Center for Strategic and International Studies Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy 1800 K Street, N.W. • Suite 400 • Washington, DC 20006 Phone: 1 (202) 775-3270 • Fax: 1 (202) 457-8746 Web: http://webmail.csis.org/burke

Iraq, the Surge, Partition, and the War: Public Opinion by City and Region

Anthony H. Cordesman Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy [email protected]

Updated: October 19, 2007 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 2

Table of Contents INTRODUCTION ...... 4 SETTING THE STAGE: THE OVERALL TRENDS IN IRAQI PUBLIC OPINION...... 5

DECLINING EXPECTATIONS...... 5 BUT ACONTINUING HOPE FOR UNITY AND THE NATION...... 5 Table One ...... 6 Declining Expectations, But Still A Desire For Unity (In Percent) ...... 6 Figure One: Iraqi Expectations: 2005-2007...... 7 LIVING UNDER CONSTANT THREAT FROM MANY KINDS OF VIOLENCE ...... 8 Iraqi Perceptions of Different Types of Violence ...... 8 Ongoing Sectarian and Ethnic Cleansing ...... 9 Perceptions of Unnecessary Violence ...... 9 Table Two ...... 10 Kinds of Violence Iraqis Reported as Occurring Nearby, and Perceptions of Unnecessary Violence...... 10 IRAQI VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES ROLE IN IRAQ...... 11 Broad National Trends in Perceptions of the US Role in Iraq...... 11 Iraqis Who Think It is Acceptable to Attack US Forces ...... 12 Iraqi Reactions to the US “Surge”...... 12 IRAQI VIEWS OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT...... 13 Figure Two: Iraqi View of US Role and Presence...... 14 Figure Three: The Presence of US Forces and their Effect on the Security Situation ...... 15 Figure Four: The Acceptability of Attacks on Coalition Forces...... 16 Figure Five: Impact of US Surge: Perceptions of Change in the Security Situation...... 17 in the 6 Months Prior to August, 2007...... 17 Figure Six: Impact of the Surge: Perceptions of Change in the Security Situation...... 18 in the 6 Months Prior to August, 2007 by Sect and Ethnic Group...... 18 Figure Seven: Iraqi Popular Approval of the Iraqi Government...... 19 SOURCE: ABC NEWS POLLING UNIT, BASED ON ABC/BBC/NHK POLL “IRAQ, WHERE THINGS STAND, AUGUST, 2007. REGIONAL, SECTARIAN, ETHNIC, AND TRIBAL DIVISIONS IN IRAQ...... 19 REGIONAL, SECTARIAN, ETHNIC, AND TRIBAL DIVISIONS IN IRAQ ...... 20 Table Three ...... 21 If asked your religion, what do you prefer the answer to be?...... 21 Figure Eight: Iraq by Governorate and Summary Demographics...... 23 Figure Nine: Iraq’s Ethnic and Sectarian Character: CIA Estimate...... 24 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 3

LOOKING AT IRAQI DIVISIONS BY CITY AND GOVERNORATE: IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENCE...... 25 Figure Ten: Percent of Iraqis rating key aspects of personal security as “bad” – ABC Poll (August 2007)...... 27 Figure Eleven: Percent of Iraqis Rating Security Situation as ‘Bad’ in Own Neighborhoods March and August 2007– ABC Poll (August 2007)* ...... 28 Figure Twelve: What Kinds of Violence have occurred nearby? – ABC Poll (August 2007)...... 29 Figure Thirteen: What is the single biggest problem facing your life these days? ABC Poll (August 2007) ...... 30 LOOKING AT IRAQI DIVISIONS BY CITY AND GOVERNORATE: IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF CIVIL WAR...... 31 Figure Fourteen: Has the Separating of People Been Happening In Your Mahallah or Not? Has this been mainly forcible or mainly peaceful? – ABC Poll (August 2007)*.32 Figure Fifteen: Percentage of Iraqis reporting separation and forcible separation in Their Neighborhood– ABC Poll (August 2007)*...... 33 Figure Sixteen: Do you think the separation of people on sectarian lines is a good thing or a bad thing? – ABC Poll (August 2007)*...... 34 LOOKING AT IRAQI DIVISIONS BY CITY AND GOVERNORATE: IRAQI PERCEPTIONS OF LIFE, THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT, AND IRAQI SECURITY FORCES ...... 35 Figure 17: Overall, how good would you say things are going in your life these days? (Iraqi responses in percent) – ABC Poll (August 2007)* ...... 36 Figure 18: Lack of Confidence in Iraqi National and Local Leaders (Iraqi “not confident”* responses in percent) – ABC Poll (August 2007)*...... 37 Figure 19: Lack of Confidence in Iraqi Security Forces and Militias (Iraqis saying “not confident”* responses in percent) – ABC Poll (August 2007)*...... 38 US AND COALITION FORCES ...... 39 Figure Twenty: What kinds of unnecessary violence have you seen against Iraqi citizens? – ABC Poll (August 2007)...... 41 Figure Twenty-One: Percent of Iraqis Expressing No Confidence in US, UK, or Iraqi Military or Security Force – ABC Poll (August 2007)*...... 42 Figure Twenty-Two: Percent of Iraqis saying they feel the US and Coalition forces have done a good or bad* job of carrying out their responsibilities – ABC Poll (August 2007)* ...... 43 Figure Twenty-Three: Percent of Iraqis saying attacks on Coalition and Iraqi Forces are acceptable – ABC Poll (August 2007)* ...... 44 Figure Twenty-Four: Percentage of Iraqis saying that that bringing more US forces into Baghdad and Anbar will make security worse or have no effect (Iraqi responses in percent)– ABC Poll (March 2007)*...... 45 Figure Twenty-Five: Iraqi opinion of how long US and Other Occupation Forces Should Remain in Iraq* – ABC Poll (August 2007)**...... 46 PERCEPTIONS OF AID, THE ECONOMY, AND SERVICES ...... 47 Figure Twenty-Six: Percent of Iraqis saying the reconstruction efforts in their area have been ineffective or never effort took place – ABC Poll (August 2007)*...... 48 Figure Twenty-Seven: Percent of Iraqis rating Water, Electricity and Fuel services as “bad” – ABC Poll (August 2007)*...... 49 Figure Twenty-Eight: Percent of Iraqis Rating Schools and the Availability of Medical Services as “bad” – ABC Poll (August 2007)*...... 50 ABC/BBC/NHK POLL: METHODOLOGY AND SURVEY TECHNIQUES ...... 51 STATISTICAL TABLES...... 53 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 4

Introduction The patterns of conflict in Iraq have grown steadily more complex with time, adding sectarian and ethnic conflicts to what began as a largely Ba’athist dominated resistance in mid-2003. There are now five major patterns of violence:

• Sunni Islamist extremist insurgents, where Al Qa’ida plays a major role along with at least two other movements. These are the primary source of suicide attacks, car bombings, and attacks on Iraqi and Coalition forces.

• Iraqi Arab Sunni versus Arab Shi’ite conflicts, where Shi’ite militias and death squads play a major role, and where sectarian violence, threats, and pressures are forcing the segregation of many areas, leading to displacements, and creating ethnic “cleansing.”

• Iraqi Arab versus Iraqi Kurdish ethnic conflicts center around the “ethnic fault” line, where control of Kirkuk and the oil fields around it have become a major source of tension and potential conflict that extends to the West to the area around Mosul. The future of the Turcomans and other minorities is directly affected by the outcome, as is national unity. This ethnic struggle also interacts with similar Kurdish ethnic tensions and struggles affecting Turkey, Iran, and Syria.

• Arab Shi’ite on Arab Shi’ite struggles for political control and power, particularly in Southeastern Iraq. Each of the three major Shi’ite parties is a rival for power along with smaller parties that play a major role in key cities like Basra. Clashes between Shi’ite factions and militias have so far been limited, but the struggle for control of the Shi’ite shrine cites and the oil-rich provinces in the Southeast may have only begun.

• Arab Sunni on Arab Sunni violence now concentrated largely in Al Anbar but spreading eastwards into Diyala. This is partly a struggle for tribal control of given areas, but also a struggle between Sunni Islamist extremist elements like Al Qa’ida in Iraq. These struggles ease the pressure on the ISF and Coalition to some degree, but the enemy of an enemy is not necessarily a lasting “friend.” These divisions, however, tell only part of the story. Many Iraqis have divided or multiple loyalties, and the patterns of violence in one region, governorate, or city may well differ from another. This becomes far clearer from an examination of the detailed results of a recent public opinion poll by ABC News, the BBC, and NHK. This poll provides important insights into how the trends in Iraqi “hearts and minds” differ by major city and province. It also shows that any successful effort at counterinsurgency and conciliation must carefully consider regional and local patterns in Iraqi perceptions and civil conflict, and not simply the overall patterns in Iraqi public opinion. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 5

Setting the Stage: The Overall Trends in Iraqi Public Opinion The data in this analysis are provided through the courtesy of the ABC News polling unit. They portray the results of a series of polls, the latest of which was carried out by ABC, BBC, and NHK in August 2007, and published in September 2007, and were designed as part of a national poll on Iraq, and not for the regional and urban purposes presented in this analysis. At the same time, the struggles in Iraq today are ultimately battles for the control of power, force, space, and money where Iraqi perceptions are critical in determining the outcome. The US and its Coalition allies cannot force solutions on the Iraqis, nor can it afford to try to fight a military battle that ignores how Iraqis see US and Coalition forces, the success of the Iraqi government, their overall security situation, trends in the economy, or the course of their daily lives. Most of the results show a deterioration in the situation since the previous poll in March 2007.. Virtually all show the level of violence and civil conflict is higher than most Iraqi and US government sources like to publicly admit. They also show that most Iraqis see the US and Coalition forces as at least a partial threat, do not trust the US or Coalition, and see their aid efforts as failed or non-existent. Declining Expectations As security conditions have worsened, so have expectations for future improvement in the conditions of life -- an especially troubling result, since hopes for a better future can be the glue that holds a struggling society together. In 2004 and 2005 alike, for example, Table One shows that three- quarters of Iraqis expected improvements in the coming year in their security, schools, availability of jobs, medical care, crime protection, clean water and power supply. Today only about 23 percent still expect better, down from 40% in March 2007. Figure One puts this analysis in graphic form, and shows the different trends in the expectations of Arab Sunnis, Arab Shi’ites, and Kurds. The most striking difference over time is the decline in the expectations of Iraqi Kurds. The has also been a less precipitous decline in the expectations of the Iraq Arab Shi’ites. The expectations of Iraqi Arab Sunnis have been so low that little change took place during the course of 2007.. But A Continuing Hope for Unity and the Nation Yet the results do offer hope in one key areas. As the bottom section of Table One shows, most Arab Sunnis and Arab Shiites still want a unified country, and those Arab Shiites who do not want a strong central government instead want federalism with a weaker central government. Only the Kurds have a large percentage (49%) that wants independence, and 51% want a strong central government or federalism. Iraqis do not want sectarian separation, and many still identify themselves as Muslims and not as Sunnis or Shi’ites. Iraqis have not given up on the future of Iraq as a nation. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 6

Table One

Declining Expectations, But Still A Desire For Unity (In Percent)

Will Life Get Better? Worse? 11/22/05 3/5/07 8/24/07 Much Better 35 12 6 Somewhat Better 29 23 23 Same 14 32 32 Somewhat Worse 7 25 23 Much Worse 5 7 16 No Opinion 10 1 1

3/5/07 8/24/07

Desired Political System Sunni Shi’ite Kurd Sunni Shiite Kurd

One Unified Iraq with 97 41 20 97 56 9 Central Government in Baghdad

A group of Regional Sates 2 40 49 3 42 42 with their own regional governments and a federal government in Baghdad

Dividing the Country into separate 1 19 30 * 2 49 independent states

Source:\. ** ABC, BBC, NHK Poll, “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 7

Figure One: Iraqi Expectations: 2005-2007

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% : Iraq in a Year Sunni Expect Shi'ite Expect Kurd Expect : Iraq in a Year Sunni Expect Shi'ite Expect Kurd Expect Expect Better Better in a Year Better in a Year Better in a Year Expect Worse Worse in a Year Worse in a Year Worse in a Year Nov-05 69% na na na 0.11 na na na Mar-07 0.4 0.05 0.61 0.53 0.34 0.67 0.16 0.13 Aug-07 0.23 0.04 0.38 0.19 0.42 0.7 0.18 0.53

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007, pg. 2, 16 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 8

Living Under Constant Threat From Many Kinds of Violence The ABC News poll conducted in August 2007 did find, however, that 41% percent of all Iraqis saw security as the most serious single issue facing the their life (46% Sunni, 45% Shi’ite, and 21% Kurd), up from 18 percent in 2005. The poll found that while in 2005, 63 percent of Iraqis said they felt very safe in their neighborhoods in 2005, only 26 percent had said this in August 2007. 28 percent did not feel safe at all. In Baghdad, home to a fifth of the country’s population, 100% of respondents rated the security situation as bad. Overall, 61% of Iraqis reported that the security situation had become worse in the last 6 months.1

Iraqi Perceptions of Different Types of Violence The ABC poll asked about nine kinds of violence that broke the security problems Iraqis and ISF forces faced into more detail than the Coalition and US have publicly reported (car bombs, snipers or crossfire, kidnappings, fighting among opposing groups or abuse of civilians by various armed forces). These results are reflected in Table Two: 2 The ABC poll found that any focus on the numbers of Iraqis killed, and/or the number of sectarian incidents involving major acts of violence, sharply underestimates the civil-military challenge. MNF-I, US and Iraqi government statistics on violence in Iraq usually do not include threats, kidnappings, woundings, intimidation, or sectarian and ethnic crimes. Yet, public opinion polls show that such ‘lower’ forms of violence became far more common in Iraq than killings, and represent the bulk of the real-world challenge to the ISF. The ABC analysis of the poll results reported in March that,3 Widespread violence, torn lives, displaced families, emotional damage, collapsing services, an ever-starker sectarian chasm – and a draining away of the underlying optimism that once prevailed. Violence is the cause, its reach vast. Eighty percent of Iraqis report attacks nearby – car bombs, snipers, kidnappings, and armed forces fighting each other or abusing civilians. It’s worst by far in the capital, Baghdad, but by no means confined there. The personal toll is enormous. More than half of Iraqis, 53 percent, have a close friend or relative who’s been hurt or killed in the current violence. One in six says someone in their own household has been harmed. Eighty-six percent worry about a loved one being hurt; two-thirds worry deeply. Huge numbers limit their daily activities to minimize risk. Seven in 10 report multiple signs of traumatic stress. Most Iraqis in Baghdad said at least one of these had occurred nearby; half reported four or more of them. In the previous poll, in March 2007, some 53 percent of Iraqis said a close friend or immediate family member had been hurt in the current violence. That ranged from three in 10 in the

1 ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, released August, 2007, pp. 21. 2 ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, released August, 2007.. 3 ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, released March 19, 2007, pp. 1. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 9

Kurdish provinces to nearly eight in 10 in Baghdad. Even outside Baghdad, 74 percent reported at least one form of violence, and 25 percent reported four or more (34 percent excluding the Kurdish area, which was far more peaceful than the country overall). The poll results also show a significant rise in the level of violence reported by Arab Sunnis and Kurds since the poll in May, largely in car bombs and suicide attacks. These results show that popular perceptions of violence do not necessarily correlate to the declines in violence reported by the MNF-I.

