of event types in the SCAD data set is not reciprocally exclusive, and definitions are not sufficiently clear. For example, general and limited strikes could qualify as both peaceful and violent, but no explicit definitional hint is provided as to how strikes should be interpreted. This lack of clarity leads to the general impression that all forms of event types—whether violent or mostly peaceful—are associated with violence and social conflict in Kenya. This situation is unfortunate and misleading, since non-violent forms, such as demonstrations (spontaneous and organized) or strikes (limited and general), are important elements of political participation for developing and consolidated democracies alike, and therefore should be highly appreciated.
Furthermore, the definitional element of spontaneity is used only in 4 of the 10 variables, which is quite surprising, since extra-government violence or intra-government violence can be spontaneous or organized.
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Table 18. Event types over time. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012).
70 60 50 40 30 20 1990-99 10 0 2000-2009 2010-2013
When taking a closer look at event types over time, it is obvious that two event types—extra- government violence and spontaneous violent riot—are dominant during the period of time under consideration (see Table 18). 84
Spontaneous violent riots became more important during the decade of 2000 to 2010, whereas spontaneous demonstrations, their peaceful counterpart, lost steam. General strikes and intra- government and anti-government violence played only a marginal role between 1990 and 2009. Since 2010, anti-government violence has become more important and now is rated the third largest of all Kenyan event types. At the latest data point in 2013, extra-government violence, spontaneous violent riots, and anti-government violence were the three violent types of events heading the list.
6.6.2.6 Involved Parties Concerning the parties involved in social conflict, the data set does not allow for a meaningful analysis of the variable, since it includes 244 answer options with multiple mentions of the same category, sometimes due to typing errors and/or ambiguous meanings (see Addendum 15). An example of this shortcoming would be the counting of Nairobi University students within the data set. They were counted both as Students at Nairobi University and Students at University of Nairobi . In addition, a third category Students was used, rendering a clear
84 When interpreting Table 18, keep in mind that the green bars represent only 3 years of the second decade of the current century, whereas the blue and red bars represent 10 years, respectively. Therefore, interpret carefully the bar graphs for each event category. 147 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
classification impossible. Another example would be the counting of opposition supporters as involved parties in social violence. The data set does not provide a mutually exclusive set of categories when considering that opposition supporters were coded as Opposition Parties , Opposition parties , Opposition Supporters , Opposition supporters, and Opposition groups .
Moreover, in most of the conflict events, the actors involved were unknown (34 cases out of 518 total cases of social conflict / 6.6%), police (25 cases out of 518 / 4.8%) or students (19 out of 518 / 3.7%). 85
How about the different event types? Did they provide data on the specific actors involved? Not surprisingly, when combining actors and event types, the data does not reveal clear distributions (see Addendum 15). 86 In spontaneous demonstrations (etype 2), students were coded as the party most frequently involved (8 out of 57 conflict events / 14%). In pro- government violence (etype 7), policemen were involved most frequently (25 out of 34 coded events / 74%). In spontaneous violent riots (etype 4), actors were unknown in most cases (33 out of 103 cases / 32%), whereas in extra-government violence (etype 9), attackers, gunmen, and members of the Pokot tribe were the largest share of those involved. Each of the groups was coded with 11 out of 167 cases (7%) of extra-government violence events. For all other event types, the heterogeneity of the actors involved was too great to meaningfully identify any actor groups involved.
6.6.2.7 Preliminary Conclusion The previous sections revealed that social conflict in Kenya has occurred regularly, has lasted about 5 days on average, and has occurred in rural areas or the capital city most of the time. The country has had three major peaks in death rates from social conflict violence, which were in 1991, 1998, and 2007. In 2012 and 2013, the total number of conflict events significantly increased, most of which were single-day conflicts. Although the conflict events were high in number during these days, the death rates did not rise in tandem. The most frequent conflict types are extra-government violence and spontaneous violent riots.
At different stages of this section we have seen that the years 2010 to 2013 are different to previous years. As has been stated several times previously, these divergences may be
85 Even these values need to be interpreted with special care. Besides the response category students , five other similar response categories were used, such as students at Nairobi University , Students at University of Nairobi or Students at University of Nairobi (Hendrix & Salehyan 2015). 86 Again, please keep in mind that the set of categories and the coding of actors are highly doubtable. Their combination might only be considered with the utmost caution. 148 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
explained by the shorter survey period, which does not allow the data for these years to be comparable to previous decades. Nevertheless, the most interesting findings about these 4 years is summarized in the following paragraph to provide some guidelines for future research.
First, the total number of conflict events had never been higher than in 2012 and 2013; it almost doubled compared to the values of 1992 and 2002. The trend line for the total number of social conflict events for the upcoming years increases considerably when compared to the social conflict events that occurred in the 1990s and 2000s. Second, the number of deaths caused during these especially conflictual years did not rise proportionately. The death rates of 2012 and 2013 resembled those of 1992 and 1993, but are nothing like the peak years for deaths in 1991, 1998, and 2007. Third, single-day episodes of social conflict occurred most frequently in the years 2013 (59 times) and 2012 (45 times). Fourth, the motives for conflict seem to be shifting towards an emphasis on religious issues and domestic war. More details about the motives for social conflict are provided in the following sections.
It remains to be seen whether the pattern of more conflict events, accompanied by subordinate death rates in general as well as shorter conflict episodes and a change in motivation for conflicts will persist in the future. A continuation of this pattern would be an interesting development for Kenya that would merit further research.
6.6.3 Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya As has been discussed in section 5.5, violent electoral conflict is defined as: “Acts or threats of coercion, intimidation or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arise in the context of electoral competition” (UNDP 2005, p. 4).
Since the exact timeframe for an electoral process or an electoral competition is not provided in this definition, reference will be made to Straus and Taylor’s (2012) statement about considering any conflict event “that occurred from six months before an election until three months after an election to be electoral violence” (2012: 19f).
In the context of the SCAD data used in the present study, a variable to directly measure violent electoral conflict does not exist. Therefore, the definition of violent electoral conflict was operationalized in two ways: first, by taking a closer look at the magnitude and lethality of all conflict events that were coded with the motive “election” (see section 6.6.3.1) and second, by analyzing all the events of social conflict that occurred during an election year (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2013). As a measure for quality assurance, Straus and Taylor’s
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definition of election time , 6 months before and 3 months after an election event, was used in the present study (see section 6.6.3.3).
6.6.3.1 Issues of Social Conflict: What is it all about? SCAD defines “the issues related to each conflict event, making it feasible to distinguish between conflicts over economic resources, ethnic or religious issues, and those directly related to elections, among other issues” (Salehyan & Linebarger 2013, p. 4). Since the present study is particularly interested in the phenomenon of violent electoral conflict, this section investigates, in particular, the issue of elections as a source of social conflict.
Table 19 shows the frequency of all types of issues that have caused social conflict in Kenya between 1990 and 2013, in descending order. As the SCAD data reveals, conflict over economic resources and assets constitutes the most common motive for conflict at 21% (108 cases out of 518). Ranking at position 2 and 3— both with about 12% of the cases—are unknown issues (63 cases) and struggle over human rights and democracy (60 cases). Elections are ranked fourth as the motive for conflict at 10% of all the cases (54 out of 518) included in the data.
Table 19. Issues causing social conflict, Kenya 1990-2013. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
Environmental Degradation Education Food, Water, Subsistence Domestic War, Violence,… Ethnic Discrimination / Ethnic… Foreign Affairs / Relations Pro-Government Religious Discrimination /… Frequence Economy, Jobs Other Elections Human Rights / Democracy Unknown Economic Resources / Assets 0 20 40 60 80 100 120
It is important to emphasize that although Kenya is sadly notorious for violent electoral conflict, elections are only one issue out of many that cause social conflict in Kenya. Issues
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associated with economic resources and assets outperform elections by a factor of 2. The relationship between elections and conflict is investigated further in the following section.
During the 1990s, conflicts based on elections represented an average of 20% (23 cases, N=181) of all social conflicts, and therefore was the third major cause of conflict in Kenya. Only economic resources and human rights/democracy were causing conflict more often.
In the 2000s, that number decreased to 15% (18 cases, N=191), and violent electoral conflict dropped to position 4 of the main causes of conflict. Table 20 illustrates that although in the 2000s, devastating violent electoral conflict occurred in Kenya, especially in 2007, the total number of violent electoral conflicts decreased in comparison to the previous decade.
Table 20. Issues for social conflict in Kenya, comparison of the 1990s, 2000s, and 2010 –2013. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012).
65 55 45 35 25 15 1990-99 5 2000-2009 -5 2010-2013
The years 2010 to 2013 cannot be compared meaningfully to the two previous decades, since the time period is too short. However, within 4 years, the SCAD data registered 13 cases of violent electoral conflict, provisionally positioning it at number 4 of the main conflict causes. An interesting detail about this period of time is that the ranking positions of the main causes of social conflict vary from those of previous decades. In most of the cases (33%), the motives for social conflict were unknown, followed by religious issues (11%) and domestic war (10%). Again, understandably, this variation could be attributed to the shorter sample period. Nevertheless, it will be important to follow up on whether these differences persist in the years to come. On the one hand, the recent clashes of religious groups in Kenya, ongoing terrorist attacks by Al-Shabaab and other militant Muslim groups, and acts of revenge against
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Muslim citizens speak in favor of this development. On the other hand, it is still completely uncertain whether the next five years of the current decade might force new/other motives upwards in the ranking.
The decrease in violent electoral conflict from the 1990s to the 2000s could be tied to the growing number of conflicts about economic resources and other forms of social conflict, which increased rapidly in the 2000s (see Table 20). Economic resource conflicts increased from 39 cases during the 1990s to 59 cases a decade later, whereas conflicts subsumed under the category Others increased from 20 to 31 cases. The SCAD data revealed a significant increase of unknown motives for social conflict during the years 2010 to 2013. Unfortunately, the data does not provide any further information about the reasons for this increase, whether it may be caused, for example, by a problem during the media analysis, coding, or for other reasons.
Since the data shows that elections have never been the most important issue causing conflict in Kenya, the question remains as to whether they may be the most lethal conflict type. To measure how often elections were named as the central motive for lethal violence, the total number of deaths caused by social conflict in Kenya were calculated. A second step calculated the share of deaths specifically motivated by elections, and compared these numbers to the total numbers. The results also were sorted by decade (see Table 21).
For the first decade under consideration in the present study, it is obvious that violent electoral conflict caused only a marginal share of all lethal incidences in Kenya. Only 35 out of 2,572 deaths in total were motivated by elections (1.4%). However, between 2000 and 2009, this ratio increased to 49% when 1,548 deaths out of a total number of 3,179 were caused by election-related violence. The ratio for the first 4 years of the present decade comes to 5.4% (35 out of 653 cases; decade not complete).
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Table 21. Total number of deaths, and deaths caused by violent electoral conflict, compared by decade. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012).
It is true that the 2000s had a dramatic increase in lethal violent electoral conflict. Nevertheless, Table 21 may be misleading if it gives an impression that during the whole decade , massive numbers of deaths were caused by elections. However, this is not the case; instead, the 2007 election was the only one that caused a massive and unprecedented wave of lethal violence (1,524 deaths according to the SCAD data). It is important to understand that if the 2007 election had produced an average death rate (when election violence causes between 10 and 20 deaths), election-related violence would not have been said to dramatically increase in Kenya during the 2000s. If not for the 2007 election violence, Kenya probably would not be called a country of violent electoral conflict at all.
6.6.3.2 Excursus: Ethnicity Ethnic cleavages often are cited as the major trigger for social conflict in Kenya (Musoni 2012, Elischer 2008, Bratton & Kimenyi 2008, Ajulu 2002). It is true that Kenya is a multi- ethnic state, divided into seven major ethnic groups, representing 84% of the total population: Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, and Meru 6% 87 (CIA World Factbook 2013, African Studies Center 2015).
Furthermore, from a traditional standpoint, ethnicity has been considered to be one important influence on the politics of Kenya, both regarding voter mobilisation and voter behaviour
87 Other groups are other Africans 15% and non-African (Asians, Europeans, and Arabs) 1%. 153 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
(see, for example, Omolo 2002, Steeves 2006, Bratton & Kimenyi 2008, Young 2009). As Barcan (2013) puts it: “Kenyan politics have historically been contests in which the leaders of the country's largest ethnic groups form ethnic coalitions among themselves and with the leaders of smaller groups to dominate their rivals” (p. 2).
Howden (2013) offers a rather dejected resume of the 2013 coalition building process: “Hopes that the country might move beyond tribal politics in this election cycle have evaporated.Two nakedly tribal alliances have congealed around presidential hopefuls drawn from the same pool of politicians who oversaw the chaos in 2008” (p. 1).
Although the SCAD data does not have any information concerning coalition building, voter mobilization, or behavior, it is useful for answering the question as to whether or not ethnic issues have caused social conflict in Kenya between 1990 and 2013. According to the data, this was not the case. As can be seen in Figure 13, ethnic discrimination and ethnic issues rank 11th out of 14 issues named to have had an influence on the social conflict in Kenya. Contrary to expectations, ethnicity dropped to the bottom of the list during the 2000s, when it ranked 14 th out of 14 issues, causing only 0.5% of all the conflicts in Kenya (1 case N=191). During the 1990s, ethnicity ranked 7 th and was named the motive for social conflict in 6% of the cases (10 cases N=181). During the years 2010 to 2013, ethnicity ranked 8 th . It is the cause for conflict in 5% of all the cases of social conflict (7 cases N=146).
No. Issue 1990-99 No. Issue 2000-2009 No. Issue 2010-2013 1 Economic Resources / Assets 39 1 Economic Resources / Assets 59 1 Unknown 48 2 Human Rights, Democracy 31 2 Other 31 2 Religious Discrimination/Religious Issues 16 3 Elections 23 3 Economy, Jobs 19 3 Domestic War, Violence, Terrorism 14 4 Economy, Jobs 20 4 Elections 18 4 Elections 13 5 Other 20 5 Human Rights, Democracy 18 5 Foreign Affairs/Relations 11 6 Pro-Government 14 6 Foreign Affairs/Relations 9 6 Human Rights, Democracy 11 7 Ethnic Discrimination/Ethnic Issues 10 7 Pro-Government 8 7 Economic Resources / Assets 10 8 Unknown 8 8 Unknown 7 8 Ethnic Discrimination/Ethnic Issues 7 9 Food, Water, Subsistence 4 9 Religious Discrimination/Religious Issues 6 9 Food, Water, Subsistence 5 10 Education 4 10 Education 5 10 Economy, Jobs 4 11 Environmental Degradation 3 11 Food, Water, Subsistence 4 11 Education 2 12 Religious Discrimination/Religious Issues 3 12 Environmental Degradation 3 12 Pro-Government 2 13 Foreign Affairs/Relations 2 13 Domestic War, Violence, Terrorism 3 13 Other 2 14 Domestic War, Violence, Terrorism 0 14 Ethnic Discrimination/Ethnic Issues 1 14 Environmental Degradation 1 Total 181 Total 191 Total 146
Figure 13. Issues causing social conflict in Kenya, compared by decade. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
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These numbers make it clear that, when considering SCAD data, ethnicity does not constitute a relevant motivation for social conflict in Kenya, not even during the 2000s in which the devastating 2007 election violence occured. Since the data for the current decade is still incomplete, the results for this time period will need to be re-considered and interpreted at a later time. Furthermore, the reader should bear in mind that the SCAD data is based on experts’ rankings and the media resources available. It cannot be determined whether the media articles under consideration may have underestimated the influence of ethnicity on violent electoral conflict. Furthermore, SCAD researchers may have missed the relevance of ethnicity to a social conflict event, since they often were overlaid with other more ostensible issues, such as economic or pro-/contra-government issues.
6.6.3.3 Conflict during Election Time This section takes a closer look at the special relationship between elections and social conflict in Kenya. In the previous section, we learned that elections ranked only 4th out of all the issues causing social conflict in Kenya between 1990 and 2013. To complement this finding, this section focuses attention on the actual election times in Kenya during the years 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2013.
The goal of this section is to analyze the effect of elections on the number of social conflict events, and also on the number of deaths caused by elections. Additional context information for each general election is provided to contextualize the results. This research goal is worth pursuing, since it enables the testing of the hypothesis that elections catalyse social conflict that leads to increased death rates in Kenya. The hypothesis is that the election time, in contrast to non-election times, leads to an increase in conflict events and the number of people being killed during these events:
H1: Election time increases the number of conflict events in Kenya between 1990 and 2013.
H2: Election time increases the number of people being killed in social conflict events.
To begin, election time is defined as the calendar years in which general elections in Kenya were held: 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2013. Considering the total numbers, Kenya has had 518 conflict events between 1990 and 2013, with 6,404 people killed during these events (see Table 22).
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Table 22. Number of conflict events and number of deaths in Kenya sorted by year. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
styr NEvents ndeath
1. 1990 3 45 2. 1991 13 824 3. 1992 28 276 4. 1993 16 275 5. 1994 5 24
6. 1995 14 13 7. 1996 11 84 8. 1997 35 267 9. 1998 35 695 10. 1999 21 69
11. 2000 18 232 12. 2001 20 212 13. 2002 24 109 14. 2003 14 36 15. 2004 9 33
16. 2005 29 229 17. 2006 26 200 18. 2007 20 1963 19. 2008 19 129 20. 2009 12 36
21. 2010 9 20 22. 2011 19 64 23. 2012 57 308 24. 2013 61 261
Out of the total 518 conflict events, 168 occurred during one of the five election years. Thus, conflict during election time comprises 32% of all conflicts in Kenya between 1990 and 2013. However, 350 events (68%) occurred outside the election years, and thus count as non- election time.
When comparing the conflictual character of all five elections under consideration, it is clear that the 2013 elections were the most conflictual (with 61 conflict events), whereas the 2007 elections were mostly peaceful (with 20 conflict events). The total ranking is shown in Table 23. This result is completely counterintuitive, since 2007 is associated with high levels of conflict in Kenya. Yet, the number of conflict events was the lowest compared to all the other election years. In contrast, the 2013 election year, widely considered to have been peaceful, had the highest ever number of conflict events. It can be concluded that the conflictuality (number of conflict events) of an election year in Kenya must not be equated with the lethality (number of people being killed) of an election year.
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Table 23. Number of conflict events and number of deaths per election year. Source: SCAD (Hendrix & Salehyan 2015), adapted by the author of the present study.
Election of Number of Conflict Events Number of Deaths 2013 61 261 1997 35 267 1992 28 276 2002 24 109 2007 20 1963 Total 168 2876
Looking at the corresponding death rates, the results are the opposite of what is expected for elections with a low number of conflict events. Since 1990, the most lethal election year in Kenya was in 2007 with 1,963 people killed; 1992 scores second with 276 deaths (see Table 23, right column). 88 The 2013 election year, which had the highest number of conflict events, scored last with 261 people killed.
Now that we know about the most and least violent and lethal election years in Kenya, the following paragraph examines the general association between elections and conflict— whether a significant correlation exists between election time and conflict events and people being killed in these conflict events, respectively.
First, the normality of the data was tested via a Shapiro Wilk test and a Shapiro Francia test, the latter being more robust to outliers. The results are shown in Table 24.
Table 24. Shapiro Wilk test and Shapiro Francia test for normality of variables, number of deaths (ndeath), and number of conflict events (NEvents). Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z
ndeath 24 0.57620 11.432 4.968 0.00000 NEvents 24 0.86455 3.654 2.642 0.00412
. sfrancia ndeath NEvents
Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
Variable Obs W' V' z Prob>z
ndeath 24 0.55336 13.378 4.690 0.00001 NEvents 24 0.85977 4.200 2.595 0.00473
Data is considered to be normally distributed if the respective p-value is > .05. If this is the case, no reason exists to reject H0 stating that the data under consideration is normally
88 More details about each election are provided in the following sections. 157 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
distributed. In the present case, both tests revealed that the variable NEvents (the number of conflict events per year) and the variable ndeath (the number of deaths per year) were not normally distributed, since the p-values were below the threshold of .05. The Shapiro-Wilk test revealed a Prob>z = 0.0000, the Shapiro-Francia test a Prob>z = 0.00001 for the variable ndeath. For the number of conflicts (NEvents), Prob>z = 0.00412 in the Shapiro-Wilk test and Prob>z = 0.00473 in the Shapiro-Francia test. Thus, the data of interest is non-parametrically distributed, and so suitable statistical tests need to be applied to work with the data.
Hypothesis 1: Election time increases the number of conflict events in Kenya between 1990 and 2013. The hypothesis was operationalized by the variable election year, as described above, and the variable number of conflicts (NEvents) per year. Thus, the sample included 24 years, 5 election years (1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2013) and 19 non-election years (all other years between 1990 and 2013). To test for a significant correlation between the two variables, a negative bivariate regression—also known as a Poisson regression—suitable for non-parametric data, was run. The regression showed a significant, positive correlation between the two variables, with P P>|z|= 0.028 (see Table 25). Since the variables concerned have non-comparable units, the strength of the correlation cannot be interpreted meaningfully. Nevertheless, Hypothesis 1 is approved, since election time significantly increased the number of conflicts in Kenya between 1990 and 2013.
Table 25. Poisson regression of the correlation between election year (electionyear) and the number of conflict events (NEvents) per year. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 24 LR chi2(1) = 4.72 Dispersion = mean Prob > chi2 = 0.0299 Log likelihood = -90.697222 Pseudo R2 = 0.0253
NEvents Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
electionyear .6010319 .2743802 2.19 0.028 .0632565 1.138807 _cons 2.913494 .1292521 22.54 0.000 2.660165 3.166824
/lnalpha -1.335106 .3383676 -1.998295 -.6719182
alpha .2631302 .0890347 .1355663 .510728
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 88.29 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000
158 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
Hypothesis 2: Election time increases the number of people being killed in social conflict events.
As with Hypothesis 1, a Poisson regression was used to test the correlation between the variables election year and number of deaths (ndeath) per year. The results are presented in Table 26.
Table 26. Poisson regression of the correlation between the variables election year (electionyear) and the number of deaths (ndeath) per year. Source: SCAD (for access see Salehyan et al, 2012), adapted by the author.
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 24 LR chi2(1) = 5.24 Dispersion = mean Prob > chi2 = 0.0221 Log likelihood = -155.05314 Pseudo R2 = 0.0166
ndeath Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
electionyear 1.13067 .5197349 2.18 0.030 .1120088 2.149332 _cons 5.224047 .2375455 21.99 0.000 4.758467 5.689628
/lnalpha .0646109 .2545689 -.4343351 .5635568
alpha 1.066744 .2715598 .6476952 1.75691
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 6947.93 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000
Table 26 indicates that a significant positive correlation exists between the two variables under consideration, with Prob>z= 0.030. Thus, during election years, the number of people killed during social conflict events increased significantly. However, due to the difference in the unit of the two variables, a statement cannot be made with regards to the strength of the correlation.
Redefinition of Election Time
As a measure of quality assurance, the analysis was rerun by applying Straus and Taylor’s (2012) operationalization of election time as 6 months before and 3 months after a polling day. Thus, instead of taking whole election years into consideration, election time is now reduced to a 9 month model as described in Table 27.
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Table 27. Defining election periods following Straus & Taylor (2012). Source: Election Guide (2015). Table by author of the present study.
Election 6 Months pre- Election Day 3 Months post- election election
1992 29 June 1992 29 December 1992 29 March 1993
1997 29 June 1997 29 December 1997 29 March 1998
2002 27 June 2002 27 December 2002 27 March 2003
2007 27 June 2007 27 December 2007 27 March 2008
2013 4 September 2012 4 March 2013 4 June 2013
Following Straus and Taylor (2012), the number of election time months would be 45 in total (9 months x 5 elections = 45 months), the total number of non-election months would be 230 (total number of months between 1990 and 2013 [275] – the total number of conflict months [45] = 230 months). All conflict events were then sorted into the category of conflict time months or non-conflict time months.
The calculation for the number of events of social unrest per months is as follows: 365 conflict events during non-election times have to be considered in relation to 230 months in which no election occured, resulting in 1.6 conflict events per month during non-election times (365/230 = 1.6). For election times, 153 conflict events were divided by 45 election months, resulting in a ratio of 3.4 conflict events per month (153/45 = 3.4).
The calculation for the total number of deaths was applied in an analogous manner: the total number of deaths caused within election time months divided by the total number of months within election times (2475/45 = 55). The total number of deaths per month for conflict events within election times is thus 55 . The number of deaths per month in non-election times is calculated in the same way, considering only deaths and events that occurred outside election times (3929/230 = 18). During conflict events outside election times, 18 people died per month.
In summary, when considering the total numbers for conflict and deaths in Kenya between 1990 and 2013, the total number of conflicts per month roughly doubles during election times
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(1.6 conflict events during non-election times compared to 3.4 during election times). The number of deaths approximately triples during the period under consideration, from 18 deaths to 55 deaths. When distinguishing election time and non-election time conflict events, the data shows an interesting distinction with respect to conflict motivation. During election times, defined in accordance with Straus and Taylor (2012), an election constitutes the most important factor by far (39 out of 153 cases; 26%), followed by economic resources with 16% (25 out of 153 cases). Outside election times, these preferences change, and economic resources take over the top position with 23% (83 cases out of 365; see Table 28.
Table 28. Conflict events (election time and non-election time) sorted by issue for conflict. Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by author of the present study.
issue1 non-election time conflict event election time conflict event total election 15 39 54 economic resources/assets 83 25 108 unknown 41 22 63 human rights/democracy 40 20 60 economy/jobs 29 14 43 other 44 9 53 pro-government 18 6 24 domestic war/violence/terrorism 12 5 17 ethnic discrimination/ethnic issues 14 4 18 religious discrimination/religious issues 22 3 25 foreign affairs/relations 19 3 22 education 9 2 11 food/water/subsistence 12 1 13 environmental degradation 7 0 7 Total 365 153 518
In light of these results, Kenya strongly corresponds to the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, as Salehyan and Linebarger (2013) describe: “Considering all African countries from 1990 to 2010, the total number of conflict events roughly doubles during election months, while the number of deaths triples during such periods” (p. 5). Thus, it can thus be presumed that Kenya is not the prototype country of violent social conflict in Africa, but rather average in its range and lethality.
The critical reader certainly will have noticed that the number of non-conflict time months considerably exceeded their counterparts during election-times. Thus, before beginning the empirical testing of the two hypotheses, the range of the samples needed to be equalized. Therefore, 4.5 months before the election time and 4.5 months after the election time were now counted as the non-election months to be included in the sample. All other months were excluded. Using this approach, both samples had a range of 9 months per election. 161 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
Table 29. Applying Straus and Taylors’ operationalization of election time. Source: Election Guide (2015). Table by author of the present study.
4,5 Months 6 Months pre- Election Day 3 Months post- 4,5 Months post pre pre- election election post-election election
14 Feb 1992 29 June 1992 29 Dec 1992 29 March 1993 13 August 1993
13 Feb 1997 29 June 1997 29 Dec1997 29 March 1998 13 August 1998
12 Feb 2002 27 June 2002 27 Dec 2002 27 March 2003 11 August 2003
12 Feb 2007 27 June 2007 27 Dec 2007 27 March 2008 11 August 2008
19 April 2012 4 Sept 2012 4 March 2013 4 June 2013 19 October 2013
When applying Straus and Taylor’s scheme, all the conflict events that occurred within the five time ranges described in Table 29 were sorted into the respective categories of election time and non-election time. The sample included 37 conflict events outside election time and 35 conflict events during election time (see Table 30).
Table 30 . Number of conflict events during and outside election times as defined by Straus and Taylor (2012). Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
. tab electiontime
(mean) electiontim e Freq. Percent Cum.
0 37 51.39 51.39 1 35 48.61 100.00
Total 72 100.00
The Shapiro-Wilk test and the Shapiro-Francia test for normality of data revealed, once more, that both variables—number of deaths (ndeath) and number of conflict events (NEvents)— were not normally distributed (see Table 31), since their p-value was far below .05.
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Table 31. Shapiro Wilk test and Shapiro Francia test for normality of variables—number of deaths (ndeath) and number of conflict events (NEvents). Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data
Variable Obs W V z Prob>z
ndeath 72 0.24053 47.830 8.424 0.00000 NEvents 72 0.86746 8.347 4.622 0.00000
. sfrancia ndeath NEvents
Shapiro-Francia W' test for normal data
Variable Obs W' V' z Prob>z
ndeath 72 0.23825 53.035 7.683 0.00001 NEvents 72 0.90248 6.790 3.706 0.00011
Applying the new time frame, the Poisson regression for hypothesis 1—that election time increases the number of conflict events in Kenya between 1990 and 2013—is shown in Table 32.
Table 32. Poisson regression for election time—applying Straus and Taylor’s operationalization frame—and the number of conflict events (NEvents). Source: SCAD (for access, see Salehyan et al. 2012), adapted by the author of the present study.
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 72 LR chi2(1) = 8.85 Dispersion = mean Prob > chi2 = 0.0029 Log likelihood = -151.56832 Pseudo R2 = 0.0284
NEvents Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
electiontime .4643299 .1527474 3.04 0.002 .1649504 .7637093 _cons 1.004203 .1150293 8.73 0.000 .7787493 1.229656
/lnalpha -2.093639 .520594 -3.113984 -1.073293
alpha .1232379 .0641569 .0444236 .3418808
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 6.52 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.005
As within the previous section, the regression showed a significant, positive correlation between the two variables, this time with a higher p-value of P>|z|= 0.002 (see Table 32). Since the variables concerned have non-comparable units, the strength of the correlation cannot be interpreted meaningfully. Nevertheless, Hypothesis 1 is approved for applying Straus and Taylor’s operationalization frame of election time.
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When testing Hypothesis 2 according to the new definition of election time , the situation is different (see Table 33).
Table 33. Poisson regression for election time—applying Straus and Taylor’s operationalization frame—and the number of deaths (ndeath).
Negative binomial regression Number of obs = 72 LR chi2(1) = 3.55 Dispersion = mean Prob > chi2 = 0.0596 Log likelihood = -316.17291 Pseudo R2 = 0.0056
ndeath Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
electiontime .7979922 .4152592 1.92 0.055 -.0159008 1.611885 _cons 3.460655 .2899395 11.94 0.000 2.892384 4.028926
/lnalpha 1.124602 .1567406 .8173966 1.431808
alpha 3.078993 .4826031 2.264597 4.186263
Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0: chibar2(01) = 1.1e+04 Prob>=chibar2 = 0.000
In this case, the significance level of the correlation dropped to P>|z| = 0.055 and thereby razor-thinly missed the applied significance level of P>|z| = 0.05. When applying Straus and Taylor, no significant correlation was found to exist between election times and an increase in the number of people killed during social conflict. Nevertheless, the p-value shows that a clear trend exists between the two variables.
6.6.3.4 Interim Conclusions It was the overall goal of this section to provide some insight into the social and violent electoral conflicts in Kenya by shedding light on their magnitude, characteristics, sources, and parties involved. Therefore, elections were operationalized first by taking a closer look at all conflict events that erupted with the motive “elections,” and second by analysing the time period of the election years—1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2013. As a measure of quality assurance, Straus and Taylor’s definition for election time was operationalized as well.
The following results were obtained. First, a statistically significant correlation exists between election time and an increase in social conflict, as well as between election time and an increase in the lethality of social conflict in Kenya between 1990 and 2013 when election time is operationalized per year. Both election times and non-election times increase the number of conflicts and the number of deaths in a statistically significant way. However, the strength of the correlation cannot be precisely assessed due to the characteristics of the SCAD data.
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When operationalizing election time according to Straus and Taylor, only the increase in election events is statistically significant.
Second, the election year 2007 was the most deadly in Kenya since the early 1990s, and the 2013 elction year was the most peaceful. When considering the number of conflict events, this finding inverts. The 2013 election year, mostly considered to have been widely peaceful, even during the elections, had the highest number of conflict events ever.
Third, the main motive for violence during the election years in Kenya was elections, whereas conflict over economic resources/assets was the motive for violence when Kenyans were not at the polls.
Fourth, when considering social conflict in Kenya between 1990 and 2013, the total number of conflicts per month roughly doubled during election times (1.6 conflict events during non- election times compared to 3.4 during election times). Also, the number of deaths tripled during election times from 18 to 55 per month.
Last, the level of conflict events and death rates during elections in Kenya are comparable with the average values for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Therefore, the Kenyan results are not an extreme outlier; rather, violent electoral conflict has continuously and very regularly occurred in Kenya during all its election rounds, but only some elections produced very high death rates.
The next section provides a critical evaluation of the SCAD data used for the analysis. This data is the only available database that includes data about the social conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole over a relatively long time span. As has been indicated at several stages of this chapter, the data is not free of weaknesses. First and foremost, the compilation of a data set, based on media articles, is never free from shortcomings, especially concerning inter- coder variance or bias. The researchers of these articles may have over- or under-estimated the issues that were mentioned in the articles as sources of conflict in Kenya. Often, the issue of ethnicity is obscured by other plausible issues—such as economic cleavages or political struggles—and thus may not be considered appropriately. Unfortunately, insight into how the media articles were transferred into data is not provided in the SCAD data. Furthermore, the classification of event types has considerable shortcomings, since definitions are not sufficiently clear and do not always allow for a systematic differentiation into violent and peaceful events. Since both categories are mixed together, peaceful events of political participation may be conflated with violent events which attach a negative connotation to an
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important and positive element of Kenya’s political culture. The most obvious shortcoming lies with the coding of conflict parties. Due to the 244 answer options, comprising multiple mentions of categories or multi-dimensional coding categories, no meaningful analysis is possible. Hopefully, forthcoming SCAD data will address these shortcomings to improve its overall data quality.
6.7 Kenya’s Elections at a Glance
6.7.1 The 1992 Elections As a result of the massive pressure and protests by the public and the international community, in 1992, the first multi-party competitive elections—the first since its independence—were held in Kenya (see, for example, Laakso 2007, Dercon & Gutiérrez- Romero 2011). Unfortunately these elections were accompanied by massive violent electoral conflict —before, during, and after the elections—which were attempts at ethnic cleansing. As in many other episodes of violent electoral conflict in Kenya to come, the Rift Valley Province was one of the violence ‘hotspots’ in 1992. Urban areas were affected likewise, mainly the Nairobi area “where the opposition held sway” (Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero 2011, p. 732).
Laakso (2007) has identified the main motivations for the violence as being the ethnic campaigning of the political elite—who were situated in the former single-state party KANU (Kenya African National Union)—and the mobilisation of unemployed youth in para-military and security groups prior to the elections. These findings are supported by Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2011) who have argued that government members were responsible for the outbreak of violence and its half-hearted management: “Hence, contrary to the government’s description of the violence as ‘spontaneous ethnic clashes’, the evidence suggests that much of the violence was in fact sponsored by the state whose actions did little to contain it” (p. 732).
The mobilisation of the Kenyan population along ethnic lines became possible because unresolved conflicts, mainly over access to land and state resources, had been simmering under the surface since the early 1960s (Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero 2011, p. 731). Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero (2011) have traced these land disputes “to the land settlements devised in the Rift Valley when the country moved towards independence” (p. 732). Motivating these land settlements was the British attempt to counter the Kikuyu’s struggle against British colonialism by bargaining peace for land in the Rift Valley (Leo 1978, 1981, 1984). As a
166 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
consequence the Kalenjin and Maasai, the originally residing tribes of the Rift Valley, struggled to buy land within the region, which ignited the tensions. Later, they were “allowed to occupy land abandoned by displaced groups to ensure their political alliance” (Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero 2011, p. 732; see also Kagwanja 2003, Boone 2009).
In contrast, the mobilization of youth in the so-called youth security organs (Laakso 2007) was underpinned mainly by the economic grievances of the country, which weighed heavily on the shoulders of the younger generations. According to Laakso (2007), “the socio- economic crisis and rising unemployment marked a sharp contrast with the positive development trend of the first two decades after independence” to which “multipartyism, however, brought no improvements” (p. 230). Thus, this crisis in unemployment, especially for youth, was an important catalyst for the mobilisation of youth in the parties’ youth organizations, which included power positions and influence for youth within the parties’ campaigns, and which quickly developed its own dynamics. Youth for KANU (YK ’92) and Operation Moi Win (OMW) spearheaded KANUs 1992 electoral campaigning by organising hearings and assemblies in KANU strongholds and those of the opposition, and by interrupting opposition campaigning whenever possible. Civilians were intimidated, even terrorised, to direct their election intentions in the desired direction. At one point, the power of the YK ’92 and OMW’s leadership had grown to such an extent that the senior party officials of KANU felt impelled to dismiss both of these youth organisations shortly after the Election Day.
According to Human Rights Watch, during 1992 about 2,000 people were killed in the attempt at ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley Province. By 1993 about 300,000 people, mainly Kikuyu and Luo farmers had been displaced. The Parliamentary Select Committee (the Akiwumi Commission) that investigated the clashes later revealed that the attacks against the Kikuyu and Luo in the Rift Valley Province were executed by KANU militias, who were paid 10,000 Ksh for every permanent house burnt, 1,000 Ksh per person killed, and 500 Ksh for every grass-thatched house torched (Akiwumi 2002, Robins 2011). As early as October 1991, local KANU politicians had begun the chase by “advocating for a federal system of government (Majimboism ) and argued that the Rift Valley was for the Maasai and Kalenjins (…) and KANU” (Laakso 2007, p. 232).
6.7.2 The 1997 Elections The 1997 Kenyan general elections were a further intensification of the 1992 events. Before the elections were held, all parties installed their own youth security groups: KANU tied in 167 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
with YK ’92 and OMW, and the opposition parties tried to keep up with the government’s tactics. Clashes between the various youth organizations became regular events, such as the terrorisation of the civilian population. With respect to the mobilised youth organizations, one group clearly stood out from all the others—KANU’s new youth organization Jeshi la Mzee (the Old Man’s Army)—because of its high degree of organization, equipment, and financial accoutrement. According to Laakso (2007), “it was supported by the police and financed from senior KANU elites, which enabled it to hand out daily payments for its members” (p. 231). The Jeshi la Mzee were recruited mainly from the KANU youth wing, and an important element belonged to the Luhya ethnic group in Nairobi (Laakso 2007, p. 232). Opposition groups, such as FORD-KENYA’s Operation Moi Out (OMO) failed to join forces against the Jeshi la Mzee, and hence “tended to react to, rather than organise against Jeshi la Mzee” (Laakso 2007, p. 232). Other than in 1992, the main focalpoints of the violence widened from Nairobi Province and the Rift Valley Province to the Coast region, including Likoni and Kwale. Again, KANU was early linked to the violence, since local party leaders started building a Digo 89 -led militia, sworn in by a ritual oath, to “introduce Majimbo and to get rid of the ‘upcountry people’ in their area” (Laakso 2007, p. 233). The term upcountry people refers to the Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba ethnic groups who had migrated to the coast in search of business opportunities in the tourism sector and the government’s settlement schemes. Trained by former servicemen, the Digo-militia began their violent attacks against Kikuyu, Luo, and Kamba citizens in the coast region, forcing thousands to flee from the danger. Again, high sums were promised to the raiders for killing members of the upcountry people (FIDH 1997, p. 8). Most of the victims killed by Digo militia were Luos. Nevertheless, with the spread of this violence, the situation spun out of control. KANU lost control of their militia when they refused to obey orders: “Descriptions of the attacks showed that that there was also antagonism against [other] non-Digo indigenous people. On the other hand, in some cases people were saved if they were Muslims. In addition, in the attacks some Digos were also killed and their houses were burned” (Laakso 2007, p. 235).
As a consequence of the confusing and uncontrollable situation, the KANU government reacted with “an arbitrary intimidation of Digos” (Laakso 2007, p 235).
As a consequence of this ongoing chaos, those Kenyans who were spending the Christmas holidays outside the Coast region, 90 hesitated to return for the polls so as to escape the violent
89 The term Digos refers to an Arabic indigenous ethnic group living in the Coast area of Kenya. 90 The Election Day was scheduled for December 29th and 30th, 1997. 168 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
militia terror. This led to a massive drop in the voter turnout, reducing it to 37% in the Likoni constituency (Laakso 2007, p. 233).
In the Rift Valley Province, about 200 people were killed in pre- and post-electoral violence. Unlike in 1992, the violence spread quickly to towns, since more firearms and light weapons were circulating, mostly for self-protection.
6.7.3 The 2002 Elections The 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections were outstandingly important for Kenya for two reasons. First, they represented the first Presidential handover of power to occur through the ballot box in Kenya’s history. The oppositional National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), under its Presidential candidate Mwai Kibaki, came to power after 24 years of Daniel Arap Moi’s government. Second, the 2002 elections were the most peaceful and basically free and fair elections in the history of Kenya. According to Hornby (2013), “There was little trouble and the process was smooth” (p. 690).
In preparation for the third presidential election in 2002, the opposition parties united their forces by creating NARC, which included Kibaki’s Democratic Party (DP), Raila Odinga’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and other smaller parties. Learning from the past, the newly- formed opposition coalition nominated only one presidential candidate, and maintained their fragile coalition through the presidential campaign. Although head of the largest coalition member, the LDP, Odinga supported Kibaki after receiving a vague promise to become Kenya’s first Prime Minister under a Kibaki’s presidency. Moreover, although the position of Prime Minister did not exist in Kenya’s political constitution at the time, NARC said it was at the top of its list for planned constitutional reform. All in all, NARC was less of a love match and more a marriage of convenience, which superficially united the members of the coalition, who also benefitted considerably from the “short-term bandwagon effect” (Hornsby 2013, p. 694) of Moi’s political withdrawal. Over the 1990s, Moi’s party KANU (Kenya African National Union) had squandered the remaining trust and legitimacy of Kenyan voters with ongoing corruption, violence, misuse of the judiciary, and political and economic inefficiency. As a consequence, voters had “little pleasure in supporting the ruling party, even in its strongholds” (Hornsby 2013, p. 694). Furthermore, the inauguration of Uhuru Kenyatta, a member of the Kikuyu tribe and son of the founding father of modern Kenya Jomo Kenyatta, as Moi’s successor did not inspire a massive voter turnout of Kikuyus for KANU. Therefore, a breeding ground for a political change of power through the ballot box was born. Furthermore, with the growing probability of a NARC success, experienced and versed 169 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
members of the political elite assembled under the rainbow emblem. As Hornsby (2013) has suggested, “Kibaki, Musyoka, Saitoti, Kamotho, Ntimama and Awori gave the opposition the gravitas, experience and money that at times made KANU seem the opposition party” (p. 694).
All in all, it was this wave of success that influenced the particular peacefulness, freeness, and fairness of the 2002 elections. Since it was foreseeable that Kibaki was going to win the presidential race, any attempt of electoral cheating would have been extremely costly and blatant. Although the governing party had experience in rigging electoral outcomes, the size of the gap was simply too large. Furthermore, a manipulation of the electoral outcome became more difficult as well. During the 2002 elections, for the first time, the vote count and announcement was done at each of the 14,000 polling stations, which reduced the risk of manipulation during the transfer to constituency headquarters. Thus, KANU refrained from systematic electoral fraud, which inhibited the outbreak of potential chaos. Obviously, this statement must not be misinterpreted in the sense that electoral manipulation did not occur. Contrariwise, international observers such as the European Union, the Carter Center, the African Union, and the Commonwealth detected evidence of bribery in almost every constituency. However, the fact that an opposition coalition came to power through an electoral competition silenced the discussion of systematic electoral fraud. For foreign observers and African and Western governments, and the Kenyan people, KANU’s election defeat sufficiently proved and attested to the freeness and fairness of the 2002 elections.
On December 30, 2002, only 3 days after the election polling day, Kibaki was inaugurated as the third President of Kenya, while he was seated in a wheelchair due to the lingering impact of a serious car accident. He took 61% of the poll, won six of the eight provinces, 91 and also took 25% or more of the vote in all eight provinces, “the first time this had happened” (Hornsby 2013, p. 691).
6.7.4 The 2007 Elections In the 2007 general elections in Kenya, the spirit of peaceful, free, and fair elections disappeared without a trace. In sharp contrast to their 2002 predecessors, they went down in history as the most corrupt, destructive, and violent electoral episode ever seen in the modern history of the country. They plunged Kenya into chaos.
91 These six provinces are Nairobi, Central, Eastern, the Coast, Western, and Nyanza. 170 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
Initially, everything seemed like it was going according to plan, and the electoral process went smoothly. The party nominations were “violent, corrupt and incompetently run as usual” (Hornsby 2013, p. 752), but they did not encumber the process as a whole. Turnout on election day (December 27, 2007) was higher than in 2002, with about 70% of Kenyans casting their vote despite technical problems and delays in the voting process on polling day. It is important to understand that voter turnout was implausibly high in Nyanza, Central Province, and Nairobi where it came close to an unrealistic 100%. This phenomenon is further explained in the following paragraphs.
The Presidential count caused the disaster. At an early stage, around December 28th, all signs pointed to a clear election victory for Raila Odinga and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) (cf. Hornsby 2013). First projections indicated a 10 percentage point lead over his Party of National Unity (PNU) opponent Mwai Kibaki. However, these projections were misleading, since the process of tallying and reporting the results was heavily delayed in the PNU strongholds. With this delay, tensions grew, particularly for the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) and its chairman Samuel Kivuitu to present the final election results. Rumours abounded of manipulated results being reported to the ECK that favoured the PNU. Later on, international observers supported the concerns of the reported discrepancies between the ECK results and those announced by returning officers, as well as the overstatement of results in some seats and their reduction in others (see, for example, Hornsby 2013):
In some seats, the number of presidential votes was far higher than the parliamentary tally, suggesting stuffing or vote inflation. The number of votes cast rose by 66 per cent across the board and 75 per cent or more in Nairobi, Nyanza and Central. Even given the huge media attention and polarisation of this election, this was an extraordinary increase, given the number of dead voters on the register (Hornsby 2013, p. 762 f).
All in all, international observers, African and Western governments, national and international media expressed serious concerns about the tallying of the vote of the 2007 general elections, and accused the government—some more openly than others—of rigging the count (see, for example, EU EOM 2008, The Economist 2008, KEDOF 2007, BBC News 2008, Nyong’o 2008, Dercon & Gutiérrez-Romero 2011, WikiLeaks 2008).
On December 31 st , a highly overstrained Kivuitu declared Kibaki elected as the 4 th President of Kenya, and he was sworn in in a hasty ceremony hidden from the public gaze. On the same
171 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
evening, chaos erupted, mainly in the Luo metropole Kisumu, in Nairobi’s ethnically mixed slums, and in the northern Rift Valley Province. In an unprecedented wave of violence, Kikuyus and other ethnicities, alleged of supporting Kibaki or the PNU, were hunted down— more than 1,133 people were killed, about 3,500 were injured, and about 350,000 were displaced 92 (see Republic of Kenya 2008). Looting, raping, and ethnic killings could not be stopped. It took several months, and the conflict management initiative of former UN Secretary Kofi Annan, to stop the violent electoral conflict that was characterized by a strong politicalization of ethnicity. Annan’s initiative resulted in the implementation of a grand coalition. The Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence (CIPEV) was established in February 2008 by the Kenyan government to investigate the 2007/2008 post-election clashes. The internationally composed commission published its report, the so-called WAKI-report, on October 15, 2008 (Waki 2008). A separate list, containing the names of alleged perpetrators, was handed over to Kofi Annan who sent it to the International Criminal Court in The Hague.
6.7.5 The 2013 Elections Five years after the devastating violence of 2007, Kenyans were asked once again to cast their votes in a general election. The 2013 elections are said to be the most important, high stake, and complicated elections since the country’s independence in 1963, since they would determine whether Kenya’s future will be democratic, peaceful, and prosperous or violent and further destabilized. As a matter of fact, the 2013 polls represented more than just a choice of the 5 th President of the Kenyan Republic and other political personnel; they were to be the test case for the new Constitution and the values anchored in it. Under the watchful eyes of the international community, the media, and external donors, Kenya had to prove its ability to run peaceful, free, and fair elections, and to move beyond the 2007 trauma and previous violent electoral conflict. They had high stakes, since the two main players—Kenyatta and Ruto— were seeking power in order to escape prosecution on charges of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Since the 2013 elections were the first vote after the disastrous violence of the 2007 elections, the question of whether violence would accompany the voting was omnipresent. Although some violence occurred during the campaigning process—six people were killed in three successive grenade attacks in Nairobi (see The Telegraph 2010)—the polls remained widely peaceful.
92 Other sources have suggested that 600,000 persons were displaced (see, for example, Barkan 2013). 172 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
The elections also were described as the most complicated elections in Kenyan history, since citizens were called on to vote for six elective positions at multiple constitutional levels—47 counties, 290 constituencies, and 1,450 county assembly wards—at a time. At the national level, citizens had one vote for each of the positions of President, Senators, Members of Parliament, and Women Representatives to Parliament. On the newly created county level, the positions of the Governor and County Assembly Representatives had to be filled by a direct vote of the citizens. 93
Table 34. Elective positions at a glance. Source: Election Guide (2015). Diagram created by the author of the present study.
National Level County Level
President of Kenya 47 County Governors
(Chapter 9, Part 2 of the new constitution) (Chapter 11, Part 2 of the new constitution)
47 Senators 1450 County Assembly Representatives
(Art. 98 of the new constitution) (Art. 177 of the new constitution)
290 Members of Parliament (Bunge)
(349 members in total; Art. 97 of the new constitution) 94
47 Women Representatives
(Art. 97, letter b of the new constitution)
Seven male and one female Presidential candidate had thrown down their gauntlet in the political arena, including International Criminal Court defendant and son of the first Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta (TNA/Jubilee Alliance). From early December 2012, the election polls were predicting a tight race between Kenyatta and his main opponent, former Prime Minister and flag bearer of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM/CORD), Raila Odinga. In addition to these two frontrunners, the following candidates also ran for the Kenyan presidency: Musalia Mudavadi (UDF/Amani Coalition), Martha Karua (NARC-Kenya/no coalition), Peter Kenneth (KNC/Eagle Alliance), Mohammed Abduba Dida (ARC/no
93 For a detailed description of the new political system of Kenya after the implementation of the new Constitution, see Sections 6.3 and 6.4. 94 The National Assembly of Kenya (Bunge) has 349 members in total, including 290 parliamentary seats; 12 “appointed members” who are nominated by parliament through party lists, in proportion to their nationwide vote share; and 47 women who are elected by the registered voters of the 47 counties (cf. Election Guide 2015). 173 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
coalition), James ole Kiyiapi (RBK/no coalition), and Paul Kibugi Muite (Safina/no coalition). According to the regularly published opinion polls, the latter candidates never had a realistic chance of winning the presidential elections. Thus, at an early stage, the election of the 4 th Kenyan president became a two horse race.
