PB 80–99–4 Fall 1999 Vol. 12, No. 4 from the Commandant Special Warfare

Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–99–4 Fall 1999 Vol. 12, No. 4 From the Commandant Special Warfare

In November, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command will mark the 29th anniversary of the Son Tay Raid by dedicating a statue to “Bull” Simons, who led the raid. Simons is remembered as a dedicated soldier who was loyal to the men who served under him. In hon- oring his memory, we recognize his service, his duty and his loyalty as qualities for which all SOF soldiers should strive. “Bull” Simons richly deserves such recognition. Yet in all our memorialization, we have not yet recognized the man who did much to make our modern Army special-operations forces possible. The man whose the creation of the Psychological Warfare vision and efforts did most to make psy- Center at Fort Bragg and to the founding chological warfare and unconventional of the 10th Special Forces Group. warfare permanent capabilities in the Those of us who serve in Army SOF U.S. Army is unknown to many soldiers today owe a great debt to Major General who have spent the majority of their McClure. As we search the past for careers in SOF. I refer to Major General heroes, we could find no one more deserv- Robert Alexis McClure. ing of honors than the man whom Dr. In this issue, Dr. Al Paddock details Paddock has rightfully called the forgot- Major General McClure’s service and the ten father of Army special warfare, role that Major General McClure played Robert Alexis McClure. I am confident in the creation of Army SOF. Through that Major General McClure will receive diligent research, Dr. Paddock has recon- the proper recognition that he has so structed the early days of Army special well earned. warfare. His article shows the planning and the effort that were needed to make an Army special-warfare capability a reality. From his assignments during World War II, Major General McClure acquired Major General Kenneth R. Bowra a unique appreciation of the value of UW and PSYWAR capabilities. He envisioned a permanent special-warfare capability, and his commitment to that idea caused him to pursue the concept with military and civilian officials after the war. Major General McClure never gave up, despite resistance within the Army and from other agencies. His persistence led to the formation of the Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare and, ultimately, to PB 80–99–4 Contents Fall 1999 Special Warfare Vol. 12, No. 4

Commander & Commandant Major General Kenneth R. Bowra Features Editor 2 Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of Army Special Jerry D. Steelman Warfare Associate Editor by Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr. Sylvia W. McCarley 10 Steel Wings and a Wielded Sword: The 160th SOAR Graphics & Design by General Henry H. Shelton Bruce S. Barfield 14 Cognitive and Personality Assessment in Special Forces Automation Clerk Assessment and Selection Gloria H. Sawyer by Major Gary A. Hazlett and Dr. Michael Sanders 21 The 1999 SF Conference: Setting a New Standard by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Adelstein 24 Theory, Research, Practice: Three Ways to Increase PSYOP

V E R TAS I T R A B E Effectiveness S LI E T by Dr. Mark F. Dyer Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission 31 Army Values: Loyalty — Bull Simons is to promote the professional development of special- operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas. 32 Military Legitimacy in OOTW: Civilians Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do as Mission Priorities not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented by Colonel Rudolph C. Barnes Jr. in other official Army publications. Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and 44 Armageddon 2000: Military Implications should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: of the Y2K Problem DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. by Dr. James J. Schneider Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors. Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available on the USASOC internal web (http://asociweb.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag/sw-mag.htm).

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Eric K. Shinseki Departments General, United States Army Chief of Staff 50 1999 Index 52 Letters Official: 56 Enlisted Career Notes 58 Officer Career Notes Joel B. Hudson Administrative Assistant to the 60 Foreign SOF Secretary of the Army 62 Update 9920302 64 Book Reviews Headquarters, Department of the Army Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of Army Special Warfare

by Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr.

here is the monument to honor McClure was born March 4, 1897, in the man who provided the vision Mattoon, Ill. After graduating from Ken- Wand the impetus for establishing tucky Military Institute in 1915, he served U.S. Army special warfare? More than 42 with the Philippine Constabulary as a sec- years after his death, visitors to Smoke ond lieutenant. On Aug. 9, 1917, he earned Bomb Hill still find no evidence of his place a Regular Army commission and was pro- in special-operations history. In fact, most moted to first lieutenant. From then until SOF soldiers are unfamiliar with his name. the eve of World War II, he served in a vari- Robert Alexis McClure is the forgotten ety of infantry and service-school assign- father of Army special warfare. ments in China and in the United States. During the interwar years, McClure, like Robert A. McClure as a other career officers, found promotion cadet at the Kentucky Mil- excruciatingly slow: he served in the rank itary Institute, December of captain for 17 years. 1912. By 1941, however, McClure was a lieutenant colonel with orders to London, where he was to serve as the assistant military attaché. In swift succession, he earned promotions to colonel and brigadier general, and he became the military attaché to the American Embassy in Lon- don. As an additional duty, he served as military attaché to nine European govern- ments in exile. In September 1942, Gener- al Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed McClure to his Allied Forces headquarters as chief of intelligence for the European theater of operations. During the next three months, McClure’s career took a new direction — one that would immerse McClure in a new and different field for most of the rest of his life. In December 1942, from “somewhere in Africa,” McClure wrote to his wife, Marjo-

Photo courtesy Robert D. McClure ry: “My new job — for which I was called by

2 Special Warfare As a brigadier general, McClure was assigned as military attaché to the American Embassy in London. Here, he stands outside No. 10 Downing Street, next to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Photo courtesy Robert D. McClure Ike — very hurriedly — is a continual cables, telephone for all of North & West headache — I have what I call the INC Sec- Africa, Sicily, etc., over 400 personnel & tion — I am just creating it.” In prepara- supervising 700 French. Public relations — tion for the North African landings, Eisen- press and correspondents — 150 correspon- hower had put McClure in charge of the dents — 250 personnel — a total “com- Information and Censorship Section, or mand” of 1500 in an organization never INC, of the Allied Forces headquarters. It contemplated in the Army. was McClure’s job to consolidate several By the end of the North African and functions for which most Army officers had Sicilian campaigns, McClure believed that little preparation: public relations, censor- psychological warfare had become, for him, ship and psychological warfare. As the “big job,” and he felt good about its con- McClure colorfully stated, the job also car- tribution: “Our propaganda did a lot to ried with it a “slop over into civil affairs.” break the Wops — as their emissaries The INC was, indeed, an ungainly organ- admit — now we have to turn it on the Ger- ization that included military and civilian mans,” he wrote to Marjory. But the “big personnel from the U.S. Office of War Infor- job” was to become even bigger. mation, or OWI; the U.S. Office of Strategic In early 1944, General Eisenhower Services, or OSS; the British Political War- authorized the establishment of the Psy- fare Executive, or PWE; and the U.S. Army. chological Warfare Division of the Supreme McClure vividly outlined the scope of his Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, new responsibilities in a September 1943 or PWD/SHAEF, to support the European letter to Marjory: campaign against Nazi Germany. McClure, We operate 12 high powered radio sta- as its director, controlled and coordinated tions — 6 of them are stronger than WLW psychological warfare in continental in Cincinnati. My Psychological Warfare Europe. For years afterward, he empha- staff — radio, leaflet, signals, front line, sized that PWD was built upon the trial- occupation, domestic propaganda person- and-error experience of his ordeal in start- nel, exceed 700. In censorship — troop, ing up and running INC in North Africa — mail, and cables, civilian mail, radio, press, in particular, the Psychological Warfare

Fall 1999 3 General Dwight D. Eisen- hower presents the Distin- guished Service Medal to Brigadier General McClure in 1944. The award recognized McClure’s accom- plishments as chief of psychological warfare, SHAEF. Photo courtesy Robert D. McClure Branch. In North Africa and in Europe, quite different backgrounds and tempera- McClure’s definition of psychological war- ments. It was one of his most successful fare was quite concise, yet inclusive, by leadership traits. today’s standards: “The dissemination of But even after V-E day, McClure’s job propaganda designed to undermine the was far from finished. Eisenhower once enemy’s will to resist, demoralize his forces again called upon McClure, directing him and sustain the morale of our supporters.” to participate in planning for the occupa- In Europe, PWD made radio broadcasts tion of Germany. McClure jubilantly wrote from OWI transmitters and over the to Marjory on May 8, 1945: British Broadcasting Corporation; conduct- The shooting war is over, here! Signed ed loudspeaker broadcasts on the front yesterday. Paris is wild with excitement. … lines; and conducted large-scale leaflet With one phase over I am now up to my operations using specially designated air- neck on the control phase. We will rigidly craft squadrons. PWD even provided control all newspapers, films, theatre, radio, leaflets to be dispersed by the then-novel music, etc., in Germany! My division now method of specially designed artillery publishes 8 newspapers in Germany with shells. McClure had four deputies, each 1,000,000 circulation and sends 2 million+ representing a civilian agency that con- language papers each day by air for distributed personnel to PWD: OWI, OSS, placed persons and POWs. Biggest newspa- PWE, and the British Ministry of Informa- per enterprise in the world. tion. By the end of the war in Europe, PWD Essentially, McClure’s Psychological War- controlled the activities of more than 2,300 fare Division changed names, becoming the military and civilian personnel from two Information Control Division, or ICD. ICD countries. As he had in the North African took on a new role as a key player in the and Italian campaigns, McClure demon- reorientation and de-Nazification of Ger- strated his ability to manage personnel of many. The change was not totally abrupt —

4 Special Warfare during the combat phase PWD worked Pentagon, whose office serviced and con- closely in support of Civil Affairs with its trolled all military government in occupied “consolidation propaganda,” the purpose of areas. As he had done in his previous which was both to gain the cooperation of assignment in Germany, McClure organ- the German population in restoring essen- ized the New York field office into sections tial services, and to create a public opinion for press, periodicals, motion pictures, favorable to post-war Allied aims. ICD thus radio, theater, music, arts, exhibits, became an integral part of the U.S. military- libraries, and book rights. government (or Civil Affairs) effort in the There was, however, another aspect of U.S. portion of occupied Germany. McClure McClure’s activities during the postwar reported to General Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. period that would bear importantly on the military governor. future of Army special warfare. After the The reorientation of the German popula- massive demobilization of U.S. military tion was a formidable task. McClure forces during 1945-46, American concerns undertook it in three phases: first, the com- about the Soviet Union’s intentions grew in plete shutdown of all media; second, opera- intensity, ushering in the Cold War. tion by U.S. forces of selected instruments For four years, McClure engaged in a of information (radio, newspapers, etc.); dialogue with a number of high-ranking and, third, a gradual turnover of these instruments, by licensing them to carefully In June 1947, McClure sent a memo to his selected Germans. McClure’s aims were to cause individual Germans to renounce old boss from World War II — now Army Nazism and militarism, and to help them Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower — urging, take their place in a democratic society. McClure’s ICD organization mirrored the ‘Psychological warfare must become a part German media, with five “control” branch- es for radio, press, film, theater and music, of every future war plan.’ and publications. A sixth branch, intelligence, focused on public-opinion research, officers and civilian officials in an effort to with emphasis on German bureaucracies, rebuild the military psychological-warfare youth, and the church. ICD had a wide- capability that had essentially been dissi- ranging charter, indeed, as McClure wrote pated during the general demobilization. to his friend and vice-president of Time- In a letter to the War Department in early Life, Inc., C.D. Jackson, in July 1946: 1946, McClure advocated the integration of We now control 37 newspapers, 6 radio material on psychological warfare into stations, 314 theatres, 642 movies, 101 mag- service-school curricula, stating, “The igno- azines, 237 book publishers, 7,384 book rance, among military personnel, about dealers and printers, and conduct about 15 psychological warfare, even now, is public opinion surveys a month, as well as astounding.” In June 1947, McClure sent a publish one newspaper with 1,500,000 cir- memo to his old boss from World War II — culation, 3 magazines, run the Associated now Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhow- Press of Germany (DANA), and operate 20 er — urging, “Psychological warfare must library centers. … The job is tremendous. become a part of every future war plan.” In In the summer of 1948, the Army decid- November of that year, McClure gave ed that McClure’s experience could best be Eisenhower a list of former PWD/SHAEF used in a similar assignment in the U.S. As staff members that he recommended for chief of the New York field office of the forming a psychological-warfare reserve. Army’s Civil Affairs Division, McClure was McClure continued his correspondence, responsible for supporting U.S. reorienta- consultations and exhortations with the tion and re-education efforts in the occu- War Department, but it was not until the pied countries of Germany, Austria, Japan North Korean invasion of South Korea in and Korea. He reported to Major General June 1950 that his efforts bore fruit. Short- Daniel Noce, chief of Civil Affairs in the ly after that shocking event, Major Gener-

Fall 1999 5 McClure as chief of the New York field office of the Army’s Civil Affairs Division.

