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PUTIN's FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SYRIA Mark N

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PUTIN's FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SYRIA Mark N PUTIN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD SYRIA Mark N. Katz* This article examines why Russian-Syrian relations were not especially close during the first five years of Putin's presidency and why the relationship suddenly improved at the beginning of 2005. It will also examine how Putin has sought to maintain good relations with Syria and Israel simultaneously, and how various future scenarios might affect Russian-Syrian relations. Despite their many common interests Why did their relationship suddenly (including opposition to American improve at the beginning of 2005? Can Putin "hegemony" in general and to the American- maintain good relations simultaneously with led intervention in neighboring Iraq in Syria and Israel even though hostility particular), Russian-Syrian relations have not between these two countries remains strong? been particularly close during most of the Where do Russian-Syrian relations appear to Putin era. Russian-Israeli relations, by be headed? Each of these questions will be contrast, became very close under both Putin addressed in turn. and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Since Syrian President Bashar Assad met FLOUNDERING AT FIRST with Russian President Vladimir Putin in In July 1999--just a few weeks before Moscow in January 2005, however, Russian- Vladimir Putin became President Boris Syrian relations have improved dramatically. Yeltsin's last prime minister, and just a few Russia has even agreed to sell an advanced months before he became president of Russia air defense missile system to Syria over both himself--Syria's longtime dictator, Hafiz American and Israeli objections. Russian- Assad, paid his last visit to Moscow. Izvestia Syrian cooperation deepened since then noted at the time that Syria still owed despite Damascus's increasing isolation over Moscow as much as $12 billion from Soviet its role in the assassination of Lebanese times and that "Russia virtually froze Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Yet while cooperation with Damascus pending a increasing cooperation with Syria, Putin has resolution of the debt issues. But Moscow has sought to maintain close ties to Israel. While now softened its position and reestablished this has not been easy, he has been relatively ties."1 Izvestia listed three reasons why successful at this delicate balancing act--at Moscow wanted good relations with least so far. Damascus: 1) "Moscow in particular is Why did Russian-Syrian relations capable of persuading Syria to make peace flounder during the first five years of the with Israel," 2) the fact that Tartus on the Putin presidency despite their common Syrian coast was Russia's only naval base in interests, including a mutual desire to the Mediterranean, and 3) that Damascus was improve them? prepared to pay "cold cash" (a figure of $2 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) 53 Mark N. Katz billion was mentioned) for Moscow to Mustafa Tlas, in May 2001.5 Syrian Vice upgrade its old Soviet weapons as well as sell President Abdel Halim Khaddam came to it new Russian ones (including anti-aircraft Moscow in January 2003 and met with systems).2 Putin.6 As early as April 2001, the Russian Russian-Syrian ties then seemed set to press announced that President Putin was improve on the basis of Moscow not insisting planning a trip not only to Egypt and Israel that Damascus repay its entire Soviet-era debt (which he would visit in April 2005), but also in return for Damascus buying Russian to Syria and Lebanon (which he ha s not yet weapons. The deal seemed to be quite a visited).7 sensible one : in exchange for Moscow's Despite their efforts to improve relations, "flexibility" on the debt (which the Kremlin there were some important differences undoubtedly knew Damascus was not likely between Moscow and Damascus. Moscow to pay much of anyway) , Syria would has long sought to play a greater role in the become what the Russian arms industry Washington-dominated Arab-Israeli peace desperately needed: a cash paying customer. process. Even when Putin was still prime Yet although envisioned in 1999, this deal minister, Nezavisimaya gazeta noted that "the would not become a reality until 2005. Syrian front is virtually the only one where Delay in reaching this deal may have been Moscow could play a lead role in the peace inevitable due to the leadership changes that process."8 Yet soon after Putin became both countries experienced during the year president, Syria and Lebanon (whose foreign following Hafiz Assad's visit to Moscow. In policy Damascus controlled until the political Russia, Putin became acting president upon upheaval that took place there in early 2005) Yeltsin's resignation in December 1999 and boycotted a February 2000 Moscow meeting only