Mapping International Responses to the Political Crisis in 01 What is happening in Belarus? 3

02 What is the project about? 6

03 What are sanctions? 8

04 What are the types of sanctions? 10

05 What sanctions against Belarus are currently in place? 15

06 What other international respon- ses are in place, besides sanctions? 22

07 What has been the response of the Belarusian de facto leadership? 26

08 What has been the reaction of civil society and alter- native democratic forces? 28

In August 2020 protests erupted in Belarus, following an allegedly rigged presidential election. Police brutality and political persecu- tion continue to date. International actors adopt various responses to the political and human rights crisis, including sanctions.

As representatives of civil society, we are deeply concerned with the current political crisis unfolding in Belarus. By mapping inter- national responses to the crisis, we explore the toolbox used by various actors to ensure accountability and inspire change. The project’s goal is to monitor, document, and analyse international responses, seeking to clarify their complex nature to the general public, as well as to inform advocacy efforts. What is happening in Belarus?

Belarus has been under the rule of Alexander Lukashenko1 since 1994. Originally authorised to serve for two presidential terms, Lukashenko initiated two referen- da on amending the constitution in 1996 and 2004. The contested outcomes of the referenda allowed him to run for the post indefinitely and widened the extent of presidential powers, effectively turning Belarus into a presidential republic.2 Lukashenko’s presidency has been marked by authoritarianism and oppression. The allegations against the regime range from state-sponsored and politically motivated murders3 to routine election fraud.4 Although crackdowns on dissent and political persecution have been common during Lukashenko’s rule,5 the re- gime’s response to peaceful demonstrations has arguably been the most brutal in 2020.

The largest protests in Belarusian post-Soviet history erupted following the 2020 presidential election. The announcement of a landslide victory for Lukashenko contrasted with ample evidence of electoral fraud,6 and mobilised to take their demands for free and fair elections to the streets. The continued vio- lent crackdown on peaceful protesters, manifest in the first days of protests7 and still ongoing,8 transformed the agenda of the demonstrators, now demanding 1 Hereinafter, the names of key figures are transliterated from the . The read- er may encounter other spellings of names in sources using Belarusian transliteration. 2 Artyom Shraibman, Belarusian Constitution: An Obituary on Democracy, BelarusDigest, 25 March 2013. 3 Belarus: How death squads targeted opposition politicians, DW, 1 December 2019. 4 OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Presidential Election in the Republic of Belarus, 11 October 2015, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/0/0/218981.pdf; OSCE/ ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Presidential Election in the Republic of Belarus, 19 December 2010, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/4/75713.pdf; OSCE/ODIHR Elec- tion Observation Mission Final Report, Presidential Election in the Republic of Belarus, 19 March 2006, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/c/19395.pdf; OSCE/ODIHR Election Observa- tion Mission Final Report, Presidential Election in the Republic of Belarus, 9 September 2001, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/c/19395.pdf. 5 C. J. Chivers, Belarus Protest Dispersed as Police Arrest Hundreds, The New York Times, 24 March 2006; Tom Parfitt,Belarus protests: more than 600 charged and opposition leaders in jail, The Guardian, 21 December 2010; Belarus protests: Hundreds arrested after defying ban, BBC, 25 March 2017. 6 Falsifications at every third polling station: “Golos” questioned the results of election in Be- larus, announced by the Central Electoral Commission / Фальсификации на трети участков: «Голос» поставил под сомнение результаты выборов в Беларуси, объявленные ЦИК, Cur- rent Time/ Настоящее Время, 11 August 2020; Kostya Manenkov and Daria Litvinova, Belarus poll workers describe fraud in Aug. 9 election, The Washington Post, 1 September 2020; OSCE, Wolfgang Benedek, OSCE Rapporteur’s Report under the Moscow Mechanism on Alleged Human Rights Violations related to the Presidential Elections of 9 August 2020 in Belarus, 29 October 2020, p. 21. 7 Belarus: Police unleash appalling violence on peaceful protesters, , 10 August 2020; Belarus: Violence, Abuse in Response to Election Protests, Human Rights Center Viasna, 12 August 2020; Second night of protests: Police violence, more injuries, death con- firmed, Human Rights Center Viasna, 11 August 2020; “They did not allow me to see my son’s body.” A 25-year old died following detention in Homel / «Мне адмовіліся паказваць цела сына». У Гомлі пасьля затрыманьня памёр 25-гадовы хлопец, RadioFreeEurope / RadioLiber- ty, 12 August 2020; International Committee for the Investigation of Torture in Belarus, Mass torture in Belarus 2020, First interim report: state response and measures taken to investigate mass torture on 9-13 August 2020. 8 ‘The World Should Not Ignore Systematic Torture in Belarus’, The Economist, 5 December 2020; International Committee for the Investigation of Torture in Belarus, Mass torture in Bela-

3 not only a new election but also an end to killings, torture, and political persecu- tion of peaceful protesters.

The demands of protesters have not been met so far. The human rights situation in Belarus continues to deteriorate, as demonstrated by data from local human rights defenders, as well as international bodies.

Belarusian Political Crisis in Numbers (as of March 2021)

People killed as a result of alleged state-sponsored violence 89

People arrested since 9 August 2020 30 000–32 00010

Political prisoners 29911

People facing criminal charges on politically motivated grounds 90012

People reporting torture 200013

Arrest and detention are not the only instruments in the toolbox of repression. There are also numerous cases of people fired from work,14 expelled from uni- versities,15 or threatened with deprivation of parental rights.16 Lawyers’ licenses and journalists’ accreditations are revoked.17 Businesses are forced to close or rus 2020, Second Interim Report: Detention, Conditions of Detention and Treatment of Detain- ees in September–November 2020. 9 Tsikhanouskaya state that 8 people were killed during the protests. Who are they? / Тихановская заявила, что за время протестов убиты 8 человек. О ком она?, Telegraph.by, 19 November 2020. 10 Total number of people detained during protests exceeded 30 thousand / Общее число задержанных за время протестов превысило 30 тысяч человек, Nasha Niva, 22 November 2020. 11 List of Political Prisoners, Human Rights Center Viasna, 5 December 2020 12 OHCHR, Intersessional meeting of the Human Rights Council - The situation in Belarus, Statement by Michelle Bachelet, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 4 December 2020. 13 Ibid. 14 ‘After Yesterday’s Protests Factory Workers are Fired in Belarus / После вчерашних протестов в Беларуси начали увольнять заводчан’, Onliner.by, 27 October 2020; Tatsiana Nevedomskaya, ‘Lukashenko’s Revenge? Why Historians are Fired in Belarus?’ / Лукашенко мстит? За что в Беларуси увольняют историков, DW, 21 November 2020; Denis Martinovich, ‘Nesvizh Museum Director Fired. A White-red-white Flag was Raised on the Museum’s Building in Summer’ / Уволен директор Несвижского музея Сергей Климов. Летом на здании появился БЧБ-флаг, TUT.by, 9 December 2020. 15 ‘Belarusian Students Complain of Expulsions after Joining Opposition Strike’, Reuters, 28 October 2020. 16 Tatsiana Nevedomskaya, ‘Why Belarusians take Children to Protests Despite the Threats Parental Rights Deprivation’ / Почему белорусы берут на протесты детей, несмотря на угрозы лишить их родительских прав, DW, 21 September 2020. 17 ‘Joint Letter on Revocation Licenses of Aliaksandr Pylchanka and Yulia Levanchuk’, Lawyers for Lawyers and the Law Society of England and Wales, 3 November 2020; ‘Belarus Cancels all Accreditation for Foreign Journalists’, DW, 2 October 2020.

