Redalyc.Power and Powerlessness. Alfred Schutz's Theory of Relevance
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Civitas - Revista de Ciências Sociais ISSN: 1519-6089 [email protected] Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul Brasil Goettlich, Andreas Power and powerlessness. Alfred Schutz's theory of relevance and its possible impact on a sociological analysis of power Civitas - Revista de Ciências Sociais, vol. 11, núm. 3, septiembre-diciembre, 2011, pp. 491-508 Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul Porto Alegre, Brasil Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=74221624009 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative Power and powerlessness Alfred Schutz’s theory of relevance and its possible impact on a sociological analysis of power Poder e desempoderamento A teoria da relevância de Alfred Schutz e seu possível impacto na análise sociológica do poder Andreas Goettlich* Abstract: After demonstrating that there is a certain deficit within the existing sociological reflection on power, this article discusses the possible benefit of consulting Alfred Schutz’s theory of relevance for the study of power relations. Especially, Schutz’s distinction between “intrinsic” and “imposed” relevances is reconsidered at length. The thesis claims that an application of Schutz’s concepts can be of some original use, particularly in exploring the perspective of those subject to power, however this application calls for some theoretical revision. Keywords: power, powerlessness, (theory of) relevance, Alfred Schutz Resumo: Após demonstrar que há um certo déficit na reflexão sociológica disponível sobre poder, o artigo discute o possível benefício de consultar a teoria da relevância de Alfred Schutz para o estudo de relações de poder. Em especial, a distinção de Schutz entre relevância “intrínseca” e “imposta” é reconsiderada detidamente. A tese sustenta que uma adoção dos conceitos de Schutz podem ser originais, particularmente ao explorer a perspectiva daqueles sujeitos de poder, entretanto, esta aplicação exige alguma revisão teórica. Palavras-chave: poder, ausência de poder, (teoria da) relevância, Alfred Schutz * Andreas Goettlich works as a research fellow at the University of Konstanz, Germany. His topics of research fall within the scope of the sociology of knowledge, protosociology, the sociology of morality, and the sociology of corruption. <[email protected]> Civitas Porto Alegre v. 11 n. 3 p. 491-508 set.-dez. 2011 492 Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 11, n. 3, p. 491-508, set.-dez. 2011 Introduction: outlining the problem Power is omnipresent – this fundamental statement not only applies to social reality but also to its study within sociological theory. When thinking about social relationships, one cannot ignore the importance of power, which has, consequently, been one of the central subjects for social scientists of all types since the dawn of the field. At the beginning of the 20th century, Bertrand Russell declared “that the fundamental concept in social science is Power, in the same sense in which Energy is the fundamental concept in physics” (Russell 1957, p. 10). Later on, Robert Dahl stated that “the concept of power is as ancient and ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast” (Dahl, 1957, p. 201). Norbert Elias claimed that “balances of power … form an integral element of all human relationships” (Elias, 1978, p. 74), and Heinrich Popitz argued “that the bacillus power is inherent in all human relationships” (Popitz, 1992, p. 21)1. From the standpoint of systems theory, Niklas Luhmann conceived of power as a “symbolically generalized medium of communication” (Luhmann, 1979). These quotations are a more or less random selection from the scientific pool of citations; similar statements could be found in nearly every theoretical paradigm of sociology. It is Max Weber to whom we owe the insight that power is not some kind of essence which adheres to the individual who is in possession of it, but a social “construction” emerging from intersubjective processes. Weber’s genealogical studies on domination2 make clear that power is not a personal trait developed within a solipsistic sphere; it rather refers to an attribution that occurs within social relationships: one person (or a group of persons) ascribes certain traits to another person and this very circumstance enables the second person to assert his/her will. This attribution can rest on “objective” criteria, such as physical strength, yet the aspect of the phenomenon that is of primary sociological interest, is the way in which social patterns of perception, judgment, and behavior are built upon the basis of such criteria. These patterns cannot be attributed to particular social actors; instead they demonstrate the fundamental intersubjectivity of power. In short, sociology is less concerned with power, than it is with power relations. Norbert Elias put it as follows: “Power is not an amulet possessed by one person and not by another; it is a structural characteristic of human relationships” (Elias, 1978, p. 74). This fundamental insight into the relational character of the phenomenon brings into focus the “between” of a social relationship, which requires (at 1 Translation by A.G. The German original reads: “daß der Bazillus Macht in allen menschlichen Beziehungen steckt”. 