February 2021

Monthly Forecast

1 Overview Overview 1 In Hindsight: Subsidiary Bodies Chairs and Penholders for 2021 In February, the UK will have the presidency of Panel of Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan 3 Status Update since our the Security Council. Its signature events will focus Sanctions Committee. January Forecast on climate change and COVID-19. The high-level Regarding the Middle East, there will be the 4 Central African meeting on security risks in climate-vulnerable monthly meeting on developments in Yemen, as Republic contexts is expected to be chaired by UK Prime well as a briefing by the chair of the 2140 Yemen 6 COVID-19 Minister Boris Johnson. The COVID-19 meeting Sanctions Committee. The renewal of Yemen will focus on equitable access to vaccines, especially financial and travel ban sanctions and the mandate 7 Syria in conflict-affected areas; UK Foreign Secretary of the Yemen Panel of Experts is also anticipated. 9 Myanmar Dominic Raab is expected to chair. Other Middle East issues that will be 10 Sudan There will also be a briefing on the threat considered include: 12 Counter-Terrorism posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant • Iraq, update on UNAMI and on the missing and the Secretary-General’s twelfth strategic-level Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and 13 Yemen report on this issue. missing Kuwaiti property, including the 14 Iraq Several meetings are planned on Somalia. The national archives; 16 Somalia Council will receive a briefing on developments • The Middle East, including the Palestinian 17 Haiti in Somalia and the UN Assistance Mission in Question, the monthly briefing; and 19 Climate Change and Somalia (UNSOM). A meeting is also planned • Syria, the regular briefings on the political Security on the 751 Somalia sanctions committee. At and humanitarian situations and on the use of the end of the month the Council is expected to chemical weapons. 20 DPRK (North Korea) renew the authorisation of the AU Mission in Two meetings on Asia are anticipated: on Somalia (AMISOM). Myanmar and the 1718 Democratic People’s Other African issues include: Republic of Korea Sanctions Committee. • CAR, update on developments and the most Finally, there will also be a meeting on the UN recent MINUSCA report; and Integrated Office inHaiti (BINUH). • Sudan, renewal of the mandate of the

In Hindsight: Subsidiary Bodies’ Chairs and Penholders for 2021

The presidential note on the election of the Guidance and Practice in the Selection of Subsidiary chairs and vice-chairs of subsidiary bodies for Body Chairs 2021, issued on 7 January, was the culmination In 2016, the Informal Working Group on Doc- of almost six months of negotiations among the umentation and Other Procedural Questions Security Council’s incoming and permanent (IWG) issued a presidential note on transitional members (P5). Despite new working methods put arrangements for elected members (S/2016/619) 29 January 2021 in place in 2016 to facilitate a more efficient and calling on Council members “to make every effort This report is available online at securitycouncilreport.org. transparent process, getting agreement this time to agree provisionally on the appointment of the was protracted and challenging. The difficulties chairs of the subsidiary organs for the following For daily insights by SCR on evolving Security Council actions please had as much to do with the negotiations between year no later than 1 October”. Since then, mem- subscribe to our “What’s In Blue” the permanent and elected members as is it did bers have made concerted effort to reach agree- series at securitycouncilreport.org or follow @SCRtweets on Twitter. with competition among elected members to head ment by this date, although it has never quite been particular subsidiary bodies, coupled with reluc- met. Even if the list is agreed before the end of tance to take on others. the year, the presidential note setting out the new

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 1 In Hindsight: Subsidiary Bodies Chairs and Penholders for 2021

chairs of subsidiary bodies is traditionally concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban was in 2019, Germany appointed its deputy per- issued at the beginning of January. split into one committee for more general manent representative as chair of the 1970 The transitional arrangements conveyed terrorist listings, and another for the Taliban. Libya Sanctions Committee. Now, Norway in the 2016 Note were incorporated in the Second, the 2021 presidential note con- has appointed its deputy permanent repre- 2017 “Note 507” on working methods. These tains two footnotes. The first states that sentative as chair of the DPRK Sanctions arrangements included that consultations on “India will be the Chair of the counter-ter- Committee. Late in the negotiations, ques- the appointment should begin as soon as pos- rorism committee until the end of 2022, tions arose over the role of vice-chairs and sible after the elections and be conducted in a after Tunisia leaves the chair”. The second how they are chosen. The guidelines of many “balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive footnote states that Mexico will be the Vice- subsidiary bodies state that, when the chair is way” by two members of the Council “work- Chair of the Working Group on Children unable to chair a meeting, they will nominate ing in full cooperation”. The understanding and Armed Conflict until the end of 2022, one of the vice-chairs or a representative of from the start has been that the two mem- after Niger concludes its term as Vice-Chair. their mission. While chairs often use the lat- bers in question would be the IWG chair and In effect, these negotiations have selectively ter option, it appears that an actively engaged one permanent member. This year, St. Vin- brought 2022 chairing arrangements into vice-chair, working closely with the chair, is cent and the Grenadines, as chair of the IWG, the mix, giving some members dibs on more strongly positioned to play a substan- coordinated the process among the incom- future year arrangements and taking these tive role. Further discussion may be needed ing members and worked on the list of chairs slots off the table for the 2022 incoming on how vice-chairs can best be utilised. with the “P5 coordinator”, a position that members. While similar verbal agreements Representational level also featured in the rotates quarterly. Last year, France was the have been made in the past, these footnotes negotiating process. The initial discussions P5 coordinator from August to October 2020, formalise such commitments. among the incoming members were held at and China from November to January 2021. permanent representative level, with final Reflections and Takeaways discussions among the political coordina- This Year’s Process This year’s negotiations may have been espe- tors. The P5 were apparently represented at This year’s elected members made a prom- cially complicated due to the mix of subsid- political coordinator level throughout the dis- ising start. The first meeting to discuss sub- iary bodies available as well as the composi- cussions, creating a perception of imbalance. sidiary body chairs took place in late June, tion of the five incoming members. With three It is possible that having more engagement shortly after the five incoming members were of the five members having similar priorities among the P5 permanent representatives elected on 17 June 2020. By early July, an regarding protection issues, files such as chil- might allow for easier agreement. initial list of members’ preferences had been dren and armed conflict, women, peace and There is also a continuity argument for drawn up. There were ten subsidiary bodies security and climate and security were hotly designating one P5 coordinator to serve available: six sanctions committees and four contested. At the other end of the spectrum throughout the negotiations, rather than the subsidiary organs. Agreement was reached were “undesirable” sanctions committees, mid-way change entailed by the position’s on all the vacant slots except for one sanc- perceived as singularly politically sensitive or usual three-month rotation cycle, although tions committee, which was viewed as politi- resource-intensive. It was hard for the incom- this does not seem to have been an impedi- cally sensitive. One thematic working group ing five to present a list without gaps or over- ment in the recent process. had two elected members vying for the chair: lap, despite the general perception that giving it was proposed to split the chair, with each the P5 an incomplete list is more likely to Penholderships and Burden-sharing member getting a year. This initial list was result in a reshuffling of positions. While today the subsidiary body chair posi- conveyed to the P5 in mid-August. The P5 This year informal bodies, such as the tions are all filled by elected members, the responded with a counter-proposal in late Informal Experts Group on women, peace position of penholder on most country files is September, which was not acceptable to sev- and security and the choice of the elected largely in the hands of the P3, with few such eral incoming members. Following further members for the Peacebuilding Commission penholder positions available to elected mem- discussions, the incoming members agreed were treated as part of the mix of subsidiary bers—currently only Afghanistan, Guinea- to resubmit the original list, this time with bodies and included in the list given to the Bissau, the Syria humanitarian file and West no vacant slot or shared positions. The P5 P5. In previous years, positions for informal Africa and the Sahel. (The penholder role accepted most of the allocations, but further bodies were de-linked from the appointment refers to the member of the Council that leads negotiations were needed with at least one process for formal subsidiary bodies and they the negotiation and drafting of resolutions on incoming member that remained dissatisfied do not appear in the presidential note on the a particular Council agenda item. Somewhat with its mix of subsidiary bodies. The list of appointment of subsidiary body chairs. These contentiously, there has been no structured chairs was ultimately agreed on 5 January. positions have not traditionally required P5 link between the chair of a given subsidiary There are two unusual aspects to the 2021 sign-off; arguably, however, their inclusion body and the penholder on the same agen- presidential note on chairs of the subsidiary can ease the overall negotiation process by da item.) Elected members have also called bodies. For the first time, the 1267 and 1988 putting more options on the table. for better burden-sharing and more equal sanctions committees will be chaired by dif- Committee chairs serve in their personal distribution of work among the members ferent members. These two committees were capacity and the general practice has been for of the Security Council. A December 2019 created in 2011 when the committee estab- the permanent representative to take on this presidential note stressed that the selection of lished pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) role. However, departing from this practice chairs should “take into account the need for

2 securitycouncilreport.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 In Hindsight: Subsidiary Bodies Chairs and Penholders for 2021 a shared responsibility and a fair distribution Conclusions While the incoming members may have had of work for the selection of the Chairs among Elected members often come to the Coun- to plunge into tough negotiations, among all members of the Council, bearing in mind cil table with a clear idea of their priori- themselves and with the P5, even before tak- the capacities and resources of members”. ties. Their subsidiary body preferences are ing their Council seats, their ability to remain Co-penholderships between permanent often linked to these priorities as well as to united in the face of proposed changes from and elected members, another regular topic the resources they can bring, including the the P5 was essential to having an outcome of discussion, became a reality for the first country’s—or the permanent representa- with which most members appear satisfied. time when Germany joined the UK as co- tive’s—experiences. To avoid gaps in the ini- Incorporating reflections from the 2021 penholder on Libya sanctions and Sudan in tial list for the P5, however, members may appointment process may allow for an easier 2019. However, the 2020 incoming members need to be flexible and willing to consider and earlier decision for the 2022 positions. did not seek such partnerships. It appears some positions not on their “wish list” or to For more information on the penholders that while some of the 2021 incoming mem- give up those that are. As members prepare and chairs of subsidiary bodies, please refer bers were interested in co-penholding with a for a seat on the Council, an earlier under- to our 2021 table on Security Council pen- permanent member, they chose not to pur- standing of the workings of the different sub- holders and chairs of subsidiary bodies as of sue this following signs that it would not be a sidiary bodies might demystify some of the January 2021. viable proposition in 2021. As before, there more opaque committees and spur interest are several co-penholder positions involving in areas that had not been an initial priority. two elected members.

Status Update since our January Forecast

Maintenance of International in Mali (MINUSMA) Mahamat Saleh and Secretary-General of the LAS Ahmed Peace and Security: Challenges of Annadif. Annadif presented the Secretary- Aboul Gheit briefed the Council on areas of Maintaining Peace and Security in General’s latest report on Mali dated 28 cooperation between the two organisations. Fragile Contexts December 2020 (S/2020/1281). In addi- On 6 January, the Council held a high-level tion to the report, members considered Cyprus open videoconference (VTC) debate on the the Secretary-General’s bi-annual letter on On 19 January, the Council held VTC con- challenges faced by countries in fragile con- MINUSMA operations, including security sultations on the situation in Cyprus. Special texts, in particular on the African continent challenges, implementation of the mission’s Representative and head of the UN Peace- (S/2021/24). Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed adaptation plan, mission performance, and keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) Eliza- chaired the meeting. UN Secretary-General transition planning (S/2020/1282). Closed beth Spehar briefed the Council on the recent António Guterres, Chair of the AU Com- VTC consultations followed the public developments and key findings from two Sec- mission Moussa Faki Mahamat, and former session. On 14 January, Security Coun- retary-General’s reports on UNFICYP: one President of Liberia Ellen Johnson Sirleaf cil members issued a press statement that was the semi-annual report on the mission briefed. Tunisia circulated a concept note condemned in the strongest terms the (S/2021/4) and the second focused specifi- ahead of the debate (S/2020/1296). attack perpetrated on 13 January 2021 cally on UNFICYP’s good offices (S/2021/5). against MINUSMA north of the town of On 29 January, Council president Tunisia West Africa and the Sahel Bambara-Maoudé, in the Timbuktu region, read the results of the written voting proce- On 11 January, Security Council members which resulted in four peacekeepers from dure for resolution 2561, which was adopted held a VTC briefing with the Special Repre- Côte d’Ivoire killed and five others injured unanimously and extended the mandate of sentative and head of the UN Office for West (SC/14411). In an 18 January press state- UNFICYP for another six months. Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) Mohamed ment, Council members also condemned in Ibn Chambas, who presented the Secretary- the strongest terms the 15 January attack Colombia General’s 24 December 2020 report on West near Tessalit in Kidal region, which resulted On 21 January, the Security Council con- Africa and the Sahel. At the time of writing, in the death of one peacekeeper from Egypt, vened for an open VTC meeting, followed by Council members were still negotiating a and seriously injured another (SC/14414). a closed VTC session, on Colombia. Special draft presidential statement on the region Representative and head of the UN Verifica- proposed by Ireland and Niger. Cooperation between the UN and the tion Mission in Colombia Carlos Ruiz Mas- League of Arab States sieu briefed on recent developments and the Mali On 18 January, the Council held a meeting Secretary-General’s latest 90-day report on On 13 January, Security Council members on cooperation between the UN and the the mission (S/2020/1301). On 28 January, held a VTC briefing on Mali, with Special League of Arab States (LAS) at the initia- Council members issued a press statement, Representative and head of the UN Multidi- tive of Tunisia, Council president in January. which expressed grave concern over the mensional Integrated Stabilization Mission Under-Secretary-General Rosemary DiCarlo targeting and killing of former combatants,

