This article was downloaded by: [Universita degli Studi di Siena] On: 09 May 2013, At: 07:25 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Modern Italian Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rmis20 Was there a revolution? The function of penal law in fascist and in Lutz Klinkhammer a a German Historical Institute, Rome Published online: 27 May 2010.

To cite this article: Lutz Klinkhammer (2010): Was there a fascist revolution? The function of penal law in fascist Italy and in Nazi Germany, Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 15:3, 390-409 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13545711003768592

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub- licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. Journal of Modern Italian Studies 15(3) 2010: 390–409

Was there a fascist revolution? The function of penal law in fascist Italy and in Nazi Germany

Lutz Klinkhammer German Historical Institute, Rome

Abstract Did the fascist seizure of power cause a revolutionary change in the administration of justice in Italy? Did the fascist transform the judicial institutions it inherited from liberal Italy? During the early phase of seizure of power (1923–1926), the fascist regime deployed existing instruments to influence judges and prosecutors by means of Ministerial instructions, threats of disciplinary measures or denial of career advancement. The first major innovation came with the creation of a Special Tribunal for Crimes Against the State in 1926, to punish anti-fascist activities and opinions. Although there is still a great deal of research to be done on the working of the ordinary courts, there is considerable evidence that both the courts and the magistrates were subject to an effective process of ‘fascistization’ and recent studies illustrate how the ordinary administration of justice provided an effective support mechanism for the more overt apparatus of repression carried out by the police, the fascist militia and, in the case of the occupied or annexed territories, the army. Although there were many striking similarities with Nazi policies, especially when it came to the working of the Special Courts, the fascist dictatorship was always less radical than its German equivalent and the differences became increasingly evident after 1939. Keywords , Italy, justice, repression, , Second World War.

Did the ‘fascist revolution’ lead to a revolutionary organization of justice? To what extent was the administration of justice ‘fascistized’? Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 The day of the so-called ‘’, 28 October, 1922, was later celebrated as a major revolutionary event by Italian fascists. Especially in the years after the regime’s tenth anniversary in 1932, the date marked the most important festivity in the new fascist calendar and a key instrument of fascist self-representation. In reality, the ‘March on Rome’ was in military terms little more than a well calculated bluff, but the fascists’ threat to use military violence if necessary to enter Rome had worked well: the crisis led the king, Victor Emanuel III, to adopt a legal procedure to appoint Mussolini as prime minister.

Journal of Modern Italian Studies ISSN 1354-571X print/ISSN 1469-9583 online ª 2010 Taylor & Francis http://www.informaworld.com DOI: 10.1080/13545711003768592 Was there a fascist revolution?

Mussolini was received by the king not at the head of his ‘victorious’ fascist troops but in a bourgeois morning suit. Although Italy’s constitution (the Statuto Albertino) was successively undermined by the fascists, the ways in which the take over of state power was achieved, and which Hitler tried to copy although without success until 1933, had important institutional consequences. Italy remained a monarchy and the king, who thanks to the and the invasion of Ethiopia acquired the new title of emperor, continued to sign all laws and decrees. This was very different from the situation in Nazi Germany where after 1934 the office of the Reich President remained vacant. In contrast, Mussolini regularly went in person to the monarch’s residence in the Quirinale palace to report on matters of state. As a result, the transition from constitutional monarchy to fascist dictatorship in Italy took place step by step in a gradual process. Nor was this by any means irreversible, as would become evident in the summer of 1943 when after the king had deposed Mussolini he was arrested, following the motion approved by the at its famous meeting on 25 July in the Palazzo Venezia. The motion had called for Mussolini to restore the military high command to the monarch, a vote that implied a clear declaration of no confidence (De Felice 1996; Grandi 1983). Despite its revolutionary claims, from this institutional perspective fascist Italy remained essentially within the legal framework of the unified liberal nation state that had been founded in 1861.1 This was very evident in the first year of the fascist seizure of power when institutional continuity was the norm for both the state bureaucracy and the administration of justice. The oath to the monarch remained unchanged and so did the traditionally strong but indirect powers that enabled the Minister of Justice to influence judges and public prosecutors, either through withholding promotions, or by means of disciplinary measures and punishments, or simply by transferring magistrates quite arbitrarily to other and often uncongenial locations. It was established practice to give instructions to even the most senior judges, be they general attorneys and the public prosecutors at the Courts of Appeal, but sometimes even the Chief Judges of the appeal courts as well, by means of political directives, or circolari, issued by the Minister of Justice. These measures were by no means new and had been employed extensively by 2 Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 Giolitti (Neppi Modona 1973: 134). In fact until 1941, when the Minister of Justice decided to reorganize the administration of justice, the fascist regime did not attempt to change the existing organization of the administration of justice or relation between executive and judicial power. Indeed, Guido Neppi Modona has argued the regime did not need to intervene to make the administration of justice more fascist. This was partly because the authoritarian nature of the pre-fascist Italian judicial system meant that such intervention was not necessary (Neppi Modona 1973: 136).3 However, in order to avoid conflicts with the judges and to remove potential difficulties facing perpetrators of fascist violence, the new government introduced a series

391 Lutz Klinkhammer

of general amnesties (1922, 1923, 1925) for crimes committed during the years of civil war that had accompanied the fascist seizure of power (Ferrajoli 1996: 575; Neppi Modona 2007b: 343–4; Neppi and Pelissero 1997: 767).4 The only change in the instructions sent by the fascist Ministry of Justice was that as well as the public prosecutors and attorney generals, judges now also received direct instructions from the government. There were also some attempts to impose a fascist style on the administration of justice, especially by the first fascist Minister of Justice, Aldo Oviglio. Although he resigned after Mussolini’s ‘Discorso del Bivacco’, Oviglio deposed the Chief Judge and the General Attorney of the Supreme Court. Still more decisive was the reduction of the number of the courts which fell by 30 per cent. Fifty-four of 169 courts were closed, six of twenty-four courts of appeal and five civil sections of the Supreme Court were unified into a single section sited in Rome. These measures affected career and promotion opportunities and hence served to reinforce attitudes of obedience and accommodation on the part of the judges (Meniconi 2008: 184–5, 2006; Preti 1983: 38). The most important Minister of Justice during the fascist ventennio was Alfredo Rocco. During his seven years in office he made extensive use of the traditional means of relocation and promotion to discipline uncooperative judges or to reward others for their political accommodation, especially when it came to silencing political opposition after the assassination of . A new law approved on Christmas Eve 1925 (Law n. 2300, 24 December 1925) that was initially claimed to be temporary allowed for the suspension of judges who were allegedly not in keeping with the political directives of the regime and resulted in the early retirement of seventeen judges in 1926 (Meniconi 2008: 187).5 Thanks to these removals and the threat of inconvenient relocations for those judges who remained in office, Dino Grandi could hypocritically praise the administration of justice’s ‘new independence from political influence’, even though in reality the judiciary had been penetrated by members of the Fascist Party and the fascist style. Guido Neppi Modona, a former judge at the Italian Supreme Constitutional Court, is one of the most insightful analysts of the fascist administration of justice and the use made of the instructions issued by the Ministry of Justice during the ventennio. At least superficially and

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 especially after 1932 when party membership became obligatory for a career in the civil service, he argues, there was a perfect accommodation between the magistrates and the regime (Neppi Modona 1973: 125–49).6 The Chief Judges participated in the official ceremonies to welcome Italy’s Duce and ‘head of the government’ with the fascist salute, but it is more difficult to tell whether fascism was also able to change bourgeois habits and styles (see Salvati 1993), despite a major campaign against bourgeois customs like hand shaking and ‘Lei’ form of address in favour of the fascist salute and the use of ‘Voi’. Neppi Modona has no doubts that ‘The ministerial instructions and directives which were increasingly addressed to the judges as well, enabled the