2 In sub-volume II of the German version of Economy and Society. A. Goettlich – Power and powerlessness 493 least) one person performing power and (at least) one other person subjected to this same power. Typically, this “between” is approached in one of two or three different ways: (1) one can seek a “direct” approach by focusing on societal elements of a structural nature which somehow determine the behavior of social actors – I will call this the “structuralistic” approach. It assumes that for any study on the nature of power it is crucial to know about such structures, and not so much about how people conceive of them. (2) One can analyze the “between” by studying its meaning for the persons involved – I will call this the “individualistic” approach. It assumes that intersubjective structures become apparent only in the behavior of individual social actors and therefore can only be explored by studying individual actions. The “individualistic” approach can be further subdivided into (a) the analysis of the person performing power and (b) the analysis of the person who is subjected to this power. Having said this, I should add that the distinction between the two types of approaches focuses on the different starting points of the two paradigms, not on their results, which may be quite similar. Therefore they do not stand in a contradiction to each other.3 This paper is foremost concerned with the “individualistic” approach. Given the fact that the conception of power as a relationship between at least two individuals owes considerably to Max Weber, his definition of power, which is still the most prominent one within the discipline, seems to be curiously one-sided, since it only looks at the performer of power: “Power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests” (Weber, 1968, p. 53). At first glance, Weber’s focus may be perceived as being self-evident. Since he is concerned with power instead of powerlessness, then the concentration on the performer of power appears sound. Yet, if we take his insight seriously with regards to the relational character of power, his definition appears to be one-sided, as it largely ignores the perspective of the person who is exposed to power. One man’s chance to dominate is another man’s risk of being dominated. This aspect is somehow reflected in Weber’s use of the term “resistance”, but he does not elaborate on it. Now, Weber’s definitional bias did not mislead him into only studying the perspective of the performer of power, since he was clearly aware of the constitutive role played by those ascribing power to other persons. His exploration of this perspective, however, ends at the very point that his cognitive interest extends to – an interest marked by the popular dictum of David Hume: 3 It can be further added that the distinction is ideal-typical. Concrete sociological theories may therefore fall under both categories, like e.g. Elias’s theory of figuration (1978). 494 Civitas, Porto Alegre, v. 11, n. 3, p. 491-508, set.-dez. 2011 “Nothing appears more surprizing to those, who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye, than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few” (Hume, 2002, p. 29). Weber’s sociological reflections can be read as an answer to the question inherent to Hume’s statement: how is it that the few are allowed to govern the many? Accordingly, Weber’s genealogical studies end at the point where this question is answered satisfactorily, and he is, therefore, not interested in the further consequences of powerlessness for those experiencing it in everyday life. This bias becomes apparent in the fact that, when taking Weber’s definition as a basis, powerlessness is a mere residual category which can only be defined ex negativo, that is, as the lacking of something else. Still the relation is an asymmetric one: someone who has power has the chance to manipulate his fellow men and he can make use of this power; on the other hand we cannot say that someone “has” powerlessness or that he “makes use” of his risk to be manipulated by others. Another popular definition of power has been provided by Heinrich Popitz. According to him, power is “the ability to prevail over external forces” (Popitz, 1992, p. 22)4. I touch on this (not specifically sociological) definition, because it clearly hints at an anthropological background, which necessarily stands behind every theory of power – explicitly or implicitly.