Ongoing Sectarian and Ethnic Cleansing Nationally, 11 percent of all Iraqis surveyed in August 2007 reported that ethnic cleansing -- the forced separation of Sunnis and Shiites -- had occurred in their neighborhoods. Table Two shows that by August, 27% of all Iraqis reported that they had had an encounter with sectarian fighting, and that this included 35% of all Arab Sunnis and 30% of all Arab Shi’ites. The figure was only 2% for Iraqi Kurds – partly because of added security in the Kurd areas and partly because Kurds may see such violence as “ethnic,” rather than sectarian. In mixed-population Baghdad, 27 percent of all Iraqis surveyed in August 2007 reported that ethnic cleansing -- the forced separation of Sunnis and Shiites -- had occurred in their neighborhoods. As of March 2007, one in seven Iraqis overall -- rising to a quarter of Sunni Arabs, and more than a third of Baghdad residents -- said they themselves have moved homes in the last year to avoid violence or religious persecution.

Perceptions of Unnecessary Violence Table Two does not show a rise in Iraqi perceptions of unnecessary use of force by US and coalition forces during the surge. This reflects well on the US operation since the sharp increase in US operations and the embedding (hold phase) by US forces might well have produced a different result. Nevertheless, a slight increase did take place in Arab Sunni perceptions (60% to 63%), and the decline in Arab Shi’ite perceptions – while more significant – still leaves a high percentage (46% to 38%). These figures should, however, be kept in context. Far more Iraqis encounter US forces on a day-to-day basis than other forces in Iraq, and perceptions of the US military are colored by encounters with civilian contractors that are often far less sensitive to Iraqi concerns. The trend in perceptions of unnecessary violence by local militias, Iraqi police, and the Iraqi Army are also favorable -- perhaps reflecting the impact of the surge and US efforts to make sure that the ISF act to protect Sunnis as well as Shi’ites. Sunni perceptions of unnecessary violence by militias, the police, and army dropped significantly during the surge period. The significant rise in Shi’ite perceptions may reflect the impact of operations against Shi’ite militias, but could be a warning of rising Shi’ite sensitivity to operations that are perceived as pro-Sunni. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 10

Table Two

Kinds of Violence Iraqis Reported as Occurring Nearby, and Perceptions of Unnecessary Violence (In percent)

3/5/07 8/24/07

All Sunni Shi’ite Kurd All Sunni Shi’ite Kurd

Type of Violence Encountered (Percent reporting)

Kidnappings for ransom 40% 50% 42% 10% 40% 52% 42% 6% Gov’t/anti-gov’t fighting 34 44 36 1 34 33 44 5 Car bombs, suicide attacks 32 48 27 7 42 61 36 14 Snipers, crossfire 30 40 33 1 30 45 27 5 Sectarian fighting 25 31 28 2 27 35 30 2

Perceive Unnecessary Violence by: (Percent reporting)

U.S./coalition forces 44 60 46 8 41 63 38 7 Local militia 31 55 22 2 30 38 33 2 Iraqi police 24 55 8 1 21 33 18 3 Iraqi Army 24 56 7 0 19 30 17 1

Source: ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, released August 24, 2007, pp. 27-28. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 11

Iraqi Views of the United States Role in Iraq One key result of the August 2007 poll is that most Iraqis still do not see the US and Coalition forces as allies or liberators, and the US has failed to win the battle for “hearts and minds.” These results are portrayed in far more detail later in this report, but are presented in graphic form in Figure Two, and may be summarized as follows.

Broad National Trends in Perceptions of the US Role in Iraq Iraqi views of the US role in Iraq are summarized in Figures Two and Three. The poll result found that Iraqis as a whole divided sharply over whether the United States was right (37 percent), or wrong (63 percent) to invade in spring 2003. Once again, however, there were sharp sectarian and ethnic splits within this total. A total 49 percent of Shiites and 71 percent of Kurds polled endorsed the invasion; but 96 percent of Sunni Arabs said it was wrong. Figure Two shows that a total of 47% of all Iraqis felt US forces should leave Iraqi immediately. This percentage has been steadily rising, from 35% in March 2007 and 26% in November 2005. In contrast, about one third (34%) of Iraqis felt that US and Coalition forces should stay until security is restored. Other analysis of the polling results showed that nineteen percent of Iraqis polled blamed either US and coalition forces for the current violence in Iraq, and eight percent blamed George W. Bush personally. Al Qa’ida and foreign jihadi fighters were blamed by 21 percent (far more by Shiites and Kurds than by Sunnis). Indeed, one of the top instances of local violence measured in the poll was “unnecessary violence against Iraqi citizens by U.S. or coalition forces.” Forty-one percent of Iraqis -- including 63 percent of Sunni Arabs -- reported such violence as having occurred nearby. Figure Three shows there was little overall confidence in US forces: Eighty-six percent of the Iraqis polled in August said that they were not confident in US and UK forces -- 91 percent of Shiites as well as 99 percent of Sunni Arabs. (That fell to about half of generally pro-US Kurds.) In spite of allocating $38 billion in development funds (some $33 billion of which were US funds) Reconstruction is another complaint: Nationwide, 72 percent of Iraqis say post-war reconstruction efforts in their area have been ineffective or nonexistent. Sixty-eight percent of Shiites say so; among Sunnis, it’s 89 percent. (Again, attitudes were different in the Kurdish area, where 45 percent call reconstruction effective, down from 70% in March 2007.) In the first ABC News poll in Iraq, in February 2004, 51 percent of Iraqis opposed the presence of U.S. forces on their soil. By November 2005 that jumped to 65 percent. In February/March 2007, it was 78 percent, and as of August 2007 it was 79%. More than eight in 10 Shiites (as well as 98 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 12

percent of Sunni Arabs) opposed the presence of U.S. and other forces in their country. (Kurds, again, differed significantly: 70 percent support the U.S. presence.) More than seven in 10 Shiites – and nearly all Sunni Arabs – thought the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq was making security worse.

Iraqis Who Think It is Acceptable to Attack US Forces Figures Two and Four show that the poll found that the number of Iraqis who called it “acceptable” to attack U.S. and coalition forces totaled only 17 percent in early 2004, but that the percentage had more than tripled to 57 percent in August 2007. The main source of this antipathy was disaffected Sunni Arabs, the group that lost power with the overthrow of Saddam. Ninety-three percent of Sunni Arabs called attacks on U.S. forces acceptable. That compared with 50 percent of Arab Shiites (still a large number to endorse violence), and only five percent of Kurds, who’re far more favorably inclined toward the United States. Polls taken in 2004 that found attacks on Coalition forces were approved by roughly 63% percent of Sunni Arabs and 11 percent of Shiites.

Iraqi Reactions to the US “Surge” Some of the negative attitudes of Arab Sunni in the August poll may reflect the fact that the poll was being take at a time when many Arab Sunnis did not know of development in Anbar and the “tribal awakening” that led large numbers of Sunnis to turn on the Taliban and begin cooperating with the US. This may also help explain the negative overall view Iraqis had of developments in during the surge period reflected in Figures Five and Six.

The poll does cover a period of intense combat and when population displacements and sectarian and ethnic cleansing continued to have a major impact. Figure Five is almost certainly correct, however, in showing that most Iraqis did see a decline in their personal economic well-being and saw little evidence of improved government services, reconstruction, and the pace of economic development.

The key issue in terms of the longer-term impact of the surge is how Iraqis saw the change in the security situation. These results are shown by sect and ethnicity in Figure Six. The figures for Sunnis seem too negative to reflect the real impact of the surge, are the percentages seem likely to improve in future polls. This may well be true of the other indices in Figure Five as well. The full security impact of the surge did not take place until the late summer of 2007, and this meant a substantial lag almost certainly took place before improved security could have an impact on other aspects of Iraqi life. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 13

Iraqi Views of the Iraqi Government What is less clear is that the decline in popular approval of the Iraqi government shown in Figure Seven will be reversed in the near term. The number of all Iraqis describing the central government as “bad” rose from 53% in March 2007 to 65% in August 2007. This shift was driven by the fact that the number of all Iraqis describing the central government as “very bad” rose from 26% in March 2007 to 38% in August 2007.

What is particularly disturbing about these numbers is the sharp decline in Sunni approval of the government at a time when political accommodation was a critical priority, a decline in Sunni support that probably reflects internal Shi’ite feuding and a continuing lack of government services, and a decline in Kurdish support that other polls show may reflect a growing popular Kurdish desire for independence and feeling that the central government is too pro-Shi’ite. The unfortunate fact is that the Iraqi central government Failed to make progress in serving the interests of any key element of the Iraqi population as well as in national accommodation and reconciliation. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 14

Figure Two: Iraqi View of US Role and Presence

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Invasion was Wrong Coalition Forces Attacks on US Forces Should Leave Now "Acceptable" Feb-04 39% NA 17% Nov-05 50% 26% NA Mar-07 52% 35% 51% Aug-07 63% 47% 57%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007, pg. 25. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 15

Figure Three: The Presence of US Forces and their Effect on the Security Situation

100%

90%

80%

70%

60% Better 50% Worse 40% No Effect 30%

20%

10%

0% All Sunni Shi'ite Kurd

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007, p. 26 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 16

Figure Four: The Acceptability of Attacks on Coalition Forces

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% Acceptable 3/5/2007 40% Acceptable 8/24/2007 30% Not Acceptable 3/5/2007 20% Not Acceptable 8/24/2007 10% 0% All Sunni Shi'ite Kurd Acceptable 3/5/2007 51% 94% 35% 7% Acceptable 8/24/2007 57% 93% 50% 5% Not Acceptable 3/5/2007 49% 6% 65% 93% Not Acceptable 8/24/2007 43% 7% 50% 94%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007.. Pg. 26. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 17

Figure Five: Impact of US Surge: Perceptions of Change in the Security Situation in the 6 Months Prior to August, 2007

100% 90%

80% 70%

60% 50%

40% 30%

20% 10% 0% Pace of Government's Political Security in Security in Pace of Security in Economic Ability to Dialogue Surge Areas Other Areas Reconstruction Iraq overall Development Function Better 10% 18% 12% 9% 6% 12% 11% Worse 70% 70% 61% 67% 67% 65% 31% No Effect 20% 11% 28% 24% 26% 22% 45%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 18

Figure Six: Impact of the Surge: Perceptions of Change in the Security Situation in the 6 Months Prior to August, 2007 by Sect and Ethnic Group

100%

90%

80%

70%

60% Better 50% Worse 40% Same

30%

20%

10%

0% Total Sunni Shi'ite Kurd

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Pg. 21 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 19

Figure Seven: Iraqi Popular Approval of the Iraqi Government

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50% 40%

30%

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0% Total August Total March Shi'ite August Shi'ite March Kurd August Kurd March Sunni August Sunni March 2007 2007 Very Good 6% 0.1 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.01 0.01 Quite Good 0.28 0.36 0.44 0.53 0.36 0.55 0.03 0.05 Quite Bad 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.33 0.22 0.2 0.32 Very Bad 0.38 0.26 0.18 0.06 0.2 0.07 0.77 0.62

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 20

Regional, Sectarian, Ethnic, and Tribal Divisions in Iraq Understanding key national trends, however, is only one part of putting Iraqi public opinion into perspective. To understand how Iraqi “hearts and minds” affect the course of the fighting and nation building, it is necessary to understand how Iraq divides into key cities and the nature of its governorates. This is anything but easy. Over four million Iraqis have been displaced inside the country or forces in to exile, no meaningful census exists that describes Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic composition, and virtually every sectarian and ethnic group feels it is larger than current estimates indicate, and that population movements, displacements, and cleansing are making “guesstimates” more uncertain by the day.

There seems to be no official US or Iraqi government “guesstimate” of the country’s Sunni vs. Shiite Arab populations, and no single authoritative source of empirical data on the subject. The most commonly cited estimate is an unsourced reference in the CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html). According to the factbook, 60-65 percent of Iraqis are Shiite Muslims, 15-20 percent Kurds and three percent non-Muslims. Although it is not explicitly stated in the CIA Factbook, that leaves room for 12 to 22 percent Sunni Arabs.4

While it is not certain what the CIA source is, according to the ABC poll: “This estimate may derive from a 1988 book, “Iraq: a Country Study” produced by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. This book (pp. 80-81) characterizes data on ethnicity and religious doctrine in Iraq as “not absolutely reliable.” It says, “Officially the government sets the number of Shias at 55 percent. In the 1980s knowledgeable observers began to question this figure, regarding it as low. …a more reasonable estimate of their number would seem to be between 60 and 65 percent.” It adds, “…the Sunni Arabs…constitute a decided minority of only about 13 percent...” These data also are unsourced. The 60-65 percent Shiite estimate matches that in the CIA World Factbook; the 13 percent Sunni Arab estimate compares to the World Factbook’s unstated range of 12 to 22 percent.”5

The August ABC survey found that Iraqis identified themselves as 48 percent Shiite Arab, 33 percent Sunni Arab, 16 percent Kurdish and three percent other.6

4 ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, August 2007. http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=3571535 5 ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, August 2007. http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=3571535 6 ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, August 2007. http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=3571535 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 21

D3 Systems reports that its previous surveys found that Shiite Arabs ranged from the high 40s to low 50s, and Sunni Arabs in a range from the high 20s to mid-30s. The 35 percent Sunni Arab estimate in this poll is at the high end of its previous data, but within that range. This poll had more sampling points than any previous individual national study in Iraq by D3/KARL.