392 Was there a fascist revolution?

fascist government to attain a nearly total control over all sectors of the administration of justice, a control facilitated by the firm hierarchical system to which prosecutors and judges were subordinated’. The ‘forced-coordination’ of the justice system increased during the 1930s, and after 1939 no criminal statistics were published because the regime declared that crime was decreasing. In 1938, the regime abolished the annual welcoming addresses of the Crown prosecutors at the Courts of Appeal, an occasion that had allowed some possibility for deviating from official propaganda and setting different priorities. In 1941, Minister of Justice Dino Grandi attempt to impose even tighter control and his re-organization of the administration of justice was the ‘coronation of fascist codification’ that gave normative recognition to the de facto accommodation of the magistrates to fascism (Neppi Modona 1973: 153, 2007b: 370–2, 2007a: 1000).7 In a more recent analysis that cites Yannick Beaulieu’s (2006) unpublished study of 449 disciplinary measures initiated against judges between 1918 and 1943, Neppi Modona underlines that the magistrates were also the object of a very high degree of disciplinary control, that made often use of anonymous denunciations, pressures from the high ranking officials in fascist administration and other measures to coerce conformity. Those forms of intimidation must have inevitably influenced the judgements, but the personal files of the 327 magistrates who held leading positions in the Justice Ministry and of the thirty- three who became Senators during fascism or who were subject to purges after the collapse of the regime reveal as well an overwhelming degree of self- elective fascistization. ‘There is no doubt, therefore, that the regime had been able to achieve the ‘‘fascistization’’ of the magistracy through the power that the state exerted over public employees’ (Neppi Modona 2007b: 373–5).8 Despite the increasingly close alignment between the regime and the administration of justice during the 1930s, judges and prosecutors continued to retain a traditional self-perception and considered themselves to be apolitical technicians or ‘priests of Athena’. This form of self-representation was cultivated by many other professions as well and survived fascism without any problems. However, the influence exerted by the fascist regime on the magistracy was channelled primarily through the treatment of individuals. Since the regime chose not to change the judicial system radically but instead exerted

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 direct and indirect forms of pressure to reach a high level of accommodation, were there any specifically fascist alterations in the administration of justice during the ventennio? Did it reach a deformation of justice behind a fac¸ade of judicial normality? Did the judges contribute to a create, to back or to cover up a fascist terror regime?

Special tribunals as instruments of repression One important fascist innovation was the creation of the Tribunale speciale per la Difesa dello Stato, a Special High Court installed by the Law n. 2008, 25

393 Lutz Klinkhammer

November 1926, that also reintroduced the death penalty that had been abolished in Italy. The Special Court was clearly a political one, like its Nazi German equivalent, the Volksgerichtshof. The judges were not professionals, but were army officers or officers of the Fascist Party Militia (MVSN) with only one military judge. From 1927 to 1941 the Special Court conducted cases against 5619 defendants. Eighty per cent of these (4596) were convicted. Nine of them were condemned to death and were executed (Neppi Modona and Pelissaro 1997: 770, 776; see also Aquarone 1965: 101; Neppi Modona 1973: 155).9 The total number of cases was quite small. The very first verdict was pronounced on 1 February 1927 against two workers who were condemned to 9 months imprisonment because of offence against the Duce: they had been heard to deplore the fact that the assassination attempt by Gino Lucetti on Mussolini had gone wrong. The first death sentence was imposed in 1928 on a Michele Della Maggiora, a communist worker who after his return from France was convicted for the assassination of two fascists. In 1932, the amnesty to mark the regime’s tenth anniversary led to a reduction in the number of trials (see Galzerano 1992: 12),10 but this increased after the outbreak of the Second World War. 978 trials were held during the years of the war, with a slightly increasing number of death penalties (but still relatively few in comparison with Nazi Germany): thirty-six death sentences were pronounced (and twenty-six of these were executed) against 131 Slovenian and Croatian defendants (see Schwarzenberg 1977: 88–9; Magrı` 2000; Puppini et al. 2003; Anon. 2008). The Special Tribunal was abolished in July 1943 (Regio Decreto n. 668), but its competences were simply passed to Military Tribunals. In its initial phase, the Nazi German Volksgerichtshof seemed in many respects quite similar to the Special Tribunal, although later under the direction of Freisler it became much more bloody. In the German court, the first sentence was pronounced on 1 August 1934, condemning Max Theiss, a 32-year-old communist, to jail for one year and nine months for attempting to ‘undermine’ the German armed forces. Under its president Thierack, in 1937, thirty-two of 618 defendants were condemned to death and fifty-two acquitted. In 1938 the number of death penalties was seventeen, while fifty-four of the accused were acquitted. After the start of the Second Word War, the number of death

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 sentences increased remarkably and in 1941 there were over 100. But under the Freisler presidency from August 1942 onwards, the number of death sentences rose from 1100 in 1942 to 1662 in 1943 and reached their peak in 1944 with around 2200. The similarities between the two political courts have to be sought, therefore, in the period before 1939 (Eder 2002: 208, 220–2). How can we interpret the existence and function of the fascist Special Tribunal? There does not seem to be much truth in the self-seeking claim made by many former fascist judges that fascism did not dare stage a showdown with the magistrates and therefore chose to avoid any intrusion into the autonomy of justice by means of specific laws or decrees. The implication was of course that

394 Was there a fascist revolution?

the Special Tribunal was created in order to bypass the ordinary apparatus of justice, and defenders of that position argue that this meant that the repression of political opposition could be achieved only by means of direct police measures that did not require any recourse to the apparatus of justice. But it has already been shown that there is no basis to these claims (Neppi Modona 1973: 153–4). The number of cases that came before the Special Tribunal in sixteen years was equivalent to the number of trials held during a single year in the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. The function of the Special Tribunal was not, therefore, to conduct mass trials of political opponents. The Special Tribunal was created to deal only with the ‘most grave crimes against the personality of the State’, and for that reason Neppi Modona argues it had a ‘subsidiary character’. It was a little faster and more spectacular than the normal tribunals which were already willing to convict the enemies of the dictatorship and could always be expected to defend the political and economical interests of fascist society (Neppi Modona 1973: 155; Meniconi 2008: 186). In effect, it was a showcase that was used for the conviction of defendants or deeds interpreted as particularly dangerous and/or important in order to scare the public and deter imitation. Giovanni De Luna describes the Special Tribunal as an ‘extraordinary and efficient judicial machinery’. He argues that the high quantity of denunciations and complaints transmitted by the police, the fascist Militia and the Carabinieri, gave the examining magistrate (giudice istruttore) attached to the Special Tribunal the opportunity to exercise considerable discretion in selecting the cases that were considered to be of most political relevance. For that reason, the examining magistrate referred many cases back to the ordinary tribunals on the grounds that they did not fall under the competence of the Special Tribunal. By contrast, at the next judicial level, the investigating judges (commissione istruttoria) of the Special Tribunal sent a high percentage of those accused to trial. Altiero Spinelli claimed that the Special Tribunal knew very well who were the real anti-fascists and convicted them accordingly. Neppi Modona has also shown how the Justice Ministry exercised complete control over ‘penal action’ and chose whether to hand over a person to the Special Tribunal, the ordinary penal justice or to the administrative commissions that