Photo courtesy Robert D. McClure al Charles Bolte, the Army Staff G3, tions, the Army first established a psycho- requested that McClure report to Washing- logical-warfare division in the G3, with ton for a few days to help him determine, McClure as its first chief, and then made it with respect to psychological warfare, “the a special staff office reporting directly to further organizational steps necessary to the Army chief of staff. Because of his asso- meet the operational requirements of the ciation with the OSS during World War II, Korean situation or of a general war.” The McClure appreciated the potential of latter contingency was key: Even during unconventional warfare, and he lobbied for, the Far East crisis, the Army believed that and received, staff proponency for UW as the greater threat lay in a potential inva- well. On Jan. 15, 1951, the Army formally sion of Western Europe by the Soviet recognized the Office of the Chief of Psy- Union, and it wanted to create an uncon- chological Warfare, or OCPW — the first ventional-warfare capability primarily for organization of its type in Army history. the conduct of guerrilla warfare in Europe Although McClure’s new office started out in the event of a Soviet invasion. Bolte with a staff of only five men, that number added, “I know of no one better qualified to eventually grew to more than 100. assist us in that respect.” For McClure, “a OCPW’s mission was “to formulate and few days,” became the formative years of develop psychological warfare and special Army special warfare. operations plans for the Army in conso- On the basis of McClure’s recommenda- nance with established policy and to recom-

6 Special Warfare mend policies for and supervise the execu- available from disbanding the Ranger com- tion of Department of the Army programs in panies in Korea, the Army chief of staff these fields.” McClure organized his office approved the activation of Special Forces into three divisions: Psychological Warfare, in early 1952. Requirements and Special Operations. The Creating an unconventional-warfare latter was particularly significant, because capability was not the only challenge on it formulated plans for the creation of the OCPW’s plate. When the Korean War broke Army’s first formal unconventional-warfare out in June 1950, the Tactical Information capability: Special Forces. Detachment at Fort Riley, Kan., was the Realizing that his firsthand experience only operational psychological-warfare was basically in psychological warfare and troop unit in the Army. After its deploy- Civil Affairs, McClure told his staff early ment to Korea, the detachment became the on that he was “fighting for officers with 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet, or L&L, Com- background and experience in special oper- pany, and it served as the 8th Army’s tacti- ations.” He brought into the Special Opera- cal-propaganda unit throughout the con- tions Division several officers who had flict. By April 1951, McClure had requested World War II or Korean War experience the activation of the 1st Radio Broadcast- either in guerrilla warfare or in long- ing and Leaflet, or RB&L, Group to assist range-penetration units. Two officers who played particularly key roles in developing the plans for the cre- McClure assumed a leading role in ‘selling’ the ation of Special Forces were Colonel Aaron need for an unconventional-warfare capability Bank and Lieutenant Colonel Russell Vol- ckmann. Bank had fought with the French to the senior military and civilian leadership. Maquis as a member of OSS. Volckmann had organized and conducted guerrilla- In the face of fierce resistance, … Special warfare operations in the Philippines dur- Forces became a reality largely through the ing World War II; during the Korean War, he had planned and directed behind-the- persistence of McClure and through the lines operations in North Korea. Volckmann later remembered that efforts of Bank and Volckmann. McClure had approached him in Walter Reed Hospital (where Volckmann had been the Far East Command, or FECOM, in con- evacuated from Korea) with a request to ducting strategic propaganda; the 2nd L&L help organize the Special Operations Divi- company at Fort Riley, a prototype unit; the sion. It was only after being assured that 5th L&L Company at Fort Riley, scheduled the Army was interested in organized to be sent to FECOM); and the 301st behind-the-lines operations that Volck- (Reserve) RB&L Group, to be trained at mann agreed to take the job. Bank later Fort Riley and then shipped to Europe. gave Volckmann considerable credit for the Thus, while he was in the process of “development of position, planning, and staffing his own unprecedented office — policy papers that helped sell the estab- OCPW — McClure moved quickly to assist lishment of Special Forces units in the FECOM in its organization and conduct of active Army.” both psychological warfare and unconven- McClure assumed a leading role in “sell- tional warfare, while he concurrently ing” the need for an unconventional-war- helped the European Command prepare fare capability to the senior military and for the employment of both capabilities in civilian leadership. In the face of fierce the event of a war with the Soviet Union. resistance, not only within the Army but One other part of McClure’s vision also from the CIA, Special Forces became a remained to be accomplished — centraliz- reality largely through the persistence of ing the functions of what he called, “the McClure and through the efforts of Bank whole field of OCPW.” Psychological war- and Volckmann. With personnel spaces fare possessed a formal lineage and a tra-

Fall 1999 7 dition in the Army, which unconventional niques and tactics for psychological war- warfare did not, and McClure believed that fare and for Special Forces), and the 10th the two capabilities should be combined Special Forces Group. Colonel Charles under a single headquarters. Karlstad, former chief of staff of the During that period of postwar budgetary Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Ga., was austerity, McClure encountered consider- the first to serve as commander of the Cen- able resistance to this idea, but he was able ter and commandant of the Psychological to convince the Army chief of staff, General Warfare School. The Psychological Warfare J. Lawton Collins, that a central organiza- School’s organization reflected the Center’s tion was necessary for consolidating the mission. It consisted of a headquarters training activities for psychological war- staff and two instructional divisions — one fare and Special Forces. Accordingly, in for psychological warfare, the other for May 1952, the Army formally announced Special Forces. the activation of the Psychological Warfare Initially, the 6th RB&L Group was the Center at Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission was: largest unit in the Center’s force structure. To conduct individual training and Formed at Fort Riley and then shipped to supervise unit training in Psychological Fort Bragg in June 1952, the 6th consisted Warfare and Special Forces Operations; to of a headquarters company, the 7th Repro- develop and test Psychological Warfare and duction Company, the 8th Mobile Radio Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tactics, Broadcasting Company and the 2nd L&L and techniques; to test and evaluate equip- Company. In May 1953, OCPW activated ment employed in Psychological Warfare the 12th Consolidation Company under the and Special Forces Operations. 6th RB&L Group. The organizational con- As it was originally established, the Psy- cept of the 6th RB&L Group, the forerun- chological Warfare Center consisted of the ner of today’s psychological-operations Psychological Warfare School, the 6th group, was first employed in Korea. The RB&L Group, a psychological-warfare ancestry of the mobile radio company, board (to test materiel, doctrine, tech- however, can be traced to McClure’s PWD/SHAEF, which used several such McClure with the Shah of companies to support front-line combat Iran in 1955. McClure forces in Europe during World War II. developed a close rap- McClure selected Bank from the OCPW port with the Shah and staff to command the 10th Special Forces with his senior general officers. Group. Bank’s “command” in June 1952 consisted of seven enlisted men and one warrant officer — a rather inauspicious beginning. But by April 1953, with the aid of vig- orous OCPW recruiting efforts throughout the Army, the 10th had increased to 1,700 officers and enlisted men. Essentially, the 10th Special Forces Group represented a pool of trained man- power from which units or combinations of units could be drawn to execute specific unconventional-warfare missions. At the heart of the group’s organization was the operational detachment, or “team,” established along the same lines as the OSS operational group. Commanded by a captain, the team, with a first-lieutenant executive officer and 13 NCOs, was capable of infiltrating behind enemy lines to organize,

Photo courtesy Robert D. McClure train and direct friendly resistance forces

8 Special Warfare in guerrilla warfare. Early training focused tation on the origins of the Army’s special- on the individual skills of the various mem- warfare capability. Having served several bers of the team: operations and intelli- tours with Special Forces during the 1960s gence, light and heavy weapons, demoli- without ever reading or hearing about him, tions, radio communications, and medical. I was amazed to discover the central role Each man trained thoroughly in his partic- that McClure played in the creation of a ular specialty, then participated in cross- permanent psychological- and unconven- training to learn the rudiments of the other tional-warfare capability. This article is skills. drawn from that dissertation in history at By early 1953, most of McClure’s major Duke University; from my subsequent book, programs had been launched; nevertheless, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins he was surprised to learn that he was being (National Defense University Press, 1982); assigned to Iran as chief of the U.S. Military and from my more recent research in Gen- Mission. The rationale was that he had been eral McClure’s personal papers. I am deeply in a specialized activity too long. The Army indebted to Colonel Robert D. McClure, U.S. chief of staff, General Collins, implied that Air Force (Ret.), and his wife, Betty Ann, for McClure’s chances for promotion would be giving me complete access to General enhanced by the new assignment. McClure’s papers. In Iran, McClure formed close associations with the Shah and the Iranian senior military. As Collins had predicted, McClure was Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr. promoted to major general. In 1956, McClure completed his 31-year Army retired from the Army, ending more than 39 career as a colonel in October years of continuous active service. While dri- 1988. His military career ving cross-country with Marjory to San included command and staff Clemente, Calif., where they planned to build assignments in Korea, Laos, their dream home, McClure became serious- Okinawa, Vietnam and the ly ill. He died of a heart attack at Fort U.S. He served three combat tours with SF Huachuca, Ariz., on Jan. 1, 1957, two months units in Southeast Asia. Among his varied prior to his 60th birthday. assignments, Paddock was an instructor of Robert A. McClure’s position as the strategic studies at the U.S. Army Com- founder of Army special warfare seems mand and General Staff College; he served indisputable. Over a critical period of 10 in the Politico-Military Division of the years, he made vital contributions to psy- Army Staff in Washington, D.C.; he com- chological warfare, to Civil Affairs, and to manded the 6th PSYOP Battalion and the the creation of Army Special Forces. But his 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg; and he most important legacy may have been the was the military member of the Secretary’s establishment of the Psychological Warfare Policy Planning Staff, Department of State. Center. From its humble beginning, that Paddock completed his military career as institution grew, becoming the Special War- the Director for PSYOP, Office of the Secre- fare Center in 1956 and later evolving into tary of Defense. A graduate of the U.S. Army the U.S. Army Special Operations Com- Command and General Staff College and mand and the U.S. Army Special Warfare the U.S. Army War College, he earned a B.A. Center and School. Yet despite the fact that in political science from Park College. Pad- McClure made all these things possible, his dock also holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in role has gone largely unrecognized. Robert history from Duke University. A. McClure remains the forgotten father of U.S. Army special warfare.

