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Abstract JULIAN CORBETT and the DEVELOPMENT of a MARITIME Abstract JULIAN CORBETT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MARITIME STRATEGY by SAMUEL E. ROGERS NOVEMBER, 2018 Director: DR. WADE G. DUDLEY DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY Sir Julian Corbett (1854-1922) is one of the two most influential theorists of sea power. He defined maritime operations, limited war, and our understanding of the “British Way of War,” while also foreshadowing the Great War at Sea. Corbett’s lasting theoretical contributions to strategic thought are captured in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911). It remains a centerpiece of military and international relations theory and continues to be studied in professional military education alongside Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Antoine-Henri Jomini, Carl von Clausewitz, and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Corbett’s influential theories were shaped by multiple influences, including Mahan, Corbett’s own study of British sea power, his reading and understanding of Clausewitz’s On War, and Admiral John Fisher’s naval revolution at the turn of the twentieth century. While Mahan linked sea power with national power, Corbett illuminated this relationship and displayed a keen understanding, developed through his own historical study, of the limits of sea power, and war more broadly, as an instrument of national policy. His influential theory on the role of sea power in the geopolitical context of the European balance of power at the turn of the twentieth century is a clear reflection of Britain’s rapidly changing strategic environment and the equally rapid changes in military technology. Heavily influenced by Admiral Fisher, Corbett, building on the work of Mahan and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, defined maritime strategy, limited war, command of the sea, and, at the height of the British Empire, laid the ground work for understanding a “British way of war.” Corbett was first and foremost a historian and a professional military educator. Corbett tied the study of history to the development of theory with a constant focus on the role of education in developing a leader’s critical thinking and judgment. Corbett introduced new interpretive approaches to the study of military history based on his interaction with the burgeoning military theory of the nineteenth century. Corbett’s historical writing evolved over a prolific decade of multi-volume works from 1898 to 1911 and directly influenced his conception of maritime strategy that underpinned his lasting contribution to military theory. Corbett was one of the earliest and most enduring contributors to fully establish the link between history, theory, and professional military education. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy was the culmination of Corbett’s study of history and his lasting achievement. Ultimately, however, Corbett wrote Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, at Fisher’s behest, to educate officers and statesmen about the Royal Navy’s maritime and economic doctrine for dealing with the rising threat of Imperial Germany. JULIAN CORBETT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MARITIME STRATEGY A Thesis Presented To the Faculty of the Department of History East Carolina University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Masters of Arts in History by Samuel E. Rogers November, 2018 ©2018, Samuel E. Rogers JULIAN CORBETT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A MARITIME STRATEGY by Samuel E. Rogers APPROVED BY: DIRECTOR OF THESIS:_________________________________________________________ Wade Dudley, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER:________________________________________________________ Timothy Jenks, Ph.D. COMMITTEE MEMBER:________________________________________________________ Gerald Prokopowicz, Ph.D. CHAIR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY:__________________________________________________________________ Christopher A. Oakley, Ph.D. DEAN OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL:__________________________________________________________ Paul J. Gemperline, Ph.D. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: JULIAN CORBETT AND THE VERDICT OF HISTORY………………… 1 CHAPTER 2: THE INFLUENCE OF HISTORY…………………………………………… 20 CHAPTER 3: MILITARY THEORY AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION… 44 CHAPTER 4: A MAN OF HIS TIMES: MARITIME THEORY IN THE AGE OF FISHER.. 74 CHAPTER 5: CORBETT’S MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE REALITY OF WAR….. 110 CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS…………………………………………………………….. 139 REFERENCES………………………………………………………………………………. 143 CHAPTER 1 JULIAN CORBETT AND THE VERDICT OF HISTORY Today, Sir Julian Stafford Corbett is generally considered one of the most influential theorists of sea power and a key proponent of linking policy and military strategy in a broader approach to grand strategy. Corbett’s lasting theoretical contributions to maritime and strategic studies are captured in Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911). Most modern analysis, however, suffers from a solitary focus on Some Principles of Maritime Strategy and fails to consider the work within context of Corbett’s broader thinking and purpose for which he wrote. When placed in context, it is clear that Corbett was one of the earliest writers to fully establish the link between history, theory, doctrine, and professional military education. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy was the culmination of Corbett’s study of history, teaching at the Royal Navy College, and work for Admiral John Fisher at Admiralty. Ultimately, Corbett wrote Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, at Fisher’s behest, to educate officers and statesmen about the Royal Navy’s strategic and doctrinal thinking for meeting the rising threat of Imperial Germany. It is as an educational tool that Some Principles of Maritime Strategy retains its lasting value. Since the end of the Cold War, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy has returned to prominence in military and security studies. War Studies scholar J.J. Widen recently noted: Only a theory can provide the necessary intellectual tools to understand the totality of a subject, in this case war at and from the sea. Corbett’s work on maritime strategy presents such a rare theory. Like Carl von Clausewitz’ On War, it has greatly influenced scholars and practitioners alike, and, therefore, warrants serious study and critical analysis if we aim to develop further the field of naval thought.1 1 J.J. Widen, Theorist of Maritime Strategy: Sir Julian Corbett and his Contribution to Military and Naval Thought (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2012), 1. Since the publication of Some Principles in 1911, Corbett and his maritime doctrine have not always received as fulsome a reception or interpretation by either scholars or practitioners. When first published in 1911, Some Principles proved controversial, coming under criticism from defense analysts and many senior and retired naval officers. During the First World War, the controversy only increased as several commentators blamed Corbett and his theories for what they perceived as a lack of aggressiveness in the Royal Navy’s officer corps, manifest, they argued, in the Battle of Jutland. After Corbett’s death in 1922, his maritime strategy began to fade from professional consideration. By the Second World War and then throughout the Cold War, references to Corbett primarily relegated him to a minor player in Sir John Fisher’s Admiralty during the “Dreadnought Age.” Only after the American experience in Vietnam and the end of the Cold War did practitioners and scholars begin to reassess Corbett and the relevance of his theories to the post-Cold War world. This reassessment expanded into multiple new areas including: the development of the relationship between Corbett’s thought and the other great military theorists of the nineteenth century; Corbett’s influence on the Royal Navy during the “Dreadnought Age” and the First World War; and the role of the historian in influencing national policy and strategy debates. Upon publication in 1911, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy received mixed reviews. Many in the Royal Navy, a service steeped in the Nelsonian tradition, were not receptive to Corbett’s qualifications concerning the limitations of sea power. The leading public critic was noted historian and prominent military affairs commentator Spenser Wilkinson. Wilkinson provided regular commentary on British military policy in the Morning Post and became the first Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford in 1909. While Wilkinson 2 respected Corbett’s work as a historian, he launched some of the most vitriolic attacks on Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Wilkinson adamantly opposed, what he saw as, Corbett’s departure from previous naval strategy: Corbett’s claims that seeking out the enemy’s main battle fleet should not always be a navy’s primary objective, and Corbett’s emphasis on limited war theory. In reviewing Some Principles, Wilkinson wrote: It seems to me that in the absence of the personal experience which would justify an independent judgement…Mr. Julian Corbett, whose instinct seems to lead him on paths of his own. He seems to me to assume that the teachings of the strategists whose names I have mentioned (Admiral Philip Colomb, Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge, Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, and Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan) are to be regarded as of doubtful value, and that he must begin de novo. He seems to question the conclusions which they regard as firmly established. My impression is that if Mr. Corbett’s volume were read by young naval officers it must have a disastrous offset upon the Navy.2 Wilkinson attacked Corbett’s lack of emphasis on decisive battle, writing that “the naval commander ought never allow anything but the enemy’s naval forces to
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