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 imposed house arrest or internal exile (De Luna 2003: 738–9; Neppi Modona 2007a: 1000). The Special Tribunal followed a clearly defined course in order to repress political crimes. In 1932 for example, of the 603 individuals accused of subversive activities, 149 were sent for trial in the ordinary courts while 429 were discharged because ‘there are no grounds for proceeding against them’. Of the 831 individuals tried that year, 179 were sentenced and 90 per cent of the convictions were for ‘subversive activities’. Only five people were tried for ‘defending the crime of assassination’. In 1932, 439 accused were convicted by the Special Tribunal, only three passed to the jurisdiction of ordinary tribunals,

395 Lutz Klinkhammer

but 342 persons were acquitted or amnestied. The amnesty of 1932 (Regio Decreto n. 1403, 5 November 1932), which was granted to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the ‘fascist Revolution’, was also a means to single out the more important cases from others. The amnesty extended to ‘minor crimes’ like ‘membership of dissolved parties’ or ‘subversive propaganda’. However it did not cover the crime of ‘reconstituting a subversive association’, enabling judges to distinguish in between simple ‘membership’ of a ‘subversive association’ and the more serious crime of ‘reconstituting’ such an association. The accused could be treated in a different manner depending on his or her presumed dangerousness. Such decisions were made on the basis of information on the accused supplied by the police and the Tribunal took its time. Many cases were closed only after several months of inquiry, during which time the accused were imprisoned. The amnesty made it easier to target selected political opponents, but meant that many anti-fascists were not brought to trial, or were released from prison or had their sentence commuted or reduced. In one case, seven men were acquitted although they had shouted at a member of the Fascist Militia calling him a ‘cuckold and a shitty fascist’. The judges ruled that the insult was not punishable because it had been directed at an individual and not at the Militia as an institution (Dal Pont and Carolini 1980: 560). Even verbal attacks on Mussolini were not always treated by the Special Tribunal. A Sicilian named Leonardo Salemi who was imprisoned at the island of Pianosa, insulted Mussolini in 1932, but the case was passed over to the ordinary tribunals. The same happened six months later with five men from Campania who had expressed negative opinions about Mussolini and the Militia in April 1933 in a small town near Avellino. In several other cases of ‘insults to the head of government’, ‘disrespect to the Militia’, ‘insults to the King and the institution’, ‘disrespect of the national flag’, and so on, the Special Tribunal tended to transfer complaints to the ordinary courts. Sometimes the accused were aquitted by the Special Tribunal, as happened to a 55 year old man from Bergamo named Valsecchi, who on 27 April 1932 in Milan had pronounced the following words against somebody else, implicitly but equally evidently insulting Mussolini: ‘It is useless trying to talk to you because you have the same face as that delinquent down in Rome’. Valsecchi was reprimanded for ‘insults to the head of the government’, but the competent section of the Special Tribunal acquitted him. In

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 other cases, the reasons given by the judges for acquittal of the accused indicated that neither the fascist ‘syndicates’ nor the ‘Charter of Labour’ could be the object of disrespect since they were not mentioned in the Constitution (Dal Pont and Carolini 1980: 560, 607, 632, 708–9, 606). The tendency to hand cases over to the ordinary tribunals was evident in many of the instructions handed down by the Special Tribunal. A soldier from Avellino, Raffaele Carmine, 22 years old, in service at Bardonecchia to the Italo- French border, addressed the militia in July 1938 as ‘a bunch of good-for-nothing crooks and vagrants’. This was deemed to be a case of ‘disrespect for the Militia’ and was passed over to a military tribunal. Luigi Orsetti from Rome, 48 years old

396 Was there a fascist revolution?

and a prisoner on Ponza, was handed over to the ordinary tribunals for committing ‘vituperation of the government’ when he shouted: ‘This State of ours is a son-of-a-bitch cuckold’. Another person who referred to ‘that stinking Mussolini’ was not accused of ‘insulting the head of the government’, and a man from the Tuscan city of Poggibonsi was also acquitted of having ‘vituperated the nation’ and ‘shown disrespect to the head of the government’ by saying that ‘Italy would have done better to have civilized itself rather than go off to civilize Abyssinia. Mussolini has brought starvation on us all.’ During the war against Abyssinia another man got away with saying: ‘You have defended the cause of delinquency, but the League of Nations will sort him out’ (Dal Pont and Carolini 1980: 862–3, 954). These examples give some idea of the operations of the fascist Special Tribunal during the 1930s. The cases relating to ‘Volksscha¨dlinge’ or ‘Heimtu¨cke’ that came before the Nazi Special Tribunals created at the appeal courts (Sondergerichte) were very similar, but the punishments in Nazi Germany (70,000–80,000 cases brought to trial) were immeasurably more severe and bloody, as well as being highly efficient in targeting selected political opponents (Do¨rner 1998, 2008; Ruckebiel 2003; Hu¨ttenberger 1981). The Reichstag- Fire-Ordinance (28 February 1933) and the ‘Ordinance Against Perfidiousness’ (‘Heimtu¨cke’-Verordnung, 21 March 1933) were the beginning of a wide range of decrees and legalized instruments for use against all (alleged or real) political enemies. The new Special Tribunals became more and more important and like the Italian Tribunale Speciale they were engaged in ‘repressing opinions advanced in everyday life’ and they used in particular the accusation of ‘perfidiousness’. In 1933, nearly 10,000 people were convicted for political crimes. The German criminal tribunals pronounced an annual average of 300,000 sentences, and in his magisterial study of ordinary and special justice during the Nazi regime Lothar Gruchmann concluded that the ‘political leadership could always act upon the jurisdiction in order to get the desired result. The judicial apparatus became qualitative instruments of the unjust state and could no longer guarantee the individual the protection of the law.’ The ordinary tribunals (not counting the military courts) made a major contribution to reinforcing Nazi rule and handed down more than 16,000 death sentences (Gruchmann 1988: 951, 1143; Hu¨ttenberger 1981; Kolb 1983:

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 279). These figures indicate a quality and quantity of juridical repression that was never reached by . In Italy, the attention that has focused on the Special Tribunal, has led to the relative neglect of the repressive functions of other judicial agencies. This distortion has been influenced by the perceptions of repression transmitted first by the Resistance and then by postwar anti-fascism, which following the famous pamphlet published by Giustizia e Liberta` during the 1930s focused on the Special Tribunal that had been created for the repression of the regime’s political opponents. The result has been a tendency to view the Special Tribunal as the spearhead of an apparently homogeneous fascist machine of