During their presidential campaign, all candidates were passionate about the idea of the six- piece vote , the term “that has been adopted to describe voting for the same coalition on all six ballots” (Green 2013, p. 1). Senators, Members of Parliament, Women, Governors, and County Assembly Representatives were all to be chosen based on the one and only characteristic of coalition affiliation. By simply ignoring relevant qualifications and (in-) capacities of the individual candidates, the six-piece vote was promoted for a simple reason: to get as many coalition combatants into an elected position as possible, and thereby making the political life of the future government easier. As Green (2013) put it: “It [the six-piece vote] is a strategy presidential candidates in this election were overtly encouraging at the campaign’s onset—for obvious reasons: The more coalition members in power, the easier governing will be” (p. 1).
The media strongly rejected the six-piece vote strategy when they interpreted it as a form of voter coercion (cf. Standard Digital 2013). Journalists were constantly warning that “this demand, much as it makes political sense to those seeking highest offices in the land, does not do much to respect the inviolable sanctity of the voter to make his or her own decision without undue pressure” (Standard Digital 2013, p. 1). Political parties finally dropped their calls, since they feared voter apathy (cf. Ongiri 2013). However, the ODM made their decision to drop the call to support the six-piece vote strategy only 2 weeks before Election Day. Thus, the six-piece vote strategy that all presidential candidates jumped on willingly had a strong influence on the political campaigning for all other positions as well. Since potential Senators or Members of the Assembly were hoping to “ride the top-of-the-ticket platform to victory” (Green 2013, p. 1), they didn’t focus their own political campaigning on political issues crucial to their specific area of influence. Although political decisions made within counties will affect voters most directly in the future, future Governors and County Assembly Members concentrated their efforts on running for the right (Presidential) party or coalition. This behavior left voters without the necessary and relevant information to make important political decisions. Further, the willingness and ability of the average voter to acquire sufficient information to make an informed vote for all the different political positions to be filled decreased, as their presidential choice dominated all their electoral decisions.
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Although all presidential candidates promoted the slogan of Peace and Unity during their political campaigns, the mobilization of supporters along ethnic lines had not changed a bit.
Although Kenyatta and Ruto announced they would present themselves for the questioning of the International Criminal Court, even though being elected President and Vice-President, their alliance appeared to be the last straw to try to escape prosecutuion by the ICC. From an ethnic-strategically point of view, binding William Ruto, the so-called Lord of the Rift , as a running mate was a reasonable move. In earlier moves, Ruto proved his ability to mobilise the Kalenjin community behind him. He was the right person to be the link between the former enemy tribes—the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu—and to convince the Kalenjin to overcome their hesitation to support a Kukuyu presidential candidate. Nevertheless, his move challenged his Kalenjin support base, and for long time it remained uncertain whether it could overcome this identity crisis.
Rounding up the Jublee Alliance with Charity Ngilu, a Kamba, opened the door for Kamba supporters of the Jubilee Alliance, and split the Kamba electorate into two different camps: those who supported Ngilu and the Jubilee Alliance, and those who supported Kalonzo Musyoka of the CORD Alliance. In the 2007 elections, Musyoka had abandonded his alliance with Raila Odinga at the last second, and ran in the elections as the leader of ODM-Kenya. Yet, 5 years later, the former rivals reunited, joined by Moses Wetangula who was supposed to bring Luhya voters to the CORD Alliance. On January 16 2013, Peter Kenneth was implemented as presidential candidate for the Eagle Coalition, supported by his running mate 33-year-old businessman Ronald Osumba and coalition partner Raphael Tuju of the Party of Action (POA). Unlike many other Alliances, the Eagle Coalition focused on political issues and thus received respect during the Presidential debates. Musalia Mudavadi, also a Luhya, had been solicited for a long time by Uhuru Kenyatta to join his consortium. This move would have united two strong Luhya representatives under the Jubilee Alliance tent. However, the 2007 ally of Raila Odinga decided otherwise, and instead became the leader of the Amani Coalition.
Only 5 days before the 2013 General Election, the polls predicted a tiny lead of 45.8% for CORD over 44.5% for Jubilee, although the race had been close for a long time between these two large coalitions. Other alliances forecasts’ ranged below 5% (cf. Siringu 2013).
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Table 35. 2007 and 2013 Presidential Alliances/candidates at a glance. Source: EISA (2008, 2013), Kenya Elections (2007). Diagram created by the author of the present study.
2007 General Elections 2013 General Elections
Competing Alliances /Parties Competing Alliances / Parties
PNU – Party of National Unity (KANU, DP, Jubilee Alliance (TNA, URP, NARC-Kenya)
Narc-Kenya, Ford-Kenya, Ford People, Shirikisho) Candidate: Uhuru Kenyatta Candidate: Mwai Kibaki Running mate: William Ruto Running mate: Uhuru Kenyatta
ODM – Orange Democratic Movement CORD Alliance – Coalition for Reform and Democracy (ODM, WDM, FORD-Kenya)
Candidate: Raila Odinga Candidate: Raila Odinga Running mate: Kalonzo Musyoka Running mate: Musalia Mudavadi
ODM-Kenya – Orange Democratic Amani Coalition (UDF, KANU and New Movement Kenya Ford Kenya)
Candidate: Kalonzo Musyoka Candidate: Musalia Mudavadi
Running mate: Julia Ojiambo Running mate: Jeremiah Kioni
KTPT – Kenya Patriotic Trust Party Eagle Alliance (KNC, POA)
Candidate: Joseph Karani Candidate: Peter Kenneth
Running mate: Running mate: Ronald Osumba
KPP – Kenya Peoples’ Party ARC – Alliance for Real Change
Candidate: Pius Muiru Candidate: Mohammed Abduba Dida
Running mate: Eugene Wamalwa Running mate: Joshua Onono
WCPK – Workers Congress Party of Kenya Narc-Kenya – National Rainbow Coalition- Kenya Candidate: Nazlin Omar Candidate: Martha Karua
176 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
Running mate: Augustine Lotodo
SSA – Saba Saba Asili RBK – Restore and Build Kenya
Candidate: Kenneth Matiba Candidate: James Ole Kiyiapi
Running mate: Winnie Kinyua
CCUP – Chama Cha Umma Party Safina
Candidate: David Ng'ethe Candidate: Paul Kibugi Muite
Running mate: Shem Ochudho
RPK – Republican Party of Kenya
Candidate: Nixon Kukubo
Election Day in Kenya in 2013 was widely peaceful and orderely. Most of the 33,400 polling stations in the 290 constituencies opened at 6 am on March 4, 2013. Despite the early hour, thousands of Kenyans had already flocked to the polling stations and were waiting patiently to cast their votes. On this hot, late summer Monday, which had been declared a national holiday, 12,330,028 votes were cast, creating a strong voter turnout of 86%. Some voters in Nairobi’s Kibera had to wait for 9 hours, without food or water, to cast their vote in a slow but steady voting process.
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Figure 14. Long queues at the polling station at the “Olympic Primary School” in Kibera (Nairobi). Source: Taken by S. Plata, March 4, 2013.
A record 90,000 police officers were deployed to the polling centres and previous violence ‘hotspots’ to guard the elections and to handle potential security issues (cf. Nation Team 2013). Although this number sounds impressive at first glance, it needs to be considred in relation to the total number of polling stations that were needed to run the elections. Considering the fact that the previous violence ‘hotspots’ had a larger number of security personnel, the total number of policeman available at ordinary polling stations was one to two rifle-equipped officers. To avoid riots, voters were forced by law to leave the polling station after they cast their votes, and were not allowed to linger closer than 400 meters away from the ballot boxes afterwards; any gatherings were broken up by police forces. Usually busy streets and roads remained calm, and almost all shops were closed for fear of torching. Twenty-four hours before the elections, shops were running short on staple supplies, such as bread, milk, flower, and rice, since Kenyans were building up stocks in case of violence. According to Gettleman (2013), “many people have fled ethnically mixed urban areas, fearing reprisal killings should the vote go awry” (p. 1). The reports of co-ordinated attacks on policemen in the port cities of Mombasa and Kilifi, only shortly before the start of the elections, which left 13 people dead, spiked growing fears a repeat of the 2007 violence (cf. Reuters 2013, Martell 2013, Smith, 2013). The attackers were suspected members of the 178 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
Mombasa Republic Council (MRC) who had announced they would boycott the elections. According to media reports, a group of 200 MRC members “armed with guns, machetes and bows and arrows set a trap for police before dawn, killing five officers” (Smith 2013, p. 1). One attacker died in the gunfight. In a second attack in Kilifi, one police officer and an election official, as well as five attackers, died. Since the motives for the violence did not follow ethnic conflict lines as did the killings in 2007 (see Obulutsa & Macharia 2013), the violence was limited to the Mombasa area and did not spread across the country.
In addition to these incidences of violence during the 2013 elections, some irregularities and malfunctions affected the quality of the voting process. Some voting stations opened late due to a lack of voting materials and, more significantly, due to “failures in the biometric voter registration (BVR) kits that were used to identify voters before they cast their ballots” (Tucker 2013, p. 1). The breakdown of the BVR kits constituted a major quality restriction, since paper registers did not provide for the same voter identification certainty and increased the risk of multiple voting. Since identical paper registers were used at different polling stations, voters potentially could cast their vote at one station and then repeat the process at other polls. Thus, the principle of voter equality, summarized by “one man one vote,” could have been compromised during these general elections. According to media reports, in some polling stations, the number of votes cast exceeded the number of registered voters at this specific station, or voters were provided with multiple ballot papers for the presidential election. Reports also stated that many voters struggled to insert the ballot papers into the right box, since the chosen colouring didn’t allow for a one-to-one distinction.
At 5 pm local Kenyan time, the official voting period ended, making way for the maximum 7 day long counting process. Security personnel on the ground ensured that no new voters arriving at the polling stations joined the queues of waiting voters. Only those who arrived at the polling stations earlier than 5 pm were permitted to continue their wait. To compensate for the lost voting hours due to late openings, some polling stations closed their doors later in the evening. During the evening, after the tallying process had already started, two grenade attacks were reported in Garissa, a town close to the Somali border. One grenade detonated in a tallying center, but nobody was injured. The second grenade exploded in a police station and caused the death of two people. In the town of Kitengela, south of Nairobi, 20 people had to be hospitalized after a gunman sought violent access to a polling station. In Mandera, near the Somali and Ethiopian boarder, a bomb attack was reported, leaving three people injured (cf. Karimi & Elbagir 2013).
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All in all, the March 4, 2013 elections were a widely peaceful, although not completely, election day with only local incidences of violence. The golden rule in violent electoral conflict studies, that states that very often the actual Election Day is the most peaceful time of elections, has proven its accuracy once more with respect to the 2013 Kenyan elections.
It was after the actual Election Day that the introspection of the 2013 elections started. After a widely peaceful and quiet post-election night, voters were glued to the TV or radio in hopes of gaining information about any substantial trends in the election results. However, the results were trickling in very slowly. More than 17 hours after the official start of the tallying process across the country, only roughly 35% of the 33,000 polling stations had counted and reported their votes to the central tallying centre in Nairobi. Provisional figures of the IEBC indicated that presidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta has taken an early lead in the counted votes. Since only a farily small percentage of the total votes had been counted, this lead could not even be deemed to be a first trend. In the course of an IEBC press conference scheduled on Wednesday morning (March 5, 2013), the IEBC chairman Isaack Hassan conceded the technical problems plaguing the BVR kits during the elections: “The electronic voter identification device failed” Hassan stated on national television, but nevertheless assured citizens that the integrity of the election process had not been compromised. Instead of the failed BVR kits, a paper-based voter register had been used, which identified voters by their name, ID, and photograph. The 2013 elections were the first in the history of Kenya to deploy an electronic voter register instead of a manual version. The IEBC, in charge of election organization as laid out in the Constitution, decided to implement an electronic system to avoid the manipulations that had apparently occurred during previous elections, such as multiple voting and the use of ghost voters. Hassan further commented on the high number of invalid votes that had reached 5% of all the votes counted to that point, and stated that an audit would be run to investigate their “quite worrying” (Sapa-AP 2013, p. 2) number. Even before the IEBC made the failure of some BVR kits public, CORD officials had expressed their nervous concern about the legitimacy of the election process. Frank Bett, a senior CORD official, had made comments in media reports about late voting, rumours of multiple voting in some areas, and a failure of the electronic voter registration system in some places: “These we find to be placing jeopardy the credibility of this process” (Reuters 2013, p. 2). Despite these early dissonances, Kenyans waited patiently and uncomplainingly for the final elections results despite several delays in their announcement.
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According to Article 138, Number 10 of the new Constitution, the Chairperson of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission has 7 days to declare the results of an election. Although priority was granted to the Presidential tallying, the IEBC could not keep its public commitment to deliver the final results within 48 hours. Although 3 days had passed after the general elections, the counting process had not shown substantial progress. Forty- eight hours after the polls closed, the IEBC acknowledged the complete crash of the virtual private network (VPN) that was supposed to transmit the results from the 33,000 polling stations first to the county tallying centre and finally to the national tallying centre in Nairobi. As a consequence, a manual tallying process—for transporting the different forms that had to be signed by party representatives present on the ground—had to be installed. Furthermore, a software bug was found to have manipulated the number of invalid votes by multiplying the number of rejected ballots by a factor of eight. At its peak, the number of rejected ballots was 6% of all votes cast, “generating nervousness among election watchers over the credibility and legitimacy of the eventual outcome” (Tucker 2013, p. 1). After the bug was detected and the calculation adjusted, the number of rejected ballots was 1% of all votes cast. After the return to the manual tallying process, the credibility of the electoral process began to totter.
An urgent attempt by the African Centre for Open Governance (AFRICOG) to stop the manual tallying process was dismissed by the High Court because of the lack of jurisdiction of any petition concerning Presidential elections. Nevertheless, the ruling of the three member panel acknowledged the raising of serious issues and advocated reference to the Supreme Court. On Saturday March 9, 2013, the Chairman of the IEBC declared Uhuru Kenyatta to be the 5 th President-elect of Kenya. He had defeated his chief opponent Raila Odinga with a surprisingly clear decisiveness of 6.2 to 5.3 million votes (50.07% to 43.6%). By passing the required 50% plus one benchmark, Kenyatta also avoided a Presidential runoff. The announcement was accompanied immediately by the filing of several petitions to the Supreme Court, challenging the declaration of Kenyatta as President elect, and the general freeness and fairness of the entire electoral process.
6.7.6 Conclusion The aim of this chapter was to provide some insight into the political system of Kenya and to assess the democratic performance of Kenya during the conduct of the 2013 elections against the legal framework of the new Constitution. Election performance was measured by Wigell’s regime typology as the theoretical basis for the analysis, and the latest PEI data as the empirical base. With respect to the 2013 elections, the democratic performance of Kenya was 181 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
a mixed picture. Experts gave high performance levels for the peacefulness of the 2013 elections, and highly praised the constitutional reforms achieved. In their opinion, Kenyans had a real choice at the ballot box, which indicated an increasing trust in the variety of party candidates. All parties were assumed to have had fair access to the media, and opposition candidates were not prevented from campaigning. This is good news for Kenya, and reform plans should be continued in view of the 2017 general elections.
Shortcomings were detected in mainly four areas. First and most striking was that Kenya urgently needs to improve its electoral procedures . The conduct of the nomination process for party candidates needs to be expurgated from fraud and rigging, and primaries need to be held without time pressures. Parliament passed a campaign finance regulation in December 2013 that came into force in spring 2014 (the Election Campaign Finance Act, 2013), with a goal to safeguard fair competition and equality between candidates and parties. The next general elections will reveal whether the new law has delivered on its promises. Furthermore, voter education initiatives need to be intensified, and technical problems during the voting process must be eliminated.
Second, the level of fraud and vote buying during elections in general is still considered high enough to impair Kenya’s elections. Adequate countermeasures need to be implemented to make Kenyan elections truly free and trustworthy. Third, women’s equal opportunities need to be strengthened. Fourth, the 2013 elections did not allow for the broad participation of all eligible voters, and thus did not ensure Kenyans right to vote adequately. Kenyan elections still do not allow disabled and national citizens living abroad to vote by mail-in ballots. Clearly, Kenya urgently needs to implement countermeasures to improve the inclusiveness of its elections. In the preparation of the 2017 general elections, first attempts in this directions have been made, which need to be continued.
Chapter 6 also provided insight into the phenomenon of social conflict in Kenya. With regard to its magnitude, it was found that social conflict is an omnipresent and re-occurring phenomenon. Between 1990 and 2013, not a single year passed without an event of social conflict. The year 1990 was the most peaceful in sharp contrast to 2013, in which the number of conflict events was highest. Surprisingly, high numbers of conflict events do not produce high death rates.
The most frequent conflict types in Kenya are extra-government violence and spontaneous violent riots. However, struggles over economic resources and assets are by far the most
182 6. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of Kenya
important factors for social conflict in Kenya. It is important to emphasize that although Kenya is sadly notorious for violent electoral conflict, elections are only one issue out of many that cause conflict in the country. Conflicts over economic resources and assets outperform elections by a factor of two.
Furthermore, and even more surprisingly, elections did not cause a significant share of deaths, with the only exception—the 2007 general elections. If these elections had produced an average death rate motivated by the “elections” themselves, Kenya probably would not be called a country of violent electoral conflict. It is true that the general rate of social conflict in Kenya is high and the country has had repeated incidences of violent electoral conflict (conflict motivated by “elections”). With the exception of the 2007 elections, Kenyan elections were never particularly lethal. Furthermore, ethnicity does not constitute a relevant motivation for social conflict in Kenya.
Turning to the main interest of the present study, the characteristics of social conflict during election times, Chapter 6 revealed that the 2013 elections were the most conflictual, whereas the 1992 elections had the least conflicts. Not surprisingly, the 2007 general elections caused most lethal attacks.
The logistic regression analysis revealed no significant change in the duration of confrontation within or outside the election time conflicts in Kenya. Furthermore, conflict events within and outside election times produce an almost equally high number of deaths per event. The number of conflict events roughly doubles during election times, and the number of deaths triple. As has been mentioned earlier, the main motive for violence during election times is elections, whereas struggles over economic resources/assets are most important when the country is not at the polls. Last, the level of conflict events and death rates during elections in Kenya are comparable with the average values for Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Therefore, Kenyan elections are not an extreme outlier of violent electoral conflict (violence during election times) within Sub-Saharan Africa.
183 7. Data Analysis: Presentation of Data
7 Data Analysis: Presentation of Data
7.1 Introduction
After the interviews were transcribed, they were analyzed using a theoretical qualitative content analysis approach. This chapter presents the material gathered in the course of the field work, which was carried out from March to May in 2013. In total, 36 interviews were conducted, 32 of which were with victims of violent electoral conflict, and 4 with experts on specific issues of relevance. Two interviews were conducted in a group, and 30 interviews in a bilateral interview situation with an interpreter present if necessary. All interviews were transcribed and completely anonymized. Data triangulation, space triangulation, and method triangulation was used during the analysis to increase the validity of the data.
The following sections describe the individual working steps of the analysis, and are presented in four parts. The first section summarizes the details about the collected material and its formal characteristics. Section 2 provides a summary of the inception phase, including contact making with interviewees and details about the interview procedure. Section 3 tabulates the descriptive details of all 32 victim interview partners. In section 4, the procedure of data analysis is described in detail, including the development of an appropriate coding frame, the quality assurance mechanisms implemented, and a description of the pilot coding phase and the main coding phase. Thus, the chapter follows Schreier’s (2012) recommendations about how to present the analysis process in qualitative research transparently and comprehensibly. Chapter 7 closes with a conclusion, which takes a critical look at the collected interview material.
7.2 Determination of Material
In the course of the present study, 36 semi-structured face-to-face interviews were conducted with 38 interviewees in total. 32 of the interviews were conducted with Kenyan citizens who had personally experienced violent electoral conflict during one of Kenya’s elections between 1992 and 2013, and four with experts in particular fields of interest, such as Peace Committee Work or NGO Development in Kenya. In total, the number of victims being interviewed was 34, as two interviews were conducted as group interviews.
Interviewees belonged to different ethnicities and age groups, had different religious affiliations and gender, and were from four ‘hotspot’ regions of violent electoral conflict in
184 7. Data Analysis: Presentation of Data
Kenya (Nairobi Province, Nyanza Province, the Rift Valley Province, and the Coastal Province).
Thirty-four interviews were conducted one-to-one, using an interpreter if necessary. Two interviews were carried out within a smaller group of two participants, all according to the preferences of the interviewees.
Questions of interest guiding the study were the following: What major changes did the experience of violent electoral conflict cause in the lives of participants? Did it make them change their political participation and/or their attitude towards democracy? What were the individual motives for their behavior?
To find an answer to these questions, data was collected by means of non-participant observation as well. The researcher of the present study visited the interview partners at home or at their workplace, and received first-hand impressions of their living-conditions, working- conditions, and family-life. Furthermore, the researcher attended the 2013 general elections in Nairobi, and visited three polling stations (two in Kibera and one in Kilimani) herself.
The transcription and analysis of the interviews began during the field phase and continued afterwards.
The following analysis is based on the 36 interviews that were taped with the consent of the interview partners 95 and then transcribed in digital text form with time lines using the transcription software f4 (Dresling & Pehl 2012). Three people were involved in the transcription process that produces transcripts totaling 630 pages. The interviews were fully anonymized to completely protect the identity of interview partners.
The transcriptions of the authentic words of the participants are presented throughout the analysis. The documentation from, and professional opinions of, NGO workers, social workers, and clergymen who are actively working with victims of violent electoral conflict were included as information on various issues. The theoretical assumptions of the present study guided the analysis process and was expressed in the core-dimensions (main categories) of the coding frame presented in this chapter.
Although the collected data do not claim universality in an empirical sense, they allow for valid results as they respect the principles of good science, such as transparency of methods,
95 In one of the 36 cases, the participant refused to be taped with a recorder. The interviewer respected this decision and summarized the interview findings in minutes written from memory. 185 7. Data Analysis: Presentation of Data
empiric foundation, and replicability whose empirical confirmation/falsification will require further testing.
Using software for doing transcription facilitated the conversion of the texts into the analysis software MaxQDA (Kuckartz 2010, Lamnek 2010, Schreier 2012). MaxQDA considerably supported building the hierarchical coding frame; defining categories; accomplishing all phases of the coding, including a pilot phase, an evaluation of the coding frame, and the main coding phase; and carrying out the actual analysis. It also enabled working together with other coders (blind coding) to test inter-rater reliability.
7.3 Analysis of Inception
Participation in the present study was on a voluntary basis. In the cases in which the interview partners communicated a certain interest in the study, a summary of the results were provided. The semi-structured interviews were carried out using an interview manual. The actual formulation and sequence of questions varied. Questions concerning the participants’ experience with violent electoral conflict were asked in an open way to enable the interview partners to speak freely about their experiences. The interview language was English. Whenever an interview partner asked, an interpreter in her/his mother language was provided.
The interviews were conducted by the author of the present study. The interview partners were approached by NGOs in the regions concerned. Depending on the interviewees’ wishes, the interviews were carried out on neutral territory (in quiet and/or public spaces or in the premises of local NGOs, churches, etc.) or at the interviewees home or workplace. The 36 interviews were transcribed by the author of the present study herself and two supporting M.A. students from the social sciences, according to the transcribing standards GAT2. All the interviews were double checked by another transcriber and corrected if necessary. Unclear passages were checked collectively. Yet due to the basic knowledge skills of some interview partners, a considerable amount of text passages could not be transcribed completely. Respective words or sentences were marked with question marks: [???].
7.4 Descriptive Details of Interview Partners
In 32 interviews, a total number of 34 people described their personal experiences of violent electoral conflict during one of Kenya’s Presidential or Parliamentary elections since 1992. Eight of them experienced violent electoral conflict in the Coast Province, 3 in Nairobi Province, 1 in Nairobi Province and Nyanza Province, 5 in Nyanza Province, 14 in the Rift 186 7. Data Analysis: Presentation of Data
Valley Province, and 1 in Western Province, close to the Nyanza Province’s boarder. All the descriptive details of the interview partners are presented in Figure 15.
187 7. Data Analysis: Presentation of Data
Nr. of Province Nr. of people where E.V. Level of Income * Gender Age Ethnicity Religion Family Status Current Job rooms at sharing was schooling Group disposal these experienced rooms 2 (10,001- 1 Male 32 Nairobi Kikuyu Christian Married, 2 children 7 years Project Manager NGO 3 7 20,000KSh) 1 (0-10,000 2 Male 71 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian Married, 11 children 3 years Community Leader IDP camp 1 1 KSh) 1 (0-10,000 3 Male 38 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian Married, 4 children 3 years Casual labourer; farmer 1 5 KSh) 1 (0-10,000 4 Female 50 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian Unknown, 6 children 6 years Casual labourer 1 7 KSh) Married, living Casual labourer, community 1 (0-10,000 5 Male 63 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian 6 years 1 1 separately spokesman KSh) 1 (0-10,000 6 Female 31 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian Single, 4 children 6 years Farmer, casual labourer 1 5 KSh) 1 (0-10,000 7 Female 35 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian Single, 5 children 8 years Casual Labourer 1 6 KSh) High School NGO worker; community 1 (0-10,000 8 Female 32 Western Kikuyu Christian Single, no children 3 1 level worker KSh) University 1 (0-10,000 9 Female 28 Rift Valley Kalenjin Christian Divorced, 2 children casual labourer 2 4 degree KSh) Primary 1 (0-10,000 10 Male 35 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian Married, 3 children Casual Labourer 1 5 Education KSh) Primary 1 (0-10,000 11 Male 63 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian Unknown Farmer Unknown Unknown education KSh) Primary Chairman Peace Committee, 1 (0-10,000 12 Male 41 Rift Valley Luhya Christian Married, 3 children 2 3 Education farmer KSh) High School Chairman Peace Meeting, 1 (0-10,000 13 Male 41 Rift Valley Luhya Christian Married, 3 children 2 5 level Church work KSh) Primary 2 (10,001- 14 Female 53 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian Unknown, 3 children Peacemaker, Farmer 5 4 Education 20,000KSh) married, 4 both both 12 years/11 1 (0-10,000 15 Female & Male 37/50 Rift Valley children/married, 7 Farmer/Fish Farmer 3/2 6/5 Kikuyu Christian years KSh) children 1 (0-10,000 16 Female 54 Nyanza Luo Christian Widdow, 12 children None Farmer 2 12 KSh) Living separately, 4 Nairobi and Primary 1 (0-10,000 17 Female 26 Luo Christian children, lives with Casual Labourer 3 6 Nyanza Education KSh) brother 1 (0-10,000 18 Female 25 Nyanza Luo Christian Single, 1 child 7 years Casual Labourer 2 2 KSh) Primary 1 (0-10,000 19 Female 26 Nyanza Luo Christian Married, 2 children Casual Labourer 2 4 Education KSh) Primary 3 (20,000- 20 Female 31 Rift Valley Luo Christian Married, 2 children Chairperson Womens Group 7 1 Education 30,000 KSh) Primary Working with children 1 (0-10,000 21 Male 59 Nyanza Luo Christian Married, 7 children 2 9 Education (education) KSh) Primary 1 (0-10,000 22 Female 31 Nyanza Luo Christian Single, 1 child Cleaning lady 1 2 Education KSh) 1 (0-10,000 23 Male 30 Coast Kamba Christian Married, 3 children 5 years Shop owner 3 5 KSh) 1 (0-10,000 24 Female 28 Coast Meru Christian Married, 2 children 7 years Shop assistent 1 4 KSh) Primary 1 (0-10,000 25 Female 34 Coast Luo Christian Single, 2 children Bartender 1 3 education KSh) Giriama 1 (0-10,000 26 Female 31 Coast Muslim Single, no children None Fruit vendor 3 1 (Mijikenda ) KSh) Chonyi 1 (0-10,000 27 Female 32 Coast Christian Married, 7 children None Laundress 1 3 (Mijikenda) KSh) 2 (10,001- R1Female& both Meru both both married; having 20,000KSh) 28 32&33 Coast both 8 years both Shop owner unknown unknown R2Female (Marian) Christian children &1 (0-10,000 KSh) Primary 1 (0-10,000 29 Female 42 Coast Kamba Christian Single, 2 children Laundress 1 3 education KSh) Giriama informal marriage, 2 Primary 1 (0-10,000 30 Female 29 Coast Christian housewife 1 4 (Mijikenda ) children education KSh) Primary 1 (0-10,000 31 Female 57 Nairobi Kamba Christian 7 children manager children shelter 4 10 education KSh) University 3 (20,001- 32 Male 65 Nairobi Kikuyu Christian married, 7 children retired, former civil servant 4 3 degree 30,000 KSh)
Figure 15 . Descriptive details of the interview partners.
188 7. Data Analysis: Presentation of Data
With one Muslim exception, all the interview partners were Christian. Their level of schooling ranged from none at all to a university degree; the majority had achieved some primary school level. Most interview partners had a monthly income ranging between 0 – 10,000 KSh, five made a higher income. As their means to making a living, most of the interview partners described their professions as farmer, business man/lady, or casual labourer.
7.5 Procedure of the Coding Process
7.5.1 Getting to Know the Data To get to know the transcribed material, all the interviews were printed once and sifted through. The transcripts had an average length of 15 pages. During the analysis, only those parts of the interviews were considered that were relevant to addressing the selected research questions. As a consequence, the opening and closing of the interview and small talk elements were not considered. Information that was not directly related to the research questions but which nevertheless provided insight into the personality structure or the interviewee’s living conditions—such as descriptions of childhood experiences, current occupation, etc.—were considered as background information and coded correspondingtly. In total, about 70% of all the interview material could be processed within the qualitative content analysis. This rather low value can be explained in the main by a lack of language skills of the interviewees and the researcher. The author of the present study could not speak Swahili or any Kenyan dialects well enough to conduct any of the interviews in the mother tongue of her interview partners. The partners sometimes preferred to do the interview in English (perhaps because they disliked the presence of a third person, i.e., the interpreter) but then were confronted with some language shortcomings during the process. Since the author did not want to discourage the interviewees or disrespect their preferences at any time, she was willing to absorb the loss of usable interview material to gain this benefit. As a compensatory measure, the author of the present study conducted more interviews than necessary so to have enough information material for the content analysis.
Working with interpreters wasn’t the solution to this problem either. Although the author invested time and effort in their training, translation always loses information and the authenticity of language and expression. Furthermore, it cannot be ruled out that the presence of a third person had an effect (negative or positive) on the interviewees’ response behaviour.
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The author is well aware of these possible biases and kept them in mind during the actual analysis.
Four expert interviews were treated as background information for the analysis, since they were not offering insight into the personal experience of violent electoral conflict but provided first-hand information on the situation on the ground.
7.5.2 Building a Coding Frame Every qualitative content analysis needs a coding frame that covers all the relevant material. To achieve this goal, a coding frame was developed according to the following four steps: selecting, structuring, defining, and revising .
7.5.2.1 Selection When building a coding frame, selection is important, since relevant data needs to be distinguished from irrelevant data, keeping in mind the goal of reducing the amount of collected material. To accomplish this goal, the collected interview material was broken down according to source , separating it into four groups according to where (in which region) the interviewees had experienced violent electoral conflict. Then, all the interviews were reviewed for incomprehensible (in the sense of non-transcribable) passages that were consequently marked irrelevant. The relevant passages were further reviewed for their relevance with respect to content for answering the formulated research questions. Again, irrelevant passages were marked as such.
This process was conducted carefully and rather conservatively, meaning that passages only were marked irrelevant when they did not enable an understanding of the broader idea of the narration. Simple stuttering, stammering, omission, or misapplications of words were not sufficient to exclude passages from the relevant material. Furthermore, in cases of doubt whether or not a passage was to be considered relevant as regards to content, it remained within the passages to be coded.
To prevent bias in the selection of relevant and irrelevant material, a second researcher marked relevant and irrelevant passages within four interviews in total. Doubtful passages were reviewed mutually. Once the relevant passages of the material were identified, the units of coding were marked within each of these. Again, the second researcher marked units of coding within four interviews separately, and the results were compared and discussed afterwards. Marking the units of coding and the actual coding was done in separate steps as
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recommended by Schreier (2012). Coding units were chosen and marked according to a thematic criterion.
7.5.2.2 Structuring and Generating After the interviews were selected into groups and the irrelevant passages were marked accordingly, the structuring phase was addressed. To develop categories for the coding frame, i.e., the filter through which the data would be analyzed later on, a combined concept-driven and data-driven strategy was applied. First, the main categories were developed deductively by referring to the interview guide, theories worked out in Chapter 2, logic, and everyday knowledge (the concept-driven part). The main categories were successively expanded until structurally complete (cf. Schreier 2012).
Second, the (sub-)categories were generated inductively—based on the interview material— by the principle of subsumption (Mayring 2010, Kuckartz 2012, Schreier 2012). 96 The latter strategy is especially useful if the main categories of a research project have been worked out to a large extent, and subcategories should be added inductively based on existing data. When working with the principle of subsumption, as in the current study, a relevant text passage is characterized as new and then turned into a new main category; or it is characterized as a new aspect of an already existing (main-) category and is then simply passed over. As Kuckartz (2014) puts it, such a proceeding is “characteristical for a qualitative content analysis” and always follows the same pattern (p. 69). This process was continued until a point of saturation was achieved. Residual categories were included at all levels of the coding frame. The process of subsumption again was paralleled, in part, by a second researcher who brought up additional ideas for main- and sub-categories.
7.5.2.3 Definition In a third step, the determined main- and sub-categories were defined by providing each of them with a name, a description, one or more examples, and a decision rule if necessary. The name was formulated as succinctly as possible to provide a concise, clear, and comprehensible description to what the category refers. The associated descriptions were formulated with the intention to describe the features of that category and to provide
96 In the literature, alternative strategies for generating categories inductively can be found, such as in the conventional, directed, or summative qualitative content analysis approach by Hsieh & Shannon (2005), in coding with grounded theory (Moghaddam 2006; Strauss & Corbin 1990, 1998), or in thematic analysis by Boyatzis (1998). Although Schreier (2014) and Kuckartz (2012) consider all of these nuances as being useful for theoretical qualitative content analysis, subsumption remains the standard practice. 191 7. Data Analysis: Presentation of Data
indicators, i.e., aspects of the data that point to the category (cf. Schreier 2012, section 5). Examples were included to illustrate the categories or to provide negative examples that should not be coded in a specific category. Decision rules were added to avoid the overlapping of categories.
7.5.2.4 Revision and Expansion After the relevant parts of the material were marked and categories defined, it was time to step back and take a look at the developed coding frame from a structural point of view. Consequently, in Step 4, the coding frame was revised and adapted by concentrating on structural considerations, such as mutual exclusiveness, unidimensionality, and exhausiveness. 97
Mutual exclusiveness is a quality criterion for sub-categories belonging to the same main category (dimension). It is defined as the entitlement that every code should be assigned to one sub-category only within one dimension (cf. Schreier 2012). In contrast, a code may well be assigned to different sub-categories of different dimensions.
Unidimensionality refers to the dimensions of a coding frame as well. It means that “each dimension in your coding frame should capture only one aspect of your material” (Schreier 2012, p. 72).
The definition for exhaustiveness applied in the present study states that “a coding frame is said to be exhaustive if you are able to assign each unit of coding in your material to at least one subcategory in your coding frame” (Schreier 2012, p. 76).
The described process was repeated using further interview material until the point was reached where no categories needed to be added, and at least one interview of all four interview categories had been covered.
7.6 Trying the Coding Frame: a Pilot Phase
According to Schreier (as cited in Flick 2013), “In the pilot phase, the coding frame is tried out on part of the material. This is crucial for recognizing and modifying any shortcomings in the frame before the main analysis is carried out” (p. 178).
97 The author of the present study did not forget about the quality insurance indicator called saturation (Schreier 2012, Mayring 2010), which says that every category must be filled with at least one code, and consequently, empty categories need to be deleted. The author decided to set this criterion aside, since empty categories were considered important information—such as non-existent knowledge about democracy—and were worth being included in the analysis. 192 7. Data Analysis: Presentation of Data
As recommended in the literature, the developed coding frame was tried out on about 20% of the material (cf. Schreier 2012, p. 151), meaning seven interviews, during the so-called trial coding. The latter is an important part of the pilot phase in which the shortcomings of the coding frame were discovered at an early stage. During the main coding, an adaptation of main- and sub-categories is impossible. Therefore, the pilot phase was treated with the necessary diligence.
The most important decision made during the pilot phase was to decide which material to select for the trial coding. Since the present study does not test a hypothesis, but instead is interested in the detailed description of the collected interview material, the trial coding and the main coding could be based on the same material.
The concrete selection of interviews was guided by the intention to integrate all variability included in the interview material (cf. Neuendorf 2002), especially the region in which the violent electoral conflict was experienced, ethnicity, gender, and age. 98 Furthermore, a group interview should be included in the trial coding as well, since this type of interview might differ in response structure. The inclusion of a subset with limited variability could and most probably would have led to systematic gaps and shortcomings in the coding frame, which would have taken revenge during the main coding.
Besides variability, trying out the entire coding frame was the second most important selection criterion for trial coding. As Schreier (2012) has put it: “Unless you try out a category definition at this stage, you cannot tell whether the phrasing is suitable and whether the category overlaps with any other categories” (p. 150).
As a third criterion of selection, the author of the present study made sure to choose interviews that showed variety in their answers to the question of whether the experience of violent electoral conflict had changed their political participation. By using this approach, different varieties in the direction of the opinion could be tested and coded during the pilot phase.
The trial coding was done simultaneously, despite the size of the coding frame. The decision to proceed in this way was discussed with two researchers who supported the author throughout the trial coding. The decision was taken for two reasons. First, the main categories might be numerous—more than 40 (sub)categories is considered a highly complex coding
98 The interview partners were widely homogeneous with respect to the demographic variables of religion, income group, and level of schooling. 193 7. Data Analysis: Presentation of Data
frame (cf. Schreier 2012, p. 153)—but they were good to handle, since they were sufficiently distinct and thus were clearly differentiated from each other. Second, the author and the two co-coders invested considerable time in familiarizing themselves with the coding frame together, and thus all were willing and able to apply the full set simultaneously.
Coding was done independently of each other, and the results were compared and discussed by using a coding sheet (see Addendum 17 and 18). Structural discrepancies were discussed until mutual agreement was achieved. Changes in the coding frame were documented by the author to keep the co-coders updated. The coding sheets turned out to be a useful and feasible quality assurance tool for inter-coder reliability.
The pilot phase ended when no more categories needed to be added or re-defined (theoretical saturation) and an interrater-reliability of 80% or more was achieved. 99
7.7 The Main Coding Phase
The main coding phase was conducted by using the final frame (see Figure 16; a copy of the whole coding frame is provided in Addendum 19). With the exception that no more changes in the coding frame were allowed from this point in time, the main coding was conducted using the same logic as the trial coding.
Step 1: Familiarize with the final version of the coding frame.
Step 2: Divide and mark the material in units of coding.
Step 3: Do simultaneous coding.
Step 4: Do partial double-coding of interview material.
Step 5: Compare codes. 100
Step 6: Prepare the results.
This time, coding including all 36 interviews. As a few changes were made to the coding frame from the pilot phase, the material used during the trial phase was recoded, respectively. In total, the final coding frame encompassed 13 main categories and 394 sub-categories on five sub-levels.
99 A copy of the final coding frame can be found in Addendum 20. 100 In contrast to the pilot coding, at this stage, no changes of the coding frame are possible.
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Codesystem 1 Knowledge about Democracy 2 Expectations towards democracy/politicians 3 Challenges for Democracy in Kenya 4 Attitudes 5 Political participation 6 Electoral violence 7 Victims of electoral violence 8 Impact of experience of electoral violence 9 Perpetrators in the memory of the victims 10 Year of election 11 Participation in the official reconciliation process 12 Helpful institutions 13 Hopes/Wishes for the future
Figure 16. Main categories of the final coding frame.
7.8 Conclusion
This chapter provided an in-depth description of the collected material and the procedure of coding, which was done with high diligence to achieve high values of inter-coder reliability and validity.
The author is well aware of the fact that the collected interview material constitutes a research treasure of first-hand reports of experiences of violent electoral conflict and reports about its consequences that are rarely available in the world of research. Every effort was made to arrange a heterogeneous sample, with interviewees differing in important characteristics, such as ethnicity, age, gender, and region where the violent electoral conflict was experienced. Interviews were conducted even during the rainy season, which made access to interview partners difficult. Nevertheless, the fact that the researcher of the present study is a female, non-Kenyan visitor who does not speak Swahili and has a different cultural and ethnic background may have brought about an interviewer effect. Thus, the researcher made a huge effort to train the participating interpreters and to arrange gender-matching for the interview situations. Due to time and cost constraints, a gender match of interviewee and interpreter could not always be achieved. It was achieved in all cases with experienced sexual violence.
Reporting their experience was sometimes difficult for respondents, since sensitive issues were addressed. Furthermore, the event of violent electoral conflict lay in the past (telescope reporting), about 5 years in most of the cases. The re-occurrence of violence in the 2013 general elections contributed to the reminiscence of memories, which lowered the telescope reporting effect on the one hand, but sometimes restored fears and uncertainty on the other.
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The low level of education of the majority of the interview partners was a further hurdle that needed to be addressed during the formulation of the interview questions, the translation, and the actual interview situation. The unfamiliarity of the interview situation and the lack of language skills certainly contributed to the reduced amount of codable units within the interviews.
Chapter 8 will present the research findings.
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8 Research Findings
8.1 General Remarks
Previous chapters have provided the descriptive details of the interview partners and the data to be analysed, and this chapter describes the core results of the qualitative content analysis.
As has been set out in Chapter 1.3, the present study is interested in answering the following research questions:
• When and what kind of violent electoral conflict did the participants experience?
• What major changes did the experience of violent electoral conflict bring to the lives of the participants?
• Did the experience of violent electoral conflict make the participants change their political participation? Do they participate less, more, or equally compared to the time before their experience of violent electoral conflict?
• What is their personal understanding of political participation?
• Did their attitude towards democracy change?
To answer these research questions, the present chapter is divided into four sections. In Section 1, the most pertinent codings are described briefly, including the year of the experience, the experienced forms of violent electoral conflict, a description of the perpetrators, and an analysis of one particular form of violent electoral conflict, which is sexual violence. The section concludes with a detailed description of experienced changes in life (positive and negative) and coping strategies taken up by the interviewees.
Section 2 focuses on the effect of violent electoral conflict on victims’ political participation. It starts with a description of the forms of political participation practiced by the interviewees and then compares the interviewees to understand who participated less, more, or equally compared to her/his pre-experience level (addresses research Question 3). This section also decribes individual motives for a chosen behaviour.
Section 3 follows up on this comparison of cases by developing a typology of four different types of citizens identified in the interview material. Their attitudinal dispositions towards politics, politicians, democracy and elections as well as their socio-demographic characteristics will be compared. In a final stept the four types of citizens will be related to the human empowerment theory as described in the theory chapter (see Section 2.3).
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Section 4 provides an interim-conclusion of the results.
8.2 Year and Form of Experience
Violent electoral conflict in Kenya has occured during all of its electoral cycles. The 2013 general elections were the first—since the reintroduction of competitive, multiparty elections in 1992—to be described as widely (but certainly not completely) peaceful. The 2007 polls were accompanied with the hitherto most blatant outbreaks of post-election violence. Thus, it is not surprising that almost all the interview participants experienced violent electoral conflict during these specific elections. For 33 of 34 interviewees (4 expert interviews are excluded, since not all the experts spoke about their personal experience of violent electoral conflict), this was the case. One interviewee was affected only during the 2013 elections. Four others experienced violent electoral conflict both in 1992 and 2007, and one in 2002 and 2007. Therefore, the focus of this analysis is on the post-election violence of 2007/2008.
Figure 17. Experienced forms of electoral violence (multiple mentions possible).
Which forms of violent electoral conflict did the interviewees experience? Figure 17 provides an overview of the forms of violence that were mentioned in the interviews, which included destruction of property, forced expulsion, internal displacement, looting, and physical and psychological violence.
The most frequent form of experienced violent electoral conflict was forced expulsion, coded in 22 interviews in total, which describes how participants had to flee their homes or 198 8. Research Findings
workplaces to escape the erupting clashes. The following statement by a Nairobi citizen provides a good example of such a tense situation:
Very fast we were walking. I could not see anyone. We were literally running and with directions [along a specific way]. Pass this way, pass this way. And we managed to escape. And when we reached the other bridge, then he [his friend] pulled out, because that was not his zone (Man from Nairobi Province).
Very often, interviewees sought refuge in the homes of relatives or friends, local police stations, churches, or simply in the forest. For 11 interview partners, the violence erupted as a total surprise, so they were unable to organize their escape, as indicated by the following statement of an interviewee from the Coastal Province: “All you do is just run and you leave what you have (.) in the house and everything. Maybe you lock the door and run.”(Woman from the Coastal Province)
Besides the shock of having to leave all their belongings behind, these unexpected outbreaks of violence also separated family members. In the chaos when everyone was running for refuge, children and parents were separated, and sometimes could not find each other again. The following dialogue between a female respondent (RF) and a male respondent (RM) from the Rift Valley illustrates what happened:
RM: The children were going on their own. The fathers, the mothers were going on their own.
RF: Most of them got lost.
RM: Yeah.
RF: Because you go, you're in a big crowd. You're moving, you don't know, you have like seven children.
RM: Everyone was running around.
RF: Someone has gone that way. And when we ran, it was in a big crowd. When they started transporting [evacuating] people, you just find your child has been transported, you don't know where to get it. Even up to date many are still searching for their parents, and parents for their children.
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In 19 interviews, interviewees mentioned that some or all of their belongings were stolen (looted) during their experience of violent electoral conflict. In many cases, articles of great value, such as cattle, household effects, or business inventories were taken from them. Although the stolen property varied in value and nature, the consequences of their loss were nevertheless comparable, as the following two examples indicate:
I had a hardware store somewhere. I started to go there and see if it's going ok. When I went there, you imagine, I met nothing. They had already taken everything that was in the shop. They took everything that was in there. And to make the matters worse, they started looking for my house. They took everything in our house. We had nothing left. They left us with nothing (Woman from the Coastal Province).
None of the goats survived. They had all been eaten. People used to come to see in here, picked a goat, and slaughtered it (Man from Nairobi Province).
In 18 cases, interviewees were internally displaced as a consequence of violent electoral conflict, meaning that they were forced to leave their homes for at least several weeks. In many cases, the interviewees had to flee to provisional camps or even IDP camps where they stayed for some weeks or even several years, as the following description of a man from the Rift Valley Province indicates:
The show ground is a big area. People were living there in small tents, so that it can hold many people, about twenty thousand. Even these Kalenjins, even them they were there. Every tribe was living around, not only the Kikuyus were there. Everybody (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
This description illustrates the extent of internal displacement that was experienced by the Kenyan people in early 2008. From one day to the next, tens of thousands of internally displaced people needed shelter, security, food, and water, and—in many cases—medical treatment. For most interviewees, the duration of stay in such camps was over after a few weeks, but for some, this stopgap became a permanent situation. Seven interviewees from the present sample are still living in one of the IDP camps to this day, camps that were built as temporary shelters. They do not have any hope of leaving in the future, as the short statement of one IDP camp resident in the Rift Valley Province indicates: “He can’t stay here but he can’t go back where he used to stay either.”
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All interviewees still living in IDP camps are Kikuyus, three females and four males, varying in age from 31 to 71. Obviously, these findings are not generalizable, since the sample is not representative of Kenyan society as a whole. Nevertheless, it shows that the 2007/2008 post- election violence has had long lasting, life-altering effects on many people, and its scope should not be underestimated.
In 18 interviews, statements were coded as psychological violence when interviewees mentioned they had been threatened with death or had witnessed violence against other people, as the following dialogue with another interview partner from the Rift Valley Province illustrates 101 :
They told him to talk to god, so that he could enter in heaven properly. He looked into the sky and he started to cry. They surrounded him. They asked him: Have you prayed? One of them raised a panga [machete] to cut his neck (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
In other cases of psychological violence, interviewees had to witness the killing of other people, in some cases their own life partner, a child, other family members, or friends.
Respondent: I went to place where some young people had been killed. In fact they were murdered. They were just cut through, using pump guns. And when one of them was struggeling for his life, his phone rang in his pOcket. It was his Mama trying to call him.
Interviewer: Ja
Respondent: One of the guys [perpetrators] took the phone from the young man’s pocket. It was like the mother was asking why is [my son] not even calling and why doesn’t he pick up the phone. So, such kind of things happened (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
In 15 interviews both the experience of physical violence and the destruction of property were named. Physical violence was coded in two sub-forms: first as assault and second as sexual violence. In any conflict situation, physical violence can take multiple forms depending on the
101 The passage was translated by an interpreter, so the statement is not given in the first person perspective.
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actors involved, location, weapons used, etc. In the present sample, five sub-categories of physical violence were indicated by the interview partners and thus coded respectively: first attempted killing, second beating, third hurt by stone, fourth shooting, and fifth stabbing.
Figure 18. Code Matrix Browser for coded sub-categories of assault.
The category attempted killing included all codings of interviewees’ descriptions of how perpetrators tried to kill them. Following is a description from woman from the Rift Valley who was attacked during 2008 post-eleciton violence:
They had even beaten my head and then they left me there when I was unconscious. I could not understand. I could not even walk. And my body was blood all over. They wanted to kill me. When I made a noise, those people held my throat.
In total, four interviewees, three females and one male, reported their attempted killing—three (all female) were beaten, one (female) was hurt by other people throwing stones, three (two females and one male) were shot, and two (one female and one male) were stabbed.
It is not a surprise that interviewees often experienced multiple forms of violent electoral conflict. The question that arises is: Does a clear pattern of violent electoral conflict exist in the data? Using a code relation test for the forms of experienced violent electoral conflict in MaxQDA, at least pairwise combinations and their respective frequency can be calculated as shown in Figure 19.
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physical violence psychological violence forced expulsion destruction of property looting internal displacement physical violence 0 6 6 2 5 6 psychological violence 6 0 14 9 9 11 forced expulsion 6 14 0 12 12 13 destruction of property 2 9 12 0 9 6 looting 5 9 12 9 0 8 internal displacement 6 11 13 6 8 0
Figure 19. Code relation matrix for the forms of experienced violent electoral conflict .
Figure 19 shows that four code-combinations appear with the highest frequency. The combination of forced expulsion and psychological violence was found 14 times 102 , the combination of forced expulsion and internal displacement was found 13 times, the combination of forced expulsion and destruction of property was found 12 times, and the combination of forced expulsion and looting was also found 12 times. Thus, the victims of the 2008 post-election violence often suffered from a combination of different forms violent electoral conflict. In addition to this information, the following section provides detailed insights into who committed the violence.
