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The War of 1812
American flag HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY The War of 1812 Teacher Guide British navy Americans and British make peace American victory on Lake Erie G2T_U7_The War of 1812_TG.indb 1 27/09/19 8:48 PM G2T_U7_The War of 1812_TG.indb 2 27/09/19 8:48 PM The War of 1812 Teacher Guide G2T_U7_The War of 1812_TG.indb 1 27/09/19 8:48 PM Creative Commons Licensing This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. You are free: to Share—to copy, distribute, and transmit the work to Remix—to adapt the work Under the following conditions: Attribution—You must attribute the work in the following manner: This work is based on an original work of the Core Knowledge® Foundation (www.coreknowledge.org) made available through licensing under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. This does not in any way imply that the Core Knowledge Foundation endorses this work. Noncommercial—You may not use this work for commercial purposes. Share Alike—If you alter, transform, or build upon this work, you may distribute the resulting work only under the same or similar license to this one. With the understanding that: For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. The best way to do this is with a link to this web page: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ Copyright © 2019 Core Knowledge Foundation www.coreknowledge.org 5 All Rights Reserved. - 3 Core Knowledge®, Core Knowledge Curriculum Series™, Core Knowledge History and Geography™, and CKHG™ are trademarks of the Core Knowledge Foundation. -
Rationality, Pirates, and the Law: a Retrospective
LEESON.OFFTOPRINTER.CORREX.SECOND (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2010 6:44 PM RATIONALITY, PIRATES, AND THE LAW: A RETROSPECTIVE * PETER T. LEESON TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction .......................................................................................1219 I. Antipiracy Law Before 1700 ....................................................1220 II. Antipiracy Law After 1700 .......................................................1222 III. The Hard-Plucked Fruit of Antipiracy Legal Reform and Pirates’ Response .....................................................................1224 Conclusion .........................................................................................1229 INTRODUCTION In the late 1720s, Caribbean piracy was brought to a screeching halt. An enhanced British naval presence was partly responsible for bringing pirates to their end. But the most important factor contributing to this result was a series of early eighteenth-century legal changes that made it possible to prosecute pirates effectively. This short Article’s purpose is to recount those legal changes and document their effectiveness. Its other purpose is to analyze pirates’ response to the legal changes designed to exterminate them, which succeeded, at least partly, in frustrating the British government’s goal. By providing a retrospective look at antipiracy law and pirates’ reactions to that law, my hope is to supply some useful material for thinking about how to use the law to address the contemporary piracy problem. * Visiting Professor of Economics, -
War at Sea: Nineteenth-Century Laws for Twenty-First
International Review of the Red Cross (2016), 98 (2), 419–447. War and security at sea doi:10.1017/S1816383117000418 War at sea: Nineteenth-century laws for twenty-first- century wars? Steven Haines* Steven Haines is Professor of Public International Law at the University of Greenwich and a retired British naval commander. He chaired the Editorial Board of the UK’s official Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2004) and co-authored its chapter on “Maritime Warfare”. He had previously written the Royal Navy’s maritime strategic doctrine (British Maritime Doctrine, 1999). Abstract While most law on the conduct of hostilities has been heavily scrutinized in recent years, the law dealing with armed conflict at sea has been largely ignored. This is not surprising. There have been few naval conflicts since 1945, and those that have occurred have been limited in scale; none has involved combat between major maritime powers. Nevertheless, navies have tripled in number since then, and today there are growing tensions between significant naval powers. There is a risk of conflict at sea. Conditions have changed since 1945, but the law has not developed in that time. Elements of it, especially that regulating economic warfare at sea, seem outdated and it is not clear that the law is well placed to regulate so- called “hybrid” warfare at sea. It seems timely to review the law, to confirm that which is appropriate and to develop that which is not. Perhaps a new edition of the San Remo Manual would be timely. Keywords: naval warfare, conduct of hostilities at sea, sea control, economic warfare, power projection, maritime hybrid warfare, San Remo Manual. -
Was The War of 1812. Impressment (Or Impressing Sailors). The