4 relocate.18

The crisis continues to worsen, and the pressure continues to mount. Belaru- sian citizens bear the cost of authoritarian political ambitions. Their life, liberty, and economic well-being are under constant threat. Political crackdown has not weakened or subsided since August 2020. Both close attention to the situation in Belarus as well as solidarity with Belarusian people are still sorely needed.

18 ‘At Least 12 IT Companies In Belarus Are Relocating, More Are Considering’, BelarusFeed, 29 August 2020; Jurgita Lapienytė, ‘Are Tech Companies Leaving Belarus?’, Cybernews, 26 Au- gust 2020.

5 What is the project about?

As representatives of civil society, we are deeply concerned with the current political crisis unfolding in Belarus. By mapping international responses to the crisis, we explore the toolbox used by various actors to ensure accountability and inspire change. The project’s goal is to monitor, document, and analyse international responses, seeking to clarify their complex nature to the general public, as well as to inform advocacy efforts.

We do not intend to rank international responses based on their effectiveness or formulate a ‘one size fits all’ strategy for handling the crisis. We welcome all steps taken by local and global actors to raise awareness about the dire human rights situation in Belarus. In the absence of a functioning domestic justice sys- tem to remedy violations, the response of the international community is espe- cially important. We encourage dialogue and action that can help put an end to human rights abuses and political persecution in Belarus.

States and international organisations, unless neutral by their mandate (e.g., the International Committee of the Red Cross), tend to speak up on events of high international resonance. As numbers of the regime’s victims continue to grow, actors on the international arena respond in a variety of ways, including but not limited to: ꒾ issuing official statements condemning violence and electoral fraud; ꒾ imposing travel bans and asset freezes on state officials; ꒾ shrinking the size of diplomatic missions; ꒾ withdrawing from joint economic projects; ꒾ providing financial support to civil society, independent media, and victims; ꒾ adopting resolutions and recommendations; and ꒾ starting formal investigations.

The reactions of international actors vary in their framing and choice of rhetoric, as well as in their legal and political consequences.

Are actors reacting because they can or because they must?

Some actors react out of a sense of legal obligation. For instance, states that view the prohibition of torture as a jus cogens (peremptory) or erga omnes (to- wards all) rule of international law may treat instances of torture in Belarus as an affront to the rights and interests of all states and consider themselves legally obliged to react to the violation. States that cease the performance of their obli- gations in respect to Belarus may also frame such actions as countermeasures.1

Other actors may frame their responses as something that they choose to do rather than must do. For instance, it is within states’ discretion to condemn Be- larusian de facto leadership because they are concerned by the implications of such leadership’s harmful policies, without necessarily qualifying the policies in question as violations of erga omnes rules.

1 ILC, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, adopted by the UNGA resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, Chapter II.

6 Are the responses binding?

Although states cannot unilaterally impose obligations on other states, interna- tional organisations do sometimes have the power to issue binding decisions. For instance, if the United Nations Security Council were to establish an existence of threat to international peace and security,2 it could adopt a binding resolution adopting either peaceful or forceful measures against a state.

Responses to the situation in Belarus issued by third states and organisations that Belarus is not a member of are not binding in nature. However, just because such responses are not directly binding on Belarus, this does not mean that they do not have consequences on the ground. Discontinuation of joint projects or freezing of assets affect Belarusian authorities, immediately depriving them of tangible economic benefits. Initiating criminal proceedings against perpetrators of torture in foreign states may not prompt Belarus to cease torture, but may re- sult in an actual criminal sentence should the perpetrator be caught and brought to justice.

Although Belarusian state agencies may be quick to label all unfavourable re- sponses to their actions as sanctions, not all responses easily fall under the sanctions umbrella. As discussed in a separate section, sanctions are typically characterised by the taking away certain benefits — like unrestricted travel or unrestricted trade. Other measures (e.g., official statements, resolutions, for- mal and informal investigations, financial support to civil society) may lack the element of ‘privilege deprivation’, but exert pressure on the regime in other meaningful ways.

2 United Nations Charter, Chapter VII.

7 What are sanctions?

The term ‘sanctions’ is so frequently used in modern political and legal discourse that its meaning seems intuitively clear. In the most general sense, sanctions are measures taken against states that violate their obligations or behave in an undesirable or reprehensible manner. The context in which sanctions are brought up often involves violations of international law committed by one state, for which other states, groups of states, or international organisations respond by depriving the wrongdoer state (its state officials, citizens, or entities) of cer- tain rights and privileges.

Sanctions are used as a preventive and deterrent measure in order to send a signal of what constitutes unacceptable behaviour on the international stage. They can be seen as one of the ‘naming and shaming’ tools used to induce com- pliance with international obligations. Although the desired compliance is not guaranteed, sanctions are often used to send a symbolic message, and show a commitment to fundamental values that have been disregarded.

There is no single definition of sanctions in international law. State-to-state sanc- tions are often referred to as ‘unilateral coercive measures’. Sanctions manifest- ing in non-performance of obligations in response to an internationally wrong- ful act may qualify as countermeasures’ under the law of state responsibility.1 Diplomatic sanctions may go by the label of ‘retorsions’.2 Sanctions, taken by the United Nations Security Council against its member states are different from sanctions taken by the (EU), which are used as a foreign policy tool against non-member states.

It is crucial to note that whenever we refer to ‘sanctions’, we do not refer to a single mechanism, but to multiple mechanisms, different in their scope and ef- fect. These mechanisms may share the same general name and even have some common attributes but, upon closer analysis, they exhibit distinctive features. Sanctions adopted by the United Nations Security Council, Council of the - pean Union, the International Olympic Committee, and sovereign states individ- ually will inevitably differ in their legal basis, scope, legitimacy, and impact. It is more practical to shift focus from an ambitious endeavour defining sanctions exhaustively to analysing them on a case-by-case basis.

There are some typical (but not necessarily universal) attributes of sanctions:

꒾ Sanctions are introduced by states or international organisations

Actions by individuals or companies are not typically characterised as sanc- tions. For instance, if a person is boycotting , it does not mean that he/she/they is thereby sanctioning the state. Likewise, the actions of pri- vate companies who choose to close their operations in a particular state are 1 ILC, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, adopted by the UNGA resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, Chapter II. 2 Tom Ruys, Sanctions, Retorsions and Countermeasures: Concepts and International Legal Framework (April 8, 2016). Forthcoming in Larissa van den Herik (ed.), Research Handbook on UN sanctions and international law (Edward Elgar Publishing) (2016).