The August ABC poll warned that: “Other Iraq surveys are difficult to compare because they ask religious doctrine different ways, often reporting significant numbers of Muslims of unspecified doctrine, and use different weights, including, in some cases, weighting to a predetermined assumption of distribution by religious doctrine.”7 An earlier ORB poll, for example, drew on 5,019 interviews carried out in home between 10 and 22 February, 2007, using probability samples based on the 1997 census. It was never intended to estimate sect or ethnicity. However, it found that 82% of those surveyed thought of themselves as Arab, 16% as Kurds, 2% as Turcomans, with less than 1% for any other faction.

It also found that when the survey base was asked about its religion, 14% identified themselves as Sunni, 24% as Shi’ites, and 61% as Muslims – giving faith a clear priority over sect. As for minorities, no minority reached 1%. A total of 58% in urban areas and 68% in rural areas identified themselves as Muslims, rather than by sect. The figures by governorate are shown in Table Three below, and show that many Iraqis still thought of themselves as Muslims, although some Sunnis in threatened regions may have been afraid to respond, and Shi’ites are clearly more likely to identify themselves by sect than Sunnis:

Table Three If asked your religion, what do you prefer the answer to be?

Sunni Arab Shiite Arab Kurdish Anbar 100% 0 0 Babil 16 84 0 Baghdad 42 57 0 Basra 23 75 0 Dhi Qar 3 97 0 Diyala 55 28 13 Irbil 0 0 100 Ninevah 69 1 14 Sulaimaniyah 0 0 100 Tamim 49 3 23

7 ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, August 2007. http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=3571535 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 22

Source: ABC News 8/07

That said, the following figures, drawn from CIA and Department of Defense sources, do provide a useful overview of Iraq’s divisions by city and province, and by sect and ethnicity. They also allow the reader to orient the poll results by governorate and city that follow in terms of location and where the area is dominated by Arab Sunni, Arab Shi’ite, or Kurd.

• Figure Eight shows the location of the governorates (provinces) and major cities in Iraq, and the CIA estimate of Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic distribution. It should be note that it makes no estimate of how Iraq Arabs are divided by sect, and does not provided detailed breakouts of the percentages of the smaller minorities. Estimates of such data are extremely uncertain. ABC polls found a much larger percentage of Arab Sunnis, for example, than are reported in most sources.

• Figure Nine provides a rough estimate of the sectarian and ethnic population by region and governorate, and also shows that size of the minority vote in each governorate in the December 2005 election. This figure shows which provinces are clearly dominated by one ethnic and sectarian group and which are mixed. The December 2005 election showed, however, that almost all provinces have very substantial minorities that would oppose any form of federalism that gave the majority sectarian or ethnic group control. Moreover, a map this general cannot show that there are minority enclaves, mixed cities, and other sectarian and ethnic “islands” in most governorates. Similarly, it cannot reflect the fact that many Iraqis see their national identity as more important than their sectarian or ethnic identity, or are in mixed families and marriages. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 23

Figure Eight: Iraq by Governorate and Summary Demographics

Population: 27,499,638

Ethnic Groups:

Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian or other 5%

Religions:

Muslim 97% (Shi’a 60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%), Christian or other 3%

Languages:

Arabic, Kurdish (official in Kurdish regions), Assyrian, Armenian Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 24

Figure Nine: Iraq’s Ethnic and Sectarian Character: CIA Estimate

Minority Votes by Province

Province Majority Minority Vote in December 2005 Election Anbar Sunni 26% Baghdad Mixed 43% Basra Shi’ite 23% Diyala Mixed 62% Dhi Qar Shi’ite 13% Najaf Shi’ite 18% Maysan Shi’ite 13% Qadisiyah Shi’ite 19% Muthanna Shi’ite 14% Wasit Mixed 19% Babil Mixed 24% Karbala Shi’ite 24% Salahaddin Mixed 67% Ninewa Sunni 73% Kirkuk Mixed 57% Dahuk Kurd 10% Sulaymaniyah Kurd 13% Arbil Kurd 5% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 25

Looking at Iraqi Divisions by City and Governorate: Iraqi Perceptions of Violence The following figures show the results of the August 2007 polling effort by major city and governorate where the ABC News Polling Unit felt the sample was large enough to provide statistically valid results. Some important cities and areas like Mosul have to be omitted for this reason, although the sampling that was done in this city produced anything but optimistic results.

Once again, it should be stressed that the ABC Poll was not designed to support detailed analysis of the trends in the insurgency and civil violence, and any interpretation of the results that goes beyond the obvious implications of the results shown is necessarily somewhat speculative. The reader should also be careful to read the actual spread sheets providing detailed polling results attached at the end of this paper. Graphs can do a great deal to illustrate the diversity in Iraq regarding virtually every issue, and the importance of looking beyond a narrow focus on the insurgency. They can also illustrate the dangers of generalizing by sect or ethnicity. At the same time, it is dangerous to take individual poll results out of the context of the full results for a given question and the overall results of the poll.

• Figure Ten shows how Iraqis feel about key aspects of security like freedom of movement, freedom from persecution, and freedom from crime. The same broad patterns emerge, but significant differences do emerge by governorate that do not reflect the levels of Sunni Islamist insurgent activity, and civil violence and threats are generally seen as significantly more threatening than crime. This was not the case in 2003 and 2004.

The urban figures are disturbing because they show very high levels of concern with all aspects of security, especially in Baghdad, which was a key focus of the surge. The levels in Basra, however, are also very high, and reflect significant Shi’ite on Shi’ite tension. The Kirkuk data reflect Kurdish-Arab tensions. The data for governorates do show considerably better data for the two Kurdish governorates (although some of the data for Irbil are disturbing), but only one of the Shi’ite governorates shows similar levels of security. Again, Shi’ite on Shi’ite tensions are a serious issue as is sectarian cleaning in some of the areas involved.

• Figure Eleven addresses perceptions of neighborhood security. Perceptions of local security are better than perceptions of security on a broad level. At the same time, it is clear that aside from the Kurdish areas and the most secure Shi’ite dominated governorates, Iraqis generally do not feel safe in their own neighborhoods, and this is often true in cities and governorates dominated by one sect or its militias.

The shift in the fighting resulting from the tribal awakening in Anbar and the rise of violence in Diyala are clearly reflected in the shifts in opinion between March and August. There are, however, no broad trends toward improved perceptions of security in most areas, and perceptions of local security in Baghdad grew worse. This again, however, may reflect the lag between successful military operations and public perceptions of day-to-day security. The surge had led to more visible military operations but had not yet taken hold in providing a stable increase in local security.

• Figure Twelve shows Iraqi perceptions of violence that has occurred nearby. As is the case with the polling results that follow, Iraqis tend to perceive very different mixes and causes of violence by city and governorate. Urban Iraqis tend to experience more violence than the population as a whole. Car bombings and Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 26

suicide attacks are experience most often in governorates with strong Sunni Islamist insurgent activity. Kidnappings are common, but show significant geographic variations as do snipers, crossfire attacks, and sectarian clashes.

What is also striking about such data, however, is the fact that the net perceptions of violence are not significantly lower in many Shi’ite dominated areas than mixed areas, although the mix of violence is different. Somewhat ironically, Anbar’s data reflect the fact that fewer Sunnis have experienced violence near them than Shi’ites in supposedly more secure governorates. Crime and extortion are particularly serious problems in some Shi’ite governorates. The data for cities are somewhat surprising, although the fact that Shi’ites dominate Basra has never been thought to have brought a meaningful degree of security in the city, The high levels for Kirkuk may reflect the fact that its residents live in a constant state of ethnic tension and perceive higher levels of violence than have actually taken place.

• Figure Thirteen shows that most Iraqis -- aside from the Kurds -- continue to list a lack of security as the single biggest problem facing their lives today. They do, however, perceive the main cause of that violence in very different ways. In Anbar, for example, the fact that violence is Sunni on Sunni leads to low percentages for sectarian violence and ethnic religious tension. Similar trends emerge in Shi’ite dominated Basra, but not in Babil. It is also striking that violence is seen as more generic than sectarian in Diyala. Any analysis of the reasons for these differences must be speculative, but it may reflect the fact that many Iraqis still do not think in sectarian or ethnic terms and characterize violence in more generic terms. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 27

Figure Ten: Percent of Iraqis rating key aspects of personal security as “bad” – ABC Poll (August 2007)

Cities Governorates

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0% Suleyma Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah . -niyah Irbil-Kurd National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Kurd Freedom from Crime 65% 100% 55% 64% 100% 60% 10% 51% 62% 100% 93% 76% 11% 15% Freedom of Movement 74% 100% 75% 86% 100% 76% 17% 66% 84% 100% 100% 86% 15% 31% Freedom from Persecution 77% 100% 71% 84% 100% 74% 31% 81% 83% 100% 100% 89% 21% 46%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 28

Figure Eleven: Percent of Iraqis Rating Security Situation as ‘Bad’ in Own Neighborhoods March and August 2007– ABC Poll (August 2007)* Cities Governorates

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0% Total Baghdad -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleymani Basra City Kirku City . Irbil-Kurd National City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed yah-Kurd Mar-07 54% 80% 59% 75% 100% 59% 5% 31% 69% 81% 81% 74% 2% 9% Aug-07 57% 100% 70% 79% 61% 69% 22% 25% 80% 100% 100% 58% 13% 9%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things StandAugust, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 29

Figure Twelve: What Kinds of Violence have occurred nearby? – ABC Poll (August 2007)

Cities Governorates 90%

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10%

0% Total Baghd Basra Dhi Tami Baghd Ninew Suley Basra Kirku Anbar- Babil- Diyala- Irbil- Nation ad . h- Qar- m- ad- ah- maniy City City Sunni Shi'ite Mixed Kurd al City Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed ah- Car Bombs or Suicide Attacks 42% 52% 65% 75% 42% 59% 2% 56% 63% 52% 48% 79% 4% 25% Snipers or Crossfire 30% 43% 20% 21% 27% 14% 50% 6% 30% 44% 37% 71% Fighting Among Sectarian Factions 28% 53% 54% 37% 27% 56% 4% 12% 38% 54% 34% 32% Kidnappings for Ransom 41% 44% 67% 81% 23% 79% 14% 67% 83% 44% 27% 63% 2% 2% Fighting between Iraqi Government and Anti- 34% 56% 32% 48% 22% 30% 49% 34% 53% 55% 34% 17% 4% Government Forces

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 30

Figure Thirteen: What is the single biggest problem facing your life these days? ABC Poll (August 2007)

Cities Governorates 35%

30% 1 Lack of security/safety

25% 2 War/civil war/unrest

3 Sectarian violence 20%

4 Terrorist attacks 15%

5 Ethnic-religious tension/ Persecution/Discrimination 10%

5%

0% Total Baghda Ninewa Suleym Baghda Basra Kirku Anbar- Basrah- Dhi Qar- Babil- Tamim- Diyala- Irbil- Nationa . d- h- aniyah- d City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Kurd l Mixed Mixed Kurd 1 Lack of security/safety 17% 13% 14% 25% 33% 19% 5% 11% 25% 13% 27% 10% 4% 2% 2 War/civil war/unrest 4% 11% 5% 4% 3% 3% 1% 3% 10% 4% 7% 1% 1% 3 Sectarian violence 6% 7% 8% 10% 3% 5% 23% 11% 7% 5% 5% 3% 2% 4 Terrorist attacks 7% 7% 11% 8% 1% 11% 1% 22% 6% 6% 8% 10% 5% 2% 5 Ethnic-religious tension/ Persecution/Discrimination 4% 6% 2% 6% 3% 1% 7% 5% 6% 1% 5% 2% 2%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 31

Looking at Iraqi Divisions by City and Governorate: Iraqi Perceptions of Civil War Given the previous data, it should be clear why asking Iraqis whether they face a state of civil war can produce uncertain results. The nature of violence in Iraq is extremely complex, and Iraqis who see US and other Coalition forces as a major threat, or feel that way about foreign jihadists, may not see civil conflict as a civil war even if it is a serious problem in their area. Nevertheless, the ABC poll, and a recent ORB poll, both show that many Iraqis do see themselves as in a civil conflict.

• Figure Fourteen approaches the issue differently by asking Iraqis about sectarian and ethnic separation. This figure is both revealing and should be a source of deep concern to those who advocate federalism or partition. Like the previous figures, it shows that Iraq is not dividing along the kinds of sectarian and ethnic lines that offer any hope of near term security or stability even in governorates dominated by given sects and ethnic groups,

The polling data reflects the high degree of displacement or cleansing in most areas, but also indicates that many Iraqis may be in a state of denial about what is happening. The data for Basra, for example, clearly understate the level of forcible displacement. The polling often indicates that Iraqis who live in mixed areas do not describe the area as “mixed” if their neighborhood is not mixed, and many Iraqis cite displacements as “ voluntary” in areas that were subject to high levels of intimidation and violence. What is particularly striking, however, are the low percentages for mixed neighborhoods that have not yet been caught up in separation. This is a warning of just how dangerous forced separation or a broad-based civil conflict might be in the future. These figures are particularly striking for Basra, Kirkuk, and other cities, but are high for Baghdad. They affect eight of Iraq’s provinces, including most Shi’ite ones. The only exceptions are the two Kurdish governorates of Suleymaniyah and Irbil, and the Kurds seem to be ignoring Turcoman and Christian minorities.