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 3 Status Update since our January Forecast social leaders, and indigenous, Afro-Colom- The Situation in the Middle East, (UNSMIL), Stephanie Williams, in an open bian and other communities. They also wel- including the Palestinian Question VTC briefing followed by closed VTC consul- comed the Colombian government’s recent On 26 January, the quarterly open debate on tations. Due to lack of consensus in the 1970 request for the expansion of the Verification “The Situation in the Middle East, includ- Libya Sanctions Committee on his statement, Mission’s mandate to verify implementation ing the Palestinian Question” was held in the new chair of the committee, Ambassador of the sentences of the Special Jurisdiction VTC format. Tor Wennesland, who replaced T.S. Tirumurti (India), was unable to brief for Peace and undertook to give this request Nickolay Mladenov as the Special Coordi- the Council on Libya sanctions. prompt consideration. nator for the Middle East Peace Process in December 2020, gave his first briefing to the Arria-Formula Meeting on Belarus Council in his new role. Ahmed Aboul Gheit, Repatriation of Children from Conflict On 22 January, there was an Arria-formula the Secretary-General of the League of Arab Zones meeting, held via videoconference, on media States, also briefed. On 29 January, Security Council members freedom in Belarus. The meeting was organ- held an Arria-formula meeting on “Children ised by Council members Estonia, France, UN Regional Centre for Preventive and Armed Conflict, Repatriation of Chil- Ireland, Norway, the UK, and the US, and Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) dren from Conflict Zones: From Camps to co-sponsored by non-Council members Bel- On 27 January, Special Representative and Homes. Call for Action”. The meeting was gium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germa- head of the UN Regional Centre for Preven- co-organised by the Russian Federation, ny, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and tive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA) Kazakhstan and the Office of the Special Ukraine. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Natalia Gherman briefed Council members Representative of the Secretary-General for Estonia, Urmas Reinsalu, chaired the meet- in a closed VTC meeting on the UNRCCA’s Children and Armed Conflict. The briefers ing. The keynote speech was delivered by activities. She updated Council members were Virginia Gamba, Special Representative Irene Khan, the UN Special Rapporteur on on the activities of the centre since her last of the Secretary-General for Children and the promotion and protection of freedom of briefing in July. In this regard, she apparent- Armed Conflict; Vladimir Voronkov, Under- opinion and expression. Sviatlana Tsikha- ly discussed the centre’s efforts to empower Secretary-General for Counter-Terrorism; nouskaya, the Belarusian opposition presi- women and youth in the region, UNRCCA’s Anna Kuznetsova, Presidential Commission- dential candidate, delivered introductory support for transboundary water manage- er for Children’s Rights of the Russian Fed- remarks. Briefers included Pavel Latushko, ment projects, and its support for the imple- eration; and Magzhan Ilyassov, Permanent a member of the opposition’s Coordina- mentation of the UN’s anti-terrorism strategy. Representative of Kazakhstan to the UN. tion Council Presidium and the Head of the National Anti-Crisis Management; Stanislav Libya Ivashkevich, an investigative journalist and On 28 January, the Council received a brief- producer at Belsat TV; and Gareth Browne, ing by the Acting Special Representative and a journalist for The Times (UK). head of the UN Support Mission for Libya

Central African Republic

Expected Council Action the 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee run-up to, and following, the 27 December In February, the Council will discuss the expires on 31 August 2021. 2020 presidential elections. Secretary-General’s latest report on the UN One week before the presidential elections, Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Key Recent Developments armed groups attacked several towns outside Mission in the Central African Republic Since the Council’s 12 November 2020 Bangui, CAR’s capital. MINUSCA forces (MINUSCA), which is due by 15 Febru- adoption of resolution 2552, which extend- were deployed on 20 December 2020 to two ary. The Council will be briefed by Mankeur ed MINUSCA’s mandate by one year, the municipalities to the north-west of Bangui Ndiaye, the UN Secretary-General’s Spe- security and political situation in the CAR that had been attacked by the armed groups. cial Representative for the Central African has deteriorated considerably. The country On 21 December, Under-Secretary-Gener- Republic (CAR) and head of MINUSCA. has suffered a series of attacks by an alli- al for Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix The mandate of MINUSCA expires on ance of armed groups, known as the Coali- briefed Council members on the escalating 15 November 2021. The CAR sanctions tion of Patriots for Change (CPC), against situation under “any other business”. On regime expires on 31 July 2021, and the Central African armed forces (FACA) and 23 December, MINUSCA reported that it mandate of the Panel of Experts supporting MINUSCA in towns across the CAR in the had retaken control of the town of Bambari,

UN DOCUMENTS ON THE CAR Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2552 (12 November 2020) extended the mandate of MINUSCA and the authorisation to use all means to provide operational support to MINUSCA until 15 November 2021. S/RES/2536 (28 July 2020) renewed the CAR sanctions regime until 31 July 2021 and the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the CAR Sanctions Committee until 31 August 2021. Secretary-General’s Report S/2020/994 (12 October 2020) was the most recent report on MINUSCA. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8771 (19 October 2020) was a briefing on the Secretary-General’s report.

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235 miles north-east of Bangui, which had that had followed the retreat of armed groups. reportedly a reference to Russian and Rwan- briefly fallen to armed groups. On the same On 18 January, two more MINUSCA dan troops, pushed back the CPC forces. day, the Council approved Secretary-Gen- peacekeepers—from Gabon and Morocco— eral António Guterres’ proposal to tempo- were killed on the outskirts of Bangassou Human Rights-Related Developments rarily redeploy two infantry companies and when their convoy was ambushed by armed In a 15 January statement, the independent expert on human rights in the CAR, Yao Agbetse, said two military utility helicopters from the UN groups. In a press statement on 18 January, that “thousands of Central Africans were unable Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to assist Council members expressed their condo- to exercise their right to vote” and that “many MINUSCA for a two-month period. On 25 lences to the families of the killed peace- were victims of torture or ill-treatment and death December, three MINUSCA peacekeepers keepers. The press statement also warned threats for exercising their right to vote” dur- from Burundi died following an attack by that “attacks against peacekeepers may con- ing elections in December 2020. The CPC had obstructed elections, including by preventing the armed opposition groups in Dékoa, approxi- stitute war crimes” and reminded “all par- dissemination of election materials and burning mately 160 miles north of Bangui. ties of their obligations under international polling stations, the statement added. Agbetse Presidential elections were held on 27 humanitarian law”. urged MINUSCA, the Special Criminal Court, and December 2020. International media sourc- According to the mission, seven MINUS- the ICC promptly to investigate serious violations es reported numerous low-level violent inci- CA peacekeepers have been killed since the of human rights and international humanitar- ian law committed by the CPC and other armed dents on election day, and there were reports recent unrest began and 60,000 refugees have groups and called on the Security Council, includ- that voting did not take place in 29 of CAR’s fled across CAR’s border into neighbouring ing the CAR Sanctions Committee, to impose 71 sub-prefectures. On 30 December, the Cameroon, Chad, DRC, and the Republic consequences on those individuals involved. Democratic Opposition Coalition (COD- of the Congo. Another 58,000 persons are 2020), which consists of a number of oppo- displaced within CAR. The CAR authori- Key Issues and Options sition presidential candidates, called for the ties have blamed the outbreak of violence on There are two immediate issues for the Coun- results to be annulled, claiming that there groups affiliated with Bozizé, who announced cil to consider in the context of the recent had been widespread fraud. Despite this, the on 25 July that he would run in the elections, resurgence of violence: the first pertains to head of CAR’s National Elections Authority but whose candidacy was rejected by CAR’s providing the mission with the resources declared on 4 January that incumbent presi- Supreme Court on 3 December. (Bozizé was needed to address the fresh violence and dent Faustin-Archange Touadéra had won re- listed under Security Council sanctions in allow it to fulfil its protection of civilians man- election, gaining an absolute majority of 53.9 2014 for “engaging in or providing support date, provide assistance to the CAR authori- percent of the vote in the first round, obviat- for acts that undermine the peace, stability ties to stabilise the situation, and demonstrate ing the need for a second round in February. or security of CAR”.) MINUSCA, in a press the Council’s unified support for MINUSCA. On 18 January, CAR’s Constitutional Court release dated 18 January, also attributed the The Council may wish to adopt a resolution certified Touadéra as the winner. violence to “allies” of the former president. that offers further concrete support to the Numerous attacks have taken place since On 21 January, at the request of the mission and the CAR authorities. the elections, including a 2 January assault CAR government, the Council met again. The second issue relates to the arms by armed forces allied with former CAR Ndiaye told the Council via videoconfer- embargo. Over the past year, China and president François Bozizé on the town of ence that the deployment of reinforcements Russia have taken the view that the Council Damara, which lies 50 miles north of Bangui, from UNMISS had “lifted morale among should go further in easing the arms embargo and a 3 January assault on the town of Ban- MINUSCA personnel” but that the CPC with the aim of lifting it completely. A num- gassou, some 450 miles east of Bangui along appeared to be “increasingly aggressive”. He ber of other Council members have argued CAR’s border with the Democratic Republic subsequently requested an increase in both that there is little room for further adjust- of the Congo (DRC). On 9 January, several troops and police officers within the frame- ments in light of the political and security armed groups attacked the towns of Bouar, work of inter-mission cooperation. CAR situations and the limited progress that has some 270 miles north-west of Bangui, and Foreign Minister Sylvie Baïpo-Temon, also been made on achieving the benchmarks for Grimari, approximately 185 miles north- participating in the meeting, requested the progressively lifting or suspending the arms east of Bangui. In both instances, MINUS- Council to fully lift the arms embargo that embargo. However, in light of the CAR for- CA assisted the FACA to repulse the attacks; has been imposed on the CAR since the eign minister’s request to lift the embargo, the in Bouar, MINUSCA deployed air assets in adoption of resolution 2127 in 2013. Coun- Council may wish to revisit this issue well support of their operations. cil members issued a press statement on 22 in advance of the sanctions regime renewal On 13 January, Security Council mem- January. That same day, the CAR authorities anticipated in July. bers again discussed the situation in the CAR announced a 15-day state of emergency. On under “any other business” at the request 24 January, the CPC reportedly surrounded Council and Wider Dynamics of France. Lacroix briefed on the situation, Bangui, cutting off the capital’s main supply There is consensus among Council members focusing on MINUSCA’s operation in the route with Cameroon. According to interna- for providing the mission with the resources context of the rising violence. Two days lat- tional media, over 1,600 trucks--including needed to quell the recent violence in the er, following the arrival of reinforcements, those carrying food, medicine and humani- country and ensure that the mission can MINUSCA troops regained control of Ban- tarian assistance--were stranded. On 25 Jan- fulfil its protection of civilians mandate. In gassou, offering protection to Bangassou’s uary, the CAR government announced that addition, Council members agree on the civilian population and stopping the looting FACA troops, working with “allied forces”, need for accountability for the perpetrators

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 5 Central African Republic of the recent violence and a recommitment embargo has become a contentious issue for France is the penholder on the CAR, and by all of the signatories of the Political Agree- the Council over the past year. These differ- Ambassador Abdou Abarry (Niger) chairs the ment for Peace and Reconciliation to its full ences were again demonstrated during the 21 2127 CAR Sanctions Committee. implementation. However, lifting of the arms January Council session.