8.3 The Perpetrators
Now that we have a better understanding of the time and form of violent electoral conflict that the interviewees experienced, this section focuses on the perpetrators. It answers the following three questions: Who were the perpetrators of the 2008 post-election violence? What were their socio-demographic characteristics and motivation? and Can regional differences be identified with respect to these characteristics and motivations?
Except for one case, all other interviewees experienced violent electoral conflict in the aftermath of the 2007 general elections. Thus, the analysis focuses on this specific event in which Mwai Kibaki—a Kikuyu of the Party of National Unity—was rashly declared President by the Electoral Commission of Kenya. On New Year’s Eve, the first clashes escalated mainly in the Rift Valley Province and spread to ‘hotspots’ in Nyanza Province, Nairobi Province, and the Coastal Province. At first the violence was against members of the Kikuyu ethnicity (ethnically motivated)—since their political candidate was alleged to have rigged the counting process—but then it spread to other victims.
102 In a range of 30 segments maximum per interview.
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The assumed motivation of the perpetrators, as well as their socio-demographic characteristics, were made available by the violence victims’ memories of their experiences of the violence. No perpetrators were interviewed directly. Thus, the results reflect the interviewees’ evaluation of the situation, rather than an empirical reality. Since the victims sometimes witnessed severeal events of violent electoral conflict, multiple nominations for perptetrator groups were possible. For the purpose of this analysis, the four expert interviews were removed. Thus, the sample includes 32 interviews and 34 interviewees in total.
In the memories of the interviewees, who were the perpetrators? As Figure 20 indicates, six different groups of perpetrators could be identified in the data:
Figure 20. Types of perpetrators from the memories of the interviewees.
The first and most prevalent group of perpetrators (11 interviews /13 interviewees) were those who were known by the victim: “Most people who would have come to cause violence by night were those people who know you” (Man from the Rift Valley Province). “Even my neighbours, even those people stole my stock” (Woman from the Coastal Province).
Known perpetrators included neighbours (named by six interviewees), neighbours supporting strangers in attacking the community (named by five interviewees), and others—victims’ employees and pastors (named by two interviewees).
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Members of youth gangs or youngsters in general were the second most prevalent group of perpetrators (9 interviewees). Two specific youth gangs were mentioned during the interviews: the Mungikis and the Siafu Boys, both who were operating in Nairobi.
Mungiki , meaning “the Maltitude, the masses or a united people” (Hornsby 2013, p. 676), is a part religious, part self-help, part criminal mafia organization that operates mostly in Nairobi’s slums and recruites from the poorest of the poor Kikuyu community members. By rejecting Western lifestyle, women’s liberation, Christianity, and liberal attitudes of all kind, the Mungiki strive for the revival of the Kikuyu nationalism and animist religion that have been decimted by British colonialism. Although the Mungiki disapprove alcoholism, prostitution, drug addiction, and Western influences, they have allegedly been accused of organized crime, racketeering, contract killing, and even organized ethnic killings, such as in the Waki report investigating the 2008 post-election violence (Waki 2008). The Mungiki amalgates an ethnic agenda with criminal ideation by exploiting the extreme povery of their members and supporters, which contributes to the brutalization of society and ubiquity of violence and murder as a means of goal achievement. One interviewee directly connected the murder in the Luo community in Nairobi to the Mungiki gang:
People were being killed and most Luos were beeing targeted. Where she was staying, her neighbour was killed. Her head was chopped off and was placed at the railway. That triggered their fear. They had to run to their cousin who helped them to come back to Nyanza. They didn't know who exactely these people were, but people used to call them Mungiki. They were speaking Kikuyu language.
During an interview with a Kamba inhabitant of Nairobi’s slums, the interviewee vividly described the racketeering of the so-called Siaf boys, a rather unknown Luo youth gang also referred to as the Black Hands in their neighborhood:
Last week I bought a pole like this. Because there was something I wanted to construct inside the house. But even cutting that pole, they will follow you just like bees. They will come to you like bees. They follow you to know where you're taking this pole because they want to know what you are going to construct. We are not supposed to construct something in this area. You are asking why? They are the people who are ‘guarding’ the slum. They are the people who know about this area. Is this the government we are supposed to have? It has been that way for five good years now.
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As a matter of course, she named Raila Odinga, the 2013 presidential candidate of ODM, as the head of the criminal organization:
Raila [Odinga] is known to have a group. Nobody will touch that group. I can tell you the group which is acting in the area, it belongs to Raila. They call themselves ‘Siafu’, blackhands. They are Luos. I'm telling you, they will kill you today and the police will pretend they have taken that person to the jail only to see the man back the next day.What comes to your mind? Take care of yourself.
Many witnesses of the 2008 post-election violence shied away from openly speaking about the involvement of high ranking politicians as commanders of violent youth gangs. Although their use of these young, often underprivileged, and barely educated men is widely known, talking about it is very dangerous. However, due to the promise of confidentiality, some interviewees were willing to share their knowledge with me for the benefit of this research project. On the other hand, none of them, although they were approached, agreed to be official witnesses for the ICC.
One of the Nairobi women interviewees also mentioned that all slum inhabitants have to pay a “fee” for using the public toilets, which are run by the Black Hands. Although she was visited by several of the Siaf Boys at her home, she refused to pay this fee or to bribe them for any other purpose.
Her male counterpart confirmed her impression of high-ranking politicians being involved as commanders of the youth gangs.
He clearly connected them to murders during the 2008 post-election violence in Nairobi:
Respondent: I believe no neighbour did that to us. Those were people who were properly prepared. Interviewer: Prepared? Respondent: A team. It was a team. Interviewer: Okay. Respondent: Today they are known as Siafu. They were prepared and they were very well coached as to what to do.
With eight cases each, the third largest group of perpetrators is slipt into “complete strangers” and “can’t tell/no memory.” In the latter category, the interviewees were not able to identify
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the perpetrator because she/he could not really see them, i.e., due to darkness, or their faces were masked.
In eight other cases, the perpetrators were complete strangers to the victims. Four of the eight interviewees further characterized the strangers as coming from afar or as having been very well prepared. They were carrying weapons, worked as a team, or used insider information such as maps, photographs, or names:
“It was a funny thing. Those who came to take our things used the same map to locate [the Kikuyus]. You see, it had all the names, photographs, everything.”
This interviewee from Nairobi Province was convinced that the 2007/2008 election violence in Nairobi was not a spontaneous outburst of frustration with the election results, but rather a well-prepared and coordinated event of goal-achievement by local politicians.
The group of “other perpetrators”, the fifth most prevalent group of perpetrators found in the sample, included more diffuse characteristics that did not help to further classify them. Such characteristics included their accent (“They were speaking Swahili” [Woman from Nyanza Province].) or statements on the quantity of attackers (“They were so many” [Man from Nairobi].). One interviewee from Nairobi directly accused the German ambassador to Kenya to have been involved in the preparation of the attacks in the capital.
Members of the police in Kenya or Uganda (named by five interviewees) were the sixth most prevalent group of perpetrators. Two of the five interviewees experienced police violence in Nyanza (both were raped), two other cases occurred in the Rift Valley (one interviewee was permanently internally displaced and one was shot by a police bullet), and one case in Nairobi (a general declaration that police were shooting civilians). The finding of police violence in the data conforms with earlier investigations of 2008 post-election violence (Waki 2008; Hornsby 2013). Although no state of emergency was declared, Hornsby (2013) has called the police response “merciless” as “in Nyanza and Western, two-thirds of the dead had been shot by police” (p. 765; for more details, see Waki 2008, p. 170).
When looking at these findings, it becomes obvious that the characteristics of the perpetrators of the 2008 post-election violence were manifold. Different victims were terrorized by different perpetrators or perpetrator combinations.
The finding that many victims actually knew the perpetrator(s) is crucial, since it has important implications for the process of reconciliation and psychological recovery. Seeing
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your own neighbour looting your home, hurting or killing beloved family members or friends, and destroying the future of other people destroys trust and an opportunity for a mutual process of recovery, grief, and reconciliation. The situation in the communities is further aggravated because only a very few perpetrators were indicted and convicted for their crimes. Many victims still meet the perpetrators of violent electoral conflict in the street, and know that they will never be prosecuted. As will be shown in Section 8.6 on coping strategies, many victims have turned to God for justice, since, for them, temporal justice in Kenya seems out of reach.
Although Figure 21 shows that interviewees often named more than one perpetrator group, no specific pattern of perpetrator combination is dominantly prevalent. In three interview, a combination of the perpetrator groups “complete strangers” and “others” was indicated. In six interviews, the respondents spoke of two different groups of perpetrators (i.e. complete strangers and known people).103
known people complete strangers police/state forces youth gang / bad boys can't tell/no memory others known people 0 2 2 1 00 complete strangers 2 0 0 2 2 3 police/state forces 2 0 0 1 1 1 youth gang / bad boys 1 2 1 0 2 1 can't tell/no memory 0 2 1 2 0 2 others 0 3 1 1 2 0
Figure 21 . Code-Relation-Browser for types of perpetrators in the 2008 post-election violence.
What drove the perpetrators to attack their fellow neighbours or community members? What was their motivation?
As the interviews revealed, the victims assumed the perpetrators were motivated to commit violence for five reasons. First, the violence was ethnically motivated, including the wish for the punishment of the Kikuyus following their acts of revenge. Second, with an equal number of nominations, the violence was incited by village elders or political leaders. Third, criminals simply took advantage of the overall chaos to commit opportunistic crimes. Fourth, the violence was an outburst of anger over the unexpected 2007 general election results. Fifth, the violence was caused by a resurfacing of the long-running resentment over land-issues (see Figure 22).
103 As has been mentioned before, the software MaxQDA does not allow for the combination of more than two categories. A more detailed overview of the types of perpetrators is provided in addendum 21. 208 8. Research Findings
Figure 22. Assumptions about the motivation of the perpetrators of violent electoral conflict expressed by the interviewed victims.
The category of ethinc motivation itself included several sub-forms. Addendum 20 provides an overview of the different sub-forms of ethnically motivated violence during the 2008 post- election crisis, including anti-Kikuyu violence and Kikuyu acts of violence against the Luo people.
In total, 14 interviewees assumed that ethnic motives guided the perpetrators during their 2008 post-election violence. As addendum 20 illustrates, the great majority of all ethnically motivated attacks of the present sample address the Kikuyu community. In total, 11 cases (1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 28, 29, 31, 32) of ethnically motivated violence against Kikuyus were documented. In these 11 cases, the perpetrators were Luos (3 cases), Maasai (4 cases), Kalenjin (1 case), and unspecified attackers (3 cases). Yet, the Kikuyus were not only mentioned as victims of the 2008 post-election violence, but also as perpetrators. In two cases (17 and 25), the Luos were identified as the victims of Kikuyu attacks.
In yet another case (16), the Luos were identified as perpetrators against the Kisii community (another Bantu ethnic group in Kenya). Case number 16 is the only one in which the interviewee identified her own ethnic goup as the perpetrators.
In summary, most of the documented cases of ethnical violence in the present study involve the Kikuyus, and a few cases involve the Luos and the Kisii.
Another important condition for the escalation of the post-election violence of 2008 was identified as the incitement by village elders, members of the political class or the devil (14
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cases).104 Eight interviewees blamed politicians of different levels to have taken advantage of the severe poverty of potential perpetrators or to have instrumentalized youth gangs for their own ends. The following citation of a woman in Nairobi addresses both aspects:
Now what I came to know, Raila used those boys in a very bad manner. They have no work. They don't know how to work for themselves. What they want is just to hit easily way.
The use of violent youth groups to intimidate political opponents and their supporters, to torpedo the political rallies of other candidates, or to terrorize the civil population is a well- known and documented phenomenon in Kenya (see Hornsby 2013). This political strategy takes advantage of the disastrous poverty of mainly young men who get used to using violence and crime as a normal means of achieving their goals.
The interviewees (in 6 interviews) assumed that village elders used this same strategy to incite violent electoral conflict. Whereas in previous electoral clashes, they contributed to de- escalating the tensions by warning specific ethnicities of possible outbreaks of violence or by holding back youngsters of their own community, their behavior was different during the 2007/2008 post-election violence.
The following statements illustrate this attitude change:
1992 it was better because the same village men, the village elders, they were the one who protected them. They were the ones who told them: Take your cow to the chief camp. If you have a very important property, take it to the police. And then they were the ones who protected them since they knew them. But this time, they never protected them. This time, they were just saying, hey it’s very bad and you have to go. They were not telling them like we will protect you, just stay here. They recruited the ones who were doing the violence (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
The village elders they influenced the situation because they were the ones who picked the young people who will go and cause the violence (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
104 Multiple nominations were possible. 210 8. Research Findings
The influence of the devil was named as a third factor (3 interviews) in the incitement of the violence clashes, as the following short statements illustrate:
We don't know which Satan came inside our sons and do things like these (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
So they don’t understand why this or that happened. He feels like it’s the devil that comes. And now he influences the other people who come and make them think about the land which their father sold (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
Twelve interviewees assumed that opportunstic crimes were the motivation for the overall chaos of the 2007/2008 post-election violence. Opportunistic crimes subsume a variety of offenses in this sample, such as rape 105 , robbing, looting, destruction of property and highjacking.
The following quotation provides an exmple of an opportunistic crime that occurred in the Coastal Province.
It illustrates how opportunistic crime does not depend on ethnicity but befalls victims no matter their ethnic affiliation:
She doesn't think that it was only some people from a particular tribe. She feels that it is the work of criminals who felt that it was the best time to do it, seeing what Kenya was going through at that time. All they had to do was tap in and steal and do everything just like how they always do. They were robbing, not necessary looking if you were supporting the same [politica] person as they. No, they were just robbing any business that was open at that time and beating anyone that they met on their way (Woman from the Coastal Province).
In this case, the attacks are assessed as being the actions of criminals taking advantage of the general tenuous situation. Another interviewee described the intra-group development of the Kalenjin people in the Rift Valley Province as diversifying from ethnic aggression against Kikuyus to opportunistic crimes, even against their own people:
105 The five cases of sexual violence in this sample are anaylzed separately in the Section “Sexual Violence”. 211 8. Research Findings
When they finished the looting in the Kikuyu community - now that they had become used to it - they also stole animals from their own communities. From the Kalenjins, yes. And also from anybody in their community who was not supporting them, they would attack them. They could even kill them. That's what we learned (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
Thus, the latter example confirms that the motivation of the perpetrators actually developed over time. Therefore, they could have had different motivations for their actions at different stages in time.
The expression of anguish over the highly unexpected 2008 presidential election results was nominated as a violence trigger in 10 interviews. In some interviews, this anguish was said to have occurred spontaneously, and was the motivation for attacks on nearby neighbors. This version is illustrated in the following short quotation:
When the results were announced spontaneously, I think people became just violent and they attacked their neighbours (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
In other interviews, the anguish about the election results was equated with the general frustration of the never-ending political success of the Kikuyu ethnic community.
Some form of oppression at the end of the day, in that she personally may go to vote and even vote for a person from another tribe. But at the end of the day, the Kikuyus have their say. Their preferred candidate is the one who gets into power (Woman from the Coastal Province).
The long-running resentment over land allocations was named (in 9 interviews) as another motivation for the 2008 post-election violence. The cleavage of land disputes always has had, and continues to have, an enormous potential to escalate conflict in Kenya. It is highly interconnected with inter-ethnic violence. In the present sample, the land disputes between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyus (Rift Valley Province), the Maasai and the Kikuyus (Rift Valley Province) as well as the Luos against the Kisiis (Nynaza and Western Province) were the most prevalent lines of resentment and high emotion. Land-related injustices such as the illegal re- occupation of previously owned areas and the perceived discrimination of loss compensation for those who experienced forced expulsion and internal displacement have squashed any hopes of a cool down of these disputes in the near future.
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The findings of the present study make clear that the assumed origins of 2008 post-election violence were manifold and have changed over time.
How about their regional impact? Did different hot-spot areas of violence have specific motivations for violent electoral conflict? Table 36 provides an answer to these questions. The top three ranked motivations for the 2008 post-election violence were found by sorting the information in Addendum 20 by region (Coastal Province, Nairobi Province, Nyanza Province and Rift Valley Province). The contemplated, assumed motives for violence were then counted together and the sums put into a three-scale ranking.
Table 36. Assumed motivation of the perpetrators of the 2008 post-election violence by the victims of this violence. Ranking of Coastal Nairobi Nyanza Province Rift Valley Motivations Province Province Province 1 Unwelcome Ethnic Unwelcome Mobilization election results motivation election results through others and Land issues 2 Opportunistic Mobilization Opportunistic crimes through others crimes 3 Ethnic - Mobilization Ethnic motivation through motivation others/Ethnic motivation
Table 36 reveals that in the Coastal Province and Nyanza Province, more spontaneous, non- organized, opportunistic incitement occurred, since the top two origins of violence in both cases were “unpleasant election results” and “opportunistic crimes.” Nairobi Province and the Rift Valley Province paint a completely different picture. In both areas, long-running conflicts, rather than a spontaneous outburst of election frustration, are at the top of the list. In Nairobi Province, old ethnical cleavages were at the point of bursting, and in the Rift Valley Province, traditional resentments over land broke lose.
This section has revealed that the most prevalent type of perpetrators in the present sample is people known to the victims of the violence. They were either neighbours or neighbours supporting strangers to systematically choose who to loot/attack and who to spare. The use of youth gangs, even by high-ranking politicians, to cause panic and fear among political opponents and civil society alike was also a common feature. The exploitation of the young, poor, and uneducated people of Kenya’s slums as killing machines for political ends is a 213 8. Research Findings
dangerous game. Their implicitness in the use of violence will continue beyond the period of the elections and beyond their usefulness for politicians to the disfavor of society as a whole. The most prominent motivation for perpetrators to commit election violence in the present sample was ethnic motivation and the incitement of others. Yet, the data shows that the assumed motives varied by region. In the Coastal Province and Nyanza Province, unpleasant election results and opportunistic crimes were the top two motives for violence, whereas in the Rift Valley Province and Nairobi Province, long-lasting conflicts re-opened. Not surprisingly, in the Rift Valley Province, the assumed motivations for violence were the frustrations over land issues that had broken out again, and the negative incitement by village elders and politicians that had increased. In the Nairobi Province, the assumed ethnic motivation for violence was at the top of the list, followed by the incitement of violence through others.
Some statements of the interviewees indicated that the motivations of the perpetrators changed over time. It is conceivable that an initial anguish about an unpleasant election result further fired up the continuation of ethnical cleavages and the resentments over land issues. Or the ethnical motivation may have mutated into opportunistic crime, considering the ongoing extreme poverty, frustration, and life without hope of many Kenyans. The potential of violent electoral conflict cannot be reduced until the long-lasting conflicts are addressed and managed properly. Furthermore, as long as the political success of a certain candidate decides the life or death of an entire ethnical community, elections will remain an arena of merciless ethnical fighting.
8.4 Sexual Violence
The second form of physical violence coded from the research data was sexual violence, including rape and attempted rape. Sexual violence in general and against women in particular, has received growing scientific attention with the documentation of its massive use during conflicts in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Uganda (see for example Bastick et al. 2007; Highgate 2004 Mobekk 2006; Peterman et al. 2011; Sivakumaran 2007). According to Bastick et al.(2007):
Conflict-related sexual violence occurs in homes, fields, places of detention, military sites, and camps for refugees and displaced persons. It occurs at the height of armed conflict, during population displacement, and continues after conflict. (…) In many conflicts, indigenous people or people from specific population groups are targeted for 214 8. Research Findings
sexual violence based upon their ethnicity. Perpetrators of sexual violence in armed conflict include members of official armed and security forces, paramilitary groups, non-state armed groups, humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel, and civilians (p. 9).
The majority of victims of sexual violence are females, although male victims do exist (see Sivakumaran 2007). In the present sample, five female interviewees reported to have suffered from sexual violence, and one other woman reported an attempted rape. All the women were from the Luo ethnic group, but experienced sexual violence at different hot spot areas (Coastal Province, Rift Valley Province, and Nyanza Province). In 2008, their ages ranged between 20 and 29, and they all had a low level of education and income. Three of the five victims were married, one was unmarried, and one was living separately from her husband. Four women had children, and one was 6 months pregnant when she was attacked. None of the women knew the rapists personally, and the rapes occurred in a public space. All the women were raped multiple times and by multiple rapists, as the following short statements indicate:
They were many men. One would finish with me and another one comes and another one comes (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
They raped me and then they leave me theres. After one hour I stood up and then I walk slowly into my House (Woman from Nyanza Province).
Thereafter, the four men, the police officers grebbed her, and they threw her in a ditch, in drainage. And the four of the men raped her many times.When she was raped, she was six months pregnant (Woman from Nyanza Province).
Another woman was held hostage by a group of police men for about 2 weeks, during which she was raped multiple times and had to witness the rape of other women. From her description, it appears to have been a rape camp, comparable (but in smaller dimensions) to those in other armed conflicts:
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They used to identify these people [the women] if you were speaking a certain language and that other person who was abusing, speaks the same language. Then you could be saved, you could you could have been saved from being molested. But if one of the abusers didn’t speak your language, then they [the women] were taken. They were Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin who were taken. They were taken-to another place, where they were abused. In the mornings, they were taken back. It went on like that for round two weeks (Woman from the Coastal Province).
The preceding quotation indicates further that the attack against the woman was ethnically motivated. In the memory of this victim, only those women were held hostage that belonged to the specific ethnic groups of Luos, Luhyas, and Kalendjins. As she described, since the perpetrators picked women who did not speak their personal dialogue, it can be assumed that the perpetrators of this case did not belong to the Luos, Luhyas, or Kalenjins.
Another woman clearly identified the perpetrators as Luos, meaning that they belonged to the same ethnic group as the victim: They were Luos like me. Yes. She saw the perpetrators only once after the elections (Woman from Nyanza Province).
One of the women confirmed that the perpetrators intentionally chose people from the Luo community. Whether or not they were Luo themselves cannot be confirmed, since she only referred to them as “Kisumu speaking”:
They [the perpetrators] were speaking Kisumo. The majority of people living in the area were Luos. They used to walk at the pipeline and the vehicles would come to that plot to take them [matatus & busses] and drop them and then bring them back to the same plot. So, most of the people knew that those people who stayed there, that the majority of them were Luo (Woman from Nyanza Province).
In two of the four cases of rape, the perpetrators of sexual violence were police officers who are notorious for their brutality, corruption, and misbehavior towards women in Kenya. Therefore, the Kenyan police are met with extraordinary suspicion and distrust, as the following statement concerning the 2013 elections illustrates:
The police were brought here just to kill people. That is why they had to keep quiet (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
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As will be shown later within this chapter, the police involvement in handling the post- election violence of 2008 was widely considered inadequate, and many victims of violent electoral conflict shied away or did not see any point in reporting the crimes against them to the police. It was just considered useless to do so.
In one of the cases of rape, a Kenyan police man was joined by a group of three foreign officers, probably from Uganda, as the following statement indicates:
Four men, the police officers grabbed her. She hadn't seen them before and neither can she recognise them. One of them was speaking Kisuaheli. But the rest was speaking English. And when she asked the bodaboda [taxi] people what kind of tribe those officers were, they answered they were likely from Uganda (Woman from Nyanza Province).
The most flagrant case of police misconduct is the systematic kidnapping and sexual abuse of women in a kind of rape camp, mentioned by the woman from the coast and described previously. Not only did these officers repeatedly misuse women in the most cruel and inhumane way, but their choice of women belonging to the Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin ethnic communities manifests the systematic targeting of a specific group of the population based upon their ethnicity. These officers knowingly put the women at risk of sexual diseases such as HIV, syphilis, and other sexually transmitted diseases; unwanted pregnancies; and long- term trauma. This behavior is miles away from expectations of the police profession, whose unique role and essential task is to protect the civilian population, especially women and children, from danger. It is no surprise that the police in general lacks support and respect from the population, as the statement of the woman from the coast region makes very clear:
They are the people who are supposed to protect the citizens, but then they turn out to be very inhuman. Now she never wants to have anything to do with the police. She doesn't want to associate herself with the police (Woman from the Coastal Province).
In two of the four cases, the women’s’ children had to witness the abuse of their mothers, as is deducible from the following statement of the woman from the Rift Valley Province:
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When my senses came back, the only thing I could remember was my children. I cried to where my children had gone. I realized they didn't run far away because my elder daughter was going to join from near. I heard my younger child crying. I called and asked where they are. I just heard my younger child calling me Mama. And then I told them where I was, they came to me. I don't know if they they had hidden in that ditch or whatever, they had hidden themselves. They all came to me. When the children ran to me, they held me and we all started crying (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
Referring to Bastick et al’s (2007) definition of conflict-related sexual violence, it can be summarized that the 2008 post-election violence included sexual violence at the height of tensions, mainly after the election results were announced. The documented rapes of the present study mainly occurred in public places and invloved women of the Luo community at different hot spot areas of post-election violence (the Coastal Province, Nyanza Province, and the Rift Valley Province). In two of the four cases, the sexual violence was ethnically motivated, since women of specific ethnic groups were attacked or the attacks happened in specific areas of a certain ethnic group, so it was foreseeable that the attacked women would be of Luo ethnicity. In one case, the perpetrators belonged to the same ethnic group as the victim. In two cases, the perpetrators were members of the police force, in one case probably from Uganda. In all cases, the rapes were accompanied by physical torture. Although these findings are by no means generalizable to the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya as a whole, the documented cases do fit the definitional conditions of Bastick et al’s (2007) definition of conflict-related sexual violence.
As a consequence of the rapes, all the women in the sample suffered from immediate physical symptoms, including bleeding wounds, headaches, dizziness, muscle pain, and diffuse pain; and also from severe and long-lasting physical and/or psychological impairments.
As a consequence of the sexual abuse, one woman became pregnant and gave birth to a child. Neither she nor the child were infected with HIV. The woman who was 6 months pregnant when she was raped also was able to deliver her baby, but was infected with HIV through the repeated rapes. Due to medical treatment, the transmission of the virus to her baby was successfully prohibited. Nevertheless, the woman suffers from severe and long-term physical impairments, since she was severely vaginally damaged due to the sexual violence, and did not receive adequate medical treatment. To date, she has difficulties in everyday life, as is indicated in the following statement:
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She still has that damage within her. She can never even get engaged or be involved with any man. She still feels that pain and she can not even sit for long because she has not received the right treatment. She was not stitched (Woman from Nyanza Province).
Furthermore, to make the expensive HIV medication work, she needs to invest a significant amount of her income for healthy food. This income is reduced, since the medication causes dizziness and reduces her ability to work.
A third woman repeatedly fainted after her traumatizing experiences and was later on diagnosed with tuberculosis. She had to be treated with medication for about 8 months. The fourth women admitted to suffering from long time vaginal impairments due to the experienced sexual violence:
She's releasing some water, from the abdomen. That is something that she never used to experience. This came as a result of the raped body that she lived through (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
The long-term physical impairments found in the sample included rape-related pregnancy, infection with HIV, vaginal damage, fainting, tuberculosis, incontinence, and ascitic water retention.
Sexual violence, such as rape and attempted rape, very often are accompanied by severe psychological impairments of the vivtims as well. A rape is a deeply traumatizing event that can cause short- and long-term psychological impairments with severe consequences on the victim’s social and family life and intrapersonal well-being (see, for example, Lon čar et al. 2006; Coker et al. 2002; Campbell et al. 2002). Yet, coping with this kind of traumatizing event is a highly individual process, and the psychological responses are therefore similar but not identical.
It is important to note that the assessment of short term emotional reactions and the long term psychological consequences of rape or attempted rape on the victims is not a professional mental status examination. The interviews conducted did not include a clinical questionnaire nor was the prior psychiatric history of the women victims diagnosed. Rather, the semi- structured interviews allowed them to speak about their lives, jobs, and family history prior to the actual narration of their experience of sexual violence. The relevant text passages were coded according to described symptoms, such as nightmares/flashbacks, social withdrawal, or
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switching to survival mode, which do not classify as psychiatric diagnoses. Nevertheless, they will be interpreted by consulting the DSM-V, the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (APA 2015), and different fact sheets on psychiatric diseases such as depression and posttraumatic stress disorder provided by the American Psychiatric Association (APA).
The most frequent emotional reaction of all the women interviewed, including the victim of the attempted rape, was a strong feeling of fear. This reaction is briefly illustrated by the following two short statements:
There was that fear earlier when she was raped. Fear of going to the market where she feared being involved again (Woman from Nyanza Province).
When this happened, for a long time she did not leave the house. She was always indoors because of fear until when things had cooled down (Victim of attempted rape from Nyanza Province).
These statements focus on the women’s fear of being raped or generally victimized again. In contrast, other statements addressing fear included a more unspecific fear about unsafety or how to survive economically, how to feed or get clothing for the children, how to pay their school fees etc.:
In the past, I was very scared. Even at home, I was very afraid. I could not even manage to get out of the house, when I thought of what happened to me (Woman from Nyanza Province).
If she doesn't go to look for all these odd jobs then she cannot get food to eat. Then she cannot support her son. She just has to. Even if it means her washing peoples’ toilets in order to get something to eat. She has to do it (Woman from Nyanza Province).
When she went home to visit her kids, she would feel really bad because now the kids don't go to school and that's what really gets to her emotionally (Woman from the Coastal Province).
Another very specific fear concerned the victim’s husband, whom she feared would react negatively when informed about her molestation: "She felt like hiding herself because the husband might do something” (Woman from Nyanza Province).
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Besides fear, one other emotional reaction was traceable within the coded interviews. The emotional reaction of confusion was expressed in one case directly after the perpetrators left and in one case after a time lag.
Besides these negative emotional reactions (fear and confusion), the victims of sexual violence expressed more long-term negative feelings that developed as a result of their molestation. All four rape victims expressed the feeling of decreased trust in other people, as exemplified in the following statements:
Yes, it has changed my thinking about other people. You know, in our days, if you meet a crowd of PEople you cannot know what happens, you can just reach them and you go. People are not friends (Woman from Nyanza Province).
No one you can trust in, except god. It's better to live with your people, where your people are many. In case of violence, then you will have people to run to. When you are alone in a strange land with different tribes, she doesn’t want to be there. They wanted her blood and the familie’s blood. That has made her even not wanting to go back to live with any other people or any other tribe. She prefers to stay in her own county, at her own place (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
Whereas the first statement reveals a decrease in trust towards other people in general, the second clearly concerns people from other tribes. Living with people from other tribes constitutes a life threat to her, which she intends to avoid in the future. Consequently, she advocates the separation of Kenya’s different ethnic tribes into separate counties. This position is consistent with her assumption that her perpetrators intentionally chose a Luo woman rape victim. In her case, inter-ethnic violence is answered with mistrust towards people from other tribes and the wish for physical separation from them.
This reaction behavior is not echoed by the second woman reporting the selection of rape victims according to ethnic affiliations. Although she assumed that especially Luo, Luhya, and Kalenjin women were taken hostage (in a camp) by perpetrators of other ethnic groups, her reaction is the opposite of the previous case:
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She has no problem with other ethnic groups. Even during that time, there were different ethnic groups and they went through the same things. There was nothing to fight about among them. They were united; they had no quarrels, no disputes among them. Ttheywere different people in one group and they were going through the same thing. She doesn't feel that there's anything wrong with people from other ethnic groups (Woman from the Coastal Province).
This difference in reaction may have two explanations. First, the woman from the coast identified her rapist as members of the Kenyan police force and thus developed a strong antipathy (she even speaks of hate) towards this group. Although her brother came to rescue her and some other women from the camp, she broke off contact with him, since he was a policeman too. Whereas in the previous case the rape victim channeled her negative feelings towards members of other ethnic groups, the woman from the Coastal Province channelled hers towards policemen. Secondly, the woman from the Coastal Province shared her experience with other women from at least two other ethnic tribes. Thus, she never had an impression that her own ethnic group was the only ethnic group that was victimized. Furthermore, since the exact ethnicity of her perpetrators remained unknown, a simplistic division of bad ethnic tribes (those of the perpetrators) and good ethnic tribes (those of the victims) did not arise.
Other negative feelings included the feeling of despair, expressed by two of the four rape victims, and a general feeling of disappointment expressed by two women. Other negative feelings expressed by only one woman were sadness and shame.
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Figure 23. Code Relation Matrix for forms of negative feelings and emotions.
As Figure 23 indicates, negative emotions and feelings often were expressed in combination (inter-code combinations); the same was found for different feelings/different emotions (intra- code combinations). Yet, no specific combination is outstandingly prevalent.
As indicated in Chapter 2.4, the present study is inter alia interested in the question, of whether the experience of violent electoral conflict leads to psychological effects on the person concerned. The experience of sexual violence during the 2008 post-election period clearly qualifies as severe violent electoral conflict. If psychological effects occur after the experience of violent electoral conflict, they should be traceable within the coded material of the five victims of sexual violence under consideration.
In total, nine psychologically relevant symptoms were found in the interviews with the five women victims of sexual violence that occurred during the 2008 post-election period. They include symptoms such as avoidance of memory, depressed moods, an attempt to hide the experience from others, nightmares/flashbacks, pessimistic thoughts, social withdrawal, suicidal ideation, switch to survival mode/emotional brutalization and the general notion of traumatization (see Figure 24). The latter category was an N-vivo that was used whenever the victims themselves referred to their experiences as a trauma or as traumatizing.
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Figure 24. Code Matrix Browser for coded sub-categories of psychological problems.
As Figure 24 illustrates, all five women victims mentioned an experience of depressed moods, as is reflected in the following statements:
She wants to be back to the way she was. Without stress, without those kind of memories. She wants to go back to her life (Woman from Nyanza Province).
At times she's only strong because she's a leader. But at times she even reflects back and she feels pain. Then even tears come in her eyes (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
The coded segments reveal that, even after 5 years, the women still suffer from the experience, and go through phases of sadness and the feeling of emptiness.
The attempt to hide their experience of sexual violence was expressed by four of the five women victims, whereupon three different types of hiding could be found: 1) hiding the experience from the husband (in two cases), 2) hiding from other members of the community to avoid gossip and blaming (in four cases), and two women only confessed their trauma to their closest family members such as a mother and a brother, and 3) the avoidance of distressing memories (in one case). All three dimensions are illustrated in the following quotations:
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Even the women, the market tenders, the reason why she wouldn't want to tell them is that because she knows these women. These women never stop speaking about people and in case she told them her problem, then the women would go ahead and tell other women that this lady is HIV positive and that she was raped. She didn’t want that. So she decied to keep quiet (Woman from Nyanza Province).
She didn't confess to her husband because with the kind of man that he was in the house. It was not that easy (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
You know you can meet so many people. After meeting them the first thing that comes up your mind is what happens to you now? So you are still afraid. After some years, it will bury (Woman from Nyanza Province).
In one case, one woman’s attempt to hide her experience from others went so far as she would not confess her rapes to medical personnel. Neither did she have the courage to tell her (female) midwife nor the doctors at two different hospitals. The feeling of shame and fear of being blamed was too overwhelming for her to confess her experience.
Just like depressed moods and the hiding of experience, the withdrawal of women victims from social activities and other people in general was found in four of the five interviews under consideration. Some women did not leave their house for a long time, sometimes because of fear and other times because of a general fatigue or the wish to be alone.
Others avoided specific people or places, such as the church, as the following example illustrates:
Being that she had to work in a bar, sometimes when she met a member of the congregation, it will become the talk in the church. That really used to teach her, not to participate too much. But she had to work, even if it was in the bar so that her kids could at least eat (Woman from the Coastal Province).
Pessimistic thoughts about the future were expressed by four of five women victims but in very different ways, such as worries of not being able to feed her children, fear that they could be affected by violent electoral conflict again, an ongoing feeling of insecurity, or the general feeling of being overwhelmed by an unsolvable multiplicity of challenges.
The majority of victims (three out of five) experienced nightmares or flashbacks in the form of bad memories. Furthermore, three out of five women indicated in their interview that they 225 8. Research Findings
had to switch to survival mode, which allowed them to take up their lives again by ignoring or changing their previous ethic principles:.
She came to hate people. There was that hatred. Today when she hears anything or even stories concerning her violence [election violence], she just changes her state of mind. She becomes scared. It is as if that hatred begins again. She has to be a bartender, working in a bar so that she can get money. That is something she would never have thought she could do. But she just had to do it because of the situation (Woman from the Coastal Province).
But now, I am not scared. Because of gun sellings that we get, each one of us (Woman from Nyanza Province).
She says it is hard seeing what has happened to them. But then they have to move on. They have to move on with life. Even though it is not so easy but she has to move on (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
None of the women reported an actual use of violence against others as a coping mechanism. Nevertheless, their switch to survival mode has some similarities with a phenomenon called violent coping (see, for example, Schulz 2015) that has received attention within the General Strain Theory (GST) (Agnew 1985, 1992, 2006). GST states that:
People engage in violence and other types of crime in order to cope with their negative emotions, such as anger, frustration, and depression, caused by experiencing strain or stressors. (…) Strain refers to events, conditions, or types of relationships that are disliked by individuals: ‘relationships in which others are not treating the individual as he or she would like to be treated.’ (…) The negative emotions aroused by experiencing strain create pressure for corrective action. Crime is a possible coping response, because it might be useful to reduce or escape from strains, seek revenge against the source of strains, and/or alleviate negative emotions (e.g. through drug use) (Agnew 1992 as cited in Schulz, 2015: 3).
In GST, violence is a coping strategy to handle the experience of negative emotions. The category of switching to survival mode/emotional brutalization found in the present study might be a pre-stage to violent coping that allows the person concerned to mobilize the strength (unexpected) and will to adapt to his/her situation. In this case, it might be, on the
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one hand, a useful psychological mechanism to adapt to traumatizing situations, and, on the other, it might result in violent coping mechanisms or prolonged emotional self-numbing, which might even increase the personal distress of a victim. Further studies need to be done to test for the occurrence of the survival mode and its possible dimensions.
As Figure 25 illustrates, in the interviews of interest, psychological problems often occurred in combination with one another. 106 In four of the five interviews considered, pessimistic thoughts were coded nearby the description of a depressed mood. In three of the five cases of sexual violence, social withdrawal, for example, was coded nearby (maximal separation of 30 segments) the attempt to hide the stressful experience.
Figure 25 . Code-Relations-Browser for psychological problems faced by women victims of sexual violence.
To interpret these combinations adequately, the diagnostic criteria of the American Psychiatric Association for measuring major depressive disorder and depressive episodes were consulted (see Figure 26), and then the sub-codes used within this present study were sorted accordingly.
106 As has been illustrated earlier, the software analysis tool MaxQDA only allows for testing the combination of two (sub)-codes. Unfortunately, testing multiple combinations (3-n codes) is not possible using this software.
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Diagnostic Criteria for Major Depressive Disorder and Depressive Episodes: American Psychiatric Association (APA) Equivalent sub-codes in the present PhD thesis Feeling sad or having a depressed mood (Dysphoria) Depressed Mood and Pessimistic thoughts Loss of interest or pleasure in activities once enjoyed (Anhedonia) Social Withdrawal and Hiding of experience Changes in appetite — weight loss or gain unrelated to dieting Change in appetite Trouble sleeping or sleeping too much Nightmares/Flashbacks Loss of energy or increased fatigue Increase in restless activity (e.g., hand-wringing or pacing) or slowed movements and speech Feeling worthless or guilty Ideas of unworthiness Difficulty thinking, concentrating or making decisions Thoughts of death or suicide Suicidal ideation
Figure 26. Combination of APA diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Disorder and sub-codes found in the present PhD-project.
Since the women victims were not asked how often during the last 2 weeks they experienced symptoms of a depression or depressive episode, a diagnosis of the existence of a depressive disorder was not possible. Rather, their answers were checked simply for the presence of multiple depression indicators that might indicate the existence of a depressive illness.
As Figure 27 illustrates, all the victims of sexual violence indicated (interviews 19, 20, 21, 22 and 28) they were suffering from at least four diagnostic criteria for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and Depressive Episodes (as listed in the left-hand column), and one woman suffered from five.
Figure 27. Code-Matrix-Browser for the prevalence of MDD clinical criteria among women victims of sexual violence in the present study.
To summarize these findings, it can be said that all the women victims of sexual violence, experienced at three hotspot areas of post-election violence in Kenya in 2008, showed symptoms of a MDD or depressive episode. Whereas the quantity of indicators is comparable between the cases, including the case of attempted rape (Interview 21), the quantity of coded statements was lower in the case of attempted rape. In Interview 21, only one segment was coded with the experience of nightmares/flashbacks, one segment with social withdrawal, one 228 8. Research Findings
with pessimistic thought, and one with depressed mood. Other interviewees talked more often about problems, and thus have higher segment numbers.
Indicators for the prevalence of posttraumatic stress (APA 2015b) and anxiety disorders (APA 2015c) also were detected with the coding. The experience of violent electoral conflict —in these cases in the form of sexual violence—may thus lead to psychological effects on the persons concerned (Hypothesis 1 trauma response).
Besides physical and psychological impairments, other areas of victims’ lives were affected by the experience of sexual violence. These other impairments include a general economic decline, and changes in their family life, sexual life, social life, and educational development (see Figure 28).
Figure 28. Code Matrix Browser for other impairments of women victims of sexual violence in 2008.
All the women victims experienced a heavy economic decline due to their experience of violent electoral conflict. Their shops were robbed, their sales merchandise was stolen, or they could not work as routinely as before because of a physical impairment. Since none of them received compensation from the state to re-start their businesses, they could not go back to their previous lives. As a consequence, all of them are working as casual labourers now, “doing odd jobs,” as the following example illustrates:
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Initially before the violence she used to stay in a good house, getting her own money and looking after her kids very well. But then with the disruption, after all she had to go through, she had to start looking for work. She had to work for people and the income that she gets is not enough to look after her family (Woman from the Coastal Province).
Again, all of the women victims declared they were suffering from unsatisfied basic human needs, as they struggled to earn enough money to pay the rent, their children’s’ school fees, food, clothing, etc.
Concerning their family life, two women declared to have suffered from negative changes in their marriages. One husband left shortly after his wife admitted to having been raped; in the other case, the emotional bond between the married couple—although theye were still living together—ended abruptly:
You're sitting in your house, it's hard. And even more so because of the world that they're living in, her and her husband. Sometimes he comes home really late in the night. At these times, the husband refused to come for two days (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
The divorced woman further suffered from the condemnation of her former family in law who blamed her for the failed marriage. Two other women experienced a decline in their social roles—one because she had to work as a bartender and people looked down on her, and the other blamed herself for the diminished living situation with which she and her family was confronted. 107 Two women also admitted suffering from impairments to their sexual activity, either due to a permanent vaginal injury or psychological constraints.
Figure 29 provides an overview of all the coping strategies that the victims of sexual violence indicated in their interviews.
107 The positive changes in the social life of women victims are addressed in the next section (coping strategies). 230 8. Research Findings
Figure 29. Code Matrix Browser for coded coping strategies of victims of sexual violence in 2008.
The most prevalent forms of coping strategies used were attending counselling activities, which was very much appreciated by all the women victims, but with only about 2 to 3 days of duration, it was considered too short a time to have lasting positive effects. Social withdrawal, as has been described in the previous sections, was used by four of the five women victims as a psychological coping strategy in reaction to their traumatization. Together with an attempt to hide their experience turning towards faith was found to be the third most important coping strategy for the women victims. They were very explicit in their description of God as their only hope, strength, and justice. Since none of the perpetrators of the five documented cases of rape and attempted rape have been caught or brought to trial, a terrestrial system of justice seems to be absent in Kenya, so the women victims have found assurance and consolation in God’s justice:
She rather dedicates her life to God and not politics. Because politics are human driven but only God is a friend. He knows the friendly people. A human being can continue to go and kill somebody or continue to do other things. But with God, God is always good (Woman from Nyanza Province).
The women victims did not seek a confrontation with their perpetrators, which was certainly due to the fact that in most cases, they were strangers/unknown to the victim. But even if they had the chance to meet them, the majority of these women would not accept and would avoid the confrontation, as the following statement illustrates: 231 8. Research Findings
I would just greet them and run. I'll go my way. Or if I found them there, I can use another path so that I leave them there. And I use another path (Woman from Nyanza Province).
Two of the five women also reported an increased social engagement with the community, such as through peace initiatives, women support groups, or informal meetings. The wish to transform the negative, stressful and traumatizing experience into something productive and motivating is highly understandable. It will be interesting to test whether this phenomenon is generally traceable—perhaps even stronger—among all the interviewed victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya.
Now that the findings concerning the cases of sexual violence during the post-election violence of 2007/2008 in Kenya have been described—including the descriptive details of the women victims; the perpetrators; the physical, psychological, and other forms of impairments; and the coping strategies used—the following section examines a broader range of victims. The focus is on the effects of violent electoral conflict on victims’ lives and their coping strategies to deal with this traumatization.
8.5 The Impact of Violent Electoral Conflict on Participants’ Lives
What changes are the victims of violent electoral conflict experiencing in their lives because of this violence? Are any short- or long-term effects traceable? Do different age or ethnic groups differ in their impairments? Do the victim’s impairments vary depending on their place of residence? In contrast to the previous section that focused on women victims of sexual violence during the 2008 post-election violence in Kenya, this section considers different types of victims of violent electoral conflict during this time who vary in age, gender, ethnicity, and place of residence.
Figure 30 includes the data from 32 interviews with 34 victims of election violence in total. Four interviews with experts were excluded, since they only answered specific questions from their specific area of expertise, not the complete range of interview questions.
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Figure 30. Frequency distribution of coded forms of changes in victims’ lives.
Most interestingly, 32 out of 32 (100%) interviews showed some form of psychological change as a consequence of the experience of violent electoral conflict. Psychological changes could include psychological problems (for example suicidal ideation), negative feelings (such as despair), negative emotions (such as fear), but also “positive” psychological changes (such as increased charity). These four elements will be examined in the following pages.
8.5.1 Psychological Changes Instead of explicitly naming psychological changes, interviewees described symptoms or non- specific problems, such as difficulty with sleeping, a feeling of emptiness, flashbacks, or their new engagement in a peace initiative.
The category psychological problems includes symptoms of mental disorders, generally characterized by “a combination of abnormal thoughts, perceptions, emotions, behaviour and relationships with others” (WHO 2015).
Psychological problems were indicated by 13 females and 5 males. The 18 interviewees under consideration experienced violent electoral conflict in different ‘hotspot’ areas of violence, and they varied in age, ethnicity, income group and education level. The 13 women had an age range from 25 to 57; experienced violent electoral conflict in the Rift Valley Province, Western Province, Nyanza Province, the Coastal Province and Nairobi Province and were of Kikuyu, Kalendjin, Giriama, Kamba and Luo ethnicity. The group included one Muslim
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woman, and all the others were Christians. The educational level of the women ranged from none to university level. As has been discussed earlier, all victims of sexual violence expressed at least one symptom of a mental disorder. The 5 male victims under consideration ranged in age from 35 to 65; came from the Rift Valley Province, Nyanza Province, and Nairobi Province; included members who had an average monthly income of up to 10.000 Schilling (income group 1) and one member who had a monthly income of 20.001-30.000 Schilling (incoming group 3; and all were Christians.
Thus, both females and males who showed psychological problems after their experience of violent electoral conflict vary considerably in their socio-demographic characteristics. Their values do not hint at a correlation between one or a set of these characteristics and the occurrence of psychological problems. What could be a predictor for the development of such problems? The answer to this question was found in the code “level of impairment.” Almost all interviewees (17 out of 18) who considered themselves highly affected or whose experiences were coded as such by the researcher actually developed one or several symptoms of a mental disorder. In contrast, this effect was not detected within the group of victims with a medium or low level of impairment. The same was true for the participants of a group interview. In these cases, the absence of described symptoms of mental disorders is most likely to be assumed to the interview setting and not to specific psychological characteristics of these respondents. The specific situation and the dynamics of the group discussion most probably restrained victims from admitting highly personal and intimate information.
The three most prevalent symptoms—9 out of 32 cases (28%)—were a depressed mood, nightmares/flashbacks, and pessimistic thoughts (see Figure 31).
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Figure 31 . Frequency distribution of coded psychological problems in victims’ lives.
In 6 out of 32 interview cases (19%), the hiding of experience, social withdrawal, and switch to survival mode were the second most frequent symptoms of mental disorders.
Suicidal ideation was expressed by two interview partners. Both were young females, 26 and 32 years old, who were strongly effected by the violent electoral conflict in Western and Nyanza Provinces. One woman was a victim of multiple rapes (see Section 8.4 Sexual Violence) and one suffered from multiple murder attempts and an irreversible disablement due to the lack of medical treatment available in her IDP camp. The latter woman not only expressed suicidal ideation but indicated that she also had attempted suicide three times.
Within the category of negative feelings , the category “decreased trust in people” was the most prevalent, expressed in 15 out of 32 interviews (see Figure 32).
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Figure 32. Frequency distribution of coded negative feelings of victims after the experience of violent electoral conflict .
Seventeen out of 34 interviewees in total declared that their trust in other people decreased as a consequence of their experience of violent electoral conflict. Again, the effect was found within a wide range of socio-demographic characteristics of the interview partners. For example, this effect was found in both gender groups (14 women and 3 men), within the age range of 25 to 71, and within five ethnic groups (Kamba, Kikuyu, Meru, Giriama, and Luo). Their educational background varied from none to 12 years, and they belonged to income group 1 (0 –10,000 KSh) or 2 (10,001–20,000 KSh).
The victims’ decrease in trust took different forms. For 2 of the 17 interviewees, the decrease in trust was only a temporary effect, and for another one, an initial hatred had softened to a general feeling of distrust:
I've forgiven the police. I felt that they are the enemies to people although they are supposed to protect the country or the people around them. At the time when i was released from hospital and then I came in contact with the police my heart would break and I started crying. It was frightening. Thanks to God, we forgive them. SO now if I see one, it is no problem (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
Two weeks to accept, it was about two weeks. After this was done, I feel even I don't want to see somebody called Kalenjin in my eyes. Because if I see one of them, I feel that something comes up. It was very hard to accept (Woman from the Rift Valley Province). 236 8. Research Findings
After the 2008 violence, she really didn't like the Kisiis. She had this pain when she saw them because she thought that if they didn’t come to stay among them, then what happend to her and the husband would not have happened. She had that pain after the counseling which helped her a lot. She realized that it is needless to have rage with the Kisiis (Woman from Nyanza Province).