8 rarely framed as sanctions. However, private companies could be taking such measures in order to implement sanctions adopted by states or international organisations.

꒾ Sanctions are introduced to induce compliance with international ob- ligations

Sanctions are not typically adopted on a whim. Whichever form sanctions may take, they are usually accompanied by the rationale for their adoption. Such rationale stems from breaches of certain international norms (e.g., the violations of human rights to be free from torture, freely assemble, elect, and be elected). Although it is possible to trace the source of the obligation to the legal instrument where it is contained (e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), actors adopting sanctions do not always cite specific legal norms. There is space for debate on whether outside actors have stand- ing to essentially represent the people whose rights are violated and decide on their behalf on how their oppressor should be ‘punished’.

Although sanctions, coming in many different shapes and forms, are not al- ways equivalent to countermeasures under the law of state responsibility,3 they are similarly aimed at inducing state compliance with the breached ob- ligation. Sanctions are meant to be lifted when the sanctioned state starts complying with its obligations.

꒾ Sanctions limit, pause, or stop the implementation of rights or grant- ing of privileges

Sanctions are meant to limit the sanctioned state’s ability to enjoy the rights and privileges vis-à-vis the sanctioning state or organisation. Sanctioned state officials are often banned from entering certain states and territories, even though they are entitled to the right of free movement under international human rights law. The privilege of keeping financial assets in foreign banks may also be limited as a result of sanctions, even though there is no universal entitlement to keep one’s financial assets in any bank of choice.

It is important to note just how multifaceted the discussion on sanctions is,4 as sanctions remain a fact of political life and an instrument regularly used in in- ternational relations.

3 ILC, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, adopted by the UNGA resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, Chapter II. 4 Ali Z. Marossi, Marisa R. Bassett, under International Law: Unilateral- ism, Multilateralism, Legitimacy, and Consequences, Asser Press: The Hague, 2015. See also the OHCHR mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of the unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights.

9 What are the types of sanctions?

꒾ Based on the actors adopting sanctions:

States’ sanctions (unilateral sanctions)

States’ sanctions are measures adopted by a state vis-à-vis another state, its citizens, or entities.

Since states are equal in their sovereignty and are prohibited from interfering in one another’s internal affairs, these types of sanctions often cause contro- versy and backlash. The sanctioned states tend to challenge the standing of other states to make outside determinations on the human rights situation on the ground, and even frame them as unlawful interventions.

Although the unilateral character of state-to-state sanctions may cause con- cern for some actors, there are factors that support the legitimacy of such sanctions: ▻ It is within a state’s sovereignty to build economic, diplomatic, and cultural relations with other states in whichever way it pleases. It is within a sovereign state’s discretion to stop or limit such relations by means of sanctions. ▻ Sanctions are often demanded by the population of the sanctioned state. The violations that trigger sanctions can be grave and sub- stantial. The call to impose sanctions is often voiced and lobbied for by the sanctioned state’s civil society, undermining the argument that outsiders do not represent the interests of the actual popula- tion.

Examples of such sanctions include the United States’ sanctions on Cuba or Switzerland’s sanctions on Belarus.

International organisations’ sanctions (multilateral sanctions)

International organisations’ sanctions are measures adopted by an interna- tional organisation vis-à-vis a state, its citizens, or entities. There are two subcategories of these types of sanctions: ▻ Measures international organisations impose on their member states. ▻ Measures international organisations impose on non-member states.

▷ Member states

When a state joins an international organisation, it transfers part of its sovereignty to the organisation.

The organisation’s structure typically includes collective bodies, competent to make strategic decisions on behalf of the organisa- tion. The rules and instruments of the organisation often stipulate situations in which member states may be sanctioned and the pro-

10 cedure for such sanctioning. The sanctions against member states may include: ▹ Suspension of funding. ▹ Suspension of membership. ▹ Suspension of providing certain services. ▹ Limiting voting rights within the organisation. ▹ Termination of membership.

These types of sanctions cause little controversy. There is an as- sumption that states consent to being governed by the organisa- tion’s rules, being fully aware of the rules on sanctions. They may dispute the factual grounds for imposing sanctions, but rarely ques- tion the legality of the sanctions mechanism as a whole.

Examples of such sanctions include the United Nations Security Council sanctions mechanism или the Council of mecha- nism of limiting voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly. The EU typically does not label actions against its own member states as sanctions, understanding sanctions, as a foreign policy tool. However, Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union provides for a mechanism of suspending certain rights of member states. This in effect may be characterised as an internal sanctions mechanism.

▷ Non-member states

Measures taken by international organisations against non-mem- ber states face the same criticism as unilateral state-to-state sanc- tions.

Since they are taken by an organisation against states that never subjected their policies to the scrutiny of such organisations, there is concern about the competence of such organisations to make any determination and ‘punish’ the wrongdoer.

The counterarguments about the legitimacy of unilateral state-to- state sanctions also apply to sanctions imposed by international or- ganisations against non-members. Reputable international organ- isations are often called upon to react to human rights violations by imposing sanctions. The sanctions typically remain within the organisation’s discretion of determining its cooperation strategies.

Examples of such sanctions include the EU’s restrictive measures against , North Korea, , Belarus and other states, as well as the United Nations Security Council sanctions against North Korea.

꒾ Based on the nature of sanctions:

Diplomatic

In a broad sense, sanctions include ‘unfriendly acts’ of calling back diplomats or closing diplomatic missions. Such measures are often mirrored by equiva- lent measures from the sanctioned state.

11 Financial

Financial sanctions may include freezing assets of individuals, terminating fi- nancial support to the sanctioned state, closing or pausing joint projects.

Economic

Economic sanctions may range from prohibitions on importing certain goods from the sanctioned state to complete trade embargoes and termination of economic cooperation.

Travel-related

Travel-related sanctions include travel bans and visa restrictions, effectively preventing sanctioned individuals from entering certain territories.

Military

Sanctions involving the use of force (e.g., placement of armed forces) can only be adopted by a United Nations Security Council Resolution.1 The only other permitted case of using force in international law is self-defence.2

꒾ Based on the scope of measures taken:

Narrow (targeted)

Sanctions may be considered narrow if they target a limited number of indi- viduals or entities, directly associated with alleged violations. There are no specific rules on how many targets sanctions should have to remain inthe ‘narrow’ category.

The fact that sanctions may target a small group of individuals does not mean that their consequences do not affect a wider population.

▷ Travel restrictions

State officials and private individuals associated with human rights violations are often banned from entering countries that individual- ly or collectively adopt sanctions.

Travel bans are not a blanket measure that apply to all state offi- cials. As a rule, people who make it to the sanctions list are care- fully reviewed. Travel bans that apply to the relatives and family members of people directly associated with violations may be more controversial.

▷ Freezing of assets

The assets of state officials, private individuals, and companies -as sociated with human rights violations are often frozen as a result of sanctions.