became president in his own right after of the Multilateral Steering Group for Middle the elections of March 2000. In Syria, Hafiz East Peace.9 Assad died in office in June 2000, and his Russian-Syrian differences over how to son, Bashar, was officially elected president resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict were again the following month. It is doubtful, though, evident in March 2002, when Russia along that these two leadership transitions could with 13 other members of the United Nations have delayed the improvement of Russian- Security Council (UNSC) voted in favor of Syrian relations for long, especially if both Resolution 1397 calling for the coexistence governments sought this. of an Israeli and a Palestinian state, while Indeed, both governments did. In October Syria (a non-permanent member of the 2000, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov UNSC) abstained on the measure. In went to Damascus and met with the new addition, although Russia did vote in favor of President Assad as well as with the Syrian a UNSC resolution proposed by Syria and foreign minister.3 Syrian Foreign Minister Sudan (which the United States vetoed) Farouk al-Shara, in turn, visited Moscow in calling upon Israel not to expel Palestinian April 2001,4 and was soon followed there by leader Yasir Arafat from the occupied the Syrian Defense Minister, Marshal territories, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yury Fedotov indicated Moscow's lack of 54 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) Putin's Foreign Policy toward Syria enthusiasm for the measure by saying that Putin declared that "Russia will never help "the vote should not have been rushed."10 Israel's enemies."14 What these instances indicate is that Moscow Under Putin in particular, Russian ties to has been unwilling to support Syria 's harder Israel have grown quite close. Trade between line on the Arab-Israeli issue , while the two countries has increased greatly, and Damascus has not been willing to moderate Russia and Israel cooperate in the security its position in order to align itself more realm as well.15 Indeed, the Syrian defense closely with Russia. minister "expressed concern" about growing Both Russia and Syria opposed American Russian-Israeli security cooperation during efforts to obtain UNSC support for his visit to Moscow in May 2001.16 This intervention in Iraq in 2002-03, as well as the cooperation was stepped up in the wake of American-led intervention which both the September 2004 Beslan tragedy. Shortly toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein in afterward, Kommersant predicted that "There 2003 and ha s sought to pacify Iraq ever since. is every chance that the information Israel is The Russian press noted on several occasions willing to share with Russia will indeed that Syria might be next on America's list of prompt Moscow to reassess its relations with countries to invade.11 There appears to have 'traditional Arab friends' whose territories been no suggestion on Russia's part, though, harbor the headquarters of a considerable that Moscow would do anything to protect number of extremist organizations."17 Syria if this scenario occurred. Kommersant Finally, Russian press coverage during even asserted that, "The main addressee of this period made it clear that Moscow and the State Department's harsh anti-Syrian Damascus had been unable to reach declarations is most likely not Damascus, but agreement on the debt issue. Moscow."12 None of this could have been reassuring to the Syrian government. THE 2005 BREAKTHROUGH Nor was Moscow willing to sell Since the beginning of 2005, Russian- Damascus all the weapons that it wanted to Syrian relations appear to have undergone a buy. According to Russian press accounts, dramatic improvement. As was noted earlier, Moscow would not approve a Syrian request Bashar Assad visited Moscow and met with to purchase Russian S-300 air defense Putin in January 2005--his first visit since missiles, which have a 200 km range .13 Nor becoming Syria 's president in mid-2000. On could Damascus have been pleased when, in this occasion, it was announced that Moscow response to Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's had agreed to write off 73 percent of Syria 's plea that Putin not sell the much shorter range now $13.4 billion debt to Russia. Moreover, Igla man-portable air defense systems as Vremya novostei noted, Moscow allowed (MANPADS) to Syria for fear that they Damascus to repay the rest of the loan on would wind up in the hands of Hizballah, terms extremely favorable to Syria: "The remaining $3.618 billion will be paid off in Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006) 55 Mark N. Katz installments, with Syria paying $170 million One of these was the announcement in on the debt in 2005. Actually, only $1.5 December 2004 that Moscow had agreed to billion of the remaining sum will be repaid in write off 90 percent of Iraq's debt to Russia.
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