COVID-19

Expected Council Action Concerns about unequal access to the vac- as much as $9.2 trillion in 2021. Nearly half In February, the Security Council is expect- cine by wealthy and low-income countries of these costs, $4.5 trillion, would be borne ed to hold a high-level briefing on COV- have already materialised in the initial roll- by wealthy countries because of continued ID-19, with a focus on equitable access out, however. WHO Director-General Tedros disruptions to global trade and supply chains. to vaccines, especially in conflict-affected Adhanom Ghebreyesus, addressing the Another more likely scenario, according to areas. UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab Executive Board of the WHO on 18 January, the study, found that if developing countries is expected to chair the briefing. warned that “the promise of equitable access vaccinate half their populations by the end of is at serious risk”. He noted that 39 million the year, the world economy would still expe- Background and Key Recent doses of vaccine had already been adminis- rience losses between $1.8 trillion to $4.4 tril- Developments tered in at least 49 higher-income countries, lion, with more than half the losses occur- Last year, the Security Council organised while one low-income country had received ring in wealthy economies. These economic several meetings on the COVID-19 pan- just 25 doses. According to Tedros, “some costs, noted the study’s authors, far outweigh demic centred around resolution 2532, countries and companies continue to pri- the current donor financing needed to pro- which demanded a cessation of hostilities in oritize bilateral deals, going around COVAX, cure vaccines for everyone and fully fund the all situations on its agenda to support the driving up prices and attempting to jump to ACT Accelerator, which has a funding gap Secretary-General’s 23 March 2020 global the front of the queue”, and the situation is of $27.2 billion as of 19 January. Referring ceasefire appeal to fight COVID-19 in con- compounded by manufacturers prioritising to this analysis at the Council’s 25 January flict-affected countries. By late 2020, several regulatory approval in rich countries where VTC, Under-Secretary-General for Humani- COVID-19 vaccines had been developed, profits are highest as opposed to submitting tarian Affairs Mark Lowcock said, “[t]his is and the subsequent rollout of initial vacci- vaccine candidates to the WHO for review. not about generosity but a matter of the self- nations in a range of countries brought new Secretary-General António Guterres interest of wealthier countries”. hope for an end to the pandemic. repeated calls in January for COVID-19 The global response to the pandemic in A key mechanism for the development of vaccines to be a global public good, saying 2020 was hampered by tensions between the COVID-19 vaccines and for promoting their this requires full funding for the ACT Accel- US and China and US criticism of the WHO. distribution is COVAX, run by the World erator and its COVAX facility, while raising In the Security Council, these tensions led to Health Organization (WHO), the Gavi vac- concerns about what he called “vaccination- drawn-out negotiations on resolution 2532, cine alliance and the Coalition for Epidemic alism”. At a Council videoconference (VTC) which was adopted more than three months Preparedness Innovations. COVAX is one on 25 January on the implementation of after the Secretary-General’s initial ceasefire of the four pillars—diagnostics, therapeutics, resolution 2532, Under-Secretary-General appeal. The new US administration of Presi- vaccines, and health systems—of the Access for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rose- dent Joe Biden, however, has already acted to to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator that mary DiCarlo asserted that inequalities in the restore US participation in multilateral efforts was launched in April 2020 by the WHO, global recovery and the failure to vaccinate to address the pandemic. On 20 January, the the European Commission and France in in developing countries, including countries first day of the new administration, President response to the pandemic. The COVAX vac- affected by conflict and instability, would be Biden signed a letter to the Secretary-Gen- cines pillar includes a funding instrument, “a severe blow to peace and security”. eral retracting the US decision last year to backed with official development assistance A study commissioned by the Interna- withdraw from the WHO, which would have and contributions from the private sector tional Chamber of Commerce, released on taken effect on 6 July 2021. The US has also and philanthropy, to assist 92 middle- and 25 January, revealed the potential economic expressed its intention to join COVAX, in lower-income countries that cannot fully impact of failure to distribute vaccines equita- which the administration of Biden’s predeces- afford to pay for COVID-19 vaccines. Other bly. It concluded that if wealthy nations fully sor, Donald Trump, declined to participate. activities of the COVAX facility are support- vaccinate by the middle of the year and low- At the Council’s 25 January VTC, Coun- ing the development of vaccine candidates income countries are largely excluded, the cil members also heard briefings by Under- and negotiating prices. global economy would suffer losses totalling Secretary-General for Peace Operations

UN DOCUMENTS ON COVID-19 Security Council Resolution S/RES/2532 (1 July 2020) demanded a general and immediate cessation of hostilities in all situations on the Council’s agenda and called upon all parties to armed conflicts to engage immediately in a 90-day humanitarian pause.General Assembly Document A/RES/74/270 (2 April 2020) reaffirmed the General Assembly’s “commitment to international cooperation and multilateralism and its strong support for the central role of the UN system in the global response to the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic”.

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Jean-Pierre Lacroix and Under-Secretary- COVID-19 vaccines, in particular how to In addition, the negotiations on resolution General for Operational Support Atul Khare. ensure equitable access to vaccines, especially 2532 were made difficult by US opposition Lacroix said that across all UN field mis- in conflict-affected and fragile countries. Bar- to any reference in the text to the WHO. sions, 2,486 cumulative COVID-19 cas- riers to access, such as vaccine supplies and But at the initial 25 January Council brief- es among UN personnel and dependents funding, logistical challenges to delivering ing, the US administration took a much had been reported, with 24 deaths. Khare and administering vaccines, and humanitar- more conciliatory tone, stressing the cen- described plans to vaccinate UN person- ian access in conflict situations are key issues. tral role of the WHO in the global pandemic nel and dependents worldwide. He said Council members may use their national response and the US commitment to sup- the plans called for cooperating with host interventions to promote international coop- porting multilateral instruments to facilitate countries to include UN personnel in their eration and coordination through the main a rapid global vaccine rollout. Until the US national vaccine programmes and, where multilateral tool, COVAX, and may appeal announced that it would join the COVAX that was not possible, that the UN would for donor funding to support vaccine access facility, the US and Russia were among only seek alternative arrangements. He also not- for low-income countries. Members may fur- a handful of countries that had not commit- ed the convening of a Group of Friends of ther reiterate the Council’s demand for states ted to participate in COVAX. troop- and police-contributing countries to and parties to armed conflicts to conclude Another area of difference that has surfaced agree on “pragmatic, coherent and com- cessation of hostilities agreements or even in Council consideration of the pandemic has mon efforts” to vaccinate troops and police encourage the idea of “vaccine pauses”. been over sanctions. Russia and China often in peacekeeping operations and guard units recall, as have other members, their view in special political missions. Council Dynamics that unilaterally-imposed sanctions should The new US administration has already be waived as they can undermine countries’ Key Issues and Options shown that Council dynamics around the capacity to respond to the pandemic. Resolution 2532 recognised that the pan- pandemic will be different in 2021. Last France and Tunisia served as co-penhold- demic is likely to endanger the maintenance year, Council meetings on the pandemic ers on resolution 2532. of international peace and security. In this were punctuated by US interventions that context, the focus of the meeting will be on were highly critical of China and the WHO.

Syria

Expected Council Action million people, including 5.5 million Syrian for many Syrians. Finally, Syria has seen the In February, the Security Council expects refugees, in need in the region. number of COVID-19 cases continue to rise to hold its monthly meetings on the political The dire humanitarian situation has been rapidly, putting increased strain on Syria’s and humanitarian situations and on the use exacerbated by Syria’s deteriorating econom- health care and educational systems, as well of chemical weapons in Syria. ic conditions as well as continuing food inse- as driving up unemployment. curity. According to a 19 January 2021 World During a briefing to the Council on Key Recent Developments Food Programme (WFP) report, the price 20 January, Special Envoy for Syria Geir Briefing the Security Council on 20 January, of basic food items continued to increase in O. Pedersen noted that the “Syrian people Under-Secretary-General for Humanitar- December. Syria’s standard food basket was have seen less all-out violence” than during ian Affairs Mark Lowcock offered a sober- 236 percent higher compared to December previous periods of the conflict. Nonethe- ing account of Syria’s ongoing humanitarian 2019, a month-to-month increase of 13 per- less, the fragile security situation continues needs. He noted that in 2020 the UN-coor- cent that brought the basket to its highest to threaten civilians, with reports of civilians dinated humanitarian operation assisted, on recorded price since WFP started monitor- being killed in crossfire between warring par- average, 7.6 million people a month across ing prices in 2013. In addition, the Food and ties or by improvised explosive devices. On Syria. That represented an increase of 20 Agriculture Organization recently reported 2 January, two car bombs were detonated in percent compared to 2019. In Syria’s north- that the Syrian government has doubled the northern Syria—one in a market in Ras al- west, OCHA dispatched a monthly average price of subsidised bread. Ain, killing two children, and another outside of 1,000 trucks of aid, reaching 2.4 million Fuel shortages have also contributed to a bakery in Jinderis, near Aleppo, killing one people each month. He said that the situa- the worsening economic situation. On 10 Jan- person. Shelling and airstrikes continued to tion was likely to deteriorate further in 2021, uary, Syria’s petroleum ministry announced harm civilians in and around Idlib despite a estimating that approximately 13 million that it would cut its fuel distribution by 24 10-month-old ceasefire in the area. people will remain in need of humanitarian percent because of delays in the arrival of Other reports suggest a recent uptick assistance inside Syria with an additional ten needed supplies, causing further hardship in violence in several of Syria’s regions: on

UN DOCUMENTS ON SYRIA Security Council Resolution S/RES/2533 (11 July 2020) renewed the authorisation for cross-border humanitarian aid into Syria through one border crossing (Bab al-Hawa) for 12 months. Secretary-General’s Report S/2020/1195 (11 December 2020) was the regular 60-day report on the implementation of humanitarian resolutions by all parties to the conflict in Syria.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 7 Syria

12 January, Israeli airstrikes in and around the Council had “heard nothing new from the Council in February. Most Council mem- Deir al-Zour in the eastern part of the coun- [Arias] either at the open or the closed seg- bers agree that the political track has yielded try reportedly targeted Syrian military sites, ment of [the] meeting in December”. few results, and some members have become killing 57 Syrian government soldiers and, On 21 January, Secretary-General openly concerned about this after more than according to international media, members António Guterres announced the establish- a year of Constitutional Committee meet- of Iranian-backed militias. On 30 December ment of a three-person independent senior ings. European members on the Council have 2020, Islamic State militants attacked a bus advisory panel to strengthen the “decon- tended to emphasise that reconstruction aid on a road outside Deir al-Zour, leading to fliction mechanism” in Syria. According to to Syria will not be forthcoming without tan- increasing concerns about the resurgence OCHA, this mechanism provides for “the gible progress on the political front. With the of the group in some parts of Syria. On 11 exchange of information by humanitar- completion of the fifth round, members may December, a car bomb killed 16 people at a ian actors with military actors in order to… wish to take stock of what the Committee has checkpoint in the Syrian town of Ras al-Ain avoid potential hazards for humanitarian been able to accomplish to review how they near the Turkish-Syrian border. Turkish gen- personnel”. On 6 April 2020, the Secretary- will approach its future work. The Council darmes were among those killed in the attack. General released a summary of his Board of could adopt a presidential statement welcom- From 25 to 29 January, the Small Body Inquiry (BOI) report into attacks on sites ing the limited progress to date, while also of Syria’s Constitutional Committee con- in north-west Syria—including hospitals, laying out a clear set of substantive achieve- vened for a fifth round of meetings, discuss- schools and camps for internally displaced ments they expect the Committee to aim for ing constitutional principles for the first persons—that had been on a “deconflic- in upcoming rounds of meetings. time. Speaking to the press on 29 January, tion” list. At the time, the Secretary-General Pedersen gave a downbeat assessment of the informed the Council that he was planning Council Dynamics meetings, stating that the “week had been to appoint a senior independent adviser to The Council remains deeply divided on a disappointment” and that the committee help prevent similar incidents and improve Syria’s political, humanitarian and chemi- “cannot continue to meet if [they] do not the mechanism. The panel is expected to cal weapons files. OPCW Director-Gen- change their approach”. As such, he noted submit its final report by 10 May. eral Arias’ unequivocal assessment for the that there had been no agreement on the Council in December that Syria is still not timeframe for another meeting. Human Rights-Related Developments in compliance with its obligations did little The issue of the use of chemical weapons In a 29 December 2020 statement, the spe- to bridge the gap that exists amongst Coun- cial rapporteur on the negative impact of uni- remains a deeply divisive one amongst Coun- cil’s members on the chemical weapons file. lateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of cil members. During his 11 December 2020 human rights, Alena Douhan, called on the US While there are two new penholders—Ireland briefing to the Council, Fernando Arias, the to remove unilateral sanctions imposed in June and Norway—on the Syria humanitarian file, Director-General of the Organisation for the 2020 under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protec- the 20 January Council meeting showed lit- Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), tion Act of 2019. According to the statement, tle change in the stark cleavages that exist these broad sanctions “violate the human rights concluded that “the declaration submitted between Council members on that issue. On of the Syrian people” and may inhibit rebuilding by Syria still cannot be considered accurate of Syria’s civilian infrastructure destroyed dur- the political front, there is broad agreement and complete”, a sentiment that was echoed ing the conflict. They could target any foreigner among Council members that the work of the by High Representative for Disarmament helping in reconstruction as well as employees Constitutional Committee is a generally posi- Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu during her briefing of foreign companies and humanitarian opera- tive development, but some members have tors helping to rebuild Syria. to the Council on 5 January. Though most become openly concerned about the Com- Council members welcomed the work of the mittee’s lack of progress. OPCW and Arias, Russia, in its 5 January Key Issues and Options statement to the Council, expressed dissat- The completion of the Constitutional Com- isfaction with Arias’ briefing, claiming that mittee’s fifth round will be a key focus for

8 securitycouncilreport.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 Myanmar

