MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST SPECIAL GROUP (GSM)
THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION
Special Report
Gilbert ROGER (France) Acting Chairperson
095 GSM 20 E rev.2 fin | Original: French | 11 December 2020
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION: THE COURSE OF COVID-19 IN THE MENA REGION AND ITS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ...... 1
II. ECONOMIC IMPACTS ...... 2
III. ENERGY MARKETS ...... 3
IV. REFUGEES AND CONFLICT ...... 4
V. GENDER ...... 5
VI. YOUTH ...... 5
VII. THE SITUATION IN MENA COUNTRIES AND REGIONS ...... 6 A. IRAN ...... 6 B. ISRAEL, GAZA AND THE WEST BANK ...... 7 C. LEBANON ...... 10 D. JORDAN ...... 12 E. LIBYA ...... 12 F. TUNISIA ...... 13 G. ALGERIA ...... 14 H. MOROCCO ...... 14 I. EGYPT ...... 15 J. THE GULF ...... 16 K. IRAQ AND SYRIA ...... 18
VIII. CONCLUSIONS ...... 20
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 21
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE COURSE OF COVID-19 IN THE MENA REGION AND ITS ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
1. COVID-19 first appeared in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region in January 2020 in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). At first, much of the region managed to avoid the kind of rapid growth of the virus that struck Europe and the United States. But since this summer, the number of reported cases in the region has increased substantially. At first, the greatest problem seemed to be the secondary effects arising out of disease-driven shutdowns, the precipitous fall of trade, the collapse of energy prices and the evisceration of the travel and tourism industries. But by late this summer, an epidemiological crisis had struck many of the countries of the region and the outlook has worsened both on the medical and economic fronts.
2. The region’s economy is now set to shrink by at least 5.7% in 2020 with several of those countries in conflict forecast to undergo as much as a 13% fall in GDP this year. By July, Arab stocks had fallen by 27%, suggesting the degree to which oil price falls and shutdowns had triggered knock-on effects in capital and equity markets. These changes will have a profound impact on the lives of those living in the region. The UN forecasts that the number of impoverished people living in the Arab world could increase by 14.3 million to 115 million overall. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) estimates that the equivalent of 17 million full-time jobs were lost in the second quarter of 2020 alone (UN 7/20). Young people and women have suffered particularly hard as a result of this downturn and attendant job cuts. This has serious implications not only for the region but also for Europe.
3. Already by early March 2020, with the threat of infection becoming apparent, the region’s governments began implementing serious containment measures including travel restrictions as well as school, factory and store shutdowns. Limited border closures ensued which undermined trade and supply chains. Places of worship were also shuttered, and several countries invoked emergency laws to impose quarantine measures on the public. Some governments underreported the spread of the disease, making the spread of COVID-19 all the more likely. The pandemic put into even greater relief the adverse impacts of violence and conflict. In several of the region’s war- torn societies wide-spread inequality, mass unemployment, undeveloped social safety nets, human rights neglect, poor governance have exacerbated the epidemiological challenges (UN, July 2020).
4. While the pandemic has triggered a crisis in many of the region’s poorer countries, the wealthier Gulf countries have had the means, infrastructure and know-how to cope with challenges both in terms of public health and economically. They have been in a stronger position, for example to more seamlessly scale up the digital economy to meet consumer goods and service requirements as traditional businesses shut down. That said, even these countries confront serious longer-term challenges stemming from the pandemic, including the dramatic fall of energy prices and the economic recession this has triggered.
5. Indeed, there is a range of new threats that could undermine this highly heterogenous and already unstable region’s security and economic well-being. For some analysts, the crisis, if it endures could supersede what transpired during the so-called Arab Spring—a disparate set of political uprisings throughout the region that ultimately factored into the onset of three disastrous civil wars in Syria, Yemen and Libya and the fall of governments in Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria. The emerging crisis could reignite public anger if governments fail to get ahead of the pandemic and effectively manage its medical, economic, and social consequences. Were such instability to break out in parts of this extensive region, the humanitarian and security consequences would be grave and would pose an immediate challenge to trans-Atlantic security interests.
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6. Many of the MENA region’s countries are not well equipped to manage a pandemic. Health care systems are weak, infrastructure is poor and there are far too few health care givers. Health expenditure levels range between 0.6% of GDP in Yemen to 4.6% in Israel (Talbot, 2020). It is difficult to compare morbidity and case statistics across the region due to significant discrepancies in data collection methods and state capacity. Some countries do not publish morbidity statistics and COVID-19 testing is not uniformly administered throughout the region. These deficiencies have led to a serious regional transparency problem with adverse public health, social and economic implications (MENA Crisis Tracker). As a general rule, the wealthier countries are far better positioned to generate reliable public health data, administer virus testing and enforce effective public health regulations. The most destabilised countries obviously are in a far worse position. War-ravaged and impoverished Yemen, to take one example of the problem, has simply stopped publishing testing data and there are signs COVID-19 rates in that country are soaring. Syria, the densely populated Gaza Strip and Libya, are very poorly positioned to manage this health crisis.
7. Allied countries and institutions like the EU have provided emergency support where it is most needed. For example, Allied countries have offered countries support in this difficult moment. In August for example, Spain dispatched large quantities of disinfectant to Iraq as part of a larger donation of medical supplies. This summer, Poland transported large quantities of medical supplies to Iraq, including 1,000 litres of disinfectant and 50,000 masks. Turkey airlifted supplies including large quantities of masks, ventilators and testing kits.
8. Expected macroeconomic losses arising out of the crisis have increased substantially in recent months and hit an estimated 7.5% of MENA’s 2019 GDP as of 4 September relative to what might be the case had no crisis occurred. The expected GDP losses are greatest for Lebanon, with an expected loss in 2020 approaching 18% of its 2019 GDP. The IMF now anticipates that the economy of the greater Middle East and Central Asia will shrink by 4.1% in 2020 (IMF, October 2020) and the greatest burden of this decline will fall on the most vulnerable sectors of society (UNHCR, March-August 2020). Indeed, economic fallout from the pandemic has significantly increased poverty, and the World Bank has expressed concern that these reported poverty rates are systematically underestimated (World Bank, 10 June 2020).
II. ECONOMIC IMPACTS
9. The combination of restrictions on movement and work, and the collapse of local and global demand has generated a deep economic crisis throughout the region. The UN has warned that 52 million people in the region could be undernourished as a result. According to the Executive Secretary of the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), Rola Dashti, “The consequences of this crisis will be particularly severe on vulnerable groups, especially women and young adults, and those working in the informal sector, who have no access to social protection and unemployment insurance.” The MENA region is already among the world’s most unequal in terms of wealth distribution; the pandemic will only exacerbate the problem. The impoverished are vulnerable to the ravages of the disease and poor countries are less well-positioned to contain it (OECD, 20 April 2020). The region’s more fragile and destitute countries are now confronting serious social dislocation, recession, and further political instability. Refugee communities in the region are particularly exposed on this front because of poor and crowded housing and inadequate health care.
10. As typically happens at moments of global economic crisis, a flight to safe financial assets has unfolded globally that has taken a high toll on developing countries. The MENA region has not
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been spared. Stock markets throughout the region have plummeted and bond spreads have risen considerably. The region has USD 35 billion in maturing sovereign debt to cover in 2020. Doing so will require agile manoeuvring by the region’s central banks, and the international lending community.
11. Some estimates suggest that Arab countries could undergo a 45% fall in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2020 (MEMO, 19 March 2020). Fiscal revenues in the region are now expected to fall by USD 20 billion in indirect taxes including a USD 5 billion decline in import tariffs. Public budget deficits will likely rise from an average of 2.9% in 2018 to 10% in 2020 and this will require the countries of the region to shoulder more debt. The public debt to GDP ratio already stood at 91% in 2019 and is now slated to rise to 115% in 2020. The figure for Lebanon will hit 151% of GDP. Making this level of debt sustainable will be inordinately challenging. The region’s exports could plummet by USD 88 billion, according to UN estimates, and the fall in oil and gas revenues will account for an important share of these losses. Falling imports will undermine customs revenues and the tax intake will shrink, undermining the capacity of the region’s hard-pressed states to finance basic services precisely when they are most needed (MEMO, 24/4/ 20, UN 7/20).
