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Cash Transfer Programs in Yemen N UP MEE YE EN GDP SO DA SOCCIO-ECONOMIC M $ CIO-ECONOMIC TE $ YE UP UPD DA GDP SOCIO-ECONOMICS TE ATE $ Ministry of Planning YEMEN 2020 & International Cooperation Economic Studies & Forecasting Sector N SOCIO-ECONOMICME Issue (49) June, 2020 YE UPDATE Social Protection in Yemen: Resilience and Coping amid the COVID-19 Pandemic (Part Two) Social Protection amid the COVID-19 Pandemic Developments…Interventions…Responses…Evaluation and Priorities INTRODUCTION IN THIS EDITION: Social protection becomes of paramount importance during pan- I: The Novel Coronavirus Pandemic (Covid-19) Up- demics, including the current coronavirus crisis because their con- dates sequences overshadow the various social perceptions i.e. livelihood and humanitarian dimensions. Decent life is an existential and in- II: The Role of MoPIC in Mobilizing Resources for herent right bestowed to humans who deserve to be protected ad- Social Protection (Social Safety Net) equately as civilization makers/developers and consumers of what III: Key Interventions by Donors (Humanitarian Ac- the planet tolerates. As the coronavirus pandemic spirals put of tors) in the Area of Social Protection control, social protection is widely seen as the preferred sanctuary IV: The Novel Coronavirus Outbreak Response in Ye- and the most effective means by which countries manage to address men protection and security issues, mainly the groups most affected by the pandemic, as well as other routine beneficiaries. To realize that, V: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Social Protection appropriate financial resources for planned social interventions and in Yemen economic stimulus packages have to be allocated to prevent the VI: Social Protection Priorities and Policies economy from slipping into deep recession. This issue of the YSEU Bulletin comes as a follow up to the pre- I: The Novel Coronavirus Pandemic vious one. It highlights developments pertaining to Covid-19 at the (Covid-19) Updates global and national levels, including the role assumed by the Min- istry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) in mobi- At the Global Level (https://elaph.com/coronavirus-statistics.html) lizing support by donors and international organizations and how Globally, confirmed cases of Covid-19 are soaring exponentially to channel their interventions and responses towards strengthening and at alarming level reaching 10.7 million cases as of July 1, 2020. the capacity of relevant national institutions to better respond to the Figure (1) shows the pandemic becomes increasingly worrying, as growing social protection needs, on the one hand, and provide direct one million confirmed cases were reported in the first three months support to the poor and the most affected groups on the other. It also since the outbreak began i.e. 10 thousand cases per day, on average, underlines the role by international donors and agencies as part of amid total closure of the economy. Yet, the ninth million took just 8 social protection programs and response measures to combat Co- days to add to the list (125 thousand infections per day on average) vid-19 crisis and the need to link them to relevant programs. and another 6 days to hit the ten million threshold (167,000 cases per day, on average) as economies are gearing up for partially or It also provides an evaluation of the extent to which efforts and in- full reopening. Daily infections are expected to rise to 200,000/ terventions introduced by the social protection system are affective day during the upcoming weeks, as closure restrictions are relaxed and how capable they are in containing further spread of the pan- and life began to return to normal. However, alternatives such as demic. This implies priorities and solutions designed to empower stricter personal protection measures, maintain social distancing social protection programs to be more resilient and capable of fac- and avoid crowding have to be in place together with exploring the ing the Covid-19 pandemic in particular, and the broader humani- risks specific to each country. This would include also easing clo- tarian crisis in Yemen in general. In doing so, the social protection sure and tabling solutions that balance out between actions to limit system and national institutions would grow stronger and capable of the spread of the virus vi-a-vis protecting livelihoods though social responding to potential crises in the future. protection programs and sustaining the global economy. FACTS AND INDICATORS 75% $ 0.51-0.57 / Day 12.4 Million People is the poverty rate in Yemen out of is the average per capita pension in 22 governorates benefited from WFP in February 2020, includ- the total population till the end of share for a family of 5. ing 9.4 million people received in-kind food assistance, 2.4 million 2019, and it is expected to reach 79% received food vouchers and 430,000 people benefitted from cash if the conflict drags on until 2022. (MoPIC Based on data, of General Authority for Insur- transfers. (UNDP, Assessing the Impact of War in Yemen on Achieving ance and Pensions and General Corporation for Social (WFP Yemen Situation Report – February 2020) the Sustainable Development Goals, 2019) Insurance). 