These chosen quotations illustrate well that the temporary decrease in trust was channelled towards specific groups of people—the police in the first example, and ethnic groups (Kalenjin and Kisii) in the second and third example.
This specific focus is a significant difference from the cases expressing a long-term decrease in trust, which was found in 13 out of the 15 interviews. One interview included both short- and long-time effects. Eleven of these 13 interviews included a general mistrust (long-term) towards other people, and 2 addressed specific ethnic or social groups.
The following quotation indicates a connection between experienced violence and the general decrease in trust towards other people in general:
It’s still about trust. At the moment he's still staying with people. But one thing that he has learned is that he's very careful when he's around people. Because you never know. At the end of the day he's always careful because you never know who you're talking to. Or maybe the person you are laughing with can change his mood the next minute. It is generally about trust. He really can't come to trust someone like he used to trust people way back before the 2007 elections (Man from the Coastal Province).
In two interviews, the long-term decrease in trust remained limited to a specific social group:
I think surely I lost a lot of trust the other ethnic community. Because we have stayed together since we were young, we were all born here, have grown up with them. We were going to school together. And now a time comes when a friend of mine can take a weapon and try to kill me. So that one broke a lot of trust. I don't trust them anymore. Yes, we are talking but I don't have trust in them anymore (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
Now she never wants to have anything to do with the police (Woman from the Coastal Province).
In summary, the decrease in trust is a significant outcome of the experience of violent electoral conflict in general. Even worse, with respect to the present sample, this effect has been stable over time. Negative feelings towards people in general are more prevalent than the
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mistrust of specific groups. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that this distrust of people strongly involves people from other tribes, since this has been, and continues to be, a strong cleavage within Kenyan society.
Besides the decrease in trust, other negative feelings, such as despair (11 interviews), sadness and disappointment (both 9 interviews), rage (4 interviews), and feelings of loss (2 interviews) were found.
Concerning the third dimension of psychological changes, negative emotions , the emotion of fear was traceable in 18 out of 32 interviews. Confusion was indicated in 6 out of 32 interviews.
The fourth dimension, positive psychological changes , was added inductively as a sub- category to the coding-frame, meaning that it was not foreseen in the interview manual. Rather, it appeared within several interviews and was thus added as a separate unit of coding. In the course of the interview coding, 14 interviewees (in 13 interviews) revealed they had increased their social engagement or their charity towards other people as a consequence of their traumatic experience of violent electoral conflict. This “legacy of trauma” (Tedeschi & Calhoun, 1996) is a not well known psychological phenomenon referred to as posttraumatic growth (Tedeschi & Calhoun 1996, 1998, 2004, 2014), benefit-finding (Affleck & Tennen 1996, 1999), stress-related growth (Park et al. 1996), thriving (O’Leary 1998) or positive psychological changes (Yalom & Lieberman, 1991) .
Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004), known as the discoverer of posttraumatic growth, it as follows:
Posttraumatic growth is the experience of positive change that occurs as a result of the struggle with highly challenging life crises. It is manifested in a variety of ways, including an increased appreciation for life in general, more meaningful interpersonal relationships, an increased sense of personal strength, changed priorities, and a richer existential and spiritual life (p. 1).
In the present study, these positive changes resulting from the experience of violent electoral conflict included an increase in charity for the victims’ communities and specific social groups or society in general, and increased courage and sympathy for people.
Two interviewees (two females) revealed an increase in courage in their answers. Increased sympathy for people was coded in three interviews (two females and one male). In total, eight females and six males indicated they had increased their social engagement. They varied
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significantly in age (26 –63), ethnicity (Kikuyu, Kalendjin, Luhya, Luo, and Giriama), and educational level (primary to university). The trend is traceable as well for different provinces (the Rift Valley Province, Western Province, Nyanza Province, and the Coastal Province). Intertestingly, the interviewees did not actively report positive psychological changes after their experience of violent electoral conflict, and most did not connect their increased social engagement with their negative experience. The following quotation is one of the exceptions, in which a man from the Rift Valley Province—now Chairman of a Peace Initiative and active in church work—directly connects his experience of violence and his social engagement:
Yes, personally after the 2008 violence I came not as a leader. I decided to jump in for the communities because even that is enlightening. I told them talk to people about this. Talk to people about the constitution, about self-education, how the constitution assures their future. At the end of the day, I look what they say and I just love the youth. That is now the motivation that I have had after the 2007 post-election violence. At the end of the day, I talk to these human beeings who were fighting (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
For him, educating people about their rights, written down in the Kenyan constitution, is his personal means of engagement. Another victim actively draws strength from her social status as a leader, her responsibilities and duties: “At times she's only strong because she's a leader” (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
Due to their personal experiences, they work to avoid harm or support others in their coping:
I like supporting women. Any project funded to support women; I would do anything if it's a yes. I would go for it. Walk and try to collect some funds to support these people because I understand what they go through. If you are pregnant at 14, you become a mommy; you get into a life where you’re stuck. You survive but with a lot of shame (Female from Western Province).
What is evident at this point is that an increase in social engagement can be a chosen, but nevertheless unconscious, coping strategy to manage better an experience of violent electoral conflict. Men and women victims—no matter what age, ethnicity, or educational level—seem to experience relief through their engagement on behalf of others or for a specific issue. It must certainly be remembered at this point that interview partners were recruited with the help of NGOs and peace initiatives, which may have caused a bias. Victims connected to
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these institutions could have a stronger predisposition for social engagement than other/non- connected victims. Nevertheless, this finding is worth being pursued further and should be considered by politicians, NGOs, and psychologists working with victims on the ground.
The following section addresses the second most prevalent consequence of violent electoral conflict —economic impairment.
8.5.2 Economic impairment When asked about the consequences of violent electoral conflict on their lives, most Kenyan victims first referred to economic impairments. Twenty-six interviewees out of 34 reported to have experienced an economic decline after the violent electoral conflict. Often, this decline was the result, as a logical consequence, of the looting of their business inventory, savings, and animals; or of destroying the harvest, agricultural land, or the family’s home. These sometimes devastating consequences are illustrated in an interview excerpt of a 30 year old man from the Coastal Province:
The greatest effect was that it affected him economically. During the time, things were pretty hard for him financially. He says that he had plans for his business, like expanding the business. But when the violence took place, it just killed that dream that he had at that time. He had to start from zero again. He was actually miles away to his success. He says things haven't been pretty well economically, because he's trying hard to reach his goals after the election took him some steps back (Man from the Coastal Province).
The severity of the described economic crisis on this man and his whole family cannot be overestimated. The loss of his basic income was an existential threat, since he no longer had economic access to the basic necessities of life, including food, clothing, shelter, school fees, medical treatment, and so on. The existence of the whole family was threatened. As a consequence of the violent electoral conflict, 19 of the interviewees had unsatisfied basic human needs, such as insufficient food, inadequate shelter, lack of school fees for their children, inadequate access to medical treatment, etc.
In many cases, the economic crises that resulted from the experience of violent electoral conflict was not temporary. Rather, for many, it has resulted in a permanent state of crisis and struggle to survive. Seven interviewees are still living in the same IDP camps they fled to when the 2007/2008 post-election violence erupted. Their living conditions are simply
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inhumane. They are still living in tents as in the first days of their escape, with no hope of improvement of their living conditions or any stable means of livelihood. During her visit at an IDP camp in the Rift Valley Province the author of the present study noted the following:
The residents of the camp are still living under the same conditions as in the first days of their escape. They are accommodated in tents, made out of plastic tarp, that were sponsored by UNHCR and USAID years ago. They are full of holes where the rain and cold/hot temperatures can easily enter. The tents are arranged side by side, still missing sanitation access, electricity, water pipes, and tanks. The residents are forced to carry water from a watercourse outside the camp. Cooking is done outside the tents over an open fire, creating a high risk of fire hazards. Most children of the camp are not attending school. The few that are going to the town school have to quit after primary education (8 years), since the costs for exams, books, and clothing exceed the financial capabilities of the parents. Two elderly people of the camp have died recently because their relatives could not afford to pay for their medical treatment in a hospital. As the Vice-Chairman explains, the residents do not have access to medication or medical treatment, since they cannot afford to pay the bills. Ten elders are currently in need of medical treatment and assistance but cannot afford it (Interview Transcript, Visit to IDP Camp in the Rift Valley Province, March 21st, 2013).
In cases of severe physical impairments, economic decline is caused by the reduced working capacity of the victim—for example, women victims of sexual violence and victims of shootings. They have lost their status as businesswomen and have moved to doing “odd jobs” on an irregular basis, such as cleaning or washing up for other people.
In short, the experience of violent electoral conflict has resulted in severe and long-lasting economic declines, especially for those victims who were highly affected. In addition, 16 victims blamed the government and provincial administration for inadequate compensation for their loss of earnings and livelihood, and a high level of corruption in the distribution process. The non-Kikuyu victims further denounced the highly corrupt and ethnically biased distribution of scarce compensation funds, as the following quotation illustrates:
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Most of the People that were compensated they bribed the responsible people so that they could get the compensation. Some got compensation because of their tribal lines. Most of the Kikuyuswere compensated. If they asked, they were told that they have to go back to where they came from to get the compensation. Like her, she told the DC, she's not going back to that place because of what she saw there. There was no way she was going to go back there. Another thing is that her name was on the list of the people and she was one of the IDPs who were supposed to get compensation. Only to realized that when the compensation was there, now her name was not on the list anymore. It was a new list altogether (Woman from Nyanza Province).
The 63 year old spokesman of an IDP camp in the Rift Valley Province further indicated that his community was betrayed by the 2008 government, since they would not be granted the status of internally displaced people due to false information:
When they were at that camp, the Chief [governor] told them: If you know a place where you can go, just go there. The government still recognises you as IDPs. So they went. And at the end of the day, it was like they were tricking them to go (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
The statement of a 59 year old man from Nyanza Province summarizes well the expectation that the interviewed victims of violent electoral conflict formulated towards people in power:
I want them [the political leaders] to understand, that the victims of electoral violence should be given first priority in order not to stay where they are but that they can come out (Man from Nyanza Province).
8.5.3 Change in Family Life and Change in Sexual Life The family structures of victims of violent electoral conflict changed due to their experiences of violence. First and foremost, these changes were chartacterized by the negative impacts on their marriages. In total, seven victims—five females and two males—reported that their spouse or husband ended the marriage as a consequence of changes in living conditions. In the case of the two male respondents, the wives decided to leave and live with their families due to the aggravated living conditions in the IDP camp. Their husbands could not follow them because Kenyan customs hold that a man is not supposed to live with his wife’s relatives.
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All five women whose marriages ended were highly affected by the violent electoral conflict: two suffered from sexual violence, one is living with a disability (leg amputation), and two are permanently living in an IDP camp. The end of these marriages was always directly connected to the experience of violent electoral conflict, as the following citation illustrates:
By then I was married. After losing my leg, let's say one year after losing my leg, my husband just left us and went unmarried. I'm living alone with my children now (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
Closely related to the changes in marriage status was a change in the sexual lives of the women victims of sexual violence. Both women who later on were divorced by their husbands reported that their psychological or physical impairment incapacitated them to have sex with their husbands. One of them even admitted to feeling permanently unable to sleep with a man.
The second most prevalent change in family life was the loss of a beloved person due to violent electoral conflict. In total, seven interviewees reported losing at least one family member or a close friend. One female interview partner from the Rift Valley Province lost her parents and her brother in violence clashes during the 2002 general elections. Having become an orphan, she was integrated into her sister’s family. Other interviewees lost their father and brother, husband, a friend, or an uncle. The following statement was made by a 53 year old female from the Rift Valley Province, describing the killing of her husband during the 2008 post-election clashes:
He left the house to go and buy a few things from the shop. He did not come back. There was a lot of noise outside so they feared and didn’t dare to leave the house. In the morning, when they woke up and the husband still had not come back, the husband was found lying in a pool of blood. He had injuries at his head, in the ears and the chest. They used an arrow, they also used knives to kill him (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
Besides her husband, she had to witness the killing of her father and her brother by a youth group (perpetrators were known to her) as well as the killing of 14 other community members.
A gender-specific change in family life that was found in the interviews was the condemnation of female victims for the pain and suffering of the family. According to Kenyan customs, the wife is responsible for the well-being of the family. In case of a 243 8. Research Findings
catastrophe, such as happened during or after violent electoral conflict, she is blamed for the negative consequences on the entire family. This cultural pressure on Kenyan women was confirmed by the Director of an NGO in Nyanza Province, who has been working with women victims of violent electoral conflict since 2008.
Culture is not fair to women. It does not protect the weak ones of the society. Rather, it kills the weak ones. So you can imagine that you have all this responsibility dealing with something that you haven't been coping with yet. There's no way you can be whole. You will always just be stumbling, giving up, accepting to be restricted. Because you don't have the courage to say no and you don't have any alternative (Director of an NGO in Nyanza Province).
Thus, five females reported to have been condemned by their family or family in law; for example, a 35 year old woman from the Rift Valley Province admitted to have been isolated by her family members: “everybody would separate from me.” Not surprisingly, none of the women actively criticized this custom as being unjust or out-dated; rather, they accepted the consequences as their destiny.
Other changes in the family lives of interviewees included changes in the household structure. In five cases, victims’ children are living separately from the interviewee. In another case, a rape resulted in an (unintentional) pregnancy, and the woman gave birth to the child. In four cases, the children of victims were affected by violent electoral conflict as well.
8.5.4 Physical Impairment The acute outbreak of violent electoral conflict in Kenya was accompanied by a high level of violence against civilians. Although present in all electoral rounds since 1992, the violence culminated in the 2007/2008 post-election clashes causing thousands of deaths and injures. In total, 11 of the 34 interviewees in the sample reported or evinced physical impairment. These impairments can be separated into four groups. The first group includes rape-induced physical impairments, such as one HIV-infection, permanent incontinence, and an unintentional pregnancy. The second group includes stress-induced afflictions, such as ulcers and high blood pressure. The thirs group includes weapon-induced impairments, such as limb amputations, wound infections, deformations, and fractures. The fourth group includes other physical impairments, such as an infection with tuberculosis and the loss of sight and hearing due to insufficient health services.
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The severity of some of the impairments is illustrated by the short report of a 31-year old Luo woman from Nyanza Province, who was shot in the head during the 2007/2008 violent electoral conflict:
The bullet went through from behind through the ear and it came past the head. It even affected her mouth. That is why the mouth is not straight. Even the eye was affected and that is why she is using a spectacle. She was supposed to go back for further treatment. She was supposed to go back for operation, for alignmental the ear and even the eye, because the eye cannot close. It cannot fully close. Even the mouth so that it could be in the right place. She's not able to do so because of lack of funds. Even today, she's still having some pain. At times she feels a lot of pain.What happened to her, it has really affected her life so much. It was only in February that she was in hospital for some time. There are so many other infections that she gets or other things because of what happened to her (Woman from Nyanza Province).
It is clear that not all interviewees suffered from such severe and life-changing injuries. However, it is alarming that almost all the injured interviewees complained of inadequate health support in the aftermath of the violent electoral conflict of 2007/2008. Some were denied any state-sponsored medical treatment, forcing them to pay for it on their own if possible. Due to a lack of finances, some went without any treatment. One raped woman, for example, never received adequate medical treatment; she was not stitched and to this day suffers from long-term physical and psychological impairments. Others received basic treatment but had to pay the bills for additional measures, such as HIV medication or further bone corrections.
One of the respondents who was active in the medical service during the 2008 post-election violence confirmed shortcomings in resources, as illustrated in the following statement:
Initially nurses were in a position to handle the magnitude of the numbers of injured people coming in. But with time it was a bit expensive for them. Because the facilities were trimmed and resoures were also trimmed and there was also no room of transport (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
Medical treatment of victims needs to be organized adequately and must respect equality no matter who is in need of medical help. The suspicion of some victims—whether empirically true or not—that specific ethnic groups were granted better treatment must be addressed with
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better emergency services, fair and non-discriminatory access to additional treatment, and comprehensible explanations of medical conditions and treatments that can be understood even by illiterate people.
8.5.5 Change in Social Life The experience of violent electoral conflict has provoked an increase in charity in 14 out of 34 interviewees (see Section 8.5.1). This psychological change was channelled into an increase in social engagement—many interviewees reported thay have become active members of peace initiatives, educational programmes, support groups, and other organizations. By engaging in such activities, their social role has been enlarged automatically by an important component, helping them to cope with their negative experiences.
Undeniably, the experience of violent electoral conflict has had negative implications on the social role of victims as well. As a means of survival, one victim of sexual violence started working as a bartender in a local pub. The negative implications of that decision were that her community avoided contact with her and she was condemned by the members of her church.
Now that the multiple and complex consequences of violent electoral conflict on victims’ lives have been presented, the following section focuses on the analysis of the consequences of violent electoral conflict on victims’ political participation.
8.6 Coping Strategies and Defense Mechanisms
Defense mechanisms and coping strategies both classify as psychological concepts relating to individual psychological reactions to traumatizing situations. They concretize step 4 in Lazarus’ description of the coping process after a stressful situation (see Figure 33).
Strain; Re- Assessment Coping Stressor Psychological Assessment of Situation Attempts Effects of Situation
Figure 33 . Lazarus’ description of the coping processes involved in a stressful situation. Source: Ulrich et al. (1985, p. 69).
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In psychology, different definitions of coping exist, which stress that coping is a conscious effort to deal with a stressful situation (Weiten & Lloyd 2008; Lazarus & Folkman 1996; Carver et al. 1989; Friedman et al 1963).
Friedman et al. (1963) define coping strategies as “All of the mechanisms utilized by an individual to meet a significant threat to his [her] psychological stability and to enable him [her] to function effectively” (p. 616). Carver et al. (1989) further distinguish three types of coping strategies, which are shown in Figure 34.
Problem-focused Coping Emotion-focused Coping Maladaptive Coping
Active coping Seeking of emotional social Venting of emotions support
Planning Positive reinterpretation Behavioral disengagement
Suppression of competing Denial Mental disengagement activities
Restraint coping Acceptance
Seeking of instrumental Turning to religion social support
Figure 34. Coping strategy typology. Source: Figure created by the author of the present study by applying Carver et al. (1989).
Problem-focused coping is a strategy that relies on “using active ways to directly tackle the situation that caused the stress” (CSHS 2015). Carver et al. (1989, p. 269) define the elements of problem-focused coping as follows:
• Active Coping: “Process of taking active steps to try to remove or circumvent the stressor or to ameliorate its effects.” 108
• Planning: “Is thinking about how to cope with a stressor, such as action strategies.”
• Suppression of competing activities: “Putting other projects aside, trying to avoid becoming distracted by other events.”
108 This category can be criticized for its indefinite range. Active coping as defined by Carver and Scheier is a synonym for problem-focused coping , rather than a concretion.
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• Restraint Coping: “Waiting until an appropriate opportunity to act presents itself; person’s behavior is focused on dealing effectively with the stressor.”
• Seeking of Instrumental Social Support: “Seeking advice, assistance, or information.”
In contrast, emotion-focused coping is “used to handle feelings of distress, rather than the actual problem situation” (CSHS 2015). Carver et al. (1989, p. 269) define the elements of emotion-focused coping as follows:
• Seeking of Emotional Social Support: “Getting moral support, sympathy, or understanding.”
• Positive Reinterpretation: “Construing a stressful transaction in positive terms should intrinsically lead the person to continue active, problem-focused coping actions.”
• Denial: “Denying the existence of a stressor.”
• Acceptance: “Person, engaged in the attempt to deal with the situation.”
• Turning to religion: “Tendency to turn to religion in times of stress.”
While both problem-focused and emotion-focused coping are generally adaptive and effective in most cases, maladaptive coping strategies exist as well. They include venting of emotions, behaviour, or mental disengagement. Although these strategies can be effective in the short term, they may strengthen a psychological disorder and thus lead to an aggravation of the psychological condition (non-coping) in the long run. Carver et al. (1989, pp. 269 –270) define maladaptive coping elements as follows:
• Venting of emotions: “Tendency to focus on whatever distress or upset one is experiencing and to ventilate those feelings.”
• Behavioral Disengagement: “Reducing one’s effort to deal with the stressor, even giving up the attempt to attain goals with which the stressor is interfering.”
• Mental Disengagement: “Variation of behavioral disengagement, postulated to occur when conditions prevent behavioral disengagement.”
A defence mechanism , in contrast to a coping strategy, is an unconscious psychological mechanism that “reduces anxiety arising from unacceptable or potentially harmful impulses” (Schacter 2011, p. 189). Obviously, the list of defence mechanisms in the psychology literature is long and heterogeneous. Thus, the present study focuses on the three most commonly accepted defense mechanisms (see Weiten & Wayne 2007) as shown in Figure 35. 248 8. Research Findings
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Defense Mechanisms
Repression Keeping distressing thoughts and feelings buried in the unconscious.
Rationalization Justification of one’s behaviour by substituting good acceptable reasons. Identification Incorporation of an object/thought into oneself.
Figure 35. Defense mechanisms. Source: Figure created by the author of the present study by applying Weiten and Wayne (2007).
All the coping strategies and defense mechanisms described have been applied as an analytical framework to categorize the psychological mechanisms used by the interviewed victims of the post-election violence in Kenya. The sample included 32 interviewees in total, who either suffered from the post-election violence of 2008 or from the violent electoral conflict in 2013.
8.6.1 Active Coping Strategies The category of coping strategies applied (and developed) in the coding frame was acquired inductively, meaning that the different codes were developed directly from the data. Two main categories were distinguished: active coping strategies and passive coping strategies. 109
Figure 36 illustrates the forms and frequencies for the active coping coded in the interview material.
109 As it is common in qualitative research, the author of the present study entered the field open-mindedly, without a pre-existing analytical structure of coping and defense mechanisms in her head. That is why the coding structure varies from the now used analytical framework. Thus, it was one of the goals of this chapter to sort the coping mechanisms found in the interviews, according to the analytical framework described at the beginning of this section. 250 8. Research Findings
Figure 36. Active coping strategies coded in 32 interviews with victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya.
The two most prevalent forms of active coping strategies found in the interview material were participation in counselling activities and confrontation with the (own) perpetrator or perpetrators in general .
8.6.1.1 Participation in Counselling Activities The category of counselling activities itself includes four sub-forms. In total, seven interviewees indicated to have profited from official and organized counselling sessions. In all cases, these sessions were not set in place on the initiative of the victims but were organized by local, national, or international NGOs or other stakeholders. The number of those who received counselling is probably higher in this sample than in reality, since the interviewees were contacted through an NGO that already had organized trauma counselling for victims of violent electoral conflict. Generally, victims described the counselling sessions as very helpful, providing practical advice about how to organize everyday life after the trauma. The following short quotations illustrate this graphically:
It was not that easy to understand the situation until she went through counselling. During that counselling, they were even training them how to share their experiences, how to open up about it so that they could share it with the husband. But it is a challenge in the family (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
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They told us: Even if you have something small, just appreciate it. No matter it is small or big, you can just be at peace with it. A person has so many things he wants, small things. You should appreciate those ones which God has given you (Woman from Nyanza Province).
Always try to interact with people so that you don’t keep on reflecting about the past and thinking of the past. Another thing is that she was also being cautioned against taking her photos from the album, her old photos. Even looking at these old photos is not good because those would remind her of what happened. So those are the examples of the things that she's been tought. And when she's coming from that counselling session, she is stronger, because she stops doing such things (Woman from Nyanza Province).
Although the counselling was considered positive in general, the interviewees did not consider it sufficient with regards to time and the number of sessions. The counselling provided usually consisted of either a weekend workshop or some subsequent group meetings. None of the victims received a complete trauma- or psychotherapy. Many of the victims, especially victims of sexual violence, asked for more counselling to help them cope with their stressful experiences.
To balance the small number of counselling sessions, six interviewees started or participated in self-help groups, either formal groups with regular meetings and a fairly high degree of organization or informal groups that meet from time to time. The following two quotations describe the meetings of a formal and an informal self-help group:
Formally organized women’s group in Nyanza Province:
We have groups and group meetings every week. Every Wednesday at 2 p.m. The meetings are good. We are bringing ‘Merry-go round’. It's a type of banking that they contribute and then when it's collecting time, you bring the money back with an interest. If I have 20 Shillings, you have 20 Shillings, and she has 20 Shillings. We deposit our 20 Shillings. Next week we give it to another person. It helps us even if you don't have the school fees for the child. You can just go there and borrow some money and the next meeting, you see how you can return it (Woman from Nyanza Provice).
Informal self-help group in Nairobi Province: 252 8. Research Findings
I was in a meeting yesterday. If you wanted to know, I can call the people who were most affected, who have pangas’ [machetes’] cuts on their body. You meet people there who were half dead, who were taken to hospital for death. We ourselves, we know ourselves in the community. We somehow meet and talk of ourselves. We were there yesterday. This is a reality. People were hurt (Woman from Nairobi Province).
As the two examples illustrate, group meetings have a quasi-therapeutic and a social, more practical, problem-oriented approach. Victims share their thoughts, feelings, and problems with each other, and find their own creative ways to address practical problems within their own network. Thus, the engagement in such group meetings qualifies as both problem- and emotion-focused coping strategies. The described “Merry-go round” credit system is an excellent example of instrumental social support within the realm of problem-focused coping (see Figure 34).
When carefully looking at the codings, a gender bias for participation in counselling activities is detectable. All ten interviewees who attended counselling and/or self-help group meetings were females. No male interviewee reported that they had engaged in trauma-coping activities. This phenomenon might be explained in two ways: it might be the case that male respondents didn’t dare to speak about their involvement in help-seeking, or the male interviewees of this sample were de facto less likely to choose such options. Both options are possible. The second option speaks to the fact that one male interviewee explicitly indicated that he had rejected an offer of counselling:
Because I, myself, I have done counseling and psychologic training. Then definitively what they would have to tell me, I already know. There is no need for me to go to counseling. I've come to realize that counseling is not much. It will not change you if you're not ready for a change. That's why I reached the point where I decided to counsil myself. I decided to counsil myself, talk to myself, and accept the situation. Then I asked myself: Do we have any positive side of war? That's now the question that really changed my perception. Do we have any positive side of violence? I realized there is. When you have violence some things will change (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
In addition, the psychology literature shows a generally higher willingness among women to seek medical help (see, for example, Strauß et al. 2002; Möller-Leimkühler 2002; Bertakis et al. 2000; Addis et al. 2003; O’Brien & Hunt 2005). Möller-Leimkühler (2002) summarizes 253 8. Research Findings
that: “Consultation rates and help-seeking patterns in men are consistently lower than in women, especially in the case of emotional problems and depressive symptoms” (p. 1). 110 The reasons for such male behaviour, if applicable to Sub-Saharan Africa, need to be investigated further, since socio-cultural (concepts of men and masculinity, mental diseases, and so on) and socio-economic conditions, as well as the availability of adequate treatment may vary considerably from the Western world.
8.6.1.2 Confrontation With The Perpetrators The second most prevalent form of active coping mechanism found in the interview material is the confrontation with the perpetrator category, which was used by both gender groups and of respondents from all four provinces under consideration. In total, 10 respondents indicated to have considered a confrontation with “their” perpetrator(s) or perpetrators in general. Five of these 10 respondents indicated that they actually met and talked with their perpetrator(s). In four of these cases, the largest group, these meetings were initiated by the victim. In one case, the confrontation was initiated by the perpetrator. In one additional case, the victim sought the confrontation, but it was refused by the perpetrator. In two additional cases, victims acted as mediators for other victims and perpetrator groups who were not connected with their own impairment or victimization. The following quotation briefly illustrates the procedure of mediation:
If a friend comes to me, tells me, I did this and this to so and so. I know that I can act as a mediator. I can go and talk to that person and come back and say talk to this one and some help is needed there. We do it to some extent (Male from the Rift Valley Province).
Five interviewees made a conscious decision not to confront their perpetrator(s) because the victim did not consider him/herself strong enough to do so, anger towards them, or to simply avoid an unpleasant situation. The latter scenario is illustrated in a short statement:
I would just greet them and run. I'll go my way. Or if I found them there, I can use another path so that I leave them there. And I use another path (Female from Nyanza Province).
110 One important exception to this general finding for the present study is: “There is only an excess of males in diseases classified as trauma” (Möller-Leimkühler 2002, p. 2).
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The high prevalence of this category might be explained due to the fact that the majority of the perpetrators of the post-election violence of 2008 were known to the victims, such as neighbours or neighbours supporting strangers. Applying the analytical framework of coping and defense mechanisms, the confrontation with the perpetrator(s) initiated by a victim, as well as the conscious decision not to meet with the perpetrators/to avoid any further contact would classify as a strategy of problem-focused coping, within the category active coping. However, if the decision to avoid the perpetrators was taken unconsciously, the behaviour would be categorized as behavioural disengagement.
Other forms of active coping strategies found in the interviews were the conscious decision not to take revenge on the perpetrators (three cases) and the attempt to speak as often as possible about the traumatic experience so that “I did not= put it in my heart” (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
8.6.2 Passive Coping Strategies Now that the active forms of coping found in the interviews have been decribed, the next step is to examine their passive counterparts, as illustrated in Figure 37.
Figure 37. Passive coping strategies coded in 32 interviews with victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya.
Four forms of passive coping were found to be the most prevalent within the present sample: turning towards faith, increased charity, forgiveness, and a decreased level of trust towards other people. 255 8. Research Findings
8.6.2.1 Turning Towards Faith/Religion In 18 cases, turning towards faith was by far the most frequent coping strategy exercised, even when considering active and passive coping strategies together. This finding holds true for Christians and Muslims alike, for both gender groups and all provinces under consideration.111 For the majority of all the interviewees, turning towards faith had a strong healing effect for five reasons. First, the traumatic experience was interpreted as “God’s will,” which gave it a positive reinterpretation. By accepting the experience of violent electoral conflict as God-given, it was no longer senseless and therefore easier to accept. This idea is illustrated in the following quotation by a Christian woman from the Rift Valley Province:
I was strong in faith. I usually pray to my God so badly. I usually tell him: If it is your will I'm taking this will. Maybe you are the purpose. That is what has been keeping me alive. The lord has been giving me a lot of strength (Christian woman from the Rift Valley Province).
Second, turning towards faith actually restrained the victims of violent electoral conflict from takinge vengeance on their tormentors. By strongly believing that “God will pay back” and “God's punishment will be much worse than when you pay back [yourself]” (Woman from Nyanza Province), the victims decided to forgive their perpetrators and leave their rightful punishment in God’s hands. Third, by doing so, they accepted God as the final and only available source of justice. Interestingly, none of the victims expressed his/her desire to see the perpetrators in court or jail as one would have expected. Kenyan law was not even considered an option to achieving true justice for their suffering. Fourth, attending church services, reading the Bible, and praying were rituals that were said to give encouragement, comfort, and strength even in difficult moments, as the following statements illustrate:
She feels that whenever she prays to God, at times when she reflects back, then she gets that inner strength in her. She at least finds some of her strength back because of God. She is able to now stand and speak and she has her life back (Christian woman from Nyanza Province).
111 The sample only included one Kenyan with a Muslim religious affiliation. Therefore, no further distinctions between Muslims and Christians in the sample can be drawn.
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After reading the scripture, the bible, that gives her a lot of comfort. Today she is really free with those people and they can even sit together. Even when they come to her house and they sit and they talk. She doesn't have rage with them anymore (Christian woman from Nyanza Province).
Fifth, God was trusted to prevent future violence in Kenya. When praying hard enough, it was believed that God would hear the Kenyan people and hold his hand over future elections, so they would be peaceful. Following this line of argumentation, God is allocated, if one is allowed to say so, a political role of maintaining peace and stability in Kenya. The following statements illustrate this great hope for God-mediated peace in Kenya:
Without God and his intervention, Kenya would not be in the position it is now. She's really sure that people would be in violence. There would be violence everywhere in Kenya today. It is because of the trust that they have in God that things happened the way they are today. Even though people still are having pain at their hearts, they're able to keep quiet and proceed with their lives. All that remains is prayers and asking for peace from God (Christian woman from Nyanza Province).
She rather dedicates her life to God and not in politics. Because politics are human driven but god is a friend. He knows the friendly people. A human being can continue to go and kill somebody or continue to do other things. But with God, God is always good (Christian woman from Nyanza Province).
To summarize, the category turning towards faith/religion of the present study fits perfectly into Carver et al.’s (1989) emotion-focused coping strategy called turning to religion .
The phenomenon of turning towards religion after traumatic or stressful experiences is well known in the psychology literature since the early 1980s, and has been called positive religious coping (PRC) (Wigger et al. 2008, p. 120). It implies a positive relation to God or spirituality in general, accompanied by a feeling of a deep attachment and the finding of meaning of life. Although the positive implications of positive religious coping for psychological well-being in general, post-traumatic growth, and grief more specifically have been found in the literature, they remain contested (see, for example, Calhoun et al. 2000; Dörr 2001; Harrison et al. 2001; Koenig et al. 2001; Macker & Zöllner 2004). The present study has found clear evidence for positive religious coping among the victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya. Religion even seems to paly a larger role in the lives of Kenyans
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compared to its impact in the Western World. Some interesting follow-up questions could be addressed in further research: Has PRC had a healing effect on trauma patients in Kenya? If so, are these positive effects long- or short-term in character? Rather than healing, is it possible that PCR promotes a denial of reality and a behavior of disengagement? These questions would be interesting for researchers, politicians, and peacemakers alike, since PRC might be (the) one successful coping strategy for creating more efficient counselling programs in Kenya or a wider range of African countries. None of the interviewees reported to have lived through what is called negative religious coping (NRC) (Wigger et al. 2008, p. 120), resulting in a weak relation to God, accompanied by a questioning of their own existence and meaning of life. Interestingly, NRC was found to be strongly associated with complicated grief after the loss of a loved person and even depression in numerous empirical studies in Europe and the USA (see, for example, Calhoun et al. 2000; Dörr 2001; Harrison et al. 2001; Koenig et al. 2001; Macker & Zöllner 2004). Nevertheless, so far, little is known about the existence and consequences of NRC in Africa (or Kenya), a gap that should be addressed considering the permanent and ongoing crises and various violent conflicts on the African continent.
8.6.2.2 Forgiveness The second most prevalent passive coping strategies found in the interview material of the present study—all three with 15 cases each—were forgiveness , increased charity , and decreased trust in people . The concept of forgiveness is closely related to the category of turning towards faith/religion , as described in the previous section. In the understanding of the Kenyan interviewees, forgiveness is a Christian concept both to achieve self-relief and a practical guide to how to address perpetrators. The following citations exemplify the explicit use of the term forgiveness by many of the interviewees of the sample:
She does remember what happened, but she prays to God so that she can be able to forgive. She always forgives them (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
People who did whatever they did, where they used to stay, it was not their fault. Furthermore, their land has already been given to other Massais. So for him, he doesn’t feel bad. There are still some people asking for forgiveness. He has forgiven and continued his life (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
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She doesn't feel bad because the bible says you should forgive your neighbor (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
Please greet me. I forgive you. I forgive your people (Woman from Nairobi Province).
He says that according to how he was brought up, he's a person who has learned to forgive. You really don't know what the future holds for you. He also says that to him at the moment he has forgiven.Time has healed his wounds.It was a long time ago (Man from the Coastal Province).
Unsurprisingly, 8 of the 15 interviewees who indicated they practiced forgiveness also indicated that they had turned towards God/religion. When carefully looking at the coding, one effect is striking: all the interviewees from Nyanza Province, who indicated they had turned towards faith/religion after their experience of violent electoral conflict were not found within the sample of interviewees who had indicated they had practiced forgiveness as a coping strategy (see Figure 38).
Category: Forgiveness
Gender Distribution Provinces represented
Male: 7 Coastal Province: 1
Female: 8 Nairobi Province: 2
Nyanza Province: 0
Rift Valley Province: 9
Western Province: 1
Figure 38. Gender and regional distribution of respondents coded in the category forgiveness .
The outlying group of interviewees from Nyanza consisted of three females and one male respondent who all suffered from a high level of impairment due to 2008 post-election violence. They were all Luos, belonging to the lowest income group (0 –10,000 KSh) and had none or primary education. It can be assumed that these interviewees, although they emphasized the importance of God and the Bible for their coping processes, did not adhere to actually forgiving their perpetrators. This finding clearly separates them from the respondents
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from the other three provinces under consideration that may well have had non-forgiving victims among them, since only 18 of 32 interviewees in total subscribed to the principle of forgiveness. Nevertheless, no other region besides Nyanza Province was completely absent from the category of forgiveness .
The statements concerning forgiveness coded in this study further provoke a question concerning the potentially negative psychological implications of forgiveness: Is forgiveness to be achieved at any price? Isn’t there a right to un-forgiveness and blaming of those who caused heavy impariments on victim’s lives?
While reading through the statements of interviewees, one becomes aware of obvious contradictions, ambivalent feelings, and inconsistencies with regard to their feelings towards their perpetrators. Sometimes holding up the postulate of forgiveness seemed more like a burden than a sincere belief. This suspicion is illustrated in the following quotations:
He’s saying he was feeling very bad, very bad. But then, when people requested112 to come back together, he was able to forgive them. People were saying let’s help one another. He thinks he had no other choice but to forgive them and move on (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
I've forgiven the police. I felt that they are the enemies to people although they are supposed to protect the country or the people around them. That is frightening (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
I just forgave them all. All (Woman from the Coastal Province).
In the first example, the decision of the man from the Rift Valley Province to confront his perpetrators, and the direction this meeting actually took, sounds imposed and against the victim’s true belief. Rather, he was persuaded to agree to the confrontation by the promise that he might get future support from the perpetrators.
In the second example, the forgiveness postulate given at the beginning of the quotation is further and further relativized to the point where the woman switches from speaking in past tense to present tense. At the end of the quotation, she seems to be expressing an ongoing fear towards the Kenyan police, which she, earlier, suggested she had overcome.
112 Accentuations made by the author of the present study, here and in the following citations.
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The third short quotation does not reveal a critical examination of the victim’s actual experiences. Rather, her statement bears the characteristics of mental disengagement or denial of memory to avoid further confrontation with stressful memories.
Instead of pushing the victims of violent electoral conflict towards forgiveness when they are not ready to take this step, they should be allowed the necessary time for sadness, helplessness, anger, and grief. Forcing them to forgive might even be contra-productive in the long-run, since it disregards the pain they had to go through, and it simply covers over the surface of cleavages, which will easily break through again in the future. Furthermore, by forcing forgiveness upon them, the risk of maladaptive coping strategies—such as behavioral or mental disengagement, denial, or depersonalization—in the long run, could be avoided. Certainly, the religious concept of forgiveness constitutes a constructive approach for people to better cope with their negative feelings and to prevent counter-measures. Nevertheless, it needs to come at the right time so that it does not cause psychological dysfunction in victims of violence.
Applying these thoughts to the analytical framework of Carver et al. (1989), it can be said that the conscious and self-chosen decision to forgive perpetrators fits into their category of acceptance within the category of emotion-focused coping. If the appropriate mental conditions are not present, and forgiveness is forced upon a victim of violence, it becomes a maladaptive strategy, in the sense of being a mental disengagement.
8.6.2.3 Increased Charity / Social Engagement The category of increased charity was found in 15 cases and 16 interviewees in total. This category describes the tendency of respondents to engage increasingly in social activities after their experience of violent electoral conflict, in their own community, within a larger regional scope, or with regard to a specific topic, such as civic education, the empowerment of women, the empowerment of youth, peace building, or poverty reduction. This category subsumes both gender groups in equal numbers (eight females and eight males). Thus, the category strongly contrasts with the category participation in counselling activities , which had a surplus of women. An increase in charity was reported by interviewees from all provinces under consideration and by different ethnical, educational, and age groups. The ethnical groups included were Kikuyus, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luos, and Giriamas. The respondents’ education levels ranged from primary school to university. The income groups 1 to 3 were represented in the sub-sample. Thus, it can be assumed that an increase in charity represents a
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general phenomenon in the present sample, with no regional, ethnical, educational, gender, or income bias.
According to the interviewees’ statements, the increase in charity can be interpreted as an unconscious psychological process that resulted in changed behavior over the long-run. The interviewees showed an intrinsic motivation to contribute to a better Kenya, and thereby— again unconsciously—come to a positive reinterpretation of their own traumatic experiences. With the formation of womens’ groups for victims of sexual violence, peace committees, youth committees, learning groups about the constitution, the trauma experience is transformed into something constructive of value that has brought a new sense of life to the victim. By these means, the victims could personally grow (posttraumatic growth) and successfully cope with the experienced stress. Obviously, the level of engagement varied from interviewee to interviewee, but the principle stayed the same. The following statements provide examples of positive reinterpretation of trauma:
We also had a peace-forum about victims to show the whole country that it wasn't only one ethnic group that was affected. We had Luos, Luhyas, Kalenjins, and Kikuyus. It was something consoling to inform the whole country about it, so that you don't feel that your tribe was affected alone. It healed me, it made me heal (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
I already tried to organise some youth meetings, where we would talk about their situation and also abuot politics. It has helped me, you understand. It made me to become closely to the people. I learn a lot from them. I learn a lot from young people. I'm very much happy, very much happy about when I'm sitting with people, very much happy (Man from Nyanza Province).
At that time that the fight was cooling down, there was a meeting I was called to join. It was at the Serena Hotel, where Ambassador X wanted to tell the people in Kenya that we are meeting. I was fortunately allowed to be part of it. When I was there, I was pushing the agenda of young people. We met to strategise. I think we met for one or two weeks. Then there were like strategies how to do things. I was given the permission of organize turnaments for all the hotspots. Because I thought that sports are a good tool to use to bring people together. Because you can play soccer, people want community (Man from Nairobi Province).
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In the political science literature, the importance of social engagement (and political participation) to the successful operation of modern democracies is widely agreed on (see, for example, Almond & Verba 1963; Olsen 1972; Barnes & Kaase 1979; van Deth 1997; Ellison & London 1992; Putnam 1995). Social organizations are called “schools of democracy” (van Deth 2001, p. 217), since they train their members in democratic values and behavior. Social and political engagement generally are found to be interrelated 113 in the way that social engagement leads to an increase in political participation over the long-run. Since the present sample included codings for interviewees for both an increase in charity (social engagement) and an increase in political participation (see Section 8.7.2), the sub-samples were checked for mutual overlap. In total, 6 out of 15 interviewees who reported to have increased their social engagement after their experience of violent electoral conflict were found to also have increased their political participation (40%). When considering the sub-sample of interviewees who increased their political participation after their experience of violent electoral conflict, 6 out of 8 also increased their social engagement (75%). Thus, the general connection between the two concepts is confirmed. Nevertheless, the numbers of participants in social engagement clearly exceeded those for political participation in general. Whether or not Kenyans prefer to engage in social engagement rather than in political engagement after the experience of violent electoral conflict needs to be tested with a larger and population- representative sample and by considering the specific socio-demographic and socio-cultural characteristics of the Kenyan population.
8.6.2.4 Decreased Level of Trust We will now continue with another passive coping strategy found in 15 cases (and 16 interviewees) out of 32 in the data: the decrease in the level of trust among victims of violent electoral conflict. In the section on the consequences of sexual violence on victims’ lives (Section 8.4), evidence was found for a decrease in trust in people in general as well as a decrease in trust towards people of other tribes. This section will show whether these findings hold true for a larger sample as well.
The interviewees who mentioned they had experienced a decrease in trust after violent electoral conflict consisted of 3 males and 13 females who came from all provinces under consideration with the exception of Nairobi Province. The sub-sample also included the ethnic
113 The specific cultural conditions of the country under considerations as well as specific combinations of forms of social and political participation need to be distinguished.
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groups of Kikuyus, Kalenjin, Luos, Kambas, Merus, and Giriamas; income levels from group 1 to group 3; and educational levels ranging from none to university. Thus, the composition of the sub-sample includes an overrepresentation of women and excludes Nairobi Province as a geographical unit.
The most prevalent decrease in trust that interviewees mentioned was a distrust of people in general. Twelve out of 34 interviewees indicated they had generally lost trust in other people due to their experiences in the 2008 post-election violence. Furthermore, the decrease in trust has to be considered long-lasting, as the following statements illustrate:
She fears everybody around her (Woman from Nyanza Province).
It's still about trust. At the moment he's still staying with people. But one thing that he has learned is that he's very careful when he's around people. You never know. Someone may laugh at you but at the end of the day, he's always careful because you never know who you're talking to. Maybe the person you are laughing with can change his mood the next minute. It is generally about trust. He really can't come to trust someone like he used to trust people way back before the 2007 elections (Male from the Coast).
I never trust anybody. You cannot be free, you cannot trust anybody. No trust (Woman from the Coastal Province).
The second most prevalent loss of trust was related to people from other tribes. In total, 6 out of 34 interviewees stated they had lost trust in people from other tribes. These 6 interviewees came from the Coastal Province, the Rift Valley Province, and Nyanza Province; and included members of the Giriama, Kamba, Luo, and Kikuyu ethnic groups.
For two of these interviewees, their decrease in trust lasted for a limited time and then finally abated. For one interviewee, the short-term decrease in trust was directed towards the Kisii- tribe, and in the other case towards the Kalenjin-ethnic group.
The following statements are examples of decreased trust towards other ethnical groups:
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I think surely I lost a lot of trust towards the other ethnic community. We have stayed together since we were young. We were born here, have grown up with them. We were going to school together. And now a time comes when a friend of mine can take a weapon and try to kill me. That one cost a lot of trust. I don't trust them anymore. Even if we talk. Yes, we are talking but I don't have trust in them anymore (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
After the post-election violence, one effect is that it has strengthened tribalism. People are able to come and reconcile with one another but deep inside them, they lost trust. They had the fear that I may be laughing with you now, but what if tomorrow you had another general election and things didn't turn out as you want it? Or as I wanted it to? It feels like people are living with one another, laughing with each other. But deep inside they still hold something back. I can't trust you, I can still laugh with you but deep inside, I can't trust you. You never know what tomorrow will hold for us during elections (Man from the Coastal Province).
The third and last category of decreased trust after violent electoral conflict addresses the particular group of Kenyan policemen. In total, two interviewees expressed their decreased trust towards members of the police, since they had suffered from severe police mishandling during the 2008 post-election violence. For one of these cases, their decreased trust was a short-term effect that ended after an undefined period of time. Yet, for the other one, their decreased trust persisted.
In total, four interviewees reported they had lost trust in two ways: towards other people in general and towards people from other tribes more specifically.
Thus, the experience of violent electoral conflict had a long-lasting negative effect on the level of trust on a significant number (47%) of the interviewees of the present sample. This finding is alarming, since an end to tribalism, mutual mistrust, and fear towards the other doesn’t seem to be on the horizon. This assumption is shared by one of the experts interviewed from Nyanza Province. As the head of a local NGO in Nyanza Province and an experienced social worker with affected women, she summarized the loss of trust of victims of violent electoral conflict as follows:
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I think particularly for victims of post-election violence, they will continue to harbour ethnic animosity towards the others. No matter what you do. There is a core group of people who will never be comfortable with another ethnic community because of the experiences that they went through. Those experiences also are transferred to how the government has behaved towards them, the experiences that they went through to get compensation (Expert interview with head of NGO in Nyanza Province).
The overrepresentation of women in this sample may speak to the fact that men generally struggle more with talking about feelings and emotions than women do. Therefore, the results should not be interpreted in the sense that women are more likely to lose trust in others after an experience of violent electoral conflict. Not enough evidence exists to prove such an assumption. The same applies to the omission of the Nairobi Province from the sub-sample. It might be true that Kenyans living in the capital and its suburbs generally are used to interacting with people from other tribes, and therefore are less likely to lose trust in other tribes after a stressful event. Nevertheless, this argument is not applicable to the loss of trust towards other people in general. Therefore, no further assumption about why Nairobi was not included in the sample of decreased trust will be made.
Most interestingly, the sub-sample of decreased level of trust and forgiveness showed a high level of mutual exclusiveness, meaning that only five interviewees are subsumed in both sub- samples. When indicating forgiveness of the perpetrator(s), the probability of lost trust in people is unlikely within the present sample. This can be interpreted as a proof of response validity among the interviewees.
Turning back to Carver et al,’s (1989) analytical framework for coping and defense mechanisms, the category of decrease in trust is not easily sorted. Losing trust appears to be a rather unconscious psychological decision that surfaces in interactions with other people. Therefore, decreased trust qualifies as a defense mechanism, yet it does not fit any of the available sub-categories. 114
8.6.2.5 Other passive coping strategies Other passive coping strategies found within the interview material were the switch to survival mode in six cases, social withdrawal in six cases likewise, hiding of the experience in
114 These categories are rationalization, identification, displacement, projection, regression, reaction formation, and repression.
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six cases, and control memories by keeping busy in one case. These four passive coping mechanisms classify as maladaptive coping within the analytical frame work of Carver et al. (1989).
Furthermore, two emotion-focused coping strategies were detected: forget and learn from the past but do not live in the past , which both can be subsumed under acceptance in Carer et al.‘s (1989) analytical framework.
8.6.2.6 Conclusion Section 8.6 has presented the forms and frequencies of coping strategies found within the interviews of 34 victims of violent electoral conflict. In total, four active forms of coping were found, which were—in order of their prevalence—participation in counselling activities , confrontation with the perpetrator , the active decision not to take revenge , and the internal wish to make one’s own voice to be heard .
Their passive counterparts were larger in number, with 10 coded strategies in total. These were—again order of their prevalence—turning towards faith/religion , by far most prevalently applied coping strategy of all; increased charity ; forgiveness ; decreased trust in people ; switch to survival mode ; social withdrawal ; hiding of experience ; forget ; learn from the past but do not live in the past ; and control memories by keeping busy .
These findings replicate the coping strategies found in the established psychological literature. When applying Carver et al.’s (1989) analytical framework for coping and defense mechanisms, the picture looks as follows in Figure 39. The coping strategies found in the present study fit especially well in the emotion-focused coping strategy, with four out of five elements being traceable in the interviews. The same holds true for the problem-focused coping strategies, where three out of five elements were found. With seven coping strategies found in the data, the number of maladaptive coping strategies is noticeably high.
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Problem-focused Coping Emotion-focused Coping Maladaptive Coping
Active coping Seeking of emotional social Venting of emotions support [participation in counselling [participation in counselling activities] activities, here: self-help [confrontation with groups] perpetrator, here: conscious decision] [make one’s own voice to be heard] Planning Positive reinterpretation Behavioral disengagement [active decision not to take [increased charity] [avoidance of confrontation revenge] with perpetrator] [social withdrawal] [hiding of experience] Suppression of competing Denial Mental disengagement activities [forced forgiveness] [switch to survival mode] [hiding of experience] [control memories by keeping busy] Restraint coping Acceptance [forgiveness] [forget] [learn from the past but do not live in it] Seeking of instrumental Turning to religion social support [participation in counselling [turning towards activities, here: self-help faith/religion] groups]
Figure 39. Combining Carver et al.’s (1989) analytical framework on coding strategies with the codings found in the present study (in blue brackets). Source: Figure created by the author of the presdent study by applying Carver et al. (1989).