• Figure Fifteen highlights the areas where separation and cleansing are already serious problems. They include Baghdad city and the Basra, Babylon, Baghdad, Diyala, and Ninevah governorates. The data, however, cover only a limited number of governorates, and largely areas where the main source of tension is Arab Sunni versus Arab Shi’ite. They do, however, reflect the fact that the primary pressure for relocation has Arab Shi’ite pressure on Arab Sunnis, particularly in Baghdad and Basra

• Figure Sixteen shows one of the most tragic aspects of the civil conflicts in Iraq. The vast majority of Iraqis in all major cities and r governorates feel separation is bad, generally by margins of well over 90%. This is true regardless of whether the population is Arab Sunni, Arab Shi’ite, or Kurdish.

It is also important to note that all of these charts illustrate the extraordinary complexity of violence in Iraq. A focus concentrating on the insurgency, militias, fears of civil war, or sectarian and ethnic differences does not reflect the realities Iraqis perceive or the problems the US, its allies, and the Iraqi government face in dealing with local threats and perceptions. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 32

Figure Fourteen: Has the Separating of People Been Happening In Your Mahallah or Not? Has this been mainly forcible or mainly peaceful? – ABC Poll (August 2007)* Cities Governorates 100%

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10%

0% Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleyman . Irbil-Kurd National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed iyah-Kurd

Yes, has happened 17% 43% 45% 23% 39% 22% 20% 44% 16% 2% Mainly forcible-- 11% 27% 39% 15% 34% 15% 12% 28% 10% 1% Mainly voluntary- 5% 16% 6% 6% 5% 7% 6% 16% 6% 0% No, remains mixed 29% 24% 52% 52% 43% 40% 76% 43% 25% 61% 10% 1% 0% No, never has been mixed 54% 33% 3% 25% 100% 19% 60% 2% 37% 31% 23% 88% 99% 100%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 33

Figure Fifteen: Percentage of Iraqis reporting separation and forcible separation in Their Neighborhood– ABC Poll (August 2007)* Cities Governorates

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0% Suleyma Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah -Irbil . -niyah National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Kurd Kurd Yes, has happened 17% 43% 45% 23% 39% 22% 20% 44% 16% 2% Mainly forcible-- 11% 27% 39% 15% 34% 15% 12% 28% 10% 1%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 34

Figure Sixteen: Do you think the separation of people on sectarian lines is a good thing or a bad thing? – ABC Poll (August 2007)*

Cities Governorates

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0% Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleymani . Irbil-Kurd National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed yah-Kurd Good thing 2% 15% 4% 10% 1% 3% 5% 1% 12% Bad thing 98% 100% 85% 96% 100% 90% 98% 100% 97% 100% 100% 95% 99% 88% Don't Know 0% 0% 1% 0%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 35

Looking at Iraqi Divisions by City and Governorate: Iraqi Perceptions of Life, the Iraqi Government, and Iraqi Security Forces Iraqi perceptions of the overall conditions of life are necessarily mixed, and can be misleading. For example, other polls have shown that human beings rarely give way to despair and find ways to cope with major hardships. Simply asking people if they are optimistic about the future can sometimes produce useful trend analysis, but is not particularly useful as a measure of how serious anything but the most dire conditions really are.

• Figure Seventeen shows that when Iraqis are asked if their current lives are good or bad, the results are vary sharply by urban area and province. The results clearly show a correlation between “bad” and ongoing sectarian and ethnic violence, and that Shi’ite and Kurdish dominated areas have more favorable results than mixed areas. This is likely to be as influenced by the poor levels of governance, services, and employment in such areas as by the levels of violence per se.

• Figure Eighteen shows Iraqis have limited confidence in either the national government or local governments, although they are much more likely to have confidence in their local governments than the national government. Arab Shi’ites have mixed feelings about their local governments, but are more confident than most Iraqis in the national government (which is Shi’ite dominated) than Arab Sunnis or the population in mixed areas. Kurds seem to be confident in their local governments, but have mixed feelings about the national government. The data for Anbar, Diyala, and Dhi Qar almost certainly reflect the fact that Sunnis felt they had little reason to trust the national government, and only limited control over local governments in cities and governorates.

• Figure Nineteen shows that Iraqis retain more confidence in the army and police than in the government, and generally do not trust militias. These results do not apply in high conflict areas or areas with strong Sunni majorities. The more active the Iraqi forces are, the less they are trusted. As later figures show, at least some of the confidence in the Iraqi army and police also comes from the deep distrust Iraqis feel for both the militias and Coalition forces – the latter are the subject of deep Iraqi resentment and anger. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 36

Figure 17: Overall, how good would you say things are going in your life these days? (Iraqi responses in percent) – ABC Poll (August 2007)* Cities Governorates

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0% Suleyma Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah -Irbil . -niyah National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Kurd Kurd Net Good 39% 26% 60% 35% 0% 51% 56% 60% 35% 25% 18% 35% 31% 61% Net Bad 61% 74% 40% 63% 100% 49% 44% 40% 63% 75% 82% 65% 67% 39%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 37

Figure 18: Lack of Confidence in Iraqi National and Local Leaders (Iraqi “not confident”* responses in percent) – ABC Poll (August 2007)* Cities Governorates

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0% Suleyma Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah -Irbil . -niyah National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Kurd Kurd Natonal Government 61% 67% 24% 60% 100% 37% 49% 36% 62% 69% 84% 89% 32% 50% Local Leaders 53% 69% 29% 46% 77% 41% 48% 38% 45% 70% 91% 41% 25% 29%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. *Note: “Not Confident” is net of “not very much (confidence) / None” Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 38

Figure 19: Lack of Confidence in Iraqi Security Forces and Militias (Iraqis saying “not confident”* responses in percent) – ABC Poll (August 2007)* Cities Governorates

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0% Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleymani . Irbil-Kurd National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed yah-Kurd Iraqi Army 33% 55% 13% 15% 46% 23% 8% 12% 23% 57% 78% 39% 13% 31% Iraqi Police 32% 42% 22% 12% 57% 38% 21% 28% 18% 45% 76% 18% 4% 23% Local militias 68% 80% 72% 82% 100% 77% 60% 53% 86% 82% 93% 75% 6% 38%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August , 2007. *Note: “Not Confident” is net of “not very much (confidence) / None” Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 39

US and Coalition Forces One of the most striking aspects of public opinion polling in Iraq is the extent to which given groups of Iraqis see the US and Coalition forces as a threat, an enemy, illegitimate, or a danger to avoid. The US may see itself as a liberator, and many Iraqis -- particularly Kurds, do share this view. In broad terms, however, many other – if not most – Iraqis see US and Coalition forces as much of a threat as the insurgents and militias.

• Figure Twenty shows that nearly half of the Iraqis polled feel they have seen unnecessary violence by US and Coalition forces. It should be noted, however, that many Iraqis also report excessive use of force by the ISF and militias. These figures need to be kept in careful perspective. They reflect a poll taken before the impact of the “surge” could be translated into the conditions of ordinary life, and there seems to be a lag in Anbar in reflecting the impact of the Sunni tribal awakening and resistance to Al Qa’ida on local society as a whole.

Far more Iraqis have had active contact with US and Coalition forces carrying out actual operations or carrying out defensive road movements, checkpoint, and area security operations than have had contact with the Iraqi Army, Iraq police, or hostile forces like Al Qa’ida. Once again, Iraqis often cannot distinguish between US forces and security contractors – which often show little or no regard for the impact of their operations on Iraqi perceptions. Perceptions of the ISF tend to be significantly more negative in the Sunni and mixed areas where the ISF has conducted significant operations. In general, perceptions of militia use of unnecessary violence also depend heavily on how active the militias are in a given area. For example, perceptions of the militias are very negative in Basra even though this is a Shi’ite area and all militia and local security forces are Shi’ite.

The poll did not ask whether Iraqis saw violence by such movements as “unnecessary.” The survey almost certainly produces positive if Iraqis have had one bad encounter with Coalition forces over time, and Iraqis also may not distinguish between US and Coalition forces and contractor (PSD) security detachments which are notorious for their lack of responsibility and any concern for the reaction of Iraqi civilians.

• Figure Twenty-one shows, however, that Iraqis have little confidence in US and other Coalition forces almost regardless of Iraqi area, sect, or ethnicity. At the same time, the results in Figure Twenty-One are a warning that Iraqis do not see US and Coalition forces as effective or a source of security, with the partial exception of the Kurds. How much of this is based on unfair expectations regarding security, and how much is based on feelings such forces are occupiers and the product of an unjust war – versus their actual performance – is a matter of speculation. It is also quite possible that such negatives are again based on a tendency to generalize from the worst personal experience or perception. The fact remains, however, that these results are deeply disturbing.

• Figure Twenty-two provides a more qualified picture of how negative Iraqi perceptions are of US and Coalition forces. It shows that Kurds and Shi’ites outside combat areas are less likely than Sunnis and Shi’ites in high combat/threat areas to say that US and Coalition forces have done a “very bad” versus a “bad” job. Once again, however, these figures are deeply disturbing in terms of Iraqi popular perceptions of US forces and their role in Iraq. Unless they show a major shift over time as the tribal awakening and surge impact on the daily lives of Iraqis, they provide a strong indication that the US should seek to transfer operational contact with Iraqis to the ISF as soon as possible. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 40

• Figure Twenty-Three shows that Iraqis are more than angry at US and Coalition forces. Many actively support attacks on such forces. They are far less likely to support attacks on Iraqi Army and police forces. The overall level of hostility clearly cuts across regions and ethnic and sectarian lines. Support for attacks on US and Coalition forces often surpass 50% even in Shiite and some Kurdish areas. The first polls taken in 2003 shows that only about 37% of Sunnis and 11-12% of Shi’ites supported such attacks. The ABC and other polls have seen a steady rise in such hostility over time. It is not clear, however, how many Iraqis that say they support such attacks actually mean what they say, and only a small fraction are probably willing to participate. It should also be noted that the more “positive” data on Iraq Army and police forces are much less positive in the areas where Iraqi forces have been active in combat or actively caught in the middle of sectarian and ethnic violence.

• Figure Twenty-four shows that Iraqis initially had little faith in the new “surge strategy” when it was announced in early 2007. This reflects past performance, however, not actual experience with the new strategy and new US-ISF method of operations.

• Figure Twenty-five indicates that Iraqis do not translate their anger and hostility into demands for the instant departure of US and Coalition forces. Iraqis may not like US and Coalition forces, as almost half (47%) want such forces to “leave now.” However, a slim majority (53%) want the US to stay until the Iraqi forces are ready and/or the government is strong and security is restored. Virtually none want any form of lasting US presence, even in Kurdish areas.

There is nothing paradoxical about the fact that angry and hostile Iraqis wanting US and Coalition forces to stay. The preceding Figures have shown just how endemic perceptions of violence and fears of civil war are. Iraqis are realistic enough to recognize that US and Coalition forces are better than weakness or anarchy. This is reflected even in Sunni dominated areas like Anbar and mixed , high conflict areas like Diyala, and it seems likely that far more Sunnis in Anbar would want to US to stay until security is restored now that the population has a better understanding of the scale of the tribal awakening and US aid have begun to reach many areas. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 41

Figure Twenty: What kinds of unnecessary violence have you seen against Iraqi citizens? – ABC Poll (August 2007)

Cities Governorates 100%

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0% Total Baghdad Basra Kirku Anbar- Basrah- Dhi Qar- Babil- Tamim- Baghdad- Diyala- Ninewah- Suleyman . Irbil-Kurd National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed iyah-Kurd

by US or Coalition Forces 43% 49% 50% 52% 66% 50% 11% 33% 57% 50% 66% 67% 5% by the Iraqi Police 21% 45% 3% 20% 23% 8% 7% 15% 28% 46% 38% 6% by the Iraqi Army 19% 45% 8% 16% 27% 11% 7% 2% 22% 46% 39% 12% by Local Militia Forces 30% 44% 55% 37% 19% 57% 34% 36% 34% 44% 34% 37%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 42

Figure Twenty-One: Percent of Iraqis Expressing No Confidence in US, UK, or Iraqi Military or Security Force – ABC Poll (August 2007)*

Cities Governorates

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0% Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleymani . Irbil-Kurd National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed yah-Kurd US & UKForces 86% 99% 95% 87% 100% 87% 93% 66% 89% 99% 100% 78% 42% 55% Iraqi Army 33% 55% 13% 15% 46% 23% 8% 12% 23% 57% 78% 39% 13% 31% Iraqi Police 32% 42% 22% 12% 57% 38% 21% 28% 18% 45% 76% 18% 4% 23% Local Militias 68% 80% 72% 82% 100% 77% 60% 53% 86% 82% 93% 75% 6% 38%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 43

Figure Twenty-Two: Percent of Iraqis saying they feel the US and Coalition forces have done a good or bad* job of carrying out their responsibilities – ABC Poll (August 2007)* Cities Governorates

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0% Total Baghdad Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleymani Basra City . Irbil-Kurd National City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed yah-Kurd

Bad job 80% 100% 57% 79% 100% 61% 87% 53% 79% 100% 100% 77% 30% 51% Good Job 19% 0% 43% 21% 0% 39% 13% 47% 21% 0% 0% 23% 61% 47%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. *Note: “Good Job” = a combination of those reporting “good” and Very good.” “Bad Job” = a combination of those reporting “bad” and “very bad.” Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 44

Figure Twenty-Three: Percent of Iraqis saying attacks on Coalition and Iraqi Forces are acceptable – ABC Poll (August 2007)*

Cities Governorates

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0% Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleymani . Irbil-Kurd National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed yah-Kurd

On Coalition Forces 56% 60% 38% 67% 100% 32% 47% 45% 71% 61% 74% 70% 1% 6% On Iraqi Forces 7% 8% 4% 25% 3% 2% 3% 9% 39% 3% 4% 2%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 45

Figure Twenty-Four: Percentage of Iraqis saying that that bringing more US forces into Baghdad and Anbar will make security worse or have no effect (Iraqi responses in percent)– ABC Poll (March 2007)*

Cities Governorates

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0 Total Baghdad Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleymani Basra City All Other Irbil-Kurd National City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed yah-Kurd

No Effect 22 27 20 5 21 - 24 28 13 4 26 48 20 27 21 Worse 49 38 54 58 52 100 49 59 58 54 40 36 63 23 21

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/USA today/BBC/NHK poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand March, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 46

Figure Twenty-Five: Iraqi opinion of how long US and Other Occupation Forces Should Remain in Iraq* – ABC Poll (August 2007)**

Cities Governorates

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90% 80% 70% 60%

50% 40% 30% 20% 10%

0% Total Baghda Ninewa Suleym Baghda Basra Kirku All -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Diyala -Irbil Nationa -d -h -aniyah d City City City Other Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Kurd l Mixed Mixed Kurd

Never leave 0% 1% 2% Remain longer but leave eventually 2% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2% 4% 4% 11% Remain until Iraqi forces can operate independently 7% 5% 12% 14% 9% 3% 9% 11% 5% 7% 8% 8% 24% Remain until Iraqi government is stronger 10% 15% 16% 14% 22% 23% 14% 6% 9% 31% 19% Remain until security restored 34% 55% 16% 18% 24% 22% 45% 33% 18% 55% 43% 10% 48% 34% Leave now 47% 40% 52% 51% 76% 49% 29% 35% 55% 40% 45% 67% 9% 8%

*Note: 1% of Irbil Residents reported “Don’t Know.” **Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 47

Perceptions of Aid, the Economy, and Services One of the great tragedies of the US intervention in Iraq is that the US has obligated more than $38 billion in US and Iraqi funds in reconstruction efforts that produced little material support and left Iraqis deeply dissatisfied with the results. As the reports of the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) have shown, reporting by the State Department, USAID, and the Corps of Engineers that focuses on the amount of money spent, projects started, and buildings completed is essentially meaningless “spin,” and has nothing to do with the effectiveness of such aid. The same is true of gross macroeconomic statistics that do little more than measure the impact of rising world oil prices on export revenues and the gross volume of monetary transfers resulting from the war.