Like travel bans, asset freezes are not intended to be introduced

1 United Nations Charter, Article 42. 2 Ibid., Article 51.

12 arbitrarily or in an overbroad manner. There may be difficulties in targeting the assets if such assets belong to the identified

Broad (sectoral)

Sanctions may be considered broad if they target economic sectors general- ly or limit the entire population (or a significant part) in their privileges and rights.

Even broad restrictions are, to an extent, targeted. It may be unrealistic or unreasonable to halt any and all cooperation with the sanctioned state. Al- though excessive impact of broad sectoral sanctions on the already repressed populations is not the end goal, it may be a negative consequence.

▷ Trade restrictions

Restricting trade or lifting trade preferences is a common strategy to induce state compliance with human rights obligations.

Trade restrictions range from bans on trading in certain goods or services (in many cases sanctions specifically prohibit trade in arms or dual-service goods) to complete trade embargoes.

Trade restrictions may affect one or many economic sectors of the sanctioned state. The stricter the character of trade restrictions, the likelier they are to affect broad groups of population.

▷ Termination of global services

Termination of international services, like SWIFT, is a measure that cannot be applied in a narrow manner.

Such measures necessarily affect large groups of people whose ability to benefit from a global and integrated service system is limited.

꒾ Based on the grounds for adopting sanctions:

Geographic

Some sanctions regimes are adopted in response to political crises in par- ticular states. Such sanctions usually specify a series of events within the sanctioned state that have led to the adoption of restrictive measures and demand that state authorities change harmful state policies or practices. The ‘usual suspects’ for geographic sanctions include North Korea, Venezuela, Syr- ia, Russia, and Belarus.

Thematic

Some sanctions are adopted in respect of specific types of violations or mis- conduct. For instance, the United States has sanctions regimes associated with counter-terrorism, malicious cyber-enabled activities, or rough diamond trade.

Magnitsky-style sanctions mechanisms, that originated in the United States

13 and have recently been introduced at the EU, level, allow sanctioning of spe- cific individuals for serious human rights violations without assessing whether the regime as a whole is ‘sanction-worthy’.

꒾ Based on the object of sanctions:

Affecting rights

Some sanctions, similar to countermeasures under international law,3 intro- duce measures that would have been illegal if they were not adopted in re- sponse to a violation. Rights that sanctioned states and their citizens were entitled to pre-sanctions are no longer guaranteed under a sanctions regime.

Sanctions may contradict contractual obligations of the sanctioning state — for instance, if trade agreements are unilaterally terminated as a result of the newly introduced trade restrictions.

Assuming that the right to free movement4 applies extraterritorially,5 the imposition of travel bans effectively deprives sanctioned persons from the en- joyment of this right.

Affecting privileges

Some sanctions introduce measures that may be unfavourable to the sanc- tioned states and their citizens but remain within the lawful discretion of the sanctioning state.

Assuming that diplomatic measures fall under the broad umbrella of sanctions, calling back diplomatic missions or limiting the number of diplomats stationed in a particular state is within a sovereign state’s discretion.

Choosing to limit the access of certain state officials to official events or sports competitions is also within the discretion of the sanctioning state or organisa- tion. The sanctioned state cannot expect an invitation as a matter of right; it is only granted as a matter of privilege.

3 ILC, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, adopted by the UNGA resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, Chapter II. 4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 12. 5 See Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, and Policy, OUP, 2011

14 What sanctions against Belarus are currently in place?

Belarus is no stranger to international sanctions. The recent violations of have prompted several states and international organisations to impose more restrictive measures. In some cases, sanctions were not adopted anew, but rather re-imposed or extended. This section seeks to analyse the measures taken by the key international actors.

European Union

The EU boasts of a comprehensive and well-documented sanctions framework. It has formulated basic principles, guidelines, and best practices of applying restrictive measures. On 7 December 2020, it introduced the new EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (EUGHRSR).1 The new tool is projected to allow the EU ‘to target serious human rights violations and abuses worldwide, irrespective of where they occur, whereas existing sanctions regimes focus on specific countries’.2

Sanctions procedure

The procedure of imposing sanctions under the (EUGHRSR) remains similar to the original country sanctions mechanism. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and EU member states can put forward proposals for listings. The Council [in its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) configuration] decides on the listings and imposes restrictive measures inits CFSP Decision. Measures such as arms embargoes or restrictions on admission are implemented directly by the member states, which are legally bound to act in conformity with CFSP Council Decisions. The Council then proceeds to adopt a regulation which contains the measures on interrupting or reducing, in part or completely, economic relations with a third country, including measures freezing funds and economic resources.

The imposition of sanctions requires a unanimous vote by the Council, which is often held hostage to intra-EU controversies. The European Parliament (EP) does not take part in the decision-making procedure on sanctions. However, as a norm entrepreneur, the EP actively advocates for human rights in the EU’s foreign policy and is arguably the most vocal actor in calling for EU sanctions. In its September 2020 resolution on Belarus, the EP strongly supported (574 votes in favour) targeted EU sanctions against individuals responsible for the falsification of the election results and the repression in Belarus. While this

1 EEAS, Questions and Answers: EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, 7 December 2020. 2 EEAS, Questions and Answers: EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, 7 December 2020. See also Netherlands Helsinki Committee, One Step Closer to an EU Magnitsky Act, 10 November 2020: “While the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime would not replace ex- isting EU geographic sanctions regimes (some of which already address human rights violations and abuses in for example Syria, Belarus or Venezuela), the new regime would enable the EU to impose asset freezes and travel bans on foreigners that are deemed to have violated fundamen- tal rights: regardless of where they occur or who is responsible. The sanctions regime marks a great improvement for the protection of human rights, as it would replace the EU’s current coun- try-by-country system for imposing asset freezes and travel bans on foreigners with a single framework.”

15 resolution is not binding, such broad support sends a strong political signal to other EU institutions.

Once sanctions are adopted, the Council notifies the sanctioned persons of the measures taken and provides them with an opportunity to present observations, upon which the measures may be reviewed.3 The EU targeted sanctions must be based on evidence that links the sanctioned persons to the violations for which the sanctions are imposed. The EU sanctions can be appealed at the EU’s Court of Justice. Once adopted by the Council, the responsibility to implement sanctions lies with the EU member states.

Sanctions on Belarus pre-2020

Belarus has been on the EU sanctions map since 2004 , when four Belarusian officials (Yury Sivakov, Victor Sheiman, Dmitri Pavlichenko, and Vladimir Naumov) associated with the enforced disappearances of Yury Zakharenko, Viktar Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovskiy, and Dmitriy Zavadskiy were put under travel restrictions.