Binder Page ______________ Name _________________________________________________ Period _____________ The War of 1812 Date____________________ PRESIDENT- JAMES MADISON James Madison was known as the “Father of the Constitution” and is sometimes also called the “Father of the Bill of Rights”. He had helped write the Constitution and the Federalist Papers that helped insure that the Constitution would be ratified. However, like his friend Jefferson, he was in the Democratic-Republican party. When Jefferson was President, Madison was his Secretary of State. After Jefferson’s two terms, Madison was elected as our 4th president. By far, the most important thing that happened in his presidency was the War of 1812 . CAUSES OF THE WAR OF 1812 The causes of the War of 1812 are tied to the enormous amount of fighting that had been taking place between Britain and France. The French leader, was trying to take over Europe and Britain was trying to stop him. Americans were making profits trading with both sides. Both Britain and France were forbidding the Americans to trade with the other side. In spite of the fact that the Americans claimed to be neutral, both sides stopped American ships bound for their enemy. Since the British had the stronger navy, they were more effective at stopping American shipping and were seen at the bigger problem. To make matters worse, the British were also forcing British citizens to fight in the their navy. Drafted sailors was a practice known as impressment (or impressing sailors). The British believed that British citizens anywhere in the world could be forced to serve in His Majesty’s Navy. -
The Ambiguous Patriotism of Jack Tar in the American Revolution Paul A
Loyalty and Liberty: The Ambiguous Patriotism of Jack Tar in the American Revolution Paul A. Gilje University of Oklahoma What motivated JackTar in the American Revolution? An examination of American sailors both on ships and as prisoners of war demonstrates that the seamen who served aboard American vessels during the revolution fit neither a romanticized notion of class consciousness nor the ideal of a patriot minute man gone to sea to defend a new nation.' While a sailor could express ideas about liberty and nationalism that matched George Washington and Ben Franklin in zeal and commitment, a mixxture of concerns and loyalties often interceded. For many sailors the issue was seldom simply a question of loyalty and liberty. Some men shifted their position to suit the situation; others ex- pressed a variety of motives almost simultaneously. Sailors could have stronger attachments to shipmates or to a hometown, than to ideas or to a country. They might also have mercenary motives. Most just struggled to survive in a tumultuous age of revolution and change. Jack Tar, it turns out, had his own agenda, which might hold steadfast amid the most turbulent gale, or alter course following the slightest shift of a breeze.2 In tracing the sailor's path in these varying winds we will find that seamen do not quite fit the mold cast by Jesse Lemisch in his path breaking essays on the "inarticulate" Jack Tar in the American Revolution. Lemisch argued that the sailor had a concern for "liberty and right" that led to a "complex aware- ness that certain values larger than himself exist and that he is the victim not only of cruelty and hardship but also, in the light of those values, of injus- tice."3 Instead, we will discover that sailors had much in common with their land based brethren described by the new military historians. -
The Idea of a “Fleet in Being” in Historical Perspective
Naval War College Review Volume 67 Article 6 Number 1 Winter 2014 The deI a of a “Fleet in Being” in Historical Perspective John B. Hattendorf Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Hattendorf, John B. (2014) "The deI a of a “Fleet in Being” in Historical Perspective," Naval War College Review: Vol. 67 : No. 1 , Article 6. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Hattendorf: The Idea of a “Fleet in Being” in Historical Perspective THE IDEA OF a “FLEET IN BEING” IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE John B. Hattendorf he phrase “fleet in being” is one of those troublesome terms that naval his- torians and strategists have tended to use in a range of different meanings. TThe term first appeared in reference to the naval battle off Beachy Head in 1690, during the Nine Years’ War, as part of an excuse that Admiral Arthur Herbert, first Earl of Torrington, used to explain his reluctance to engage the French fleet in that battle. A later commentator pointed out that the thinking of several Brit- ish naval officers ninety years later during the War for American Independence, when the Royal Navy was in a similar situation of inferior strength, contributed an expansion to the fleet-in-being concept. -
The War of 1812: the Rise of American Nationalism