12. Containment and lockdown measures and falling demand have struck the region’s commercial sectors. The tourism and travel sectors are important for Jordan, Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, Israel, the UAE, and Morocco but also generate income for Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, which draw millions of Muslims each year to holy sites. The crisis, however, has struck the travel industry. Trade has been upended by commercial lockdowns which, in turn, have undermined international supply chains. China is a particularly important link to the MENA region’s manufacturing sector, and its early shutdown had a direct impact on many of the region’s businesses. Imports to the region fell sharply, while governments imposed export bans on critically needed food and medical supplies out of concern about pending shortages of both. It is possible that the crisis could lead to a global restructuring of supply chains with some firms shortening the distance between parts manufacturing and primary markets. This could prove a long-term benefit to the region given its proximity to large and important European markets (OECD, 20 April 2020).
13. Labour markets in much of the MENA region are precarious and informal, at least for many of those not working directly for the state or large firms. The informal sector typically pays lower wages, and workers do not enjoy the kind of social protections and insurance extended to those employed in the formal sector. The spread of COVID-19 and lockdowns have thus exacted a high toll on vulnerable informal workers throughout the region. Many have lost their jobs and have little other sources of income. This is not simply a humanitarian challenge; it poses a genuine risk to social and political stability.
III. ENERGY MARKETS
14. At the onset of the pandemic, Russia and Saudi Arabia engaged in discussions to reduce oil supplies to maintain prices despite a recession-driven collapse in global demand. The two initially failed to reach an agreement and instead launched a price war that drove prices to the lowest level since 2003 (Alterman, 28 April 2020). Although several weeks later Saudi and Russian negotiators agreed on output cuts, the damage had been done, and an oil glut coupled with a lack of available storage drove prices to near zero for some oil markets. Oil exporting states in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq underwent deep earnings falls when increased government expenditure has been needed to provide basic support for citizens. This market imbalance will take months to correct even after the global economic outlook begins to improve.
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15. The MENA region’s economic prospects are closely linked to the fate of energy markets. Producer countries obviously benefit from high global prices. While the region’s energy poor countries might suffer when energy prices soar, they have nonetheless benefited both directly and indirectly from the prosperity of their richer energy exporting neighbours. Millions of their citizens work in energy exporting countries and send home remittances. For Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon remittances constitute roughly 10% of GNP, and so the contraction in the Gulf countries quickly spilled over to these economies through a fall in remittances, trade, and foreign assistance (Alterman, 28/4/20). Energy wealth undergirds regional trade relationships as well as aid and other transfer payments to poorer countries. The stabilisation of prices which in November stood at roughly 40 USD/b at least injected a degree of certainty to the situation although that price is quite low compared to the 64 USD/b and 73 USD/b average prices in 2019 and 2018 respectively (US Energy Information Administration, 7 January 2020).
IV. REFUGEES AND CONFLICT
16. Those countries in the region engaged in conflict are particularly vulnerable to the ravages of the pandemic. In Yemen and Syria, fighters have targeted public health infrastructure, including hospitals. Sanitary conditions were already very poor in both countries and they were already susceptible to epidemics because of the collapse of public health infrastructure, poor public access to health care, undernourishment, a lack of clean water, and a dearth of trained medical personnel.
17. There are mounting concerns about the capacity of the MENA region’s huge refugee and internally displaced communities to cope with the spread of the disease, particularly as many live in highly precarious, unhygienic and densely crowded circumstances. Impoverished communities are more exposed to the ravages of the disease and are less well-positioned to contain it. Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen as well as several countries in the Sahel must cope with huge numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) while Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan are hosting huge numbers of refugees largely from Syria.
18. By autumn 2020, the vulnerability of an estimated 15 million refugees and IDPs in the broader region began to become apparent as the COVID-19 epidemic swept through some of these communities. Infection rates in refugee camps in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine surged in September. Even prior to the pandemic, meeting refugee needs in Lebanon and Jordan became more difficult due to shortages of medical services and supplies. Social tension has risen as a result (Chulov, 2020).
19. The deterioration of living conditions among local populations may lead some hard-pressed governments, under pressure from these populations, to reduce aid to refugees. Some local authorities in Lebanon, for example, have suggested that refugees living in their communities should only expect support from international providers. North-West Syria is a particular concern as so many refugees are living in highly precarious conditions in the midst of conflict. As much as 65% of people living there have fled their homes, medical services are primitive and very few COVID-19 tests have been given (Chulov, 2020).
20. The international community has sought to respond by supporting emergency funding and a range of measures to protect refugees from the spread of the disease. The UNHCR has launched a Coronavirus Emergency Appeal to support these efforts and is working in camps like Jordan’s Zaatari and Azraq to prepare staff and residents to take protective measures to limit the spread of the disease. A far greater share of the region’s refugees, however, do not live in sanctioned camps. They too are vulnerable, with many lacking access to basic support networks and living in
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dangerously crowded urban conditions. Access to essential information is also a challenge for these vulnerable communities (Carpi, 2020).
V. GENDER
21. Gender discrimination, an enduring social challenge in the MENA region, is also worsening as a result of COVID-19. Although men are more physically vulnerable to the disease, women are more exposed to its socioeconomic impacts. Women play an important role in the emergency response health care sector in the region and are thus more exposed to infection. The shuttering of schools has placed extra burdens on women. Women are also overrepresented in a range of vulnerable sectors including the informal work sector and refugee communities. Women suffer from systematic job discrimination in much of the region and are overrepresented in the ranks of the unemployed. Women in the region endure the world’s lowest formal labour market participation rate (20%), in part, due to discriminatory societal norms. They entered the current crisis already living in relatively precarious circumstances and the crisis has only worsened the situation (OECD, 10 June 2020).
22. On average, women earn 78.9% less than men on a per capita basis and could lose 700,000 jobs in the MENA region. They are particularly vulnerable to a downturn in the informal sector where they constitute 61.8% of workers (UN, July 2020). The burden is all the greater as women take primary responsibility for children who cannot attend schools due to widespread lockdowns. It is certainly welcome that several governments in the region have formulated gender-specific policies to address these unique challenges. The World Bank estimates that achieving gender equality in earnings over the lifetime of the current generation of working-age women in the MENA region would create an additional USD 3.1 trillion of regional wealth (World Bank, 30 May 2018).
23. Since the pandemic emerged and with the onset of widespread lockdowns, the rate of spousal abuse has skyrocketed; a problem that has been evident elsewhere in the world including in the West. The problem has been aggravated by lockdowns in neighbourhoods where large families live in small apartments ill-served by public social services (OECD,10 June 2020). Although access to education has improved for girls and women in the region in recent years, the pandemic has triggered a significantly higher female school dropout rate. There are serious problems of access to the tools and conditions needed for remote learning generally, but here as well, women may suffer more daunting challenges related to child care responsibilities, and access to computers, the internet and quiet space at home for studying.
VI. YOUTH
24. The MENA Region is demographically very young, and those under the age of 30 are particularly resistant to the worst physical impacts of COVID-19. But young people bear additional socioeconomic burdens due to this pandemic. Youth unemployment for the region has not dipped below 25% over the last quarter century as compared to a global average of 13% (Kumar, 2020). The so-called Arab Spring itself was, in part, an expression of young people’s deep frustration with the region’s political and economic systems. Activists charged that governing elites were systematically denying young people economic opportunity and adequate vehicles for political expression. The problem has only worsened. In 2019, the MENA region had the world’s highest level of youth unemployment although the numbers varied considerably. Qatar, for example, had the world’s lowest youth unemployment level at 0.4% while Libya had the world’s second rate at 50% (MEMO, 12 September 2020).