Author’s note: I first read about Major General Robert A. McClure during the 1970s, while I was conducting research in the National Archives for my Ph.D. disser-

Fall 1999 9 Steel Wings and a Wielded Sword: The 160th SOAR

by General Henry H. Shelton

hroughout my career I have served As I was winched up through the jungle with, fought alongside, and had canopy, I could see where the rotor blades Tadmiration for the Army aviators were striking the treetops. Bob had had to who accompany special-operations forces hover that low, risking himself, his crew, and into battle. In Vietnam, few served with his aircraft just to reach us. As I looked into more courage or with more distinction the cockpit, I could see Bob’s fiercely deter- than the pilots, crew chiefs and gunners mined face, a look of intense concentration who supported Special Forces. Hovering and absolute focus, tinged by apprehension overhead, often in the face of withering about enemy fire and whether the blades enemy fire, they provided critical fire sup- would survive the beating they had taken port and a vital lifeline to their comrades from striking the treetops. fighting on the ground below. I have never forgotten the feel of that There is not a day in my life that I do not vibrating Huey as it rolled out and gained pause for a moment and reflect on the altitude; nor have I ever forgotten the bravery displayed by one of those aviators, courage of that warrior and his crew as they Captain Bob Moe- accomplished a very dangerous mission. berg. Bob was the Those aviators who flew with and fought pilot of a helicopter alongside Special Forces in Vietnam will that extracted my always have a special place in my heart, Special Forces Pro- and their valor is without question. How- ject Delta team ever, during the war and throughout the from the jungle 1970s, there was no permanent special- after we had spent operations aviation organization. The trag- seven days evading ic experience at Desert One in Iran in 1980 North Vietnamese was the event that finally, and with unmis- forces. As Bob ma- takable clarity, demonstrated the need for DoD photo neuvered the air- the superb rotary-wing capability that the craft overhead, the crew chief lowered the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regi- jungle penetrator; however, even when ment now provides. In a very real sense, fully extended, it did not reach all the way Desert One was the catalyst that led to the down through the triple-canopy jungle, and creation of special-operations aviation. it was just out of reach for most of my If we compare the venerable Huey of the team. We were finally able to lift the team Vietnam era with the highly sophisticated members up to reach the penetrator, and aircraft in the regiment today — aircraft then I jumped up, barely snagging it. that are air-refuelable and that are outfit-

10 Special Warfare Today’s special-operations helicopters, like this MH-60, with their sophisticated avionics and capabilities for night-vision and for in-flight refueling, are a far cry from the Huey of the Vietnam era. DoD photo ted with the latest avionics and night- elements of the 160th deployed to Somalia vision capabilities — it is easy to see how as part of Task Force Ranger. The heroism far we have come in developing special- displayed by the regiment’s members in operations aviation. While the technology that war-torn country forged a record that has changed dramatically, the courage, will endure forever. skill and determination of the men who On Oct. 3, 1993, the regiment lost five flew with Special Forces in Vietnam crewmen and two MH-60 aircraft in remain and have flourished in those who Mogadishu to hostile ground fire, and three fly with the 160th today. Throughout the short history of the Throughout the short history of the 160th, its 160th, its aviators have pioneered night flight tactics and techniques, led the devel- aviators have pioneered night flight tactics and opment of new equipment and procedures, met the call to duty wherever it sounded, techniques, led the development of new equip- and earned a reputation for excellence and ment and procedures, met the call to duty valor that is second to none. From their 1983 baptism of fire in Grenada to today, wherever it sounded, and earned a reputation the 160th aviators have always lived up to their motto, “Night Stalkers Don’t Quit. ” for excellence and valor that is second to none. Indeed, the history of the regiment is a tale of courage, honor and glory against more aircraft were hit so badly that they seemingly insurmountable odds in faraway had to make emergency landings. In the places and in skies filled with danger. midst of this chaos, in the most intense While there are many noteworthy chapters firefight since Vietnam, the pilots and crew in the annals of the 160th, an unforget- chiefs of the 160th displayed incredible table episode was written in an ancient, bravery and valor, as well as a tremendous windswept city on the Horn of Africa dur- sense of self-sacrifice. ing the hot, terrible summer of 1993, when On that day, in a valiant attempt to res-

Fall 1999 11 A Black Hawk helicopter from the 160th SOAR flies over burning oil fields in Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm. The aviators of the 160th have earned a reputation for valor and excellence. U.S. Army photo cue wounded comrades on the ground automatic weapons and rocked by explo- below, two very special, special-operations sions from volleys of rocket-propelled soldiers, Master Sergeant Gary Gordon grenades, Super 62 remained in position, and Sergeant First Class Randy Shugart, kept aloft by its pilots, Chief Warrant Offi- jumped from a Black Hawk into a blazing cer Mike Goffena and Captain Jim Yacone, firefight. The nation knows about the while its crew, Staff Sergeants Paul Shan- deeds of these two great NCOs, deeds for non and Mason Hall, covered their fellow which they were posthumously awarded soldiers on the ground. To those who were watching, the aircraft seemed, at times, to While there are many noteworthy chapters in the defy the laws of physics, and it became so badly damaged that Goffena had to make annals of the 160th, an unforgettable episode an emergency landing. While their heroism was noteworthy, it was written in an ancient, windswept city on the was the norm that day, repeated in innu- Horn of Africa during the hot, terrible summer of merable other incidents that took place in the center of Mogadishu. Two other unas- 1993, when elements of the 160th deployed to suming pilots, true “quiet professionals,” Chief Warrant Officers Keith Jones and Somalia as part of Task Force Ranger. Karl Maier, were flying an MH-6 “Little Bird” with the call sign Star 41. Star 41 the Medal of Honor, but few know about was literally the cavalry coming to the res- the countless acts of valor performed by cue of the soldiers trapped in a hellish part the members of the 160th in that battle. of that ancient city. After inserting Gordon and Shugart into Jones and Maier landed in an alley with a hail of fire, the Black Hawk, with the call just two feet of rotor clearance from the sign Super 62, went into an overhead orbit walls on either side. Jones leapt out, fought to provide close air support. Despite being his way over to two wounded special oper- pounded by extremely heavy fire from ators and then struggled back to the air-

12 Special Warfare craft with them. Meanwhile, Maier held response reveals the matchless courage, the controls of the helicopter with his right the spirit of service and self-sacrifice, and hand while firing his MP-5 submachine the willingness to do or die that lie at the gun with his left. Amid a hail of small-arms very heart of what the Night Stalkers do, fire, and with enemy soldiers dead and who they are, and why they and all of our wounded all around, Star 41 and its crew other special operators are a national lifted off with the wounded special opera- treasure. tors on board. Not long after Star 41 had taken off, another Black Hawk, flown by Warrant General Henry H. Shelton Officer Dan Jollata, was hovering over the is chairman of the Joint city while two Air Force pararescuemen, or Chiefs of Staff. Prior to PJs, Master Sergeant Scott Fales and Tech- assuming this position, he nical Sergeant Tim Wilkinson, fast-roped served as commander in in. As Jollata held his hover, a rocket-pro- chief of the U. S. Special pelled grenade exploded on the left side of Operations Command, Mac- the aircraft. Realizing immediately that Dill AFB, Fla. General Shelton’s other his aircraft had been hit and that it was assignments include commanding general, badly damaged, Jollata nevertheless avoid- XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg; com- ed his natural inclination to pull up and mander, 82nd Airborne Division; and assis- get away, knowing that such a move would tant division commander for operations, doom Fales and Wilkinson. Despite the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). He helicopter’s damaged main rotor housing also served as the Joint Task Force com- and a destroyed cooling system, Jollata mander during Operation Uphold Democ- held his hover. Only when the PJs were on racy in Haiti. General Shelton holds a the ground did he attempt to fly his crip- bachelor’s degree from N. C. State Universi- pled aircraft back to base. ty and a master’s degree in political science While all of this was going on, four of the from Auburn University. He is a graduate Night Stalkers’ AH-6 “Gunbirds” made of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced scores of gun runs — in all, 280 runs over courses, the Air Command and Staff Col- 18 consecutive hours! — providing deadly lege and the National War College. and accurate fire, some of it “danger close,” to help the soldiers on the ground hold their perimeter. All told, the gunbirds fired more than 50,000 machine-gun rounds and 70 rockets during the battle. How do you describe these actions to the average American? They are almost unbe- lievable, even by today’s action-movie standards. The fact that the events took place as described here defies comprehen- sion. Uncommon valor was indeed a common virtue that day in the 160th. There is a passage from scripture that helps us understand such courage. In words that might have been written especially for the Night Stalkers, the Lord speaks to the prophet Isaiah, asking, “Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?” Isaiah answers: “Here am I; send me!” Whenever the nation calls, the 160th responds: “Here am I; send me!” That

Fall 1999 13 Cognitive and Personality Assessment in Special Forces Assessment and Selection

by Major Gary A. Hazlett and Dr. Michael Sanders

n the Winter 1999 edition of Spe- a significant correlation to one’s al technical, or GT, score is consid- cial Warfare, Lieutenant Colonel overall intelligence. While other ered the best indicator of a sub- IManuel Diemer and Major measures may be used to provide ject’s overall cognitive potential. In Thomas Joyce, authors of “Special supplemental data, these four an adequately normed group, a GT Forces Entry-Level Training: Vision indicators represent the core score of 100 indicates that the sub- for the Future,” state, “Mental evalu- components of the cognitive ject’s performance is average; i.e., it ations are not a significant part of assessment of SF candidates. is as good as or better than that of the current assessment-and-selec- 50 percent of the recruits who tion process.” This statement sug- Education level made up the normative sample. A gests that Special Forces Assessment The average SFAS candidate has a GT score of 100 is not equal to an and Selection, or SFAS, makes no high school education and one year IQ score of 100 (suggesting aver- formal attempt to assess the cogni- of college or equivalent training. age-range cognitive potential). A tive aspects of SF candidates. But in Of 4,561 candidates assessed dur- GT score of around 108 is roughly fact, the current SFAS program uses ing the past four years, 168 had a equivalent to a score of 100 (aver- a variety of measures to assess each general equivalency diploma, or age) on a standardized test. candidate’s behavioral stability and GED, vs. a traditional high-school The minimum GT score for cognitive aptitude. diploma. The SFAS success rate for acceptance into SFAS is 100, which This article will show how the these candidates was about half ensures that candidates possess an currently available indicators of that of the candidates overall. Can- average cognitive aptitude or high- cognitive aptitude and behavioral didates with GEDs had a 26.8-per- er. Over the years, the minimum stability relate to the candidate’s cent success rate in SFAS — in GT score has varied from 110 to performance in SFAS and in the other words, nearly three out of four 100, but despite the changing crite- Special Forces Qualification were not selected. Of all the soldiers ria, the average scores of those who Course, or SFQC. with GEDs who attended SFAS volunteer for SFAS and of those To assess a candidate’s academ- from 1989 to 1998, only 14.4 percent who complete the program have ic potential and cognitive func- graduated from SFQC. That success changed little over the past decade. tioning, SFAS relies mainly on rate is also about half that of the The average GT score for SFAS four indicators: the soldier’s group as a whole. candidates is 115, indicating that record of formal education; scores in terms of cognitive aptitude and from the Armed Services Voca- ASVAB testing academic abilities, the average tional Aptitude Battery, or The ASVAB yields a number of candidate ranks among the upper ASVAB; an achievement test in subscores that reflect a candidate’s third of all soldiers. the area of basic education, or aptitude for various kinds of mili- The ASVAB GT data chart TABE; and the Wonderlic Person- tary activities. However, the gener- reflects the scores of SFAS candi- nel Test, a brief measure that has dates from 1989 to late 1998.

14 Special Warfare ASVAB GT Score Range and SFAS Success

80% GT SCORES 70% A. 109 or below 60% B. 114 or below 50% C. 115 or above D. 120 or above 40%

30%

20%

10%

0% A. B. C. D.

NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS success rates for soldiers at various GT-score levels.

Because GT scores are not avail- than for those with average used in SFAS. SFAS developed its able for most officers, the data pri- scores. own set of norms, based on a pool of marily reflect the performance of several thousand candidates who enlisted soldiers. Wonderlic Personnel Test attended SFAS in the early 1990s. The graph depicts the success The Wonderlic Personnel Test is a A recent validation check of that rates for soldiers whose GT scores brief, timed test that measures one’s normative data, involving more were in the ranges indicated. Sol- mathematical skills and, to a lesser than 4,000 candidates who attend- diers who scored from 100 to 109 extent, one’s verbal abilities. The ed SFAS between 1995 and 1998, typically had a significantly lower Wonderlic norms, developed in indicated no shift in the distribu- success rate in SFAS. In fact, 1992, are based on the test scores of tion of scores. there was a marked drop in suc- more than 118,000 job applicants The average SFAS candidate cess rates for soldiers who scored throughout the civilian population. scores at about the 70th percentile below 115. An increase or a The Wonderlic correlates closely to on the larger civilian population decrease in the GT score usually other standardized tests of intelli- norms. When SFAS Wonderlic data results in a corresponding in- gence, which suggests that it is an are divided into officer vs. enlisted crease or decrease in the success excellent indicator of an individual’s categories, the officers score, on rate in SFAS. A difference of one likely cognitive potential. average, above the 80th percentile or two points in the GT score may Ever since SFAS began intellec- for civilian norms; the enlisted seem trivial, but in data from a tual testing, it has used the Won- remain, on average, at or above the recent four-year sample, candi- derlic. Early in-house studies 70th percentile. dates who scored above 110 had a established that the average SFAS Like other test scores, lower 25-percent higher success rate candidate’s Wonderlic score was Wonderlic scores generally predict than those who scored below 110. well above that of the national lower success rates in SFAS. Can- At the same time, the success rate average, which is consistent with didates who score at the 20th per- for soldiers with scores signifi- observations in almost every other centile or above have about a 46- cantly above the average (120 or measure that has been or is being percent chance of being selected. higher) was not markedly better Candidates who score below the

Fall 1999 15 Wonderlic Percentile Scores and SFAS Success

80% PERCENTILE SCORES 70% A. 5% or below 60% B. 11% or below C. 20% or below 50% D. 24% or above 40% E. 37% or above 30% F. 51% or above G. 67% or above 20% H. 80% or above 10% I . 95% or above

0% A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I.

NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS success rates for soldiers in various percentile ranges.

20th percentile are selected about that they will not complete train- school — in other words, the per- 32 percent of the time. Candidates ing, primarily because of anticipat- formance level of the average grad- who score at the 8th percentile or ed academic problems in Phase II uating high-school senior. Even if a below (around the 27th percentile of the SFQC. It is worth noting that candidate’s performance level is for civilians) have a 28.8 percent despite the fact that SFAS places actually higher than that, his GE chance of selection. These data only minimal cognitive demands will be 12.9. demonstrate three points: on candidates, those with higher During 1995-1998, 46 percent of • Lower Wonderlic scorers per- Wonderlic scores typically are more SFAS candidates earned GE scores form significantly poorer in successful. The critical point of 12.9 on all four measures. Forty- SFAS. appears to be around the 20th per- two percent of the enlisted candi- • The general population of sol- centile: Soldiers with scores above dates scored 12.9s on all four mea- diers attending SFAS today are that have a higher-than-average sures, and 61 percent scored 12.0 or on a par with those who attend- selection rate. higher on all four measures. The ed a decade ago, in terms of cog- data indicate that with any drop nitive aptitude. TABE testing from an all-12.9-score, candidates • The average SFAS candidate is The TABE test provides four are less likely to succeed in SFAS. In a cut above the average soldier basic measures of academic skills terms of predicting future success in and the average civilian job and achievement: the ability to training, the math score is the most applicant. identify word meanings; basic definitive of the four measures. The graph above depicts the reading skills and reading compre- To attend SFQC, candidates relationship between a candidate’s hension; basic math skills; and must achieve a minimum score of percentile scores on the Wonderlic written-communication abilities. 10.6 in all TABE categories. Candi- (based on norms for all SFAS can- TABE scores are reported as grade dates may retake the TABE repeat- didates) and his success in SFAS. equivalents, or GEs. The maximum edly prior to attending SFQC. Generally, candidates who score GE is 12.9, which represents the As the TABE graph demon- below the 11th percentile are iden- ninth month of the 12th year of strates, when any of the four sub- tified as facing a high probability test scores falls below the 12th-

16 Special Warfare grade level, there is a significant defined as the likelihood that a several tests developed by the increase in the SFAS-failure rate. candidate will not complete train- United States Army Research Initially, one might assume that ing because of academic deficien- Institute (the principal one being the failure rate increases because cies or personality vulnerabilities. ARI Biodata80); the Minnesota candidates are dropped by the final On the basis of their psychologi- Multiphasic Personality Inventory, board because of their poor acade- cal test data, SFAS candidates are or MMPI; clinical-interview evalu- mic grades. For the most part, this categorized as either low-, moder- ations conducted by psychologists is not the case, as a later graphic ate- or high-risk. These categories during SFAS; and observations by will demonstrate. do not suggest the likelihood of the SFAS cadre. Research to date psychiatric problems; they refer to indicates that the ARI Biodata80 Behavioral reliability the likelihood that a candidate and the MMPI are the most useful. In addition to assessing a candi- may fail to complete SFAS or date’s intellectual potential, SFAS SFQC. A fourth group of candi- ARI Biodata80 uses several measures of personal- dates may be identified as high- The U.S. Army Research Insti- ity and behavioral tendency to risk because of deficits in their aca- tute developed ARI Biodata80 in reveal a candidate’s strengths and demic or cognitive-aptitude scores. response to requests for a test of vulnerabilities, and to identify any High-risk candidates who complete personal integrity. The test is risk of behavioral tendencies that SFAS are subsequently inter- designed to provide a variety of might prevent the candidate’s viewed to determine whether they information about the candidate, becoming a productive SF soldier. are indeed high-risk. The final including his level of social maturi- It is important to point out that selection board collects and analy- ty in comparison to his peers, and SFAS candidates very rarely pres- ses the information acquired from the likelihood of his performing ent any tendencies that approxi- the interviews as part of the candi- inappropriately under stress. The mate a formal psychiatric condi- date-selection process. test uses a unique approach: Test tion. “Risk,” in this context, is To evaluate behavioral stability items are keyed to actual behaviors and emotional maturity, SFAS uses

TABE Score Range and SFAS Failure

80% SUBTEST SCORES 70% A. 12.9 on all 60% B. Below 12 on any one C. Below 11 on any one 50% D. Below 10 on any one 40% E. Below 9 on any one 30% F. Below 8 on any one G. Below 7 on any one 20%

10%

0% A. B. C. D. E. F. G.

NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS failure rates for soldiers in various subtest-score ranges.

Fall 1999 17 ARI Biodata80 Delinquency Score and SFAS Failure

80% SF DEL SCORES 70% A. Equals 0 60% B. Equals 1 50% C. Higher than 1

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% A. B. C.

NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS failure rates for soldiers with various scores on the SF delinquency scale. rather than to personality con- cy scale will complete training. ent settings. The norms estab- cepts, as in the MMPI. The ARI Although the SF delinquency lished for SFAS differ in many Biodata80 provides information scale is the most predictive of the respects from the norms used in that is strongly predictive of a can- ARI Biodata80 scores, ARI Bioda- mental-health settings or in other didate’s inability to complete ta80 also provides other useful civilian settings. Test results are SFAS. Although such cases may scores. The U.S. Army Research helpful in identifying candidates also be identified by the MMPI, Institute is currently refining a who vary significantly from the ARI Biodata80 is able to pinpoint measure that is linked to a candi- SFAS norms. These results are individuals with significant vul- date’s flexibility in thinking and in then integrated with other data nerabilities who were not identi- problem-solving. That measure, and serve as a starting point for fied by the MMPI. which may hold substantial the interviewing of candidates. One set of scores on the ARI Bio- promise for early identification of However, the majority of candi- data80 provides a measure called soldiers who have the intensive dates are not interviewed. the SF delinquency scale. Scores on thinking abilities valued by Special In the graph depicting the rela- this scale range from 0 (the best) to Forces, is scheduled to be field-test- tionship between risk ratings and 5 (the worst). Nearly 80 percent of ed next year. performance in SFAS and SFQC, the candidates score 0. During the the first cluster depicts the repre- past two years, we have established MMPI sentation of the different groups at that candidates who score higher Since SFAS’s inception, we have the start of SFAS, at which time than 1 are likely to drop out of SFAS used the MMPI. It is the most com- the testing is conducted. Note that at a fairly high rate. During the mon psychological test in the by the end of SFAS, low-risk candi- next year, we will assess the rela- world, and it is used in a broad dates have survived the program tionship between the SF delinquen- range of military and civilian at a slightly higher rate than cy scale and the candidate’s per- assessment-and-selection pro- expected. In contrast, soldiers in formance in the SFQC. We predict grams. Norms vary considerably the high-risk (nonacademic) group that few, if any, candidates with an for different populations and differ- compose a smaller proportion of elevated score on the SF delinquen- graduates than expected, given

18 Special Warfare their representation at the start of SFQC tends to produce stress suffi- limited set of tests, the categoriza- the class. The greater attrition rate cient enough to highlight any vul- tion demonstrates substantial pre- among this group of candidates is nerabilities among its students. dictive power in terms of identify- due to a higher voluntary with- The graph demonstrates the low ing those candidates who have a drawal rate and the results of the likelihood of course completion by poor chance of success. review by the final board. individuals who are considered At the start of SFAS, about 8 per- high-risk for failure because of Conclusion cent of the candidates are placed in their psychological vulnerabilities, The SFAS incorporates method- the high-risk category, based on cognitive aptitude or academic ologies that assess candidates’ their low Wonderlic scores (high- deficits. intellectual capabilities and relates risk-for-academic-failure group). The few soldiers in the high-risk those capabilities to success in By the end of SFAS, these individ- academic group who graduated training. The program also assess- uals compose 10 to 11 percent of from SFQC most likely were sol- es psychological strengths and vul- the graduates. Generally, these are diers with reasonable cognitive nerabilities that are predictive of soldiers who are physically tough aptitude who scored low on the success in SFAS and in SFQC. but possess only average intellect. Wonderlic. Soldiers in the high-risk These methodologies are continu- The third cluster in the graph nonacademic category who gradu- ally being evaluated and improved, depicts the graduates of the SFQC: ated from SFQC most likely were with the twin goals of providing soldiers who will subsequently fill identified as being high-risk for accurate, reliable and critical infor- team slots in the SF groups. The failure on the testing, but who were mation to the command, and of SFQC is much more demanding subsequently identified as low-risk enhancing the effectiveness of the than SFAS in regard to academic after they were interviewed at the overall assessment-and-selection skills and cognitive aptitude, par- end of SFAS. process. Psychological testing is ticularly in the academic portions The key point is that even with a only one of many tools that can of Phase II. A training program as somewhat unrefined strategy of help Special Forces acquire the demanding and as long as the categorization based solely on a

Risk Ratings and Success in SFAS and SFQC

80% RISK GROUPS 70% Low risk 60%

50% Moderate risk

40% High risk – psychological

30% High risk – intellectual 20%

10%

0% Start SFAS End SFAS End SFQC

NOTE: Graph depicts SFAS and SFQC success rates for soldiers in various risk groups.