397 Lutz Klinkhammer

repression. But this fails to take account of the fact that the Special Tribunal was created at a very specific phase of the fascist takeover of power with the aim of realizing the idea of legalistic repression by the fascist state that was dear to the then Minister of Justice, Alfredo Rocco (on Rocco see Ungari 1963; Gentile 1980; Sbriccoli 2003, 536–7; Vassalli 2005). The opportunity to create the Special Tribunal came after the attempt to assassinate Mussolini at during the evening of Halloween 1926. A 15- year-old boy, Anteo Zamboni, was held responsible for the attack and was immediately lynched. The assassination attempt provoked a new wave of fascist violence, but Mussolini wanted to bring this under control and he asked Minister Rocco and the local Prefects to take rapid and rigorous measures against what was now considered an excessive outburst of fascist violence (Dalla Casa 2000: 32–3). But this seemingly moderate reaction disguised a much more radical objective, since by means of the fascistization of laws and the state bureaucracy (Meniconi 2008: 186; Preti 1983: 41) Mussolini wanted to replace the ‘hot’ violence of the fascist squads with a ‘cold’ form of administrative and political repression. This state-run repression required a legal frame and, as Alexander De Grand has argued, Alfredo Rocco played a key role in guaranteeing ‘that the repression would take place under the auspices of the traditional bureaucratic apparatus’. Indeed, this is the key to understanding why fascist Italy – as De Grand puts it – ‘would have nothing comparable to the Nazi party SS organization, although its state security police, the OVRA, was comparable to the German in function and effectiveness’ (De Grand 1995: 29). The Italian version of what Ernst Fraenkel called the ‘Dual State’ remained different from the Nazi German case especially in the police sector. Turning to the question of how efficient the Special Tribunal was, we should try to understand how it worked in conjunction with the ordinary criminal courts. Were the latter efficient instruments of repression managed according to the directives of the fascist regime, as Neppi Modona claims? Or is Mario Sbriccoli right to argue that while the Special Tribunal can be considered an ‘efficient instrument designed to guard the regime’ it was also a ‘sign that fascism, in its quest to eliminate its enemies, could not count for sure on the state judges, the ordinary criminal divisions and the normal function of the machinery of justice’ (Sbriccoli 2003: 536)? That is an important question.

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 Were the ordinary criminal courts unreliable and hence unable to guarantee the interests of the regime? The fact that the Special Tribunal passed so many cases to the ordinary courts suggests that the judges of the Special Tribunal felt confident that those cases would be treated in the expected manner. To answer the question more fully, therefore, we need to explore the function and jurisdictions of the ordinary courts. The very effective ways in which the ordinary tribunals protected fascist class interests inside a framework of a fascist welfare state that to some degree also sought to protect fascist workers has been demonstrated by Gian Carlo Jocteau’s study of 4000 cases that came before the labour courts in the district of Turin

398 Was there a fascist revolution?

between 1926 and 1934. Commenting on Jocteau’s study, Nicola Tranfaglia drew attention to the ‘Janus face of the fascist regime: a face that represented the repression of the working class, but also a demagogical social state. A face of powerful political repression, but also one of mediation and distinction between the interests to be defended, the face of an efficient containment of dissent on a material as well as on an ideological level’ (Jocteau 1978: XII). How did the judicial branch of the apparatus of repression function? This is still not an easy question to answer because the mass of proceedings and the judgements pronounced by the tribunals have not yet been sufficiently examined for the two decades of fascist rule. We can only cite some significant examples in an attempt to gauge the effectiveness of judicial repression. One set of examples is provided by the punishment of abortion, a crime that given the regime’s pro-natalist demographical policies should have been repressed rigorously. However, the data provided by the fascist Interior Ministry (Direzione Generale della Sanita` pubblica) indicate that the number of cases of abortion was extremely low. For 1938, only forty-five cases of illicit abortion were registered for the whole of Italy. However, the Ministry of Justice drew its information from the district prosecutors’ reports and had more precise and extensive data. From the district of Turin alone there were thirty-five sentences relating to abortion. In the district of Perugia, between 1920 and 1945, there were ninety-three proceedings relating to abortion, of which five were in 1938. According to Anna Muraro, an annual average of five lawsuits was quite high compared with only sixteen cases registered between 1880 and 1900 in the same district, many of which ended in acquittals. Muraro sees the increasing number of trials as an indicator of a change which occurred during the fascist ventennio. While Victoria De Grazia interpreted the increasing number of such trials as an indicator of an increasing diffusion of abortion practices following the prohibition in 1926 of the advertising of contraceptive products, Muraro sees the increasing number of prosecutions for abortion as a consequence of the increasingly repressive measures adopted by the regime, arguing also that these measures targeted only women who were already weak and socially isolated. Given that physicians never appeared as co-defendants in these trials (despite of the fact that abortions could be a quite profitable affair), the women who were tried for abortion were unmarried and already the target of public rumour and

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 disapprobation. In these cases the judicial proceeding seemed to serve only as ancillaries to much more incisive forms of social control and marginalization and Muraro argues that the repression set into operation by fascism had little impact on the wealthier strata of society (Muraro 1999: 202, 206, 226; De Grazia 1992; Detragiache 1980).

A more complex apparatus of repression Therefore, we have to look not only at the spearhead constituted by the Special Tribunal, but also at the ordinary courts that should be seen as parts of a much

399 Lutz Klinkhammer

more complex apparatus of repression that was manifest not only in court trials but also in several preparatory phases, which started with the mechanism of denunciation and police investigations. The latter in particular draws our attention to more invasive forms of social control and the degree to which the fascist dictatorship did penetrate and permeate Italian society (Do¨rner 2008; Ebner 2005; Dunnage 2004). In this case we can draw on the ample sources compiled by the police, the reports written by prefetti and questori, the rumours and confidential reports supplied by the OVRA, the information given by the Carabinieri, the PNF and the Militia. To answer how effective fascist judicial repression was, we must take account of the means of repression operated by the police. Which crimes were dealt with by the courts and which ones never reached the courts because they had been ‘resolved’ by the means and measures exercised by the police state? To judge the regime’s effectiveness in controlling opposition and repressing dissent we have to remember that in 1926, besides the introduction of the Special Tribunal, the fascist regime also introduced wide-ranging new police laws (Testo unico delle leggi di Pubblica Sicurezza, 1926), with retroactive effects. Although introduced initially for a period of up to five years only, these measures remained in force until the end of the fascist regime. The most important instrument introduced in 1926 (but which was already known and used in the Italian kingdom since the Pica Law and therefore it was not really new) consisted in ‘confinement by the police’ (‘confino di polizia’), a sort of banishment–deportation under strict police custody. Without recourse to the penal law and its regulations, the executive authority could now act more immediately against potential political opponents, unhampered by juridical regulations. This instrument of ‘confino’ can, therefore, be considered as an equivalent to the later (1933) Nazi Schutzhaft system, that did not even attempt to give some legal pretext to the rounding-up of suspects and their forced transfer, and arbitrary and terroristic confinement without appeal in Nazi concentration camps. Comparing the two, the peculiarities and specific differences between Nazi and fascist repression become more visible (Osti Guerrazzi and Di Sante 2005; Capogreco 1998, 2004; Ferenc 2000). In Nazi Germany, the attempts made by the Ministry of Justice to ‘legalize’ the Schutzhaft system failed completely

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 (Gruchmann 1988: 545–83), whereas in the Italian case to send someone to the confino remained an administrative measure; the decision was taken by a ‘District Commission’ competent for measures of administering confinement and paroles. The members of the Commissions represented the administration and district authorities: the Prefect, the Chief of Police, the Provincial Commander of the RRCC (Carabinieri) and good fascist citizens faith nominated by the local mayor; but there were a Royal Prosecutor and a career judge as well. There was even a procedure for appeal, presided over by the State General Attorney at the Appeal Court, a Chief Judge of an Appeal Court Section or alternatively an associate judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal

400 Was there a fascist revolution?

(Carucci 2001: 16ff.; Neppi Modona 1973: 155). The normal administration of justice was fully represented and participated in the process of sending politically undesirable people to enforced confinement on one of the penal colonies sited mainly on Italy’s many offshore islands, where they suffered serious physicical and psychological hardship. As in the case of the proceedings of the Special Tribunal, ‘confino’ was not used indiscriminately but was carefully targeted. By 1934, twelve years after the fascists had come to power, there were 839 people ‘confined for political reasons’. By the end of 1937 the number had increased to 2250, and by 1941 it had risen to 3100. Most were sent to inland sites like Pisticci, or to the islands of Ventotene or the Tremiti. In 1940, the Interior Ministry had efficiently compiled a card index of 12,000 former ‘confined’ persons, and by the end of the regime in July 1943 the police had produced another 2000 cards. A total of 16,786 persons were registered in the police card index as ‘confined’. In addition to those who had been ‘banished’, a further 160,000 Italians were subject to police curfew (‘ammoniti’) after receiving an official police ‘admonition’ which placed them under ‘special police surveillance’ (De Luna 2003, 740; Petrini 1996, 155; Dal Pont and Carolini 1983; Di Sante 1998; Spadafora 1989). Given that the ‘confino di polizi’ had a precedent in the Pica Law of 1863 against brigandage, which empowered the police to impose house-arrest on a person, we have to reflect about what was the specifically fascist element in the use of confino after 1926. fascism perpetuated what was used only as an emergency in the 1860s and made a norm of what was formerly an exceptional measure, even if it had been often employed during the first decade of ‘liberal’ rule (Davis 1988; Petrini 1996). What had been used as an emergency brake by the bourgeoisie in the liberal period became now a ‘normal’ instrument of repressive power. The dichotomy of juridical theory (which remained fundamental to liberal thought) and the praxis of the state of siege used in southern Italy after Unification, was now solved in favour of methods of repression that merged with the new penal code drafted by Alfredo Rocco. Even if fascist criminal justice could use instruments created by the liberal state and activate them easily for the own new purposes, the ‘Rocco Code’ made them much tighter (see Violante 1997: XXXIV–V).11 In this context, 1933 in Germany constituted a deeper break with former

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 tradition than was the case with the new police laws of 1926 in Italy. However, the threat that had formerly been identified with the classes dangereuses, was now, in the context of an advanced mass society, extended to all those who were not inclined to be followers of the Caesarist regime. The new ‘dangerous classes’ included all those who would not mobilize for the interests of the regime. While the liberal state had maintained the safety valve of emigration, for example, the fascist nationalist state did not choose to leave to the masses the opportunity to renounce their allegiance. The Italian police laws of 1926 purposely introduced the crime of ‘escaping from the state’, and introduced punishments for ‘abusive escape’ or attempting to escape, although this was

401 Lutz Klinkhammer

punishable only where the motive was political since this amounted to an offence against the national interests.The aim was clearly to keep opponents of the regime under control and avoid the escape of anti-fascists to foreign countries where they maybe could undertake anti-fascist activities (Neppi Modona and Pelissero 1997: 773). In Germany, the measures of ‘enforced domicile’ and confinement in ‘penal colonies’ was unknown before the Nazis came to power: But after the Nazi seizure of power they were adopted with unforeseen velocity not least because Nazi officials had carefully studied the achievements of Italian fascism which attracted international attention as well (Bernhard 2009; Schieder 2008).12 Before 1933, the German authorities had tried to expel political opponents from places where they could allegedly create turmoil, but not to deport them to some new place. Expulsion, banishment or expatriation were planned, not the introduction of penal camps. But the situation changed rapidly with the creation of Nazi concentration camps, which can be considered as an extreme form of coerced domicile. Forced ghettoization and the plans for deportation of political opponents to islands like Madagascar were also extensions of the principle of forced domicile (Petrini 1996: 133). The fascist confino di polizia was in many respects, therefore, an anticipation of the Nazi notion of ‘protective custody’ (Schutzhaft) or deportation to Nazi concentration camps, even though the high degree of radicalization in Nazi repression set Germany rapidly apart from Italian fascism, especially after 1939. However, three months after the Nazis came to power in Prussia alone there were more than 25,000 persons in ‘protective custody’, a police measure introduced under the Reichstag-Fire-Ordinance. The Prussian Interior Ministry calculated in the summer of 1933 that there was a constant average of 10,000 political detainees. The policy authority was empowered to decide whether those subject to ‘protective custody’ should be passed over to the criminal courts or sent directly to concentration camps. By 1939, there were 25,000 inmates in the camps, to which must be added the ‘labour education camps’ run by the Gestapo. During the Second World War, the number of those held in Nazi concentration camps increased greatly because of a high number of political opponents and resistance fighters from all the Nazi-occupied countries and by the beginning of 1942 the number had risen to 100,000 (Kolb 1983: 277–8).

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 When it came to measures of exclusion and ostracism against ‘internal enemies’ and ‘racially’ defined minorities (and without considering the acts of bloody violence), Nazi Germany also demonstrated greater speed and radicalism than fascist Italy. The Reichsbu¨rgergesetz or laws on citizenship that were introduced to ‘protect German blood and honour’, the law that defined sexual intercourse with Jews as ‘racial infamy’, and the whole series of ordinances and decrees defining in great detail a host of new interdictions and punishable acts that were introduced as early as 1935 established the legal basis to marginalize Jewish Germans and force them to leave the country. In contrast, although the fascist defence of the ‘purity of the Italian race’ was

402 Was there a fascist revolution?

present in the Rocco Code, it was not incorporated into repressive general laws until 1937/38 (Pavan 2009; Speciale 2007; De Napoli 2006; Schneider 2000). Considering in Italy repression as a whole, the curve of totalitarian development followed the same general path as in Germany and was designed to disable or eliminate political enemies, marginalize stigmatized groups and inculcate fascism as a form of political faith. The mechanisms were similar, but it did not happen with the same speed or intensity as in Germany. But the real qualitative leap came once the war began. Whereas down to 1939 both regimes showed – as Alexander De Grand has demonstrated – an impressive number of parallel developments and systemic similarities (similarities to which non-Italian historians have drawn much more attention than their Italian colleagues, in particular the conservative and liberal historians) (De Grand 1995; see also Brooker 1991; Kallis 2000; Nolzen and Reichardt 2005; Schieder 2008),13 the extreme radicalization of the Nazi war of extermination and the mass murder of the Jews had no parallels in fascist Italy. Both the quantity and quality of murderous repression were now diverging. Some similarities can be found when it comes to Italian occupation practices and in the methods of anti-partisan warfare, but only if we compare these with the measures used by the Nazis in western, northern and southern Europe, excluding the eastern and southeastern parts of Nazi occupied Europe. Looking to its military apparatus, the Italian fascist regime increased its repressive powers potential in forms similar to the Nazis, especially against the populations of occupied or annexed territories. In Slovenia (the annexed province of Lubiana) approximately 10,000 inhabitants (out of 330,000) were killed by the Italian occupiers (Bosworth 1998: 4; Ferenc 1999), a percentage of killings reached in no part of Italy during Nazi occupation from 1943 to 1945, and probably not even in France during the Nazi occupation from 1940 to 1944. In Italy, thousands of inhabitants of occupied countries (in particular those of Slav origin) and foreign Jews were confined in internment camps and houses. That Italy ‘fortunately did not have any concentration camps’, as the former Italian President Cossiga remarked during a visit in Germany, is still part of an indelible Italian myth that has cancelled much of the memory of Italian mechanisms of repression, to focus instead on the anti-fascist struggle against Nazi Germany after 1943. These few figures indicate that there were some parallels with Nazi

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 Germany, but more research is needed. However, despite the problems of gaining access to the relevant archival sources, over the last decade Italian historians have finally begun to explore these issues14 although without yet establishing an adequate base of documented studies. For that reason any attempt to draw wider conclusions at this point remains necessarily tentative.