In 2006 sanctions were imposed in response to “violations of international electoral standards and international human rights law, as well as for the crackdown on civil society and democratic opposition”.4 The sanctions extended to 36 Belarusian officials, including Lukashenko. By2012 , the sanctions list had grown to include 243 Belarusian officials and 32 entities. The restrictive measures expanded from travel bans to asset freezes and prohibitions on exporting arms and equipment that may be used for internal repression.5 In 2016 following the release of six political prisoners,6 targeted sanctions were mostly lifted, with only the arms embargo and initial sanctions on four Belarusian officials remaining in force.7

Sanctions on Belarus post-2020

Following the 2020 Belarusian presidential election and the brutal crackdown that ensued, the CFSP Council has yet again resorted to the sanctions mechanism. So far, three packages of sanctions have been adopted, targeting a total of 84 state officials (88, counting the four officials from the 2004 sanctions list), including Lukashenko and seven companies. The fourth package of sanctions is currently underway in the EU and projected to include 165 more names.8

3 Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1999 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses, Article 5. 4 Council Regulation (EC) No 765/2006 of 18 May 2006 concerning restrictive measures in respect of Belarus, Preamble, para. (2). 5 EU Sanctions Map, Belarus. 6 Andrei Makhovsky, Belarus leader pardons six jailed opposition figures, Reuters, 23 August 2015. 7 Belarus: EU prolongs arms embargo and sanctions against 4 individuals for one year, General Secretariat of the Council, 17 February 2020. 8 “Europeans have 165 names on the table, including Karpenkov.” When will the EU adopt the fourth package of sanctions? / «На столе у европейцев 165 имен, есть и Карпенков». Когда ЕС примет четвертый пакет санкций, TUT.BY, 2 February 2021.

16 Sanctions’ Package 1 Package 2 Package 3 criteria

Date of adoption 2 October 2020 6 November 2020 17 December 2020

Conditional- ity The sanctions were ad- The sanctions were ad- The sanctions were ad- opted in response to: opted in response to: opted in response to: ▻ violence; ▻ violence; ▻ violence; ▻ unjustified arrests; ▻ unjustified arrests; ▻ unjustified arrests; and ▻ falsification of elec- ▻ falsification of election ▻ falsification of elec- tion results; results; tion results. ▻ unlawful presidential ▻ unlawful presidential inauguration; inauguration; The measures are de- ▻ detention of political ▻ detention of political signed to remain in force prisoners; and prisoners; for as long as the viola- ▻ repression and intim- ▻ repression and intim- tions persist idation of peaceful idation of peaceful demonstrators, oppo- demonstrators, oppo- sition members, and sition members, and journalists. journalists; and ▻ ongoing repression of The measures are de- civil society. signed to remain in force for as long as the viola- The measures are de- tions persist signed to remain in force for as long as the viola- tions persist

Scope Targeted:travel bans Targeted:travel bans Targeted:travel bans and asset freezes and asset freezes and asset freezes

Targeted persons 40 state officials associ- 15 state officials associ- 29 state officials and ated with electoral fraud, ated with electoral fraud, 7 companies associat- repression and intimida- repression and intimida- ed with electoral fraud, tion, arbitrary arrests, tion, arbitrary arrests, repression and intimida- ill-treatment, and tor- ill-treatment, and tor- tion, arbitrary arrests, ture. ture. ill-treatment, and tor- ture.

17 United States of America

As a powerful actor on the international arena, the United States actively uses its sanctions mechanism against foreign states, businesses, and officials.1 It regular- ly introduces and extends both thematic (counter-terrorism sanctions, cyber-re- lated sanctions, rough diamond trade control, global Magnitsky sanctions), and country-specific (includingBelarus , Burundi, Cuba, North Korea, Syria) sanctions.

Sanctions procedure

The procedures for adopting and implementing sanctions are distinct. The Of- fice of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)is a financial intelligence and enforcement agency of the US Treasury Department that administers and enforces sanctions programmes. The sanctions programmes that OFAC controls represent the im- plementation of multiple legal authorities. Some of these authorities are in the form of executive orders issued by the president, others are public laws (stat- utes) passed by Congress, following the standard legislative procedure. These authorities are further codified by OFAC in its regulations, which are published in the Code of Federal Regulations. Modifications to these regulations are posted in the Federal Register.

Sanctions on Belarus pre-2020

The United States sanctions on Belarus stem from two key acts: the Executive Order 13405 of 2006 and the Belarus Democracy Act of 2004 (as amended in 2006 and 2011).

Executive Order 13405 stipulates that all property and interests in property of the following persons2 must be blocked: ▻ all persons listed in the Annex to the order (10 individuals at the time of the order’s adoption, including Lukashenko); ▻ persons who have participated in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Belarus; ▻ persons responsible for human rights abuses related to political repression in Belarus; ▻ senior-level officials, their family members, or people closely linked to such officials who are responsible for public corruption related to Belarus; ▻ persons who have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided fi- nancial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, political repression; and ▻ legal persons owned, controlled, acting for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person listed in the order.

The Belarus Democracy Act is a United States’ statute that has been transformed and amended as new violations of human rights in Belarus emerged. Originally adopted in 2004 it was amended in 2006 and 2011 годах. The attempt to intro- duce amendments to the act in 2015 failed. Before the events of 2020, the act already stipulated a framework that would allow the United States to adopt both targeted and broad sanctions, including: ▻ travel bans for Belarusian senior leadership; ▻ freezing of individual or company funds affiliated with Belarusian

1 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Sanctions Programs and Country Information. 2 The exact list of persons is to be determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, after consulta- tion with the Secretary of State.

18 senior leadership; ▻ prohibition on providing credit guarantees, insurance, financing, or other similar financial assistance to the Belarusian government; and ▻ prohibition on using the funds of the Trade and Development Agen- cy for the activities of the agency in or for Belarus.

The conditions for the lifting of sanctions under the act included:

▻ release of individuals in Belarus who have been jailed based on polit- ical or religious beliefs or expression; ▻ withdrawal of politically motivated legal charges against all opposition activists and independent journalists in Belarus; ▻ a full account of the disappearances of opposition leaders and jour- nalists in Belarus, including Yury Zakharenko, Viktar Gonchar, Anatoly Kra- sovskiy, and Dmitriy Zavadskiy, and the prosecution of those individuals who are in any way responsible for their disappearances; ▻ cessation of all forms of harassment and repression against indepen- dent media, independent trade unions, nongovernmental organisations, youth groups, religious organisations (including their leadership and mem- bers), and the political opposition in Belarus; ▻ prosecution of senior leadership of the re- sponsible for the administration of fraudulent elections and violations of human rights; ▻ a full account of the embezzlement of state assets by senior leader- ship of the Government of Belarus, their family members, and other asso- ciates; and ▻ holding of free, fair, and transparent presidential and parliamentary consistent with Organization for Security and Co-op- eration in Europe (OSCE) standards and under the supervision of OSCE observers and independent domestic observers.