Fall 1999 19 kind of tough, smart and stress- He holds a master’s and a doctorate resilient soldiers that it has had in in experimental psychology, with an the past, that it needs now, and emphasis on human factors. that it will continue to need in the future.

Major Gary A. Hazlett is assigned to the Psychological Appli- cations Directorate within the U.S. Army Special Operations Com- mand, and he manages the psychological-assessment portion of SFAS. His previous assignments include division psychologist for the 82nd Airborne Division; chief of the psychology service in the Department of Psychology and Neurology at Fort Bragg’s Womack Army Med- ical Center; and SERE psychologist for the 2nd Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, JFK Spe- cial Warfare Center and School. Major Hazlett holds a doctorate in clinical psychology from Indiana State University, and he completed a post-doctorate in clinical neu- ropsychology in the Department of Neurology at the University of Alabama-Birmingham.

Dr. Michael Sanders has served as chief of the Fort Bragg office of the U.S. Army Research Institute since July 1994. He and other ARI psychologists provide research support to the SOF community on topics that address the life cycle of the soldier, including recruiting, assessment and selection, training and retention. He began service in the Army at Fort Rucker, Ala., as an active-duty aviation psychologist at the Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory. At the Fort Rucker ARI Field Unit, he continued his research on aviator selection, screening, training, performance assessment, and retention. Dr. Sanders has also served as chief of the ARI field unit at Fort Gordon, Ga., where his unit performed research on training-technology enhancements for Signal soldiers.

20 Special Warfare The 1999 SF Conference: Setting a New Standard by Lieutenant Colonel Dan Adelstein

n April, the Special Warfare Center and tions to all active-Army SF personnel iden- School hosted the 1999 Special Forces tified through the Total Army Personnel IConference and Exposition in Fayet- Command databases. At the same time, teville, N.C., bringing together more than SWCS advertised the event through more 500 members of the SF community to cele- than 10 media outlets, including official brate the past, to discuss the present and periodicals, the Fayetteville and Raleigh, to plan for the future. N.C., newspapers, Soldiers Magazine, Army The 1999 Special Forces Conference was Times and Army Magazine. The conference the most ambitious undertaking of its kind staff also briefed the USASFC chain of com- in the history of USAJFKSWCS. From the mand down to the group level, to encourage beginning, the SWCS command strived to the widest possible attendance. make the 1999 conference different from A number of Army and SOF senior lead- previous SF conferences. The command ers, active-duty and retired, attended the intended for the conference’s symposiums 1999 conference. Among the key speakers and workshops to yield recommendations were General Hugh Shelton, chairman of for improvement in various areas. The con- the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who spoke on ference was also designed to engage a “DoD Into the 21st Century”; General wider segment of Special Forces. To achieve Peter Schoomaker, commander in chief of that end, conference planners involved the U.S. Special Operations Command, SWCS; the National Defense Industrial who discussed “SOF, Shaping, Preparing Association, or NDIA; the Association of and Responding Now”; General John the U.S. Army, or AUSA; the Army Special Abrams, commander of the Army Training Forces Command, or USASFC; and the and Doctrine Command, who discussed Special Forces Association. TRADOC’s link to the emerging regional- Working toward a common goal, these engagement concept; Thomas Umberg of five organizations synchronized their the White House Office of National Drug efforts to engage all ranks and all members Control, who spoke on “SOF Support to of the community, both active-duty and America’s Counterdrug Policy”; and retired retired. Another innovation was the loca- Lieutenant General Samuel Wilson, a tion of the conference at a large hotel/con- highly decorated World War II veteran of vention center in Fayetteville, which pro- Merrill’s Marauders and former director of vided an ideal facility for the conference’s the Defense Intelligence Agency, who dis- diverse activities. cussed the role of intelligence and “political In preparation for the conference, the con- literacy” in special operations. ference staff mailed more than 6,000 invita- Also in attendance were Lieutenant

Fall 1999 21 General William Tangney, commander of mainly for senior conference participants the Army Special Operations Command, (lieutenant colonel and above, CW4 and who presented “ARSOF Into the Future”; sergeant major/command sergeant major), and Major General William G. Boykin, but all conference participants could commander of USASFC, who presented attend. “The Direction and Focus of SF Command.” The concept for all three symposiums The guest list also included 20 other gen- was the same. The moderator convened a eral officers and civilians with strong ties panel of active-duty and retired members to the SF community or NDIA. of the SF community. To provide a catalyst Conference activities began on April 19 for the discussion, the moderator either with the first Special Forces Open Classic presented a briefing or introduced guest golf tournament, sponsored in part by the speakers. The moderator then fielded the AUSA, and an NDIA-hosted social that audience’s questions and comments, direct- evening for the conference participants. Dur- ing them to the appropriate panel mem- ing the next three days (April 20-22), the con- bers. Each symposium was videotaped so ference conducted a number of concurrent that a post-conference distillation of the activities: three symposiums, 10 workshops discussions could be presented to the and the NDIA SWCS senior leadership. exposition. The collected input from each symposium The sympo- will also further the progress in three vital siums were con- areas: SWCS will provide the synopsis of ducted on sepa- the core-ideology symposium to the Army rate days. Each SF Command to facilitate its initiative to supported the define the SF core ideology. SWCS’s Con- conference cepts Development Directorate will use rec- theme, “Region- ommendations from the REF symposium to al Engagement further develop the concept of regional and the Fu- engagement. SWCS will also provide the ture.” The first synopsis of the SF training-pipeline sympo- symposium, sium to the U.S. Army Research Institute, or “SF Core Ide- ARI, as feedback for ARI’s SF Pipeline Proj- ology,” ect. That project, largely the work of ARI’s sought to Dr. Michelle Zazanis, will identify the attri- identify butes and the training required for optimal the core performance by members of SF A-detach- values ments. The SF Pipeline Project also plans to and the provide recommendations that will make it core pur- possible for SFAS to improve the process by pose of which it identifies highly qualified soldiers Special Forces. The and for SFQC to provide those soldiers with second symposium, “The Regional the best possible training. Engagement Force,” sought to advance The 10 conference workshops were con- SWCS’s development of the regional- ducted at the same time as the second and engagement concept. The third sympo- third symposiums. Workshop topics were: sium, “The SF Training Pipeline,” exam- • Development of an SF team-sergeant ined the future of Special Forces Assess- course. ment and Selection, or SFAS, and of the • Standards for SFAS. Special Forces Qualification Course, or • Criteria for SFQC. SFQC, based upon possible requirements • ARSOF simulations. of the regional-engagement force. All con- • Management of unit supplies and ference attendees were invited to partici- ammunition. pate in the first symposium. The second • Defining materiel requirements at the and third symposiums were intended lowest level.

22 Special Warfare • Alternative methods for training SF ly attended social event in recent SWCS advanced skills. history. Among the distinguished guests • Defining and enhancing force protection. were the keynote speaker, retired Colonel • Development of future courseware for Roger Donlon, who was the first soldier to distance learning. receive the Medal of Honor during the • Medical implications of SF training. Vietnam War; and the guest of honor, Ross The workshops were designed to gain Perot. A highlight of the evening was a input from members of the SF community film clip showing Donlon in Vietnam. The who had played a minimal role in earlier footage, furnished by the National conferences — personnel in the grades of Archives, had never before been shown staff sergeant through master sergeant, publicly. Another guest, Wayne Newton, WO1 through CW3, and captains and received an award in recognition of his majors. Subject-matter experts conducted service as an entertainer of U.S. military the workshops, evaluated the input and personnel in Vietnam. provided recommendations to the SWCS The 1999 SF Conference was a hallmark senior leadership. event that will set a standard for confer- The NDIA exposition was a first for the ences in years to come, and SWCS plans to SF conference. The event, which required include activities similar to this year’s in no soldier support from SWCS, provided future SF conferences. Had it merely cap- “one stop shopping” for SF. The displays of tured the interest of all ranks and 43 vendors covered a variety of topics, improved the cohesion of the SF communi- including electronics, weapons, synthetics, ty, the conference would have been a suc- robotics, human engineering, mobility, cess. But it went beyond that to provide training and leadership. Conference atten- input that will help guide actions critical to dees also had the option of participating in the SF community — actions that will con- a vendor-sponsored live-fire of some of the tinue through next year’s conference and weapons, held at the Fayetteville Police beyond. Department’s firing range. In a separate event held adjacent to the exposition, the Army Quartermaster School exhibited a Lieutenant Colonel Dan field kitchen containing samples of the Adelstein is director of the Army’s latest field rations. Special Operations Propo- On April 20, SWCS sponsored a memori- nency Office at the JFK Spe- al ceremony to remember SF personnel cial Warfare Center and killed in action. Conducted at the USASOC School. In 1999 he served as Vietnam War Memorial statue, the ceremo- the officer in charge of the ny included a wreath-laying by Major Gen- Special Forces Conference. Commissioned eral Kenneth R. Bowra and retired Com- as an infantry officer, Adelstein served as a mand Sergeant Major Franklin D. Miller, rifle-platoon leader with Company C, 4/9th an SF Medal of Honor recipient. The cere- Infantry in Alaska, and as commander of mony featured remarks by Major General Company C, 2/4th Infantry in Germany. Bowra; Robert L. Jones, deputy assistant His SF assignments include detachment secretary of defense for POW and MIA commander, ODA 573, and commander, affairs; and Harold Jacobson, president of Company A, 1/5th SF Group. Adelstein the SF Association. holds a bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Mil- Each day of the conference ended with a itary Academy and a master’s degree in his- social event: On the first evening, the SF tory from Ball State University. Association hosted a barbecue. On the second evening, conference participants gath- ered at a local restaurant for a no-host din- ner. On the third evening, the conference concluded with the SF Ball. This year’s SF Ball was the most heavi-

Fall 1999 23 Theory, Research, Practice: Three Ways to Increase PSYOP Effectiveness

by Dr. Mark F. Dyer

sychological operations, or PSYOP, it is important to base “interventions,” the has a difficult goal: to change the actions designed to influence an audience, Pbehavior of target audiences. Other on the best theories of human behavior and fields — politics, advertising, marketing and behavioral change. Theories, far from being health communications, for example — useless academic constructs, can assist share that goal, and practitioners in these practitioners during all phases of a pro- related fields, like those in PSYOP, know gram: from planning through implementa- that their efforts to stir audiences to action tion to evaluation. may often be fruitless. Behavior theories can explain why tar- Nevertheless, over the last 20-30 years, get audiences behave as they do, and they these related behavior-change fields have can pinpoint specific information that developed methods that have proven to be practitioners will need in designing effec- effective in winning votes, selling products, tive interventions. Behavior-change theo- gaining customers and improving health ries can provide guidelines on how to shape practices. Their successes are not the program strategies, and they can form the result of secret tactics or sneaky tech- basis for evaluation by making explicit the niques, but rather of a disciplined method- assumptions about how interventions ology that makes good use of its three com- should work. ponents — theory, research and practice — Practitioners in behavior-change fields are in designing programs to affect target pragmatic and results-oriented. They never- audiences. theless seem to have a firm understanding of Because PSYOP shares a common goal the theoretical underpinnings of their with these related fields, we may be able to actions. They have a theory-based apprecia- adopt their methodology, and PSYOP prac- tion of their audience’s behavior, and they titioners can improve their effectiveness by can explain exactly how their intervention is learning from other fields’ approaches to supposed to change that behavior. theory, research and practice. An understanding of theories can con- vert a practitioner from a technician into a Apply behavior theory “professional who … comprehends the While theory is sometimes overlooked by ‘why’ and can design and craft well-tai- those who are involved in the practical con- lored interventions … [who] does not blind- cerns of accomplishing a mission, a funda- ly follow a cookbook recipe but constantly mental lesson that we can draw from the creates the recipe anew, depending on the … experience of behavior-change fields is that nature of the target audience, setting, resources, goals, and constraints.”1 In short,