CSIS, USIP, and other have all proposed meaningful measures of effectiveness. So far, however, no US Department or Agency has provided reporting with any integrity or value aside from SIGIR.

The following poll results strongly suggest that new measures of effectiveness are absolutely critical for any major stability operation, nation building effort, or counterinsurgency campaign.

• Figure Twenty-Six shows that nearly 72% of the Iraqis polled feel reconstruction efforts in their area have been ineffective, very ineffective, or never took place. What is striking about these percentages is that there is a close correlation between the intensity with which Iraqis feeling aid was ineffective and Sunni or high combat areas. Dollars may be as important a weapon in counterinsurgency and stability operations as bullets, but Iraqis in the areas where military operations have been most important feel there has been little or no US aid activity. At the same time, the figures for Shi’ite-dominated and Kurdish areas are scarcely reassuring. The best results are miserable from a US perspective, and show that a massive aid program r failed to reach the Iraqi people in ways that influenced Iraqi opinion to anything like the level it should have produced.

• Figure Twenty-Seven shows that Iraqis almost universally rate basic economic and government services in electricity, water, and fuel as bad. Views do differ sharply as to how bad a given service is in a given city and governorate, but there is no area where Iraqis feel the government or US aid program has come close to meeting their needs. These perceptions again raise very serious questions about the effectiveness of US and other aid levels and the credibility of the national government, and the and quality of its governance. They also show the almost total lack of correlation between aid spending and project activity levels and the impact of aid efforts on how Iraqis see their lives and the impact of the aid effort upon them.

• Figure Twenty-Eight shows that Iraqis are much more divided over the quality of medical services and schools, but views of medical care are largely negative with few exceptions. Iraqi perceptions are that services only rise above minimal adequacy in the Shi’ite area in the Babylon and Dhi Qar governorate and the Kurdish governorates in Suleymaniyah and Irbil. As might be expected, perceptions are extremely negative in Sunni-dominated and high conflict areas. Like the previous results, these perceptions may also create added problems for political accommodation and reconciliation. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 48

Figure Twenty-Six: Percent of Iraqis saying the reconstruction efforts in their area have been ineffective or never effort took place – ABC Poll (August 2007)* Cities Governorates

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0% Suleyma Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah -Irbil -niyah National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed Kurd Kurd Ineffective 72% 100% 41% 71% 100% 51% 49% 42% 69% 100% 100% 61% 50% 50% Although needed, no effort took place 3% 2% 7% 3% 18%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 49

Figure Twenty-Seven: Percent of Iraqis rating Water, Electricity and Fuel services as “bad” – ABC Poll (August 2007)*

Cities Governorates

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0% Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleyman Irbil-Kurd National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed iyah-Kurd

Electricity supply 92% 100% 88% 88% 100% 93% 89% 91% 86% 100% 100% 92% 87% 92% Availability clean water 75% 100% 61% 75% 100% 58% 76% 67% 75% 100% 100% 56% 59% 28% Availability of Fuel 92% 100% 80% 88% 100% 88% 79% 85% 88% 100% 100% 88% 89% 90%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 50

Figure Twenty-Eight: Percent of Iraqis Rating Schools and the Availability of Medical Services as “bad” – ABC Poll (August 2007)*

Cities Governorates

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0% Total Baghdad Basra Kirku -Anbar -Basrah -Dhi Qar -Babil -Tamim -Baghdad -Diyala -Ninewah Suleymani Irbil-Kurd National City City City Sunni Shi'ite Shi'ite Shi'ite Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed yah-Kurd Medical care 67% 100% 40% 43% 100% 39% 40% 45% 51% 100% 94% 65% 36% 47% Schools 49% 81% 30% 38% 100% 30% 17% 28% 40% 81% 89% 19% 18% 25%

Source: ABC News Polling Unit, based on ABC/BBC/NHK Poll “Iraq, Where Things Stand, August, 2007. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 51

ABC/BBC/NHK Poll: Methodology and Survey Techniques

This survey was conducted for ABC News, the BBC and NHK by D3 Systems of Vienna, Va., and KA Research Ltd. of Istanbul, Turkey. Interviews were conducted in person, in Arabic or Kurdish, among a random national sample of 2,212 Iraqis aged 18 and older from Aug. 17 to Aug. 24, 2007.

Four-hundred-fifty-seven sampling points were distributed proportionate to population size in each of Iraq's 18 provinces, then in 101 of 102 districts within the provinces (excluding Sinjar district in Ninevah province, which was not accessible because of security concerns at the time of the survey), then by simple random sampling among Iraq's nearly 11,000 villages or neighborhoods, with urban/rural stratification at each stage.

Maps or grids were used to select random starting points within each sampling point, with household selection by random route/random interval and within-household selection by the "next-birthday" method. An average of five interviews were conducted per sampling point. Sixteen of the 457 sampling points were inaccessible for security reasons and were substituted with randomly selected replacements.

Interviews were conducted by 117 trained Iraqi interviewers with 30 supervisors. Sixty-nine percent of the interviews were supervised or reviewed by supervisors -- 44 percent by direct observation, 16 percent by revisits and nine percent by phone. All questionnaires were subject to further quality-control checks.

In addition to the national sample, oversamples were drawn in Anbar province, Sadr City, Basra city and Kirkuk city to allow for more reliable analysis in those areas. Population data came from 2005 estimates by the Iraq Ministry of Planning. The sample was weighted by sex, age, education, urban/rural status and population of province.

The survey had a contact rate of 93 percent and a cooperation rate of 65 percent for a net response rate of 60 percent. Including an estimated design effect of 1.51, the results have a margin of sampling error of 2.5 percentage points at the 95 percent confidence level. Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 52

Iraq surveys from other sources are difficult to compare; some ask religious doctrine different ways, often reporting significant numbers of Muslims of unspecified doctrine; some use different weights, including weighting to a predetermined assumption of distribution by religious doctrine. In the absence of other persuasive empirical data, this poll did not weight Iraqis' religious doctrine to any assumed target. 8

8 ABC News/BBC/NHK poll, August 2007. http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=3571535 Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 53

Statistical Tables

ABC NEWS/BBC/NHK POLL AUG. 17-24, 2007. MUST CREDIT ABC NEWS City Province Dhi Total Baghdad Basra Kirkuk Anbar Basra Tamim Babylon Baghdad Qar Diyala Nineveh Suleymaniyh Irbil Sample size 2212 430 98 99 199 171 123 110 491 109 105 189 127 103 Q1 Overall, How Would You Say things are Going in Your Life these Days? March NET GOOD 39% 22% 48% 48% 0% 46% 51% 51% 21% 68% 16% 29% 59% 73% NET BAD 61% 78% 52% 52% 100% 54% 49% 49% 79% 32% 84% 71% 41% 27% 9 Don't know August NET GOOD 39% 26% 60% 35% 0% 51% 35% 60% 25% 56% 18% 35% 31% 61% NET BAD 61% 74% 40% 63% 100% 49% 63% 40% 75% 44% 82% 65% 67% 39% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2% 2%

CHANGE IN GOOD 0% 3% 12% -13% 0% 5% -15% 9% 4% -12% 2% 6% -27% -11%

Q2 Expectation for How Things will be in Your Life One Yr From Now? March NET BETTER 42% 40% 73% 44% 0% 67% 46% 47% 38% 41% 19% 39% 55% 67% 3 About the same 22% 18% 6% 4% 35% 7% 6% 25% 20% 31% 23% 21% 20% 21% NET WORSE 36% 42% 20% 53% 65% 26% 49% 28% 42% 27% 58% 40% 25% 12% 9 Don't know August NET BETTER 29% 13% 64% 34% 0% 55% 31% 58% 13% 48% 11% 31% 26% 41% 3 About the same 32% 20% 24% 28% 34% 27% 30% 33% 19% 41% 41% 35% 25% 24% NET WORSE 39% 67% 11% 36% 66% 18% 37% 10% 68% 11% 48% 34% 46% 27% 9 Don't know 1% 2% 1% 1% 3% 8%

CHANGE IN BETTER -13% -27% -9% -10% 0% -12% -14% 11% -25% 6% -8% -8% -29% -25%

Q3 Single Biggest Problem Facing Your Life these Days? March 1 Lack of security/safety 12% 40% 27% 37% 24% 17% 11% 9% 4% 22% 8% 2 War/civil war/unrest 23% 22% 33% 16% 31% 22% 32% 20% 34% 12% 14% 33% 41% 3 Sectarian violence 32% 37% 9% 31% 19% 10% 29% 36% 37% 44% 13% 39% 26% 38% 4 Terrorist attacks 25% 42% 15% 4% 50% 15% 6% 9% 43% 8% 46% 30% 11% 9% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 54

5 Ethnic-religious tension/ Persecution/Discrimination 7% 4% 22% 31% 8% 19% 5% 2% 20% 13% 4% August 1 Lack of security/safety 17% 13% 14% 25% 33% 19% 25% 11% 13% 5% 27% 10% 4% 2% 2 War/civil war/unrest 4% 11% 5% 4% 3% 3% 3% 10% 1% 4% 7% 1% 1% 3 Sectarian violence 6% 7% 8% 10% 3% 5% 11% 23% 7% 5% 5% 3% 2% 4 Terrorist attacks 7% 7% 11% 8% 1% 11% 6% 22% 6% 1% 8% 10% 5% 2% 5 Ethnic-religious tension/ Persecution/Discrimination 4% 6% 2% 6% 3% 5% 7% 6% 1% 1% 5% 2% 2%

CHANGE IN SECURITY 5% 13% -27% -2% 33% -18% 1% -5% 13% -6% 17% 6% -18% -5%

Q4 Think Your Children will have a Better Life than You? March 1 Better 42% 41% 65% 35% 60% 34% 61% 39% 62% 21% 18% 40% 66% 2 Worse 37% 54% 33% 2% 73% 36% 6% 22% 56% 9% 57% 45% 33% 10% 3 About the same 21% 6% 2% 64% 27% 4% 60% 16% 5% 30% 22% 35% 26% 24% 9 Don't Know 0% 1% 1% 1% August 1 Better 33% 45% 57% 19% 47% 21% 65% 44% 47% 20% 11% 17% 29% 2 Worse 42% 46% 16% 47% 73% 22% 50% 20% 49% 17% 49% 57% 59% 42% 3 About the same 25% 8% 27% 34% 27% 31% 29% 15% 8% 36% 31% 32% 25% 27% 9 Don't Know 0% 2%

CHANGE IN BETTER -9% 5% -8% -16% 0% -13% -13% 4% 5% -15% -1% -8% -23% -36%

Q5 Overall, How Would You Say things are Going in Iraq these Days? March NET GOOD 35% 31% 46% 44% 0% 44% 46% 51% 30% 39% 19% 16% 70% 38% NET BAD 65% 69% 54% 56% 100% 56% 54% 48% 70% 61% 81% 84% 29% 62% 9 Don't know 0% 1% 1% August NET GOOD 22% 24% 32% 21% 0% 34% 21% 60% 24% 36% 10% 4% 22% 12% NET BAD 78% 76% 68% 77% 100% 66% 77% 40% 76% 64% 90% 96% 78% 88% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2%

CHANGE IN GOOD -13% -7% -14% -23% 0% -10% -24% 9% -6% -3% -9% -12% -48% -26%

Q6 Expectation for How Things will be in Our Country One Yr From Today? March NET BETTER 40% 39% 72% 41% 0% 67% 43% 58% 37% 63% 21% 20% 55% 44% 3 About the same 26% 0% 8% 34% 30% 11% 32% 32% 0% 31% 18% 44% 27% 46% NET WORSE 34% 61% 19% 25% 70% 22% 25% 9% 63% 6% 61% 36% 17% 9% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 55

9 Don't know 0% 0% 1% 1% August NET BETTER 23% 14% 66% 23% 0% 56% 22% 57% 13% 40% 11% 3% 24% 14% 3 About the same 35% 29% 26% 40% 39% 27% 34% 36% 28% 48% 53% 35% 28% 21% NET WORSE 42% 57% 8% 35% 61% 17% 42% 7% 59% 10% 36% 62% 48% 64% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 1% 2% 2%