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25. Although shutdowns have temporarily quelled street demonstrations in several countries, young people’s alienation could be exacerbated because of this health-economic emergency and the related economic downturn. Civil society in much of the region is not fully articulated, and limits on political expression can make it very difficult for young people to express grievances and work within the legal frameworks to find solutions. This dynamic has been a source of enduring instability in the region and was central to the Arab uprisings in 2011 (Kumar, 2020). The concern now is that the public health emergency and recession could become a pretext to ratchet up both protest and repression in some countries. There is obviously a fine balance to be struck here, and the situation varies enormously by country and sub-region. The risk is that further repression in some countries could undermine the legitimacy of ruling elites and thus foment future civil and political unrest.
VII. THE SITUATION IN MENA COUNTRIES AND REGIONS
26. Government responses to the COVID-19 crisis in the MENA region have varied considerably as have public reactions to it. Although the challenges are widespread, there are particular concerns for the most fragile countries burdened with weak health care systems, poor finances, insufficient legitimacy, and internal instability. The remainder of this report will survey the situation in the countries of the region.
A. IRAN
27. Last spring, Iran was the epicentre of the regional health crisis. As of 9 November 2020, Iran has registered more than 692,949 cases and 38,749 deaths (Worldometer, Iran). This is the highest number of confirmed cases and deaths in the MENA region and 13th highest in the world (WHO, 2020). The virus initially appeared perhaps because of Iran’s extensive ties with China. China is one of Iran's few economic partners, and the government was initially unwilling to restrict trade and travel there. It is believed that parliamentary elections held on 21 February drew millions of Iranians to the polls, and that this too helped spread the virus.
28. The Iranian government initially insisted that the disease was simply a flu (Zimmt and Fadlon, 2020). Misinformation concerning the merits of alternative medicine was widely spread, perhaps because these provided affordable if ineffective substitutes for scarce and costly drugs (The Economist, 12 April 2020). Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself championed alternative medicine to limit Western imports. To deflect attention from its own failure to manage the crisis, the regime promulgated the notion that the disease originated as an American biological weapon (RFE/RL; Al Arabiya; Tass, 2020). These initial prevarications exacted a high toll. Hundreds of Iranians died from drinking ethanol, which was rumoured to kill the virus (The Economist, 12 April 2020).
29. Trust in the regime was already low due to recent crackdowns against protestors, the high unemployment rate, and the cover-up of the Iranian military’s 8 January 2020 downing of a Ukrainian civilian airliner. While high-ranking politicians and officials were quarantined, the population continued to work as the disease spread. Official infection figures likely understated both the level of contagion and the number of deaths in the country. As of 25 March, the COVID-19 crisis in Iran had officially killed 2,077 people and infected 27,017, but WHO suggested the death toll could be five times higher. The government’s inadequate response to the pandemic could reinforce mounting demands for political change.
30. Iran also confronts structural problems coping with the disease. It has a limited capacity of 8,212 intensive care unit beds (OECD, 29 April 2020). The government has transformed stadiums into isolation centres (The Economist, 12 March 2020), while the military has established
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emergency medical facilities and isolation wards. Armaments factories are now producing personal protective equipment, oxygen canisters and hospital beds (Perteghella, 2020). Government in- fighting has clearly been a factor in the chaotic response (Fassihi, 2020). While the religious supreme leader controls the armed forces, the elected president runs the civil administration. The government was slow to shut down the city of Qom, where the outbreak started, and it may have hesitated because of that city’s sacred status. Although Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ordered the armed forces to impose curfews, President Rouhani initially rejected doing so. Already burdened by international sanctions and decades of questionable economic policy, the state clearly lacks the economic and financial resources to support millions of people in quarantine.
31. On 5 March 2020, President Rouhani finally imposed restrictions on some economic activities, and announced the closure of commercial centres, markets, and cultural centres. The government shut schools and universities and postponed major religious events. On 25 March, the state imposed restrictions on the movement of vehicles and citizens (Zimmt and Fadlon, 2020). This partial lockdown included the closure of all non-essential businesses and the suspension of travel between provinces. To reduce the spread of the virus in prisons, the regime temporarily released 85,000 inmates and pardoned 10,000 prisoners (Geranmayeh, 2020).
32. The regime wanted to strike a balance between fighting the pandemic and keeping the economy afloat. On 8 April 2020, it announced that two thirds of “low risk” economic businesses would resume on 18 April, except in the province of Tehran. It also approved income supplements to 3 million of the poorest Iranians, while providing interest-free loans to 4 million people without an income (Zimmt and Fadlon, 2020). Iranian authorities then postponed health insurance, tax and utility payments for three months. For the first time since the Islamic Revolution, Iran requested an emergency IMF loan of USD 5 billion to underwrite the fight against the pandemic, while the European Union approved a humanitarian assistance package of EUR 20 million to Iran.
33. Far from responding to requests to lift sanctions against Iran for the duration of the pandemic, the Trump Administration imposed additional sanctions on Iranian energy companies following the attacks on American troops in Iraq on 11 March 2020 by Iranian proxies (Clarke and Tabatabai, 2020). US forces and Iranian proxies continue to clash in Iraq.
B. ISRAEL, GAZA AND THE WEST BANK
34. The first cases of COVID-19 in Israel were reported at the end of February, just prior to general elections. Because authorities acted quickly, the national hospital system was not initially overwhelmed with COVID-19 cases. Israel is relatively isolated in the region and does not have a great deal of cross-border movement of people to monitor. In addition to self-quarantine regulations, closure of public facilities, and restriction on movement and trade, the Israeli government initially issued a series of emergency regulations, some of which were controversial. Israel’s security agency, the Shin Bet, for example, was empowered to use cover advanced surveillance technology to track people’s movements to ensure compliance with these rules.
35. This initially proved helpful in containing the disease, and as of 15 June 2020, the country had suffered only 302 deaths for a population of 9 million (Johns Hopkins, 2020). Unfortunately, that figure has since skyrocketed. As in many European countries, once Israel was able to flatten the curve in May, it allowed gyms and restaurants to reopen and permitted large gatherings. These decisions appear to have backfired as they have elsewhere, and the virus relentlessly spread in conditions of openness. The caseload in Israeli hospitals subsequently soared. Indeed, by late summer, the infection rate had accelerated to about 3,000 per day, which at the time was the highest per capita rate in the world (i24 News). As a consequence of the increased rate of infection, on 7 September, the government reimposed strict measures across 40 towns to curb the
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outbreak, including movement restrictions, curfews and the closure of schools and non-essential businesses. In late September, further restrictions were enacted as the number of cases continued to rise. Israel was the first developed country to impose a second lockdown (BBC 25/9/20). As of 9 November 2020, Israel had recorded 319,562 cases and 2,674 deaths (Worldometer, Israel).
36. The lockdown has generated a degree of resistance in Israeli society due to its obvious economic consequences. There have been a series of public demonstrations against the measures taken by the government. The Israeli economy is now set to shrink for the first time in two decades after a long period of sustained growth in which unemployment was halved and public debt slashed. An estimated 800,000 Israelis are currently out of work and this has fed the political backlash (Halbfinger, 13 August 2020).The OECD now projects that the Israeli economy will shrink by 6% in 2020, although it could return to a projected grow rate of 2.9% in 2021 (OECD, 23 September 2020).
37. The dynamics at play in Gaza are very different. The geopolitical isolation of that highly crowded enclave probably delayed the onset of the pandemic. The first two cases of COVID-19 were only confirmed in late March, two weeks after the Palestinian Authority (PA) reported the first cases in the West Bank and declared a state of emergency. Gaza is very vulnerable both to the pandemic and its economic fallout. The pandemic is now exacerbating an underlying humanitarian crisis that has gripped the enclave for years. Before the pandemic, 54% of the population lived below the poverty line, and food insecurity levels had reached 71% (Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor, 2020). Even before the outbreak, the WHO warned that Gaza’s health care system was “on the brink of collapse” (Lovatt, 7 April, 2020). Gaza’s population density, already overstretched health facilities, chronic drug shortages and lack of essential equipment make it extremely vulnerable. Gaza entered the crisis with only 87 intensive care beds and only 20 doctors trained to deal with such an epidemic (Imbert, 2020; OCDE, 2020). Moreover, the precipitous decline in the quality of life has undermined societal resilience which has also been undercut by chronic water shortages and inadequate sewage treatment facilities among other things (Crisis Group Middle East, 2020).