Military tribunals and repression during the Second World War It is still more difficult to compare fascist Italy to Nazi Germany in terms of judicial repression after 1939, because we have to take into account the

403 Lutz Klinkhammer

activities of the military tribunals as well. In Germany, the number of crimes punishable by death increased remarkably with the frequent modifications of a special war time penal law ordinance, the Kriegssonderstrafrechtsverordnung (KSSVO), which was amended several times during the war. These measures allowed the application of a death penalty for disciplinary reasons or to protect the army, which in practice meant coerced allegiance. In parallel with the regulations of the KSSVO for the military, special war-time penal laws were created for civilians as well, with a further extension of crimes that warranted the death penalty (Volksscha¨dlings-Verordnung, Rundfunkverbrechen, Wehrkraftzer- setzung). The accusation of ‘perfidiousness’ was used even against Nazi officials. The Special Tribunal started for example an inquiry against Josef Mulka, condemned in 1965 by the German court at Frankfurt am Main for the crimes he committed at the Auschwitz camp where he was a guardian, because he had expressed doubts on the German ‘final victory’ (Do¨rner 2008: 99). During the Second World War, the German tribunals imposed an extremely harsh repression on their own soldiers. According to the official statistics, the Wehrmacht tribunals in 5 years passed 630,000 sentences. The number of death sentences can only be estimated because a large part of the proceedings and files were destroyed, but between 15,000 and 50,000 death sentences (mainly for desertion) were carried out on those serving in the German armed forces. Another 23,000 received jail sentences in the penitentiaries, while another 400,000 were sent to other prisons. The tribunals were composed of a lawyer (although not necessarily a career magistrate), an officer and one other military person having the same rank as the accused. The votes of the officer and lawyer could provide a majority and they could define the sentence without the consent of the third ‘judge’. The German military judges passed tens of thousands of death penalties and continued their bloody work for the regime until the first days of May 1945 (see the case of Filbinger) (Messerschmidt and Wu¨llner 1987; Seidler 1998). With the exception of Ferenc, there are no studies on the Italian military tribunals during the Second World War. This can be explained by the difficulty in gaining access to the relevant military archives, but it marks a major discrepancy with the historiography on the First World War, which has documented clearly (but not in an exhaustive manner) the harsh repression that the Italian military tribunals imposed on Italian soldiers. By 2 September 1919,

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 the military tribunals had heard 350,000 cases, passed 210,000 convictions (mostly desertion) and 140,000 acquittals. The military tribunals passed 4028 death sentences (2967 on those in absentia) and of these 750 were executed. We know nothing about the 62,000 civilians convicted by the military tribunals for assisting the deserters and there are no systematic studies on the sentences passed by the 117 Italian military tribunals that operated during the First World War, except for the purely statistical analysis organized in 1921 by Guglielmo Tagliacarne and in 1927 by Giorgio Mortara for the Ministry of War, which remains to this day the only reliable source of numbers. Even the extraordinarily high number of 100,000 Italian prisoners of war who died of starvation in

404 Was there a fascist revolution?

Austrian and German camps were for a long time forgotten by the nation. By any comparison, the juridical repression that the Italian military authorities used against their own soldiers during the Great War was much greater than in other European countries (Forcella and Monticone 1968: XVI; Rochat 1999; Gibelli 1998: 14, 123; Bianchi 2001: 60–1, 207–8, 221, 291; Procacci 1993, 1999).15 The proceedings of the Special Tribunal in Rome also increased after 1939, and the number of offences expanded as well in connection with the war. As yet there are no studies on the sentences of the Italian military tribunals against the indigenous population of the annexed or occupied countries – with the exception of Ferenc (1999). The Italian military tribunals like their Nazi counter- parts were mobilized to combat crimes that now included insubordination, subversive propaganda, sabotage and defeatism. They also took on many cases passed to them by the ‘Tribunale Speciale’, when the latter saw no sufficient political reason for handling a trial itself (see Dal Pont and Carolini 1980: 1019). This opens a new dimension of repressive activities that complemented the functions of the Special Tribunal that must have made possible a more capillary penetration of Italian society. Michele Albertini’s forthcoming study of the military tribunal in Turin reveal that this single court passed 10,000 sentences between 1922 and 1940, which indicates that there is a huge amount of research on the Italian ordinary courts and the military tribunals that still remains to be done and especially for the years from 1939 to 1943. The same is true for the military tribunals attached to the Italian armies in the occupied countries. Research undertaken by Giorgio Rochat demonstrates that the high degree of repression affected by Italian military tribunals on their own soldiers known from found a continuity in World War II (Rochat 2002: 23). Therefore, we can presume that we can only guess that during the state of military emergency that continued throughout the war, the repressive measures deployed through the apparatus of justice became more intense and violent in the occupied territories, exceeding the intrinsic violence that the regime developed in the homeland. As a conclusion, we can underline that the judicial repression in Italy as in Germany remained an extremely important element of fascist and of Nazi rule, an instrument to complement the (especially in Germany) more arbitrary mechanisms of repression adopted by the police. The administration of justice and of the police did not represent different parts of a ‘dual state’, but two basic

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 elements of political repression of equal importance for the control of society and of ‘undesirable’ behaviour, at home as in the occupied countries.

Notes 1 On the problem of continuity from liberal state to the fascist state and back to the liberal state, see Luminati (2007) and Sbriccoli (1997: 528ff). 2 For the liberal period, see Marovelli (1967). 3 It was also difficult to change established regulations: even Minister of Justice Rocco failed when he tried to introduce new mechanisms in order to accelerate promotions of judges (Meniconi 2008: 190).

405 Lutz Klinkhammer

4 Between 1919 and 1922 some 3000–4000 politically motivated cases of death were recorded (2000–3000 socialists and 637 militant fascists). See Gentile (1989: 493–4). 5 Neppi Modona argues that this law was more important for purging judges than the Regio Decreto n. 1028, 3 May 1923, which empowered Oviglio to remove judges (Neppi Modona 1973: 135–6). 6 In 1940 party membership also became a pre-requisite for promotions or increases in salary. 7 Grandi’s belated intervention did not have striking results (Meniconi 2008: 191–2, 198–200). 8 The same mechanism is observed by Osti Guerrazzi (2004) on behalf of the police administration. 9 The sentences handed down by the Special Tribunal were published by the Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito. 10 On the Special Tribunal, see also ‘Il Tribunale speciale – I processi di Roma’ (Edizioni di Giustizia e Liberta`), reprinted by Galzerano (1992: 21–87). 11 On the situation in the liberal era, see Levra (1975), Cordova (1983), Jocteau (1988), Aquarone (1965: 95 ff.) and Neppi Modona and Pelissero (1997: 757–847). 12 For the law system, see Somma (2005) and Englert (2003). 13 There is a strong link between the construction of the Italian memories of war and the political self-representation of the Italian Republic (see Focardi 1996). 14 For Italian occupation policies, see Mantelli (2000), Focardi and Klinkhammer (2008). 15 For death penalties in other European armies, see Rochat (1999: 15). For Germany, see Kolb (1983: 281).