CHANGE IN BETTER -17% -25% -7% -18% 0% -11% -20% -1% -24% -23% -10% -16% -31% -31%

Q7 Single Biggest Problem Facing Iraq As Whole? March 1 Lack of security/safety 22% 12% 35% 13% 35% 39% 15% 24% 12% 20% 32% 18% 1% 17% August 1 Lack of security/safety 23% 17% 35% 36% 34% 40% 38% 15% 18% 12% 45% 24% 9% 5%

CHANGE IN SECURITY 0% 5% 0% 23% -1% 1% 24% -9% 6% -8% 13% 6% 8% -12%

Q8 From Today's Perspective: Right/Wrong that US-Led Coalition Forces Invaded Iraq in Spring 2003? March NET RIGHT 48% 56% 41% 41% 0% 40% 43% 41% 53% 64% 16% 15% 94% 79% NET WRONG 52% 44% 59% 59% 100% 60% 57% 58% 47% 36% 84% 85% 6% 20% 9 Don't know 0% 1% 1% August NET RIGHT 37% 21% 57% 33% 0% 68% 26% 60% 21% 60% 6% 12% 82% 76% NET WRONG 63% 79% 43% 67% 100% 32% 74% 40% 79% 40% 94% 88% 17% 24% 9 Don't know 0% 1% 1%

CHANGE IN RIGHT -11% -35% 16% -8% 0% 28% -16% 20% -32% -5% -10% -3% -12% -2%

Q9a In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Security Situation March 1 Good 46% 20% 41% 25% 41% 31% 69% 19% 95% 19% 26% 98% 91% 2 Bad 54% 80% 59% 75% 100% 59% 69% 31% 81% 5% 81% 74% 2% 9% August 1 Good 43% 30% 21% 39% 31% 20% 75% 78% 42% 87% 91% 2 Bad 57% 100% 70% 79% 61% 69% 80% 25% 100% 22% 100% 58% 13% 9%

CHANGE IN GOOD -3% -20% -11% -4% 39% -10% -11% 5% -19% -17% -19% 16% -11% -1%

Q9b In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Availability Of Jobs March 1 Good 20% 15% 28% 31% 33% 31% 15% 15% 5% 18% 62% 54% 2 Bad 80% 85% 72% 69% 100% 67% 69% 85% 85% 95% 100% 82% 38% 46% 9 Don't know August 1 Good 21% 22% 24% 21% 23% 20% 16% 21% 8% 9% 15% 25% 62% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 56

2 Bad 79% 78% 76% 77% 100% 77% 78% 84% 79% 91% 91% 85% 75% 38% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2% 1%

CHANGE IN GOOD 0% 8% -4% -10% 0% -10% -11% 1% 7% 4% 9% -3% -38% 8%

Q9c In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Supply Of Electricity March 1 Good 12% 28% 27% 31% 28% 16% 36% 12% 21% 1% 2 Bad 88% 100% 72% 73% 100% 69% 72% 84% 100% 64% 100% 88% 79% 99% August 1 Good 8% 12% 12% 7% 14% 9% 11% 8% 13% 8% 2 Bad 92% 100% 88% 88% 100% 93% 86% 91% 100% 89% 100% 92% 87% 92%

CHANGE IN GOOD -5% 0% -16% -16% 0% -24% -14% -7% 0% -26% 0% -4% -8% 8%

Q9d In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Availability Of Clean Water March 1 Good 30% 31% 21% 34% 39% 40% 9% 44% 73% 63% 2 Bad 69% 100% 100% 69% 79% 100% 66% 61% 100% 60% 91% 56% 27% 37% 9 Don't know 0% 1% August 1 Good 25% 39% 25% 42% 25% 33% 24% 44% 41% 72% 2 Bad 75% 100% 61% 75% 100% 58% 75% 67% 100% 76% 100% 56% 59% 28% 9 Don't know

CHANGE IN GOOD -6% 0% 39% -6% -21% 42% -9% -6% 0% -16% -9% 1% -32% 9%

Q9e In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Availability Of Medical Care March 1 Good 31% 27% 28% 56% 40% 46% 75% 67% 2 Bad 69% 100% 100% 73% 100% 100% 72% 43% 100% 60% 100% 54% 25% 33% 9 Don't know 0% 1% August 1 Good 33% 60% 57% 61% 49% 55% 60% 6% 35% 64% 53% 2 Bad 67% 100% 40% 43% 100% 39% 51% 45% 100% 40% 94% 65% 36% 47% 9 Don't know 0%

CHANGE IN GOOD 2% 0% 60% 29% 0% 61% 21% -1% 0% 20% 6% -11% -12% -13%

Q9f In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Local Schools March 1 Good 43% 14% 67% 63% 67% 13% 82% 56% 87% 77% 2 Bad 57% 86% 100% 33% 100% 100% 37% 32% 87% 18% 100% 44% 13% 23% 9 Don't know 0% 1% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 57

August 1 Good 51% 19% 70% 62% 70% 60% 72% 19% 82% 11% 81% 82% 75% 2 Bad 49% 81% 30% 38% 100% 30% 40% 28% 81% 17% 89% 19% 18% 25% 9 Don't know 0% 1%

CHANGE IN GOOD 8% 5% 70% -6% 0% 70% -3% 5% 6% 0% 11% 25% -5% -2%

Q9g In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Local Gov't March 1 Good 43% 38% 41% 44% 40% 45% 53% 36% 46% 14% 35% 56% 85% 2 Bad 57% 62% 59% 56% 100% 60% 55% 47% 64% 54% 86% 65% 44% 15% August 1 Good 39% 21% 72% 51% 59% 50% 50% 21% 54% 9% 51% 65% 64% 2 Bad 61% 79% 28% 49% 100% 41% 50% 50% 79% 46% 91% 49% 35% 36%

CHANGE IN GOOD -4% -17% 31% 7% 0% 19% 5% -2% -15% 8% -5% 16% 10% -21%

Q9h In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Availability Of Basic Things Needed for HH March 1 Good 38% 43% 47% 34% 43% 43% 49% 71% 31% 50% 61% 47% 2 Bad 62% 100% 57% 53% 66% 57% 57% 51% 100% 29% 69% 50% 39% 53% August 1 Good 39% 56% 63% 28% 54% 58% 58% 64% 26% 64% 57% 55% 2 Bad 61% 100% 44% 37% 72% 46% 42% 42% 100% 36% 74% 36% 43% 45%

CHANGE IN GOOD 2% 0% 14% 16% -6% 12% 14% 9% 0% -7% -5% 14% -4% 8%

Q9i In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Your Family's Protection From Crime March 1 Good 40% 9% 41% 11% 41% 15% 37% 9% 88% 8% 32% 85% 88% 2 Bad 60% 91% 59% 89% 100% 59% 85% 63% 91% 12% 92% 68% 15% 12% 9 Don't know August 1 Good 35% 45% 34% 40% 36% 49% 90% 7% 24% 89% 85% 2 Bad 65% 100% 55% 64% 100% 60% 62% 51% 100% 10% 93% 76% 11% 15% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2%

CHANGE IN GOOD -5% -9% 3% 23% 0% -1% 22% 12% -9% 2% 0% -8% 4% -3%

Q9j In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Your Family's Econ Situation March 1 Good 36% 15% 14% 33% 18% 19% 35% 46% 14% 55% 21% 40% 69% 65% 2 Bad 64% 85% 86% 67% 82% 81% 65% 54% 86% 45% 79% 60% 31% 35% 9 Don't know August 1 Good 37% 15% 48% 49% 24% 42% 49% 45% 14% 52% 24% 41% 64% 64% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 58

2 Bad 63% 85% 52% 49% 76% 58% 49% 55% 86% 48% 76% 59% 36% 36% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2%

CHANGE IN GOOD 1% 0% 33% 16% 6% 23% 14% -2% 0% -3% 2% 1% -6% -1%

Q9k In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Availability Of Fuel For Cooking Or Driving March 1 Good 12% 49% 25% 47% 22% 19% 32% 18% 8% 10% 1% 2 Bad 88% 100% 51% 75% 100% 53% 78% 81% 100% 68% 82% 92% 90% 99% 9 Don't know August 1 Good 8% 20% 12% 12% 12% 15% 21% 12% 11% 10% 2 Bad 92% 100% 80% 88% 100% 88% 88% 85% 100% 79% 100% 88% 89% 90% 9 Don't know 0% 0% 0% 1%

CHANGE IN GOOD -3% 0% -29% -14% 0% -35% -10% -4% 0% -12% -18% 4% 1% 9%

Q9l In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Your Freedom Of Movement March 1 Good 25% 12% 11% 16% 16% 25% 88% 20% 81% 54% 2 Bad 75% 100% 88% 89% 100% 84% 84% 75% 100% 12% 100% 80% 19% 46% 9 Don't know August 1 Good 26% 25% 14% 24% 16% 34% 83% 14% 83% 69% 2 Bad 74% 100% 75% 86% 100% 76% 84% 66% 100% 17% 100% 86% 15% 31% 9 Don't know 0% 2%

CHANGE IN GOOD 1% 0% 13% 3% 0% 8% -1% 9% 0% -5% 0% -6% 2% 15%

Q9m In Your Village / Neighborhood, Rate: Your Freedom To Live Where You Wish w/o Persecution? March 1 Good 23% 17% 11% 21% 18% 21% 60% 20% 83% 52% 2 Bad 77% 100% 83% 89% 100% 79% 82% 79% 100% 40% 100% 80% 17% 47% 9 Don't know 0% 2% August 1 Good 23% 29% 16% 26% 17% 19% 69% 11% 77% 54% 2 Bad 77% 100% 71% 84% 100% 74% 83% 81% 100% 31% 100% 89% 21% 46% 9 Don't know 0% 2%

CHANGE IN GOOD -1% 0% 12% 5% 0% 5% -1% -3% 0% 8% 0% -9% -6% 3%

Q12 How Effective / Ineffective have Reconstruction Efforts been in Your Area Since the War of Spring 2003? March NET EFFECTIVE 33% 22% 7% 27% 0% 8% 34% 55% 21% 29% 9% 24% 84% 63% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 59

NET INEFFECTIVE 58% 54% 67% 67% 100% 70% 59% 44% 56% 62% 87% 66% 16% 36% 6 No reconstruction was needed in this area 1% 4% 3% 3% 7 Although necessary there have been no reconstruction efforts 9% 24% 26% 2% 22% 4% 2% 24% 9% 3% 8% 1%

9 Don't Know August NET EFFECTIVE 23% 0% 59% 18% 0% 49% 17% 58% 0% 43% 0% 13% 43% 50% NET INEFFECTIVE 72% 100% 41% 71% 100% 51% 69% 42% 100% 49% 100% 61% 50% 50% 6 No reconstruction was needed in this area 1% 10% 11% 1% 6% 1% 7 Although necessary there have been no reconstruction efforts 3% 2% 3% 7% 18%

9 Don't Know 1% 0% 0% 2% 7%

CHANGE IN EFFECTIVE -10% -22% 51% -10% 0% 41% -17% 3% -21% 14% -9% -11% -41% -13%

Q13 Which of the Following Structures do You Believe Iraq should have in the Future? March 1 One unified Iraq with a central government in Baghdad 58% 44% 31% 59% 100% 37% 65% 75% 47% 70% 80% 78% 22% 12% 2 Regional states with their own gov't & Baghdad federal gov't 28% 31% 46% 35% 44% 29% 18% 29% 25% 15% 16% 32% 59%

3 A country divided into separate independent states 14% 26% 23% 6% 19% 6% 6% 24% 5% 5% 7% 46% 27% 9 Don't know 0% 2% August 1 One unified Iraq with a central government in Baghdad 62% 54% 78% 67% 100% 76% 74% 64% 55% 69% 66% 82% 7% 5% 2 Regional states with their own gov't & Baghdad federal gov't 28% 46% 20% 23% 21% 18% 30% 45% 30% 34% 9% 25% 47%

3 A country divided into separate independent states 9% 2% 6% 3% 5% 6% 7% 67% 48% 9 Don't know 1% 4% 3% 1% 2%

CHANGE IN CENTRAL GOV 4% 10% 47% 8% 0% 39% 10% -11% 8% -1% -15% 5% -15% -7% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 60

Q14a Have Confidence in Iraqi Army? March 1 Confident 61% 32% 69% 89% 63% 87% 86% 31% 91% 20% 63% 88% 70% 2 Not confident 39% 68% 31% 11% 100% 37% 13% 14% 69% 9% 80% 37% 12% 30% August 1 Confident 67% 45% 87% 85% 54% 77% 77% 88% 43% 92% 22% 61% 87% 69% 2 Not confident 33% 55% 13% 15% 46% 23% 23% 12% 57% 8% 78% 39% 13% 31%

CHANGE IN CONFIDENT 6% 13% 19% -4% 54% 14% -9% 2% 12% 0% 2% -2% -1% -1%

Q14b Have Confidence in Police? March 1 Confident 64% 56% 69% 87% 62% 85% 63% 53% 89% 20% 72% 90% 70% 2 Not confident 36% 44% 31% 13% 100% 38% 15% 37% 47% 11% 80% 28% 10% 30% August 1 Confident 68% 58% 78% 88% 43% 62% 82% 72% 55% 79% 24% 82% 96% 77% 2 Not confident 32% 42% 22% 12% 57% 38% 18% 28% 45% 21% 76% 18% 4% 23%

CHANGE IN CONFIDENT 4% 2% 9% 1% 43% 0% -3% 9% 2% -10% 4% 9% 5% 7%

Q14c Have Confidence in US & UK Occupation Forces? March 1 Confident 18% 0% 40% 35% 23% 0% 13% 9% 20% 81% 45% 2 Not confident 82% 100% 100% 60% 100% 100% 65% 77% 100% 87% 91% 80% 19% 55% 9 Don't know 0% 1% August 1 Confident 14% 1% 5% 13% 13% 11% 34% 1% 7% 22% 58% 45% 2 Not confident 86% 99% 95% 87% 100% 87% 89% 66% 99% 93% 100% 78% 42% 55% 9 Don't know