Expected Council Action The Council may receive a briefing in Feb- Voting in 56 townships, largely in Rakh- Children and Armed Conflict-Related ruary on the situation in Myanmar from ine State, was cancelled on security grounds, Developments Special Envoy Christine Schraner Burgener. leaving 1.2 million out of 1.6 million regis- The Secretary-General’s 2020 annual report on children and armed conflict delisted the Tat- Briefers from the UN Office of the High tered voters in the state unable to cast bal- madaw for the violation of recruitment and use of Commissioner for Refugees and UNDP are lots. In order to hold supplementary elec- children, conditioned on the “immediate ending also possible. tions, originally anticipated for the end of and preventing of the ad hoc use of children in January, the Arakan Army, an armed group non-combat roles”. It warned that failure to com- Key Recent Developments composed largely of Rakhine Buddhists, and ply would result in relisting in the 2021 report. In a 14 October 2020 press release, the co-chairs On 21 January, Bangladesh Foreign Secretary the Tatmadaw agreed to an informal cease- of the UN Country Taskforce on Monitoring and Masud bin Momen, Chinese Vice Foreign fire brokered by the Japanese special envoy Reporting on Grave Violations against Children Minister Luo Zhaohui and Myanmar Inter- to Myanmar, Yohei Sasakawa. in Myanmar expressed grave concern over the national Cooperation Deputy Minister Hau On 18 November 2020, the Third Com- circumstances of the killing of two children in Do Suan held a virtual tripartite meeting on mittee of the General Assembly—which fighting between the Tatmadaw and the Arakan Army in Buthidaung Township, Rakhine State. the repatriation of Rohingya refugees from deals with social, humanitarian and human They called for an investigation and reiterated Bangladesh. The last such meeting was held rights issues—approved a draft resolu- that the use of children for non-combat pur- in January 2020. Media reports indicate that tion on the “Situation of Human Rights of poses should not be seen as a lesser violation during the meeting Myanmar agreed to begin Rohingya Muslims and other Minorities in than recruitment. The Secretary-General’s sixth repatriation in the second quarter of this year. Myanmar” by a vote of 131 in favour to 9 report on children and armed conflict in Myan- mar, which covers the period 1 September 2018 Bangladesh and Myanmar signed a bilateral against, with 31 abstentions. The resolution to 30 June 2020, was published on 18 Decem- agreement on repatriation in November 2017, expressed grave concern at recent reports of ber 2020. The Secretary-General acknowledged but tangible progress on returns has been serious human rights violations and abuses the progress made in developing a legal frame- elusive. Repatriation attempts in November in Myanmar, in particular in Rakhine State work and implementing the action plan to stop 2018 and August 2019 were abandoned after and in Kachin and northern Shan States, recruitment and use of children. He expressed concern over the killing and maiming of children the refugees refused to return to their home- and called for “full and unhindered access” and urged the government to sign a joint action land, citing security concerns. for the delivery of humanitarian access and plan with the UN on killing and maiming and sex- On 28 December 2020, about 1,800 the “voluntary and sustainable return” of all ual violence against children. He also expressed Rohingya refugees were transferred from internally displaced persons and refugees. concern over the recruitment and use of children Cox’s Bazar refugee camp to Bhasan Char It also called on the government to ensure by armed groups. The Working Group on Chil- dren and Armed Conflict is expected to consider island, located 34 miles from mainland accountability by undertaking “full, trans- this report in February. Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal. Ahead of parent and independent investigations” of the impending movements, the UN issued reports of human rights violations. Key Issues and Options a statement on 2 December stating that On 11 September 2020, the Council dis- For much of 2020 the government’s attention it had not been involved in the relocation cussed Myanmar during a closed videocon- was focused on addressing the COVID-19 exercise and reiterating its position that ference (VTC). Special Envoy for Myan- pandemic and preparing for the November Rohingya refugees needed to make a “free mar Christine Schraner Burgener, High elections. Council members refrained from and informed decision” about relocating to Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Gran- putting pressure on Myanmar ahead of the Bhasan Char and that the movements to the di, and UNDP Assistant Administrator and elections. The February meeting could allow island should be voluntary. Director of the Regional Bureau for Asia the Council to convey its views on recent The National League for Democracy and the Pacific Kanni Wignaraja briefed developments and to revisit issues such as (NLD), led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won a on a range of issues, including the need the challenges to repatriation of Rohingya resounding victory in a general election on to de-escalate the conflict; humanitarian refugees, the security situation in northwest 8 November 2020, taking more than 80 per- access; the peace process; accountability; Rakhine State and the impact of COVID-19 cent of the democratically contested seats the Rakhine Advisory Commission recom- in Myanmar. One option would be for Coun- and increased its parliamentary majority. (A mendations; the tripartite memorandum of cil members to issue a press statement react- quarter of the seats are reserved for the mili- understanding between the Myanmar gov- ing to the elections, encouraging the gov- tary.) The new government is expected to be ernment, UNDP and UNHCR; and the ernment to hold supplementary elections in formed in March. The Myanmar military November 2020 elections. Rakhine State, and formalising the ceasefire. (known as the Tatmadaw) has called for an A stronger outcome, such as a resolution or investigation of voting lists, alleging fraud. presidential statement, would likely prove

UN DOCUMENTS ON MYANMAR Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2017/22 (6 November 2017) addressed the situation in Rakhine. Secretary-General’s Report S/2020/1243 (17 December 2020) was on children and armed conflict in Myanmar. S/2020/525 (9 June 2020) was the Secretary-General’s 2020 annual report on children and armed conflict. Security Council Letter S/2020/67 (24 January 2020) conveyed the notice of the International Court of Justice order indicating provisional measures in the case concerning application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar). Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8477 (28 February 2019) was a briefing by Special Envoy Christine Schraner Burgener. General Assembly Document A/C.3/75/L.34 (30 October 2020) was the resolution on the situation of human rights of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar. Human Rights Council Document A/HRC/39/64 (12 September 2018) was the report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 9 Myanmar difficult given the divisions in the Council through a procedural vote will be difficult joint statement following the meeting, If on Myanmar. In addition, Council members unless the Council is able to meet in person. it is not possible for the Council to agree could reiterate the need for the return of refu- A possible compromise could be to hold an on an outcome after the February meeting, gees to be safe, voluntary, dignified and sus- open VTC briefing so that Council members “like-minded” Council members may again tainable, and show support for greater coor- can hear from the Special Envoy and the choose to issue their own press statement dination between the Myanmar government Myanmar and Bangladesh government repre- which could highlight the recent develop- and the UN on this issue. sentatives but not express their views publicly. ments while reiterating their views on the The Council may want more information They could then make national statements in need for returns to be safe and voluntary. about the relocation of refugees to Bhasan a closed VTC that could include other brief- Several members in the Council have Char. The UN has maintained the need for ers, including the Special Representative for strong historical and regional ties to Myan- comprehensive technical assessments that Children and Armed Conflict, Virginia Gam- mar. China is likely to emphasise its role would review the safety and feasibility of ba, and representatives from UNHCR and in encouraging the repatriation of Rohing- Bhasan Char as a place to live. Council mem- UNDP. ya and dialogue between Bangladesh and bers could encourage the Bangladesh govern- Myanmar. India may be reluctant to discuss ment to invite the UN to conduct technical Council Dynamics Myanmar in light of recent positive develop- assessments of the suitability of the island to At the meeting on Myanmar in September ments such as the November elections, the house the refugees and to verify that those 2020, Council members were united over informal ceasefire, and the tripartite meet- being relocated are doing so voluntarily. the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and ing. As a member of ASEAN, Vietnam has It is unclear if the meeting on Myanmar the need for conflict de-escalation. How- taken a cautious approach in line with ASE- will be held in an open or closed format. Sev- ever, the familiar cleavages over account- AN’s general principle of non-interference eral Council members are likely to oppose ability, international humanitarian law, and in the affairs of its member states and has having an open VTC. In the past, opposition humanitarian access were also evident. The not been a strong advocate of greater Coun- to the format of a meeting could be settled UK, as penholder, floated the idea of a press cil involvement. These members, together through a procedural vote. (A procedural statement as a possible outcome, but this with Russia, may also be concerned that vote takes place in a formal meeting, requires was not acceptable to at least one perma- active Council engagement may jeopardise nine affirmative votes, and cannot be vetoed nent member. As a result, the European current regional and tripartite activities. by a permanent member.) VTC meetings are members at the time (Estonia, France, Ger- not currently considered official meetings of many, and the UK), the Dominican Repub- the Council, however, so reaching agreement lic, Tunisia and the US decided to issue a

Sudan

Expected Council Action between the Masalit and Arab communi- and ensure the protection of civilians, in In February, the Security Council is expect- ties around a camp for internally displaced accordance with the government’s National ed to renew the mandate of the Panel of people in West Darfur. The clashes also led Plan for Civilian Protection. (The plan was Experts assisting the 1591 Sudan Sanctions to the mass displacement of over 50,000 transmitted to the Council in May 2020.) Committee by 12 February, in advance of persons from the camp and nearby villages. On 21 January, the UK, along with Esto- its expiration on 12 March, as set out in Sudanese authorities responded by declaring nia, France, Ireland, Norway, and the US, resolution 2508. a state of emergency and imposing a curfew raised the violence in Darfur under “any The mandate of the UN Integrated Tran- in the region. The government also deployed other business”, discussing the govern- sition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNI- military units to West Darfur. In South Dar- ment’s response and possibilities for UNI- TAMS) expires on 3 June in accordance fur, 72 people were reportedly killed and 73 TAMS to support the government. with resolution 2524. injured on 18 January in clashes between the The violence in Darfur comes less than Falata and Reizigat tribes. a month after the Security Council unani- Key Recent Developments In an 17 January statement, UN Sec- mously adopted resolution 2559, on 22 On 16 and 17 January, 160 people were retary-General António Guterres called on December 2020, on the exit of the UN/AU reportedly killed and 215 injured in clashes the Sudanese authorities to end the fighting Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

UN DOCUMENTS ON SUDAN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2559 (22 December 2020) was on the end of the mandate of UNAMID. S/RES/2524 (3 June 2020) established UNITAMS for an initial period of 12 months. S/RES/2508 (11 February 2020) extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts for one year. Secretary-General’s Report S/2020/1155 (1 December 2020) was the 90-day report of the Secretary-General. Security Council Letters S/2021/11 (30 December 2020) announced the appointment of Volker Perthes (Germany) as Special Representative for the Sudan and head of UNITAMS. S/2020/1319 (30 December 2020) was a summary of the meeting on Sudan of the Informal Expert Group on Women, Peace and Security on 14 December 2020. S/2020/1209 (15 December 2020) was the annual report of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. S/2020/1235 (17 December 2020) was a record of the quarterly briefing on 11 December by the Chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. S/2020/1183 (18 December 2020) was a record of the briefing on 8 December on UNITAMS and UNAMID.

10 securitycouncilreport.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 Sudan

The resolution terminated the mandate of Revolutionary Front and the Sudan Liberation situation in Darfur, particularly in light of UNAMID as of 31 December 2020 and Movement-Minni Minawi in Juba in October the violence in January and the drawdown requested the Secretary-General to com- 2020, including the fact that only 10 percent of and exit of UNAMID currently under- negotiators involved were women and all media- plete the withdrawal of all uniformed and tors were male. Speakers stressed that lockdown way, as set out in resolution 2559. Another civilian UNAMID personnel by 30 June, measures to combat the COVID-19 pandemic had key issue is what role UNITAMS can play, other than those required for the mission’s made documenting cases of conflict-related sex- within its mandate contained in resolution liquidation. (For more see our What’s In ual violence harder. (UNAMID reported 191 cases 2524, in supporting the government to ful- Blue story of 21 December 2020.) of such violence in 2020.) They also noted the fil its obligation to protect civilians, includ- transitional government’s adoption of Sudan’s On 8 December 2020, the Coun- first National Action Plan on women, peace and ing implementation of its National Plan cil received a briefing on UNITAMS and security. During the meeting, UN entities provided for Civilian Protection. Council members UNAMID from Under-Secretary-General Council members with recommendations. They could consider holding an Informal Interac- for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rose- asked the Council to ensure that civilians were tive Dialogue with Sudanese officials to dis- mary DiCarlo, Under-Secretary-General for adequately protected in Darfur; this included pro- cuss how the Council and UNITAMS could tecting women from sexual and gender-based Peace Operations Jean-Pierre Lacroix and violence. They also requested that the Council best support implementation of this plan. Under-Secretary-General for Operational retain and support women protection advisors Support Atul Khare. On 11 December 2020, and gender advisors in UNITAMS. Council Dynamics Ambassador Sven Jürgenson (Estonia) pro- It appears that members continue to hold vided the most recent quarterly briefing in divergent views on the utility of the sanctions his capacity as chair of the 1591 Sudan Sanc- Key Issues and Options regime. Those members that would like the tions Committee, during which he highlight- An immediate issue for the Council is renew- Council to review and ease the sanctions ed several aspects of the panel’s reporting. ing the mandate of the Panel of Experts. measures, including developing benchmarks He also reiterated that the sanctions regime Another issue is to consider reviewing the in this regard, may encourage that this be “is not to punish the Sudan, but to support sanctions measures on Darfur, as signalled done now by emphasising positive develop- the attainment of sustainable peace”. Sudan in the past three resolutions that renewed ments in the country over the past year, such made a statement expressing its position that the mandate of the Panel of Experts. A fur- as the signing of the peace agreement in Juba sanctions should be lifted. ther issue is to consider establishing clear, in October 2020. Following the adoption of In a 30 December 2020 letter, the Secre- well-identified and measurable key bench- resolution 2508 in February 2020, China said tary-General announced the appointment of marks to guide the Council in reviewing the that regular review of the sanctions regime Volker Perthes (Germany) as Special Represen- sanctions measures on the government of was necessary and urged Council members tative for the Sudan and head of UNITAMS. Sudan, an intention expressed by the Coun- to consider developing a road map towards cil in resolutions 2455 and 2508. lifting such measures. Russia, too, said it was Human Rights-Related Developments An option for the Council is to consider, time to formulate a road map towards the Following the violence in Darfur in January, the in the resolution renewing the mandate of lifting of sanctions. However, other Council spokesperson for the High Commissioner for the Panel of Experts, including a request that members may take a more cautious approach Human Rights said in a statement on 22 Janu- ary that “the lack of security and chronic impu- the Secretariat provide a report assessing the in reviewing the sanctions measures, includ- nity in the region leaves it vulnerable to further role of the sanctions regime and specifying ing as a result of the violence in Darfur in serious violence”. The spokesperson added that options for the elaboration of benchmarks, January and the findings contained in the there “are severe gaps in protection by state as was done in relation to South Sudan final report of the Panel of Experts. At the authorities, as well as a lack of accountability with the adoption of resolution 2521 on 29 time of writing, Council members had been for violations” and that “local health facilities have reported being unable to cope with the May 2020. A less likely option is to consider unable to agree on a statement condemning high number of casualties”. expanding the regime’s designation criteria the violence in Darfur in January. to include acts of rape or sexual violence. In The UK is the penholder on Sudan, and Women, Peace and Security assessing the options, Council members are the US is the penholder on Sudan sanctions. On 14 December 2020, the Informal Experts likely to be informed by the final report of Ambassador Sven Jürgenson (Estonia) chairs Group (IEG) on women, peace and security met on Sudan, attended by all Council members. the Panel of Experts, which at the time of the 1591 Sudan Sanctions Committee. The Among the key topics discussed were points writing was yet to be released publicly. vice-chairs are Ireland and Viet Nam. related to the peace agreement signed by the A key issue that Council members transitional government of Sudan, the Sudan will want to follow closely is the security