Since none of them has received a trauma- or psycho-therapy, the probability of maladaptive coping is relatively high. As has been described earlier, these mechanisms often are effective in the short run, yet they can strengthen a psychological disorder, and thus lead to an
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aggravation of the psychological condition (non-coping) in the long run. Politicians, social workers, NGOs, and other stakeholders involved should consider the words of an NGO head:
That's why I keep saying that it is important to have a permanent centre. A place where you can provide that counseling on a regular basis, where somebody can walk in at any time. You never know what somebody says to you and you get depressed. You don't know what comments people will make and it takes you back to where you were. We have simply gotten women to lock their trauma up somewhere because we haven't completely healed them. We don't provide the whole service necessary for them to be able to move from the trauma to the healing, the reconciliation and then further on. We don't provide that. What we do it's really very on the surface and therefore we don't touch the core (Expert interview with head of NGO in Nyanza Province).
This is not only true for Nyanza Province, but for all the other hotspot areas in Kenya as well. More of an effort should be made to support victims of violent electoral conflict to successfully overcome their trauma experience. Existing initiatives were appreciated, yet they were too limited to be truly effective.
With respect to Weiten and Wayne’s (2007) framework for defense mechanisms, the interviews did not reveal the use of many defense mechanisms. Furthermore, it is not adviseable to subsume this category ( decreased trust ) under one of the three elements (see Figure 40).
Defense Mechanisms
Repression Keeping distressing thoughts and feelings buried in the unconscious.
Rationalization Justification of one’s behaviour by substituting good acceptable reasons. Identification Incorporation of an object/thought into oneself.
[Decreased trust]
Figure 40. Combination of Weiten and Wayne’s (2007) analytical framework of defense mechanisms with the codings of coping strategies found in the present study (in blue brackets).
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Thus, it can be reasoned that the interviewees of the present study relied on conscious coping strategies in much greater number than on unconscious defense mechanisms. The fact that the interviews were conducted 5 years after the traumatic experience certainly influenced this effect. As time went by, victims had time to reflect on their own behavior and made conscious decisions about how to handle the situation.
Now that the coping mechanisms of the present study have been analyzed, the following section focusesd on the special effects of violent electoral conflict on the political participation of its victims.
8.7 The Effect of Violent Electoral Conflict on Participants’ Political Participation
The political participation of citizens is a fundamental necessity for democracy and the democratization process. As was described in Chapter 2, the present study subscribes to the modern definition of political participation used by Teorell, Torcal, and Montero (2007, p. 336) that goes back to Brady (1999): “ action by ordinary citizens directed toward influencing some political outcomes .”
The research questions that apply to this section are the following: What forms of political participation do Kenyans practice? Did the experience of violent electoral conflict make the participants change their political participation? Do they participate less, more, or to an equal amount compared to the time before their experience of violent electoral conflict? What is their personal understanding of political participation? In what ways did violent electoral conflict affect the political participation of ordinary Kenyan citizens and their democratic attitude?
8.7.1 Form of Political Participation Practiced In the course of the interviews, the different forms of political participation practiced were found. They were subdivided into two different categories: active and passive forms of political participation, both of which apply to Brady’s (1999) definition of political participation as all “action by ordinary citizens directed toward influencing some political outcomes .”
Figure 41 shows the frequencies that were detected for active forms of political participation:
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Figure 41. Practiced forms of active political participation.
Figure 41 illustrates very well that the interviewees’ active political participation was strongly focused on the act of voting. Thirty out of 34 respondents indicated that they have or still practice their right to vote. Voting is considered to be the form of political participation among the interviewees. 115
Figure 41 also shows that interviewees very much appreciated the visit of politicians in their community. Eleven out of 34 respondents indicated they had attended meetings with political candidates of all executive levels during their campaigns. The personal contact with the candidates was very important for the political decision-making of respondents, since they indicated they were more likely to vote for those candidates that visited the community in person. The interviewees also stated they preferred bringing forward personal issues and problems when making direct contact with their politicians.
Furthermore, eight interviewees indicated they had attended the political rallies of political candidates. In most cases, they attended one or several rallies of their preferred political party; in rare cases, they attended rallies of different candidates to compare the political arguments.
Other forms of active political participation included membership in a political party or union (four cases), campaigning for a political candidate (three cases), running for a political office (two cases), and attending demonstrations (one case).
115 Interviewees’ attitudes towards voting are analysed in Section 8.8.1.
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The practiced forms and frequencies of passive forms of political participation are illustrated in Figure 42.
Figure 42. Practiced forms of passive political participation.
Figure 42 illustrates graphically that the frequencies of the passive forms of political participation found in the sample did not achieve as high a frequency as those for the active forms of political participation. The most frequent passive forms were listening to politics on the radio/TV (fourteen cases) and talking about politics with others (eleven cases), mostly family and friends. Low frequencies were found for reading the newspaper (three cases), reading party manifestos or other political documents (two cases), and the internal wish to make one’s voice heard by politicians (one case).
The findings can be summarized as follows: interviewees of the present sample practiced both active and passive forms of political participation. Alone on top of the list is the act of voting, which was done by almost all the interviewees, and with great diligence. Exchanging political information or views was mostly shared in a direct exchange with other people. It was their preference to meet with politicians directly, sit down with them, and discuss personal issues or problems of the community. This “face to face democracy” was traceable for interviewees from all geographical regions under consideration, and all age groups, gender, and income groups. Furthermore, the interviewed Kenyans liked to talk about politics with others more than reading party manifestos or other political documents. About a third of the sample had attended political rallies. Instead of reading the newspaper, they prefered to listen to the radio or TV about politics.
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Now that the practiced forms of political participation have been laid out, the following section sheds some light on the question of whether or not the experience of violent electoral conflict influenced the interviewees’ behaviour with regard to political participation.
8.7.2 Change in Political Participation In total, 24 interviewees provided an answer to the question of whether or not their behaviour of political participation changed after their experience of violent electoral conflict. It goes without saying that the great majority of the interviewees was unfamiliar with the term political participation (or democracy in general), so the question was asked indirectly by referring to their changed/unchanged thinking about politicians, politics, or elections. Their answers were then scanned for any mention of changes in behaviour. In some cases, the interviewee was unaware of the fact that he/she had actually increased his/her engagement for political purposes—for example, by engaging in a peace building initiative or helping to form an environmental organization—since he/he did not associate this engagement with a political domain. Alternatively, they were asked directly about any changed behaviour with respect to their participation in voting, a political party, and demonstrations after their experience of violent electoral conflict. Many respondents did not understand the questions about political participation, or the interview situation was just too emotional to speak about political participation, such as for many cases of sexual violence or for women who had been severely affected by violent electoral conflict in other ways. In other cases, the mostly male respondents were too strongly involved in talking about their views of the 2008 post-election violence or their engagement in counter-measures of future violence that they did not engage in the discussion on political participation (see, for example, Interviews 12 and 14).
For these cases, a missing response was written in the table. The heterogeneous results are presented in Figure 43.116
116 The variable level of impairment has three values: high, medium, and low. The actual sorting of each interviewee into one of these three values was carried out either by self-assessment of the interviewee, or by the sorting done by the author of this study. The value “high level of impairment” was used, if the interviewee indicating that he/she is still struggling badly with the consequences of violent electoral conflict and it continues to negatively influence his/her life. “Medium level of impairment” was assigned to the interviewee if he/she mentioned to be struggling with the consequences of violent electoral conflict only sometimes or to a minor degree. “Low level of impairment” of impairment was coded if the interviewee did not mention any ongoing struggle with the consequences of violent electoral conflict. The sorting of each interviewee was discussed with a second researcher until a mutual decision was taken.
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Interview Nr. Age Gender Ethnic Affil. Religious Affil. Province during E.V. Level o. Schooling Level of impairment Income Group Changed Political Participation 1 32male Kikuyu Christian Nairobi Primary high 3 no 2 71male Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary medium 1 yes, more 3 38male Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary high 1 no 5 63male Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary high 1 yes, more 7 35female Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary high 1 no 8 32 female Kikuyu Christian Western High School level high 1 yes, more 9 28 female Kalenjin Christian Rift Valley University high 1 no 11 35male Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary high 1 yes, less 13 41male Luhya Christian Rift Valley Primary medium 1 yes, less 15 53female Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary high 2 yes, more 17.2 37 female Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Secondary missing 1 no 18 54female Luo Christian Nyanza None high 1 yes, less 19 26 female Luo Christian Nyanza and Nairobi Primary high 1 yes, more 21 26female Luo Christian Nyanza Primary high 1 yes, more 23 59male Luo Christian Nyanza Primary high 1 yes, more 24 31female Luo Christian Nyanza Primary high 1 yes, less 26 30male Kamba Christian Coast Primary low 1 yes, less 27 28female Meru Christian Coast Primary medium 1 yes, less 28 34female Luo Christian Coast Primary high 1 no 30 32female Chonyi Christian Coast None low 1 no 33 42female Kamba Christian Coast Primary medium 1 yes, less 34 29female Giriama Christian Coast Primary low 1 yes, more 35 57female Kamba Christian Nairobi Primary high 1 no 36 65male Kikuyu Christian Nairobi University high 2 no
Figure 43 . Document variables for 24 interviewees, including the variable changed political participation .
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As can be seen in Figure 43, the greatest proportion of respondents (37%) subscribed to an unchanged/constant political participation when compared to the breakdown of their “participation more” (33%) and “participating less” (30%) counterarts. Yet, when comparing changed and unchanged behaviours of political participation, the latter group is outnumbered clearly with 37% (unchanged political participation) compared to 63% (changed political participation). In total, 15 interviewees out of 24 indicated they had changed their behaviour of political participation after their experience of violent electoral conflict or they described behaviour that could be interpreted as such. Eight respondents showed an increase in political participation, whereas seven indicated they had reduced their political engagement due to their negative experience after the 2007 general elections.
The findings can be summarized as follows:
1. Constant political participation (9 cases)
2. More political participation (8 cases)
3. Less political participation (7 cases)
Considering these findings, the experience of violent electoral conflict led to diametrically opposed reactions. Thus, the expectations formulated in the theory chapter (Section 2.4) concerning trauma response were met in the sense that different reactions to the trauma stimulus of violent electoral conflict are traceable. It can be assumed that trauma response theory is a valuable approach in the context of the experience of violent electoral conflict.
Although the numbers of all three categories are very similar, an overall tendency can be ascertained. The largest part of the interviewees certainly stuck to their usual behaviour of political participation, since they maintained high sympathy values for voting even after the experience of violent electoral conflict. Thus, it can be assumed that the number of constant participants is even higher than in the present sample.
This assumption must not be confounded by the fact that they will remain strong participants in the further development of democracy in their country. As the previous section showed, the majority of Kenyans in the present sample have a rather focused understanding of political participation, which mainly consists of voting (for more information, see Section 8.8).
However, what is rather surprising is the high number of increases in political participation among the members of the sample (8 cases out of 24; 33%), considering the fact that the majority of the interviewees expressed a negative attitude towards politics, including almost
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all those respondents with an increase in political participation. Seventeen interviewees (50% of the total sample) in total expressed negative attitudes towards politics, stating that it was a “dirty game.” 117 As a consequence, their individual motives for an increase in political engagement must have been stronger than their generally negative attitude towards politics. The motives that drove interviewees to engage in politics will be presented in detail in the following section.
In the case of two interviewees from the Rift Valley Province, the decision to count them as cases of increased participation was not based on self-assessment but on the researcher’s analysis of their respective behaviour. It is important to emphasize here that the interviewees’ personal definition of political participation differed from the definition by Teorell, Torcal, and Montero (2007) chosen here. In the understanding of these two interviewees, the representation of their community during meetings with politicians or administrative personnel did not count as political engagement. This was the case even for the community leader, who had been elected especially for this particular purpose. The following example of the 53 year old woman from the North Rift area graphically illustrates this discrepancy in definitions. In the first quotation, she explains why she cannot change her political participation due to her social role as a peacemaker. In the second, she indicates her engagement in the representation of different communities at meetings with local/regional politicians:
I have never been involved in politics. That is actually why people trust me. If you are to ask me, you are a member of the Jubilee coalition because you are a Kikuyu. I say to them: I have never met with any of them even not sitting down with the politician. You will never meet me there. I want to be everybody's friend (…).
I am a chairperson of the district peace committee. Even the old people they asked me: Go and talk to our politicians. Tell them we want them to unite and we want Uhuru [Kenyatta] and Raila [Odinga] to unite, so that we have peace (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
As Figure 44 further illustrates, the three different groups (constant, less, and more participation) are heterogeneously composed. The group of non-changers includes men and
117 Only two respondents indicated positive attitudes towards politics. These interviewees were both actively involved in politics themselves: one ran for office as a Women Representative in Parliament, and one worked as a political agent during the 2013 general elections.
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women from Nairobi Province, the Rift Valley Province, and the Coastal Province who had varying levels of impairment, schooling, income, and different ethnic affiliations. Interestingly, all the interviewees of Nyanza Province had undergone a change in political participation. In contrast, their Nairobi Province counterparts all stuck to their previous level of political participation (constant political participation). Furthermore, all the interviewees with an increased level of schooling are part of the constant political participation group. This may be a simple coincidence due to the small size and composition of the sample. Nevertheless, it could be worth investigating this finding further. Better educated people, although impaired to an equal degree, may have better knowledge bases to separate the violent electoral conflict from elections and other democratic institutions as a whole, and thus do not adapt their behavior as quickly as others. On the other hand, a higher level of education and high levels of socio-economic resources generally increase the probability of political engagement, which would have spoken in favor of an increase in political participation (van Deth 2001; Milbrath & Goel 1977). These questions need to be addressed in further research.
Apart from the lower level of education grouped in the categories yes, less political participation and yes, more political participation , these two groups are highly heterogeneously composed. Thus, at this point, no further assumptions about specific socio- demographic characteristics leading to a change in political participation can be drawn.
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Interview Nr. Age Gender Ethnic Affil. Religious Affil. Province during E.V. Level o. Schooling Level of impairment Income Group Changed Political Participation 1 32male Kikuyu Christian Nairobi Primary high 3 no 3 38 male Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary high 1 no 7 35 female Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary high 1 no 9 28 female Kalenjin Christian Rift Valley University high 1 no 17.2 37 female Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Secondary missing 1 no 28 34 female Luo Christian Coast Primary high 1 no 30 32female Chonyi Christian Coast None low 1 no 35 57female Kamba Christian Nairobi Primary high 1 no 36 65male Kikuyu Christian Nairobi University high 2 no 11 35 male Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary high 1 yes, less 13 41 male Luhya Christian Rift Valley Primary medium 1 yes, less 18 54female Luo Christian Nyanza None high 1 yes, less 24 31female Luo Christian Nyanza Primary high 1 yes, less 26 30 male Kamba Christian Coast Primary low 1 yes, less 27 28 female Meru Christian Coast Primary medium 1 yes, less 33 42 female Kamba Christian Coast Primary medium 1 yes, less 2 71 male Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary medium 1 yes, more 5 63 male Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary high 1 yes, more 8 32 female Kikuyu Christian Western High School level high 1 yes, more 15 53female Kikuyu Christian Rift Valley Primary high 2 yes, more 19 26 female Luo Christian Nyanza and Nairobi Primary high 1 yes, more 21 26female Luo Christian Nyanza Primary high 1 yes, more 23 59male Luo Christian Nyanza Primary high 1 yes, more 34 29female Giriama Christian Coast Primary low 1 yes, more
Figure 44. Document variables for 24 interviewees sorted by the variable changed political participation .
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Another important finding of the data was the identification of short- and long-term reactions towards violent electoral conflict. In two interviews, the respondents indicated they had initially decided to never participate in politics again as a short-term reaction to their high level of impairment from violent electoral conflict. However, after some time, their attitudes changed, and both are now intensely deeply in politics. One interviewee even contested for a seat as a Women’s Representative.118 The following statements illustrate her change of mind over time:
At that particular moment i felt like never voting again in my life. Even in 2007 I had not voted but i was chased away. I was still scared and confused, I kept on telling my mom that I will never vote, I will never vote. If you vote and you don’t vote, it's still zero (…).
If I'll get that position as a women representative in Parliament, honestly, I’ll advocate for change, our rights, and making sure that a girl child and a woman are treated equal to a man (Woman from Nairobi Province).
These two cases indicate that the short-term and long-term implications on the political participation of victims of violent electoral conflict are traceable, even though their number in the present sample was small (n = 2).
Two additional interviewees mentioned they had increased their social participation, a concept which is similar and highly interlinked to political participation (for an overview, see van Deth 2001). Social participation is defined as “all voluntary activities of citizens in social organizations” (van Deth 2001, p. 208). One interviewee began educating Kenyans, especially youth, about politics, and from 2010 on, about the new Kenyan constitution. The other interviewee is providing counselling to other victims of violent electoral conflict to prevent future ethnic clashes. Applying van Deth’s (2003) or Soss’ (2002) broad definition of political participation, which includes social engagement in the community, these cases would fall into the category of increased political participation as well.
The following section focuses on the individual motives driving the interviewees change or constancy with respect to political participation after their experience of violent electoral conflict.
118 Further details about the candidature were left out for reasons of data security (de-personalization).
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8.7.3 Individual Motives for Participants’ Changed/Unchanged Political Participation The interviewees of the present study did not only indicate if or how they changed their political participation; they would also substantiate their decisions.
In total, four motives were indicated for the increase in political participation: 1) achieve a common good, 2) achieve a personal good, 3) represent the community, and 4) contribute to a change. In some cases, interviewees based their decisions on two or more reasons. Each motive is named and described briefly and is further illustrated by an explanatory statement:
1. Attempt to achieve a common good
Six interviewees in total stated that since their experience of the 2008 post-election violence, they have increased their engagement to achieve a common good. Examples of such a common good were engagement in reconciliation initiatives, peace initiatives to avoid future violence and to foster social unity, and the empowerment of women, each of which is illustrated by a short quotation:
It is good to intervene and give them the experiences to talk to them. It will help out. Even ourselves we will learn. People came who experienced violence and we learned through them. We transformed our minds. We learned that you get healing from forgiving somebody. You heal yourself from getting stress and other problems (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
I'm fighting not for myself but for my generation. Yes. I want to live in a better world. I want my generation to live in a better world. That's why I'm fighting for this country. But what can i do? I’ll not go and tell them that my country will be finished, that we will be fighting for the next 50 years. I have to continue fighting for change. That's the message we have. We are going to fight for that. I'm still positive (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
Involvement in these political activities actually triggered a feeling of unity among people. Whenever she was telling people about the policies the candidates had in mind for the people, it was actually like you are uniting the people (Woman from the Coastal Province).
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I like fighting a lot for women. I personally can fight for democracy and maybe for the women who are married to men because they're rich. That number needs to be reduced. Also bribing during elections will be a thing of the past. So for me, fighting for democracy it's something that is worth fighting for (Woman from Nairobi Province).
2. Attempt to achieve a personal good
The second motive for increased political participation that was found in the interview material was the wish to achieve a personal good. Three interviewees in total stated they wanted to be better informed about politics, so they could make the right decisions, have their preferred presidential candidate elected, and give their own life a new direction. These three motives are illustrated by the following quotations:
Interviewer: So she thinks that being informed helps her? Respondent: Yes. Interviewer: And how? Respondent: She says that it helps her to make rightful decisions. Decisions that can help her achieve something in her life (Woman from Nyanza Province).
She felt that with the leadership of Raila [Odinga], things would be better unlike with the leadership of Uhuru [Kenyatta]. And that is why she came out to vote (Woman from Nyanza Province).
It has somehow given me a new direction, a new direction in life (Woman from Nairobi Province).
3. Represent the community
Another motive for an increase in political participation was the wish to represent the community to governmental or administrative bodies, which was by four interviewees. In half of these cases, the interviewees were approached by their community to represent them, to tell politicians about their difficult living conditions, or to bargain their financial compensation due to the experienced violent electoral conflict. In the two other cases, the interviewees chose to become a leader for the community:
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Respondent: As a community leader he goes to the government to try to convince them that they were also affected by the election violence so that they can be recognized as IDPs by the government. His work is to do that as a community leader. Interviewer: He is going to the government in Nairobi? Respondent: Nairobi and Naivasha. Interviewer: He is negotiating for his community? Respondent: Yes (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
4. Contribute to a change in Kenya
The fourth motive, mentioned by two interviewees in total, includes the rather abstract wish to contribute to a positive change for Kenya. The following two statements illustrate this motive:
I want to prove to them even if you have a disability and you bring in some tact and your personality is correct, you can create change, a positive change (Woman from Nairobi Province).
The only reason that she got involved in 2013 was that looking back at what occurred in 2007, she felt that maybe her participation in 2013 could actually account for some change (Woman from Nyanza Province).
In one of these cases, the interviewee named all four motives mentioned above for their increase in political participation (Woman from Nairobi Province). Two other interviewees, one from Nyanza Province and one from the Coastal Province, both mentioned the achievement of a common and a personal good as their motivators for an increased political participation.
Besides these four motives, one other driving force for political participation completely unrelated to the specific events of the post-election violence was found in the interviews: the new Kenyan Constitution. Many interviewees revealed a very positive attitude towards the newly implemented Constitution, since they believed it would safeguard their rights to free speech, settle land disputes, and empower the county level. The following quotation illustrates the general opinion towards the new Constitution:
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He’s saying that the constitution is going to help. It’s a good thing, and it is going to bring changes especially at the county level because the constitution takes care for the minorities. We have that in the constitution. No minority group will be oppressed or suppressed or pertained. They will have an opportunity to articulate their issues (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
One interviewee specifically referred to the Constitution as her inspiration to further engage in politics. It remains to seen whether the high expectations of Kenyans towards the new document can be fulfilled.
Now that the motives for an increase in political participation have been laid out, the following paragraphs focus on the decrease in political participation . The corresponding codings made within the 32 interviews under consideration are summarized in Figure 45:
Figure 45. Motives for decreased political participation as coded within 32 interviews of the present study.
The most prevalent motive for a decrease in political participation indicated by six interviewees in total was “bad memories about the last elections” in Kenya. For these six interviewees, elections in Kenya were associated generally with violence, chaos, and fear, and therefore needed to be avoided. The interconnections between elections and violence in Kenya is applied to the different stages of the election process, including the campaigning, election day, and the political decision-making process as a whole, as the following quotations illustrate: 283 8. Research Findings
She's scared because in the 2007 elections she could sit with a fellow woman and say: I feel this candidate is going to win. She could also attend political rallies during that time. But after the post-election violence came even during the 2013 general elections, she never went to any rally (Woman from the Coastal Province).
She was heartbroken and she thought that if she voted this time round, it would happen again, that there would be violence again. So she decided to not go to vote again (Woman from the Coastal Province).
The experience of electoral violence really changed his ideas about politics and politicians as well. He doesn't see himself going to the polls ever again (Man from the Coastal Province).
Her participation in her community does not even interest her. She cannot even join any group or affiliation where she's talking about politics or participation in politics. She feels that if she would go to such meetings then she would end up with the same problem again, that she is going through now (Woman from Nyanza Province).
Since their conscious non-participation persisted even during the 2013 general elections, it can be assumed that the negative effect of violent electoral conflict on interviewee’s participation is of long-term character. This is a dangerous and alarming finding which needs to be addressed by stakeholders on the ground. Seeing that 18% of all Kenyans interviewed in this sample withdrawal from political participation is a threat especially to a developing democracy such as Kenya. When taking scientific concepts on political participation, such as the human empowerment theory by Inglehart and Welzel (2008) seriously, this effect of withdrawal caused by the experience of violent electoral conflict causes threat to the democratization process of the Kenyan democracy.
Three of these six interviewees further expressed a general disenchantment with politics after their experience of violent electoral conflict. In total, four respondents indicated this motive in their interviews, making it the second most prevalent of all. In most of the cases, the interviewees bewailed the general uselessness of politics and casting votes:
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He's not into politics anymore because he feels like it's going to waste his time. He feels that there are better things to do that he could do with his life apart from engaging in politics (Man from the Coastal Province).
If you vote and you don’t vote, it's still zero (Woman from Nairobi Province).
Other motives indicated for the decrease in political participation were the “disappointment with a candidate’s performance” during the 2007 general elections, the wish to “focus on the family” rather than to invest time in politics, the impression that political participation is incompatible with a respondent’s social role, and finally the wish to adhere to village conformity. All these four motives were named once during the interviews. village conformity was a rather surprising finding describing the phenomenon that a voting decision can, even to this day, be discussed and determined on a community level, rather than being a personal decision by every member of that community. This process is illustrated in the following quotation:
The reason why he reduced his political participation is because of party preferences. He may have his own choice of party but the locals have their own choice of party and that will bring conflict. He doesn’t match with their opinion and that can affect him negatively (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
Now that the motives for decreased political participation after an experience of violent electoral conflict have been discussed, the following paragraph sheds some light on the question why some respondents kept their political participation on a constant level .
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Figure 46. Motives for unchanged political participation as coded within 32 interviews of the present study.
As Figure 46 reveals, three interviewees named the incompatibility of their social role within the community as the guiding motive for their constant political participation. In all three cases, this constant behaviour implicated their participation in voting and their complete withdrawal from any other form of political engagement, as the following quotation describes graphically:
I cannot go for a party or political meeting. I’m like that. I’ll vote for you, if you have good policies. But I will not be a partisan of any political party or movement. Just because I’m a role model to many. Not only for the people that are TNA, but also to the people of other parties. I’m a role model and a leader to many, to people from different political backgrounds. I have to be neutral and I have to make a stand. Not only a stand but a firm, firm stand. That’s why I’m not playing in any political team. I’m just a neutral person (Man from Nairobi Province).
Again, it is very clear that political participation has a negative connotation, since it is associated with the aggravation of conflict lines, mistrust, and even violent dispute in Kenya.
Furthermore, three other motives for constant participation in politics were indicated by one interviewee each: the importance of voting as a citizen’s duty ; the constant wish to make one’s own voice be heard to politicians; and trust in god , which provided the necessary strength to overcome fears and the wish to withdraw from engaging in politics after the traumatic experience. 286 8. Research Findings
8.7.4 Conclusion The aforegoing sections addressed the question of the specific effect of violent electoral conflict on the political participation of its victims in Kenya. First, the forms of political participation by the victims of violent electoral conflict were investigated. In the the results, the interviewees revealed a strong focus on voting as their preferred act of political participation. since many respondents were not even aware the other options they have to influence a political outcome in their country.
Interestingly, the different victims’ experiences of violent electoral conflict led to diametrically opposed behaviours with respect to their political participation The largest part remained persistent in its previous behaviour of political participation. The second most prevelant reaction, in a surprisingly high number of cases, was an increase in political participation as a result of the stressful experience of violent electoral conflict. In 24% of the present sample, the victims of violent electoral conflict increased their political participation so to achieve a common or personal good, or to contribute to a general change in Kenya. Keeping in mind that an even larger percentage of victims increased their social engagement as well, the overall amount of increased participation in response to the experience of violent electoral conflict is remarkable. This phenomenon adds to the hope that the experience of violent electoral conflict does not necessarily lead to a rejection of political participation. It was remarkable to find the great optimism and positive attitude of the respondents for the new Kenyan Constitution of 2010. Many respondents even named the Constitution as a source of inspiration for getting involved in politics again. Time will tell whether the trust in the new regulations or institutions—such as land regulations and the implementation of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC)—will persist.
Unfortunately, the story does not end here, since an almost equal number of interviewees reported an adverse effect on their political participation due to their experience of violent electoral conflict. This effect was reported by an alarming 18% of all interviewees. It is troubling that the majority of these 18% of respondents came to generally associate elections with violence or experienced a general fatigue for politics (uselessness; zero-sum game), which has translated into a decrease in political participation. Even worse, their lower level of support was found to be long-lasting (more than 5 years). This phenomenon cannot be ignored for any consolidating democracy such as Kenya, especially when experiencing violent electoral conflict as a repeating pattern. Efforts need to be made to rewin victims’ trust and willingness to be involved in the political decision making process of their own country.
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The following section examines the different definitions of political participation traceable in the Kenyan interviewees’ responses.
8.8 Citizen- and Voter-Typology for 34 Victims of Violent Electoral Conflict in Kenya
According to Tilly (1997):
Citizenship designates a set of mutually enforceable claims relating categories of persons to agents of governments. Like relations between shouses, between co- authors, between workers and employers, citizenship has the character of a contract: variable in range, never completely specifiable, always depending on unstated assumptions about context, modified by practice, contrained by collective memory, yet ineluctably involving rights and obligations sufficiently defined that either party is likely to express indignation and take corrective action when the other fails to meet expectations built into the relationship (p. 599).
Follwing Tilly’s definition of citizenship, a citizen has specific rights and obligations towards the government and its agents. He/she can express indignation towards governmental actions and even take corrective measures. One way of expressing indignation (or consent) and taking corrective measures is through political participation, which enables every citizen of a democracy to bring her/his opinion forward to contend for ajustments, changes, continuances, etc.
The following section analyzes how the 34 Kenyan victims of violent electoral conflict gathered in this sample exercise their citizenship. Thereby, four prototypes of citizens found in the data are distinguished: the voting citizen, the resigned citizen, the passive citizen, and the active citizen. It is important to note here, that these four citizen-types are not mutually excluses, but respondents could hold attitudes of different sub-groups. By allowing this multiple coding of one interviewee in different citizen-prototypes, the results come closer to reality, in which respondents often find themselves in between categories.
All four sub-types are defined and are illustrated by quotations of the respondents. The most prevalent sub-type found in the sample is further partitioned into its constituent parts. Thus, three main sub-forms of the Kenyan voter are distinguished: the resilient voter, the demanding voter, and the rational voter.
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The frequencies of the four sub-types of the Kenyan citizen found in the data are shown in Figure 47:
Figure 47. The typology of citizens as developed from 32 interviews with victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya.
The result of this inquiry is a distinct typology—from the viewpoint of 34 victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya—of their political attitudes towards political participation, politics, and democracy as a whole.
Considering that in Kenya, as in other multi-ethnic societies of Sub-Saharan Africa, ethnicity and other socio-demographic characteristics are closely related to voting (see for example Burchard 2015), the typology takes into account the socio-demographic characteristics of the interviewees as well, which include the following: gender, ethnic affiliation, province during the experience of violent electoral conflict, level of schooling, income group, and level of impairment.
8.8.1 The Voting Citizen The first finding of this section is that the greatest number of all the victims of violent electoral conflict of the present sample considers themselves to be primarily “voting citizens.” When asked about their understanding of political participation, 27 of the 34 interviewees (or 25 interviews out of 32) said that voting was the first thing that came to mind. Based on the codings of the interviews, summarized in Figure 48, the voting citizen can be defined as a citizen whose political behaviour is unidirectionally oriented towards the act of voting. Even though she/he might or might not be interested in politics, his/her political behaviour remains 289 8. Research Findings
the same. As a further detailed description of the voter sub-types will reveal, his/her self- limitation to the act of voting is not entirely applicable to all cases, since many attend rallies, meet with politicians, talk about politics within their family or among friends, etc., yet refuse to consider themselves as politically interested or involved. This refusal reveals a highly negatively connotated understanding of politics, and an even stronger negative regard for politicians among voting citizens. Although the voting citizen considers voting to be a highly valued freedom, she/he does not hold a positive attitude towards elections and voting per se. For about half of the sample, elections and voting are connected with chaos, insecurity, and violence. However, the positive evaluation of the 2013 general elections by voting citizens may reflect an attitude change in a positive direction in the long-run, if elections remain peaceful, free, and fair in the future. The voting citizen generally values democracy as a good form of government, yet this positive attitude does not apply at all to the Kenyan democratic status quo.
Furthermore, voting citizens include both gender groups, although with a surplus of women, as well as almost all ethnic groups, with Kikuyus from the Rift Valley Province being the largest group of the sample. The details of this citizen type are shown in Figure 48.
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The voting citizen = 1 (N=24) Gender: female, total (%) 16 (66,7) Gender: male, total (%) 8 (33,3)
Ethnic Affiliation: Chonyi, total (%) 1 (4,2) Ethnic Affiliation: Giriama, total (%) 2 (8,3) Ethnic Affiliation: Kalenjin, total (%) 1 (4,2) Ethnic Affiliation: Kamba, total (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kikuyu, total (%) 11 (45,8) Ethnic Affiliation: Luhya, total (%) 2 (8,3) Ethnic Affiliation: Luo, total (%) 5 (20,8) Ethnic Affiliation: Meru, total (%) 2 (8,3)
Province during E.V.: Coast, total (%) 6 (25,0) Province during E.V.: Nairobi, total (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Nyanza, total (%) 2 (8,3) Province during E.V.: Nyanza and Nairobi, total (%) 1 (4,2) Province during E.V.: Rift Valley, total (%) 14 (58,3) Province during E.V.: Western, total (%) 1 (4,2)
Changed Political Participation: no, total (%) 6 (25,0) Changed Political Participation: yes, less, total (%) 5 (20,8) Changed Political Participation: yes, more, total (%) 8 (33,3)
Level of impairment: high, total (%) 16 (66,7) Level of impairment: low, total (%) 2 (8,3) Level of impairment: medium, total (%) 5 (20,8)
Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: negative, total (%) 4 (16,7) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive, total (%) 5 (20,8) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive negative, total (%) 3 (12,5) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive neutral, total (%) 2 (8,3)
Attitude towards Democracy: negative, total (%) 1 (4,2) Attitude towards Democracy: positive, total (%) 7 (29,2) Attitude towards Democracy: positive negative, total (%) 2 (8,3)
Attitude towards Politicians: negative, total (%) 10 (41,7) Attitude towards Politicians: negative neutral, total (%) 2 (8,3) Attitude towards Politicians: neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2) Attitude towards Politicians: positive, total (%) 1 (4,2) Attitude towards Politicians: positive negative, total (%) 3 (12,5) Attitude towards Politicians: positive negative neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2) Attitude towards Politicians: positive neutral, total (%) 2 (8,3) Attitude towards Politicians: positve, total (%) 1 (4,2)
Attitude towards politics: negative, total (%) 13 (54,2) Attitude towards politics: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards politics: neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2) Attitude towards politics: positive, total (%) 2 (8,3) Attitude towards politics: positive negative, total (%) 0 Attitude towards politics: positive neutral, total (%) 2 (8,3)
Attitude towards elections: negative, total (%) 6 (25,0) Attitude towards elections: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards elections: positive, total (%) 7 (29,2) Attitude towards elections: positive negative, total (%) 4 (16,7) Attitude towards elections: positive negative neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2)
Attitude towards 2013 elections: negative, total (%) 3 (12,5) Attitude towards 2013 elections: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive, total (%) 9 (37,5) Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive negative, total (%) 2 (8,3) Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive negative neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2)
Figure 48. Socio-demographic characteristics and attitudinal dispositions of the voting citizen as coded in the sample of 34 Kenyan victims of violent electoral conflict .119
119 This Figure illustrates one of the shortcomings of the analysis software MaxQDA. Since the software is not able to include all the different interviewees of one group interview, it does not include the data from one Kikuyu-female interviewee from the Rift Valley Province who had a tertiary level of education and the lowest income level. Thus, in this Figure, N is considered to be 17.
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We will now shed some light on the three sub-types of the voting citizen. Obviously, the sub- categories are idealtypes that might be mutually-eclusive on paper but will never be in reality. As such, victims of violent electoral conflict of this sample might subscribe to multiple sub- forms, reflecting a complicated and often unconscious decision making process towards politics and political participation. Yet, an overall bias is nevertheless traceable.
In 50% of all interviews (17 out of the 34 interviewees included), the resilient voter is the most prevalent subtype found in the data of the present study. The resilient voter can be defined as a Kenyan citizen who is frustrated with and disillusioned by politics and politicians in general, and who therefore chooses to abstain from any political participation except for voting. Going to the polls to vote is considered a highly precious democratic right that is pursued by any means. Getting up at 3 o’clock in the morning and waiting in the queue in the burning heat for several hours does not stop the resilient voter from casting his/her vote. Although she/he might be involved in other means of political participation—such as attending rallies, meeting with politicians, speaking about politics with others—the resilient voter does not want to be considered politically active. The resilient voter associates violence, clashes, and even police brutality with political participation. For the resilient voter, politics in general and politicians specifically have a negative connotation, yet these voters carefully listen to their political leaders and follow their sayings/instructions.
These characteristics of the resilient voter are illustrated in the following quotations:
I went and proved if I was in the register. On the day of voting, I just came myself to vote. Even before the violence I've never been that strong in politics. But the post- election violence of 2008 made me to hate politics more. I hate politics. Even if it is a demonstration for you rights, what were the consequences of that demonstration? Maybe in that demonstration, the police comes, maybe they use teargas. You run, you fall down; maybe you break your arm, such things (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
She doesn't like politics. It is because of politics that they were kicked out of their homes. People would go for meetings, but she never went. The Only thing she did was just to go and vote (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
He can vote. He can go and be in a line until even night and be sure that he has voted. But he is not that interested in political things (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
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She's afraid of joining any political movement. She says when the time of voting comes, she only casts her vote and the story ends there. She doesn't involve herself strongly. She doesn't involve herself strongly in any political movement (Woman from the Coastal Province).
The only political thing I can have is to go and vote. I cannot wear a political t-shirt; I cannot go for a party or political meeting (Man from Nairobi Province).
Keeping in mind that Kenya has had constant electoral violence since 1992, every additional round of electoral violence has the potential to increase the negative associations with politics, politicians, and political participation. The strong commitment of the resilient voters in this sample to the democratic act of voting, even after their experience of electoral violence, nevertheless emphasizes their keen sense of belonging to the fundamental values of democracy, which could help to further anchor democracy in Kenyan society.
Who are the resilient voters in the present research study? Figure 49 illustrates their most important socio-demographic characteristics.
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Resilient Voter = 1 (N=16) Gender: female, (%) 11 (68,8) Gender: male, (%) 5 (31,3)
Ethnic Affiliation: Chonyi, (%) 1 (6,3) Ethnic Affiliation: Giriama, (%) 1 (6,3) Ethnic Affiliation: Kalenjin, (%) 1 (6,3) Ethnic Affiliation: Kamba, (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kikuyu, (%) 9 (56,3) Ethnic Affiliation: Luhya, (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Luo, (%) 2 (12,5) Ethnic Affiliation: Meru, (%) 2 (12,5)
Province during E.V.: Coast, (%) 5 (31,3) Province during E.V.: Nairobi, (%) 1 (6,3) Province during E.V.: Nyanza, (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Nyanza and Nairobi, (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Rift Valley, (%) 10 (62,5) Province during E.V.: Western, (%) 0
Level of Schooling: None, (%) 2 (12,5) Level of Schooling: Primary, (%) 12 (75,0) Level of Schooling: Secondary, (%) 1 (6,3) Level of Schooling: University, (%) 1 (6,3)
Income Group, Mean (Stdev.) 1,3 (0,6)
Level of impairment: high, (%) 10 (62,5) Level of impairment: low, (%) 1 (6,3) Level of impairment: medium, (%) 4 (25,0) Level of impairment: missing, (%) 1 (6,3)
Figure 49. Socio-demographic characteristic of the resilient voters of the present sample. 120
Figure 49 shows that the resilient voter of the present sample includes both gender groups and the ethnic groups Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luo, Giriama, and Meru. The Kikuyus are by far the most prevalent ethnic group represented. Most resilient voters experienced electoral violence in the Rift Valley Province. However, this finding must be interpreted with special care, since the interviewees coming from this specific area are overrepresented in the sample. The majority of the resilient voters has a primary level of schooling and has suffered from a high level of impairment due to electoral violence. The mean income is 1.3 (between income group 1 and 2).
120 Again, since the software is not able to include the different interviewees of one group interview, the Figure 49 lacks the data of one Kikuyu-female interviewee from the Rift Valley Province who has a tertiary level of education and the lowest income level. Thus, in this Figure, N is considered to be 17.
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The second most prevalent sub-type of “the voter” found in the present sample (14 interviewees out of 34 in total) is the so called demanding voter . This voter type casts his/her vote with a first and foremost goal to have her/his preferred political candidate or party win the election. While this might be considered a mutual aspiration of all voters in Kenya and the rest of the democratic world, the demanding voter is more drastic in his/her assumptions. If the goal of winning the election is not achieved, voting is considered useless, and future participation in the electoral process is questioned. This is the case, since the demanding voter exercises his/her democratic right to vote mainly with an intention of benefitting from the candidate’s electoral success. This behaviour is rational, since winning or losing an election in Kenya can be a question of life or death for big ethnic blocksto this day. Therefore, it is not surprising that the expectations of voters to have their preferred political candidate succeed are correspondingly high, since they are interrelated to a prosperous or a disastrous/marginalized future. The demanding voter connects his own personal growth, i.e., getting a house or a piece of land, a good position/job, etc., directly to the electoral success of his/her preferred political candidate. Prior to election day, the demanding voter compares the offers, i.e., which of the candidates’ promises have the greatest overlap with his/her own interests. The following quotations illustrate the characteristics of the demanding voter:
If the President of her hearth wins, maybe she can get a good house and a good peace of land. Yes, that’s the hope she has (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
She used to be an agent in the political party that she was in. When their preferred candidate lost the election, she actually also quit the party. The political candidate, that they were in support of, lost the elections. That’s why she saw that there was no meaning to still be in the party when the person that she was looking up to had actually lost the elections (Woman from the Coastal Province).
Firstly she voted especially for our mp Member of Parliament, our counsellors, because they are all in the area. I was not to cast my vote because of the president but because of our councellor and my MP. That's what took me there. The councellor is nearer to me. I think in case of any problem, in fact I can reach him. He will hear me (Woman from the Coastal Province).
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Another reason why she voted was because she wanted change. She wanted the kind of change with a new leadership so that even her problems, as an IDP, would be addressed (Woman from Nyanza Province).
Figure 50 illustrates the socio-demographic characteristics of the demanding voter within the present sample.
Demanding Voter = 1 (N=13) Gender: female, (%) 12 (92,3) Gender: male, (%) 1 (7,7)
Ethnic Affiliation: Chonyi, (%) 1 (7,7) Ethnic Affiliation: Giriama, (%) 2 (15,4) Ethnic Affiliation: Kalenjin, (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kamba, (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kikuyu, (%) 5 (38,5) Ethnic Affiliation: Luhya, (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Luo, (%) 4 (30,8) Ethnic Affiliation: Meru, (%) 1 (7,7)
Province during E.V.: Coast, (%) 5 (38,5) Province during E.V.: Nairobi, (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Nyanza, (%) 1 (7,7) Province during E.V.: Nyanza and Nairobi, (%) 1 (7,7) Province during E.V.: Rift Valley, (%) 6 (46,2) Province during E.V.: Western, (%) 0
Level of Schooling: None, (%) 2 (15,4) Level of Schooling: Primary, (%) 10 (76,9) Level of Schooling: Secondary, (%) 1 (7,7) Level of Schooling: University, (%) 0
Income Group, Mean (Stdev.) 1,2 (0,4)
Level of impairment: high, (%) 8 (61,5) Level of impairment: low, (%) 2 (15,4) Level of impairment: medium, (%) 2 (15,4) Level of impairment: missing, (%) 1 (7,7)
Figure 50 . Socio-demographic characteristic of the demanding voters of the present sample.
In the sample, we found a considerable surplus of females represented. Aso, the ethnic composition is more heterogeneous compared to the findings of the resilient voter sample, especially with regard to the conflicting groups of Kikuyus and Luos. The same holds true for the geographical distribution of the sample (3 “hotspot areas” out of four were represented). The majority of demanding voters has primary education, just like the resilient voters, but a
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slightly lower income (1.2 compared to 1.3) than their resilient counterparts. In addition, most demanding voters experienced a high level of impairment due to violent electoral conflict.
The third sub-group of the voter-category found in the data is the so-called rational voter . The rational voter bases her/his voting decision on the evaluation of party manifestos, statements of the political candidates, or other party/candidate information that is available. Thus he/she bases her/his decision on rational arguments, rather than on ethnicity or other people’s advice. The rational voter also refuses any attempt of vote buying or any other form of election manipulation, which is illustrated in the following quotations:
Respondent: She went to rallies held by the two political parties, which were ODM and TNA. Interviewer: Oh. So different parties. Why did she go there? Respondent: The reason why she went to the two different political parties was because she wanted to weigh out their policies. What this side had in mind and what the other side had in mind in order to make a good vote (Woman from the Coastal Province).
In 2007, the community was following the money [bribe], not a political candidate. They were going for money. But during the 2013 general elections, and after that post- election violence, it changed. People saw the importance of choosing a leader and not the money. Therefore I think during the last elections [2013], people tried very much not to choose money but to choose a leader (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
I’ll vote for you, if you have good policies (Man from Nairobi Province).
Surprisingly and contrary to our expectations, only 3 out of 34 interviewees indicated they based their voting decision on ethnic grounds. Although the respondents asssumed that in numerous cases their fellow voters would primarily chose a political leader on ethnic grounds, they did not include themselves in this group. Whether this result is an interview(er) effect, since the respondents did not want to admit this approach, or a contradiction to existing assumptions about ethnic voting in Kenya, it canot be clarified in this context.
The socio-demographic characteristics of the rational voter of this sample is shown in Figure 51.
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Rational Voter = 1 (N=6) Gender: female, (%) 2 (33,3) Gender: male, (%) 4 (66,7)
Ethnic Affiliation: Chonyi, (%) 1 (16,7) Ethnic Affiliation: Giriama, (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kalenjin, (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kamba, (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kikuyu, (%) 4 (66,7) Ethnic Affiliation: Luhya, (%) 1 (16,7) Ethnic Affiliation: Luo, (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Meru, (%) 0
Province during E.V.: Coast, (%) 1 (16,7) Province during E.V.: Nairobi, (%) 1 (16,7) Province during E.V.: Nyanza, (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Nyanza and Nairobi, (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Rift Valley, (%) 4 (66,7) Province during E.V.: Western, (%) 0
Level of Schooling: None, (%) 1 (16,7) Level of Schooling: Primary, (%) 4 (66,7) Level of Schooling: Secondary, (%) 1 (16,7) Level of Schooling: University, (%) 0
Income Group, Mean (Stdev.) 1,5 (0,8)
Level of impairment: high, (%) 2 (33,3) Level of impairment: low, (%) 1 (16,7) Level of impairment: medium, (%) 2 (33,3) Level of impairment: missing, (%) 1 (16,7)
Figure 51. Socio-demographic characteristic of the rational voters of the present sample.
With six respondents in total, the sample of rational voter is considerably smaller than the resilient and rational voter samples. The ethnic affiliation of rational voters was limited to mainly Kikuyu respondents who had a medium level of impairment from the violent electoral conflict. The mean income of this small sample is 1.5, and the respondents experienced their violent electoral conflict mainly in the Rift Valley Province, but also in Nairobi and the Coastal Province. Due to the small sample size, the interpretation of these characteristics must be considered with special care; it can only work as a hypothesis-generating tool, whose findings need to be tested with larger N-size studies.
When interpreting the socio-economic findings of all three voter-types, it can be cautiously hypothesized that the rational voter experienced less violent electoral conflict, and is rather better educated and wealthier than the other samples. The rational voter is predominant in the Rift Valley Province and is of Kikuyu ethnicity, the same ethnic group as the current and
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previous Kenyan Presidents. The latter fact might have made it easier for them to consider rational arguments for making their voter decision (instead of ethnic considerations or the acceptance of bribes), since they could be sure of their Kikuyu advantage. It will be interesting to see whether the rational voter will actually stick to her/his current voting behaviour in future electoral rounds in which other (ethnic) candidates may win the race. This kind of rational consistency would be a first step towards an issue-based decision-making process that would force political leaders to present proper manifestos and political content, rather than mobilizing ethnic voter blocks.
The demanding voter actually bases his/her voting decisions on a rational consideration of political offers, yet with an aim to benefit him/herself personally or his/her community. The rather heterogeneous composition of the sample with regard to ethnicity and regional scope can be explained by the general problem of poverty in Kenya. Voters struggling hard to satisfy their basic human needs understandably pursue their personal interest instead of focusing on more issue-based politics and the shiny political manifestos of their parties. The slightly lower level of income and the gender bias in income, women usually suffer more often and/or more severely from poverty than men, could help to explain the perspective of the demanding voter.
The resilient voter, holding tight to the democractic right of voting even though being desillusionated with politics to a great extent, is rather often found among the Kikuyus in the Rift Valley. It will be determined in the following paragraphs whether the Luo ethnic group has shifted towards the group of resigned or active citizens due to their experiences of post- election violence in 2008.
Other voter types found in the data were the ethnic voter who based his/her voting decision on ethnic issues, the uninformed voter who votes according to the advice of others (family, friends, community, etc.), the tactical voter who is trying to increase his/her chances of electing his/her candidate by tactical measures (ethnic block voting, coalition anticipation, etc.) and last, the virtuous voter who stands against any form of vote buying, rigging, or other forms of election manipulation. Figure 52 illustrates the frequencies for all voter types found in the sample of the present study.
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Figure 52 . Voter types identified within the interview material of the present study.
An overall trend detected in the interview material was the prefence of voters to meet with politicians directly to finalize their voting decision. Such a “face to face” political culture was detected in nine interviews in total. These interviewees were very explicit about the meaning of such meetings: speaking directly with the politician was the ultimate decision-making situation for their later voting behaviour.
The person they are going to vote for is the person who always comes here. She was voting because she believed in this person according to the way this person was coming to talk to her. That’s what mattered to her (Woman from the Rift Valley Province).
According to the way people are coming and talking to him or talking to the community. They could just sit down and see if this guy is making sense and if he is making sense, he’ll vote for that person (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
But if somebody would come here, telling him he has to vote for him and then another person comes and so on. At the end, he sits down and he reflects about which of these persons who came he should vote for. Then during the voting time that’s when he knows who the best person to choose is (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
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8.8.2 The Resigned Citizen The second most prevalent type of citizen found in the interview material (nine interviews, nine interviewees) is the resigned citizen . The resigned citizen can be defined as a politically desillusionated Kenyan who is no longer involved in politics at all, not even in voting. The latter behaviour clearly separates the resigned citizen from her/his voting counterparts. His/her disillusion has reached a point where he/she no longer takes an interest in the political status quo of his/her country at all, and, even worse, disengages from the ideal of democracy. Therefore, the resigned citizen rejects both democracy as a preferable form of government and the implemented form of democracy in Kenya. Furthermore, he/she holds negative attitudes towards elections, which for her/him are associated with violence but also with manipulation, fraud, and rigging to the advantage of one specific ethnic bloc: the Kikuyus and its cousin-tribes (the Bantu). Although the 2013 elections were considered a great improvement with regards to peacefulness, freedom, and fairness, the resigned voter strongly doubts the polling will be conducted fairly, especially the counting process. As a consequence, the resigned voter reduces his/her engagement in voting after experiencing violent electoral conflict, and is less likely to get involved in any future voting process. In extreme cases, he/she might even reveal anti-democratic ideation. The coded socio- demographic chatacteristics and attitudinal dispositions of the resigned voter are summarized in Figure 53.