References Anon. (2008) Il confine degli altri. La questione giuliana e la memoria slovena, Roma: Donzelli. Aquarone, Alberto (1965) L’organizzazione dello Stato totalitario, Torino: Einaudi. Beaulieu, Yannick (2006) ‘Magistrature et pouvoir politique en Italie entre 1918–1943. Analyse socio-historique des magistrats ordinaires et de leurs relations avec le personnel politique’, The`se de Doctorat d’Histoire Contemporaine soutenue le 20 Novembre 2006 a` l’Institut Universitaire Europe´en, sous la direction de Raffaele Romanelli. Bernhard, Patrick (2009) ‘Repression transnational – Die Polizeizusammenarbeit zwischen Drittem Reich und italienischem faschismus, 1933–1943’, in Wolfgang Schulte (ed.) Die Polizei im NS-Staat,Frankfurt:Verlagfu¨r Polizeiwissenschaft, pp. 407–24. Bianchi, Bruna (2001) La follia e la fuga. Nevrosi di guerra, diserzione e disobbedienza nell’esercito italiano (1915–1918), Roma: Bulzoni. Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 Bosworth, Richard J. B. (1998) The Italian Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism, London: Arnold. Brooker, Paul (1991) The Faces of Fraternalism: Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carucci, Paola (2001) L’ordinamento dei servizi di polizia, in Costantino Di Sante (ed.) I campi di concentramento in Italia: dall’internamento alla deportazione 1940–1945,Milano:F.Angeli. Cordova, Ferdinando (1983) Democrazia e Repressione nell’Italia di fine secolo,Roma:Bulzoni. Dal Pont, Adriano and Carolini, Simonetta (1980) L’Italia dissidente e antifascista. Le Ordinanze, le Sentenze istruttorie e le Sentenze in Camera di consiglio emesse dal Tribunale speciale fascista contro gli imputati di antifascismo dall’anno 1927 al 1943, vol. II, Milano: La Pietra.

406 Was there a fascist revolution?

Dal Pont, Adriano and Carolini, Simonetta (eds) (1983) L’Italia al confino. Le ordinanze di assegnazione al confino emesse dalle Commissioni provinciali dal novembre 1926 al luglio 1943, 4 vols, Milan: La Pietra. Dalla Casa, Brunella (2000) Attentato al duce. Le molte storie del caso Zamboni, Bologna: Il Mulino. Davis, John (1988) Conflict and Control: Law and Order in Nineteenth-Century Italy, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan. De Felice, Renzo (1996) Mussolini l’alleato. Vol. 1: L’Italia in guerra (1940–1943): dalla guerra ‘breve’ alla guerra lunga, Torino: Einaudi. De Grand, Alexander J. (1995) Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The ‘Fascist’ Style of Rule, London: Routledge (published 1999, in Italian as L’Italia fascista e la Germania nazista, Bologna: Il Mulino). De Grazia, Victoria (1992) How Fascism Ruled Women. Italy, 1922–1945, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. De Luna, Giovanni (2003) ‘Tribunale speciale per la difesa dello Stato’, in Dizionario del fascismo, vol. II, Torino: Einaudi, pp. 738–41. De Napoli, Olindo (2006) ‘Razzismo e diritto romano. Una polemica degli anni Trenta’, Contemporanea 9(1): 35–63. Detragiache, Denise (1980) ‘Un aspect de la politique de´mographique de l’Italie fasciste: la re´pression de l’avortement’, Me´lange de l’Ecole francaise de Rome 92(2): 691–735. Di Sante, Costantino (1998) L’internamento civile nell’Ascolano e il campo di concentramento di Servigliano 1940–1944, Ascoli Piceno: ISML. Do¨rner, Bernward (1998) ‘Heimtu¨cke’: Das Gesetz als Waffe. Kontrolle, Abschreckung und Verfolgung in Deutschland 1933–1945, Paderborn: Scho¨ningh. —— (2008) ‘Willku¨r mit System: Zur Funktion des ‘Heimtu¨cke-Gesetzes’ im NS- Herrschaftssystem’, in Hans-Hermann Hertle and Thomas Schaarschmidt (eds) Strafjustiz im Nationalsozialismus. Rassische und politische Verfolgung im Kontext der NS- Strafjustiz, Potsdam: Zentrum fu¨r Zeithistorische Forschung, pp. 93–112. Dunnage, Jonathan (2004) ‘Social control in fascist Italy: the role of the police’, in Herman Roodenburg, Pieter Spierenburg, Clive Emsley and Eric Johnson (eds) Social Control in Europe, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, pp. 261–80. Ebner, Michael (2005) ‘Terror und Bevo¨lkerung im italienischen Faschismus’, in Armin Nolzen and Sven Reichardt (eds) Faschismus in Italien und Deutschland,Go¨ttingen: Wallstein, pp. 201–24. Eder, Wolfgang (2002) Das italienische Tribunale speciale per la Difesa dello Stato und der deutsche Volksgerichtshof: ein Vergleich zwischen zwei politischen Gerichtsho¨fen, Frankfurt am Main: Lang. Englert, Tassilo W. M. (2003) Deutsche und italienische Zivilrechtsgesetzgebung 1933–1945: Parallelen in der Rechtsetzung und gegenseitige Beeinflussung unter besonderer Beru¨cksichti- gung des Familien- und Erbrechts, Frankfurt am Main: Lang. Ferenc, Tone (1999) ‘‘‘Si ammazza troppo poco’’. Condannati a morte – ostaggi –

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 passati per le armi nella provincia di Lubiana 1941–1943. Documenti’, Ljubljana. —— (2000) ‘Rab – Arbe – Arbissima. Confinamenti – rastrellamenti – internamenti nella provincia di Lubiana 1941–1943. Documenti’, Ljubljana. Ferrajoli, Luigi (1996) ‘Scienze giuridiche’, in Corrado Stajano (ed.) La cultura italiana del Novecento, Roma–Bari: Laterza, pp. 559–97. Focardi, Filippo (1996) ‘‘‘Bravo italiano’’ e ‘‘cattivo tedesco’’: riflessioni sulla genesi di due immagini incrociate’, Storia e Memoria 5: 55–83. Focardi, Filippo and Klinkhammer, Lutz (2008) ‘Italia potenza occupante: una nuova frontiera storiografica’, in Politiche di occupazione dell’Italia fascista. Annale Irsifar, Milano: F. Angeli. Forcella, Enzo and Monticone, Alberto (1968) Plotone d’esecuzione. I processi della Prima Guerra Mondiale, Bari: Laterza.