24 Special Warfare Enlisted PSYOP specialists learn printing techniques. While standard procedures facilitate quick work in the field, an understanding of theory would allow practitioners to design more effective PSYOP strategies. Photo by Keith Butler theories give practitioners indispensable apply the theories in action, to evaluate the advantages in establishing the coherence, effectiveness of the program, and to judge effectiveness and evaluation of behavior- the performance of the practitioners. change interventions. At times, PSYOP officers will have to Officers who are responsible for design- rely on their intuition and judgment in ing, implementing and evaluating PSYOP deciding what actions to take to effect a programs can gain those advantages by behavior change in a target audience. Even learning and applying the various behav- at those times, however, the officers’ “gut ioral theories used in related fields. Cer- tainly not everyone involved in a PSYOP At times, PSYOP officers will have to rely on program needs to understand behavioral theory. Subordinate officers and enlisted their intuition and judgment in deciding what soldiers can (and in many instances probably should) use standard procedures that actions to take. … Even at those times, how- facilitate quick and effective work in the ever, the officers’ ‘gut reactions’ will be most field. The officer in charge of the program, however, must be fully aware of theory in on target if they result from an internalized order to direct the appropriate research, to design effective interventions, and to carry understanding of behavioral theory. out monitoring and evaluation. Civilian researchers who are involved in reactions” will be most on target if they the program must also understand theory result from an internalized understanding in order to design research that will of behavioral theory. In most situations, answer the questions that the officer in practitioners should be able to articulate charge is asking. Finally, officers in eche- their understanding of the situation they lons above the officer in charge must face as well as their perception of the way understand behavioral theories in order to their proposed program will change audi- help select appropriate theoretical ence behavior. In articulating the concept, approaches, to give guidance on how to the officers will form a clear idea of the

Fall 1999 25 Many PSYOP operations not only address audiences that can be researched, but also offer audiences something of value.

Photo by Keith Butler task, formulate specific questions that can conditioning theory, social-learning theory, be answered by research, develop a plan of balance theory, cognitive-dissonance theo- action to achieve the behavioral goal, and ry, psychological-reactance theory, mes- establish guidelines both for monitoring sage-learning theory, and the elaboration- the progress of the program and for evalu- likelihood model. ating it when it is over. Elaboration likelihood, as well as rea- Like their fellow behavior-change practi- soned action, is also emphasized in text- tioners in other fields, PSYOP planners should books dealing with advertising4 and in allow others in their field to review their theo- those dealing with consumer behavior used ries and planned operations. This “peer by marketers.5 The field of social marketing review” can help ensure that the theoretical relies heavily on the transtheoretical model approach to the operation is consistent, effi- or stages of change theory.6 The field of cient and plausible, and that it is the most health promotion uses a variety of theoreti- appropriate approach for the given situation. cal approaches: A recent review of theories Officers and civilians engaged in design- used in health-education programs over a ing and implementing PSYOP programs three-year period identified 21 different can learn about theories of human behavior conceptual frameworks, although the from the various behavior-change fields. health-belief model dominated the field.7 While each field takes a somewhat different As PSYOP gains experience in applying approach, all are practical, and they share behavior-change theories to its campaigns, many of the same basic theories. PSYOP it can teach those theories in its training practitioners therefore have the twin luxu- programs, develop a repertoire of theories ries of being able to approach behavioral found to be most effective, and contribute theory through whatever field best suits to advancements in behavioral theories their preferences, and of being able to work that will be of value to practitioners in effectively with others who approach behav- related fields. For now, however, PSYOP ioral theory from a different viewpoint. should concentrate on assimilating exist- Some of the basic theories of human ing theories and integrating them into behavior can be found in textbooks on per- ongoing PSYOP programs. suasive communications, such as the one written by E.P. Bettinghaus and M.J. Base decisions on research Cody,2 or the one by J.B. Stiff.3 Among the Behavioral theory provides a blueprint theories emphasized in persuasive commu- for planning and evaluating behavior- nications are the source-message-channel- change interventions, but theory is not a receiver model of communication, classical- goal in itself. Marketers, politicians and

26 Special Warfare health-care workers do not seek simply to ic behavior-change interventions should we understand the behavior of consumers, vot- undertake? How can we most efficiently ers and patients; rather, they strive to allocate our resources to the various seg- develop effective strategies for changing it. ments and interventions? Formative While theory is invaluable in planning research consists primarily of listening to those strategies, practitioners do not blind- target-audience members through the use ly apply textbook theories. Behavior- of surveys, personal interviews and focus- change practitioners are fanatical about group interviews. The aim of formative research — a practical kind of research research is to provide specific information that is designed to help them make deci- that the theoretical model suggests would sions on operational considerations such as be useful in planning interventions. target segmentation, behavior-change After behavior-change practitioners have strategies, resource allocation, and the decided on intervention strategies and choice of strategy elements. audience segments, their next step is to Behavior-change practitioners use pretest their strategies. Pretesting allows research to determine how well their theory explains the behavior of the target audience, to find facts that suggest appropriate Primary research of the target audience is an approaches and effective interventions, indispensable tool in bridging the gap between and to test how well their theoretically derived actions actually change the behav- theory and practice. In effect, research helps prac- ior of the target audience. Primary research of the target audience titioners determine whether what they think they is an indispensable tool in bridging the gap are doing is what they are doing, and whether between theory and practice. In effect, research helps practitioners determine there is a connection between the actions of their whether what they think they are doing is what they are doing, and whether there is programs and the behavior of the target audience. a connection between the actions of their programs and the behavior of the target the practitioners to evaluate the effective- audience. When research reveals that the ness of the strategies before they devote connections are weak, the practitioners any resources to them. In the final step, the rethink their approach and revise their practitioners monitor data that tell them program until it works. how the strategies are doing and how to PSYOP can best ensure that its actions make changes in the audiences, strategies, change behavior in the desired way by con- or any other elements of the intervention. ducting practical primary research on the Monitoring, like formative research, is a target audience. The other behavior- process of listening closely to members of change fields have found that research is the target audience. Monitoring is most most useful and most efficient when it is useful when it measures the audience’s performed as an aid in making operational behavior against the program goals that decisions. Presented with a problem to were suggested by the theoretical model. solve or an opportunity to exploit, practi- Research of the target audience, with its tioners perform exploratory research to dis- concern for answering the question “What cover information of general interest about should we do?” at each step of a campaign, the target audience — its knowledge, atti- provides an ideal paradigm for PSYOP tudes and behaviors. practitioners who seek to design effective Once these practitioners have selected a interventions. PSYOP practitioners who model for action, they turn to formative wish to learn about research methodologies research to answer basic operational ques- will find an extensive amount of literature tions: Which target audiences can we available. The field of commercial market- address with the most effect? How should ing has taken the idea of practical research we segment those audiences? What specif- to its extreme, and the vast amount of mar-

Fall 1999 27 By adopting a marketing approach, PSYOP practitioners could view surrender as an exchange that can be made easier, more appealing and less costly for enemy soldiers. Photo by Joel M. Torres ket-research literature is perhaps best Most behavior-change practitioners have approached through a standard textbook learned that a marketing approach is the such as the one written by T.C. Kinnear and most effective means of designing a pro- J.R. Taylor.8 The methodology of interview- gram that achieves results. ing focus groups, which originated in the For many years, behavior-change profes- commercial sector but is now being widely sionals, such as advertisers and managers practiced in politics, social marketing, of political campaigns, concentrated on health communications and other fields, communications as a means of convincing has a particularly large body of supporting or persuading their audiences to behave in literature, such as the recent guide by desired ways. Nearly all of them now Richard Krueger.9 Books on research meth- agree, however, that they need to go beyond ods are also available,10 as are discussions communications to marketing. of research as it is applied in social market- The marketing approach proposes “that ing.11 The field of advertising offers litera- success will come to that organization that ture that is especially useful for pretest- best determines the perceptions, needs, ing,12 and the fields of economic develop- and wants of target markets and satisfies ment,13 mass communication14 and health them through the design, communication, communications15 have also contributed to pricing, and delivery of appropriate and the literature on various aspects of competitively viable offerings.”16 Although research methodologies. the marketing approach originated in the field of commercial marketing, it is applic- Adopt a marketing approach able in all behavior-change fields, includ- For the various practitioners who seek to ing PSYOP. change people’s behavior, practice is the The marketing approach also proposes bottom line — the ultimate goal of their that target audiences will perform a craft. Whatever their motivation, practi- desired behavior only if they are offered tioners strive to do something that will something in exchange — something that cause the audience to change its behavior. they want or need, something that they can afford (economically and otherwise), or

28 Special Warfare something that they can access easily. to do something that they do not want to There are two parts to successful mar- do, we can manipulate the other elements keting. The first part is thorough research of the marketing mix, thereby making our to determine the perceptions, needs and operations more flexible and possibly more wants of target markets. The second part is effective. the “marketing mix,” often referred to as PSYOP practitioners can learn the mar- the four “Ps”: product, price, promotion and keting approach by reading the literature place. This mnemonic device reminds mar- pertaining to the various behavior-change keters that they must offer their audience fields. Books and college courses on com- something that it values (product); ensure mercial marketing are widely available. that the costs of the desired behavior One important book that outlines the appli- (price) are not greater than the value of the cation of market methodologies to social- product; effectively communicate to the behavior interventions is Alan Andreasen’s audience the benefits of the offering (pro- Marketing Social Change.17 Other works motion); and ensure that the offering is deal with social marketing18 and marketing available to the audience at the appropri- in health communications.19 ate time and place (place). Behavior- change practitioners have found that if Even in a situation such as surrender, in they consider all four Ps, they will be more successful in obtaining the behavior which the terms ‘research’ and ‘exchange’ changes they seek. At first glance, marketing may not seem meaningless, the marketing approach appear to be an appropriate model for can be applied. While traditional research PSYOP. After all, PSYOP seeks to compel enemy soldiers to surrender — an action may be difficult on the battlefield, prisoners that is clearly not in their best interest. It is also impossible to conduct focus-group of war, defectors, ex-soldiers, informants interviews with enemy soldiers. But many and others can provide information to PSYOP operations — such as managing friendly populations and enemy civilians in researchers who ask the right questions. wartime, and conducting mine-awareness and drug-prevention campaigns in peace- Adopting a marketing approach is, as time — not only address audiences that Kotler and Andreasen point out,20 mostly a can be researched but also offer those audi- question of developing the proper mindset. ences something of value. If PSYOP practitioners are to implement a Even in a situation such as surrender, in marketing approach, they must adopt a which the terms “research” and “exchange” “customer-centered” orientation, or in seem meaningless, the marketing PSYOP terms, they must begin and end all approach can be applied. While traditional analysis and planning with consideration research may be difficult on the battlefield, of the target audience, whose behavior is prisoners of war, defectors, ex-soldiers, the ultimate goal of their interventions. A informants and others can provide infor- customer-centered orientation would mation to researchers who ask the right require PSYOP to use all elements of the questions. Surrender itself can be seen as marketing mix, to broadly define competi- an exchange, suggesting that PSYOP can tion, to develop a heavy reliance on profitably go beyond simply trying to “per- research and to perform target-audience suade” enemy soldiers to surrender, work- segmentation. ing instead to make surrender easier, more Kotler and Andreasen also mention sev- appealing and less costly. eral considerations that an organization The greatest strength of the marketing should take into account when attempting approach is that it broadens the scope of to introduce a marketing approach into its actions that are available to the practition- operations.21 Among these are recognizing er. Instead of trying to persuade audiences the limited understanding of marketing