38. Palestinian refugee camps are a particular source of concern. Apprehensions mounted when four members of the same family in the In Al Maghazi refugee camp tested positive on 24 August. Since then, cases have been on the rise, with about 98 new cases reported at the beginning of September, bringing the total number of cases to 581. Authorities in the Gaza strip have imposed strict quarantine measures through a full lockdown of 48 hours across the entire strip. After the reopening of schools on 8 August, the academic year soon came to a halt with some 600,000 students confined to their homes. Meanwhile, recent tensions between Hamas and Israel led the Netanyahu government to halt fuel shipments into Gaza, leading to an electricity shortage. Tensions mounted further when Hamas launched bomb carrying balloons, triggering Israeli airstrikes on Hamas.
39. According to the Palestinian Authority’s Ministry of Health, the number of COVID-19 cases in the occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza reached 13,457 at the end of July after infections sharply increased in the second half of that month. The rate of transmission in the West Bank by then had reached 1.58, meaning that every two infected individuals are likely to spread the virus to three other people. Initially, the rate of infection in the territories was quite low and when the PA eased its initial lockdown after public protests in late May, there were less than 130 confirmed coronavirus cases. Rising numbers in July led to a second partial lock (Husseini, 2020).
40. Most of the reported cases have been in the southern city of Hebron, but cases are generally underreported due to the relatively small number of administered tests. One official noted that in late July, there were about 35,000 tests administered for every one million people, compared, for
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example, to the UAE which conducted 490,000 for every one million people (Husseini, 2020). Whereas many of the early cases were traced to those who were working in Israel, now most cases are attributed to community infection.
41. On 26 March, the PA released a National COVID-19 Response Plan that outlined health, economic, and social measures to mitigate the impact of the pandemic. The authorities imposed confinement measures and a curfew, the shutting of schools, universities, and public facilities, and restrictions on movement between cities. Quarantine and treatment facilities were established in several West Bank governorates and public laboratory capacities were scaled up (OCDE, 20/4/20).
42. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), although the initial number of detected cases remains relatively low, the Palestinian health system would likely struggle with a significant increase in COVID-19 cases due to structural challenges and critical shortages. Even if the pandemic outbreak were limited, the financial impact could push the Palestinian Territories over the edge, particularly in Gaza. Although the West Bank is better prepared than Gaza to cope with the crisis (Tzoreff, and Michael, 2020), its own health care system is hampered by years of low investment, personnel shortages and a lack of essential equipment including testing kits (OCDE, 20 April 2020). In May 2020, West Bank hospitals had 205 ventilating machines at their disposal.
43. While aspiring to limit the spread of COVID-19, the Palestinian Authority’s emergency measures, including a total lockdown, had a significantly negative impact on economic activity. The 100 000 to 130 000 Palestinian workers who normally commute to Israel or Israeli settlements were no longer able to do so (El-Halabi, 2020). This dealt a sharp blow to the Palestinian economy, as these relatively well-paid workers and their families account for a third of private consumption in the West Bank (World Bank, 16/4/20). Output, consumption, and investment have plummeted there, primarily because of the lockdown affecting tourism, education, most branches of trade and services (Khalidi, 2020).
44. Following three years of GDP growth averaging 2% a year, the economy of the Palestinian territories will shrink by an estimated 8% according to the World Bank, depending on the duration of restrictive measures and developments in Israel. The PA’s fiscal deficit will limit the government’s capacity to maintain services, provide immediate economic support and underwrite longer-term measures to galvanise economic recovery. The Minister of Finance recently announced that debt payments will now be postponed. The World Bank now forecasts a GDP growth of 2.5% in 2021 but adds that full normalisation of activity is not expected before the second half of 2021. The poverty rate is projected to stall around 27.5 percent in 2021 (World Bank, Palestinian Update, October 2020).
45. Earlier in the year, The UN Special Coordinator, Nikolay Mladenov, warned the Security Council that “if current trends continue, the damage to the economy risks the very existence of the Palestinian Authority” (UNOCHA, 2020). But he has also reported that despite enduring tension, the main political actors - Hamas, the PA, and the Israeli government – were cooperating to tackle COVID-19. Following the creation of a joint operations centre, the Israeli government and the PA closely coordinated their response and confinement measures (UN News, 18 April 2020). In a practical initiative that essentially acknowledges the degree to which Israel and the Palestinian authority are mutually dependent, on 17 March the two governments announced an agreement that would allow tens of thousands of West Bank residents working in Israel to settle on Israeli territory. The Israel government’s Coordinator for Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT) has also facilitated trainings for Palestinian medical teams, while the Israeli Ministry of Health donated over 1000 testing kits to the West Bank and Gaza. Despite long-standing tensions
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between Hamas and the PA in Ramallah, the two authorities have cooperated through the good offices of WHO and UNRWA (Imbert, 2020).
46. The PA had eased sanctions on the Hamas-dominated government in Gaza, while Hamas and Israel were cooperating in limited ways to contain the spread of the virus. Israel, for example, shipped army testing kits into the Palestinian Territories (UNOCHA, 2020) and agreed to facilitate the passage of international aid to Gaza (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). Israel did not provide substantial assistance to the enclave but recognised its special humanitarian responsibilities in the region despite the conflict. On 23 April 2020, the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process urged Israeli and Palestinian leaders to build on this cooperation to take steps towards peace (UN News, 23 April 2020). An escalation of the conflict with Hamas in August, however, led Israel to tighten the blockade.
47. Several international organisations and countries are providing financial and medical support to the Palestinians. In April, the European Union launched an assistance package of roughly EUR 71 million, in addition to the EU’s annual support of EUR 13 million. The European Commission is looking into the possibility of providing an additional EUR 4 million to its EUR 82 million contribution to the UNRWA budget for 2020 (EEAS, 9 April 2020). The United Nations has launched a joint USD 34 million COVID-19 Response Plan, which it will implement in the West Bank and Gaza. The goal is to slow virus transmission, provide patient care, and mitigate the worst effects of the pandemic. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and the European Commission agreed to help underwrite this additional spending. The World Health Organisation has delivered testing kits to Palestine to conduct an estimated 57,650 tests and has provided Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and hand sanitisers to protect an estimated 2,000 health workers. It is also working with the public to provide practical advice on how to prevent COVID-19.
48. After having previously cut all funding to the Palestinian Authority and the UNRWA, the United States announced a USD 5 million aid package for West Bank hospitals and households. The PA’s Prime Minister recently announced that the Ministry of Health received 10,000 coronavirus test kits and ventilators from China, and Chinese authorities have promised to dispatch a medical team to assist medical teams operating there. In early April, Saudi Arabia provided medical supplies and preventative equipment to combat the spread of the virus. Turkey has transferred the Palestine-Turkey Friendship Hospital in Gaza to Palestinian authorities. The facility, which was built by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), is the largest healthcare facility in Palestine. Turkey has also granted $5 million and provided medical supplies to Palestine to combat the coronavirus outbreak.
C. LEBANON
49. Lebanon registered its first COVID-19 case on 21 February 2020, but the newly formed government of Prime Minister Hassan Diab was slow to react. The government was consumed with a long series of public protests that had begun in October 2019 (El-Halabi, 2020). But as the threat grew, it announced a nationwide lockdown on 15 March, which closed non-essential businesses and imposed a night-time curfew. On 12 March, the World Bank approved the reallocation of USD 40 million in emergency response to equip Lebanese governmental hospitals and increase testing and treatment. At the time, the Ministry of Health announced that only 10 public hospitals out of 33 were equipped to treat COVID-19 cases.
50. The COVID-19 pandemic is one in a long series of calamities that has struck Lebanon in recent decades including a 15-year long civil war, the presence of Iranian-trained militia on its territory, serious political tensions with its large neighbour Syria, wars with Israel, widespread corruption, poor services, paralysing political division and most recently, a catastrophic explosion in
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the port of Beirut that decimated a large swathe of that important city. That tragedy along with the pandemic and its economic fallout have come close to precipitating a collapse of the Lebanese state and triggered the government’s resignation.