Sixteen individuals and nine state-controlled enterprises were subjected to sanc- tions before the 2020 crisis.3

Sanctions on Belarus post-2020

As the situation in Belarus continues to deteriorate, new names have been add- ed to the sanctions list. Eight state officials associated with human rights abuses and undermining democratic processes have been designated in October 2020.4 More targets have been added to the sanctions list in December 2020,5 now comprising 25 individuals, 9 enterprises, and 4 collective bodies (Central Com- mission of the Republic of Belarus on Elections and Holding Republican Referen- da; Special Purpose Police Unit (Minsk OMON); Main Internal Affairs Direc- torate of the Minsk City Executive Committee (Minsk GUVD); and KGB Alpha). More people are expected to become targets of visa restrictions.

There is also a political will to push for more sanctions. The new Belarus De- mocracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020 was signed into law by the president in December 2020. In addition to the aims pursued by the current

3 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations With Belarus. 4 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Belarus Officials for Undermining -De mocracy, 2 October 2020. 5 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Additional Belarusian Regime Actors for Undermining Democracy, 23 December 2020.

19 version of the Belarus Democracy Act, it calls to widen and tighten the sanctions grip. The act seeks to expand the categories of persons targeted by sanctions by specifically adding: ▻ members of the Central Election Commission of Belarus or people assisting the Commission; ▻ members of any branch of the security or law enforcement services of Belarus, including the KGB, Interior Ministry, and OMON special police unit who participated in political repression; ▻ government officials, including at the Information Ministry, respon- sible for the crackdown on independent media, including revoking the accreditation of journalists, disrupting Internet access, and restricting online content; ▻ officials of the so-called ‘’ between Russia and Belarus (regardless of nationality); and ▻ Russian individuals who have significantly participated in the crack- down on independent press or human rights abuses related to political repression in Belarus, including Russian propagandists sent to replace local employees at Belarusian state media outlets.

Beyond reauthorising sanctions for those complicit in the crackdown on funda- mental freedoms of Belarusians by Lukashenko during and after 9 August 2020, the act authorises assistance measures to, among other things, counter internet censorship; support the work of women activists; support political refugees flee- ing Belarus; support the investigating of the human rights abuses in Belarus; and support the public health response to COVID-19.6

Sanctions of individual states (apart from the United States)

The United States may be one of the most noticeable individual actors when it comes to imposing sanctions on Belarus. However, many other states follow suit by using their national sanctions regimes in response to the Belarusian crisis. The EU member states are coming up with longer sanctions lists to complement the EU sanctions they are already obliged to implement. Non-EU states often base their sanctions on Magnitsky-style laws,7 specifically targeting the individ- uals associated with human rights abuses.

Some of the unilateral sanctions adopted in response to repressions in Belarus include: ▻ The has imposed financial sanctions on 115 Belarusian officials and 7 companies; ▻ Switzerland has introduced travel bans and asset freezes in respect of 59 Belarusian officials; ▻ Canada has added 13 more names to its sanctions list, imposing travel bans, asset freezes, and financial prohibition on 55 persons in total; ▻ , , and have compiled a joint list of 156 Belaru- sian officials subject to travel bans and asset freezes; ▻ North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and , despite being non-member states of the EU, expressed their will to align themselves with the first and second packages of the

6 Division-by-Division Summary of Authorizing Matters, p. 68. 7 Marc Limon, Rapid expansion of ‘Magnitsky-style’ human rights sanctions regimes underlines need for international coordination and norms, Universal Rights Group, 27 August 2020; Hagar Hajjar Chemali, The European Magnitsky Law—A milestone with a lot of potential, Atlantic Coun- cil, 10 December 2020.

20 EU sanctions on Belarus and ensure that their national policies conform to the Council Decision; and ▻ North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Nor- way also expressed their will to align themselves with the third package of the EU sanctions.

International Olympic Committee

The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) sanctions are somewhat unique, as this organisation does not have the power to order travel bans and asset freezes in the traditional sense. However, driven by the concern over political discrimination of athletes and negative impact on the reputation of the Olympic Movement, it introduced several specific restrictive measures: ▻ ban on attending IOC-organised competitions for all members of the Belarusian National Olympic Committee (NOC); ▻ suspension of all payments to the Belarusian NOC, with the excep- tion of those related directly to preparations of Belarusian athletes for the Tokyo 2020 and Beijing 2022 Olympics; and ▻ suspension of any discussions with the Belarusian NOC regarding the hosting of future IOC events.

The IOC tried to balance its restrictive measures with safeguarding athletes’ rights. It requested the relevant international federations “to make sure that all eligible Belarusian athletes can take part in qualification events for the upcom- ing Olympic Games without any political discrimination”. It also declared that all Olympic scholarships will be paid directly to athletes and no longer through the NOC.

21 What other international responses are in place, besides sanctions?

Not all international responses to the Belarusian political crisis qualify as sanc- tions.There are several international actors that have resorted to other measures of promoting compliance with fundamental rights. The non-exhaustive list of such measures is provided below.

Criminal proceedings based on universal jurisdiction

Some states initiate criminal proceedings and pre-trial investigations on torture and other human rights violations in Belarus. The move to prosecute the respon- sible Belarusian actors rests on the principle of universal jurisdiction — a rule that allows or requires states to initiate criminal proceedings in respect of certain crimes, irrespective of the location of the crime or the nationality of the perpetra- tor or the victim.1 In the context of torture, the rule stems from the obligations of states under the International Convention against Torture 1984 that demands states to investigate torture committed by its citizens against its citizens or in case an offender is in the territory of that state.

The Lithuanian Prosecutor General’s Office has already opened pre-triala investi- gation into crimes against humanity committed by Belarusian police against Be- larusian citizen Maxim Khoroshin. The President of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court, Dainius Žalimas, described the potential of the principle in respect to the situation in Belarus in the following way:

“The conditions must not be created for avoiding punishment for international crimes, including those currently committed in Belarus. I mean crimes against humanity, i.e. mass torture and mass persecution for political reasons against the Belarusian people who defend the rule of law and democracy. Universal ju- risdiction is based on mandatory international legal norms defining international crimes as crimes against the entire international community and, thus, against the whole of humanity. Liability for them arises irrespective of whether the law of the state in which the crimes are committed provides for relevant criminal liability. The international community has assumed the obligation to persecute the persons who commit these crimes. Therefore, universal jurisdiction can be a viable and effective instrument to prevent impunity, as well as an instrument for the prevention of international crimes.”

Other universal jurisdiction criminal cases have been initiated in regarding the facts of detention and torture of the citizens of Poland in Belarus. Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s Cabinet in its Telegram channel stated that there are 10 univer- sal jurisdiction cases ready for submission in Poland and 10 in Czech Republic. With the continuous human rights violations in Belarus, it is likely that more pro- ceedings will follow.

There are famous examples of the effective use of universal jurisdiction. Some notable cases of its application include the prosecutions of Eichmann in Israel, Pinochet in the United Kingdom and , Taylor in the United States, followed

1 Xavier Philippe, The principles of universal jurisdiction and complementarity: how do the two principles intermesh?, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 88, Number 862, June 2006.