CHANGE IN CONFIDENT -3% 0% 5% -27% 0% 13% -25% 11% 0% -7% -9% 2% -22% 0%

Q14d Have Confidence in Local Leaders in Your Community? March 1 Confident 45% 34% 51% 42% 48% 45% 47% 32% 45% 15% 47% 79% 84% 2 Not confident 55% 66% 49% 58% 100% 52% 55% 53% 68% 55% 85% 53% 21% 16% 9 Don't know August 1 Confident 46% 31% 71% 54% 23% 59% 55% 62% 30% 52% 9% 59% 74% 71% 2 Not confident 53% 69% 29% 46% 77% 41% 45% 38% 70% 48% 91% 41% 25% 29% 9 Don't know 0% 1%

CHANGE IN CONFIDENT 1% -3% 21% 12% 23% 11% 11% 15% -2% 7% -6% 12% -5% -13% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 61

Q14e Have Confidence in National Gov't of Iraq? March 1 Confident 49% 46% 51% 42% 48% 46% 49% 44% 68% 15% 30% 74% 75% 2 Not confident 51% 54% 49% 58% 100% 52% 54% 51% 56% 32% 85% 70% 26% 25% August 1 Confident 39% 33% 76% 40% 63% 38% 64% 31% 51% 16% 11% 68% 50% 2 Not confident 61% 67% 24% 60% 100% 37% 62% 36% 69% 49% 84% 89% 32% 50%

CHANGE IN CONFIDENT -10% -14% 25% -1% 0% 15% -8% 15% -12% -17% 0% -19% -6% -26%

Q14f Have Confidence in Local Militia in This Area? March 1 Confident 36% 66% 11% 25% 8% 29% 38% 64% 31% 3% 16% 11% 62% 2 Not confident 64% 34% 89% 75% 100% 92% 71% 62% 36% 69% 97% 84% 87% 38% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 1% August 1 Confident 24% 20% 28% 14% 23% 11% 47% 18% 40% 7% 24% 9% 62% 2 Not confident 68% 80% 72% 82% 100% 77% 86% 53% 82% 60% 93% 75% 6% 38% 9 Don't know 8% 4% 3% 1% 86%

CHANGE IN CONFIDENT -12% -47% 17% -12% 0% 15% -19% 9% -46% 9% 4% 8% -2% 1%

Q14g Have Confidence in Local Teachers? March 1 Confident 71% 58% 60% 80% 52% 61% 76% 81% 58% 82% 61% 74% 86% 89% 2 Not confident 29% 42% 40% 20% 48% 39% 24% 19% 42% 17% 39% 26% 14% 10% 9 Don't know 0% 1% 1% August 1 Confident 74% 70% 86% 84% 50% 92% 83% 92% 69% 83% 61% 69% 88% 71% 2 Not confident 26% 30% 14% 16% 50% 8% 17% 8% 31% 14% 39% 30% 11% 27% 9 Don't know 0% 3% 0% 1% 2%

CHANGE IN CONFIDENT 3% 12% 26% 4% -2% 30% 7% 11% 11% 1% 0% -5% 3% -17%

Q15 How do You Feel about the Way in which the Current Nat'l Govt of Iraq has Carried out Its Responsibilities? Has it Done... March NET GOOD 46% 38% 52% 43% 0% 53% 46% 60% 36% 67% 15% 28% 77% 64% NET BAD 54% 63% 48% 57% 100% 47% 54% 40% 64% 33% 85% 72% 23% 34% 9 Don't know 0% 2% August NET GOOD 35% 26% 60% 27% 0% 52% 27% 60% 26% 55% 16% 13% 59% 38% NET BAD 65% 74% 40% 73% 100% 48% 73% 40% 74% 45% 84% 88% 37% 62% 9 Don't know 0% 4%

CHANGE IN GOOD -12% -11% 8% -16% 0% -1% -18% 0% -10% -13% 1% -15% -18% -26% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 62

Q16 Approve / Disapprove of the Way Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki Is Handling his Job as Prime Minister? March 1 Approve 43% 31% 41% 35% 40% 39% 58% 30% 76% 8% 17% 57% 69% 2 Disapprove 57% 69% 59% 65% 100% 60% 61% 42% 70% 24% 92% 83% 43% 31% 9 Don't know 0% 0% August 1 Approve 33% 24% 63% 24% 52% 23% 62% 24% 59% 12% 10% 26% 45% 2 Disapprove 66% 76% 37% 75% 100% 48% 75% 38% 76% 40% 88% 89% 72% 54% 9 Don't know 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 2% 1%

CHANGE IN APPROVE -10% -7% 22% -11% 0% 12% -16% 4% -6% -17% 5% -7% -31% -24%

Q17 Members of Nat'l Assembly are Willing / Not Willing to Make Compromises to Bring Peace & Security to Ctry? March 1 Willing 41% 31% 39% 47% 33% 51% 59% 30% 72% 8% 37% 67% 47% 2 Not willing 58% 69% 61% 53% 100% 67% 49% 39% 70% 28% 92% 62% 29% 50% 9 Don't know 1% 2% 1% 4% 3% August 1 Willing 50% 72% 66% 48% 18% 60% 45% 54% 69% 53% 40% 43% 37% 66% 2 Not willing 48% 28% 34% 46% 82% 39% 50% 46% 31% 45% 60% 57% 54% 29% 9 Don't know 2% 6% 1% 5% 2% 9% 5%

CHANGE IN WILLING 9% 40% 27% 1% 18% 28% -5% -5% 39% -19% 33% 6% -30% 18%

Q18 Since War, How have the US and Other Coalition Forces Carried Out their Responsibilities in Iraq? Have the Done... March NET GOOD 23% 0% 0% 43% 0% 0% 46% 37% 0% 28% 0% 20% 84% 63% NET BAD 77% 100% 100% 57% 100% 100% 54% 63% 100% 72% 100% 80% 16% 37% 9 Don't know August NET GOOD 19% 0% 43% 21% 0% 39% 21% 47% 0% 13% 0% 23% 61% 47% NET BAD 80% 100% 57% 79% 100% 61% 79% 53% 100% 87% 100% 77% 30% 51% 9 Don't know 1% 0% 0% 8% 3%

CHANGE IN GOOD -4% 0% 43% -21% 0% 39% -24% 10% 0% -14% 0% 3% -23% -17%

Q19 Do You Support / Oppose the Presence Of Coalition Forces in Iraq? March NET SUPPORT 22% 0% 0% 41% 0% 0% 43% 32% 0% 22% 7% 23% 88% 62% NET OPPOSE 78% 100% 100% 59% 100% 100% 57% 68% 100% 78% 93% 77% 12% 37% 9 Don't know 0% 1% August NET SUPPORT 21% 0% 33% 21% 0% 33% 17% 42% 0% 18% 0% 23% 72% 76% NET OPPOSE 79% 100% 67% 77% 100% 67% 82% 58% 100% 82% 100% 77% 25% 24% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 63

9 Don't know 0% 2% 2% 3%

CHANGE IN SUPPORT -2% 0% 33% -20% 0% 33% -26% 10% 0% -4% -7% 0% -16% 15%

Q21 How Long Should US & Other Coalition Forces Remain in Iraq? March 1 Leave now 35% 36% 18% 53% 49% 17% 51% 31% 36% 37% 28% 57% 12% 15% 2 Remain until security is restored 38% 45% 56% 29% 51% 58% 30% 41% 45% 31% 55% 19% 30% 20% 3 Remain until the Iraqi government is stronger 14% 9% 26% 11% 25% 13% 22% 9% 18% 11% 12% 25% 26% 4 Remain until the Iraqi forces can operate independently 11% 11% 5% 4% 6% 10% 13% 5% 9% 27% 26% 5 Remain longer but leave eventually 2% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 7% 9%

6 Never leave 1% 1% 4% 9 Don't know 0% 1% August 1 Leave now 47% 40% 52% 51% 76% 49% 55% 35% 40% 29% 45% 67% 9% 8% 2 Remain until security is restored 34% 55% 16% 18% 24% 22% 18% 33% 55% 45% 43% 10% 48% 34% 3 Remain until the Iraqi government is stronger 10% 15% 16% 14% 14% 23% 22% 6% 9% 31% 19% 4 Remain until the Iraqi forces can operate independently 7% 5% 12% 14% 9% 11% 9% 5% 3% 7% 8% 8% 24% 5 Remain longer but leave eventually 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 4% 4% 11%

6 Never leave 0% 1% 2% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 4% 0% 2%

CHANGE IN LEAVE NOW 12% 4% 34% -2% 27% 32% 5% 4% 4% -8% 17% 10% -3% -6%

Q22 Is Presence of US forces in Iraq Making Security in Ctry Better / Worse / or Having No Effect? March 1 Better 21% 19% 40% 19% 43% 32% 18% 12% 14% 71% 59% 2 Worse 69% 100% 81% 53% 100% 81% 51% 52% 100% 54% 88% 69% 13% 22% 3 No effect 10% 0% 7% 6% 16% 0% 28% 16% 16% 19% 9 Don't Know 0% August 1 Better 18% 34% 12% 40% 12% 45% 13% 16% 51% 63% 2 Worse 73% 100% 60% 69% 100% 54% 69% 40% 100% 55% 100% 75% 31% 17% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 64

3 No effect 9% 6% 19% 6% 18% 15% 32% 9% 13% 20% 9 Don't Know 0% 5%

CHANGE IN BETTER -3% 0% 15% -28% 0% 21% -31% 13% 0% -5% -12% 2% -20% 4%

Q23a Acceptable or Not Acceptable: Attacks On Coalition Forces March 1 Acceptable 51% 50% 42% 60% 100% 44% 57% 55% 53% 48% 69% 66% 3% 9% 2 Not acceptable 49% 50% 58% 40% 56% 43% 45% 47% 52% 31% 34% 97% 91% 9 Don't know 0% August 1 Acceptable 56% 60% 38% 67% 100% 32% 71% 45% 61% 47% 74% 70% 1% 6% 2 Not acceptable 43% 40% 62% 31% 68% 28% 55% 39% 53% 26% 30% 99% 94% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2% 0%

CHANGE IN ACCEPT 5% 10% -4% 7% 0% -11% 13% -10% 9% -1% 5% 4% -2% -4%

Q23b Acceptable or Not Acceptable: Attacks On Iraqi Gov't Forces March 1 Acceptable 12% 23% 4% 31% 29% 5% 25% 1% 25% 17% 16% 1% 2 Not acceptable 88% 77% 96% 69% 71% 95% 75% 99% 75% 100% 83% 84% 99% 100% 9 Don't know August 1 Acceptable 7% 8% 4% 25% 3% 2% 9% 3% 39% 3% 4% 2% 2 Not acceptable 93% 92% 100% 94% 75% 100% 95% 98% 91% 98% 61% 96% 96% 98% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2% 1%

CHANGE IN ACCEPT -5% -15% -4% -27% -4% -5% -22% 1% -17% 3% 22% -13% 4% 2%

Q24 How Safe Do You Feel in Your Neighborhood? March 1 Very safe 26% 13% 13% 28% 69% 13% 86% 66% 2 Not very safe 41% 16% 49% 53% 62% 49% 50% 62% 17% 31% 63% 62% 12% 33% 3 Not safe at all 33% 84% 51% 35% 38% 51% 37% 10% 83% 37% 25% 2% 1% 9 Don't know 0% August 1 Very safe 26% 3% 8% 2% 9% 38% 37% 18% 94% 68% 2 Not very safe 47% 42% 57% 75% 56% 40% 71% 59% 42% 57% 39% 59% 6% 31% 3 Not safe at all 28% 58% 39% 15% 44% 58% 18% 3% 58% 6% 61% 23% 1% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2%

CHANGE IN VERY SAFE 0% 0% 3% -5% 0% 2% -4% 10% 0% -32% 0% 5% 8% 2% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 65

Q25a Have Car Bombs or Suicide Attacks Occurred Nearby Here? March HAS 32% 52% 14% 78% 37% 14% 78% 34% 52% 1% 20% 58% 7% HAS NOT 68% 48% 86% 22% 63% 86% 22% 66% 48% 99% 80% 42% 100% 93% 9 Don't know 0% August HAS 42% 52% 65% 75% 42% 59% 63% 56% 52% 2% 48% 79% 4% 25% HAS NOT 58% 48% 35% 23% 58% 41% 35% 44% 48% 98% 52% 21% 96% 75% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2%

CHANGE IN OCCURRED 10% 0% 51% -3% 6% 45% -15% 21% 0% 2% 29% 21% 4% 18%

Q25b Have Snipers or Crossfire Occurred Nearby Here? March HAS 30% 56% 29% 16% 30% 27% 25% 20% 56% 27% 31% 39% 1% HAS NOT 70% 44% 71% 84% 70% 73% 75% 80% 44% 73% 69% 61% 100% 98% 9 Don't know 0% 1% August HAS 30% 43% 20% 21% 27% 14% 30% 6% 44% 50% 37% 71% HAS NOT 69% 57% 80% 77% 73% 86% 68% 94% 56% 50% 63% 29% 100% 100% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2% 1%

CHANGE IN OCCURRED 1% -13% -10% 5% -4% -13% 5% -15% -12% 23% 6% 32% 0% -1%

Q25c Has Fighting Among Sectarian Factions Occurred Nearby Here? March HAS 25% 49% 18% 16% 18% 19% 43% 50% 14% 24% 29% 3% HAS NOT 75% 51% 82% 84% 100% 82% 81% 57% 50% 86% 76% 70% 100% 97% 9 Don't know 0% 1% August HAS 28% 53% 54% 37% 27% 56% 38% 12% 54% 4% 34% 32% HAS NOT 72% 47% 46% 59% 73% 44% 58% 88% 46% 96% 66% 68% 100% 100% 9 Don't know 0% 4% 3%