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The resigned citizen = 1 (N=9) Gender: female, total (%) 4 (44,4) Gender: male, total (%) 5 (55,6)
Ethnic Affiliation: Chonyi, total (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Giriama, total (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kalenjin, total (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kamba, total (%) 2 (22,2) Ethnic Affiliation: Kikuyu, total (%) 2 (22,2) Ethnic Affiliation: Luhya, total (%) 1 (11,1) Ethnic Affiliation: Luo, total (%) 4 (44,4) Ethnic Affiliation: Meru, total (%) 0
Province during E.V.: Coast, total (%) 2 (22,2) Province during E.V.: Nairobi, total (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Nyanza, total (%) 3 (33,3) Province during E.V.: Nyanza and Nairobi, total (%) 1 (11,1) Province during E.V.: Rift Valley, total (%) 3 (33,3) Province during E.V.: Western, total (%) 0
Changed Political Participation: no, total (%) 1 (11,1) Changed Political Participation: yes, less, total (%) 4 (44,4) Changed Political Participation: yes, more, total (%) 3 (33,3)
Level of impairment: high, total (%) 7 (77,8) Level of impairment: low, total (%) 1 (11,1) Level of impairment: medium, total (%) 1 (11,1)
Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: negative, total (%) 3 (33,3) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: negative neutral, total (%) 1 (11,1) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive, total (%) 1 (11,1) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive negative, total (%) 3 (33,3) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive neutral, total (%) 0
Attitude towards Democracy: negative, total (%) 2 (22,2) Attitude towards Democracy: positive, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Democracy: positive negative, total (%) 1 (11,1)
Attitude towards Politicians: negative, total (%) 6 (66,7) Attitude towards Politicians: negative neutral, total (%) 1 (11,1) Attitude towards Politicians: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positive, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positive negative, total (%) 1 (11,1) Attitude towards Politicians: positive negative neutral, total (%) 1 (11,1) Attitude towards Politicians: positive neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positve, total (%) 0
Attitude towards politics: negative, total (%) 4 (44,4) Attitude towards politics: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards politics: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards politics: positive, total (%) 1 (11,1) Attitude towards politics: positive negative, total (%) 1 (11,1) Attitude towards politics: positive neutral, total (%) 0
Attitude towards elections: negative, total (%) 5 (55,6) Attitude towards elections: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards elections: positive, total (%) 1 (11,1) Attitude towards elections: positive negative, total (%) 1 (11,1) Attitude towards elections: positive negative neutral, total (%) 1 (11,1)
Attitude towards 2013 elections: negative, total (%) 4 (44,4) Attitude towards 2013 elections: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive, total (%) 1 (11,1) Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive negative, total (%) 1 (11,1) Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive negative neutral, total (%) 0
Figure 53 . Socio-demographic characteristics and attitudinal dispositions of the resigned citizen as coded in the sample of 34 Kenyan victims of violent electoral conflict.
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In addition, the level of impairment due to violent electoral conflict violence is considerably higher for this sub-type of citizen. The resigned voter as found in the interview material is most prevalent among Luos and is geographically focused in Nyanza Province, the Rift Valley Province, and the Coastal Province.
To summarize these findings, the resigned voter has lost her/his trust in being a citizen of Kenya. Consequently he/she does not make use of her/his contractual rights to express indignation or take corrective action towards the Kenyan government, as is illustrated in the following quotations:
She witnessed a lot of irregularities and frauds during the 2013 general elections. Because of that she thinks that peace is more important than democracy. Peace would cover a lot of things because with our Kenyan government, you will not speak your mind. If you speak your mind, you will be shot. Many people have been shot because they were speaking their minds. If you speak against UHuru [Kenyatta] then you speak against the government and your life might be in danger. You rather keep calm and you'll be at peace. With what they saw, she feels that it is even better for Kenya to be divided and to have two states. There is no benefit driven from having one state if there's one particular people who are always in the leadership. She was able to sell her clothes she could go to the common market, to buy clothes, iron them and sell them. She could earn a living, a good living out of that. But now because of the elections and also people speaking their minds, she is now the way she is today (Woman from Nyanza Province).
For him, democracy in Kenya, he doesn’t feel it. If you would go for a demonstration, nothing will change. If there was democracy in Kenya, they would not still be living in this camp. They would not still be living in here. Life would have changed. For him, he doesn’t feel it; he is somebody who doesn’t listen to whatever they have to say anymore (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
He feels that in the future, the voting numbers will go down. Some people will not want to go to the polls anymore, just like himself. They ask: What's the need of going to the polls anyway (Man from the Coastal Province)?
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Interviewer: Do you think they will go to vote? Or will they stay at home?
Respondent: Most of the people are not interested any more.
Interviewer: No?
Respondent: Ah no no. The outcome of the elections disappointed them. You understand? The outcomet of the 2013 elections disappoint them (Man from Nyanza Province).
“Respondent: I don't like it [Democracy].
Interviewer: You don't like it. Why so? Could you explain this a bit to me?
Respondent: It cannot help me. How can it help me? You can only love something which helps you.
Interviewer: And democracy doesn't help you?
Respondent: Very little. Only to a very small extent (Woman from Nyanza Province).
These statements are most alarming when taking up Inglehart and Welzel’s (2008) assumptions again about the human empowerment approach to the emergence and survival of a democracy. These authors repeatedly have emphasized the role of ordinary people in the emergence and survival of effective democracy all over the world, arguing that effective democracy does not emerge or survive because elites concede it to the masses, but because “ordinary people become increasingly capable and willing to place effective mass pressure on the elites” (p. 1). In their definition, human empowerment is the distillate of people being entitled, motivated, and able to govern their lives and to become active citizens in a democratic state:
Only when people support democracy for the freedoms that define it, are they ready to mount pressure on elites to introduce these freedoms when they are denied, to defend them when they are challenged, or to advance them when they stagnate (Haerpher et al. 2008, p. 85).
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The resigned voter is the “nightmare” of Inglehart’s and Welzel’s human empowerment approach, since these voters turn their backs on democracy and citizenship. Their behaviour is understandable though, since their traumatic experience of violent electoral conflict often has resulted—as in the scope of the present sample—in economic, social, psychological, and/or physical impairment. When health, income, and family life are impaired, victims of violent electoral conflict are by no means motivated to govern their own lives or influence public life. Values of survival gain the upper hand compared to the values of self-expression.
The question arises: Why do victims of violent electoral conflict who have experienced an equally high level of impairment become either voting citizens or resigned citizens? The answer to that question is probably related—as often is in Kenya—to the ethnic affiliation of the victim and/or her/his constant frustration of basic human needs. In contrast to the mostly Kikuyu voting citizens , Luo resigned citizen s consider their ethnic group as being constantly and sustainably marginalized by the Kikuyu political leadership. This belief may explain their high prevalence among the sample of resigned citizens. Other ethnic groups also found within the sample may develop the same frustration, since they too do not consider the political system to be sensitive or forthcoming in helping to resolve their urgent needs. At least in the present sample, the political frustration of the resigned voter can be attributed to a perceived human disempowerment of specific ethnic or economically marginalized groups.
8.8.3 The Passive Citizen The passive citizen is the third most prevalent sub-group of citizens found with 7 cases among the 34 interviewees of the present sample. Diametrically opposite to the voting citizen and the resigned citizen, the passive citizen is generally interested in politics and tries to current with the political developments in Kenya. However, this attitude is not to be confounded with a positive attitude towards politics in Kenya more specifically. As Figure 54 illustrates, the attitude of passive citizens towards politics in Kenya is negative in its tendency. This assumption is illustrated by two short quotations—one by a female victim of the 2008 post- election violence living in Nyanza Province, the other by a male victim living in the Rift Valley Province:
She doesn't want to take part but she just loves how politics are and what is going on. She loves to know what's going on (Woman from Nyanza Province).
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He always listens to the radio and reads the newspaper. So for him, he doesn't like getting too much into politics actively. But he knows politics theoretically (Man from the Rift Valley Province).
Although the passive citizen has an interest in politics, he/she refuses active involvement just like his/her voting counterparts. The reasons for this decision are manifold, but certainly they include considering politics a dirty business in which a normal person should not get involved, the fear of violence during demonstrations or political rallies, and general worries about the negative consequences attached to supporting “the wrong” political party/candidate.
Interestingly, the passive citizen as found in the present sample has an ambiguous relation towards the politicians in Kenya. Generally speaking, the passive citizen mistrusts politicians, yet she/he makes an exception for their own preferred candidate or party, as is illustrated in the following quotation:
Uhuru [Kenyatta] was the one who brought them from town A and he was the one who brought them here. Furthermore, Uhuru has helped him to have Peace right now because when the presidential candidates are arguing on television, Uhuru is not arguing with them. Uhuru is always calm. The other people are always talking bad things on television (Female from the Rift Valley Province).
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The passive citize = 1 (N=7) Gender: female, total (%) 6 (85,7) Gender: male, total (%) 1 (14,3)
Ethnic Affiliation: Chonyi, total (%) 1 (14,3) Ethnic Affiliation: Giriama, total (%) 1 (14,3) Ethnic Affiliation: Kalenjin, total (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kamba, total (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kikuyu, total (%) 3 (42,9) Ethnic Affiliation: Luhya, total (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Luo, total (%) 1 (14,3) Ethnic Affiliation: Meru, total (%) 1 (14,3)
Province during E.V.: Coast, total (%) 3 (42,9) Province during E.V.: Nairobi, total (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Nyanza, total (%) 1 (14,3) Province during E.V.: Nyanza and Nairobi, total (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Rift Valley, total (%) 3 (42,9) Province during E.V.: Western, total (%) 0
Changed Political Participation: no, total (%) 2 (28,6) Changed Political Participation: yes, less, total (%) 2 (28,6) Changed Political Participation: yes, more, total (%) 1 (14,3)
Level of impairment: high, total (%) 4 (57,1) Level of impairment: low, total (%) 1 (14,3) Level of impairment: medium, total (%) 2 (28,6)
Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: negative, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive, total (%) 3 (42,9) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive negative, total (%) 1 (14,3) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive neutral, total (%) 0
Attitude towards Democracy: negative, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Democracy: positive, total (%) 2 (28,6) Attitude towards Democracy: positive negative, total (%) 0
Attitude towards Politicians: negative, total (%) 1 (14,3) Attitude towards Politicians: negative neutral, total (%) 1 (14,3) Attitude towards Politicians: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positive, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positive negative, total (%) 3 (42,9) Attitude towards Politicians: positive negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positive neutral, total (%) 1 (14,3) Attitude towards Politicians: positve, total (%) 1 (14,3)
Attitude towards politics: negative, total (%) 4 (57,1) Attitude towards politics: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards politics: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards politics: positive, total (%) 1 (14,3) Attitude towards politics: positive negative, total (%) 0 Attitude towards politics: positive neutral, total (%) 1 (14,3)
Attitude towards elections: negative, total (%) 2 (28,6) Attitude towards elections: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards elections: positive, total (%) 2 (28,6) Attitude towards elections: positive negative, total (%) 1 (14,3) Attitude towards elections: positive negative neutral, total (%) 0
Attitude towards 2013 elections: negative, total (%) 1 (14,3) Attitude towards 2013 elections: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive, total (%) 4 (57,1) Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive negative, total (%) 0 Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive negative neutral, total (%) 0
Figure 54. Socio-demographic characteristics and attitudinal dispositions of the passive citizen as coded in the sample of 34 Kenyan victims of violent electoral conflict.
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The passive voter also has sympathy for democracy in general and democracy in Kenya more specifically. He/she has mixed feelings towards elections, again because very often in Kenya they are associated with violence, chaos, and fraud. Yet, just like the voting citizen, the passive citizen had great satisfaction with the conduct of the 2013 general elections, and thus may change her/his attitude towards elections in the long-run, if the electoral competitions remain peaceful, free, and fair in the future.
With regard to socio-demographic characterisitcs, the passive voter encompases a very heterogeneous sample of ethnic groups that come from Nyanza Province, the Rift Valley, and the Coastal Province who have suffered a medium level of impairment from violent electoral conflict.
With his/her general interest in politics, the passive voter is predestined to develop self- expression values (see Inglehart & Welzel 2008) in the future. Nevertheless, this mental pre- condition needs to materialize in real political participation to correspond to Inglehart and Welzel’s (2008) conception of an empowered citizen.
8.8.4 The Active Citizen In countrast to the types of citizens described so far in the interview material, the active citizen comes close to the ideal type of citizen anticipated by Welzel and Inglehart’s (2008) human empowerment approach. With four cases in total, the active citizen constitutes the smallest of all the coded sub-types in the present sample.
The active citizen in its ideal type represents the empowered citizen described in the human empowerment model, which is the distillate of people who are entitled, motivated, and able to govern their lives, and to become an active citizen in a democratic state. They are entitled to participate actively, since they are granted all the necessary freedoms and rights by a democratic government. They are motivated to participate, since their mindset has shifted from an on overpowering aspiration to achieve the values of survival (to satisy their basic human needs) to achieving the values of self-expression, such as 1) making their views count in shaping public life, (2) expressing their preferences in public, (3) being tolerated in their lifestyle choices, (4) efficaciously shaping their lives, and (5) being generally trusted (Inglehart & Welzel 2008).
In the present sample, this ideal type expression of an active citizen has not yet been achieved entirely. The attitude of these active citizens towards politics, politicians, and democracy in Kenya varies considerably among the cases, as is illustrated in Figure 55.
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The active citizen = 1 (N=4) Gender: female, total (%) 2 (50,0) Gender: male, total (%) 2 (50,0)
Ethnic Affiliation: Chonyi, total (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Giriama, total (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kalenjin, total (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kamba, total (%) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kikuyu, total (%) 2 (50,0) Ethnic Affiliation: Luhya, total (%) 1 (25,0) Ethnic Affiliation: Luo, total (%) 1 (25,0) Ethnic Affiliation: Meru, total (%) 0
Province during E.V.: Coast, total (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Nairobi, total (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Nyanza, total (%) 1 (25,0) Province during E.V.: Nyanza and Nairobi, total (%) 0 Province during E.V.: Rift Valley, total (%) 2 (50,0) Province during E.V.: Western, total (%) 1 (25,0)
Changed Political Participation: no, total (%) 0 Changed Political Participation: yes, less, total (%) 2 (50,0) Changed Political Participation: yes, more, total (%) 2 (50,0)
Level of impairment: high, total (%) 2 (50,0) Level of impairment: low, total (%) 0 Level of impairment: medium, total (%) 2 (50,0)
Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: negative, total (%) 1 (25,0) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: neutral, total (%) 1 (25,0) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive, total (%) 1 (25,0) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive negative, total (%) 1 (25,0) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive neutral, total (%) 0
Attitude towards Democracy: negative, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Democracy: positive, total (%) 3 (75,0) Attitude towards Democracy: positive negative, total (%) 0
Attitude towards Politicians: negative, total (%) 2 (50,0) Attitude towards Politicians: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positive, total (%) 1 (25,0) Attitude towards Politicians: positive negative, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positive negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positive neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positve, total (%) 0
Attitude towards politics: negative, total (%) 2 (50,0) Attitude towards politics: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards politics: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards politics: positive, total (%) 1 (25,0) Attitude towards politics: positive negative, total (%) 0 Attitude towards politics: positive neutral, total (%) 0
Attitude towards elections: negative, total (%) 0 Attitude towards elections: negative neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards elections: positive, total (%) 3 (75,0) Attitude towards elections: positive negative, total (%) 0 Attitude towards elections: positive negative neutral, total (%) 0
Attitude towards 2013 elections: negative, total (%) 0 Attitude towards 2013 elections: neutral, total (%) 0 Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive, total (%) 2 (50,0) Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive negative, total (%) 1 (25,0) Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive negative neutral, total (%) 0
Figure 55. Socio-demographic characteristics and attitudinal dispositions of the active citizen as coded in the sample of 34 Kenyan victims of violent electoral conflict.
309 8. Research Findings
These active citizens of the sample all shared an increased interest in getting actively involved in Kenyan politics either by being involved in multiple forms of active political participation (three out of four cases) during the last general elections (i.e., being a member of a political party, attending rallies, talking to politicians, etc.), or by actually running for office themselves (two out of four cases). On average, active citizens had a comparable level of education to the voting citizen and a slightly higher level compared to the passive and the resigned citizen (see Figure 56).
The voting citizen = 1 (N=24) The active citizen = 1 (N=4) The passive citize = 1 (N=7) The resigned citizen = 1 (N=9) Level of Schooling: None, total (%) 3 (12,5) 0 3 (42,9) 1 (11,1) Level of Schooling: Primary, total (%) 18 (75,0) 3 (75,0) 4 (57,1) 8 (88,9) Level of Schooling: Secondary, total (%) 2 (8,3) 1 (25,0) 0 0 Level of Schooling: University, total (%) 1 (4,2) 0 0 0
Income Group, mean (Stdev.) 1,1 (0,3) 1,0 (0,0) 1,0 (0,0) 1,0 (0,0)
Figure 56. Comparing the socio-demographic characteristics of “Level of schooling” and “Income” between the four types of citizens identified in the present study.
The level of income is broadly identical amongst all types of citizens (0 –10.000 KsH).
The story of a young woman from Nairobi who experienced the post-election violence of 2008 in Western can stand as a prototype of the active citizen found in this sample.
She is an outstanding example of courage and strangth. She was heavily affected by violent electoral conflict. Physically impaired and psychologically traumatized, she tried to committ suicide three times. She lost her sight and almost all her hearing during her odyssey while fleeing from the violent electoral conflict to Uganda. Her sister was murdered for supporting her. Despite or due to all these experiences, she made her way back to life and decided to fight for the rights for people with disabilities as her life-task. Her interest in politics “doubled” after her experiences of post-election violence. Today, she is very well informed about politics in Kenya, attends meetings and rallies, compaigns for politicians, and is a candidate herself as a county representative. She wants to improve the status of people with disabilities and women in Kenyan society. She is ambitious and wants to be a leader for the benefit of her country. Her evaluation of politicians’ performance is very rational and logical, and is not influenced by ethicity, clientelism, or tradition. She has heavily criticized the corruption and vote buying in her country, which, according to her experience, still exist in Kenya to this day.
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The development of this young woman, who today lives in Nairobi, represents the empowered citizen that Inglehart and Welzel (2008) imagined as necessary to make democracies emerge and survive.
8.8.5 Interim Conclusion The previous section identified four types of citizens, in the sample of 34 victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya, who varied considerably in their political attitudes—towards politics, politicians, democracy, and elections—and active political participation. These four types of citizens are: the voting citizen, the resigned citizen, the passive citizen, and the active citizen.
The comparison revealed that the active voter largely corresponds to the ideal type of the empowered citizen described by Welzel and Inglehart (2008) in their theory of human empowerment (see Section 2.3). This empowered citizen is needed in a democracy to shape public life and push for the implementation or safeguardening of an effective democracy no matter where it is in the world. Although traces of the empowered citizen can be found in the Kenyan active citizen, the characteristics of the empowered citizen are still ill-conceived, and in the sample of the present study, this type of citizen was somewhat rare.
The most prevalent type of citizen found in the sample was the voting citizen. Paradoxically, on the one hand, this type of citizen emphasizes the exercise of his/her democratic right to voting, whereas on the other, he/she restrains from any further involvement in politics or political participation. The positive and intensive bond of the voting citizen to the right to vote is an open door to the further activation of this citizen for the political system. The first and most important condition for a shift of the voting citizen’s negative attitude towards politics and political participation would be the peaceful conduct of free and fair elections in Kenya in the future. The same is true for the passive citizen who generally is interested in politics, yet for whom this interest does not thus far materialize in political engagement.
Attention also needs to be focused on the resigned citizen type who is highly desillusioned after her/his experience of violent electoral conflict, and considers all political involvement, even voting, as a needless undertaking. He/she has turned her back on democracy in Kenya and—even more alarming—on the advantages of a democratic political system as a preferable form of government in general. If this type of citizen was to exist throughout Kenyan society as a whole, a hypothesis which cannot be proven within the scope of this study, the basis for stabilizing a developing democracy such as Kenya would be at stake. Since this type of
311 8. Research Findings
citizen is potentially growing in number with every round of violent polls in Kenya, accompanied by the continuing marginalization of large social groups, the stability of the Kenyan democracy may be at stake. The number of resigned citizens may grow in the future if violent electoral conflict occurs in future polls or if the marginalization of large parts of the population continues, as does their suffering from unsatisfied basic human needs.121
Looking at the overall picture of the typology developed in this Chapter, it becomes clear that the positive development of democracy in Kenya is highly linked to the conduct of peaceful, free, and fair elections in the future, as well as to the need to reduce the frustration manifesting in the alienation of the resigned-, voting-, and passive-citizen from political participation. Obviously, this task is not easily achieved. The marginalization of specific ethnic and social blocs—such as the Luo ethnic group and the group of IDPs in the present sample—was found to contribute to the disengagement effect within this sample. The consequent implementation of the 2010 Constitution would be a first measure in this direction, since it was found to be highly valued by the vast majority of respondents. The increased voter turnout during the 2013 general elections of about 85.9% compared to 69.1% in 2007 (see, for example, Burchard 2015) has raised the hopes that Kenyans are susceptible to coming back to the polls and to abandoning their political disengagement in the long-run.
121 A tabular comparison of all four types of citizens is provided in Addendum 22.
312 9. Conclusion and Recommendations
9 Conclusion and Recommendations Competitive national elections can play a significant role in the consolidation process of developing and established democracies alike. Free and fair elections represent the peaceful succession or distribution of political power through the expressed will of an electorate, and thus are an ideal type of instrument to manage conflict. Nevertheless, if not handled adequately, they have the potential to bring long-lasting existential conflict lines to the surface, and thus can lead to violent confrontations. In the context of elections, these violent confrontations are called electoral violence . If a significantly large group of citizens associate violence and state-failure with elections, and thus refuse to participate in any political activity, the stabilization process of a relatively young and still defective democracy such as Kenya could be at stake. The Republic of Kenya has experienced violent electoral conflict repeatedly since the re-introduction of competitive elections in 1992. Thus, to date, Kenya is known as one of the prime examples of violent electoral conflict on the African continent.
This present study has examined the ways in which violent electoral conflict has affected victims’ lives with a special focus on the implications of the political participation of ordinary Kenyan citizens and their attitudes towards democracy. To answer the research questions, 32 semi-structured interviews with 34 victims of violent electoral conflict coming from four main ‘hotspot’ areas of the post-election violence of 2008—the Coastal Province, Nairobi Province, Nyanza Province, and the Rift Valley Province—were conducted. They were supplementey by four expert interviews, providing insight knowledge on selected topics.
The present study found that the victims’ experience of violent electoral conflict led to diametrically opposed reactions with respect to their political participation behaviour. While 37% of the respondents (9 out of 24) stuck to their previous political participations, a surprisingly high number of 63% (15 out of 24) reported or were found to have changed their behaviour of political involvement. With 9 out of 24 cases (37%), the greatest part of the sample remained persistent in its previous political participation, and thus did not change its political behaviour. Rather unexpectedly, as a result of the stressful experience of violent electoral conflict, an increase in political participation also was found in 33% of the respondents. Thirty percent also reported an adverse effect to their previous political participation behaviour. Motives for an increase in political participation were the wish of victims of the sample to achieve a common or personal good, or to contribute to a general change in Kenya.
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Considering that an even larger number of victims increased their social engagement after their experience of violent electoral conflict, the overall amount of increased participation in response to the experience of violent electoral conflict is noteworthy. Further research with larger samples will be needed to test this finding with regard to its accuracy for Kenyan society as a whole. This finding also adds to the hope that the experience of violent electoral conflict does not necessarily lead to the rejection of political participation, but rather may inversely activate a sense of community and motivation in some victims to contribute to a change for the better.
Unfortunately, the portion of the victims who participated more after their experience of violent electoral conflict was counterbalanced by an almost equal number of victims who participated less. It is highly alarming that the majority of those 30% participating less came to generally associate elections with violence or the development of a general fatigue towards politics (useless; zero-sum game), translating into a decrease in political participation. Even worse, their negative attitude towards elections and political participation in general was found to be long-lasting (more than 5 years) and persisting beyond another electoral cycle (the general elections of 2013). The alienation of victims of violent electoral conflict towards political participation should not be ignored by any consolidating democracy, especially when experiencing violent electoral conflict on a regular basis. If further large-n studies confirm the existence and quantity of those opting out of political participation within the total group of victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya, this result would constitute a serious threat to the democratic stabilization process of the country.
The three different groups (constant, less, and more participation) were found to be heterogeneously composed. The group of non-changers included men and women from Nairobi Province, the Rift Valley Province, and the Coastal Province who had varying levels of impairment, schooling, income, and different ethnic affiliations. Interestingly, all the interviewees of Nyanza Province had undergone a change in political participation. In contrast, their Nairobi Province counterparts all stuck to their previous level of political participation. Furthermore, all the interviewees with an increased level of schooling are part of the constant political participation group. Apart from the lower level of education grouped in the categories yes, less political participation and yes, more political participation , these two groups were highly heterogeneously composed. Thus, at this point, no further assumptions about specific socio-demographic characteristics leading to a change in political participation could be drawn.
314 9. Conclusion and Recommendations
With regard to the practiced forms of political participation it was found that voting was considered as the typical form of political participation amongst the respondents, with more than 90% of all interviewees indicating that they had pursued or continued to persue their right to vote. In other words, the interviewees equated political participation with voting.
With regard to active political participation beyond voting, the interviewees strongly preferred an inter-human, face to face exchange of ideas and views, such as could be attained by attending rallies, meetings with campaigning politicians, or talking about politics with friends and family. Sitting down with political candidates was named as the ultimate decision-making situation by the interviewees from all geographical regions under consideration, age groups, genders, and income groups. Instead of reading the newspaper, party manifestos, or other political documents, the interviewees preferred to receive their information about politics mainly via TV and radio. These specific understandings of political participation found in the sample should be taken up in further research studies and be compared to the Kenyan population as a whole, and other countries experiencing violent electoral conflict in Sub- Saharan Africa.
The present study also investigated the respondents’ attitudes towards democracy in general, and the performance of democracy in Kenya more specifically. Based on respondents’ reported attitudes towards politics, politicians, and democracy; and on the basis of their reported behaviour of political participation, a typology of four distinct types of citizens was drawn for the sample of 34 victims of violent electoral conflict. This typology was applied to the theory of human empowerment of Inglehart and Welzel (2008) who emphasized the importance of the political engagement of ordinary citizens to the emergence and survival of effective democracy all over the world. The four types of citizens identified in the sample were: the voting citizen, the resigned citizen, the passive citizen, and the active citizen.
The most prevalent type of citizen found was the so-called voting citizen . Paradoxically, on the one hand, this citizen emphasizes the importance of exercising his/her democratic right to vote, whereas on the other, she/he refrains from any further involvement in politics or political participation. He/she is a citizen whose political behaviour is unidirectionally oriented towards the act of voting. Queuing for hours in the burning heat or pouring rain will not stop him/her from executing her/his democratic right and duty as a Kenyan citizen to attend the polls. The adherent might or might not be interested in politics, but his/her political behaviour remains the same in any event. The voting citizen further possesses a highly negative connotated understanding of politics and, even stronger, with regard to Kenyan 315 9. Conclusion and Recommendations
politicians. Surprisingly, although he/she considers voting as a highly valued freedom, the voting citizen does not hold a positive attitude towards elections and voting per se. For about half of the sample, elections and voting are connected with chaos, insecurity, and violence. Nevertheless, the voting citizen spares no effort to make his/her cross in a Kenyan election. This positive and intensive bond to the right to vote constitutes an opportunity to further activate the voting citizen to engage in shaping public life. The first and foremost condition for a shift in his/her negative attitude towards politics and political participation would be the peaceful conduct of free and fair elections in Kenya in the future.
Attention also is needed to understanding better the second most prevalent citizen type found among the victims of violent electoral conflict in the sample. The so-called resigned citizen is highly disillusioned, and the experience of violent electoral conflict further adds to his/her frustration about politics. The resigned citizen considers all political involvement, even voting, as a needless undertaking. He/she has turned his/her back on democracy in Kenya and—even more alarmingly—on the prospects of a democratic political system as a preferable form of government in general. The resigned voter as found in the interview material was most prevalent among the Luo ethnic group and was geographically focused in Nyanza Province, the Rift Valley Province, and the Coastal Province. If this type of citizen was to exist in large numbers of the total group of victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya, a hypothesis which cannot be proven within the realm of this study, the process of stabilizing Kenya’s democracy would be at stake. In addition to the experience of violent electoral conflict, the continuing marginalization of specific ethnic or social groups may be a contributing factor to the increase of resigned voters in Kenyan society. However, this hypothesis needs testing by nationally representative studies.
In diametrical opposition to the voting citizen, the passive citizen was found to be generally interested in the politics of his/her country, yet he/she shares the voting citizen‘s limited participation in politics (only voting). The passive citizen was found to be the third largest type of citizen identified in the sample, characterized by an ambiguous relation towards politicians but great sympathy for democracy in general and democracy in Kenya more specifically. He/she has mixed feelings towards elections, again because very often elections in Kenya are associated with violence, chaos, and fraud. Yet, just like the voting citizen, the passive citizen has shown great satisfaction with the conduct of the 2013 general elections, and might thus change her/his attitude towards elections in the long-run if electoral competitions remain peaceful, free, and fair in the future. With regard to her/his socio-
316 9. Conclusion and Recommendations
demographic characterisitcs, the passive voter encompases a very heterogeneous sample of ethnic groups coming from Nyanza Province, the Rift Valley, and the Coastal Province; and suffers from medium level impairment by violent electoral conflict. With his/her general interest in politics, the passive voter is predestined to develop self-expression values (see Inglehart and Welzel 2008) in the future, and thus actively contributes to the determination of public life in Kenya. Nevertheless, this mental pre-condition needs to materialize in real political participation.
The fourth sub-type, the active citizen , highly corresponds to the ideal type of an empowered citizen as described by Welzel’s and Inglehart’s (2008) theory of human empowerment. This empowered citizen is needed for shaping public life and for pushing for the implementation or safeguardening of an effective democracy no matter where in the world. Although traces of the empowered citizen can be found in the characteristics of the Kenyan active citizen, the latter does not meet these characteristics entirely, and is small in number within the present sample. More efforts will have to be made to increase its numbers so that it will contribute to the further development of democracy in Kenya and human empowerment of the Kenyan people.
Looking at the overall picture of the typology developed in this study, it becomes clear that the support for democracy in Kenya is stable, yet endangered by a potentially growing number of resigned citizens. It became clear that the development of democracy in Kenya is highly linked to the conduct of peaceful, free, and fair elections in the future, as well as to the reduction of the frustration manifesting in the alienation of the resigned-, voting-, and passive- citizen from political participation. Obviously, this task is not easily achieved. Nevertheless, efforts have to be made to counteract especially the highly destructive attitudes of the resigned citizen that put Kenya’s democracy at risk.
The marginalization of specific ethnic and social blocs—as found in the Luo ethnic group and the group of IDPs in the present sample—was found to contribute to the disengagement effect within this sample. The consequent implementation of the 2010 Constitution would be a first measure in this direction, since it was remarkable to find a great deal of optimism and positive attitude in the respondents towards the new Kenyan Constitution of 2010. It was even referred to as a source of inspiration for getting involved in politics again. Time will tell whether the trust in the new regulations or institutions—such as land regulations and the implementation of the IEBC—will persist.
317 9. Conclusion and Recommendations
Overall, the 2008 post-election violence had a long-lasting, life-altering, negative effect on the respondents, especially with regard to their economic situation, their psychological and physical well-being, and their social and family life. More than half of the interviewees were internally displaced as a consequence of violent electoral conflict, meaning that they were forced to leave their homes for at least several weeks, sometimes for several years. Six interviewees are still living in one of the IDP camps to this day, without any perspective of life improvement.
Seventy-seven percent of the respondents experienced a severe economic decline after their experience of violent electoral conflict as a result of the looting of their business inventory, savings, or animals; or the destruction of their harvest, agricultural land, or the family home. The loss of basic household income was an existential threat to many families of the victims of violent electoral conflict and resulted in an ongoing struggle to satisfy their basic human needs.
Fifty-four percent of the interviewees showed symptoms of a mental disorder as a reaction to their experience of violent electoral conflict, such as depressed mood, nightmares/flashbacks, and pessimistic thoughts.
In total, 32% of the interviewees reported or evinced permanent physical impairments, which included rape-induced physical impairments, stress-induced afflictions, and weapon-induced impairments due to the experienced violent electoral conflict.
The family structures of victims also were negatively impaired. In 21% of the cases, these changes included the ending of a marriage of the victim of violent electoral conflict. Closely related to the change in marriage status was a change in the sexual lives of women victims of sexual violence. Two women reported that their psychological or physical impairment incapacitated their ability to have sex with their husbands, which led to the end of their marriages in both cases. In yet another 21% of the cases, interviewees reported the loss of at least one family member or a close friend due to the 2008 post-election violence. A gender- specific change in family life that was found within the interviews was the condemnation of female victims for the pain and suffering of the family. According to Kenyan custom, the wife is responsible for the well-being of the family. In case of a catastrophe, such as during or after violent electoral conflict, she is blamed for the negative consequences to the entire family. As a result, 15% of the respondents (all females) reported having been condemned by their family or family in law.
318 9. Conclusion and Recommendations
Besides these challenging effects of violent electoral conflict found in the sample, one ‘positive’ social effect was found, too. The experience of violent electoral conflict increased the social engagement of 41% of the interviewees in peace initiatives, educational programmes, support groups, and other organizations. Consciously or unconsciously, this social engagement helped them to cope with their negative experiences. Despite this ‘positive’ social effect, victims reported social condemnation as a negative impairment on their social life.
The three most prevalent types of perpetrators, as identified through the memories of victims, were known people , such as neighbours, neighbours assisting strangers or employees, members of youth gangs, and complete strangers .
Victims of violent electoral conflict were found to have made use of three forms of coping strategies, defined as conscious efforts to deal with a stressful situation. These three forms included problem-focused coping, emotion-focused coping, and maladaptive coping. In contrast, unconscious mechanisms, known as psychological defense mechanisms, were used in rare cases.
The contribution of the present study to the scientific knowledge on violent electoral conflict is at least threefold. First, it provides a comprehensive and detailed description of the long- term implications of violent electoral conflict on the lives of 34 victims. This description is neither limited to a single social or ethnic group nor to one geographical focus. Rather, it provides thick descriptions of Kenya’s largest ethnic groups (Kikuyu, Luo, Kamba, and Luhya) and four ‘hotspot’ areas of violent electoral conflict in Kenya (the Coastal Province, Nairobi Province, Nyanza Province, and the Rift Valley Province). Furthermore, comparisons between different age groups, gender groups, income groups, and different levels of impairments were made possible. Insights from the interviews with victims of violent electoral conflict were further substantiated with information provided by four additional expert interviews conducted during the 3 month field phase.
Second, the present study provides fresh and new insight into the correlation of violent electoral conflict and political participation in Kenya within the scope of the present sample, a topic that has received very little attention in the scientific literature so far. The study draws a map of political participation in Kenya and thus helps to define political participation within the context of 34 Kenyan victims of violent electoral conflict. In addition, the study provides new and surprising findings on the forms of changes in political participation detected due to
319 9. Conclusion and Recommendations
the experience of violent electoral conflict, their frequencies, and individual motives that have driven these changes.
Third, and most important, the present study provides an inductively developed, fourfold typology of the Kenyan citizen as found among the interviewees. This typology distinguishes subtly nuanced differences in the attitudes of victims of violent electoral conflict interviewed with regard to their attitude towards democracy in general, democracy in Kenya, elections/voting and other forms of political participation, and politics and politicians in Kenya. In addition, these attitudes can be linked to different socio-economic variables, such as level of income, level of schooling/education, gender, and level of impairment caused by violent electoral conflict. Thus the provided typology can function as a nuanced basis of analysis on where and how to place countermeasures to political and democratic disengagement. This information is useful for social science researchers, politicians, social workers, and non-governmental organizations active in the field of civic/political education, peace, or social equality. The typology should be tested by further large-n empirical studies so to test its accuracy for the Kenyan victims of violent electoral conflict as a whole.
As has been emphasized on various occations, the present study does not include enough interview cases (N) to draw generalizationable findings to the total population of all victims of violent electoral conflict in Kenya. While this is true for qualitative research in general, some shortcomings also exist with regard to the specific sampling process, sampling composition, and sample selection that need to be discussed here.
Although the interviewer made every effort to compose the sample according to the set goal, heterogeneity with regard to religion (Christian affiliation versus Muslim affiliation) could not be achieved. Thus, the anaylsis excluded a comparison of different religious groups. Finding Muslim interview partners who were willing to speak about their experience was perceived as a particular challenge during the field phase. Furthermore, finding better educated victims of violent electoral conflict with an increased monthly income constituted another challenge. Thus, representatives of both groups are less frequently represented in the sample. It remains unsolved at this point what contributed to this phenomenon, for example, poorer victims of violent electoral conflict were simply larger in numbers or were more willing to participate in an interview about their experiences. Getting in contact with the vitims of violent electoral conflict was organized with the help of local NGOs. While this approach made sure that interviewees were psychologically stable enough to do the interview, since they were used to speaking about their experiences, this fact might also have influenced their voting behavior. It 320 9. Conclusion and Recommendations
is difficult to tell whether or not the answers of other victims, unguided by NGO support, would have given significantly different answers. As has been indicated already, further research is necessary to produce generalizable findings for the total population of victims in Kenya.
Within the concrete conduct of the interviews, language was an expected, nevertheless considerable problem. The author had to make sure to adequately select and train at least one interpreter for all four visited hot spot areas of violent electoral conflict and their spoken dialects. The author was able to provide a gender match of interpreter and interviewee in all the interview situations, which was especially important during the meetings with victims of sexual violence. Communication in a third language always produces a loss of information, a fact that shall not be denied for the present study. Both situations—the direct interview in English by a non-native speaker and the translation from a Kenyan language into English by a non native-speaker—certainly contributed to the fact that 30% of the interview material could not be used because of language problems. Furthermore, transcribing the interviews was a difficult and time-consuming task that needed training in the African dialect and the more frequent revision of unclear passages. Due to the elementary level of education of many participants, technical terms such as democracy , political participation , or political parties could not be used. Respondents just did not understand the questions, which needed to be rephrased in simpler words. Although the non-understanding of the word democracy was important information per se, interviewer effects on the answers canot be excluded entirely.
As a last point, the author would suggest that due to the highly emotional setting of interviews with traumatized people, interviews should always be conducted by a research team. On the one hand, this constellation would help to reduce the total number of interviews conducted by one interviewer, and on the other, working as a team enables a mutual sharing of experiences—good and bad—and the challenges faced during the interview settings.
321 9. Conclusion and Recommendations
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ADDENDUM
Addendum 1: Semi Structured Interview Guide (original version dated March 01 st 2013)
Date: ______Time: ______
Interview No.: ______Venue: ______
Hello,
My name is Stephanie Plata , I am a researcher coming from Germany and I am collecting the opinion of Kenyan citizens like you for my study. Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this interview.
Before starting, I’d like to briefly explain to you again what my study is all about:
☐ Hand over written Short Description of the research project to Participant.
☐ Explain the project to Participant as described in the Short Description.
☐ Ask Participant, if he needs further information.
During the course of this interview, I am going to ask you different open questions. As a basic principle, I would like you to answer these open questions by telling me everything that seems important and relevant to you. I am not going to interrupt you during your answer. There is no right or wrong answer to my questions. The important thing is that you tell me everything that comes up to your mind. I will always give you enough time for your answers, so you don’t need to feel pressured. Please, take your time; we have all the time in the world. Please answer all questions truthfully, as otherwise, the results of my study will we of no use.
I assume that the whole interview is going to last about 45 to 60 minutes, like it was indicated on the short description form. If a question comes up, which you do not want to answer (for whatever reason), please just tell me. I will move on to another question then. You can interrupt or even abandon the interview at any time.
Concerning some formal issues:
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Let me assure you that your answers will be kept completely confidential; they will never be made public. It goes without saying that all interview material is treated strictly confidential and anonymous, meaning that all personal data, that allow to reach conclusions about you, are going to be eradicated or made anonymous. I will not ask you for your name, nor will I write it down.
☐ Show and explain Informed Consent Form to Participant
☐ Hand over Page 1 to Participant
☐ Participants signs Page 2, Document stays with Interviewer
I am going to record the interview with a little recorder. This enables me to later analyse what you’ve been telling me and to put it into writing. Additionally, I am going to take some notes during the interview in order to structure what you’ve been telling me. So don't let the setting make you nervous.
Would that be ok for you? (‰ if yes,)
Fine. So, let’s start the interview.
BLOCK 1: Central Question / Stimulus
Democracy in general and Democracy in Kenya
Spontaneously speaking, what is the first thing that comes up to your mind if you hear the word democracy?
Content / Aspect Maintenance questions Queries
And why is […] the first What do you mean by this?
thing that comes up your Could you please develop mind? this a little further?
What does democracy mean Is Democracy important to to you? you?
365
What do you think is the Are you actively supporting / central idea of democracy? not supporting democracy?
What do you think about elections?
Is democracy more important Why? than social peace?
What kind of political system should your kids be living in?
In your opinion: How is What do you think about the Kenyan Democracy new constitution? performing?
BLOCK 2: Central Question / Stimulus Political Participation
In your opinion, what other possibilities of influencing politics than voting do you have? OR
What is – in your opinion - political participation?
Content / Aspect Maintenance questions Queries
Do you actively participate in With your family and What was the last political politics? friends, do you sometimes issue that you discussed? discuss political issues?
What other forms of political participation do you know?
Did you ever participate in a What were you demonstration / protest demonstrating for? march?
In your opinion, does
366
democracy need the participation of its citizens?
Is Democracy something Why (not)? worth fighting for?
Is it ok to use pressure or In what situations is violence violence to achieve own legitimate? goals?
BLOCK 3: Central Question / Stimulus Elections / Electoral Conflict
Please tell me a little bit about what free and fair elections are to you.
Content / Aspect Maintenance questions Queries
Do vote buying, manipulation and violence belong to every election?
Please tell me a little bit Would you mind telling me What happened then? about how you experienced about the bad experience that the last elections. you made?
What was your first reaction And then? And later on? to this experience?
Did you give in to the How did you feel at this pressure (or other form of moment? electoral conflict)?
Did others have had the same What did your friends and experience as you? colleagues experienced?
Did you talk to someone Who did you talk to?
367
about it?
Did the experience of Anything else that has election related violence changed for you? cause any major changes in your live?
Did you cast your vote during the last elections?
If interview partner did vote Do you think it was brave at the last election: going to the polls despite the
How come you experience? (nevertheless) decided to vote?
Take a break. Ask interviewee how they are finding the interview process. Remind them that if they wish to discontinue at any point, they only need to tell the interviewer.
BLOCK 4: Central Question / Stimulus Consequences of electoral conflict
Did the experience of electoral conflict cause changes in your life?
Content / Aspect Maintenance questions Queries
If no: can you please tell me Could you please tell me a a little bit more about that? little more about that?
If yes: What changes?
Do you think differently Why? about democracy now?
Did it change your Are you more or less participation in politics? interested in politics now?
Do you want to make your Did it make you more
368
voice heard? cautious?
What do you think: Why do Is it because of the violence? Can you tell me a bit more others still campaign for about that? democracy?
Or why do others don’t support democracy anymore?
Are there other reasons you can imagine?
And what about your personal opinion? What motivates you to still participate in democracy?
OR
What made you withdraw?
BLOCK 5: Central Question / Stimulus Victim Perpetrator Relationship Today, with some distance in time, what do you think about the people, who treated you in the way you described it to me?
If the people who did that to you would be sitting here now, what would you like to tell them?
Content / Aspect Maintenance questions Queries
Do you know the people who did that to you?
Do you believe that these Were they forced to do it? people experienced pressure
369
themselves?
What could be a reason for you to put pressure on others yourself?
BLOCK 6: Background Information of Participant
1. Age: ______
2. Gender: ______
3. Family status: ______
4. Ethnic group identified with: ______
5. Religious affiliation: ______
6. Location: ☐ Urban ☐ Rural 7. Province: ______
8. Number of rooms at disposal: ______
9. Number of people sharing these rooms: ______
10. Level of formal schooling: ☐ None ☐ Primary Education (7 years)
☐ Secondary Education (7+4 years)
☐ Tertiary Education (7+4+2 years High School)
☐ University Education (7+4+2+3)
11. Do you currently have a job? ______
12. Income Group: ☐ Group 1: 0 – 10.000 KSh ☐ Group 2: 10.001 – 20.000 KSh
☐ Group 3: 20.001 – 30.000 KSh
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BLOCK 7: Open question at the end of the interview
Ok, that would be it from my side. Would you like to add something, a topic that hasn’t been mentioned during our interview yet, but which is important to you?
How did you experience the interview?
☐ I would like to sincerely thank you for your participation in this interview.
☐ Smalltalk, if desired
☐ Access to research results, if desired
☐ Researchers contact details
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Addendum 2: Informed Consent Form
To be Presented to Research Participants Prior to Commencement of Interview Page 1 – is to be given to Research Participant Page 2 – is to be signed by research participant and returned to interviewer
Department of Political and Governmental Studies Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) Tel: +27 (0)41 504-2624 Fax: +27 (0)41-504-2624
Date: …/…/…… Contact person: Stephanie Plata Dear Participant, You are being asked to participate in a research study on the consequences of electoral conflict on the political participation of Kenyan citizens. You will be provided with the necessary information to assist you to understand the study and to explain what is expected of you (the participant). The risks, benefits, and your rights as a study subject will be outlined to you. Please feel free to ask me, the researcher to clarify anything that is not clear to you. You have the right to question anything regarding the study at any time. You are invited to report anything to me, that you might think would be of interest to me during the interview or during the days following your interview. You will be provided with my contact details, so that you can get hold of me even after the interview was completed. The study has to been approved by the Research Ethics Committee of the Nelson Mandel Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth. The REC-H consists of a group of independent experts who have the responsibility to ensure that the rights and welfare of participants, such as yourself, in research are protected and that studies are conducted in an ethical manner. Studies cannot be conducted without REC-H’s approval. Queries with regard to your rights as a research subject can be directed to the Research Ethics Committee (Human) on the following telephone number +2741 504-4536, you can also write to: The Chairperson of the Research, Technology and Innovation Committee, PO Box 77000, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, 6031. Participation in this research is completely voluntary. You are not obliged to take part in it. If you do partake, you have the right to withdraw at any given time, during the study without penalty or loss of benefits. Should you wish to withdraw from the study, please inform me about your decision. Although your identity will, at all times remain anonymous and confidential the results of the research study may be presented at scientific conferences or in specialist publications. This informed consent statement has been prepared in compliance with current statutory guidelines. I thank you for your time. Stephanie Plata RESEARCHER
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Informed Consent Form To be Presented to Research Participants Prior to Commencement of Interview Page 1 – kept by research participant Page 2 – signed by research participant and returned to interviewer
Department of Political and Governmental Studies Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) Tel: +27 (0)41 504-2624 Fax: +27 (0)41-504-2624
Date: …/…/……
I ……………………………………………………………………… hereby confirm that I have been informed of and I understand the conditions of the study. These conditions are outlined in page one of this consent form which I have been given to keep. I was in no way coerced by any
NGO, or other organization or person, to participate in this research project.
Signature: ……………………………………………………………….
Place of Signature: ………………………………………….
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Addendum 3: Short Description of the Research Project
Political participation of ordinary people is very important for every democracy. Like a heartbeat, it keeps the democratic system going and makes sure that citizens contribute actively to the further development of democracy in their country. Indeed, democracy is unthinkable without the element of participation, through which citizens make politicians accountable and air their grievances and demands.
Since the 1990s, competitive elections have become the most important instrument of political participation in Africa. Almost all African countries are holding elections regularly. Unfortunately, elections are often accompanied by incidents or outbreaks of violence during the election campaign, on the election day or in the immediate aftermath. Countries like Kenya or Zimbabwe have repeatedly experienced violence causing death, displacement and enormous damage.
Given the alarming levels of violent electoral conflict on the African continent, it is crucial to further deepen our knowledge on its effects on African citizens. As such, this study will add to our understanding of violent electoral conflict by putting ordinary Kenyan citizens into focus. By conducting interviews, lasting about 60 minutes, we will learn more about peoples’ experiences with election-related violence and the effects it had on them. In the long run, these findings will be very important to understand the path of democracy in Kenya.
The interviews will be conducted in English. A translator will be providing support if necessary. In order to receive solid results, a broad variety of Kenyan people will be interviewed, taking into consideration the ethnic and religious affiliation, age, gender, place of residence (province, rural or urban) and income group of the participants. Interviews will be conducted in the Coast Province, Nairobi Province, Nyanza Province, and Rift Valley Province. All Kenyans, agreeing to participate in the study, must have personally experienced election-related violence, i.e. were intimidated to vote for a specific party, experienced physical or psychological violence related to the election, had family members injured or even killed etc., and must be willing/able to talk about their experience.
The interview might bring up memories of traumatic experiences. That’s why all participation in this research is completely voluntary and your identity will, at all times, remain anonymous and confidential.