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 11 Counter-Terrorism

Expected Council Action groups spread misinformation and propagan- that limit the exercise of human rights may In February, the Security Council is expect- da for radicalisation purposes with the goal increase existing grievances, leading to fur- ed to receive briefings by Under-Secre- of recruitment. According to CTED, there is ther radicalisation. CTED therefore empha- tary-General Vladimir Voronkov, the head some evidence that more children and young sises the need for a balanced, comprehensive, of the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism people have accessed such content online. In gender-sensitive, and human rights-compli- (UNOCT), and Assistant Secretary-General Western Europe, extreme right-wing groups ant approach to countering violent extremism Michèle Coninsx, the Executive Director of exploit woes related to the pandemic. The and terrorism. Voronkov, in his 12 January the Counter-Terrorism Committee Execu- paper argues that this trend is of concern, briefing to the Council, called for “an inclu- tive Directorate (CTED) on the Secretary- especially in connection with states’ cam- sive approach and a strategic investment in General’s 12th strategic-level report on the paigns to vaccinate their populations. CTED building resilience” in that regard. threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and also reports that misogynistic content has On 27 January, the CTC held an open the Levant (ISIL or Da’esh). increased online, risking the intensification VTC briefing on the protection of “soft” tar- of violence against girls and women. gets against terrorist attacks. On 20 January, Key Recent Developments The risk of forcible recruitment by the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al- On 12 January, the Council held a ministe- armed groups has increased in West Africa Qaida Sanctions Committee met in a closed rial-level open debate via videoconference and the Sahel as the pandemic and ongo- VTC on the 27th report of the Analytical (VTC) on the upcoming 20th anniversary ing violence have resulted in children and Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. of the adoption of resolution 1373 on 28 youths being out of school. On 29 January, Russia, Kazakhstan and September 2001 and the establishment of Violent extremist and terrorist groups in the Office of the Special Representative on the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC). the Eurasian region have exploited economic Children in Armed Conflict co-hosted an Voronkov, Coninsx and Fatima Akilu, the grievances exacerbated by the pandemic and Arria-formula meeting on the repatriation of Executive Director of the Neem Foundation, have offered financial support in an effort to children from conflict zones. Virginia Gam- briefed. The Council also adopted a presi- recruit or indoctrinate people. ba, Special Representative of the Secretary- dential statement on the issue. In his briefing, Regarding the situation of FTFs associ- General for Children and Armed Conflict; Voronkov stressed that ISIL remains a threat ated with ISIL and their families in prisons Voronkov, Anna Kuznetsova, Presidential in Iraq, Syria and the wider region. and detention camps, attention by states to Commissioner for Children’s Rights of Rus- In December 2020, CTED published an their condition and related humanitarian and sia, and the Permanent Representative of update to its June 2020 paper “The impact security challenges has further decreased. The Kazakhstan, Magzhan Ilyassov, who is also of the COVID-19 pandemic on terrorism, situation in overcrowded camps in Iraq and the co-chair of the Global Coalition for the countering terrorism and countering violent Syria—the vast majority of the population reintegration of child soldiers, briefed. extremism”. The paper focuses on the chal- being young children and women— requires lenges that the pandemic poses to address- even more urgent attention now, with cases Council Dynamics ing the root causes of terrorism and violent of COVID-19 reported, according to CTED. In general, counter-terrorism enjoys the extremism, an increase in recruitment oppor- The paper notes that implementation of support of all Council members. A recent tunities for such groups, and the situation PRR measures has decreased. The repatri- notable exception was a draft resolution on of ISIL-associated foreign terrorist fighters ation of people associated with FTFs has the prosecution, rehabilitation and reinte- (FTFs) and their families. It further discusses almost stopped, often in the name of mea- gration of FTFs. Initiated by Indonesia in the adaptation of violent extremists’ narra- sures to combat the pandemic. During the August 2020, it failed to be adopted because tives to the pandemic, the challenges posed to 12 January open debate, Voronkov called the of a US veto; the other 14 Council members prosecution, rehabilitation and reintegration repatriation of foreign nationals associated voted in favour of the text. The US argued (PRR) measures, and repatriation. with ISIL, the majority being children and that the draft resolution did not reference A reprioritisation of state spending to fight women, an urgent challenge. the repatriation of FTFs and their families. the pandemic and a strained global economy The CTED paper concludes with a call to It seems that the US’ decision to veto may has led some states to cut back on funding for address the root causes of terrorism and vio- have also been connected to wider Council counter-terrorism operations and for devel- lent extremism, such as inequality and state dynamics on the Iran nuclear issue under opment, humanitarian and peacebuilding ini- fragility. The paper cautions against “fueling the Indonesian presidency that month. tiatives meant to counter violent extremism. conditions conducive to terrorism and violent Some differences also exist regarding Violent extremists and terrorists continue extremism”, including “the increased securi- the four pillars of the UN Global Coun- to exploit trends connected to the pandem- tization of pandemic responses”. By way of ter-Terrorism Strategy. The pillars are, first, ic, including an increase in the use of social example, the paper argues that emergency addressing the conditions conducive to the media and the internet more broadly. Those measures implemented to fight COVID-19 spread of terrorism; second, measures to

UN DOCUMENTS ON COUNTER-TERRORISM Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2021/1 (12 January 2021) was on the 20th anniversary of the adoption of resolution 1373 and the establishment of the CTC. Sanctions Committee Document S/2021/68 (21 January 2021) was a letter from the chair of the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, transmitting the 27th report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team. Security Council Press Statements SC/14421 (22 January 2021) was on the two suicide attacks in central Baghdad on 21 January, resulting in 32 dead and at least 110 injured. SC/14414 (18 January 2021) was on the 15 January attack against the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), in which one peacekeeper was killed and another injured. SC/14411 (14 January 2021) was on the 13 January attack against MINUSMA, resulting in four peacekeepers dead and five injured.

12 securitycouncilreport.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 Counter-Terrorism prevent and combat terrorism; third, mea- equal support among all Council members. (Norway) chairs the 1267/1989/2253 Islam- sures to build states’ capacity to prevent and New Council members India and Kenya ic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or combat terrorism and to strengthen the role are expected to take an active interest in Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Commit- of the United Nations system in that regard; counter-terrorism issues. tee. The 1540 Non-Proliferation Committee and fourth, measures to ensure respect for The US is the penholder on counter-ter- is chaired by Ambassador Juan Ramón de la human rights for all and the rule of law as rorism. Ambassador Tarek Ladeb (Tunisia) Fuente Ramírez (Mexico). the fundamental basis for the fight against chairs the CTC. Ambassador and Deputy terrorism. The fourth pillar does not enjoy Permanent Representative Trine Heimerback

Yemen

Expected Council Action incident. The new cabinet, announced on 18 Food Programme Executive Director David In February, the Security Council is expect- December 2020, includes representatives of Beasley reiterated UN concerns. Griffiths ed to adopt a resolution renewing Yemen the separatist Southern Transitional Council observed that the designation could have financial and travel ban sanctions, which (STC), and its formation marked a key step a “chilling effect” on his mediation efforts expire on 26 February, and the mandate of in fulfilling the November 2019 Saudi-bro- and said the decision “should be revoked the Yemen Panel of Experts, which expires kered Riyadh Agreement between the STC based on humanitarian grounds at the earli- on 28 March. (The targeted arms embargo and the Yemeni government. The circum- est opportunity”. Lowcock and Beasley also established by resolution 2216 in April 2015 stances of the Aden attacks remain unclear, advocated for the US reversing the designa- against the Houthi rebel group is open-end- but the reported use of missiles in the airport tion, which Lowcock warned could cause ed.) The Council will also hold its monthly attack suggest the Houthis may have been a “large-scale famine that we have not seen briefing on Yemen with Special Envoy Mar- responsible as they are the only other party for nearly forty years”. Lowcock and Beasley tin Griffiths, Under-Secretary-General for to the conflict known to have such weapons. stressed its anticipated impact on commer- Humanitarian Affairs Mark Lowcock, and Griffiths condemned the attack on Aden cial food imports, which make up about 90 General Abhijit Guha, the head of the UN airport, which according to the government percent of Yemen’s food supplies. According Mission to support the Hodeidah Agree- included targeting the arrival hall and the VIP to Lowcock, many suppliers, banks, shippers ment (UNMHA). The chair of the 2140 lounge. He toured the damage on 7 January and insurers are likely to cease doing busi- Yemen Sanctions Committee, Ambassador I. when he travelled to Aden to meet with Prime ness in Yemen due to legal liabilities. “They Rhonda King (Saint Vincent and the Grena- Minister Maeen Abdulmalik Saeed and other fear being accidentally or otherwise caught dines), is also expected to brief. members of the cabinet and local officials. up in US regulatory action which would put When the US designated the Houthis as them out of business or into jail”, he noted, Key Recent Developments a foreign terrorist organisation on 10 Janu- adding that those who may continue doing The war in Yemen persists across multiple ary, it also labelled Houthi leaders Abdul business say that food costs will increase by at frontlines as the Special Envoy maintains Malik al-Houthi, Abd al-Khaliq Badr al-Din least 400 percent. Lowcock and Beasley also efforts to broker a ceasefire and resume a al-Houthi, and Abdullah Yahya al Hakim as highlighted the expected disruption on aid peace process involving the Yemeni govern- “specially designated global terrorists”. (The operations without exemptions for humani- ment and the Houthis. UN officials con- three individuals are under Security Coun- tarian actors, who inevitably interact with the tinue to highlight the risk of famine, rais- cil travel ban and asset freeze sanctions for Houthis and risk violating US law. ing concerns that the US designation of the undermining the peace, security and stabil- When the designation officially entered Houthis as a foreign terrorist organisation ity of Yemen.) Since November 2020, media into force on 19 January, the US issued could prove severely counterproductive to sources had reported that US Secretary of licenses exempting aid groups, the UN, efforts to ward off catastrophe. State Mike Pompeo of the outgoing Trump the Red Cross, and exports of agricultural On 30 December 2020, at least 25 people administration was planning to designate the commodities, medicine and medical devic- were killed and over 100 injured by multi- group as part of its maximum-pressure cam- es. Asked about the announced licenses, ple explosions at Aden airport shortly after paign on Iran, which is believed to provide Spokesperson of the Secretary-General Sté- a plane carrying the new Yemeni cabinet military support to the Houthis. UN officials phane Dujarric said that the UN’s position arrived from Saudi Arabia. No one on the and others lobbied against the move, worried had not changed, and that “we call on the government plane was hurt. A second attack, about its implications on the humanitarian government to reverse that decision”. by drone, reportedly targeted Mashiq Palace situation and the political process in Yemen. On 24 January, a new round of prisoner in Aden after the government was transferred At the Council’s 14 January meeting exchange talks between the government and there; no casualties were reported in this on Yemen, Griffiths, Lowcock and World Houthis and co-chaired by the Office of the

UN DOCUMENTS ON YEMEN Security Council Resolution S/RES/2511 (25 February 2020) renewed the Yemen sanctions regime for one year. Security Council Press Statement SC/14384 (13 December 2020) called for the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement and for Yemen’s parties to meet urgently to bridge differences on the joint declaration.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 13 Yemen