University of Washington Tacoma UW Tacoma Digital Commons History Undergraduate Theses History Winter 2016 The aW r of 1812: The Rise of American Nationalism Paul Hanseling [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tacoma.uw.edu/history_theses Part of the European History Commons, Military History Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Hanseling, Paul, "The aW r of 1812: The Rise of American Nationalism" (2016). History Undergraduate Theses. 27. https://digitalcommons.tacoma.uw.edu/history_theses/27 This Undergraduate Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the History at UW Tacoma Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Undergraduate Theses by an authorized administrator of UW Tacoma Digital Commons. The War of 1812: The Rise of American Nationalism A Senior Paper Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Graduation Undergraduate History Program of the University of Washington Tacoma By Paul Hanseling University of Washington Tacoma March 2016 Advisor: Dr. Allen 1 Abstract On June 18, 1812, United States President, James Madison, signed a Declaration of War against Great Britain. What brought these two nations to such a dramatic impasse? Madison’s War Message to Congress gives some hint as to the American grievances: impressment of American sailors; unnecessary, “mock” blockades and disruption of American shipping; violations of American neutral rights; and incursions into American coastal waters.1 By far, the most vocal point of contention was impressment, or the forcible enlistment of men in the navy. For their part, Great Britain viewed every measure disputed by Americans as a necessity as they waged war against the Continental advances of Napoleon and for maintaining the economic stability of the British people. -
Guide to the War of 1812 Sources
Source Guide to the War of 1812 Table of Contents I. Military Journals, Letters and Personal Accounts 2 Service Records 5 Maritime 6 Histories 10 II. Civilian Personal and Family Papers 12 Political Affairs 14 Business Papers 15 Histories 16 III. Other Broadsides 17 Maps 18 Newspapers 18 Periodicals 19 Photos and Illustrations 19 Genealogy 21 Histories of the War of 1812 23 Maryland in the War of 1812 25 This document serves as a guide to the Maryland Center for History and Culture’s library items and archival collections related to the War of 1812. It includes manuscript collections (MS), vertical files (VF), published works, maps, prints, and photographs that may support research on the military, political, civilian, social, and economic dimensions of the war, including the United States’ relations with France and Great Britain in the decade preceding the conflict. The bulk of the manuscript material relates to military operations in the Chesapeake Bay region, Maryland politics, Baltimore- based privateers, and the impact of economic sanctions and the British blockade of the Bay (1813-1814) on Maryland merchants. Many manuscript collections, however, may support research on other theaters of the war and include correspondence between Marylanders and military and political leaders from other regions. Although this inventory includes the most significant manuscript collections and published works related to the War of 1812, it is not comprehensive. Library and archival staff are continually identifying relevant sources in MCHC’s holdings and acquiring new sources that will be added to this inventory. Accordingly, researchers should use this guide as a starting point in their research and a supplement to thorough searches in MCHC’s online library catalog. -
Bibliography
BIBLIOGRAPHY I. PRIMARY SOURCES A. Unpublished 1. Government Archives British National Archives, Kew ADM 1 Admiralty: Correspondence and Papers ADM 116 Admiralty Record Offi ce: Cases ADM 167 Board of Admiralty: Minutes and Memoranda ADM 231 Admiralty: Foreign Intelligence Committee and Naval Intelligence Department: Naval Intelligence Reports CAB 37 Cabinet Offi ce: Photographic Copies of Cabinet Papers CAB 41 Cabinet Offi ce: Photographic Copies of Cabinet Letters in the Royal Archives HO 73 Home Offi ce: Various Commissions: Reports and Correspondence United States National Archives, Washington D.C. RG 19 Records of the Bureau of Construction and Repair RG 38 Records of the Bureau of Personnel (formerly the Bureau of Navigation) RG 45 Records of the Offi ce of the Secretary of the Navy RG 233 Records of the House of Representatives 2. Private Correspondence and Papers British National Maritime Museum, Greenwich Bridge, Cyprian Arthur George Fisher, John Arbuthnot Hornby, Geoffrey Thomas Phipps Laughton, John Knox Milne, Alexander © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 299 R. Mullins, J. Beeler, The Transformation of British and American Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-32037-3 300 BIBLIOGRAPHY Library of Congress, Naval Historical Foundation Collection Luce, Stephen Bleecker Mahan, Alfred Thayer Porter, David Dixon Sicard, Montgomery Walker, John Grimes Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division Collection Aldrich, Nelson Chandler, William Eaton Tracy, Benjamin Franklin Whitney, William Collins B. Published Aston, George. Memories of a Marine: An Amphibiography . London: John Murray, 1919. _________. Secret Service . London: Faber and Faber, 1930. Belknap, Charles. “The Naval Policy of the United States,” US Naval Institute Proceedings [hereafter USNIP ], vol. -
Few Americans in the 1790S Would Have Predicted That the Subject Of