51. After years of financial mismanagement, Lebanon already suffered a low level of economic resilience, leaving it poorly positioned to cope with the economic shock linked to lockdowns and global recession. The country’s foreign currency reserves have been dramatically depleted, and the currency, which was pegged to the US Dollar, fell by 80% between October 2019 and July 2020. Hyperinflation set in, and food prices in the country soared. Lebanon is highly dependent on imports, and the collapse of the Lebanese Pound triggered a dramatic rise in food and other essential goods prices. Meanwhile, critical foreign exchange generators like tourism have collapsed. Remittances, another vital source of foreign exchange, are down substantially as the global economy slows and workers are laid off in labour importing countries. On 1st April 2020, the government approved a plan to distribute USD 150 to the most vulnerable families. The low level of central state aid has opened the door for the sectarian political parties to increase their influence and legitimacy. Hezbollah, for example, quickly mobilised a team of over 24,000 health workers and 70 ambulances (El-Halabi, 2020).
52. By the end of April, the Lebanese Pound had lost three times its value in only six months. By then, five different exchange rates were in operation in the country. Lebanon’s capacity to import has fallen considerably, and this has lowered supplies of food and energy. Short-term loans to commercial firms have dried up, and many are turning to far riskier and more expensive black- market operations (Dadouch, 2020). A former director general of the Finance Ministry has charged that banks have smuggled USD 6 billion out of the country, while small account holders have been denied access to their funds (Mounzer, 2020). Many Lebanese have rapidly fallen into poverty, and the country now faces new challenges in simply feeding the population.
53. Lebanon’s fragility can also be linked to the significant presence of refugees who account for one third of its population. It has long provided generous support for these victims of regional wars and instability, despite difficult economic circumstances. COVID-19 has made that task far more daunting. Municipalities have put in place their own specific restrictions on the movement of refugees, of whom there are estimated 1.5 million residing in the country (Chehayeb and Sewell, 2020). There are also concerns about the levels of humanitarian aid and health care available to these refugees. Many impoverished parents have taken children out of school so that they can work in supermarkets or operate as street vendors or beggars. This has been hastened by school closings and the lack of organised youth activities. UNHCR has noted a substantial increase in the number of children calling child protection organisations for assistance (UNHCR March-August 2020).
54. Demonstrations that began in Lebanon prior to the crisis came to a halt after Lebanon went into quarantine. But violence returned in the northern city of Tripoli in late April as young protestors incensed by the collapse of the currency, soaring inflation approaching 60%, mass unemployment, dwindling food supplies and what many viewed as an unresponsive government took to the streets and set fire to a number of banks and clashed with the army. The unrest quickly spread to other cities. These myriad tribulations were only exacerbated when a huge explosion at a depot destroyed a large area around the port of Beirut, leading to the government’s resignation soon thereafter.
55. After a surge in cases in September, by 9 November, Lebanon had registered 94,236 COVID-19 cases and 723 related deaths (Worldometer, Lebanon).
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D. JORDAN
56. Jordan is in the midst of a sharp spike of COVID-19 cases and as of 9 November 2020 had registered a total of 109,321 cases and 1,233 deaths (Worldometer, Jordan). The caseload accelerated dramatically in September and October, putting the infection in Jordan among the highest in the Middle East. This occurred after laudable initial success in containing the virus. In mid-September, the government announced a set of school closings and a shutdown of some commercial enterprises as a result of this spike. The goal has been to avoid repeating the kind of mass shutdown that the government had deemed essential earlier in the spring because of the serious economic toll that lockdown exacted. But by late October, Prime Minister Bisher al-Khasawneh said that although the country had entered a “difficult phase” after widespread community transmission, his government would not reimpose a national lockdown (Al- Khalidi, 2020).
57. The current situation represents a genuine setback for a country that initially performed very well in fending off the virus. Already in late January 2020, Jordanian authorities had established a crisis committee to coordinate a response to COVID-19 and to establish protocols for dealing with the virus (Younes, 2020). The government declared a state of emergency on 17 March 2020 and imposed a lockdown two days later. The government also closed all land and sea border crossings and banned international flights. It also deployed the army to patrol the streets while delivering essential supplies to refugee camps.
58. Although these efforts slowed the spread of the virus in the spring, the nationwide lockdown triggered supply and demand side shocks that weakened an already vulnerable economy (Al- Ajlouni, 2020). Jordan has had to cope with a collapse in tourist revenue which is a primary generator of foreign exchange earnings. The national budget is not able to support substantial counter-cyclical spending to counteract the worst impacts of the crisis. The government has long had to manage high fiscal deficits and substantial public debt. The pandemic has gravely exacerbated those challenges. On 21 May 2020, the IMF Executive Board signed off on a USD 39 million assistance package to help Jordan cope with a balance of payments crisis, additional health care spending, and public support for vulnerable Jordanians and businesses (IMF, 21 May 2020).
59. Jordan hosts a very large refugee community residing both in camps and in the country’s cities and towns. UNHCR reports that 92 % of surveyed refugees reported in May that they had less than 50 Jordanian Dinars (JOD) of savings, while 40 % had debts of more than 100 JOD per capita. More than 90 % reported having to implement at least one negative coping strategy such as reducing expenditure on health and education (UNHCR March-August 2020).
E. LIBYA
60. Libya faces a twin challenge of pandemic and conflict between the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Fayez al-Sarraj and the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar. Humanitarian groups are deeply concerned about the potentially devastating impact of COVID-19 among the 150,000 people displaced by this civil strife (Joseph and Pusztai, 2020). Haftar’s forces have unfortunately targeted health care facilities and, for example, shelled a quarantine centre at Mitiga Airport in March 2020 (Giampaolo, 2020). As of September 2020, approximately half of Libya’s primary care facilities were closed, mostly because of the fighting. In currently operational health care facilities, medical staff have struggled to respond to COVID-19. More generally, Libyan children confront an immunisation crisis which the epidemic is only exacerbating (World Health Organisation, 2020). Although there are few reported coronavirus cases in Libya, testing is very limited due to a serious shortage of testing kits and
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laboratory capacity. Social stigma attached to COVID-19 has discouraged testing and the disclosure of close contacts for follow-up contact tracing (World Health Organisation, 2020).
61. As of April 2020, Libya counted a total of 305 isolation rooms and 542 quarantine and stabilisation rooms (OECD, 29 April 2020). Many hospitals are filled with war injured civilians and fighters. Authorities from the contending factions have formally introduced measures to prevent disease spread, but experts suggest that it is difficult to distinguish between real measures and propaganda (Giampaolo, 2020).
62. In March 2020, all land, sea, and air borders into Libya were closed for three weeks. At the time, contending authorities also imposed temporary containment measures, including the banning of large social and cultural gatherings, and the closure of schools, restaurants, and cafes. The GNA, which controls the west of the country, has pledged USD 350 million to improve the health care system and enhance responsiveness to the pandemic. It has also implemented a financial transfer system for vulnerable informal workers using mobile phones (OECD, 29/4/20). The LNA has sought to bolster public support by sending aid and medicine to the west of the country (Giampaolo, 2020).
63. Although the international community has been divided over the Libyan crisis, in September 2020, with backing from the United Nations, Libya’s warring factions reached preliminary agreements on prisoner exchanges, the opening of land and air transit corridors in the divided country, and the resumption of oil production after the blockade by General Haftar (Al Jazeera, 19 October 2020). The GNA and the LNA followed on the initial agreements with UN-sponsored talks, which culminated with the signing of a permanent cease-fire agreement on 23 October 2020 (UN News, 2020).
64. The French, German, Italian, and United Kingdom governments warmly welcomed the recent cease-fire agreed between Libya’s warring factions (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, 2020). That agreement rejected a role for foreign mercenaries, called for the formation of a joint military force, and the establishment of mechanisms to monitor cease-fire violations (AP News, 2020). Previous cease-fires have been agreed and broken in Libya, but the October diplomatic breakthrough begins a parallel political process. In November, representatives from the GNA and the LNA are expected to meet in Tunisia to hold further political talks to set up elections to decide Libya’s future (AP News, 2020).