Special Envoy and the ICRC commenced people were already experiencing famine-like environmental disaster. In the past year, in Amman, Jordan. The last talks held in conditions, and the 3 December 2020 Inte- members issued multiple press statements September 2020 in Geneva resulted in the grated Phase Classification (IPC) analysis and press elements in which they urged the exchange of 1,056 prisoners. forecasts that the number of people facing parties to reach agreement on the joint dec- Phase 4 emergency food insecurity condi- laration, called on the Houthis to facilitate Sanctions-Related Developments tions—just one step above famine—would the UN technical mission’s access to the oil On 22 January, the Yemen 2140 Sanctions Com- increase from 3.6 million to five million dur- tanker and, more recently, highlighted the mittee met to consider the final report of its Panel ing the first half of 2021. Funding for the aid need for stakeholders and the international of Experts, which included details of arms trans- fers to the Houthis in violation of the targeted operation remains a major challenge. More- community to take measures to avert famine. arms embargo and of the origins of commercial over, stabilising the Yemeni rial is critical to During January, members were split over components used by the Houthis in assembling make sure Yemenis can afford to purchase whether to attribute responsibility for the 30 weapons. At the time of writing, the Panel of food. Members may continue to advocate in December 2020 Aden attacks to the Houthis Experts planned to travel to Aden at the invita- their national statements that donors, partic- in a press statement to be issued following tion of the Yemeni government to investigate the 30 December 2020 attack. ularly Gulf States—which cut back their con- their January meeting on Yemen. The US and tributions significantly over the past year— the UK, in particular, believed that the state- Key Issues and Options support the humanitarian appeal, and inject ment should identify the Houthis as respon- Restarting the political process remains a hard currency into Yemen’s Central Bank to sible, while Russia argued that members key issue. After ten months of negotiations bolster the Yemeni rial. should be careful not to assign blame before on Griffiths’ proposed joint declaration for In the resolution to renew the sanctions an objective investigation is conducted, not- a nation-wide ceasefire, confidence-building regime, the Council could incorporate recom- ing that the Houthis had not claimed respon- measures, and the resumption of peace talks, mendations from the Panel of Experts to draw sibility, as they had in many other attacks. the Special Envoy is continuing to engage attention to the panel’s findings about the diver- The new US administration has indicated the parties to reach an agreement. Fighting— sion of assets and delays in paying civil servant that the foreign terrorism organisation desig- including the Houthi offensive in Marib gov- salaries, especially those of the military, under- nation might be reversed and that ending the ernorate, the political and economic strong- mining Yemen’s peace, security and stability. Yemen war will be a foreign policy priority. hold of the government—risks undermining The US has been criticised for complicity in peace talks. Sustaining and implementing Council Dynamics the war’s widespread violations of interna- the Riyadh Agreement is another important Council members appear aligned in their tional humanitarian law through its military related issue. If agreement is reached on the support of the Special Envoy, continuing to support for the Saudi Arabia-led coalition, joint declaration, the Council may adopt a back his mediation efforts. Members fur- as have the UK and France. resolution to endorse the deal. ther share concerns about the humanitar- The UK is the penholder on Yemen. Concerns about famine in Yemen were ian situation and the risk that the decrepit already on the rise before the US designation. FSO Safer oil tanker moored in the Red According to Lowcock and Beasley, 50,000 Sea off Hodeidah might cause a major

Iraq

Expected Council Action UNAMI’s mandate expires on 31 May bombings. The attack, the largest of its kind In February, the Security Council is expected 2021 and the mandate of the UN Investi- in three years, was claimed by the Islamic to receive a briefing by the Special Represen- gative Team to Promote Accountability for State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da’esh) tative and head of the UN Assistance Mission Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNI- a day later. On 22 January, Council members for Iraq (UNAMI), Jeanine Hennis-Plass- TAD) expires on 18 September 2021. adopted a press statement condemning the chaert, on the most recent developments in attack “in the strongest terms”. Iraq and on the two latest Secretary-General’s Key Recent Developments Attacks also continue to be directed against reports on UNAMI and on the issue of missing A double suicide attack hit central Baghdad the US military and diplomatic presence and Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and miss- on 21 January, killing 32 people and injuring the US-led Global Coalition against Da’esh ing Kuwaiti property, including the national at least 110. The same day, Secretary-Gener- (the Coalition) in Iraq. The latest such attack archives. Both reports are due in February. al António Guterres strongly condemned the took place on 20 December 2020 when 21

UN DOCUMENTS ON IRAQ Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2544 (18 September 2020) extended the mandate of UNITAD until 18 September 2021. S/RES/2522 (29 May 2020) extended the mandate of UNAMI until 31 May 2021. Security Council Letters S/2020/1216 (15 December 2020) was to the president of the Security Council from Ambassador Sven Jürgenson (Estonia), chair of the 1518 Iraq Sanctions Committee 2020-2021, transmitting the annual report of the committee. S/2020/1193 (18 December 2020) contained the briefing provided by Karim Asad Ahmad Khan, Special Adviser and head of UNITAD, and the statements by all Council members and Iraq during an open videoconference (VTC) meeting on UNITAD on 10 December 2020. S/2020/1144 (27 November 2020) contained the briefing provided by Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert during the 24 November 2020 open VTC meeting on UNAMI. S/2020/1130 (20 November 2020) contained an 18 November 2020 letter from the Iraqi foreign minister requesting the Council to strengthen UNAMI’s role with regard to the upcoming elections. Security Council Press Statements SC/14421 (22 January 2021) was on the two suicide attacks in central Baghdad on 21 January, resulting in 32 dead and at least 110 injured. SC/14365 (24 November 2020) was on Iraq-Kuwait relations.

14 securitycouncilreport.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 Iraq rockets were fired at the US Embassy in April 2020. He will hold the position until of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nation- Baghdad. One Iraqi was killed in the attack early elections are held. Initially announced als and missing Kuwaiti property, including and buildings were damaged. These attacks for 6 June 2021, the elections are now sched- the national archives. are usually not claimed by any group. In a uled for 10 October 2021 as the Iraqi par- 23 December 2020 statement, a US Central liament voted to postpone them after Iraq’s Human Rights-Related Developments Command spokesperson said that the attack Independent High Election Commission On 27 November 2020, the UN Committee on Enforced Disappearances (CED) issued its “was almost certainly conducted by an Irani- had requested more time to prepare. In an 18 findings on Iraq, calling on it to incorporate the an-backed Rogue Militia Group”. The US in November 2020 letter to the Council, Iraqi offence of enforced disappearances into domes- the past has attacked bases of Iran-backed Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein requested tic criminal legislation, and to ensure no person militias operating in Iraq in retaliation. the Council to strengthen UNAMI’s role is held in secret detention. The report found One of the Iran-backed militias that the with regard to the elections. that a pattern of enforced disappearance per- sists in much of the country. It expressed con- US has accused of perpetrating attacks On 9 December 2020, ICC Prosecutor cern over the lack of reliable data on cases of against its personnel in Iraq is Kata’ib Hez- Fatou Bensouda announced that her office enforced disappearance and the large quantity bollah, which the US has designated a ter- would not open an investigation into pos- of unidentified bodies and mass graves. It recom- rorist organisation. Kata’ib Hezbollah is part sible war crimes committed by UK nation- mended that Iraq establish a consolidated nation- of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), als in Iraq. Following the conclusion of her wide database of all cases of disappearance that have occurred in the country since 1968. The established in 2014 from different, mostly preliminary investigation, Bensouda found Committee received allegations in relation to 420 Iran-backed, Shi’a Muslim fighters to com- that “there is a reasonable basis to believe that possible secret detention sites and urged Iraq to bat ISIL. In July 2019, then-Prime Minis- members of the British armed forces commit- investigate them, close any such facilities or con- ter Adil Abd Al-Mahdi issued an executive ted the war crimes of wilful killing, torture, vert them into regular registered and supervised order bringing the PMF under the exclu- inhuman/cruel treatment, outrages upon per- detention centres, as well as to take all neces- sive control of the Iraqi state and ordering sonal dignity, and rape and/or other forms sary measures to ensure that no one is detained secretly in the future. it to cut all links with political entities. The of sexual violence”. However, her office did current Iraqi prime minister, Mustafa al- not consider the situation admissible. The Kadhimi, is trying to implement a zero-tol- ICC is a court of last resort and cases are Key Issues and Options erance policy towards armed groups oper- only admissible when “the State is unwilling Council members are closely following the ating outside state control. On 11 October or unable genuinely to carry out the investi- political, security and humanitarian situations 2020, a spokesperson for Kata’ib Hezbol- gation or prosecution”, according to Article in Iraq. After the briefing by Hennis-Plass- lah, claiming to speak on behalf of groups 17(1)(b) of the Rome Statute of the ICC. In chaert, Council members could issue a press of “resistance” against the US presence in the case of the UK, she concluded that these statement addressing issues of concern to them. Iraq, said that the group had temporarily conditions had not been met. Regarding the request from the Iraqi gov- suspended attacks on US forces. On 16 September 2007, security guards ernment for a strengthened role of the UN On 3 January 2020, a US strike near of the private military company Blackwa- in the electoral process, Council members the Baghdad airport killed Qassem Solei- ter International shot dead 17 civilians could discuss possible options. mani, the head of the Iranian Revolutionary and injured 24 in Nisour Square in Bagh- Guards’ Quds Force, as well as Abu Mahdi dad. Four Blackwater security guards were Council and Wider Dynamics al-Muhandis, the deputy commander of the convicted by a US federal court in 2014 of Council members are generally unanimous PMF. On the anniversary of the strike, thou- manslaughter, murder and weapons charges. in their support for UNAMI and the positive sands of Iraqis protested and demanded On 22 December 2020, then-US president developments in Iraqi-Kuwaiti relations. that US troops leave Iraq. Donald Trump pardoned the men. In a 30 Regional dynamics continue to affect On 15 January, the US Department of December 2020 statement, the independent Iraq. The government routinely states that Defense announced that it had completed experts of the Human Rights Council’s Work- Iraq has no intention of taking sides and the planned drawdown of its force in Iraq ing Group on the use of mercenaries as a becoming caught in the middle of Iran-US to a level of 2,500 troops. The new US means of violating human rights and imped- tensions. Turkey continues to conduct mili- president, Joe Biden, appears intent on con- ing the exercise of the right of peoples to self- tary operations against Kurdistan Workers’ tinuing the policy of withdrawing military determination condemned the pardons as a Party (PKK) positions in Kurdistan, north- personnel from Iraq while maintaining a violation of international law by the US. The ern Iraq, despite Iraq’s objections. counter-terrorism presence. Working Group argued that states are obliged The US is the penholder on Iraq issues A major wave of widespread popular to “hold war criminals accountable” under in general, and the UK is the penholder on protests demanding basic services and sys- the Geneva Conventions, including when Iraqi-Kuwaiti issues and UNITAD. Ambas- temic change started in October 2019 and they act as private military contractors. sador Sven Jürgenson (Estonia) is the chair of ultimately led to the resignation of the Iraqi On 10 December 2020, the Council received the 1518 Iraq Sanctions Committee. government that same year. Protests continue a briefing from Karim Asad Ahmad Khan, the mostly in the city of Nasiriya. Special Adviser and head of UNITAD. Iraqi President Barham Salih named al- On 24 November 2020, Council mem- Kadhimi as prime minister-designate on 9 bers adopted a press statement on the issue

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 15 Somalia

Expected Council Action During an Informal Interactive Dialogue pressure on Puntland’s federal authorities to In February, the Council is expected to renew (IID) with Council members on 20 January, boycott the parliamentary elections. its authorisation of the AU Mission in Soma- Somali Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdi- On 25 January, fighting between Soma- lia (AMISOM), due to expire on 28 Febru- rizak Mohamud explained that the federal li federal troops and Jubaland state forces ary. The Council is scheduled to be briefed government aimed to organise the elec- resulted in the death of 11 civilians in Bula on the Secretary-General’s report on the UN tions in a timely manner and would like to Hawa, a town near the border with Kenya. Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), start this process regardless of Jubaland and Dube claimed that the attack was undertak- which is due 13 February. James Swan, Spe- Puntland’s position on the matter. This posi- en by “Kenya and its guerrilla rebels”, which cial Representative of the Secretary-General tion was initially mooted by Somali Prime the Kenyan authorities denied. In a 25 Janu- for Somalia and head of UNSOM, will brief Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble on 9 ary letter to the AU, the Kenyan government the Council. Ambassador Geraldine Byrne January when he announced that the gov- warned of large-scale displacement of civil- Nason (Ireland), chair of the 751 Soma- ernment was planning to move forward with ians and further destabilisation in the region lia Sanctions Committee, will also brief the the elections without Jubaland and Puntland, if the fighting in the area continued. On 26 Council on the activities of the committee. organizing the elections in three of Soma- January, the AU called on the parties to de- The mandate for UNSOM expires on 31 lia’s five federal states—Galmudug, Hirsha- escalate tensions through dialogue. August 2021. belle and South West State—and Mogadishu Municipality. To date, no further steps have Key Issues and Options Key Recent Developments been taken to begin this process. Council members will continue to follow Because of an ongoing political dispute During a 25 January visit to Garowe, the closely progress towards parliamentary and between the Somali Federal Government, led capital of Puntland, Swan met with Punt- presidential elections, including how the dia- by President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed land President Said Abdullahi Deni. Speak- logue evolves between the Somali federal gov- “Farmajo”, and leaders from two of the coun- ing to the media after the meeting, Swan ernment and the governments of the federal try’s federal member states, Puntland and said that there was a “need for constructive member states, especially Jubaland and Punt- Jubaland, parliamentary elections scheduled compromise between the Federal Govern- land. Council members may wish to consider for December 2020 have been postponed. ment and Federal Member States to reach adopting a press statement noting the need In September, the five leaders of the feder- agreement over implementation of the elec- for the elections to be organised through a al member states and Farmajo reached an toral process” given that it is “in the nation- consensual approach and in a timely manner. agreement, subsequently endorsed by Parlia- al interest”. Speaking to the Council on 23 On 8 January, the Council received the ment, for parliamentary elections to be held November 2020, Swan called for the coun- Secretary-General’s independent assess- from 1 to 27 December and presidential try’s political consensus to be “preserved ment on the configuration of AMISOM. elections on 8 February. At the time of writ- and indeed deepened”. Required under resolution 2520 renewing ing, a date for the parliamentary elections In addition to the political instability AMISOM’s mandate last year, the report had yet to be set, and the presidential elec- caused by the uncertain electoral process, offers a series of conclusions and recom- tions seem likely to be postponed. regional relations and the security situation mendations on the future work of AMISOM According to international media reports, in the country have also been challenging and its relations with the Somali federal there are several reasons for the disagree- in recent months. On 30 November 2020, government and security forces. The assess- ments between the federal government and Somalia expelled Kenya’s ambassador, with ment is likely to guide the Council’s work as the Jubaland and Puntland governments. Somalia’s information minister, Osman it considers how to adjust AMISOM’s and These include claims that, based on long- Dube, claiming that Kenya “continues med- UNSOM’s priorities in 2021. standing precedent, Farmajo should not be dling in [Somalia’s] internal political affairs allowed to run for another term and that and…has ignored [Somalia’s] previous calls Council Dynamics he has attempted to bypass Somalia’s elec- to stop violating [the country’s] sovereignty”. There is broad consensus among Council toral laws by installing loyalists on polling The expulsion came after a meeting between members regarding the challenges facing committees charged with coordinating the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Musa Somalia. However, members remain divid- parliamentary elections. Given the logisti- Bihi Abdi, the leader of Somaliland, whose ed on the way ahead, and differences have cal and security challenges of holding direct 1991 declaration of independence from emerged on the Council’s approach to the elections (Somalia has not held direct elec- Somalia has not been recognised by any country. On 12 November 2020, for example, tions since 1969), a modified indirect elec- UN member state. At the meeting, Kenya China and Russia abstained on resolution toral process was agreed last year. This announced that it would open a consulate 2551, which, among other issues, renewed system allows clans’ delegates to choose in Hargeisa, Somaliland’s capital, and begin the partial lifting of the arms embargo on members of the lower house of parliament, direct flights between Nairobi and Somalil- Somali security forces. Both Russia and Chi- who will in turn choose the president. and. Somalia also accused Kenya of putting na argued for the inclusion of benchmarks