22 by the recent cases of prosecution of war criminals from Rwanda, Syria, Demo- cratic Republic of Congo, Libya, and other conflict-affected areas. The willingness to attempt applying the principles to stop human rights abuses in Belarus shows the commitment of other countries to uphold international justice in the situa- tion, when other international criminal institutions, like the International Criminal Code, are inaccessible to Belarus.

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Moscow Mechanism

OSCE implements its mission of promoting peace, stability, and democracy in three main spheres, also called dimensions: politico-military; economic and envi- ronmental; and human. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is responsible for the human dimension. It is within its mandate to monitor the implementation of commitments that participating states have undertaken in the field of human rights and democracy.

In the context of the Belarusian presidential election and its aftermath, 17 partic- ipating states invoked the Moscow Mechanism — a human dimension tool aimed at addressing human rights concerns. The mechanism entails creating an expert mission, tasked with establishing facts and providing advice on possible solutions to the questions raised.

Although Belarus had decided to refrain from participating in the implementation of the Moscow Mechanism in 2020, the report of the OSCE-appointed expert Professor Dr. Wolfgang Benedek was published on 29 October 2020. First, the rapporteur concluded that ‘there were evident shortcomings of the presidential elections which did not meet the basic requirements established on the basis of previous election monitoring’. Second, the violations of human rights ‘were found to be massive and systematic and proven beyond doubt’. The rapporteur also communicated its recommendations to Belarusian authorities.

Belarus is a participating state of the OSCE, and so the OSCE stance on events in Belarus does not go unnoticed by de facto authorities. By using a formal re- porting and investigative mechanism, the OSCE shows that it is willing to use the instruments at its disposal to support democratic change and accountability.

OHCHR toolbox

There are several mechanisms within the United Nations human rights system that have been deployed:

Human Rights Council Resolutions

In September 2020, the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 45/1 on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential elec- tion and in its aftermath. The resolution condemns acts of torture, enforced dis- appearance, abduction, arbitrary detention, sexual and gender-based violence, arbitrary deprivation of life, and calls upon Belarusian authorities to fulfil their human rights obligations. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights will pres- ent her report on the situation in Belarus in March 2021 on implementation of Resolution 45/1.

Although the resolutions of the Human Rights Council are not binding in nature, Belarus is a member of the United Nations and, at the very least, the adoption of

23 the resolution entails reputational risks for the Belarusian leadership. Voting on the Human Rights Council resolution is preceded by a session where state rep- resentatives as well as outside experts can express their position, encouraging dialogue and keeping Belarusian events in the spotlight.

Special Rapporteurs

Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council refer to independent experts or working groups, tasked with studying human rights in a particular sphere (the- matic mandates) or a particular country (country-specific mandates). The man- date of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus has been in existence since 2012.

Current Special Rapporteur Anaïs Marin has been active in responding to the post-election crisis and mobilising the international community to pay closer at- tention to human rights abuses in Belarus. Independently and jointly with other special rapporteurs, she has issued statements calling to stop attacks on peaceful protesters, acts of torture, and threats to women human rights defenders.2 She spoke during the 45th session of the Human Rights Council, where Resolution 45/1 was adopted, and presented at the informal Arria Formula meeting at the United Nations Security Council. The special rapporteur’s annual report will be presented in June 2021.

The efforts to direct the attention of the international community to the dire hu- man rights situation in Belarus are important to keep Belarus a priority on the human rights agencies’ agenda.

The toolbox of the United Nations human rights body also extends to assessing human rights performance through the Universal Periodic Review mechanism, which did not fully assess the 2020 events in its most recent iteration, and rec- tifying human rights violations through the individual complaints procedures of treaty bodies (in the Belarusian case, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women), which are yet to issue decisions in protest-related cases.

Official statements

Official statements condemning violence, repression, and electoral fraud in -Be larus have undoubtedly been the most widespread response to the authorities’ misconduct. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Secretary-General, the Council of Europe senior leadership, as well as many heads of state and senior officials have issued statements on the situation in Belarus. Rhetorical responses are a crucial first reaction that show solidarity with the people’s struggle, and may serve as a foundation for more decisive next steps.

Financial and other support measures

Allocating resources to the regime’s victims, civil society organisations, inde- pendent media, and solidarity initiatives is a response that is crucial for civ- il resistance to remain sustainable and strong, as repressions tighten. Support measures may include financial assistance packages distributed to trusted and effective actors, easing visa restrictions and asylum procedures, and long-term

2 All Belarus-related statements are available here.

24 planning on alleviating the economic costs of democratic transition.

If international actors only use sanctions or other unfriendly acts as a ‘feel-good’ measure, without investing time and resources into helping civil society on the ground, it will be harder to spur meaningful change. International responses to the ongoing and painful crisis in Belarus should not be used to assert moral high ground but to support civil resistance and democratic transition. Compliment- ing sanctions with financial and institutional support shows the political will to continually support democratic transformation and respect for the rule of law in Belarus.

25 What has been the response of the Belarusian de facto leadership?

Belarusian de facto authorities have consistently tried to convey a message that sanctions are not a constructive way to solve a crisis where the statehood of Belarus is at stake. In anticipation of the re-imposition of EU sanctions, Belarusian de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs asked the EU to be understanding of the “painful stages of maturing as a nation”, which every country is bound to experience.1 When re-imposition of sanctions followed, Makei continued to question the effectiveness of sanctions, stating that “no matter how beautifully wrapped, sanctions have never led to positive change” and suggesting that Belarus will provide an “adequate response”.2 State-sponsored and state- controlled TV channels stated that sanctions will only strengthen the Belarusian “immune system”.3

In response to the third round of EU sanctions, he stated that Minsk categorically rejects the logics of and politics behind sanctions. Besides declaring that Belarus would proceed to impose travel bans on EU residents, Makei also mentioned that Belarusian authorities would “limit the activities of certain political foundations in Belarus and reconsider the modality of implementing certain humanitarian, educational, and cultural programs, … including those under the auspices of foreign embassies”.4 Belarusian de facto Prime-Minister has blamed the “collective West” in slowing down the economic development of Belarus through sanctions.5