AMERICAN NAVAL POLICY IN AN AGE OF ATLANTIC WARFARE: A CONSENSUS BROKEN AND REFORGED, 1783-1816 Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Jeffrey J. Seiken, M.A. * * * * * The Ohio State University 2007 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor John Guilmartin, Jr., Advisor Professor Margaret Newell _______________________ Professor Mark Grimsley Advisor History Graduate Program ABSTRACT In the 1780s, there was broad agreement among American revolutionaries like Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton about the need for a strong national navy. This consensus, however, collapsed as a result of the partisan strife of the 1790s. The Federalist Party embraced the strategic rationale laid out by naval boosters in the previous decade, namely that only a powerful, seagoing battle fleet offered a viable means of defending the nation's vulnerable ports and harbors. Federalists also believed a navy was necessary to protect America's burgeoning trade with overseas markets. Republicans did not dispute the desirability of the Federalist goals, but they disagreed sharply with their political opponents about the wisdom of depending on a navy to achieve these ends. In place of a navy, the Republicans with Jefferson and Madison at the lead championed an altogether different prescription for national security and commercial growth: economic coercion. The Federalists won most of the legislative confrontations of the 1790s. But their very success contributed to the party's decisive defeat in the election of 1800 and the abandonment of their plans to create a strong blue water navy. -
Attitudes Towards Privateering During the Era of the Early American Republic
ATTITUDES TOWARDS PRIVATEERING DURING THE ERA OF THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC A Senior Honors Thesis by James R. Holcomb IV Submitted to the Office of Honors Programs & Academic Scholarships Texas A&M University In partial fulfillment of the requirements of the UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH FELLOWS April 2007 Major: History ii ABSTRACT Attitudes towards Privateering during the Era of the Early American Republic (April 2007) James R. Holcomb IV Department of History Texas A&M University Fellows Advisor: Dr. James C. Bradford Department of History Lacking sufficient funds to build and maintain a sizeable navy, the young United States was forced to employ privateers as a “stop-gap navy” in its struggles against stronger sea powers during the War for Independence, the Quasi War, and the War of 1812. Many American leaders opposed privateering on moral grounds, but felt compelled to employ it. Merchants and seamen were generally more supportive, wither because their usual employment, fishing and peaceful commerce, was denied them when enemies hovered outside American ports and began seizing American ships, or because privateering offered the prospect of quick and large profits. Sailors preferred service in iii privateers to enlisting in the navy because discipline tended to be less rigorous in privateers than in warships, privateers appeared safer since their captains generally tried to avoid combat with enemy men of war, and privateers offered the prospect of more prize money from the sale of captured ships. Officers in the Continental and United States Navy usually opposed privateering because privateers competed with them for recruits and for naval stores to fit their ships out for sea. -
Abstract JULIAN CORBETT and the DEVELOPMENT of a MARITIME
Abstract JULIAN CORBETT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MARITIME STRATEGY by SAMUEL E. ROGERS NOVEMBER, 2018 Director: DR. WADE G. DUDLEY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922) is one of the two most influential theorists of sea power. He defined maritime operations, limited war, and our understanding of the “British Way of War,” while also foreshadowing the Great War at Sea. Corbett’s lasting theoretical contributions to strategic thought are captured in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911). It remains a centerpiece of military and international relations theory and continues to be studied in professional military education alongside Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Antoine-Henri Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Corbett’s influential theories were shaped by multiple influences, including Mahan, Corbett’s own study of British sea power, his reading and understanding of Clausewitz’s On War, and Admiral John Fisher’s naval revolution at the turn of the twentieth century. While Mahan linked sea power with national power, Corbett illuminated this relationship and displayed a keen understanding, developed through his own historical study, of the limits of sea power, and war more broadly, as an instrument of national policy. His influential theory on the role of sea power in the geopolitical context of the European balance of power at the turn of the twentieth century is a clear reflection of Britain’s rapidly changing strategic environment and the equally rapid changes in military technology. Heavily influenced by Admiral Fisher, Corbett, building on the work of Mahan and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, defined maritime strategy, limited war, command of the sea, and, at the height of the British Empire, laid the ground work for understanding a “British way of war.” Corbett was first and foremost a historian and a professional military educator.