UN DOCUMENTS ON SOMALIA Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2554 (4 December 2020) renewed the counter-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia for 12 months. S/RES/2551 (12 November 2020) extended various elements of the Somalia sanctions regime until 15 November 2021. S/RES/2540 (28 August 2020) extended UNSOM’s mandate for 12 months until 31 August 2021. Secretary-General’s Report S/2020/1072 (2 November 2020) covered the reporting period from 1 November 2019 to 31 October 2020, detailing the international military and capacity support for efforts to combat piracy. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8775 (12 November 2020) was the adoption of resolution 2551 on the Somalia sanctions regime.

16 securitycouncilreport.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 Somalia that could begin the path towards lifting the The Secretary-General’s independent improvement on the ground. Kenya, which arms embargo while objecting to the inclu- assessment may also illuminate further joined the Council on 1 January, remains sion of human rights language. divisions: some members see AMISOM as one of the top contributors to AMISOM and There are likely to be further differences a crucial bulwark against the armed group as a close neighbour is likely to be actively of opinion over the current political impasse. Al-Shabaab and believe that removing its engaged in discussions on Somalia. A number of members might be reluctant to authorisation could create a destabilising The UK is the penholder on Somalia. address Somalia’s internal electoral processes, security vacuum. EU members on the Coun- claiming that such a move could interfere in cil, and the UK, as major financial spon- the country’s internal matters. sors of AMISOM, are eager to see tangible

Haiti

Expected Council Action office. On 23 July 2020, Moïse requested October 2020 address, Moïse claimed that In February, the Security Council is expect- that the sectors represented in the PEC he does not intend to run in the next presi- ed to receive a briefing from the Special either confirm their existing representative dential election, in an apparent attempt to Representative of the Secretary-General or appoint a new one within 48 hours. The dispel claims that he is seeking constitution- and head of the UN Integrated Office in Haitian constitution stipulates that several al reform so he can run again. Haiti (BINUH), Helen La Lime, on recent key sectors (including religious sectors and On 30 October 2020, President Moïse developments and the Secretary-General’s academia) must nominate councillors for installed an Independent Advisory Commit- latest report on the special political mission, the PEC. The members of the PEC refused tee for the development of a new constitu- due on 12 February. A civil society repre- Moïse’s request and collectively resigned tion. Details of the draft constitution—which sentative may also brief. the following day, citing in their resignation is set to be finalised by 26 February—have BINUH’s mandate expires on 15 Octo- letter concerns about the intention of the not been released to date, although a member ber 2021. presidency to move forward with changes of the Independent Advisory Committee said to the constitution and start the electoral in an early January interview that proposals Key Recent Developments process without having achieved consensus include creating a single legislative chamber Haiti continues to contend with the inter- between all relevant stakeholders, including to replace the current Senate and Chamber locking crises of political instability and a the opposition and civil society. of Deputies, extending parliamentary terms, deteriorating socioeconomic situation, as The process for the selection of the new and giving Haitians who live abroad increased electoral milestones in 2021 present oppor- PEC appears to have been controversial. Sev- representation. Moïse has declared that if the tunities and challenges for progress in the eral civil society sectors refused to nominate draft constitution is approved by referendum, country. On 7 January, Haiti’s Provisional a counsellor for the PEC, as mandated by the next elections will be organised along the Electoral Council (PEC) announced that a the constitution, in protest of the presiden- timeline of the new constitution. As such, the constitutional referendum will take place in cy’s actions. On 18 September 2020, Moïse result of the referendum could alter the elec- April, while the presidential election is set for appointed a new PEC by presidential decree, toral calendar announced in early January. September. In addition, the parliamentary without having secured the approval of the Opposition groups have also claimed and municipal elections—which were initial- Supreme Court for the nominations. Haitian that the electoral calendar constitutes an ly scheduled for October 2019 but have been opposition parties, legal scholars and human attempt by Moïse to extend his term in delayed by political stalemate—are expected rights organisations criticised this move as office. The end-date of Moïse’s term is dis- to take place in September and November, illegitimate and unconstitutional. puted because his inauguration on 7 Febru- respectively. The UN is expected to provide While there is consensus among the dif- ary 2017 was preceded by a one-year term electoral support to events related to the ferent political parties on the need for con- of a provisional president. (As there was no electoral calendar, responding to an official stitutional reform, the process leading to the elected successor when President Michel request of the Haitian government contained reform remains the main point of disagree- Martelly’s term ended in February 2016, in a letter dated 11 November 2020. ment between the president and the oppo- the Senate chose Jocelerme Privert as pro- Electoral uncertainty remains a challenge sition. The announcement of the expected visional president on 14 February 2016). because of a lack of consensus between the constitutional referendum garnered criti- Opposition groups claim that Moïse’s five- parties in Haiti around issues such as the cism from the opposition, which maintains year term will legally end on 7 February composition of the PEC, the holding of the that the referendum is illegal because the 2021 while Moïse’s position—which is sup- constitutional referendum and the end- current Haitian constitution prohibits any ported by most UN members states—is that date of President Jovenel Moïse’s term in modification of it by referendum. In a 23 the legal end-date is in February 2022.

UN DOCUMENTS ON HAITI Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2547 (15 October 2020) renewed BINUH’s mandate for one year. S/RES/2476 (25 June 2019) established BINUH. Secretary-General’s Report S/2020/944 (25 September 2020) was the latest report on BINUH. Security Council Meeting Record S/PV.8768 (15 October 2020) was the adoption of resolution 2547. Two members, China and Russia, abstained.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 17 Haiti

The opposition has called for demonstra- December 2019. The report shows a pattern of Council Dynamics tions to demand that Moïse step down in human rights violations and abuses followed by Council members generally supported the February. According to media reports, hun- a near lack of accountability and documents a establishment of BINUH instead of a peace- 333 percent increase in the number of human dreds of people participated in demonstra- rights violations and abuses against the rights to keeping mission. Former Council member, tions that took place on 15 January in Port- life and security of the person during the report- the Dominican Republic (Haiti’s neighbour au-Prince, Cap-Haitien, Jacmel, Saint-Marc, ing period. In introducing the report, the spokes- on the island of Hispaniola), was the sole and Gonaïves. Although several clashes person of the High Commissioner for Human voice advocating a return to a peacekeep- were reported between police and protest- Rights expressed concern that “persistent inse- ing operation. Several other Council mem- curity, poverty and structural inequalities in Haiti ers in the capital, the demonstrations were coupled with increasing political tensions may bers believe that the problems Haiti is fac- characterised as largely peaceful. It appears lead to a pattern of public discontent followed ing are political in nature and could be better that the opposition’s calls have not garnered by violent police repression and other human handled by a political mission and Haitians much traction so far as participation has rights violations”. The spokesperson added that themselves. Such positions came into view been lower compared to other protests held recent presidential decrees creating a national during the negotiations on resolution 2547, intelligence agency and strengthening public in Haiti in recent years. security are worrying, as it appears that they are as China seemingly advocated for a strategic In the meantime, civilians continue to not consistent with international human rights assessment of BINUH with the aim of elabo- bear the brunt of a deteriorating security norms and standards and risk leading to a further rating recommendations for an exit strategy and humanitarian situation. In her latest crackdown on the rights of freedom of peaceful leading to the eventual drawdown of the Inte- briefing to the Security Council, on 5 Octo- assembly, association and freedom of expression. grated Office and the transfer of its tasks to ber 2020, La Lime underlined the increased the Haitian government. While Russia sup- unrest in the country, threats posed to state Key Issues and Options ported China’s suggestion, other members authority by gang violence and the wide- The envisioned electoral process in Haiti is felt that such steps were premature. spread perception of impunity. Between 1 a key issue that Council members are likely China and Russia abstained on resolu- June and 31 August 2020, BINUH attrib- to follow closely. The potential for increased tion 2547, noting in their explanations of uted 172 alleged human rights abuses by insecurity due to public unrest and the rise vote that the US draft resolution failed to gang members and unidentified armed men, in gang-related activities are also matters of consider their suggested language about the including 27 killings, 28 injuries and eight concern for the Council. Council members increase in gang-related violence and the dif- rapes. According to OCHA, the humani- appear to be united in agreement on the ficult human rights situation in Haiti. While tarian situation in Haiti continues to be need for the Haitian National Police (HNP) several members agreed that it is impor- affected by political and security instability, to be adequately supported and resourced tant to address those issues, they disagreed which affect access to essential services and by the Haitian government. The Secretary- about their inclusion in a draft resolution have impacts on the most vulnerable peo- General warned in his latest report that on the renewal of BINUH’s mandate. Some ple. OCHA estimates that approximately the limited resources afforded the HNP is suggested that these issues could be better 4.4 million Haitians will need humanitarian beginning to erode operational capacity and addressed in a presidential statement so that assistance in 2021. The 2021 Humanitarian public trust in the country’s sole functioning the Council could share its concern in unison. Response Plan in Haiti will require $235.6 nationwide public safety institution. Incoming Council member Mexico, million to assist 1.5 million people in need. Council members may want to hear more which replaced the Dominican Republic in On 15 October 2020, the Security Council from La Lime about the envisioned UN sup- the Latin American and Caribbean Group adopted resolution 2547, renewing BINUH’s port for the electoral calendar and about the seat, is likely to follow developments in Hai- mandate for another year. No changes were ongoing constitutional reform process in ti closely. As combating the spread of illicit made to the core mandate of the special polit- Haiti and what it could mean for future elec- small arms and light weapons is a foreign ical mission as set out in resolution 2476 of tions. A civil society briefer could provide the policy priority for Mexico, it may join St. 25 June 2019, which established BINUH. Council with a personal perspective and fine- Vincent and the Grenadines in voicing con- grained analysis of the challenges and oppor- cern about the influx of illicit small arms Human Rights-Related Developments tunities related to the election planning. The and light weapons into Haiti and their role On 19 January, the Human Rights Service of Council may also choose to adopt a presi- in fuelling gang-related violence. BINUH and the Office of the High Commission- dential or press statement calling on Haitian The US is the penholder on Haiti. er for Human Rights released a joint report on human rights violations related to the protests stakeholders to ensure the holding of free, fair that took place between 6 July 2018 and 10 and transparent elections.