1.4 Million HouseHolds 9.15 Million Working Days 2.4 Million Yemeni children 27.1% (about 9 million individuals) benefit were generated through cash-for- at the brink of famine due to lack of is Covid-19 mortality rate in from cash transfers programs cover- work programs in Yemen during the humanitarian aid amid COVID-19. Yemen ing nearly one third of the popula- period September 2016-Decemebr tion in Yemen. 2019. OCHA, Yemen COVID-19 Preparedness and (https://www.unicef.org/yemen/emergency-cash-transfer-project) (UNDP, Yemen Emergency Crisis Response Project (YECRP), UNICEF, Yemen five years on: Children, conflict and Response Snapshot, Humanitarian Country Team Annual Report 2019) COVID-19, 26 Jun2020 - As of As of 4 July 2020 UUPD N UUP N ME ME YE DA YE P A EEN GDDP SO EN GD TE SOCIO-ECON M $ CIO-ECONO TE SOCIO-ECON M $ OMIC $ YE MICC OOMIC $ YE N UP MEE YE EN GDP SO DA SOCCIO-ECONOMIC M $ CIO-ECONOMIC TE Issue (49) June, 2020 Page$ 2 YE Yemen Socio-Economic Update Figure (1): Prevalence Speed of Coronavirus Pandemic Globally in 2020 (Daily Infection Rate) 10th Million 167 Thousands/ day 9th Million 125 Thousands/ day 1st 10 Million Thousands/ day First Three Months 3rd Week of June Last 5 Days of June Daily Range # in Millions Source: https://elaph.com/coronavirus-statistics.html The decision by countries to gradually reopen their economies - despite the continuing spike in the number of in- fections - as mentioned above, emanates from the premise that the economy is no longer capable of withstanding the closure with its sever implications that may lead to uncontrollable economic collapse or fall short of addressing the ensuing negative effects both on the economy and the society. This equation, nevertheless, is prioritizing livelihoods (the economy) over protecting lives (health), leaving protection issues triggered by Covid-19 to individual protection/ prevention measures and social distancing. At the National Level (OCHA, Yemen COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Snapshot, Humanitarian Country Team - As of 27 June & As of 4 July 2020) Figure (2) below shows that Covid-19 pandemic continues to spread at a steady pace across the country since the first confirmed case was reported on April 10, 2020. The highest daily infection rate reached 116 cases on June 15, 2020, compared to 83 cases as of June 25, 2020. Figure (2): Curve of Confirmed Daily COVID-19 Infections Reported in Yemen (1 June – 1 July 2020) 116 83 72 73 45 40 41 31 34 36 32 26 26 30 20 23 19 16 17 13 14 15 13 7 10 10 2 0 0 3 0 12345678910 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 1 June July Source: COVID-19 Supreme National Emergency Response Committee & Yemen Covid-19 Tracker: https://yemen-corona.com/ As for the cumulative cases of Covid-19 in Yemen(1) : the cumulative case curve (figure 3) shows that COVID-19 cases continue to rise, with the number of cumulative infections increased from 358 cases by June 1 to 1,194 cases on July 1, 836 up in just a month. In addition, the death toll jumped from 85 on June 1st to 319 deaths by July 1st, an increase of 234. In contrast, recovered cases increased from 16 cases as of June 1 to 274 cases on June 16, which in- dicates that recovered cases outnumbered deaths (it is also observed from Figure 3 that the green curve on recovered cases began to surpassed the red curve for deaths). The total number of recovered cases continues to rise to reach 489 cases by July 1st. (1) Excluding cases under the Sana’a Ministry of Health, however, the MoH has confirmed in a statement issued on May 29, 2020, that COVID-19 related infections have been detected in several areas and governorates, including Amanat Al Asima. http://www.moh.gov.ye/news_details.aspx?id=2277 UUPD N UUP N ME ME YE DA YE P A EEN GDDP SO EN GD TE SOCIO-ECON M $ CIO-ECONO TE SOCIO-ECON M $ OMIC $ YE MICC OOMIC $ YE N UP MEE YE EN GDP SO DA SOCCIO-ECONOMIC M $ CIO-ECONOMIC TE Issue (49) June, 2020 Page$ 3 YE Yemen Socio-Economic Update Figure (3):Curve of Confirmed Cumulative Cases, Deaths and Recoveries to Covid-19 in Yemen (1–June- 1 July 2020) 1200 1194 1000 800 600 489 358 400 274 200 319 0 1 3 57911 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 1 June July Con rmed Death Recovered Source: COVID-19 Supreme National Emergency Response Committee & Yemen Covid-19 Tracker: https://yemen-corona.com/ As of July 4, the total confirmed cases reached 1,252, including 338 associated deaths and 539 recovered cases, with infections among men account for 76% of all reported cases.
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