F. TUNISIA
65. The COVID-19 pandemic has severely tested a Tunisian government that only came to power in February 2020. On 16 March 2020, the authorities suspended international flights, closed land, and maritime borders, enforced a lockdown, and banned all public gatherings. These measures initially worked well, and the country had only 1,157 cases and 50 deaths as of 22 June 2020 (Worldometer, Tunisia). At least with the initial lockdown, Tunisian society seemed to have endorsed the effort (Dworkin and Megerisi, 2020).
66. As elsewhere in the region, the caseload began to surge at the end of the summer. The total number of coronavirus cases rose to more than 71,119 on 9 October 2020 with a total of 1,873 deaths compared with roughly only 1,000 cases before the country's borders were reopened on 27 June 2020 (Worldometer, Tunisia). Prime Minister Mechichi has now ordered Tunisia's governors to implement lockdowns where necessary. But he has been reluctant to reimpose a nationwide lockdown because the closures in March exacted such a high toll on the economy. Those shutdowns and the collapse of tourist earnings triggered a 21.6 % fall in GDP in the second
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quarter compared to the same period last year—a shocking decline for a country that has struggled economically in recent years (CGTN, 5 October 2020).
67. Tunisia has made an admirable effort to build a democratically ordered state under trying circumstances, and the government has embraced the principle of transparency in managing the current crisis. It has created a user-friendly website to share real-time information about the crisis and government policies to cope with it (Mezran et. al., 2020). Poor health infrastructure, however, remains a challenge, and the country entered the pandemic with only 331 intensive care units (ICU) beds (Guetat, 2020). On 26 March, the Ministry of Health confirmed that it had acquired 2,000 additional ICU beds.
68. As Tunisia is highly dependent on income from tourism and trade with Europe, its economy has suffered a serious setback. The government has introduced a series of economic and fiscal measures to tackle an expected recession. These include the creation of a support fund for SMEs, management credit procedures for companies in the tourism and hospitality sectors, and delayed tax levies for most affected businesses. The government has also offered financial assistance to the most vulnerable households. Tunisia has received USD 400 million from the IMF and solicited donations for a fund aiming to fight the pandemic. In May 2020, Tunisia requested critical medical supplies from NATO through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, which is the Alliance’s primary civil emergency response mechanism (NATO, 2020).
G. ALGERIA
69. The COVID-19 outbreak coincided with political and social protests that had begun in Algeria in February 2019. On 20 March, Algerian authorities prohibited further demonstrations due to mounting COVID-19 infections in the country. WHO has identified Algeria as a country at high risk of COVID-19 due, in part, to its economic links with China (Dworkin and Megerisi, 2020). Its health care infrastructure is limited with only 400 ICU beds nationwide (Hamaizia, 2020). There are also serious problems with water supplies and sanitary conditions in parts of the country. Not unlike Tunisia, in Algeria the rate of COVID-19 began to rise substantially in June 2020. As of 15 June, 10,919 Algerians had been diagnosed with COVID-19 and the death toll stood at 767. By 9 November 2020, the number of infections had risen to 61,381, while the number of deaths had reached 2,036 (Worldometer, Algeria).
70. President Abdelajid Tebboune responded to the epidemic by imposing a partial lockdown, cancelling cultural events, and closing schools and mosques. The government has used the pandemic to crack down on the press and has restricted the reporting of journalists critical of the government and its efforts to contain the virus (Roggero, 2020). The government recently released more than 5,000 inmates to limit the spread of the disease in prisons. But political prisoners including leaders of the recent social protests were not included in these releases (Hamaizia, 2020). The risk of making such political distinctions is that it could delegitimise public health measures and deepen the country’s political divide.
71. Falling energy prices have exacerbated the challenge for Algeria. Hydrocarbons generate 93% of its export revenues and account for 60% of the state budget. The IMF now estimates that economy will shrink by 5,2% in 2020 (Hamaizia, 2020). Banks and financial institutions have rescheduled loan repayments (OECD, 29 April 2020), while the government continues to pay public sector wages and subsidise consumer expenditure.
H. MOROCCO
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72. Public health experts have praised Morocco’s rapid response to the COVID-19 outbreak. On 20 March 2020, while still counting low COVID-19 numbers, Moroccan authorities imposed tough lockdown and transportation measures, while closing schools and mosques (Martini, 2020). The government immediately allocated USD 200 million to reinforce the health care system and moved with alacrity to distribute masks. The government also adopted a comprehensive communication strategy in Classic Arabic – as well as in local dialects – to broadly raise awareness on the need for social distancing and personal hygiene measures. Like other Maghreb countries, Morocco has a limited health care capacity that could be vulnerable were the rate of infection to rise to high levels. When the COVID-19 crisis began, the country had 1,642 ICU beds, but this rose to 3,000 by April 2020 (OECD, 29 April 2020). Moroccan health officials are deeply concerned about a second wave of COVID-19 this fall and winter. The overlap between the flu season and the COVID-19 pandemic could yet overwhelm the country’s hospitals and testing sites. Long lines at Morocco’s testing centres were evident over the autumn 2020. By then, case numbers had begun to rise rapidly (AP News, 2020). As of 9 November 2020, Morocco counted 256,781 COVID-19 infections and had registered 4,272 deaths (Worldometer, Morocco). The uptick in infections has led to some targeted measures in Morocco’s main cities: Tangiers, Casablanca, and Rabat (AP News, 2020).
73. King Mohammed VI has created a special fund to underwrite the fight against the pandemic. By April 2020, it had raised more than USD 3.2 billion to improve health infrastructure, acquire medical supplies and mitigate the socioeconomic burdens of the crisis (OECD, 29 April 2020). There are concerns that the pandemic might deepen economic inequalities and regional disparities, and the fund partly aims to counteract this phenomenon. Despite the government’s effective response, the general lockdown triggered some citizen backlash against the Moroccan authorities. Medical professionals, for example, have organised protests against understaffing at health care facilities and the lack of protective equipment for health care workers (Abouzzohour, 2020).
I. EGYPT
74. Egypt is the most populated Arab country with nearly 100 million inhabitants and, not surprisingly, has one of the region’s highest levels of infections (Amirah, 2020). As of 9 November 2020, Egypt had recorded 109,201 cases and 6,368 deaths (Worldometer, Egypt). In March 2020, the Egyptian government imposed a general lockdown, including closures of schools, universities, cafés, and restaurants. It banned travel, tourism, and sporting events and enforced a nationwide night-time curfew.
75. Egyptian authorities simultaneously took measures to support the most vulnerable, including extending social assistance programs. Many Egyptians were in dire need of such assistance: roughly a third of the country’s 100 million population lived below the poverty lines before the COVID-19 crisis struck (Awadalla, 2020). The government has provided funding to one million informal workers in construction, agriculture, and fishing. It has lowered the price of natural gas and electricity provided to factories and delayed property taxes to support the industrial sector (Shama, 2020). It has also decreased equity taxes, while the Central Bank cut interest rates by 3% and deferred due dates for small business and consumer loans by six months.
76. Egypt suffers a shortage of nurses, and there are only 1.3 hospital bed per 1,000 people (Shama, 2020). WHO has confirmed that Egyptian authorities have allocated 2,000 beds for COVID-19 treatment, half of which are in intensive care units and 600 with ventilators (OECD, 29 April 2020). The government has opened more testing centres and purchased roughly 400,000 test kits. Egypt’s government also announced EGP 1 billion (~USD 63.5 million) in additional funding for its health care services and has introduced several measures to better
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accommodate a sudden rise in critical patients. Egyptian authorities have also requested USD 7.9 million from the World Bank’s emergency response fund.
77. There are signs of public anger and frustration (Ardovini, 2020). Some critics charge that the government has not been transparent about infection rates and several foreign journalists reporting on the pandemic have been censured (Mezran, et. al., 2020). Reports from Cairo suggest widespread concern among medical professionals who claim that there is an inadequate supply of protective equipment. In March 2020, around 13% of those infected were medical professionals.