374
Addendum 4. Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972, 1980, 1990 and 1999 for Sub-Saharan Africa
Year(s) covered 1972 1980 1990 1999 PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL Angola #NV #NV 7 7 7 7 6 6 Benin 7 5 7 6 6 4 2 3 Botswana 3 4 2 3 1 2 2 2 Burkina Faso 3 4 6 5 6 5 4 4 Burundi 7 7 7 6 7 6 6 6 Cameroon 6 4 6 6 6 6 7 6 Cape Verde #NV #NV 6 6 5 5 1 2 Central African Republic 7 7 7 5 6 5 3 4 Chad 6 7 7 6 7 6 6 5 Comoros #NV #NV 4 5 5 5 6 4 Congo (Brazzaville) 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 5 Congo (Kinshasa) 7 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 Cote d'Ivoire 6 6 5 5 6 4 6 5 Djibouti #NV #NV 3 4 6 5 4 6 Equatorial Guinea 6 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 Eritrea #NV #NV #NV #NV #NV #NV 7 5 Ethiopia 5 6 7 7 7 7 5 5 Gabon 6 6 6 6 4 4 5 4 Gambia, The 2 2 2 3 2 2 7 5 Ghana 6 6 2 3 6 5 3 3 Guinea 7 7 7 7 6 5 6 5 Guinea-Bissau #NV #NV 6 6 6 5 3 5 Kenya 5 4 5 4 6 6 6 5 Lesotho 7 4 5 5 6 5 4 4 Liberia 6 6 6 6 7 7 4 5 375
Addendum 4 continued Year(s) covered 1972 1980 1990 1999 PR CL PR CL PR CL PR CL Mali 7 6 7 6 6 5 3 3 Mauritania 6 6 7 6 7 6 6 5 Mauritius 3 2 3 3 2 2 1 2 Mozambique #NV #NV 7 7 6 6 3 4 Namibia 6 5 #NV #NV 2 3 2 3 Niger 6 6 7 6 6 5 5 5 Nigeria 6 4 2 3 5 5 4 3 Rwanda 7 6 6 6 6 6 7 6 Sao Tome & Principe #NV #NV 6 6 5 5 1 2 Senegal 6 6 4 4 4 3 4 4 Seychelles #NV #NV 6 6 6 6 3 3 Sierra Leone 4 5 5 5 6 5 3 5 Somalia 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 South Africa 5 6 5 6 5 4 1 2 South Sudan #NV #NV #NV #NV #NV #NV #NV #NV Sudan 6 6 5 5 7 7 7 7 Swaziland 4 2 5 5 6 5 6 5 Tanzania 6 6 6 6 6 5 4 4
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Addendum 4 continued
Togo 7 5 7 6 6 6 5 5 Uganda 7 7 4 4 6 5 5 5 Zambia 5 5 5 6 6 5 5 4 Zimbabwe 6 5 3 4 6 4 6 5 sample size 39 countries 46 countries 47 countries 48 countries total value 225 207 252 249 264 240 216 213 average value PR/CL 5,769230769 5,307692 5,478261 5,413043 5,617021 5,106383 4,5 4,4375 Source: Freedom House (2012a).
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Addendum 5. Freedom in the World Country Ratings 1972, 1990 and 1999 for country status
Country Status 1972 Country Status 1990 Country Status 1999 Status Countries Status Countries Status Countries Not Free 27 Not Free 28 Not Free 16 Partly Free 9 Partly Free 15 Partly Free 24 Free 3 Free 4 Free 8 Source: Values taken from Freedom House (2012a).
378
Addendum 6. Political Right Values and Civil Liberty Values for Central African Republic, Ghana, Lesotho and Mali from 1990 to 2013
Political Rights
1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 Central African 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 7 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 Rep. Ghana 6 6 5 5 5 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Lesotho 6 6 6 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 Mali 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 5
Civil Liberties
1990 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 Central African 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 Republic Ghana 5 6 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Lesotho 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Mali 5 4 3 3 4 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 5 4 Source: Values taken from Freedom House (2012a).
379
Addendum 7. Longitudinal development of political right and civil liberty values of 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa between 1999 and 2013
(South Sudan excluded) 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 PR average 4,8125 4,6875 4,5625 4,604166667 4,6875 4,583333333 4,5 4,479166667 4,416666667 4,354166667 values CL average 4,645833333 4,8125 4,583333333 4,520833333 4,520833333 4,291666667 4,4375 4,395833333 4,4375 4,291666667 values
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 PR average 4,375 4,3125 4,229166667 4,270833333 4,270833333 4,354166667 4,458333333 4,458333333 4,416666667 4,479166667 4,45833 values CL average 4,10417 4,041666667 3,979166667 4 4,041666667 4,0625 4,1875 4,1875 4,1875 4,3125 4,27083 values
Source: Values taken from Freedom House (2012b).
380
Addendum 8. Quantity and quality evaluation of country value development for political rights 2005-2013 in 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa
(South Sudan excluded) Year(s) covered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Countries covered PR PR PR PR PR PR PR PR PR Angola 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Benin 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Botswana 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 Burkina Faso 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Burundi 3 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 Cameroon 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Cape Verde 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Central African Republic 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 Chad 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Comoros 4 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 Congo (Brazzaville) 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Congo (Kinshasa) 6 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 Cote d'Ivoire 6 7 7 6 6 7 6 5 5 Djibouti 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 Equatorial Guinea 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Eritrea 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Ethiopia 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 Gabon 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Gambia, The 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 Ghana 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Guinea 6 6 6 7 7 5 5 5 5
381
Addendum 8 continued Year(s) covered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Countries covered PR PR PR PR PR PR PR PR PR Guinea-Bissau 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6 Kenya 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Lesotho 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 Liberia 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Madagascar 3 4 4 4 6 6 6 6 5 Malawi 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 Mali 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 7 5 Mauritania 6 5 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 Mauritius 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mozambique 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 Namibia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Niger 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 3 3 Nigeria 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 Rwanda 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Sao Tome & Principe 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Senegal 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 Seychelles 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Sierra Leone 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 Somalia 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 South Africa 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
382
Addendum 8 continued Year(s) covered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Countries covered PR PR PR PR PR PR PR PR PR Sudan 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Swaziland 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Tanzania 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 Togo 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 Uganda 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 Zambia 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Zimbabwe 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 5 nr of changes per year 12 6 7 7 7 3 6 7 nr of deteriorations 7 3 6 6 4 1 2 3 nr of improvements 5 3 1 1 3 2 4 4 1 quality of changes 1 unit 1x2units 2x2units 2x2units 1x2units 1x2units 2x2units unit 1x5units
Source: Freedom House (2012b)
383
Addendum 9. Quantity and quality evaluation of country value development for civil liberties 2005-2013 in 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa
(South Sudan excluded)
Year(s) covered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Countries covered CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL Angola 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Benin 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Botswana 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Burkina Faso 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Burundi 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Cameroon 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Cape Verde 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Central African Republic 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 Chad 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Comoros 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Congo (Brazzaville) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Congo (Kinshasa) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 Cote d'Ivoire 6 6 5 5 5 6 6 5 4 Djibouti 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Equatorial Guinea 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 Eritrea 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 Ethiopia 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 Gabon 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 Gambia, The 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 6 6 Ghana 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Guinea 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5
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Addendum 9 continued
Year(s) covered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Countries covered CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL Guinea-Bissau 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 Kenya 3 3 3 3 4 3 3 4 4 Lesotho 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Liberia 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Madagascar 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 Malawi 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Mali 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 5 4 Mauritania 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 Mauritius 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Mozambique 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Namibia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Niger 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Nigeria 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 Rwanda 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 Sao Tome & Principe 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Senegal 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 Seychelles 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Sierra Leone 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Somalia 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 South Africa 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
385
Addendum 9 continued
Year(s) covered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Countries covered CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL CL Sudan 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Swaziland 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Tanzania 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Togo 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 Uganda 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Zambia 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 Zimbabwe 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 nr of changes per year 3 6 3 8 4 0 7 5 nr of deteriorations 3 4 3 7 2 0 6 1 nr of improvements 0 2 0 1 2 0 1 4 1 quality of changes 1 unit 1 unit 1 unit unit 1 unit - 1x2units 1x2units Source: Freedom House (2012b).
386
Addendum 10. Freedom in the World Country Ratings by Freedom House (Free, Partly Free, Not Free)
Source: Freedom House (2013).
387
Addendum 11. African Elections 1990-2008, by Level of Violent Electoral Conflict
No violence (0) Violent Harassment (1) Violent Repression (2) Large-Scale Violence (3) Benin: 1995, 1996, 1999, Angola: 2008 Burundi: 2005 Angola: 1992 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007 Botswana: 1994, 1999, 2004 Benin: 1991 Cameroun: 1997 CAR: 1992 Burkina Faso: 1992, 1997, Burkina Faso: 1991, 2005 Comoros: 1992 1998, 2002, 2007 DRC: 2006 Cape Verde: 1991, 1995, Eq. Guinea: 1993, 1996, Burundi: 1993 1996, 2001, 2006 1999, 2004 Ethiopia: 2005 Cameroun: 1992, 1992, Ethiopia: 2000 CAR: 1998 1997, 2002, 2004, 2007 Guinea: 1993 Chad: 1997, 2006 CAR: 1993, 1999, 2005 Guinea: 1998 Côte d'Ivoire: 2000 Comoros: 1993, 1996, 1996, Chad: 1996, 2001, 2002 Côte d'Ivoire: 1995 2002, 2004, 2006 Kenya: 1992, 1997, 2007 Djibuti: 1992, 2003 Comoros: 1990 Mauritania: 1992 Lesotho: 1998 Gabon: 1996, 1998, 2001, Djibuti: 1993, 1997, 1999, Niger: 1996 2006 2005 Madagascar: 2001 Nigeria: 1992, 1993, 2003, Eq. Guinea: 2002, 2008 Senegal: 1993 Gambia: 1997 2007 Ghana: 1996, 2000 Ethiopia: 1995 Sudan: 1996, 2000 Rep. of Congo: 1993 Guinea: 2002 Gabon: 1990, 1993, 2005 Tanzania: 2000 South Africa: 1994, 1999 Guinea-Bissau: 1999, 2004, Gambia: 1992, 1996, 2001, Togo: 1998, 1994, 2003 2008 2002, 2006, 2007 Togo: 1993, 2005 Zimbabwe: 2000, 2002, Ghana: 1992, 2004, 2008 Uganda: 2001, 2001 Lesotho: 1993, 2002, 2007 2008 Madagascar: 1997, 1998, Guinea: 1995, 2003 Zimbabwe: 2005 2002, 2007
Guinea-Bissau: 1994, 2005 Malawi: 1994, 1999 Mali: 1992, 2002, 2007 Côte d'Ivoire: 1990 Mauritania: 1996, 1997, Kenya: 2002 2006, 2007 Mauritius: 1991, 1995, 2000, Liberia: 1997, 2005 2005 Madagascar: 1993, 1993, Namibia: 1994, 2004 2006 Niger: 1993, 1995, 1996, Malawi: 2004 2004 Rep. of Congo: 2002, 2002, Mali: 1997 2007 Sao Tomé & Princ.: 1991, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001, Mauritania: 2001, 2003 2002, 2003, 2006, 2006 Mozambique: 1994, 1999, Senegal: 2001 2004 Seychelles: 1993, 1998, Namibia: 1999 2001, 2002, 2006 Togo: 2007 Niger: 1999
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Addendum 11 continued
No violence (0) Violent Harassment (1) Violent Repression (2) Large-Scale Violence (3) Zambia: 1991, 2001, 2006, Nigeria: 1998, 1999 2008 Rep. of. Congo: 1992 Rwanda: 2003, 2003 Senegal: 1998, 2000, 2007, 2007 Sierra Leone: 1996, 2002, 2007 South Africa: 2004 Swaziland: 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 Tanzania: 1995, 2005 Togo: 1999, 2002 Uganda: 1996, 2006 Zambia: 1996 Zimbabwe: 1990, 1995, 1996, 2008 * In October 1993, Melchior Ndadaye, Burundi's first democratically elected and Hutu president, was assassinated, triggering a wave of mass violence and civil war. We code the base as violent harassment for two reasons: (1) while ultimately the product of the electoral process, the assassination nevertheless was in response to policy reform proposals, particularly to the military, and not only in response to the electoral outcome; and (2) the assassination happened more than three months after the election and, thus, by our coding rules, is not categorized as "electoral" violence. Some observers might reasonably consider the case one of high electoral violence, and the logic indeed resemples one of the scenarios identified later in the chapter (where an incument or challenger protests the electoral results, leading to generalized violence).
** A high- level electoral official was assassinated after the vote, triggering the arrest and torture of high-level political opponents of the ruling Parti Socialiste du Sénégal.
Source: Straus & Taylor (2012: 25, 26).
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Addendum 12. Frequency of High Levels of Violent Electoral Conflict
Never High Electoral Violence Occasional High Electoral Usual High Electoral Violence Violence Benin: 1991, 1995, 1996, 1999, Côte d'Ivoire: 1990, 1995, Angola: 1992* , 2008 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007 2000* Botswana: 1994, 1999, 2004 Burundi: 1993, 2005 DRC: 2006* Cameroun: 1992, 1992, Burkina Faso: 1991, 1992, 1997, Eq. Guinea: 1993, 1996, 1997, 1997, 2002, 2004, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2007 1999 , 2002, 2004, 2008 2007 Cape Verde: 1991, 1995, 1996, CAR: 1992*, 1993, 1998, Ethiopia: 1995, 2000, 2001, 2006 1999, 2005 2005* Comoros: 1990, 1992, Chad: 1996, 1997, 2001, 2002, Kenya: 1992*, 1997*, 1993, 1996, 2002, 2004, 2006 2002, 2007* 2006 Nigeria: 1992*, 1993* , Djibouti: 1992, 1993, 1997, 1999, Guinea: 1993*, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2003* , 2004, 2003, 2005 1998, 2002, 2003 2007* Gabon: 1990, 1993, 1996, 1998, Lesotho: 1993, 1998*, South Africa: 1994*, 2001, 2005, 2006 2002, 2007 1999* , 2004 Gambia: 1992, 1996, 1997, 2001, Madagascar: 1993, 1997, Sudan: 1996, 2000 2002, 2006, 2007 1998, 2001*, 2002, 2007 Mauritania: 1992, 1996, Togo: 1993*, 1994 , 1998, Ghana: 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2006, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2005* , 2008 2007 2007 Zimbabwe: 1990, 1995, Guinea-Bissau: 1994, 1999, 2004, Niger: 1993, 1995, 1996, 1996, 2000*, 2002*, 2005, 2005, 2008 1996, 1999, 2004 2008* Rep. of Congo: 1992, Liberia: 1997, 2005 1993*, 2002, 2002, 2007 Senegal: 1993, 1998, 2000, Malawi: 1994, 1999, 2004 2001, 2007 Tanzania: 1995, 2000, Mali: 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 2005 Uganda: 1996, 2001, Mauritius: 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005 2001, 2006 Mozambique: 1994, 1999, 2004 Namibia: 1994, 1999, 2004 Rwanda: 2003, 2003 Sao Tomé & Princ. 1991, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2006 Seychelles: 1993, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2006 Sierra Leone: 1996, 2002, 2007 Swaziland: 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008 Zambia: 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 Itablics: Sustantial (high) violence (categories 2 and 3) * Highest violence (category 3).
Source: Straus & Taylor (2012: 27).
390
Addendum 13. Stata Do File for the Analysis of PEI data (Perception of Electoral Integrity) in Chapter 6
* Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) Dataverse, * Norris, Pippa; Martinez i Coma, Ferran; Gromping, Max, 2015, "Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, Version 3" http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/29114, Harvard Dataverse, V3 * https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/PEI, accessed on 1.05.2015
****************************************************** * General settings ******************************************************
* Set wd & load data cap log close //closes any log files that you might have accidentally left open cd "D:\Eigene Dateien\Home_Office\PEI" use "PEI country-level v12 Stata 13_02_15(PEI_3)data.dta", clear set more off
* Log-file log using "result_20150501.log", replace // writes results in a logfile (.txt)
****************************************************** * Descriptive Statistic ****************************************************** tab country tab ccode numlabel _all, add
* factor analysis factor bdiscrim bfavored bimpartial, factors(3) // factor analysis: Test if variable are on same dimension
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Addendum 13 continued
****************************************************** * Reducte Data to Countries in Sub-Sahara Africa ****************************************************** * prepare for sub-Saharan Africa keep if region <= 2 // reduce data to sub-Saharan Africa list country surveynum office // Number of elections held btw. 2012-2014; type of election(s) held list country violence Turnout reg Turnout violence performance// regression fhcategory reg PEIIndexi mediai violence
****************************************************** * Reducte Data to Kenya ****************************************************** * prepare for Kenya keep if ccode == 501 // reduce data to Kenya tab ccode tab country surveynum tab office tab y2013 office tab PEIIndexi // Perceptions of electoral integrity index imputed tab PEIIndex_rank // position on the ranking based on the PEI Index
****************************************************** * Analyse Concept of Free Elections ****************************************************** * prepare for descriptive statistic of free elections // free elections list country year office violence rich fraudulent
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Addendum 13 continued
****************************************************** * Analyse Concept of Fair Elections ****************************************************** * prepare for descriptive statistic of fair elections list country year office lawsi proceduresi fairaccess faircount impartial // additive scale for electoral laws & elect. procedures list country year office lawsunfair favoredincumbent citizens // fair elections: variables for electoral laws
****************************************************** * Analyse Concept of Competitive Elections ****************************************************** * prepare for descriptive statistic of competitive elections list country year office partyregi choice // competitive elect. additive scale for party registration list country year office oppprevent womenopp minorityopp leaderselect rallies // competitive elections variables for party registration
****************************************************** * Analyse Concept of Inclusive Elections ****************************************************** * prepare for descriptive statistic of inclusive elections list country year office voteregi postal disabled expats // inclusive elections additive scale for voter registration list country reglisted reginaccurate ineligible // inclusive elections: variables for voter registration
****************************************************** * Prepare Synoptical Table ****************************************************** * prepare for descriptive statistic of free, fair, competitive and inclusive elections list country year office PEIIndexi PEIIndex_rank violence rich fraudulent awsi proceduresi fairaccess faircount impartial partyregi choice voteregi postal disabled expats responserate log off log close exit
Source: Norris et al (2015), "Perceptions of Electoral Integrity, Version 3", http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/29114, accessed 1.5.2015.
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Addendum 14. Stata Do File for the Analysis of SCAD data (Social Conflict Analysis Database) in Chapter 6
clear use "D:\Kenya\SACD data\DataSets\SCAD2.dta"
tab NEvents tab styr tab ndeath tab ndeath styr
swilk ndeath NEvents sfrancia ndeath NEvents
gen electionyear=styr==1992|styr==1997|styr==2002|styr==2007|styr==2013
reg NEvents electionyear nbreg NEvents electionyear
reg ndeath electionyear nbreg ndeath electionyear
clear use "D:\Kenya\SACD data\DataSets\SCAD1.dta"
bysort styr: tab ndeath bysort styr: egen test=sum(ndeath) levelsof test, local(lev) foreach le of numlist `lev' { dis "`le' Tote:" tab styr if test==`le' }
sum ndeath display r(sum) tab ndeath etviolence tab ndeath etviolence, col tab issue1 etviolence, col
394
Addendum 14 continued
* Create dataset on a monthly level. clear use "D:\Kenya\SACD data\DataSets\SCAD1.dta" collapse (count) NEvents=eventid (sum) ndeath, by(styr stmo)
* Create dataset for 9 months election time and 9 months non election time; operationalize Straus & Taylor. clear use "D:\Kenya\SACD data\DataSets\SCAD1.dta" collapse (count) NEvents=eventid (sum) ndeath (mean) electiontime if electiontime!=., by(styr stmo) replace electiontime=0 if electiontime==.5 swilk ndeath NEvents sfrancia ndeath NEvents reg NEvents electiontime nbreg NEvents electiontime reg ndeath electiontime nbreg ndeath electiontime
Source: Hendrix, S. & Salehyan, I. (2015); Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD), accessed on 24.05.2015
395
Addendum 15. List and frequency of actors involved in social conflict
etype actor1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total Total 49 57 30 103 3 40 34 35 167 518 Unknown 0 0 0 33 0 0 0 1 0 34 Police 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 0 0 25 Students 1 8 1 9 0 0 0 0 0 19 Attackers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 11 14 Gunmen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11 12 Pokot tribe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 Bandits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 10 KANU supporters 2 0 4 0 0 0 3 0 0 9 Angry mob 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 7 Islamic militants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 7 Masai 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 7 Merile tribesmen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 7 Mungiki 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 7 Muslims 0 5 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 7 Islamic Party of Ke.. 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 Al-Shabaab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 5 Armed gang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 Cattle rustlers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5 Kenya National Unio.. 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 Odinga supporters 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 Protesters 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 Youths 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 5 Cattle raiders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 Ethnic Somalis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 Kalenjins 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 4 Supreme Council of .. 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 Air traffic control.. 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 Al-Shebab 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 Citizens 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 Degodia clan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 Minibus drivers 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 3 Opposition parties 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 Sabaot Land Defence.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 Teachers 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3 Villagers 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 Armed men 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Armed raiders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 Arsonists 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Bomber 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Borana clan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Busdrivers 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
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Addendum 15 continued
Cattle thieves 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 Dinka refugees 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 Ethiopian bandits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 Ethiopian raiders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 FORD supporters 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Farmers 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 Flower farm workers 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 Forum for the Resto.. 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Gangsters 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 2 Journalists 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Kenyans 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Kikuyus 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 Kipsigis 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 Luo 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 Maasai 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Maasai tribesmen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Maasai warriors 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Moslems 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 Mungiki sect 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 National Convention.. 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 Pokomo 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Pokomo farmers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Pokot 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Political parties 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 Pro-democracy activ.. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Refugees 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 Roman Catholics 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Shebab insurgents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 Shebab militants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 Slum residents 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 Somali Bandits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Somali gunmen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 Somali insurgents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 Students at Moi Uni.. 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 Sudanese refugees 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 Toposa tribe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Tribal groups 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 2 Turkana 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Turkana tribe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 Unidentified men 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 University Lecturers 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 Unknown gunmen 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 Women human rights .. 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Airline workers 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
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Addendum 15 continued
Al-Qaeda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Al-Shebab Sympathiz.. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 All-Banks Shopstewa.. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Angry protesters 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Anti-globalization .. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Anti-globalization .. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Anti-government pro.. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Armed youth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Bank workers 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Beer Drinkers 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Borana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Bukusu tribe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Catholic School Boys 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Churces 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Civil rights activi.. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Civil society activ.. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Climate Network Afr.. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Coffee growers 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Criminal gang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Dasenetch tribe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Democratic Party 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Digos 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Dockworkers 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Doctors 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Dongiro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Election officials 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Environmental Activ.. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Ethiopian raiders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 Ethiopian Borans (t.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Ethiopian cattle ru.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Ethiopian gunmen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 February 18 Resista.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 Garre clan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Garreh tribe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Greenbelt movement 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Gunman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 Health workers 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Hired thugs 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Homeowners 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Hospital workers 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Human rights activi.. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Islamic Party of Ke.. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Justice for Liz group 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 KANU Youth 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Addendum 15 continued
KANU Youth wing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 KANU members 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 KANU youths 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Kalenjin tribesmen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Karamojong 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Karamojong tribe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 Kenya African Natio.. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Kenya Airline Pilot.. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Kenya Human Rights .. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Kenya Medical Pract.. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Kenya National Afri.. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Kenya Polytechnic S.. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Kenya Union of Smal.. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Kenyan Muslims 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Kibaki Supporters 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Kiosk owners 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Kipsigi gang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Kisii 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Labor, student, opp.. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Law Society of Kenya 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Magistrates 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Man 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Market traders 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Massai pastoralists 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Massai tribesmen 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Mentally ill patients 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Merile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Military 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 Minibus Drivers 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Mob 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Mombasa Republic Co.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Mombasa Republican .. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Mourners 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Mungiki sect members 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Murule Clan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Muslim Extremists 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Muslim Human Rights.. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Muslim Organizations 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Muslim Women 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Muslim demonstrators 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 NARC Party 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 NGOs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 National Council of.. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Nomadic Tribes 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Addendum 15 continued
Nomadic tribes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Nurses 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Occupy Parliament p.. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Opponents of consti.. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Opposition MPs 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Opposition Parties 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Opposition Supporters 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Opposition groups 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Opposition supporters 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Organized protesters 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Orma 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Orma clan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Pakot tribe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Parents 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Party of National U.. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Pokomo attackers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Pokot Tribesmen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Pokot tribesmen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Political Parties 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Political factions 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Prison workers 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Pro-democracy group 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Pro-democracy youths 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Pro-government groups 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 Pro-government thugs 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 Pro-government trib.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Protester 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Raiders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Rail workers 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Reformist groups 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Riot police 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 Sabaot Land Defence.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Samburu villagers 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Sex Workers 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Soccer fans 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Somali bandits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 Somali clan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Somali raiders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Sonjo tribe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Sons of Liberty 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Stone-throwing youths 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Street vendors 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Students at Kenya P.. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Students at Nairobi.. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
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Addendum 15 continued
Students at Nairobi.. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Students at Univers.. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Sugar factory emplo.. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Supporters of Kenne.. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Supporters of Masou.. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Supporters of Odinga 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Suspected Somali in.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Suspected terrorists 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 Taxi drivers 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Tea Producers 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Terror suspect 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 The Army of Palestine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Traders 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Transport operators 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Turkana raiders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Turkana tribesmen 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Ugandan cattle raid.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Unemployed youth 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Union of Kenya Civi.. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 United Business Ass.. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 United Moslems of A.. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 University Academic.. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Vendors 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Women's Development.. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Young men 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Youth gang 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 Zanzibar refugees 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Source: Hendrix, S. & Salehyan, I. (2015); Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD), accessed on 24.05.2015
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Addendum 16. Descriptive details of interview partners
Nr. of Province Nr. of people Province where E.V. Level of Income * Gender Age Ethnicity Religion Family Status Current Job rooms at sharing currently was schooling Group disposal these living in experienced rooms Project Manager; Married, 2 2 (10,001- 1 1 Male 32 Nairobi Kikuyu Christian 7 years Co-Founder of 3 7 Nairobi children 20,000KSh) local NGO
Separated, 11 Community 1 (0-10,000 Rift 2 1 Male 71 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian 3 years 1 1 children leader IDP camp KSh) Valley
Married, 4 Casual labourer; 1 (0-10,000 Rift 3 1 Male 38 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian 3 years 1 5 children farmer; IDP camp KSh) Valley
Separated, 6 Casual labourer; 1 (0-10,000 Rift 4 1 Female 50 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian 6 years 1 7 children IDP camp KSh) Valley Casual labourer, Married, community 1 (0-10,000 Rift 5 1 Male 63 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian living 6 years 1 1 spokesman; IDP KSh) Valley separately camp Farmer, casual Single, 4 1 (0-10,000 Rift 6 1 Female 31 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian 6 years labourer; IDP 1 5 children KSh) Valley camp Single, 5 Casual labourer; 1 (0-10,000 Rift 7 1 Female 35 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian 8 years 1 6 children IDP camp KSh) Valley High NGO worker; Single, no 1 (0-10,000 8 1 Female 32 Western Kikuyu Christian School community 3 1 Nairobi children KSh) Level worker Divorced, 2 University 1 (0-10,000 Rift 9 1 Female 28 Rift Valley Kalenjin Christian casual labourer 2 4 children Degree KSh) Valley 10 1 Expert interview with Peace Initiative Organizer in Rift Valley
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Addendum 16 continued
Nr. of Province Nr. of people Province where E.V. Level of Income * Gender Age Ethnicity Religion Family Status Current Job rooms at sharing currently was schooling Group disposal these living in experienced rooms Married, 3 Primary Casual labourer; 1 (0-10,000 Rift 11 1 Male 35 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian 1 5 children Education IDP camp KSh) Valley Primary 1 (0-10,000 Rift 12 1 Male 63 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian Unknown Farmer Unknown Unknown Education KSh) Valley Chairman Peace Married, 3 Primary 1 (0-10,000 Rift 13 1 Male 41 Rift Valley Luhya Christian Committee, 2 3 children Education KSh) Valley farmer Chairman Peace Married, 3 Primary 1 (0-10,000 Rift 14 1 Male 34 Rift Valley Luhya Christian Meeting, church 2 5 children Education KSh) Valley work Unknown, 3 Primary Peacemaker, 2 (10,001- Rift 15 1 Female 53 Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian 5 4 children Education farmer 20,000) Valley 60, Three Males; around Luo 17 children / 2 Expert Interview Primary Farmer / Priest / 1 (0-10,000 Rift 16 3 40, Rift Valley Kikuyu Christian children / No Unknown Unknown with peace Education Business man KSh) Valley around Kikuyu children makers Rift Valley 40 married, 4 12 both both Farmer/Fish 1 (0-10,000 Rift 17 2 Female & Male 37/50 Rift Valley children/marri years/11 3/2 6/5 Kikuyu Christian farmer KSh) Valley ed, 7 children years Widdow, 12 1 (0-10,000 18 1 Female 54 Nyanza Luo Christian None Farmer 2 12 Nyanza children KSh) Living Nairobi and separately, 4 Primary 1 (0-10,000 19 1 Female 26 Luo Christian Casual labourer 3 6 Nyanza Nyanza children, lives Education KSh) with brother 1 (0-10,000 20 1 Female 25 Nyanza Luo Christian Single, 1 child 7 years Casual labourer 2 2 Nyanza KSh) 403
Addendum 16 continued
Nr. of Province Nr. of people Province where E.V. Level of Income * Gender Age Ethnicity Religion Family Status Current Job rooms at sharing currently was schooling Group disposal these living in experienced rooms Married, 2 Primary 1 (0-10,000 21 1 Female 26 Nyanza Luo Christian Casual labourer 2 4 Nyanza children Education KSh) Married, 2 Primary Chairperson 3 (20,001- 22 1 Female 31 Rift Valley Luo Christian 7 1 Nyanza children Education Womens Group 30,000 KSh) Working with Married, 7 Primary 1 (0-10,000 23 1 Male 59 Nyanza Luo Christian children 2 9 Nyanza children Education KSh) (education) Primary 1 (0-10,000 24 1 Female 31 Nyanza Luo Christian Single, 1 child Cleaning lady 1 2 Nyanza Education KSh) 25 1 Expert interview with NGO worker in Nyanza
Married, 3 1 (0-10,000 26 1 Male 30 Coast Kamba Christian 5 years Shop owner 3 5 Coast children KSh)
Married, 2 1 (0-10,000 27 1 Female 28 Coast Meru Christian 7 years Shop assistent 1 4 Coast children KSh) Single, 2 Primary 1 (0-10,000 28 1 Female 34 Coast Luo Christian Bartender 1 3 Coast children education KSh) Giriama Single, no 1 (0-10,000 29 1 Female 31 Coast Muslim None Casual labourer 3 1 Coast (Mijikenda ) children KSh) Chonyi Married, 7 1 (0-10,000 30 1 Female 32 Coast Christian None Laundress 1 3 Coast (Mijikenda) children KSh)
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Addendum 16 continued
Nr. of Province Nr. of people Province where E.V. Level of Income * Gender Age Ethnicity Religion Family Status Current Job rooms at sharing currently was schooling Group disposal these living in experienced rooms 31 Expert interview with Muslim preacher in Mombasa 2 (10,000- both married; Female& both Meru both both 8 both Shop 20,000KSh) 32 32&33 Coast having unknown unknown Coast Female (Marian) Christian years owner &1 (0-10,000 children KSh) Single, 2 Primary 1 (0-10,000 33 Female 42 Coast Kamba Christian Laundress 1 3 Coast children education KSh) informal Giriama Primary 34 Female 29 Coast Christian marriage, 2 housewife 1 (0-10,000 1 4 Coast (Mijikenda ) education children KSh) manager Primary 35 Female 57 Nairobi Kamba Christian 7 children children 1 (0-10,000 4 10 Nairobi education shelter KSh) married, 7 University retired, former 3 (20,000- 36 Male 65 Nairobi Kikuyu Christian 4 3 Nairobi children degree civil servant 30,000 KSh)
Source: Table created by the author of the present study.
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Addendum 17. Coding sheet used during trial coding
Name of coder / Point in time: ______Unit no. Category for dim. 1 Category for dim. 2 Category for dim. 3 1.1 1.3 2.5 3.2 1.2 1.2 2.4 3.1 ………… 2.1 1.3 2.5 3.7 ………… 3.1 1.5 2.2 3.2 ………… n.n … … …
Source: Schreier (2012: 158).
Addendum 18. Comparative coding sheet for dimension 1
Unit no. First coder Second coder 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.5 … … … 2.1 1.3 1.7 … … … 3.1 1.5 1.5 … … … n.n … …
Source: Schreier (2012: 159).
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Addendum 19. The final coding frame
List of Codes
List of Codes Memo # Codesystem 3725 GREEN 0 YELLOW 0 BLUE 0 RED 58 VIOLETT 41 1 Knowledge about Democracy 0
1.1 no understanding of the word to be coded in this category if interviewee declares to have heared the word 16 democracy before but not to have any further knowledge about its meaning; neither about polity, policy or politics. Indicator: democracy? I don't know. I don't know what it means. 1.2 rudimental knowledge about the meaning of to be coded in this category if interviewee can specify at least one prominent 18 democracy characteristics of democracy, such as specific freedoms or rights or can execute his/her impression of the new Kenyan constitution. Indocator: I don't know if you've heard that we have a new constitution in Kenya and it brings many advantages.Memo: also code examples of what democracy means to interviewee so that I can compare their understanding to the western/european understanding of democracy. it will be one goal of analysis to compare the interviewees' knowledge with my acedemic, western/european knowlede 1.3 good level of knowledge about the meaning of to be coded in this category, if interviewee can name some elements of democracy 39 democracy (such as the equal voting right, freedom of expression, the role of the opposition,
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independent judiciary etc.) or can carry out his opinion about the new Kenyan constitution. Mention of further knowledge about the political system in Kenya or names of communal, regional or national politicians shall be considered as knowledge about democracy as well. Indicator: Democracy means one man one vote and provides specific rights to all members of the society such as the right to speak freely. With the new constitution, the MPs in Kenya…Memo: also code examples of what democracy means to interviewee so that I can compare their understanding to the western/european understanding of democracy. it will be one goal of analysis to compare the interviewees' knowledge with my acedemic, western/european knowlede 2 Expectations towards democracy/politicians 0
2.1 provide support and help/ deliver Mention of a decided expectation that the government/President/democracy is 44 there to help people to reduce their poverty and to solve their problemsIndicator: he has to help us. He has to see what he can do for us. Memo: compare expectation towards democracy/politicians in Kenya with western countries. Kenya seems to have different expectations (help, rescue, accommodation) than Western states (issue voting: reduce taxes, increase employment, support climate change; positivist vs. post-positivist voting…). Check whether expectations in Kenya are personal expectations or expectations for ethnic groups (I need vs. support ethnic group). 2.2 bring peace to be coded in this category if interviewee mentions that leaders must bring peace; 5 peace is considered to be the most important thing to achieve in KenyaIndicator: Even if you're rich and you don't have peace it's nothing; no more violence 2.3 bring up/have a good leader mention that democracy is associated with good leaders. Democracy needs good 9 leaders in oder to function well. Memo: it might be interesting to investigate whether the believe in leaders is particularely strong in Kenya, compared to western standards; it might be a specific component of Kenyan democracy 2.4 electoral success of preferred candidate code in this category if respondent mentions that democracy means implementing 0 his/her preferred political candidate. mention that democracy means getting the leader he/she wants. 2.5 other 2
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3 Challenges for Democracy in Kenya Demarcation: code statements here, if they have general character; if they are not 0 associated with a specific election (triggers/causes of violent electoral conflict). When statement is referring to the motives of a perpetrator to commit violent electoral conflict, code passage in category 9.3. When they are referring to triggers of violent electoral conflict, please code them in category "causes/triggers of violent electoral conflict". 3.1 ethnic segregation passages are to be coded here, if interviewee calls ethnicity a general challenge for 0 Kenya. Indicator: Ethnicity was and still is a big problem in Kenya.Demarcation: If interviewee personally experienced ethnicity as a motivation of perpetrators of violent electoral conflict, text passages shall be coded in category 9.3.2 "ethnical motivation". If interviewee names ethnicity as a trigger or source of electora violence, passages are to be coded in category 6.6.4 "ethnic clashes". 3.1.1 electoral context 1
3.1.1.1 voting along ethnic lines/ethnic voting Respondent mentions that, generally speaking, belonging to a certain tribe 15 determins the voting decision in Kenya. Ethnicity determins the voting decision. Demarcation: if interviewee considers ethnic voting as a trigger of violent electoral conflict, the passage shall be coded in the category "triggers of violent electoral conflict".Indicator: he's a Kikuyu, so I vote for him. 3.1.1.2 go home during elections to be coded in this category if interviewee mentions that he/she or other members 18 of his/her tribe usuablly go to their home land during election times. Home land is the region, where most of the members of a certain tribe are setteled (Central is Kikuyu land; Nyanza is Luo land). Also code here, if respondent indicates that he/she or other members of his/her tribe had to flee back home during violent electoral conflict. Indicator: He had to run for his life and came back home. 3.1.1.3 ethnical campaign pledge Passages shall be coded here if politicians make promises in favour of or to the 1 detriment of a specific ethnic group during the electoral process.Indication: "We are going to remove all the Kikuyus from our land". Demarcation: If these statements are done outside election times, passages shall be coded under the category "clientelism". 3.1.1.4 others 18
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3.1.2 political context 0
3.1.2.1 clientelism The successfull politician is mainly supporting his own ethnic group when elected in 11 power. The success or failure of a particular presidential candidate is associated with prosperity or desperate poverty for the whole ethnic group, the candidate is representing.Demarcation: unequal to cateogry matter of survival as the latter takes the perspective of the citizen.Indicator: Raila is going to take over - and this is my only hope. He'll hear my problems. 3.1.2.2 matter of survival to be coded in this category if respondent associates the political success of his/her 9 preferred candidat with his/her own survival or wellbeing. 3.1.2.3 political intolerance 3 3.1.2.4 tribal parties 0 3.1.2.5 others 7 3.1.3 other context 0
3.1.3.1 struggle over land code in this category if interviewee names fight over land as one general challenge 10 for democracy in Kenya. Struggle over land is often interrelated with hostilities between ethnic groups.Demarcation: (negative) attitudes towards people of a different tribe shall be coded in category 4.8. Struggle over land as a source of violent electoral conflict shall be coded in category "causes/triggers of violent electoral conflict". Indicator: Kikuyus stole our land. Memo: non-electoral context (social, economic, political context…) 3.1.3.2 agression between ethnic groups can include general mention of general tensions or verbal and violent confrontation 33 as well as threats. Demarcation: only to be coded if the statement is not referring to a specific election (trigger of violent electoral conflict)Indicator: We have now enough, Kenya will be like Sierra Leone.Memo: non-electoral context (social, economic, political context…) 3.1.3.3 business context 2
3.1.3.4 prejudices any preconceived opinion or feeling, either favorable or unfavorable, towards 4 members or ethnic groups as a whole.Indicator: Luos are generally very proud 410
people. 3.1.3.5 housing challenges between ethnic groups in the context of housing, such as living in the 5 same building, the same street or area.Kikuyus don't like living with Luos under the same roof. 3.1.3.6 others 9 3.2 bad leaders mention of leaders contributing to the problems in Kenya. Demarcation: the 31 category is very similar to the " negative attitude towards politicians" category. Statements shall be coded here, if they can't be subsumed under the category of "negative attitudes towards politicians" (4.3.2).Indicator: leaders say that Kikuyus are thieves 3.3 weak institutions 0 3.3.1 failure of state institutions 10 3.3.2 police inaction 9 3.3.2 others 0 3.4 majoritarian characteristic of the democracy 0 3.4.1 exclusion of minorities from political power to be coded in this category, if interviewee mentions that one tribe or minorities in 0 general have less ability to reach political power.Demarcation: not equivalent to motives for changed political participation or motives of perpetrators 3.4.2 incessantly changing coalitions mention that party coalitions often change in Kenya. Coalition building is 3 unpredictable. 3.4.3 incessantly upcoming parties 1 3.4.4 others 3 3.5 poverty 18 3.6 insecurity 0
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3.6.1 terror groups and criminal gangs Code passages here if interviewee mentions terror groups or violent youth gangs as 33 a challenge for democracy in Kenya.Indicator: youth gangs, boko haram 3.6.2 weapons 1
3.6.2.1 electoral context to be coded in this category if interviewee mentions the distribution of weapons as 10 a source of danger during elections in KenyaIndicator: pangas were brought to Kibera before the elections. 3.6.2.2 non electoral context to be coded in this category if interviewee names weapons as a general source of 1 problems for democracy in KenyaIndicator: we have far too many weapons in this country. 3.6.3 no safety Passages shall be coded here if interviewee names the lack of security in Kenya as a 8 general problem.Indicator: This is Keny; there is nowhere you can go and you'll be safe. Demarcation: Unequal to no peace 3.6.4 no peace 12 3.6.5 other 0
3.7 election manipulation code passages here if interviewee mentions election manipulation or any forms of it 20 as a challenge to democracy in Kenya.Indicator: "Election fraud is a huge problem in Kenya." 3.8 corruption Mention of any form of corruption or bribery, no matter which context. Indicator: 19 "Only those one received compensation who bribed the responsibles." 3.9 other challenges Mention of other forms of challenges he/she is seeing for democracy in 34 KenyaIndicator: inequality, crime, child abuse, violence against women, corruption, gang members now unpaid, problems in somalia, 4 Attitudes 0
4.1 attitude towards Democracy in Kenya Code passages here, in which the respondent makes an either positive, negative or 0 neutral evaluation of the democracy in Kenya.Demarcation: The category is not identical with the more general category of attitude towards democracy. 4.1.1 positive 41 412
4.1.2 negative 31 4.1.3 neutral 4
4.2 attitude towards democracy Code passages here in which the respondent makes an either positive, negative or 0 neutral evaluation of the democracy.Demarcation: The category is not identical with the more specific category of attitude towards democracy in Kenya. 4.2.1 positive code in this cathegory, if the interivee evaluates democracy positively and/or if 19 he/she provides an explanation or an example for democracy being a positive thing. Explicit mention of democracy; Demarcation: negative or neutral evaluation of democracy; Indicator: democracy is good, democracy brings peace. 4.2.2 negative code in this cathegory, if the interivee evaluates democracy negatively and/or if 8 he/she provides an explanation or an example for democracy being a negative thing. Demarcation: positive or neutral evaluation of democracyIndicator: forget about democracy 4.2.3 neutral code in this cathegory, if the interivee evaluated democracy neutrally and/or if 0 he/she provides an explanation or an example for democracy being a neutral thing; Demarcation: positive or negative evaluation of democracy; no knowledge about democracy shall be coded under the sub-cathegory "knowledge about democracy"Indicator: neither positive nor negative; neutral; I don't care 4.3 evaluation of democracy 0
4.3.1 more important than to be coded in this category, if the interviewee considers democracy to be of more 4 value than i.e. social peace 4.3.2 equally important than to be coded in this category, if interviewee considers democracy to be equally 7 important as i.e. social peace 4.3.3 less important than to be coded in this category, if interviewee considers democracy to be less 22 important as i.e. social peace 4.4 attitude towards politicians include all statements about politicians in Kenya or the government as a whole. 0 4.3.1 positive code in this category if politicians or the job they are doing are positively 16 evaluated.Indicator: can be trusted, do a good job, generally honest people; I love 413
politicians 4.3.2 negative code in this category if politicians and the job they are doing are generally 71 negatively evaluated. Only such interview passages relating to a non-electoral context shall be coded here, such as general economic, social or political incompetencies of politicians.code in this category if politicians and the job they are doing are generally negatively evaluated. Only such interview passages relating to a non-electoral context shall be coded here, such as general economic, social or political incompetencies of politicians.Demarcation: incompetency during elections is to be coded in category 3.4.1 bad leadersIndicator: swindlers, cannot be trusted, dont keep their word; don't help 4.3.3 neutral code in this category if politicians or the job they are doing are neutrally evaluated 14 or if interviewee considers some politicians to perform well and other not.Indicator: some are good some are bad 4.5 attitude towards politics 0 4.5.1 positive to be coded in this category if politics are evaluated positively.Indicator: I love 8 politics. 4.5.2 negative to be coded in this category if politics are evaluated negatively.Indicator: I don't 36 want anything to do with politics. 4.5.3 neutral to be coded in this category if politics are evaluated neither completely negatively 4 or positivelyIndicator: I don't care about politics. I don't have time for it. 4.6 attitudes towards political participation This category shall include attitutdes towards all action directed toward directly 0 influencing some political outcomes except for voting which is coded in a separate category (4.6).Demarcation: all forms of political participation except for voting. 4.6.1 positive code in this category, if interviewee considers political participation to be 4 important; also code reasons/examples for his opinion.Demarcation: does not include the dimension whether interviewee actually participates politically; attitude vs. act of participation; practiced forms of political participation are to be coded in category 5.1; category 4.5 shall not include attitudes towards voting (category 4.6). Indicator: attending demonstrations is crucial
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4.6.2 negative code in this category, if interviewee considers political participation to be a bad 18 thing or unimportant/secondary; also code reasons/examples for his/her opinion.Demarcation: does not include the dimension whether interviewee actually participates politically; attitude vs. act of participation; practiced forms of political participation are to be coded in category 5.1. Category 4.5 shall not include attitudes towards voting (category 4.6). Indicator: I would never ever join a party; no politics; no time for this; working is more important than going to a political meeting. 4.6.3 neutral code in this category, if interviewee has no opinion about political participation or 3 does not know what it is; Demarcation: unequal to actual act of participation; category 4.5 shall not include attitudes towards voting (category 4.6). 4.7 attitude towards elections/voting Code all text passages here, in which the interviewee expresses an attitude towards 1 elections or voting either in general terms, or for Kenya more specifically. 4.7.1 positive assertion that generally speaking elections and voting are a good thing, mention of 15 reasons why this is so.Indicator: Voting is important.Memo: this category refers to all elections except from the 2013 election. The latter is to be coded in category 4.8. 4.7.2 negative assertion that generally speaking elections and voting are a bad thing, mention of 47 reasons why this is so; Mention that elections go hand in hand with violence which makes them a bad thingIndicator: Mention that elections go hand in hand with violence which makes them a bad thing; mention that the own vote does not have an impact 4.7.3 neutral assertion that elections/voting are a time when a political leader is chosen; not 2 mention whether this is a good or a bad thing. Also code in this category other reasons, why victims went to vote, i.e. wish for change. 4.8 attitude towards 2013 general elections Code passages here, in which the respondent makes an either positive, negative or 0 neutral evaluation of the 2013 general elections in Kenya.Demarcation: The category is not identical with the more general category of attitude towards elections/voting (4.7) in general.code passages here if interviewee explains his attitude towards the specific elections of 2013, not about elections in general. 4.8.1 positive 49
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4.8.2 negative 30 4.8.3 neutral 4
4.9 attitude towards people from another tribe code all text passages in this cathegory, if interviewee makes positive, negative or 0 neutral statements about people from other tribes in Kenya. 4.9.1 positive code in this cathegory if interviewee makes positive statements about people from 4 other tribes in Kenya.Demarcation: unequal to statements about religious minorities or social groups.Indicator: people from other tribes can be trusted; I've friends from other tribes 4.9.2 negative code if this cathegory if interviewee makes negative statements about people from 8 other tribes in Kenya.Demarcation: unequal to statements about religious minorities.Indicator: other tribes cannot be trusted; Kikuyus are dangerous. 4.9.3 neutral code in this cathegory if interviewee has no clear opinion about people from other 2 tribes. 4.10 other attitudes i.e. attitude towards the new constitution 7 5 Political Participation All action directed toward directly influencing some political outcomes, ignoring the 0 success/streinght of this influenceDemarcation: unequal to passive forms of political participationIndicator: voting, campaigning, strikes, party membership, meeting with candidate, demolition 5.1 practiced forms of political participation 0
5.1.1 active All action directed toward directly influencing some political outcomes, ignoring the 0 success/streinght of this influence.Demarcation: unequal to passive forms of political participationIndicator: voting, campaigning, strikes, party membership, meeting with candidate, demolition 5.1.1.1 voting Text passages are to be coded here, if interviewee mentions to have cast his/her 43 vote in any of Kenya's general elections since 1992. 5.1.1.2 campaigning for political candidate Code text passages here, if interviewee mentions to has been active in campaigning 8 for a specific political party or candidate.
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5.1.1.3 member of a political party or union Passage are to be coded here, if interviewee indicates to be an official member of a 6 political party or a political union. 5.1.1.4 attend meetings To be coded here if interviewee says that he/she attended rallies of one or more 15 political parties or candidates, no matter on which administrative level and/or if he/she attended meetings with politicians either going to the meeting or the meeting taking place in their community/village etc. Indicator: One politician came here and I organized a meeting. We all sat down and talked. 5.1.1.5 attend rallies Code text passages here, if interviewee mentions to have attended one or more 12 political rallies during one of the national elections in Kenya. 5.1.1.6 run for office Code passages here, if the interviewee expresses that he/she has or is intending to 7 run for a political post.Indicator: I would like to go for that elective position in 2 years. 5.1.1.7 attend demonstrations Code passages here, if interviewee mentions to have attended one or several 1 demonstrations, either for political or other purposes.Indicator: "I went to town to attend the demonstration for the IDP residents."Demarcation: A demonstration is not a political rally, the latter being organized by and in favour of a specific political party. 5.1.1.8 others 0
5.1.2 passive All action not intented to directly influence a political outcome but which 0 nevertheless have an influence on interviewees political opinion.Demarcation: active, intentional participationIndicator: political debates with family and friends; following the news on the TV, the radio, internet or the newspapers 5.1.2.1 wish to be heared / have a voice Passages shall be coded here, if interviewee wants his/her voice to be heard by 1 politicans. 5.1.2.2 listens to the radio or/and TV Mention of the radio or tv as a source of information.Indicator: radio, TV 21 5.1.2.3 reading newspapers 4
5.1.2.4 reading manifestos and other political Code passages here, if interviewee explains that he/she reads one or more 3 documents manfiestos of the political parties.
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5.1.2.5 talking about politics with others 11 5.1.2.6 other 1
5.1.3 conscious non-participation mention of active non-participation in politics; Indicator: I cannot wear a political t- 13 shirt; I cannot go for a political meeting; I don't speak about politics in the family. 5.1.4 others Indicator: peacefull, not use of violence, only political pressure. 0 5.2 Motivation for political participation Passages shall be coded here, if they include statement explaining why an interivew 0 partner participates in politics. Indicator: It is my right. I want my preferred candidate to win. This category shall not be counfounded with the motives for changed or unchanged political participation after the experience of violent electoral conflict. 5.2.1 responsibility as a citizen Code passages here, if interviewee names voting or other forms of political 5 participation his/her responsibility. 5.2.2 democatic right Code passages here, if interviewee explicitly mentions political particiaption (voting 17 among others) as his/her democratic right. 5.2.3 hoping for a change code passages here, if interviewee is participating politically because he/she is 5 hoping or actively contributing to a change. A change can be any kind of issue, i.e. economy, politics, political leader etc. in which he/she wants to see an improvement. 5.2.4. choose a good leader Code passages here if interviewee motivates his political participation with the wish 31 to choose a good leader. 5.2.5 be prepared Code passages here if interviewee mentions his/her participation in order to have 7 the necessary information to predict / see new violence coming. Indicator: "I listen to the radio. I don't want to be surprised again." 5.2.6 know the candidates and/or their political Code text passages here, if interviewee indicates that he/she participated in politics 6 programme in order to get to know a specific or several political candidates, no matter at which political level, or their political ideas and programmes. Indicator: "The only thing that made her go to the rallies was that she felt that she needed to know what the presidential candidate would do for her."