Fall 1999 29 among the members of the organization; ana- Social Sciences (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1998). lyzing the projected nonmarket pressures on 11 Andreasen, Marketing Social Change. 12 the organization; and carefully selecting J. Haskings and A. Kendrick, Successful Advertis- ing Research Methods (Lincolnwood, Ill.: NTC Busi- early marketing projects. Most importantly, ness Books, 1993); and A.D. Fletcher and T.A. Bowers, however, Kotler and Andreasen emphasize Fundamentals of Advertising Research (Belmont, that the acceptance of the marketing Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991). approach into an organization is largely a 13 K. Finsterbusch, J. Ingersoll and L.G. Llewellyn political activity, and that it can occur only (eds.), Methods for Social Analysis in Developing Countries (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990). (Vol. with the support of the organization’s top 17 of the social-impact-assessment series.) leadership. The introduction of a market- 14 H.J. Hsia, Mass Communication Research Meth- ing approach into PSYOP would thus ods: A Step-by-Step Approach (Hillsdale, N.J.: require three changes: PSYOP planners Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988). 15 would have to learn about marketing and S.C. Scrimshaw and E. Hurtado, Rapid Assessment Procedures for Nutrition and Primary Health Care: its methodology of behavior change; Anthropological Approaches to Improving Programme PSYOP personnel would have to adopt a Effectiveness (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American more customer-centered mindset; and the Center Publications, 1987). PSYOP leadership would have to give the 16 Andreasen, Marketing Social Change. 17 marketing approach its full support. Ibid. 18 M.E. Goldberg, M. Fishbein and S.E. Middlestadt (eds.), Social Marketing: Theoretical and Practical Perspectives (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Asso- Dr. Mark F. Dyer has been ciates, 1997). an analyst for the Strategic 19 R.C. Lefebvre and L. Rochlin, “Social Marketing,” Studies Detachment, 8th in Glanz, Lewis and Rimer, Health Behavior and Health Education, pp. 384-402. PSYOP Battalion, 4th PSYOP 20 P. Kotler and A.R. Andreasen, Strategic Marketing Group, since 1982. He received for Nonprofit Organizations (Upper Saddle River, his bachelor’s degree from N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1996), pp. 35-61. DePauw University in 1972 21 Ibid., p. 57. and a Ph.D. in history from Boston Universi- ty in 1986.

Notes: 1 K. Glanz, F.M. Lewis and B.K. Rimer (eds.), Health Behavior and Health Education: Theory, Research and Practice (2nd ed.) (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Pub- lishers, 1997), p. 21. 2 E.P. Bettinghaus and M.J. Cody, Persuasive Com- munication (New York: Harcourt Brace College Pub- lishers, 1994). 3 J.B. Stiff, Persuasive Communication (New York: Guilford Press, 1994). 4 W.F. Arens and C.L. Bovee, Contemporary Advertis- ing (Boston: Irwin, 1994). 5 H. Assael, Consumer Behavior and Marketing Action (Cincinnati: South-Western College Publish- ing, 1995). 6 Allen R. Andreasen, Marketing Social Change: Changing Behavior to Promote Health, Social Devel- opment and the Environment (San Francisco: Jossey- Bass Publishers, 1995). 7 Glanz, Lewis and Rimer, p. 29. 8 T.C. Kinnear and J.R. Taylor, Marketing Research: An Applied Approach (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1996). 9 Richard A. Krueger, Focus Groups: A Practical Guide for Applied Research (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1994). 10 B.L. Berg, Qualitative Research Methods for the

30 Special Warfare Army Values Loyalty

Bull Simons

Colonel Arthur D. “Bull” Simons was one of the most charismatic leaders in special-operations history. A gruff man with a wide command of pro- fanity, he inspired loyalty in his men. One subordinate of his during the 1960 White Star training operation in Laos said of him, “I would follow Bull Simons to hell and back for the sheer joy of being with him on the visit.” Simons responded to that loyalty by carefully planning all his operations so as not to risk any man’s life unnecessarily. He still planned missions that were risky — war is inherently risky — but he took as many factors into account as possible. He came to believe that “the more improbable something is, the surer you can pull it off.” Simons was commander of the Army component of the Son Tay raid, the 1970 operation designed to rescue American prisoners of war from a camp deep inside North Vietnam. Simons personally selected the raiders and oversaw their training. As he and his soldiers prepared to leave Thailand on Nov. 20, 1970, to conduct the raid, Simons swore that he would leave no man behind. Rather than surrender even one of his men to cap- tivity by the North Vietnamese, he said, he would stand and fight back-to-back with his men. Such loyalty, given and received, marked Bull Simons as a leader of men and makes him an inspiration to current and future generations of special-oper- Arthur D. “Bull” Simons ations soldiers. — Dr. Richard Stewart

Fall 1999 31 Military Legitimacy in OOTW: Civilians as Mission Priorities

by Colonel Rudolph C. Barnes Jr.

ivilian supremacy has taken a primary mission objective. To perseverance, and security — with on new meaning in the mili- complicate matters, this support is the addition of civil-military rela- Ctary. Civilians have become essentially a political objective tions, might just as well be referred mission objectives in those contem- rather than a military objective, to as the characteristics of military porary military operations former- and military leaders have tradi- legitimacy. These principles pro- ly known as low-intensity conflict, tionally been taught to avoid polit- vide a doctrinal context for under- or LIC, and now euphemistically ical matters.1 standing how civilians relate to referred to as operations other This reversal of mission priori- mission success in OOTW.2 than war, or OOTW. Whether in ties may be less confusing if com- Although the principles of Somalia, Iraq, Haiti or the Bal- manders understand the concept of OOTW may be new in military doc- kans, military leaders who are military legitimacy. Military legiti- trine, they should be familiar to accustomed to pursuing military macy deals with the delicate bal- veteran special operators. The objectives are befuddled by the ance between might and right, a principles of OOTW are little more emergence of civilians as mission balance that shifts dramatically as than warmed-over LIC impera- priorities. General Hugh Shelton, conditions move from war to peace. tives. They may also appear to be who commanded operation Uphold The six doctrinal principles of similar to the venerable principles Democracy in Haiti prior to becom- OOTW listed in chapter 13 of FM of war (objective, security and ing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 100-5, Operations — legitimacy, unity of command). However, in Staff, put it this way: “One word objective, unity of effort, restraint, their application, the principles of that represents the most vexing legal, political and operational challenge of OOTW is ‘civilians.’ ” LIC Imperatives Principles of OOTW The vexing role of civilians in OOTW is understandable in light 1. Legitimacy 1. Legitimacy of the contrasting role of civilians 2. Primacy of the 2. Objective in war. In wartime, the defeat of enemy combatants by overwhelm- political instrument 3. Unity of effort ing force is the mission priority; 3. Unity of effort 4. Restraint civilians are usually considered little more than obstacles to that 4. Restricted use of force 5. Perseverance objective. But in OOTW, mission 5. Perseverance 6. Security priorities are reversed. Most OOTW are civil-military in nature; 6. Adaptability even at the tactical and operational levels, civilian (or public) support is

32 Special Warfare OOTW have more differences than similarities with the principles of war. The unconventional nature of OOTW may explain why many consider OOTW an inappropriate use of the military.3 Legitimacy Legitimacy is the first principle of OOTW, subsuming all others. It provides the moral authority for a government and its military forces to act. Military doctrine acknowl- edges legitimacy to be the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict.4 In wartime, mission success depends upon the successful application of overwhelming military force. Photo by Joel Herard But in peacetime, political considera- A U.S. soldier gives water to Haitian prisoners during Operation Uphold Democracy. If civilian support tions severely constrain the use of is important in OOTW, then soldiers should apply the golden rule to civilians in the operational area. military force. These two scenarios reflect the contrasting requirements Balkans to justice before the wartime. Combatants are legiti- of legitimacy in war and in peace — United Nations war crimes tri- mate targets; noncombatants are requirements that are derived from bunal. If Slobodan Milosevic and not. If no distinction can be made values, constitutions, traditions, reli- his henchmen could be brought to between combatants and noncom- gion, culture, the law, and public per- trial, the process would do more to batants, the use of lethal force ceptions.5 Because of the interrelat- discourage the ethnic violence that must be severely constrained. ed nature of these sources, they will has ravaged the Balkans than did The emerging area of civilian- be abbreviated in this article to law, the NATO bombing campaign. protection law, or CPL, is the most values, culture and public support. The human rights that are applic- important component of OPLAW in These sources provide the standards able to military operations and OOTW. CPL focuses on protecting and the context for critical decisions activities are found in international the human rights of civilians. It is that ultimately determine the legiti- law, in domestic U.S. law, and in based on the fundamental human macy of military force — from the host-nation law, all of which are col- rights recognized under interna- strategic decision of the president to lectively referred to as operational tional law, but it also includes host- deploy U.S. forces to the tactical deci- law, or OPLAW. The law of war, nation law applicable in specific sion of a soldier to pull the trigger. actually part of international law, is operational areas, international a major component of OPLAW that law applicable to specific opera- Law has proven to be an adequate stand- tional activities, and domestic U.S. The law is at the foundation of ard of military legitimacy in law. And while the law of war may legitimacy, providing the standards wartime, but not in peacetime not apply in OOTW for the reasons that give legitimacy its meaning. OOTW. That is because the law of stated above, its principles are But without enforcement, these war applies only when there is often applied by analogy through standards have little meaning. The armed conflict between nations and U.S. policy, mission imperatives protection of fundamental human when there is a clear distinction and common sense. The provisions rights is the primary purpose of between combatants and noncom- of the Fourth Geneva Convention the law and is a mission priority in batants. Neither of these situations on the Protection of Civilians in OOTW. But the concept of human is the norm in OOTW. War, for example, are usually 6 rights under international law has The distinction between combat- applied in OOTW by analogy. been weakened by the failure to ants and noncombatants (the term In the final analysis, the legal bring known war criminals in the “noncombatants” includes civilians standards of military legitimacy in and prisoners of war) is critical in OOTW are derived from a complex