78. In June 2020, Egypt began lifting its lockdown while continuing certain precautionary measures, such as the suspension of Friday prayers. Clubs, cafés, restaurants, other public establishments were allowed to reopen to 25% of their full capacity (Egypt Independent, 2020). However, COVID-19 case numbers surged and by November 2020, Egypt’s Prime Minister warned that another full lockdown could be necessary (Middle East Monitor, 2020). This would take a serious toll on Egypt’s vulnerable economy, which is highly dependent on tourism (12% of GDP and 9% of employment) (Altman, 2020). Analysts estimate that the country would lose USD 1 billion per month over a lockdown (Dworkin and Megerisi, 2020). Losses on this scale could exacerbate public discontent. The collapse of global shipping has also dramatically reduced revenues generated by Suez Canal fees, which normally produce USD 5 billion a year for the Egyptian state.
J. THE GULF
79. The pandemic has also struck the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE). As of 9 November 2020, Saudi Arabia has the most confirmed cases in the GCC with 350,984 cases and 5,596 deaths followed by Qatar (134,433 / 232) and the UAE (143,289 / 516) (Worldometer, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE). The Gulf states are also expected to undergo a significant economic downturn linked largely to the sharp fall in global energy prices (World Bank, 14 April 2020). This has implications for the economies of the broader MENA region and beyond. The GCC countries have long provided vitally needed development assistance and aid to the poorer countries of the region. This has traditionally helped stabilise parts of the MENA region by underwriting support for many of the most vulnerable in these countries. But the economic crisis precipitated by the pandemic could begin to erode this support and this, in turn, could be a factor in social unrest in the region should this crisis endure.
80. Over the past 25 years, the Gulf countries have undertaken substantial investments in health care infrastructure and personnel. This has significantly improved the quality of health care services. According to a March 2020 WHO preparedness assessment, GCC countries have a sustainable capacity to respond to the coronavirus crisis. But there are vulnerabilities. Firstly, high diabetes and obesity rates leave the population at risk for hospitalisation and mortality linked to the COVID-19 infection. The region also heavily relies on an expatriate medical workforce and imported medical equipment and supplies, which have been impacted by travel and transport restrictions (OECD, 20 April 2020). This challenging situation prompted Oman to make an exception for flights from China loaded with medical supplies, at a moment when all commercial flights to and from Oman were suspended (Sievers, 2020).
81. GCC countries responded quickly to the pandemic on matters pertaining to movement, travel, and entry. Nationwide curfews, lockdowns and social distancing measures were swiftly imposed in all six countries. All suspended inbound flights, while Oman ended visa issuance to non-nationals. Saudi Arabia discontinued domestic air travel, bus, and taxi services and trains (Harb, 2020). Schools, universities, and public venues were closed, and public gatherings were prohibited. Ramadan prayers services were accordingly suspended, and mosques closed, including the
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holy mosques in Mecca and Medina (Al Yousef, 2020). In October, Saudi authorities reopened the Grand Mosque in Mecca for a limited number of Saudi pilgrims. The Saudis also began to lift some restrictions on international travel (Al-Jazeera, 4 October 2020). Beginning of May, many of these restrictions were partially lifted: Saudi Arabia eased lockdowns across the country while Bahrain reopened its airport for transit passengers (Brookings, 5 August 2020). Normally, Mecca welcomes two million visitors for the hajj; strict limits this year meant that earnings the event typically generates have been foregone.
82. The pandemic and confinement measures around the world have slashed global demand for oil and gas. Production initially continued apace resulting in huge supply gluts. This then triggered one of history’s greatest energy price shocks: oil prices plummeted by 70% in value as storage capacity reached its limits. Just as this shock was unfolding, on 1 April 2020, the Vienna agreement among OPEC member and partner countries officially expired. That agreement had fixed oil production and stabilised prices for three years (Kozhanov, 2020). A breakdown in producer negotiations and a dispute between Saudi Arabia and Russia on oil production levels hastened the price collapse. Saudi Arabia had advocated for deep production cuts while Russia opposed this course. As a response, Saudi Arabia cut its official selling price by USD 8 to pressure Russia to move off its position. Russia, which is highly dependent on energy exports, saw in the price falls an opportunity to deal a blow to higher cost US shale oil producers, that have exercised a degree of price discipline over the market (Wemer, 2020). Saudi Crown Prince bin Salman, for his part, hoped to reassert Saudi market leadership. Finally, on 12 April, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other OPEC+ nations agreed to cut oil production by a tenth of global supply for May and June. The deal reinforced Saudi Arabia’s hand while exposing the limits of Russia’s influence in the region (Cook, 2020).
83. The pandemic and related oil price shock are upending the economies of the GCC, with implications for the region’s short- and long-term outlook. Gulf labour markets seized up due to recession, commercial lockdowns, travel restrictions and quarantine efforts, while demand for GCC-produced goods, most notably oil and gas, sharply fell (World Bank, 14 April 2020). As the monarchies generate political and social consensus partly through the redistribution of energy revenues, the recession has been politically fraught. Gulf governments have accordingly unveiled substantial stimulus packages ranging from a USD 34 billion UAE initiative to Kuwait’s more limited USD 1.5 billion program. The region will spend an additional USD 120 billion to boost national economies (Al-Tamimi, 2020).
84. According to the IMF, GCC countries are expected to slide into recession in 2020. This will undermine efforts to diversify the region’s economies. In recent years, the monarchies have undertaken substantial investments in non-energy sectors including infrastructure, tourism, health care, logistics, retail, high tech, and finance (Kozhanov, 2020). Falling trade, plummeting investor confidence, reduced travel, production disruptions, and declining energy revenues now put this strategy at risk. This has prompted the Saudi Finance Minister to announce delays in the kingdom’s Vision 2030 economic diversification plan (Bordoff, 2020).
85. More specifically, the IMF forecasts that Middle Eastern oil exporting countries will experience a 7.3% fall in GDP. Oil prices stood near USD 40/b in early November 2020. The precipitous fall in oil prices and the collapse of demand triggered by COVID-19 will result in USD 270 billion lost revenues for GCC countries (Augustine, 2020). In late September 2020, GCC central government deficits were forecast to reach about USD 490 billion cumulatively between 2020 and 2023, while government debt will surge by a record high USD 100 billion in 2020. The IMF has suggested that Saudi Arabia would need oil prices at USD 76.10 (nearly twice today’s price) to achieve fiscal break-even in 2020. But with oil prices at USD 40/b, Ryad faces a budget
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deficit approaching 11.4% of GDP. Oil accounts for roughly 87% of Saudi budget revenues, 90% of export earnings, and 42% of GDP (Kimani, 2020).
86. Labour markets are also at risk. GCC monarchies employ tens of millions of expatriate workers in both skilled and unskilled positions. Foreigners constitute almost 90% of the population of the UAE and 85% in Qatar, for example (CGTN). But there have been serious problems ensuring the rights of migrant workers and in providing support to low-income foreign workers living in overcrowded, underserved accommodation camps (Sherlock, 2020). Many qualified professionals have also been affected by the virus and have now registered for repatriation. This could ultimately trigger a labour shortage in GCC countries and trigger a reassessment of current labour policies.
87. War-torn Yemen is, by far, the Gulf country most vulnerable to the COVID-19 pandemic. Although officially it only had registered 2,070 cases and 602 deaths as of 9 November 2020, there is no way of knowing how extensively the disease has spread there (Worldometer, Yemen). The International Rescue Committee asserts that Yemen has one of the world's lowest testing rates, and there are anecdotal reports of significant backlogs at burial sites suggesting a spike in the death rate. Many experts thus believe that the infection rate in Yemen is much higher than reported, particularly as the conditions for disease spread are so propitious. Save the Children, for example, recently reported that as many as 400 people died in Aden in one week and it noted that several hospitals in that city had shut down and medical staff were refusing to work due to the lack of personal protective equipment (Al Jazeera, 25 May 2020). The warring factions have sought to weaponise the pandemic and each has charged the other with deliberately spreading the disease.