407 Lutz Klinkhammer

Galzerano, Giuseppe (1992) Il Tribunale speciale fascista, Casalvelino: Galzerano. Gentile, Emilio (1980) ‘Alfredo Rocco’, in F. Cordova (ed.) Uomini e volti del fascismo, Roma: Bulzoni, pp. 305–336. —— (1989) Storia del Partito fascista 1919–1922, Roma/Bari: Laterza. Gibelli, Antonio (1998) La Grande Guerra degli Italiani, 1915–1918, Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoni. Grandi, Dino (1983) Dino Grandi, 25 luglio. Quarant’anni dopo, ed. Renzo De Felice, Bologna: Il Mulino. Gruchmann, Lothar (1988) Justiz im Dritten Reich 1933–1940. Anpassung und Unterwerfung in der A¨ra Gu¨rtner,Mu¨nchen: Oldenbourg. Hu¨ttenberger, Peter (1981) ‘Heimtu¨ckefa¨lle vor dem Sondergericht Mu¨nchen 1933– 1939’, in Bayern in der NS-Zeit, vol. IV, Mu¨nchen: Oldenbourg, pp. 435–525. Jocteau, Gian Carlo (1978) La magistratura e i conflitti di lavoro durante il fascismo 1926/ 1934, prefazione di Nicola Tranfaglia, Milano: Feltrinelli. Jocteau, Gian Carlo (1988) L’armonia perturbata, Roma–Bari: Laterza. Kallis, Aristotle A. (2000) Fascist Ideology. Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922–1945, London: Routledge. Kolb, Eberhard (1983) ‘Die Maschinerie des Terrors. Zum Funktionieren des Unterdru¨ckungs- und Verfolgsapparates im NS-System’, in K. D. Bracher, M. Funke, H.-A. Jacobsen (eds) Nationalsozialistische Diktatur 1933–1945. Eine Bilanz, Bonn/Du¨sseldorf: Bonner Schriften zur Politik u. Zeitgeschichte, Droste Verlag, pp. 270–84. Levra, Umberto (1975) Il colpo di stato della borghesia. La crisi politica di fine secolo in Italia 1896/1900, Mailand: Feltrinelli. Luminati, Michele (2007) Priester der Themis. Richterliches Selbstversta¨ndnis in Italien nach 1945, Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann. Magrı`, Enzo (2000) I fucilati di Mussolini, Milano: Baldini & Castoldi. Mantelli, Brunello (2000) ‘Die Italiener auf dem Balkan 1941–1943’, in C. Dipper, L. Klinkhammer and A. Nu¨tzenadel (eds) Europa¨ische Sozialgeschichte. Festschrift fu¨r Wolfgang Schieder zum 65. Geburtstag, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, pp. 57–74. Marovelli, P. (1967) L’indipendenza e l’autonomia della magistratura italiana dal 1848 al 1923, Milano: Giuffre´. Meniconi, Antonella (2006) La ‘maschia avvocatura’. Istituzioni e professione forense in epoca fascista (1922–1943), Bologna: Il Mulino. —— (2008) ‘Magistrati e ordinamento giudiziario negli anni della dittatura’, in Guido Melis (ed.) Lo Stato negli anni Trenta. Istituzioni e regimi fascisti in Europa, Bologna: Il Mulino, pp. 183–200. Messerschmidt, Manfred and Wu¨llner, Fritz (1987) Die Wehrmachtjustiz im Dienste des Nationalsozialismus. Zersto¨rung einer Legende, Baden-Baden: Nomos. Muraro, Anna (1999) ‘Figure maschili nei processi per aborto. Le sentenze del Tribunale di Perugia 1920–1945, Storia e problemi contemporanei, no. 24: 201–26.

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 Neppi Modona, Guido (1973) ‘La magistratura e il fascismo’, in Guido Quazza (ed.) Fascismo e societa` italiana, Torino: Einaudi. —— (2007a) ‘Principio di legalita` e giustizia penale nel periodo fascista’, Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno 36: 983–1005. —— (2007b) ‘Diritto e giustizia penale nel periodo fascista’, in Luigi Lacche´, Paolo Marchetti and Massimo Meccarelli (ed.) Penale Giustizia Potere. Metodi, Ricerche, Storiografie. Per ricordare Mario Sbriccoli, Macerata: EUM, pp. 341–78. Neppi Modona, Guido and Pelissero, Marco (1997) ‘La politica criminale durante il fascismo’, in (ed.) Storia d’Italia. Annali 12: La criminalita`, Torino: Einaudi, pp. 757–847. Nolzen, Armin and Reichardt, Sven (eds) (2005) Faschismus in Italien und Deutschland, Go¨ttingen: Wallstein.

408 Was there a fascist revolution?

Osti Guerrazzi, Amedeo (2004) Poliziotti. I direttori dei campi di concentramento italiani 1940–1943, Roma: Cooper. Osti Guerrazzi, Amedeo and Di Sante, Costantino (2005) ‘Die Geschichte der Konzentrationslager im faschistischen Italien’, in Armin Nolzen and Sven Reichardt (eds) Faschismus in Italien und Deutschland. Studien zu Transfer und Vergleich,Go¨ttingen: Wallstein, pp. 176–200. Pavan, Ilaria (2009) ‘Una premessa dimenticata. Il codice penale del 1930’, in Marina Caffiero (ed.) Le radici dell’antisemitismo, Roma: Viella. Petrini, Davide (1996) La prevenzione inutile. Illegitimita` delle misure praeter delictum, Napoli: Jovene. Preti, Alberto (1983) ‘La politica interna fascista e l’organizzazione del consenso’, La dittatura fascista, Storia della societa` italiana, 2: 13–64 (Milano: Teti). Procacci, Giovanna (1993) Soldati e prigionieri italiani durante la Grande Guerra, Roma: Editori Reuniti (republished by Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2000). —— (1999) Dalla rassegnazione alla rivolta. Mentalita` e comportamenti popolari nella Grande Guerra, Roma: Bulzoni. Puppini, Marco, Verginella, Marta and Verrocchio, Ariella (2003) Dal processo Zaniboni al processo Tomazic. Il tribunale di Mussolini e il confine orientale (1927–1941), Udine: Gaspari. Rochat, Giorgio (1999) ‘Consenso e rifiuto nei soldati della Grande Guerra 1915–1918, Studi e ricerche di storia contemporanea 28: 5–18. —— (2002) Duocento sentenze nel bene e nel male. La giustizia militare nella guerra 1940– 1943, Udine: Gaspari. Ruckebiel, Jan (2003) Soziale Kontrolle im NS-Regime: Protest, Denunziation und Verfolgung. Zur Praxis allta¨glicher Unterdru¨ckung im Wechselspiel von Bevo¨lkerung und Gestapo, Cologne: Hundt Druck. Salvati, Mariuccia (1993) L’inutile salotto. L’abitazione piccolo-borghese nell’Italia fascista, Torino: Bollati Boringhieri. Sbriccoli, Mario (1997) Caratteri originari e tratti permanenti del sistema penale italiano,in Luciano Violante (ed.) Storia d’Italia. Annali 12: La criminalita`, Torino: Einaudi. —— (2003) ‘Rocco’, in Dizionario del fascismo, vol. II, Torino: Einaudi, pp. 533–7. Schieder, Wolfgang (2008) Faschistische Diktaturen,Go¨ttingen: Wallstein. Schneider, Gabriele (2000) Mussolini in Afrika. Die faschistische Rassenpolitik in den italienischen Kolonien 1936–1941, Vierow: SH-Verlag 2000. Schwarzenberg, Claudio (1977) Diritto e giustizia nell’Italia fascista, Milano: Musia. Seidler, Franz W. (1998) ‘Das Justizwesen der Wehrmacht’, in H. Poeppel, W.-K. Prinz von Prenssen, and K.-G. von Hase (eds), Die Soldaten der Wehrmacht,Mu¨nchen: Herbig, pp. 361–404. Somma, Alessandro (2005) I giuristi e l’Asse culturale Roma–Berlino. Economia e politica nel diritto fascista e nazionalsocialista, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann (Studien zur europa¨ischen Rechtsgeschichte, 195 – Das Europa der Diktatur Bd. 8). Spadafora, Rosa (1989) Il popolo al confino. La persecuzione fascista in Campania, 2 vols,

Downloaded by [Universita degli Studi di Siena] at 07:25 09 May 2013 Naples: Edizioni Athena. Speciale, Giuseppe (2007) Giudici e razza nell’Italia fascista, Torino: Giappichelli. Ungari, Paolo (1963) Alfredo Rocco e l’ideologia giuridica del fascismo, Brescia: Morcelliana. Vassalli, Giuliano (2005) ‘Introduzione’, in Alfredo Rocco, Discorsi parlamentari, Bologna: Il Mulino. Violante, Luciano (1997) ‘Delinquere, perdonare, punire’, in Luciano Violante (ed.) Storia d’Italia. Annali 12: La criminalita`, Torino: Einaudi, pp. XVII–XXXIX.

409