18 securitycouncilreport.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 Climate Change and Security

Expected Council Action Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Niger, the Council could request a briefing from In February, the UK plans to host a high- Tunisia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, a climate-security expert from a think tank, level open debate, “Addressing climate-relat- the UK, and Vietnam) and three of the university, or non-governmental organisa- ed security risks to international peace and incoming members (Ireland, Kenya and tion who can describe linkages between security through mitigation and resilience Norway) issued a joint statement affirming climate change and security and present building”. The meeting is expected to con- that an Informal Expert Group would be options for the role the Council could play sider conflict risks, peacebuilding approaches convened “to assist the Council to achieve in tackling these issues. A briefing from a and ways to support adaptation and resilience a more comprehensive and systematic local civil society actor—who can describe in climate-vulnerable contexts. UK Prime approach on climate-security risks in situ- the impacts of climate change in his or her Minister Boris Johnson is expected to chair ations on the ground”. country or region—could provide the Coun- the meeting. Secretary-General António The first meeting of the Informal Expert cil with a first-hand, informative account of Guterres is an anticipated briefer. There may Group—which, like other expert groups the challenges facing specific situations on be other briefers as well. on the protection of civilians and women, the Council’s agenda. peace and security, is not considered a for- During the debate, some members may Key Recent Developments mal subsidiary body of the Council—was wish to explore options for the work of the In recent years, the Security Council has held virtually on 20 November 2020. All recently formed Informal Expert Group. begun to focus increasingly on the negative 15 Security Council members attended the Since the Council has repeatedly underscored security effects of climate change on vari- meeting, although China and Russia par- the importance of risk assessments and risk ous country- and region-specific files on its ticipated only as observers. Four incom- management strategies for climate-security agenda. In 2020 alone, language on climate ing members (Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, and threats, one option would be for the group change was integrated into Council outcomes Norway) also took part in the meeting. The to engage with UN officials, host govern- on the Central African Republic, Darfur, the meeting focused on the security implica- ments and regional organisations on the way Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, tions of climate change in Somalia and fea- forward in undertaking accurate risk assess- Somalia, and West Africa. Frequently, this tured briefings by Special Representative ments and in developing and implementing language has emphasised the need for ade- and head of the UN Assistance Mission in effective strategies to manage these risks. quate risk assessments and risk management Somalia (UNSOM) James Swan and Dan Another possible option would be for the strategies to cope with the adverse security Smith, Director of the Stockholm Interna- UK to produce a chair’s summary of the debate, effects of climate change and other environ- tional Peace Research Institute. capturing the main themes of the discussion. mental factors in particular situations. Although the political environment The awareness of the connection between Key Issues and Options might not be ripe in the Council for such climate change and security was also reflect- Council members and other member states action at present, in the future the Council ed in the signature events pursued by vari- might explore several key issues during the could consider authorising the deployment ous Council presidents in the second half open debate. These include: of climate advisors in peace operations and of 2020. The UK is continuing this trend • the importance of developing the analyti- regional offices where environmental or with its February open debate. The relevant cal capacities of the UN system to assess ecological conditions are having an impact signature events in 2020 were: the 24 July climate change-related security threats on the security environment. 2020 open videoconference (VTC) during in fragile states and regions, provide the Later this year, also depending on the the German presidency on the “Mainte- Security Council with useful information dynamics in the Council, members might nance of international peace and security: about these threats, and support states consider reviving the draft resolution on cli- Climate and security”; the 17 September and regional organisations in developing mate and security initially proposed by Ger- 2020 open VTC during the Nigerien presi- and implementing actionable strategies to many (and others) in advance of the 24 July dency on the “Maintenance of international address them; open VTC on climate and security. The draft peace and security: Humanitarian effects of • the importance of developing synergies was supported by most members, but it was environmental degradation and peace and among states, regional and sub-regional strongly opposed by the US and faced resis- security”; and the 3 November 2020 open organisations, and the UN system in man- tance from China and Russia. VTC during the presidency of St. Vincent aging and mitigating climate change-relat- and the Grenadines on “Peacebuilding and ed security risks; and Council Dynamics sustaining peace: Contemporary Drivers of • the need to determine how the Secu- Council members are divided over the Coun- Conflict and Insecurity”. rity Council, the peace operations it cil’s role in addressing climate and security On 24 July 2020—the same day as the mandates, UN Country Teams, and the issues. Those supportive of the issue empha- open VTC on climate and security spear- UN Secretariat can best collaborate to sise that factors such as drought, water scar- headed by Germany—ten members of the address such risks. city, food insecurity, and desertification that Security Council (Belgium, the Dominican In addition to hearing from a UN official, are caused or exacerbated by climate change

UN DOCUMENTS ON CLIMATE AND SECURITY Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2011/15 (20 July 2011) is the Council’s one thematic outcome on climate and secu- rity. Security Council Letters S/2020/1090 (5 November 2020) contained the briefings and statements by member states from the open VTC on contemporary drivers of conflict and insecurity. S/2020/929 (21 September 2020) contained the briefings and statements by member states from the open VTC on the humanitarian effects of environmental degradation and peace and security. S/2020/751 (28 July 2020) contained the briefings and statements by member states from the open VTC on climate and security on 24 July 2020.

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 19 Climate Change and Security increase the risk of violent conflict. They one of the staunchest opponents of Coun- to Council involvement on climate-security have encouraged a more systematic inte- cil engagement on this matter, joining Chi- matters. Overall, in 2021 up to 12 Council gration of climate-related security risks into na and Russia in contesting the integration members are expected to be keen to see con- the Council’s work. China and Russia are and expansion of climate language in some sistent Council engagement on this issue. less supportive of Council engagement on country-specific outcomes, and as noted The UK, which is spearheading the meet- this issue. They believe that climate change above, in disapproving of a thematic resolu- ing, has long been a proponent of Security is fundamentally a sustainable-development tion on climate and security in July 2020. In Council engagement on climate and security issue that is more appropriately addressed by contrast, it is likely that the new US adminis- matters. It hosted the Council’s first debate other parts of the UN system, including the tration will be a strong proponent of Security on the potential impact of climate change General Assembly and ECOSOC. Council engagement on climate change, as on security in April 2007. From 1 to 12 The dynamics on climate-security issues was the Obama administration (2008-2016) November, it will also be hosting the 26th are likely to shift perceptibly in the Council in which President Joe Biden served as vice UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) in 2021. The most consequential change is president. In addition, four of the five new in Glasgow, in partnership with Italy. that the views of the new US administration members—Ireland, Mexico, Norway, and Niger and Ireland are the co-chairs of the on climate change are diametrically opposed Kenya—are supportive of Council engage- Informal Expert Group in 2021. to those of the previous administration. Dur- ment on this issue. India is the one new ing the Trump administration, the US was member that has traditionally been opposed

DPRK (North Korea)

Expected Council Action DPRK’s ruling Workers’ Party, which started US president, Joe Biden, has been a vocal In February, the chair of the 1718 Demo- on 6 January. During the congress, Kim was critic of former President Donald Trump’s cratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) promoted to the position of General Secre- approach towards the DPRK, especially his Sanctions Committee, Ambassador Mona tary, the highest rank in the Workers’ Party. summit-level meetings with Kim. Biden has Juul (Norway), is due to provide her first Addressing party delegates, Kim emphasised emphasised that he would be willing to meet briefing in this capacity. The committee is that the US remains the DPRK’s main enemy Kim only upon the condition that the DPRK expected to discuss the final report of the regardless of who is leading its government. take concrete steps towards denuclearisation. Panel of Experts in February, but the report Kim outlined a set of plans to further develop During a 17 January press conference, the is not expected to be formally presented to the DPRK’s nuclear and conventional weap- president of the Republic of Korea, Moon Jae- the Council until March. Because of the tem- ons systems. While not ruling out diplomacy, in, encouraged the incoming Biden adminis- porary measures adopted during the COV- Kim said that the DPRK’s bolstered nuclear tration to build upon successes and draw les- ID-19 pandemic, the briefing is expected to capabilities are intended to give the country sons from the failures of Trump’s diplomacy be held as a closed videoconference (VTC). better leverage in dealing with the US. with Kim. Moon played an instrumental role Speaking on the economic situation in in facilitating negotiations between the US Key Recent Developments the country, Kim admitted that the party and the DPRK during the Trump presidency. Leading up to the US presidential election had made serious mistakes in handling the On 11 December 2020, Council mem- on 3 November 2020 and in its aftermath, economy. He said that the five-year plan bers met virtually under “any other busi- the DPRK remained relatively restrained for economic development had failed to ness” on the human rights situation in the and did not conduct any ballistic missile reach targets in nearly every sector. Also, DPRK. Belgium, the Dominican Republic, or nuclear tests. However, on 15 January, he added, the DPRK has faced serious eco- Estonia, France, Germany, the UK, and DPRK leader Kim Jong-un showcased the nomic challenges stemming from develop- the US requested an open videoconfer- country’s latest weapons systems, including ments outside its control. (These include ence (VTC) meeting and a briefing by the a new submarine-launched intercontinen- international sanctions, devastating natural UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, tal ballistic missile (ICBM) during a night- disasters in 2020 and strict restrictions on Michelle Bachelet. China and Russia object- time military parade in Pyongyang. During movement in and out of the country to stop ed to holding the meeting, however. Given a similar military parade in October 2020, the spread of COVID-19.) that the Council’s VTCs are not considered the DPRK displayed what it claimed was its The diplomatic effort to denuclearise official meetings, procedural votes cannot largest ICBM to date. the Korean peninsula has remained at an be held unless members are willing to meet The 15 January parade marked the con- impasse since the collapse of the February in person. From 2014 to 2017, the Coun- clusion of the eight-day congress of the 2019 US-DPRK summit in Hanoi. The new cil held an annual meeting on the human

UN DOCUMENTS ON DPRK Security Council Resolutions S/RES/2515 (30 March 2020) extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee until 30 April 2021. S/RES/2397 (22 December 2017) tightened sanctions on the DPRK. Security Council Letters S/2020/266 (31 March 2020) contained the written-procedure voting record on resolution 2515, which extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts of the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Committee. S/2020/246 (30 March 2020) was from the president of the Security Council containing the results of the vote on resolution 2515. Sanctions Committee Documents S/2020/840 (28 August 2020) was the midterm report of the Panel of Experts.

20 securitycouncilreport.org Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 DPRK (North Korea) rights situation in the DPRK in December, In 2020, the DPRK appeared to have aban- threat posed by the DPRK. The US has been but in 2018 and 2019, the proponents of this doned the diplomatic track and engaged in a strong proponent of maintaining the policy meeting could not convince nine members to heightened rhetoric towards the Republic of of maximum pressure until the DPRK takes support the meeting. (While every resolution Korea and the US. There is also some uncer- concrete steps towards denuclearisation. The requires nine votes, the veto does not apply tainty over how the DPRK will react to the EU members of the Council are generally to Council decisions of a procedural nature.) change in the US administration given that supportive of this approach. On the other On 17 November 2020, the Council met Biden criticised the US engagement with hand, China and Russia have shown interest under “any other business” to discuss issues Kim during Trump’s presidency. in considering some form of sanctions relief. related to the implementation of paragraph An option for the Council would be to In December 2019, they circulated a draft 5 of resolution 2397. The chair of the 1718 convene an informal interactive dialogue resolution providing partial sanctions relief DPRK Sanctions Committee at that time, with key regional stakeholders to dis- for the DPRK, but the proposal was not put Ambassador Christoph Heusgen (Germany), cuss next steps in confronting the security to a vote and remains stalled because of insuf- initiated the meeting to address the issue of threat posed by the DPRK. The Council ficient support from other Council members. the conversion rate between tons and bar- could also consider adopting a formal out- Council members have been generally rels related to importing refined petroleum come addressing the need for stability on united in their concern about the potential products to the DPRK; under UN sanctions the Korean peninsula and calling for the consequences for the DPRK of a widespread the DPRK’s import of petroleum products is resumption of diplomatic talks. outbreak of COVID-19. On this front, there capped at 500,000 barrels annually. A per- In light of persistent violations of the sanc- has been broad support among 1718 Com- sistent issue at the committee level has been tions regime by the DPRK, the effectiveness mittee members for accelerating the process the inability of its members to agree on a ton/ of the regime remains an issue for the Council. for considering humanitarian exceptions. barrel conversion rate, which would help the These violations have been well documented It seems unlikely that there will be a sig- committee determine with more precision in the Panel of Experts reports, most recent- nificant shift in Council dynamics because the permitted amount of imported petroleum ly in the final report of September 2020. In of changes in Council composition as of 1 products. After the meeting, Heusgen held a response, the Council could consider ways January and the new US administration. media stakeout during which he noted that of more strictly enforcing the sanctions and During the past several years of the Trump China and Russia have politicised the pro- issue a statement calling on member states to administration, the US was reluctant to draw cess of finding a solution to this issue and adhere to existing sanctions measures. too much attention to the DPRK’s ballistic have continuously stalled attempts to resolve An ongoing issue in the sanctions com- missile testing, possibly fearing negative con- it. He emphasised that the inability to resolve mittee has been the inability of members sequences for its diplomatic efforts. Instead, this issue undermines the credibility of the to reach agreement on the appropriate ton/ the US focused mostly on sanctions pressure Council and the committee. barrel conversion. Given that the Council and diplomatic efforts. During this time, the imposed limits on imports of refined petro- Council’s European members have taken the Key Issues and Options leum products to the DPRK, reaching an lead in orchestrating the Council response The security situation on the Korean pen- agreement on this issue would contribute to to the DPRK’s ballistic missile activities. insula, which remains volatile despite the better implementation of sanctions. Lack- The Biden administration has signalled that absence of ballistic missile or nuclear tests ing agreement in the committee, an option it would increase pressure on the DPRK to over the past several months, is an ongo- would be for the new chair of the commit- force it to come to the negotiating table and ing issue for the Council. As evident from tee (Norway) to continue discussions on this abandon nuclear weapons. the January military parade, the DPRK issue and, with other members, possibly ele- The US is the penholder on the DPRK, has continued to develop new weapons vate the discussion to the Council level if it and as of 1 January, Ambassador Mona Juul systems, including ICBMs, in violation of continues to falter in the committee. (Norway) chairs the 1718 DPRK Sanctions Security Council resolutions. Initial dip- Committee. lomatic efforts and a period of US-DPRK Council Dynamics rapprochement in 2018-19 resulted in the Members continue to be divided over the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. role of sanctions in addressing the nuclear

Security Council Report Monthly Forecast February 2021 securitycouncilreport.org 21 Security Council Report Staff

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