88. Fighting has continued throughout the health emergency and IDPs living in very poor and crowded conditions are highly vulnerable to the spread of the disease. Fighting in the Marib governate between Houthi rebels and Saudi-supported government forces has moved very close to IDP settlements. The lack of international aid and absence of medical support for these communities is deeply worrying. Yemen’s health care system is clearly broken, and the country lacks the means, the infrastructure, the personnel, and the finances to control the spread of the disease. In October, the physicians’ union announced that 63 Yemeni doctors have died of COVID- 19 this year (MEMO, 3 October 2020).
89. Humanitarian aid to Yemen has suffered due to a fall in international support and Houthi and government efforts to deny aid flows to regions of the country that they do not directly control. Pledged aid to the country has fallen from USD 2.6 billion in 2019 to USD 800 million in 2020. The UN has warned that 31 of 41 UN assistance programs in the country may now have to be shut down or dramatically reduced. UNHCR argues that IDPs are “the most vulnerable to the threat of COVID-19,” and confront the most serious risks. Recent flash flooding in Marib increased the chance of cholera outbreak, a problem that has afflicted the country in recent years (Human Rights Watch, 22 May 2020). In Yemen, payback rates for refugee entrepreneur microloans have dropped by 10 % (UNHCR March-August 2020).
K. IRAQ AND SYRIA
90. Iraq and Syria confront unique and serious challenges linked to the pandemic stemming from the legacy of brutal civil wars that weakened both country’s stability, institutions, economies, and infrastructure (Svensson, 2020). Syria and Iraq are highly vulnerable to the medical, social, political, and economic fallout from the crisis. There are justified concerns that the worsening public health and economic situation in both countries could further destabilise both countries.
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91. Medical capabilities and health infrastructure were severely damaged during the wars in both Syria and Iraq. Less than two thirds of hospitals were still operational at the end of 2019 in Syria while 70% of health care workers have fled that country since 2011. The situation remains highly problematic throughout Syria. Civilian infrastructure has been decimated while moving aid in the country has become very difficult.. Refugees and IDPs in Iraq confront a particularly acute problem. 79 per cent of surveyed internally displaced persons in camps and 63 per cent in urban and rural areas reported that refugee communities have been struck by rising rates of trauma, stress, and anxiety since the onset of the pandemic (UNHCR March-August 2020).
92. Ongoing instability in Syria, particularly in the northeast, has made it difficult to provide international medical support to a highly vulnerable public. The government has obstructed aid flows to Kurdish-controlled regions, and this has only increased the risk of infection. The Red Cross has warned that overcrowded refugee camps in Idlib province are potential breeding grounds for the disease as social distancing is virtually impossible there. An estimated 6 million Syrians are currently displaced but still living in the country. Poor sanitary conditions and a lack of water only heighten the risk. Restrictions on aid deliveries from Damascus and Iraq prevent delivery of medical supplies and personnel needed to prevent, contain, and treat COVID- 19. The UN claims that the lack of laboratories in north-east Syria, serious transport delays and other access challenges have undermined the capacity of aid workers to administer COVID-19 tests and provide essential care (Human Rights Watch, 28 April 2020). The UN Security Council has requested cross-border authorisation to ensure the flow of some medical supplies through Turkey into Syria. On 12 May, the European Commission issued guidance to facilitate the task of humanitarian workers fighting against the coronavirus in Syria (European Commission Press Release, 12 May 2020). Josep Borrell, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, maintains that sanctions should not impede the delivery of essential supplies needed to fight against the pandemic. He argues that humanitarian exemptions are fully in line with international law.
93. As of 9 November 2020, Syria had reported 6,215 COVID-19 cases and 317 deaths (Worldometer, Syria). But the Syrian government’s limited testing capacity, particularly where it exercises no control, suggests that the numbers are significantly higher. Testing has been largely restricted to Damascus and there are accusations that local authorities throughout the country are failing to report the spread of the disease. WHO has provided medical and lab equipment, testing kits and personal protective gear for use in Aleppo, Homs and Latakia (Al-Jazeera, 20 April 2020). Disinformation, however, remains a problem including laudatory reports of fake cures, which, like underreporting, tends to lower public vigilance (Ghebreyesus, 2020). UNHCR reports that health costs have been among the greatest impediments to accessing care, which many are unable to afford. Access to elective surgeries and medical intervention became even more difficult due to a suspension of service this spring (UNHCR March-August 2020).
94. In early October, COVID-19 cases surged in north-west Syria to a reported 100 new cases a day or about 14 times higher than the rate of infection over the summer. Once again, these numbers likely vastly understate the true extent of the crisis as there is no systematic testing in the region. Many symptomatic people refuse to seek help due to stigmatisation or because they fear going to very poor health care facilities. There are currently 2.7 million IDPs living in the region. Aid organisations warn that failure to provide support to the very weak local health care system will lead to a dramatic increase in cases this winter. The child-focused aid agency World Vision warns that unless the already weakened health system receives immediate international support, the situation will become dramatically worse very quickly. Children on the move are particularly vulnerable to catching and spreading the disease, while the capacity for testing in the region is very low. Health care workers are particularly vulnerable, and many have been infected. Economic collapse has made the situation more dangerous (World Vision, 2020).
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95. As of 9 November 2020, Iraq had reported 489,549 cases of COVID-19 and registered 11,327 deaths (Worldometer, Iraq). Iraq now has only 1.4 hospital beds and 0.8 physicians per 1,000 people (Ali, 2020). Vaccinations rates in the country are very low because of inadequate investment in health care. UNICEF and WHO have called on the Iraqi government to undertake intensive immunisation activities to reduce this vulnerability. Despite the public health emergency, insurgency remains a problem in parts of Iraq. On 5 May, ISIS claimed to have killed at least 18 people in attacks in north-east Iraq (BBC, 5 May 2020). Terrorist groups have exploited the fact that government security forces have been redeployed to urban centres to support lockdown measures (Loveluck and Salim, 8 April 2020).
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
96. Although the MENA region has generally not seen the kind of infection rates that have swept through parts of Asia, Europe, the United States, Brazil, and Russia, it has been particularly vulnerable to the economic fallout from the crisis. While the Arab Spring began at a moment when some economies in the region and particularly those in the GCC were growing, this crisis has struck a more economically and politically fragile region weakened by economic stagnation, energy price instability, war, civil unrest, an influx of refugees and IDPs, and ever more serious climate related difficulties. The MENA region is thus very vulnerable to the public health and economic fallout of this crisis (Alterman, 29 April 2020). 97. International assistance to some of the most vulnerable communities in the MENA region will be of critical importance in the coming months, and given the mounting budgetary constraints worldwide, a reduction in such assistance seems likely. The risk is that the region will explode if basic humanitarian needs cannot be met. This would have very serious security implications for the international community. Medical support will be critical and once treatments or vaccines are available to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis, these should be made widely available to the people of the region. China has moved proactively on this front by donating substantial supplies of medical equipment to many countries in the region. This is obviously welcome, but some see China’s “mask diplomacy” as a prelude to a far more interventionist approach to the region, while the West, preoccupied by its own recovery plans, feels that its own capacity for action is limited.
98. The basic needs of migrants and refugees living throughout the MENA region cannot be neglected due to the COVID-19 crisis, and these communities will require both local and international support. Their needs must be factored into all recovery plans. Providing medical assistance to IDPs and refugees in conflict-torn regions should remain a priority for the international community. Efforts to address the specific challenges confronted by women in the MENA region stemming from this crisis will be essential. They are most likely to feel the social and economic impacts of the crisis and will need support from their governments and the international community.
99. It is particularly welcome that several governments from the region have sought to incorporate gender-specific policies as part of their response to the COVID-19 epidemic. This reflects not just a change in political outlook on gender issues in parts of the region, but also a pragmatic approach to a range of socioeconomic challenges. In this sense, the onset of this difficult pandemic is introducing welcome changes at least among the more forward-thinking governments of the region, which are determined to take a more holistic and socially consequential approach both to this grave societal challenge and to economic policy making.
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