In response to the extension of the United States’ sanctions list, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that such actions do not support Belarusian independence, and impose a “human rights dictatorship”.6 The higher chamber of the Belarusian parliament characterised the passing of the Belarus Democracy, Human Rights, and Sovereignty Act of 2020 as an interference in Belarusian internal affairs and a threat to international peace and security.7 1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus,Vladimir Makei’s statement to the press during the general discussion at 75th United Nations General Assembly / Подход к прессе в рамках записи выступления Министра иностранных дел Беларуси В.Макея на общей дискуссии 75-й сессии ГА ООН, 18 September 2020. 2 Makei: no matter how beautifully wrapped, sanctions never lead to solving problems / Макей: в какой бы красивой обертке ни подавали санкции, они никогда не приводят к решению проблем, BELTA, 10 December 2020; Makei commented the meeting with foreign diplomats, calling their demands a “propaganda pitch” / Макей прокомментировал встречу с иностранными дипломатами и назвал их требования «агиткой», TUT.BY, 10 December 2020. 3 MZKT, Eismont’s husband, Kochanova - the list of persons included in the third round of sanc- tions became publicized. State channels said that it will improve Belarusian “immune system” / МЗКТ, муж Эйсмонт, Кочанова — Стал известен список, кто попал в третий пакет санкций ЕС. На госТВ сказали, что их «иммунитет повысится», Telegraf.by, 17 December 2020. 4 Makei on counter-sanctions on the EU: We will limit the activities of certain political founda- tions in Belarus acting under the auspices of foreign embassies / Макей об ответных санкциях ЕС: Ограничим деятельность ряда политических фондов, действующих и под эгидой посольств, TUT.BY, 22 December 2020. 5 Will the Belarusian authorities manage to hide from the EU sanctions under the EEU “umbrel- la”? / Удастся ли белорусским властям спрятаться от европейских санкций под «зонтиком» ЕАЭС?, Belrynok.by, 23 February 2021. 6 Belarusian MFA on the US sanctions: the US imposes a “human rights dictatorship” in Belarus / МИД Беларуси об американских санкциях: США насаждают в Беларуси «диктатуру прав человека», TUT.BY, 24 December 2020. 7 Council of the Republic: Adopting a law on Belarus in the US creates a threat to internation-

26 The Belarusian Federation of Labour Unions, notorious for its subordination to Belarusian authorities, appealed to the United Nations, asking the Human Rights Council to declare that unilateral restrictive measures adopted by the EU violate the labour rights of Belarusians.8 The Federation has also prepared an open letter to the International Labour Organization, criticizing sanctions as unfounded and harmful for the workers. Reportedly, many of the signees were forced to join the open letter by senior officials.9 The Federation did not provide any commentary on the mass termination of labour contracts with the employees of Belarusian enterprises who spoke against election fraud and violence.10 The head of the largest state-owned TV station in Belarus Ivan Eismont suggested introducing criminal responsibility for the calls to impose sanctions.11

al security / Принятие в США законопроекта по Беларуси создает угрозу международной безопасности - Совет Республики, BelTA, 24 December 2020. 8 Labor Unions appealed to the UN following the EU sanctions. What do salaries and jobs have to do with it? / Профсоюзы пожаловались в ООН из-за санкций Евросоюза. При чем тут зарплаты и рабочие места?, TUT.BY, 24 December 2020. 9 “We can be deprived of pensions and allowances.” Workers are being asked to sign the Labor Union letter on sanctions / «Можем остаться без пенсий, пособий». Работников просят подписать письмо профсоюзов по санкциям, TUT.BY, 26 January 2021. 10 Large enterprises continue to fire workers. BelAZ workers have stepped up for their col- leagues / На крупных предприятиях продолжаются увольнения работников. На БелАЗе вышли отстаивать коллег, TUT,BY, 30 October 2020. 11 Eismont: We need to introduce criminal persecution for the calls to adopt sanctions against the country/ Эйсмонт: в Беларуси надо ввести уголовное преследование за призывы к санкциям в отношении страны, BELTA, 5 February 2021.

27 What has been the response of civil society and alternative democratic forces?

Belarusian civil society has largely welcomed international responses sought to ensure accountability for human rights violations and political repressions in Belarus.

The office of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya — a perceived winner of Belarusian presidential election, forced into exile soon after the election’s disputed results were announced, — has been especially active in advocating for sanctions. In the official statements, the office has consistently called for the imposition of sanctions, widening their scope and reach.1 In the interview to the New Yorker, the national leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaya commented on the sanctions strategy in the following way:

“There should be a very broad list of people who face individual sanctions. For now, sanctions apply only to highly placed officials who’ve faced sanctions before and have parked their money elsewhere and are generally prepared. But people lower down—the principals of the schools where election results were falsified, the Interior Ministry troops whom we’ve been able to identify, heads of jails, hospital directors who fire doctors for speaking out—they’ve never faced sanctions before.

...we also need the E.U. to impose economic sanctions against major industrial enterprises, such as [the oil giant] Naftan, and [the fertilizer manufacturers] Belaruskali and Grodno Azot. We are asking for loans to these companies, purchases from them, and supplies of raw materials and spare parts to be temporarily suspended.

...They fear sanctions. Sanctions hurt. So we need to use them.”

Another alternative political force — the National Anti-Crisis Management organization, led by former Belarusian diplomat , - is less vocal in calling for sanctions in the public realm, but active in commenting on the sanctions’ rationale and results. For instance, the head of the organization Pavel Latushko stated that “the international community must react to mass human rights violations in Europe” and “it is only the illegitimate [Belarusian] leadership, unwilling to follow both international and national legal principles, that is to blame for the adverse reaction that ensued.”2

Belarusian human rights defenders have consistently condemned violence and 1 Svetlana Tikhanovskaya forwarded the Taraikovsky List to the EU and called upon Swedish parliamentarians to urgently impose sanctions / Светлана Тихановская передала в ЕС Список Тарайковского и призвала шведских парламентариев к срочному введению санкций, Office of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, 18 November 2020; Svetlana Tikhanovskaya called upon Sweden to support economic sanctions against Lukashenko’s regime / Светлана Тихановская призвала Швецию поддержать экономические санкции против режима Лукашенко, Office of Svetla- na Tikhanovskaya, 18 November 2020; Discussing new sanctions with ambassadors of foreign countries in response to the escalation of violence in Belarus, Office of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, 16 November 2020; called on the international investigation of Ra- man Bandarenka’s murder, economic sanctions and cancellation of Ice Hockey Championship in Minsk, Office of Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, 14 November 2020;

2 Post on National Anti-Crisis Management Telegram channel (@nau_belarus), 13 December 2020.

28 human rights violations pre-, mid-, and post-election in their joint statements.3 Since civil society organizations address their statements primarily to Belarusian de facto authorities and not international actors, such statements do not typically refer to sanctions or other international responses directly. However, international non-profit actors have actively pushed for sanctions, includingReporters Without Borders.

Civil society organizations are actively involved in monitoring international responses to the situation in Belarus — for instance, Belarusian online portal defenders.by has a special section dedicated to expressions of international solidarity with lawyers and human rights defenders repressed by the regime. Overall, the goals of grassroots civil society actors and international players often coincide. Both aim to end human rights abuses and are willing to employ international mechanisms that will create meaningful change.

3 Ice Hockey World Championship 2021: joint statement by human rights organizations, World Organisation Against Torture, 12 November 2020; Appeal to Business by Belarusian Human Rights Organizations in Connection with the Human Rights Crisis in Belarus, Belarusian Helsinki Committee, 5 November 2020; Заявление правозащитных организаций о недопустимости давления на белорусских правозащитников, Human Constanta, 22 October 2020; Statement of Belarusian Human Rights Defenders, Human Rights Center Viasna, 10 August 2020; Marina Baranovskaya, Belarusian human rights defenders accused authorities of repressing participants of election campaign / Правозащитники Беларуси обвинили власти в репрессиях участников избирательной кампании, DW, 12 June 2020.

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