CHANGE IN OCCURRED 3% 4% 36% 21% 27% 37% 19% -30% 4% -10% 11% 4% 0% -3%

Q25d Have Kidnappings for Ransom Occurred Nearby Here? March HAS 40% 58% 13% 73% 23% 11% 76% 67% 58% 34% 26% 50% 3% 7% HAS NOT 60% 42% 87% 27% 77% 89% 24% 33% 42% 66% 74% 49% 97% 92% 9 Don't know 0% 1% 1% August HAS 41% 44% 67% 81% 23% 79% 83% 67% 44% 14% 27% 63% 2% 2% HAS NOT 59% 56% 33% 17% 77% 21% 15% 33% 56% 86% 73% 38% 98% 98% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 66

CHANGE IN OCCURRED 1% -14% 54% 8% 0% 68% 7% 0% -13% -20% 1% 13% -1% -5%

Q25e Has Fighting between Iraqi Government and Anti-Government Forces Occurred Nearby Here? March HAS 34% 57% 29% 18% 29% 32% 26% 37% 55% 29% 27% 38% 3% HAS NOT 66% 43% 71% 82% 71% 68% 74% 63% 45% 71% 73% 61% 100% 97% 9 Don't know 0% 0% August HAS 34% 56% 32% 48% 22% 30% 53% 34% 55% 49% 34% 17% 4% HAS NOT 65% 44% 68% 46% 78% 70% 42% 66% 45% 50% 66% 83% 96% 100% 9 Don't know 1% 6% 5% 2%

CHANGE IN OCCURRED 0% -1% 3% 30% -7% -1% 27% -3% 0% 20% 7% -21% 4% -3%

Q25f Has Unnecessary Violence Against Citizens by US or Coalition Forces Occurred Nearby Here? March HAS 44% 59% 60% 55% 69% 59% 53% 52% 60% 27% 47% 48% 3% 17% HAS NOT 55% 41% 40% 45% 31% 41% 47% 48% 40% 73% 53% 49% 97% 83% 9 Don't know 0% 3% August HAS 43% 49% 50% 52% 66% 50% 57% 33% 50% 11% 66% 67% 5% HAS NOT 57% 51% 50% 46% 34% 50% 41% 67% 50% 89% 34% 33% 100% 95% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2%

CHANGE IN OCCURRED -1% -10% -10% -3% -3% -9% 4% -20% -10% -16% 19% 19% -3% -12%

Q25g Has Unnecessary Violence Against Citizens by the Iraqi Police Occurred Nearby Here? March HAS 24% 44% 12% 18% 30% 15% 18% 23% 47% 5% 27% 25% 1% 2% HAS NOT 76% 56% 88% 82% 70% 85% 82% 77% 53% 95% 73% 73% 99% 98% 9 Don't know 0% 2% August HAS 21% 45% 3% 20% 23% 8% 28% 15% 46% 7% 38% 6% HAS NOT 79% 55% 97% 76% 77% 92% 69% 85% 54% 93% 62% 94% 100% 100% 9 Don't know 0% 4% 3%

CHANGE IN OCCURRED -3% 1% -9% 1% -7% -7% 10% -8% -2% 2% 11% -20% -1% -2%

Q25h Has Unnecessary Violence Against Citizens by the Iraqi Army Occurred Nearby Here? March HAS 24% 44% 11% 16% 41% 15% 16% 19% 47% 2% 25% 26% HAS NOT 76% 56% 89% 84% 59% 85% 84% 81% 53% 98% 75% 70% 100% 100% 9 Don't know 0% 3% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 67

August HAS 19% 45% 8% 16% 27% 11% 22% 2% 46% 7% 39% 12% HAS NOT 81% 55% 92% 80% 73% 89% 75% 98% 54% 93% 61% 88% 100% 100% 9 Don't know 0% 4% 3%

CHANGE IN OCCURRED -5% 1% -3% 0% -14% -4% 6% -17% -1% 5% 14% -15% 0% 0%

Q25i Has Unnecessary Violence Against Citizens by Local Militia Forces Occurred Nearby Here? March HAS 31% 44% 23% 16% 18% 24% 16% 43% 47% 37% 42% 35% 1% 5% HAS NOT 69% 56% 77% 84% 82% 76% 84% 57% 53% 63% 58% 64% 99% 95% 9 Don't know 0% 1% August HAS 30% 44% 55% 37% 19% 57% 34% 36% 44% 34% 34% 37% HAS NOT 70% 56% 45% 59% 81% 43% 63% 64% 56% 66% 66% 62% 100% 100% 9 Don't know 0% 4% 3% 1%

CHANGE IN OCCURRED 0% 1% 31% 21% 1% 32% 17% -6% -3% -3% -7% 2% -1% -5%

Q27 Who Do You Blame The Most For The Violence That Is Occurring In The Country? March 1 The United States/coalition forces 31% 22% 48% 22% 65% 48% 22% 28% 22% 30% 57% 27% 3% 16%

2 President Bush 9% 12% 11% 9% 9% 12% 12% 2% 3% 14% 1% 4% 3 The Iraqi government 8% 6% 7% 16% 17% 12% 13% 6% 6% 3% 17% 11% 2% 6% 4 The Iraqi army 1% 3% 0% 1% 3% 1% 1% 2% 5 Iraqi police 1% 3% 1% 3% 1% 2% 6 Sunni militias/leaders 5% 8% 8% 8% 6% 1% 6% 8% 7 Shia militias/leaders 6% 7% 22% 19% 2% 8% 11% 12% 14% 8 Sectarian disputes 8% 11% 7% 10% 6% 11% 14% 9% 12% 14% 9 Al-Qaeda/foreign jihads 18% 8% 26% 7% 22% 10% 36% 8% 40% 12% 8% 37% 22% 10 Common criminals 6% 13% 6% 5% 5% 6% 1% 13% 3% 7% 3% 12% 2% 11 Iran 7% 6% 1% 20% 9% 1% 19% 2% 7% 1% 4% 13% 9% 10% 12 Neighboring Countries 0% 0% 5% 1% August 1 The United States/coalition forces 19% 11% 27% 24% 20% 24% 25% 24% 11% 28% 18% 19% 1% 5%

2 President Bush 8% 7% 4% 6% 25% 2% 5% 4% 8% 1% 16% 10% 3% 3 The Iraqi government 9% 8% 5% 4% 16% 16% 3% 8% 9% 8% 14% 19% 1% 8% 4 The Iraqi army 2% 5% 2% 2% 5% 7% 2% 1% 4% 5 Iraqi police 2% 5% 0% 0% 5% 8% 1% 4% 6 Sunni militias/leaders 6% 11% 5% 0% 4% 0% 4% 11% 7% 2% 2% 9% 8% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 68

7 Shia militias/leaders 7% 8% 2% 6% 22% 1% 8% 8% 10% 10% 7% 14% 8 Sectarian disputes 5% 4% 8% 14% 6% 15% 6% 4% 4% 3% 6% 4% 7% 9 Al-Qaeda/foreign jihads 21% 16% 28% 20% 28% 18% 44% 15% 31% 12% 9% 31% 21% 10 Common criminals 4% 7% 4% 4% 2% 3% 2% 7% 8% 3% 1% 2% 4% 11 Iran 11% 5% 18% 20% 16% 15% 22% 7% 6% 5% 7% 17% 18% 11% 12 Neighboring Countries 0% 2% 2%

CHANGE IN US -12% -11% -21% 2% -45% -24% 3% -5% -12% -2% -39% -9% -2% -11%

Q29 Who Do You Feel is Most in Command of Security in This Area at This Time? March 1 The Iraqi police 41% 24% 28% 22% 16% 30% 22% 54% 22% 66% 14% 36% 63% 45% 2 The Iraqi army 23% 17% 41% 2% 12% 41% 6% 43% 16% 27% 29% 22% 28% 13% 3 Coalition forces 12% 28% 11% 22% 10% 19% 2% 31% 2% 3% 11% 5% 13% 4 Local militia 9% 16% 20% 19% 1% 2% 15% 5% 8% 1% 29% 5 Other extra-legal armed forces 10% 16% 73% 1% 16% 32% 6% 6 No one is in command of security here 5% 55% 50% 11% 18% 8 Refused 9 Don't know 1% 12% 1% August 1 The Iraqi police 46% 29% 20% 48% 36% 21% 42% 30% 27% 66% 9% 67% 64% 47% 2 The Iraqi army 26% 21% 53% 27% 49% 49% 29% 53% 20% 22% 34% 11% 29% 14% 3 Coalition forces 3% 13% 8% 8% 6% 1% 7% 31% 4 Local militia 6% 9% 6% 2% 9% 2% 15% 8% 8% 4% 1% 8% 5 Other extra-legal armed forces 2% 5% 1% 2% 1% 5% 1% 17% 0% 6 No one is in command of security here 16% 36% 2% 15% 15% 6% 20% 1% 39% 36% 21%

8 Refused 0% 9 Don't know 1% 6% 0% 6% 0% 2%

CHANGE IN NO ONE 11% 36% 2% -39% 15% 6% -30% 1% 39% 0% 25% 2% 0% 0%

Q30 Has This Separating of People Been Happening in this Mahallah or Not? March 1 Yes it has happened 14% 34% 7% 18% 10% 16% 17% 36% 15% 21% 3% 2 No, this mahallah has been mixed and remains so 38% 49% 66% 36% 60% 31% 83% 49% 43% 52% 33% 12% 1% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 69

3 No, this mahallah has never been mixed 48% 16% 27% 45% 100% 30% 52% 15% 57% 33% 46% 82% 99%

9 Don't know 0% 0% 3% August 1 Yes it has happened 17% 43% 45% 23% 39% 20% 22% 44% 16% 2% 2 No, this mahallah has been mixed and remains so 29% 24% 52% 52% 43% 43% 76% 25% 40% 61% 10% 1% 3 No, this mahallah has never been mixed 54% 33% 3% 25% 100% 19% 37% 2% 31% 60% 23% 88% 99% 100% 9 Don't know

CHANGE IN YES 2% 8% 38% 5% 0% 29% 4% 5% 8% 0% 1% -19% -3% 0%

Q31 Has This Movement of People Been Mainly Forcible or Mainly Voluntary? March 1 Mainly forcible 12% 31% 6% 5% 9% 4% 10% 32% 11% 18% 1% 2 Mainly voluntary 3% 4% 1% 13% 1% 12% 7% 4% 3% 3% 3% 7 Not asked 86% 66% 93% 82% 100% 90% 84% 83% 64% 100% 85% 79% 96% 100% 9 Don't know August 1 Mainly forcible 11% 27% 39% 15% 34% 12% 15% 28% 10% 1% 2 Mainly voluntary 5% 16% 6% 6% 5% 6% 7% 16% 6% 0% 7 Not asked 83% 57% 55% 77% 100% 61% 80% 78% 56% 100% 85% 98% 100% 100% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2%

CHANGE IN FORCIBLE 0% -4% 33% 10% 0% 25% 8% 5% -4% 0% -1% -16% -1% 0%

Q32 Do You Think Separation of People on Sectarian Lines is a Good Thing or a Bad Thing for Iraq? March 1 Good thing 6% 7% 2% 4% 1% 7% 1% 3% 41% 17% 2 Bad thing 94% 93% 100% 98% 100% 100% 96% 99% 93% 99% 100% 97% 58% 83% 9 Don't know 0% 1% August 1 Good thing 2% 15% 4% 10% 3% 1% 5% 1% 12% 2 Bad thing 98% 100% 85% 96% 100% 90% 97% 100% 100% 98% 100% 95% 99% 88% 9 Don't know 0% 0% 0% 1%

CHANGE IN GOOD THING -4% -7% 15% 2% 0% 10% -1% -1% -7% 0% 0% 2% -40% -5%

Q33a Do You Think That Syria is Actively Engaged in Encouraging Sectarian Violence? March 1 Yes actively engaged 66% 51% 89% 69% 36% 84% 68% 74% 49% 80% 46% 46% 80% 97% 2 No not actively engaged 34% 49% 11% 31% 64% 16% 32% 26% 51% 20% 54% 53% 20% 3% Cordesman: Iraqi Attitudes by City and Region 10/19/07 Page 70

9 Don't know 0% 0% August 1 Yes actively engaged 66% 73% 80% 56% 24% 82% 51% 88% 71% 43% 46% 31% 98% 94% 2 No not actively engaged 34% 27% 20% 44% 76% 18% 49% 12% 29% 57% 54% 68% 2% 5% 9 Don't know 0% 0% 1%

CHANGE IN YES 0% 22% -9% -13% -12% -3% -17% 13% 22% -36% 0% -15% 18% -3%

Q33b Do You Think That Iran is Actively Engaged in Encouraging Sectarian Violence? March 1 Yes actively engaged 71% 64% 27% 95% 100% 33% 91% 61% 66% 56% 79% 86% 82% 93% 2 No not actively engaged 29% 36% 73% 5% 67% 9% 36% 34% 43% 21% 14% 18% 7% 9 Don't know 0% 4% 1% August 1 Yes actively engaged 79% 68% 70% 89% 100% 72% 91% 75% 70% 52% 81% 88% 98% 98% 2 No not actively engaged 21% 32% 30% 9% 28% 8% 25% 30% 48% 19% 10% 2% 1% 9 Don't know 0% 2% 2% 1% 1%

CHANGE IN YES 8% 4% 43% -6% 0% 39% 0% 14% 4% -5% 2% 2% 16% 5%

Q33c Do You Think That Saudi Arabia Actively Engaged in Encouraging Sectarian Violence? March 1 Yes actively engaged 56% 57% 89% 25% 86% 25% 79% 53% 88% 30% 37% 39% 48% 2 No not actively engaged 44% 43% 11% 75% 100% 14% 75% 21% 47% 13% 70% 63% 58% 51% 9 Don't know 0% 3% 1% August 1 Yes actively engaged 65% 73% 76% 44% 14% 80% 44% 80% 70% 74% 46% 43% 90% 50% 2 No not actively engaged 34% 27% 24% 56% 86% 20% 56% 20% 30% 26% 54% 54% 9% 45% 9 Don't know 1% 3% 1% 5%

CHANGE IN YES 10% 16% -13% 19% 14% -6% 19% 1% 17% -14% 16% 5% 51% 2%