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5.2.7 contribute to a change Code passages here, if the interviewee expresses his/her wish to make a difference 6 or a change with his participation. 5.2.8 prove strenght Code passages in this category, if interviewee uses political participation to prove 4 his own capability and strenght. 5.2.9 make a difference 1 5.2.10 persuation by others Code passages here if interviewee mentions that he/she was persuaded or conviced 4 by other people, i.e. family members, neighbours or others, to participate. 5.2.11 see preferred candidate win Code passages here if interviewee indicates that he/she participates politically 1 because he/she want his/her preferred candidate to win.Demarcation: Choosing the right leader is not identical with see the preferred candidate win. The latter indicates that the participation is only done in order to see the victory of a preferred candidate. 5.2.12 other other motives for political participationi.e. for a change; problems should be 5 addressed; friend told him/her to go to the meeting. 5.3 changed behaviour of political participation after e.v. 0
5.3.1 yes, more political participation Mention of changed political participation in direction of more activity since their 20 experience of violent electoral conflict.Memo: people can be unaware that they are participating politically; take over a role in the community (community leader), increased charity work can be defined as an increase in political participation?Memo II: Is the role of a community leader to be considered a political role? Or rather social envolvement? What separates the two forms? 5.3.2 yes, less political participation Mention of changed political participation in direction of less activity since their 15 experience of violent electoral conflict. 5.3.3 other participation code passages here, if interviewees mention to have started participating in other 2 forms than political participation after the experience of violent electoral conflict.Indication: social engagement 5.4 unchanged behaviour of political participation after Mention of unchanged political participation after the experience ofviolent 14 e.v. electoral conflict.
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5.5 motives for increased political participation 0
5.5.1 attempt to achieve common good Code text passages here if interviewee mentions to have increased his/her 14 engagement in order to achieve a common goood, such as a benefit for the community or a specific social group etc. Indicator: negotiate with the regional government for acceptance as IDPs 5.5.2 personal good Code passages here, if interviewee indicates that he/she is trying to achieve more in 8 life through political participation. This change in thinking should have been caused by the experience of violent electoral conflict.Demarcation: achieve a common good. 5.5.3 representation of community Code passages here, if interviewee indicates that he increases his own political 5 participation in order to represent his community vis-à-vis politicians. 5.5.4 contribute to change Code passages here, if interviewee mentions that the experience of violent electoral 4 conflict has motivated him/her to attempt for a change in Kenya. 5.5.5 other motives for increased p.p. related to exp to be coded in this category if the interviewee names other motives for his/her 0 of ev increased political participation, which are still related to his/her experience of violent electoral conflict. 5.5.6 other motives for increased p.p. unrelated to to be coded in this category, if interviewee names motives for his/her increased 1 the experie political participation unrelated to his/her experience of violent electoral conflict, such as demoralisation or disenchantment with politics. 5.6 motives for decreased political participation 0
5.6.1 focus on the family mention that after the experience of violent electoral conflict, interviewee wants to 1 focus on the family instead of participating in politics.Indicator: I want to focus more on the family. 5.6.2 bad memories of the last election to be coded in this category if interviewee names bad memories of violent electoral 9 conflict as the reason for decreased political participation.Indicator: I used to campaign for them but after what happened, I don't want so much. 5.6.3 disenchantment with politics to be coded in this category, if interviewee names motives such as demoralisation 12 or frustration with politics as for his/her decreased political participation Indicator:
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"politics are gainless. It's a waist of time." 5.6.4 disappointment with candidate's performance Code passages here if interviewee names frustration or disappointment with a 2 political candidate or his electoral failure as a motive for his/her decreased political participation. 5.6.5 village conformaty Code passages here, if interviewee mentions that he is participating less because 1 his/her political preferences vary from the village's party choice. In order to avoid confrontation with his community, he/she thus decided to participate less or even to stop participating.Indicator: I support another party, but I don't want trouble with the elders. So I don't go to the other parties' rallies. 5.6.6 incompatibility with social role Code passages here, if interviewee mentions to have reduced his/her political 1 engagement due to his social role, i.e. as a peace maker or preacher. Indicator: "Even at some point, the locals wanted me to candidate. Bute I refused as I'm involved in peace work now." 5.6.7 other motivation 1 5.7 motives for unchanged political participation 0
5.7.1 incompatibility with social role Mention that having a social role to play in the community is incompatible with 6 political engagement. Further explanations about this incompatibility shall be coded in this category, too.Indicator: church leaders and social leaders should be politically neutral. 5.7.2 trust in god mention of god who is protecting the interviewee from harm even during 1 elections.Demarcation: category is similar to code 7.1.2.2 (turning towards religion/faith); statements are to be coded here (5.7.2) if the answer is directly aimed at explaining why the political participation of an interviewee has remained constant. Indicator: I decided to vote, because I know this world belongs to god. 5.7.3 a citizen's duty mention of having a duty as a Kenyan citizen, despite of the dangers of violent 1 electoral conflict.Indicator: So, I decided I'm going to vote, I will do my duty. 5.7.4 make own voice heard Code text passages in here, if interviewee indicates his/her constant wish to make 1 his/her voice heard by politicians. This wish might have the intention to get support/help from the politician addressed.
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5.8 Typology of citizens code all statements here which allow for an individual understanding of poliltical 5 participation of the interviewee. Also code answers in which it becomes obvious that the respondent does not know what political participation is or whether there are other forms of participation other than voting. 5.8.1 the voting citizen 0
5.8.1.1 demanding voter Code passages here, if interviewee expects his vote to be successful, meaning that 20 his/her preferred candidate wins the election. Otherwise voting is considered as useless. 5.8.1.2 ethnic voter Code passages here, if interviewee mentions that his voting choice is influenced, no 4 matter to which degree, by ethnic questions. 5.8.1.3 rational voter Code passages here, if interviewee mentions to base his voting decision on the 8 evaluation of party manifestos, statements or other information. He/she is basing his/her decision on rational arguments, not on ethnicity or other peoples' advice. 5.8.1.4 uninformed voter Code passages here, if interviewee mentions to vote according to the advice of 3 other people instead of his/her own opinion. 5.8.1.5 tactical voter Code text passages here, if interviewee mentions any kind of tactial form of voting, 2 meaning that he/she is trying to increase his/her chances to see his/her candidate being elected. 5.8.1.6 resilient voter Code passages here, if interviewee mentions to go voting at any means but has no 34 further intention in participating in politics at all. 5.8.1.7 virtuous voter Code text passages here, if interviewee mentions to not accept bribes or any form 2 of vote buying. 5.8.1.8 face to face culture Code text passages in here if interviewee mentions that he/she wants to meet with 13 politicians and speak to them in person. In Kenya, politicians very often come to the villages and have meetings with the people. 5.8.2 the active citizen Code text passages here if interviewee mentions to have participated beyond 5 voting, either by running for office him-/herself or by a broad mixture of political participation.Indicator: I've attended two rallies, set with the politicians and I'm a member of a political party. 422
5.8.3 the passive citizen Code text passages here, if interviewee mentions to be generally interested in 7 politics but that he/she nevertheless does not want to be involved in it. The reasons for this decision can be manifold, i.e. considering politics a dirty business that a normal person should not get involved in.Demarcation: The passive citizen is similar to the resilient voter, if he/she goes to vote. Text passages are to be coded in the passive citizen category, if the interviewee speaks about his political interest in general. If he/she is referring to his/her voting behaviour, text passages are to be coded in the resilient voter category. 5.8.4 the resigned citizen Code text passages here, if interviewee mentions that political participation is 14 needless, no matter for which reason and that he/she therefore does not participate at all, not even voting. 5.9 personal understanding of democracy code all passages here, in which interviewee indicates characteristics of democracy 75 or expectations towards democracy. Indicator: Democracy brings peace and you can say whatever you want. 6 Violent Electoral Conflict 0 6.1 form(s) of experienced violent electoral conflict 0
6.1.1 physical violence mention of physical attack before, during or after elections with or without 0 weapons. 6.1.1.1 assault 0 6.1.1.1.1 attempted killing 10 6.1.1.1.2 beating 4 6.1.1.1.3 shooting 4 6.1.1.1.4 stabbing 1 6.1.1.1.5 hurt by stone 2 6.1.1.2 sexual violence mention of sexual violence or attempted sexual violence such as rape, gang rape, 0 molestation, being forced to undress or being stripped of clothing etc.
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6.1.1.2.1 rape Sexual assault usually involving sexual intercourse or other forms of sexual 10 penetration perpetrated against a person without that person's consent. The rape can be perpetrated by one or more individuals. Example: rape, gang rape, sexual assaultRape is not to be confounded with attempted rape or molestation which will be coded separately. 6.1.1.2.2 attempted rape 1 6.1.1.3 others 0
6.1.2 psychological violence Mention of any kind of psychological violence during elections, such as the threat of 41 physical violence or sexual violence towards the interviewee him-/herself or family members or friends, blackmail, the witness of other people being killed or physically or psychologically injurred. Indicator: threat of violence, menace, blackmail, witness of other people being killed. 6.1.3 forced expulsion forced expulsion from home, shop, village or area by threat of violence or fear of 56 coming back.Indicator: we had to flee, leave. We just ran. 6.1.4 destruction of property mention that property was destructed by perpetrators ; any kind of property of the 36 respondent such as house, land, animals. Also include if repsondent mentions the destruction of property that he/she witnessed. Indicator: they burnt our house or land, stole our cattle 6.1.5 looting mention that property got stolen in the course of the violent electoral 34 conflict.Indicator: they stole everything. 6.1.6 internal displacement to be coded in this category if interviewee mentions that a return after the forced 33 expulsion to his/her home was not possible immediately but that he/she had to stay outside the violence ‚hotspots‘ either in a IDP camp or with relatives for at least some weeks. 6.1.7 others 0 6.2 year of experience violence did not always occur directly after the elections but sometimes a bit later. 0 As elections were often held at the end of a year, violence could spreak in the following year, too.
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6.2.1 2013 2
6.2.2 2007-2008 mention of experience of violent electoral conflict between December 2007 and 47 March 2008 6.2.3 2002 6 6.2.4 1997 0 6.2.5 1992 22 6.2.6 other year mention of experience of violent electoral conflict at another time.Demarcation: 0 1992/93, 1997, 2002, 2013 6.3 predictability of the violent electoral conflict 0
6.3.1 total surprise to the victim to be coded in this category if victim mentions to have been surprised by the 15 violence; he/she didn't see it coming and thus did not have the time for preparations. 6.3.2 victim expected violence to be coded here, if the victim mentions to have expected the violence to occure. 6 6.4 evaluation of the violent electoral conflict 0 6.4.1 ranking of violence 0
6.4.1.1 extremely violent To be coded here if interviewee refers to the violent electoral conflict of any 8 election year as extremely violent and / or of nationwide character.Example. It honestly was terrible. All over the country, people were being killed. 6.4.1.2 violence in several areas 0 6.4.1.3 violent but regionally limited 4 6.4.1.4 Others 5 6.4.2 general characteristics of violent electoral 0 conflict
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6.4.2.1 violence against women To be coded here, if interviewee mentions violence against women as a 3 specification of violent electoral conflictduring any election year. 6.4.2.2 Other 0 6.5 causes/triggers of electoral violence 0
6.5.1 unwelcome election result Passages should be coded here, if interviewee names the disappointment of one or 20 more individuals with an election result as the trigger/cause of violent electoral conflict. Offended pride among voters can be an indicator, too. Indicator: They didn't get the leader they were expecting to be the president, so everyone went wild. And then they start talking bad about supporters about the winning candidate. 6.5.2 failure of state institutions to be coded in this category if respondent identifies the failure of one or more state 2 institutions as a source of 2007 violent electoral conflict. State institutions might include all actors of the executive, legislative or judiciary and their associated institutions. 6.5.3 assumed election manipulation to be coded in this category if respondent names electoral manipulatioins as a 2 source of the 2007 violent electoral conflict, irrespective of the proof of such manipulations. 6.5.4 politicisation of ethnic clashes to be coded in here if respondent mentions - knowingly or unconciously - that 19 elections provide(d) the frame for violent or non-violent confrontations between members of different ethnic groups.Indicator: "They were going after the Kikuyus". "When the elections actually took place, that's when everyone naturally had the chance to relieve the feeling they had inside".Demarcation: Ethnicity as the motivation for personally experienced violent electoral conflict by an interview partner is to be coded in category 9.3.2 "ethnical motivation". Ethnicity as a general challenge in Kenya, either in a election, political, social, economic or other context are to be coded in category 3.1 "ethnic segregation". 6.5.5 struggle over land to be coded in this category if respondent identifies the struggle over land as an 7 issue triggering the 2007 violent electoral conflict. 6.5.6 violence by political youth groups to be coded in this category if respondernt identifies the formation of political 3 youth groups during election time in 2007 as a trigger of violent electoral conflict. Demarcation: the general problem of youth gangs, controling communities
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(racketeering, drugs, etc.) unrelated to the event of elections is to be coded in category 3.3.2. 6.5.7 incitement by leaders 24
6.5.8 hate speech Code passages here, if the interviewee explains that hate speech over the radio or 2 during meetings triggered the eleciton violence.Indicator: "Even before the elections, we could hear them during the night meetings, they had hate speeches." 6.5.9 elections in general Code passages here, if interviewee mentions elections in general as the trigger of 2 violent electoral conflict. 6.5.10 others 0
6.6 de-escalation effects and mechanisms implemented code in this category if respondent mentions reasons, mechanisms or initiatives 0 which helped and will help to prevent future violent electoral conflict in Kenya. 7 Victims of Violent Electoral ConflictViolence 0 7.1 handling of experience 0 7.1.1 passive coping strategie Text passages should be coded here, if they include expressions that the 0 interviewee is not actively working on his/her traumatic experience but rather tries to ignore and live with it without any further reflection. Forget and move on or not wanting to speak about the experience or keeping busy are examples of such passive coping strategies.The latter are in contrast to active coping strategies, through which the aggrieved party is actively searching for ways to work on the trauma, often in exchange with other people. 7.1.1.1 forget mention of attempts to forget the experience or not to speak about it, block the 9 experience. 7.1.1.2 controle memories by keeping busy mention of being able to controle anger or bad memories by keeping oneself 1 occupied with work or daily businesses. 7.1.1.3 turning towards faith/religion 58
7.1.1.4 learn from the past, but do not live in mention of a decision that interviewee wants to move beyond the experiences 3 the past made by using the experience to grow as a person. 427
7.1.1.5 others i.e. support from friends and family. 3 7.1.2 active coping strategie 0 7.1.2.1 participation in counselling activities to be coded in this category if interviewee mentions to have attended coping 26 initiatives, such as professional trauma counselling, therapy, self-help groups (guided or un-guided) etc.Indicator: counselling, speaking about experiences with friends and family, creation of or attending a women's group etc. 7.1.2.2 active decision to not take revenge to be coded in this category if interviewee mentions to have made the decision of 3 not to take revenge on the perpetrators.Demarcation: this category does not refer to god as the guarantee for justice; the decision not take revenge is to be coded here, if the decision is unrelated to god.Indicator: I decided these people, even though they did this to me, it would be too much of an honour to them, even to kill them. This decision hada healing effect on me. 7.1.2.3 confrontation with perpetrator 0
7.1.2.3.1 initiated by the victim to be coded in this category if victim initiated a speak out with a perpetrator of 15 violent electoral conflict (for whatever reason). 7.1.2.3.2 initiated by victim but refused by to be coded in this category if victim wanted to have a speak out with his/her 1 the perpetrator perpetrator of violent electoral conflict (for whatever reason) but the speak out was refused by the perpetrator. 7.1.2.3.3 initiated by the perpetrator to be coded in this category if perpetrator initiated a speak out with his/her victim 1 of violent electoral conflict (for whatever reason). 7.1.2.3.4 conscious omission of a to be coded in this category if the victim explicitely decided to not initiate or to 7 confrontation accept a speak out with the perpetrator of violent electoral conflict; decision to greet perpetrator/s in the street but to refuse any other form of contact. 7.1.2.3.5 mediation 4 7.1.2.4 make voice be heard 3 7.1.2.5 others 0
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7.2 feelings towards perpetrator 0
7.2.1 negative feelings To be coded here if the interviewee mentions negative feelings towards the 6 perpetrator of violent electoral conflict. Negative feelings can include rage, incomprehension, mistrust, disregard or alike.Example: He is just a monster and I still hate him for what he has done to me. Why me, what did I do to deserve this? 7.2.2 indifference To be coded here, if interviewee directly names to feel indifferent about the 1 perpetrator(s) or if he/she describes a lack of interest in them.Indicator: mention that perpetrator is only greeted in the street but no further conversation is taking place: "I'm greeting him, but that's all".In contrast to "acceptance", indifference indicates an unwillingness or avoidance strategy to be confronted with the perpetrator(s) and the negative feelings he/she provokes. 7.2.3 acceptance to be coded here, if interview partner mentions acceptance of or understanding 15 why violent electoral conflict happened to him/her.Indicator: usage of considerate language, including "part of my life", " It was hard, but I'm over it". "They were misguided".Acceptance is not equal to indifference, as the latter implies the continuity of mixed feelings towards the experience. Acceptance in contrast, indicates the ability to have overcome the experience and move on with one's life. 7.2.4 forgiveness explicit mention of forgiveness for the perpetrators or mention of positive feelings 34 like love or compassion for the perpetrators, in spite of their crimes. Indicator: I've forgiven them and I love them. They are good people nevertheless. Memo: this category might be interlinked with negative psychological consequences for the victim (switch to survival mode) or/and the role of religion/god for the coping process 7.2.5 others 4 7.3 feelings towards the post-violence organization 0 process 7.3.1 negative negative assessment of the interviewee, about how he/she experienced the 1 public/national crisis management after the violent electoral conflict. Evaluations can adress national, regional or local crisis management and actors. 7.3.2 positive positive assessment of the interviewee, about how he/she experienced the 0
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public/national crisis management after the violent electoral conflict. Evaluations can adress national, regional or local crisis management and actors. 7.3.3 neutral neutral assessment of the interviewee, about how he/she experienced the 1 public/national crisis management after the violent electoral conflict. Evaluations can adress national, regional or local crisis management and actors. 7.3.4 others 0 7.4 experienced challenges after the post-election 0 violence 7.4.1 inadequate general healthcare inadequate general healthcare is to be coded here, if the respondent reports that 12 medical services were unavailbale or unsufficient.Indicator: I wasn't stitched. 7.4.2 inadequate administrative support to be coded in this category if respondent mentions lacking or insufficient support 31 from administrative side (i.e. authorities at different levels). 7.4.3 inadequate police support to be coded in this category if respondent mentions that the police did not 5 investigate at all or insufficiently into the events of violent electoral conflict. 7.4.4 inadequate NGO support 1
7.4.5 inadequate financial support explicit mention of unsifficient financial support or compensation as well as indirect 9 formulations expressing describing this shortcoming.Indicator: "It was not enough to start a new life." "There was nobody to support me, I didn't get any funds". 7.4.6 lack of justice to be coded in this category, if respondent explicitly names a lack of justice for 6 personally experienced violent electoral conflict or generally speaking about violent electoral conflictin Kenya. Also code indirect statements here, from which a lack of justice can be deduced.Indicator: The perpetrators of 2007 are still here, they are free and living amongst us. 7.4.7 causes of 2007 violent electoral conflict not to be coded in this category if respondent expresses doubts whether the 14 properly addressed perpetrators' motives for the 2007 violent electoral conflict have been addressed properly in order to provide a new outbreak in the future. Double code perpetrators' motives and ongoing challenges for Kenya's democrcy in this category , if interviewee considers these challenges as unsolved up to today.
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7.4.8 others identification of new sources of violent electoral conflict in the future. 6 7.5 state of mind 0 7.5.1 doing well self-assessment of the interviewee that he/she is doing well.Indicator: I'm a very 7 happy person. I'm doing well. 7.5.2 sometimes good sometimes bad self assessment of interviewe that he/she is sometimes doing fine, but sometimes 1 feeling bad because of what happened.Demarcation: assessment can be linked to the experience of violent electoral conflict or can constitute a more of a general statement about how the person is doing. If the respondent expresses a specific negative feeling towards his/her experience of violent electoral conflict, the statement shall be coded under 8.1.3.1.Indicator: Life is hard, but it's ok. 7.5.3 doing badly general self-assessment of the interviewee that he/she is currently not doing well. 12 Indicator: I'm feeling bad. I'm really struggeling.Demarcation: No connection with violent electoral conflict shall be included, as in the latter case text passages shall be coded in category 8. 7.5.4 other 3
7.6 ethnic affiliation code ethnic affiliation of the respondent and the ethnic affiiation of other victims of 0 violent electoral conflict in this category. Indicator: I'm a Luo. Here, it is only the Kikuyu that were effected. 7.6.1 Luo 14 7.6.2 Kalenjin 10 7.6.3 Kikuyu 23 7.6.4 Kamba 4 7.6.5 Giriama (Mijikenda ) 1 7.6.6 Meru/Marian 3 7.6.7 Chonyi (Mijikenda) 1
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7.6.8 Luhya 2 7.6.9 Maasai 1 7.6.10 others 4 8 Impact of Experience of Violent Electoral Conflict 0 8.1 form of change in life 0 8.1.1 economic impairment 6
8.1.1.1 economic decline assertion of a considerable economic or financial loss, as a consequence of the loss 60 of farm land as a basis of existence, cattle and/or the loss or severe damage of the house/hut as a consequence of the experience of violent electoral conflict. 8.1.1.2 struggle over land / land disputes to be coded in this category, if interviewee mentions land disputes either with other 2 people or the governement after the events of violent electoral conflict. Land disputes can be manifold, such as the allocation of minor land after a forced expulsion, missing restitution of land after forced expulsion or the outstanding permission to farm on new land.Indicator: title deed 8.1.1.3 unsatisfied basic human needs interviewee mentions that he/she must assign highest priority to satisfy their basic 36 human neets, such as food, shelter, clothing or money for the school fees; less time can be invested in political participation, political education etc. Indicator: for me, I am not able to understand about democracy because I have a lot of problems and issues. 8.1.1.4 other 1
8.1.2 physical impairment assertion of physical impairment, such as permanent or temporary physical 30 damages, including pain, wounds, amputations, deformation or other corporal reactions as a consequence of the experience of violent electoral conflict.Indicator: amputaton, headache caused by memories 8.1.3 psychological changes 0 8.1.3.1 negative 1
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8.1.3.1.1 psychological problems 0
8.1.3.1.1.1 suicidal ideation code passages here, if interviewee admits to be thinking about death or suicide in 5 general or with conrete plannings. Code also those passages here, from which such thinking can indirectly be deduced. 8.1.3.1.1.2 change in appetite 1
8.1.3.1.1.3 switch to survival mode / to be coded in this category if interviewee describes his/her psychological strategy 22 emotional brutalisation of how to protect him-/herself in future situations; the interviewee describes his/her mental decision to protect him-/herself by all means (i.e. the use of weapons, being ready to kill) even if such a behaviour does not correspond to his/her usual/previous character.Memo: the category includes elements of a dissociative personality disorder. 8.1.3.1.1.4 nightmares/flashbacks to be coded her, if respondent describes to have recurrent nightsmares about the 15 drama, having flashbacks, showing physical reactions when reminded of the trauma, persistent difficulty to sleep, feeling cut off from others since the trauma etc. 8.1.3.1.1.5 social withdrawal Code passages here if interviewee mentions to not socialise any more since his/her 10 experience of violent electoral conflict or that he/she does not feel good/safe in the company of people. Indicator: "I don't socialise much any more." 8.1.3.1.1.6 traumatisation code passages here, if the interviewee uses the expression of trauma or 5 traumatization in order to discribe his feelings or state of mind.Indicator: "I was so much traumatized". 8.1.3.1.1.7 hiding of experience explicit mention of attempt to hide the experienced made from friends and family, 22 the neighbours and other people. Repondent wants to keep the information for him-/herself.Demarcation: Hiding the experience is unequal to hiding from other people (change in social role). 8.1.3.1.1.8 avoidance of memories Code passages here, if interviewee mentions that he/she tries to avoid the memory 6 of the traumatic event, such as avoiding people, places, activities, objects and situations that bring on distressing memories. 8.1.3.1.1.9 pessimistic thought 22
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8.1.3.1.10 depressed mood 17
8.1.3.1.1.11 ideas of unworthiness To be coded in this category, if interviewee mentions to feel guilty or unworthy 5 since the experience of violent electoral conflict. 8.1.3.1.12 reactive symptoms Code passages here, if interviewee mentions to being easily startled or having 1 problems concentrating 8.1.3.1.1.13 others Indicator: Paralyzation 1 8.1.3.1.2 negative feelings 0 8.1.3.1.2.1 rage explicit mention of rage against a defined or undefined addressee; also code 11 segments in this category, in which the interviewee's rage is indirectly detectable through words, gesture and facial expressions. 8.1.3.1.2.2 despair explicit mention of this negative feeling or mention of efforts to get back on track 14 which constantly fail. Also subsume mention of hopelessnes here. Indicator: I'm really struggeling and whenever I make a step forward I go back. I'm hopeless. 8.1.3.1.2.3 sadness explicit mention of sadness when thinking about what has happened/is happening 13 still today. 8.1.3.1.2.4 disappointment explicit mention of the feeling or other feelings related to disappointment such as 17 bitterness. Indicator: I'm so disappointed; I feel bitterness about what happened. 8.1.3.1.2.5 shame explicit mention of feeling ashamed because of what happened during violent 2 electoral conflicte. 8.1.3.1.2.6 feeling of loss mention of feeling to have lost home, that the house or neighourhood, where the 5 interview used to or is still living does not feel like his home anymore, due to the experiences he/she made there. Also code here the explicit mention of the feeling to have lost / to be missing a beloved person who died during election violence.Indicator: I feel like the house does not belong to me. I'm not even able to renovate it. If only my husband would still be here. 8.1.3.1.2.7 decreased trust in people explicit mention of less trust in people, either of interviewee's own or different 36 tribe, as a consequence of the experience of violent electoral conflict; mention of increased fear towards other people or other indicators of decreased trust towards
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others. 8.1.3.1.2.8 decreased trust in to be coded in this category if interviewee mentions to have less trust in politicians 4 politicians after the experiene of violent electoral conflict 8.1.3.1.2.9 decreased interest To be coded in this category if respondent mentions to have less interest in politics 3 in/worsened attitude to politics or to have a worsened opinion about politics because of his/her experience of violent electoral conflict.Demarcation: The change in attitute must me linked to the experience of violent electoral conflict. In other cases, the passage shall be coded in the category negative attitude towards politics. 3.1.3.1.2.10 decreased trust in mention that violent electoral conflict contributed to a decrease in trust toward 11 elections elections. Indicator: "Since 2007 people don't trust elections any more. The polls can be very different from what you expect". 8.1.3.1.2.11 others 11
8.1.3.1.3 negative emotions emotions include a wide range of psychological reactions to an experienced 0 trauma. They can include all kinds of emotional reactions, going beyond feelings, such as confusion, fear, speechlessness Demarcation: when expressing feelings towards the perpetrators, the text passages should be coded within the main categry of 7.2. 8.1.3.1.3.1 confusion to be coded here if interviewee names confusion as the emotional reaction the 7 his/her experience of violent electoral conflict.Indicator: I was so confused. 8.1.3.1.3.2 fear to be coded here if interviewee explicitly mentions fear when thinking of the 42 experienced violent electoral conflict; all further specifications of this fear shall be coded in this category, too such as the fear of an HIV infection after being raped.Indicator: I was so scared. I fear to be infected with HIV. 8.1.3.1.3.3 others speechlessness 6 8.1.3.2 positive 0
8.1.3.2.1 increased charity mention of increased respect and value for all human beings, including people from 58 other tribes and social outsider.Indicator: what came in my mind and my heart is to value people; I need to value anyone.
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8.1.3.2.2 increased courage Indicator: I'm not going to run away from anyone, not even the devil himself. 4 8.1.3.2.3 increased sympathy for people 4 from other tribe(s) 8.1.3.2.4 others 2 8.1.3.3 neutral 0 8.1.3.3.1 unchanged level of trust mention that the trust for other people, even for those of another tribe, has not 22 changed with the experience of e.v.Demarcation: is not equivalent to the statement that everybody can be trusted; the level of trust (low, medium or high) just remained stable after the experience. 8.1.3.3.2 others 2
8.1.4 change in family life explicit mention of changes in family life as a consequence of the experienced 0 violent electoral conflict, including changes in relationship with the husband/wife or the children, the living together, the atmosphere within the family etc. 8.1.4.1 change in marriage To be coded in this category if respondent indicates that his/her marriage changed 22 after the experience of violent electoral conflict. These changes can be both positive or negative.Indicator: He left me after what happened to me, I mean after I was raped. 8.1.4.2 condemnation to be coded in this category if respondent mentions a negative reaction of one or 9 more family members towards the victim's experience, excluding the reaction of husband that is to be coded under change in marriage. Also code passages here if the victime declares to have ended a relationship with a family member at own request. 8.1.4.3 children living somewhere else to be coded in this category if interviewee mentions that his/her kids or other 6 family members are living separately from him/her temporarily or for an indefinite period of time. 8.1.4.4 loss of a loved one Code passages here in which interviewee reports that he/she lost a beloved person 18 in relation to the violent electoral conflict. Indicator: I lost my sister. 8.1.4.5 unintentional pregnancy Code passages here, if female respondents speak about an unintentional 3 436
pregnancy, caused by rape during the violent electoral conflict. Statements of male respondents, whose girlfriend or wife was raped and became pregnant, shall be coded in this category, too.Indicator: "Three months after the rape, I realized that I was pregnant." 8.1.4.6 children affected Code passages here if interviewee mentions that children are suffering from 6 Posttraumatic Stress or if they witnessed violence against family members, friends, neighbours or other people, which affected them negatively. 8.1.4.7 others 3 8.1.5 change in social life explicit mention of positive or negative changes in social life as a consequence of 1 violent electoral conflict; Indicator: problems with friends, isolation within the village or community; increased community work or work for a social change. 8.1.5.1 negative explicit mention of negative changes in social life as a consequence of violent 2 electoral conflict; including problems with friends, isolation within the village or community; 8.1.5.2 positive explicit mention of positive changes in social life as a consequence of violent 6 electoral conflict, including increased community work or work for a social change. 8.1.5.3 other 0 8.1.6 change in educational development 1
8.1.6.1 interruption or termination of mention of an interruption or termination of the interviewee's education or of 10 educational training his/her family members.Indicator: I couldn't go back to school, it was too dangerous. 8.1.6.2 others 1 8.1.7 change in sexual life to be coded in here if respondent indicates a change in his/her usual sexual life 2 compared to her/his previous life, i.e. the lack of sexual interest, avoidance of sexual activity etc. 8.1.8 others 0
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8.2 level of impairment 0
8.2.1 high self-assessmet of interviewee that he/she was affected severely by the experience 37 of violent electoral conflict; also assessment of the interviewer who's comparing the description of the interviewee about his former and his current life. Demarcation: unequal to the length (time dimension) of the impairmentIndicator: I was so much affected.Memo: It is possible that the self-assessment of an interviewee's impairment and the interviewer's assessment may differ from each other; check whether this is the case in a relevant number of interviews; reasons for this discrepancy might be: interview situation (unknown situation; not telling everything), cultural context (not show weakness; don't complain, etc.) _Memo II: How do I handle the situation when an interviewee does not mention a severe form of electoral violence he/she experienced, but I nevertheless know about it from other sources? 8.2.2 medium self-assessment of the interviewee that he/she suffered considerably from the 8 experience of violent electoral conflict but found back into life after a foreseeable period of time. 8.2.3 low self-assessment of the interviewee that the experience of violent electoral conflict 10 was an unpleasant event but only had a short-term influence on his/her life. 8.2.4 not personally affected self-assessment of the interviewee that he/she was not affected at all by the 2 ongoing violent electoral conflict. This self-assesment might be contradictory to the actual experience that the interviewee has made with violent electoral conflict but should be coded anyways. 9 Perpetrators in the Memory of the Victims 0
9.1 types of perpetrators A perpetrator is defined as such a person who directly inflicted violence or a 0 reported abuse. 9.1.1 known people 7
9.1.1.1 neighbours Mention of neighbours of the same village being the perpetrators of violent 15 electoral conflict. 9.1.1.2 neighbours supporting strangers perpetrators of violence were strangers but they were guided by the neighbours of 7
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the later victims. 9.1.1.3 others 3 9.1.2 complete strangers perpetrator is completely unknown; has never been seen before. 14 9.1.3 members of the police/state forces perpetrator was a member of the police or the state forces; wearing a police 3 uniform or a military uniform either from Kenya or a neighboring country. 9.1.3.1 Kenyan police/state force perpetrator was a member of the police or the state forces; wearing a police 7 uniform or a military uniform from Kenya. 9.1.3.2 other country perpetrator was a member of the police or the state forces; wearing a police 1 uniform or a military uniform from another country. 9.1.4 members of a youth gang / bad boys perpetrators are identified as members of a youth gang. Those gangs can have 12 either a political or a purely criminal background. They can be known or unknown in a specific neighbourhood. 9.1.5 can't tell/no memory 14 9.1.6 others 8 9.2 ethnic affiliation of perpetrators 0
9.2.1 unknown mention that the ethnic affiliation of the perpetrator is unknown to the victim. 1 9.2.2 different to victim's ethnic group 3 9.2.2.1 Maasai mention that the perpetrators belonged to the Maasai ethnic group, which is not 8 the interviewee's ethnic group. 9.2.2.2 Kikuyu mention that the perpetrators belonged to the Kikuyu ethnic group, which is not 0 the interviewee's ethnic group. 9.2.2.3 Kalenjin mention that the perpetrators belonged to the Kalenjin ethnic group, which is not 6 the interviewee's ethnic group. 9.2.2.4 Luo mention that the perpetrators belonged to the Luo ethnic group, which is not the 9 interviewee's ethnic group. 439
9.2.2.5 Other 1
9.2.3 same ethnic group as victim mention that the perpetrator belonged to the same ethnic group as the victim. 5 9.3 assumption about motivation of perpetrators by 0 victim 9.3.1 incitement/mobilisation through others mention that the perpetrator/s was/were mobilised by another person during the 3 electoral process. 9.3.1.1 mobilised though village elders/leaders Indicator: it wasn't their own idea; the leaders told them to do it. 12 9.3.1.2 mobilized by the devil 4 9.3.1.3 mobilised by politicians 15
9.3.2 ethnic motivation passages shall be coded here if interviewee reports to have personally experienced 23 ethnic rivalry or slurs as a motivation of crimes and misdoings of perpetrators.Indicator: When they noticed that we were Luo, the Police officer chased us away. He was a Kikuyu. Demarcation: passages addressing the general problem of ethnicity as a source or trigger of violent electoral conflict shall be coded in category 6.6.4 "ethnic clashes". When the interviewee names ethnicity as a general problem in Kenya, whether in an election, political, social, economic or other context, passages shall be coded in category 3 "Challenges for Democracy in Kenya". 9.3.3 struggle over land assumption that perpetrators wanted to kill or chase away people living on land 17 which the perpetrators' assumed to be theirs. Demarcation: struggle over land is often correlating with ethnic cleavages. In these cases, passages shall be double- coded with "ethnical motivation" and "struggle over land". 9.3.4 opportunistic crimes any form of violence which was not perpetrated out of political or ethnical 24 motivation or the wish for revenge but just to use the moment to committ crimes 9.3.5 unpleasant eletion results code passages in here, if the unexpected and unsupported outcome of an election 15 caused violent electoral conflict. Indicator: When they announced the results, it started. There was violence all over the village. Houses were being burnt and people ran away.
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9.3.6 others 6 9.4 state of mind of perpetrators after their crimes 0
9.4.1 bad mental condition assumption or knowledge that the perpetrators of violent electoral conflict are 8 suffering from bad mental conditions as a conseqeuence of their crimes.Indicator: bad conscience, feeling guilty, he went mad 9.4.2 bad physical condition assumption or knowledge that the perpetrators of violent electoral conflict are 3 suffering from bad physical conditions as a consequence of their crimes. Indicator: they raped many women during that time, now they have AIDS. 10 Year of Election 0
10.1 2013 to be coded if the interviewee provides information about the election of 2013 105 10.2 2007-2008 to be coded if the interviewee provides information about the election of 2007 26 10.3 2002 to be coded if the interviewee provides information about the election of 2002 6 10.4 1997 to be coded if the interviewee provides information about the election of 1997 0 10.5 1992 to be coded if the interviewee provides information about the election of 1992 5 10.6 before 1992 to be coded if the interviewee provides information about elections before 1992 0 10.7 other to be coded if the interviewee provides information about elections others than the 1 previously named ones. 11 Participation in the Official Reconciliation Process 0 11.1 testimony in front of the WAKI commission 5 11.2 media interviews 0
11.3 NGO involvement to be coded in this category if respondent indicates that one or more NGOs or other 0 organizations have contacted him/her after the experienced violence. The reasons for this contacting might vary, i.e. offer of support for women, children, offer for legal support, medical support etc.
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11.4 other 2
12 Helpful Institutions Passages shall be coded here if interviewee names institutions or representatives of 0 institutions that were helping/supporting them after the experience of violent electoral conflict. Such institutions can be NGOs, the church, hospitals, etc.Indicator: We were staying in this hospital. It was a place to sleep. 12.1 peace initiatives 15 12.2 hospital 2 12.3 church 27 12.4 family 13 12.5 NGO 22 12.6 other 26 13 Hopes/Wishes for the Future 0 13.1 health 3 13.2 peace 23 13.3 get help/support 20 13.4 education 15 13.5 re-achieve previous living standard 8 13.6 justice 9
13.7 change Code passages here, if interviewee expresses a general wish for change. This change 5 can include many dimensions which should all be coded here. 13.8 sanctions Code passages here, if interviewee expresses a will for sanctions against 1 incompetent or under-performing political leader.
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13.9 good leader 1 13.10. earn a living 1
13.11 others price stability 25
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Addendum 20. Victims of violent electoral conflict and their assumptions about ethnic motivation of perpetrators.
Province Ethnicity of Type of perpetrator Assumed ethnicity of * Gender Age where E.V. was Assumed motivation Comment the victim indicated by victim perpetrator experienced Ethnic motivation: Luos against Kikuyus; 1 Male 32 Nairobi Kikuyu Complete strangers Mobilization through Unknown others, leaders and politicians Ethnic motivation: Maasai Different to victims' 2 Male 71 Rift Valley Kikuyu Neighbours Maasai against Kikuyus ethnic affiliation Mobilization through Neighbours; leaders and the devil; Different to victims' 3 Male 38 Rift Valley Kikuyu Neighbours Ethnic motivation: Maasai Maasai ethnic affiliation supporting strangers against Kikuyus; Land issues
Neighbours; Neighbours Mobilization through 4 Female 50 Rift Valley Kikuyu supporting strangers; Missing politicians Complete strangers; Kenyan police force Mobilization through leaders and politicians; 5 Male 63 Rift Valley Kikuyu Neighbours Unknown Land issues: Kalenjin against Kikuyus Mobilization through elders; Ethnic motivation: Different to victims' 6 Female 31 Rift Valley Kikuyu Known people Maasai Maasai against Kikuyus; ethnic affiliation Land issues
Ethnic motivation: Maasai against Kikuyus/non-PNU Neighbours Different to victims' 7 Female 35 Rift Valley Kikuyu supporter; Land issues; Maasai supporting strangers ethnic affiliation Mobilization through elders
Ethnic motivation: coordinated attacks against Neighbours Kikuyus; Land issues; 8 Female 32 Western Kikuyu supporting strangers; Unknown Mobilization through Complete strangers elders; Unpleasant election results Police provoked by riots Land issues: Kalenjin against Kikuyus; 9 Female 28 Rift Valley Kalendjin Kenyan police force Unknown Mobilization through politicians; Unpleasant election results Different to victims' 10 Male 35 Rift Valley Kikuyu Complete strangers Missing Kalenjin ethnic affiliation Ethnic motivation: Kalenjin, Luos, luhyas against Kalenjin, Luos, Different to victims' 11 Male 63 Rift Valley Kikuyu Youth gang Kikuyu/PNU-supporters; Luhyas ethnic affiliation Opportunistic crimes; Unpleasant election results
12 Male 41 Rift Valley Luhya Youth gang; Can't tell Missing Missing Mobilization through 13 Male 41 Rift Valley Luhya Missing Missing others Land issues: attacks 14 Female 53 Rift Valley Kikuyu Youth gang against Kikuyus; Unknown mobilisation by the devil Neighbours and Opportunistic crimes; Land Female & 15 37/50 Rift Valley both Kikuyu neighbours issues: kick Kikuyus out of Unknown Male supporting strangers White Highlands 444
Addendum 20 continued
Province Ethnicity of Type of perpetrator Assumed ethnicity of * Gender Age where E.V. was Assumed motivation Comment the victim indicated by victim perpetrator experienced
Other motivation (revenge); Ethnic Same ethnic group 16 Female 54 Nyanza Luo Youth gang Luo motivation: Luos against as victim Kisii; Land issues
Youth gang (Nairobi); Ehnical motivation: Nairobi and Ugandan police force 17 Female 26 Luo Kikuyus against Luos; Unknown Nyanza (Nyanza) mixed with opportunistic crime (rape) unknown Kenyan Mobilized by politician; Same ethnic group 18 Female 25 Nyanza Luo Missing Luo Opportunistic crime (rape) as victim Luo men accompanied Same ethnic group 19 Female 26 Nyanza Luo Can't tell Unpleasant election results by one non-Luo man as victim Same ethnic group 20 Female 31 Rift Valley Luo Complete strangers Opportunistic crimes Luo as victim 21 Male 59 Nyanza Luo Missing Unpleasant election results Missing
22 Female 31 Nyanza Luo Can't tell Unpleasant election results Unknown Unpleasant election Can't tell and Youth 23 Male 30 Coast Kamba results; Opportunistic Missing gang crimes Mobilized by politician; Complete strangers; 24 Female 28 Coast Meru Opportunistic crimes; Missing can't tell Unpleasant election results
Kenyan police force; Ethnic motivation: Kikuyus 25 Female 34 Coast Luo Missing Can't tell against Luos Giriama 26 Female 31 Coast Complete strangers Opportunistic crimes Missing (Mijikenda ) Chonyi Opportunistic crimes; 27 Female 32 Coast Youth gang Missing (Mijikenda) Unpleasant election results Mobilization through politicians; Ethnic R1Female& both Meru Neighbours and Different to victims' 28 32&33 Coast motivation: Luos against Luo R2Female (Marian) Others (employees) ethnic affiliation Kikuyus/Marians; Unpleasant election results
Ethnic motivation: Attacks against Kikuyus, Kambas 29 Female 42 Coast Kamba Can't tell Missing and Christians; sparing Muslims and coastal tribes Unpleasant election Giriama Known people and results; Opportunistic 30 Female 29 Coast Missing (Mijikenda ) Police force crimes; Police provoked by riots Mobilized by the devil; Known people and Mobilized by politicians; Different to victims' 31 Female 57 Nairobi Kamba Luo Youth gang Ethnic motivation: Luos ethnic affiliation against Kikuyus Complete strangers; Ethnic motivation: attacks Youth gang; Others Different to victims' 32 Male 65 Nairobi Kikuyu against/assassination of Luo (German ethnic affiliation Kikuyus Ambassador)
Source: Table created by the author of the present study.
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Addendum 21. The four types of Kenyan citizens identified in the present study in direct comparison
The voting citizen The resigned citizen The passive The active citizen (N=24) (N=9) citizen (N=7) (N=4) Gender: female, total (%) 16 (66,7) 4 (44,4) 6 (85,7) 2 (50,0) Gender: male, total (%) 8 (33,3) 5 (55,6) 1 (14,3) 2 (50,0)
Ethnic Affiliation: Chonyi, total (%) 1 (4,2) 0 1 (14,3) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Giriama, total (%) 2 (8,3) 0 1 (14,3) 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kalenjin, total (%) 1 (4,2) 0 0 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kamba, total (%) 0 2 (22,2) 0 0 Ethnic Affiliation: Kikuyu, total (%) 11 (45,8) 2 (22,2) 3 (42,9) 2 (50,0) Ethnic Affiliation: Luhya, total (%) 2 (8,3) 1 (11,1) 0 1 (25,0) Ethnic Affiliation: Luo, total (%) 5 (20,8) 4 (44,4) 1 (14,3) 1 (25,0) Ethnic Affiliation: Meru, total (%) 2 (8,3) 0 1 (14,3) 0
Province during E.V.: Coast, total (%) 6 (25,0) 2 (22,2) 3 (42,9) 0 Province during E.V.: Nairobi, total (%) 0 0 0 0 Province during E.V.: Nyanza, total (%) 2 (8,3) 3 (33,3) 1 (14,3) 1 (25,0) Province during E.V.: Nyanza and Nairobi, total (%) 1 (4,2) 1 (11,1) 0 0 Province during E.V.: Rift Valley, total (%) 14 (58,3) 3 (33,3) 3 (42,9) 2 (50,0) Province during E.V.: Western, total (%) 1 (4,2) 0 0 1 (25,0)
Changed Political Participation: no, total (%) 6 (25,0) 1 (11,1) 2 (28,6) 0 Changed Political Participation: yes, less, total (%) 5 (20,8) 4 (44,4) 2 (28,6) 2 (50,0) Changed Political Participation: yes, more, total (%) 8 (33,3) 3 (33,3) 1 (14,3) 2 (50,0)
Level of impairment: high, total (%) 16 (66,7) 7 (77,8) 4 (57,1) 2 (50,0) Level of impairment: low, total (%) 2 (8,3) 1 (11,1) 1 (14,3) 0 Level of impairment: medium, total (%) 5 (20,8) 1 (11,1) 2 (28,6) 2 (50,0)
Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: negative, total (%) 4 (16,7) 3 (33,3) 0 1 (25,0) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: negative neutral, total (%) 0 1 (11,1) 0 0 Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2) 0 0 1 (25,0) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive, total (%) 5 (20,8) 1 (11,1) 3 (42,9) 1 (25,0) Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive negative, total (%) 3 (12,5) 3 (33,3) 1 (14,3) 1 (25,0)
Attitude towards Democracy in Kenya: positive neutral, total (%) 2 (8,3) 0 0 0
Attitude towards Democracy: negative, total (%) 1 (4,2) 2 (22,2) 0 0 Attitude towards Democracy: positive, total (%) 7 (29,2) 0 2 (28,6) 3 (75,0) Attitude towards Democracy: positive negative, total (%) 2 (8,3) 1 (11,1) 0 0
Attitude towards Politicians: negative, total (%) 10 (41,7) 6 (66,7) 1 (14,3) 2 (50,0) Attitude towards Politicians: negative neutral, total (%) 2 (8,3) 1 (11,1) 1 (14,3) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2) 0 0 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positive, total (%) 1 (4,2) 0 0 1 (25,0) Attitude towards Politicians: positive negative, total (%) 3 (12,5) 1 (11,1) 3 (42,9) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positive negative neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2) 1 (11,1) 0 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positive neutral, total (%) 2 (8,3) 0 1 (14,3) 0 Attitude towards Politicians: positve, total (%) 1 (4,2) 0 1 (14,3) 0
Attitude towards politics: negative, total (%) 13 (54,2) 4 (44,4) 4 (57,1) 2 (50,0) Attitude towards politics: negative neutral, total (%) 0 0 0 0 Attitude towards politics: neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2) 0 0 0 Attitude towards politics: positive, total (%) 2 (8,3) 1 (11,1) 1 (14,3) 1 (25,0) Attitude towards politics: positive negative, total (%) 0 1 (11,1) 0 0 Attitude towards politics: positive neutral, total (%) 2 (8,3) 0 1 (14,3) 0
Attitude towards elections: negative, total (%) 6 (25,0) 5 (55,6) 2 (28,6) 0 Attitude towards elections: negative neutral, total (%) 0 0 0 0 Attitude towards elections: positive, total (%) 7 (29,2) 1 (11,1) 2 (28,6) 3 (75,0) Attitude towards elections: positive negative, total (%) 4 (16,7) 1 (11,1) 1 (14,3) 0 Attitude towards elections: positive negative neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2) 1 (11,1) 0 0
Attitude towards 2013 elections: negative, total (%) 3 (12,5) 4 (44,4) 1 (14,3) 0 Attitude towards 2013 elections: neutral, total (%) 0 0 0 0 Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive, total (%) 9 (37,5) 1 (11,1) 4 (57,1) 2 (50,0) Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive negative, total (%) 2 (8,3) 1 (11,1) 0 1 (25,0) Attitude towards 2013 elections: positive negative neutral, total (%) 1 (4,2) 0 0 0
Source: Table created by the author of the present study. 446
Addendum 22. Ethics Clearance Form
• PO Box 77000 • Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University • Port Elizabeth • 6031 • South Africa • www.nmmu.ac.za
SOUTH CAMPUS FACULTY OF ARTS Tel . +27 (0)41 5042855 Fax. +27 (0)41 5041661 [email protected]
Ref: H/13/ART/PGS-001
01 MARCH 2013
Ms S Plata 14 Galpin Street Summerstrand P E 6001
Dear Ms Plata
AGAINST ALL ODDS? THE EFFECT OF ELECTORAL CONFLICT ON THE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF CITIZENS: A CASE STUDY OF VOTERS IN NAIROBI
Your above-entitled application for ethics approval served at the RTI Higher Degrees sub-committee of the Faculty of Arts Research, Technology and Innovation Committee. We take pleasure in informing you that the application was approved by the Committee. The Ethics clearance reference number is H/13/ART/PGS-001 , and is valid for three years, from 23 February 2013 – 23 February 2016. Please inform the RTI-HDC, via your supervisor, if any changes (particularly in the methodology) occur during this time. An annual affirmation to the effect that the protocols in use are still those for which approval was granted, will be required from you. You will be reminded timeously of this responsibility.
We wish you well with the project.
Yours sincerely
Mrs N Mngonyama FACULTY ADMINISTRATOR
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