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Russia's Strategic Exercises: Messages and Implications

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Russia's Strategic Exercises: Messages and Implications 978-9934-564-80-2 RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC EXERCISES: MESSAGES AND IMPLICATIONS Published by the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence ISBN: 978-9934-564-80-2 Authors: Dr. Vira Ratsiborynska, Daivis Petraitis and Valeriy Akimenko Project Manager: Marius Varna Design: Kārlis Ulmanis Riga, July 2020 NATO STRATCOM COE 11b Kalnciema Iela Riga LV1048, Latvia www.stratcomcoe.org Facebook/stratcomcoe Twitter: @stratcomcoe Dr. Vira Ratsiborynska is the co-author of the Vostok and Tsentr cases. She is an Adjunct Professor on NATO and transatlantic approaches to security and Global politics at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). Her areas of research interests include the relations between the EU-NATO and the Eastern partners, Russia and Central Asia, e.g. in energy, trade, geopolitics, border security, conflict management and peacekeeping. Daivis Petraitis is the co-author of the Vostok and Tsentr cases. He is a retired military officer recently working for the Ministry of Defense and simultaneously performing as an independent researcher on defence and military matters. His military expertise combines experiences from assignments as a reservist in the Soviet Army (infantry) and later a professional serviceman in the Lithuanian Armed Forces. Valeriy Akimenko is the author of the Grom case and the main editor of the whole study. He is the Research Lead, Russia and Ukraine, with Conflict Studies Research Centre in the United Kingdom. For two and a half decades he covered political and military developments in the former Soviet space for the BBC Monitoring Service, specialising in Russian military, hard security and power projection issues. This publication does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO StratCom COE. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. The views expressed here do not represent the views of NATO. Contents Executive summary......................................6 Introduction..........................................10 Exercises as a form of communication.......10 Message delivery mechanisms and target audiences ......................12 Case Study 1: The Major Annual Strategic Exercise Vostok 2018..................14 Overview of the exercise ...................14 Details compared .........................16 Primary messaging .......................18 Analysis of messaging in detail .............20 Conclusion...............................23 Case Study 2: The Major Annual Strategic Exercise Tsentr 2019..................................24 Overview of the exercise ...................24 Tsentr 2019 vs OSCE ......................26 Primary messaging .......................28 Hidden agenda ...........................30 Conclusion...............................37 Russia’s Grom Nuclear Exercise: Communications, Capabilities and Implications........................................38 Facts, figures & key communications ........39 Wider context of the exercise ...............48 Messages and implications ................50 Nuclear deterrent .........................59 Conclusion...............................61 Endnotes...................................................63 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY In this report, several of Russia’s strategic military exercises come under the spotlight to explore the messages and implications of these activities. A nation’s military exercises, especially strategic, are a form of important communication to a wide array of audiences including adversaries, allies, partners and the nation’s own population. This type of communication provides a better understanding of the scope and scale of a country’s military capabilities and readiness. It also provides valuable insights into a nation’s interests, operational art and strategic thinking. Military exercises support political, military and geopolitical intents as well as demonstrating capabilities and challenging our ways of thinking beyond the current framework of traditional military ‘modus operandi’. By looking at the Russian strategic military exercises Vostok 2018 and Tsentr 2019, as well as separately at the strategic nuclear-forces exercise Grom 2019, this study will address the following: how Russia uses these exercises in order to achieve information dominance and realise its geopolitical, military and political objectives, what the key messages are that Russia is trying to convey to different audiences, what the impact of these messages is on European security and the European information environment. 4 _____________________________________________________________________________ Case studies included in this report analyse project power into Russia’s Far East. Russia’s Vostok 2018 and Tsentr 2019 strategic military exercises and its Grom In messages to the local population, 2019 strategic-deterrent exercise. In each of Russia used the integrated approach of the three cases, we analyse implications and appealing to emotions and patriotism key messages. while demonstrating mobility, mobilisation, strategic deployment and troop readiness In the case of Vostok 2018 we conclude that to fight against any adversary, as well as in its communication activities designed to the moral and psychological resilience of showcase Russia’s military prowess, Russia military personnel to respond to threats emphasised improved command and control, from the West the complexity of the exercise and the ability to respond to a technologically advanced Vostok 2018 was actively communicated potential adversary, including through what by all levels of Russian political and military was portrayed as a comprehensive, ready officials and the expert community, who strategic military partnership with China. delivered selected messages to various Vostok 2018 was billed as the largest exercise audiences both internally and externally. of armed forces readiness in the entire history A number of strategic messages were of modern Russia. specifically designed and delivered in various forms to target audiences before, Vostok 2018 aimed to demonstrate the during and after the exercise. This proves enhanced ‘operational art’, performance and that communication activities were carefully capabilities of the Russian military as one of planned and implemented both in and the segments of power that supports Russia’s around the exercise in order to achieve geopolitical, military and political objectives certain goals. Communication activities supported Russia’s goal to demonstrate its Russia’s narratives during the exercise military capabilities and to communicate stressed that Russia is not isolated militarily that its military reforms are having the or diplomatically during this period of on- expected effect - Russia remains a going confrontation, sanctions and tensions formidable military superpower. with the West and that all three powers taking part in the exercise enhances stability The message of international partnerships and security in the Asia-Pacific region not only with China but also other regional powers - as well as Belarus - was reinforced Russia emphasised its ability to respond during Tsentr 2019. Research also suggests to regional security threats in cooperation that pursuant to the Russian military’s with China and Mongolia and presented tradition of maskirovka - camouflage or, more the image of a strong military force able to broadly, concealment or even disinformation - ____________________________________________________________________________ 5 the exercise functioned as a cover for Russia’s In its military messages addressed to exercising of network-centric warfare. adversaries and international audiences, Russia also emphasised an improved use Tsentr 2019 repeated the same messages as of communication systems and focus on those in the previous year’s exercise, Vostok information security during joint operations 2018, with emphasis on impressive troop with its allies. numbers, including participants from other Russian agencies; increased professionalism The Russian Ministry of Defence continually of the armed forces and federal bodies; delivered complicated and misleading the scale and size of the activities; and, as messages regarding Tsentr 2019‘ goals. noted above, the internationalisation of the During Tsentr 2019, a number of broadcast exercise. However, there were differences in messages aimed to prove the Russian troops’ the new narratives associated with Tsentr ability to move quickly, efficiently and over 2019, which could be an attempt by Russia long distances. Oddly, the messaging was in to find new roles for its exercises as part of places transparent, yet elsewhere information Russia’s messaging operations. lacked entirely. An incident during which two airborne fighting vehicles smashed into With this rhetoric directed at its adversaries each other during a parachuting exercise and partners, Russia pleaded non-aggression, was announced, but virtually nothing was while demonstrating its ability to build said about the National Guard, FSB security warfare capacity and to strengthen its service or federal agencies participating in combat potential with its allies and partners. the exercise. Russia also illustrated its capacity to incorporate lessons learnt from the tactics of By contrast, Grom 2019 was a demonstration the Islamic State group (IS) in Syria and Iraq of Russia’s sovereign nuclear might - a show and the Taliban’s tactics in Afghanistan into of force designed to reconfirm Russia’s status an educational
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