Fall 1999 33 and sometimes shifting panoply of laws and policies that protect human rights in specific operational settings. In comparison, the law of war provides relatively hard-and-fast rules for war-fighting. The importance of human rights to military legitimacy requires that commanders place unusual reliance upon their lawyers, as noted by Lieutenant General Peter Schoomaker, when he was commanding general of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command: The one legal thing [about OOTW] that sticks out in my mind is human rights. Soldiers need only a basic understanding of human Photo by Perry Heimer rights rules. But my lawyers had A U.S. soldier gives a bag of grain to Somali women. OOTW requires cultural orientation, lan- better know this stuff inside and out. guage capability, and diplomacy in sensitive environments. These requirements have long been While the law is the foundation the standards for special-operations soldiers. of legitimacy, the law seldom dic- tates command decisions. Legal U.S. Constitution. They have long the protection of minority human standards will never eliminate the been a common thread in the fabric rights through the rule of law. But moral dimension of decision-making of the U.S. national security strate- too much emphasis on the rights of upon which legitimacy ultimately gy.7 But history has taught us that individuals or groups can defeat the depends. Other requirements of legit- these values are not always priori- legitimate (and essential) collective imacy — values and cultural con- ties in military operations. In com- interests of the state. Even the rule siderations — are equally impor- bat operations, these values have of law can be tyrannical if it ceases tant to decision-making in the little application at the operational to serve the purposes of justice. ambiguous and unforgiving situa- and tactical levels, where military Personal values, or character tions that are the norm in OOTW. objectives predominate. But in traits, have traditionally been OOTW, where threats are ambigu- associated with military leader- Values ous and political objectives pre- ship. Duty, integrity, loyalty, self- Values are the context of legiti- dominate, the promotion of nation- less service, personal courage, macy; they are the virtues or the al values can be a litmus test for respect and honor are the Army vices that make people who they are the legitimacy of U.S. military values; the Army recognizes these and institutions what they are. Val- might. values as a frame of reference for ues are the product of traditions, National values are not absolute; ethical decision-making.8 Like religion and culture, and they pro- they must be considered broad and national values, personal values vide a frame of reference for the flexible concepts with universal reflect our religious heritage, decisions that affect issues of legiti- application. They are not limited to which has at its heart the golden macy. As they relate to legitimacy, ethnocentric cultural standards rule. General Dennis J. Reimer, for- values might be considered in two drawn exclusively from U.S. experi- mer chief of staff of the Army, put it categories: national and personal. ence. U.S. national values are this way: National values in the U.S. can uniquely interrelated. Democracy, The terms we use to inspire our be summarized as democracy, human rights and the rule of law values — duty, integrity, loyalty, human rights and the rule of law. are inextricably bound together: All selfless service, courage, respect and These values are the product of a three are indispensable in fulfilling honor — inspire the sense of pur- Judeo-Christian religious tradition the requirements of legitimacy. pose necessary to sustain our sol- and have been enshrined by the Democracy (majority rule) can be diers in combat and help resolve tyrannical if it is not coupled with the ambiguities of military opera-

34 Special Warfare tions short of war. Leaders of char- ceptable in Islamic Asia. And the cul- between Western and other civiliza- acter and competence live these val- tural norms of both those areas may tions. For the relevant future, there ues. We must build and maintain be different from those of the U.S. cul- will be no universal civilization, but an Army where people do what is ture. Because public support is closely instead a world of different civiliza- right; where we treat each other as linked to cultural standards, the vio- tions, each of which will have to we would want to be treated; and, lation of cultural standards can jeop- learn to coexist with the others.11 where everyone can truly be all they ardize mission success. Local cultural or moral stand- can be.9 ards often become obligatory for If civilian support is important to Culture U.S. military forces when those mission objectives in OOTW, then For the purposes of this article, standards are incorporated into we need to apply the golden rule culture is that system of values directives, general orders and rules beyond our own forces, to include and moral standards, derived from of engagement. But in OOTW, civilians in the operational area. religion and traditions, that char- effective leadership extends Personal values influence deci- acterize a specific society. Cultural beyond knowing the rules; it sion-making when specific stand- issues are pervasive in the increas- requires cultural orientation, a ards are inadequate, as is often the ingly violent strategic environ- language capability, and diplomacy case during peacetime operations. ment. Samuel Huntington calls the in politically sensitive peacetime But because values are abstract, environments. While these require- they can produce conflicting ments are new for leaders of con- frames of reference. Duty and loy- In OOTW, effective leader- ventional combat forces, they have alty, for instance, can mean quite ship … requires cultural long been the standard for special- different things to different people. operations leaders.12 In the Iran-Contra hearings, the orientation, a language The remaining five principles of testimony of Lieutenant Colonel OOTW, with the addition of civil- Oliver North indicated that even capability, and diplomacy military relations, can be consid- senior military officers can place in politically sensitive ered characteristics of legitimacy. devotion to duty (no matter how They also underscore the impor- unlawful a mission) ahead of loyal- peacetime environments. tance of the requirements of mili- ty to the Constitution and its rule While these requirements tary legitimacy, especially the rele- of law.10 vance of the law, to mission success. If military personnel differ on are new for leaders of con- the concepts of duty and loyalty, we Objective can expect even more conflict ventional combat forces, Objective, the second principle of between the military perspective they have long been the OOTW, should be read as political and the civilian perspective objectives, based on the LIC imper- regarding these values. The U.S. standard for special-oper- ative of primacy of the political military is an authoritarian regime instrument.13 In peacetime, the within a libertarian society. Indi- ations leaders. predominance of political objec- vidual rights and liberty are val- tives over military objectives ued by civilians above order and problem “the clash of civilizations,” makes legitimacy the central con- discipline, while the opposite is and he argues that new strategies cern of all parties in a conflict. true for military personnel. While must place more reliance on under- However, the difficulty in making such conflicts are of little concern standing and on cooperative efforts political objectives, such as public in wartime, they can undermine rather than on conventional mili- support, a higher mission priority civil-military relations and legiti- tary power, and that this requires: than the more familiar military macy in peacetime OOTW. A more profound understanding objectives puts conventional mili- Conflicting values in the form of of the basic religious and philosoph- tary leaders ill at ease with OOTW. culture clash can present even more ical assumptions underlying other of a threat to mission success. Tribal, civilizations and the ways in which Public support ethnic, racial and religious traditions people in those civilizations see their Public support represents the often clash with Western ideals. interests. It will require an effort to collective public perceptions that Behavior that is acceptable in identify elements of commonalty determine and measure military Catholic Latin America may be unac-

Fall 1999 35 likelihood of public support for the use of military force, and vice versa. While the public tends to forgive military excesses when the threat is clear, as it was in Desert Storm, it has little tolerance for military excesses and collateral damage when the threat is more ambiguous, as it was in Somalia (and as it is in most OOTW). The recent NATO bombing campaign in Yugoslavia drew a mixed public reaction; only time will tell whether the military victory contributes to the long-term strategic objective of regional peace with justice. While we can gain public support in large part by meeting the Photo by Frank Simpkins requirements of military legitima- U.S. public support is important to mission success, but without a clear and present threat to cy, public support has its own simplify the issues of military legitimacy in peacetime, public support will be fickle, at best. unpredictable dynamic. Without a clear and present threat to simpli- legitimacy in a democracy. Even in ers must consider the effect of all fy the issues of military legitimacy wartime, popular will is recognized their actions on public opinion. The in peacetime, domestic public sup- as “the center of gravity of a legitimacy of the actions of an port for overseas military opera- nation’s ability to wage war.”14 If armed force, or even individual tions is fickle at best. Congression- popular will is a nation’s center of members of the force, can have far- al leaders understand this. Given gravity in wartime, it is even more reaching effects on the legitimacy of the dominance of political objec- crucial to legitimacy and mission the political system that the force tives in OOTW, military leaders success in OOTW. The interrela- supports. The leader must ensure must also understand the impor- tionship between legitimacy and that his [or her] troops understand tance of public support to mission public support is emphasized in that a tactically successful opera- success, as well as those factors special-operations doctrine: tion can also be strategically coun- that influence it. In modern conflict, legitimacy is terproductive because of the way in The media reflects and shapes the most crucial factor in develop- which they executed it and how the the public support needed for polit- ing and maintaining internal and people perceived its execution.16 ical objectives. During the Cold international support. … Legitima- Two publics factor into the mili- War, the relationship between the cy is determined by the people of the tary-legitimacy equation — the media and the military was often nation and by the international U.S. populace and the populace in characterized by mutual suspicion. community based on their collective the area of operations: The low point came during the perception of the credibility of its LIC is a political struggle in which Vietnam War, when the military cause and methods. Without legiti- ideas may be more important than (made paranoid by a hostile media) macy and credibility, special opera- arms. Therefore the U.S. government, in engaged in unwarranted censor- tions will not gain the support of coordination with allies and host ship and cover-ups of military foreign indigenous elements, the nations, must fight for the minds of the operations. The rocky relationship U.S. population, or the internation- people not only inside the host nation, between the military and the al community.15 but also in the U.S. and the internation- media continued after Vietnam, as LIC doctrine confirms the impor- al community. Gaining and maintain- evidenced by the Iran-Contra affair tance of public support to strategic ing popular consensus is essential.17 and other incidents involving U.S. objectives, and the importance of mili- Domestic public support for peace- advisers in politically sensitive tary operations to that public support: time military operations varies with areas such as Latin America. In order to accomplish their larg- the perception of the threat: The Since the end of the Cold War, the er objectives in LIC, military lead- greater the threat, the greater the relationship between the media and

36 Special Warfare the military has improved. There imacy — the public’s right to know. ing of what constitutes success — is have been few restrictions on media Bad press can often be attributed to critical when the U.S. is involved in coverage of military operations, and vaguely defined mission statements peace operations. Military command- media coverage has been mostly and command directives. Concise and ers should understand specific condi- favorable, contributing to a more tions that could result in mission fail- positive image of the military. Casu- ure as well as those that mark success. alties among journalists in Somalia Military personnel should Commanders must understand the and in the Balkans have sensitized understand that it is strategic aims, set appropriate objec- the media to the need for the mili- tives, and ensure that these aims and tary to provide security for all non- shortsighted to restrict objectives contribute to unity of effort combatants. The media’s under- with other agencies.18 standing of this aspect of security media coverage of mili- will contribute to the public support tary operations for other Unity of effort needed to sustain military and Unity of effort, the third principle political legitimacy, so long as mili- than security reasons. To of OOTW, provides an organizational tary leaders do not shoot them- the extent that it reports dimension to military legitimacy and selves in the foot by disregarding is closely related to political objec- the requirements of legitimacy. the truth, the media ful- tives and civil-military relations. The First Amendment to the Unity of effort is analogous to unity Constitution protects a free press fills an important element of command, a principle of combat as the cornerstone of liberty. of military and political operations. But because OOTW Despite a history of mutual suspi- involve a variety of military and cion between the military and the legitimacy — the public’s civilian personnel, the traditional media, recent experience indicates military chain of command is that the two can be allies. Military right to know. impractical. Still, mission success personnel should understand that depends upon a workable decision- it is shortsighted to restrict media clearly defined objectives are there making process and a coordinated coverage of military operations for fore a prerequisite of legitimacy and effort between the diverse military other than security reasons. To the are closely related to the principles of and civilian components. Mission extent that it reports the truth, the unity of effort and restraint: success also requires military lead- media fulfills an important ele- A clearly defined and attainable ers who can combine military profi- ment of military and political legit- objective — with a precise understand- ciency with the finesse of a diplomat: Commanders may answer to a civilian chief, such as an ambassa- dor, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian agency. Com- mand relationships may often be only loosely defined, causing commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation rather than command authority to achieve objectives by unity of effort. Military commanders consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also political, economic, and psychological in nature.19 The international dimension of OOTW, especially peace operations, makes unity of effort even DoD photo more complex: The other public that factors into the military-legitimacy equation is the populace in the area of Whenever possible, commanders operations. No matter how effective military operations are, lasting legitimacy ultimately depends should seek to establish a control upon the public support of the indigenous population.

Fall 1999 37 structure, such as a civil-military operations center, that takes account of and provides coherence to, all activities in the area. As well as military operations, this structure should include the political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian activities involved in the peace operations. Without such a structure, military commanders need to consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informa- tional. This requirement will neces- sitate extensive liaison with all the involved parties as well as reliable communications. Because peace operations will often involve small- unit activities, to avoid friction all levels must understand the military- civilian relationship.20 U.S. Army photo To achieve unity of effort in U.S. soldiers distribute food supplies to Panamanians during Operation Just Cause. Just OOTW, military leaders must be Cause reflects the U.S. bias for quick combat solutions over more protracted measures. able to bridge the formidable gap between military matters and force] legitimacy for itself [or oth- or ROE. ROE are tailored to each diplomatic matters, and they must ers], but it can create and sustain operation. Peacetime ROE are based be able to overcome barriers of cul- legitimacy by its actions.22 on self-defense, and they are much ture and language. The demanding The application of restraint in more restrictive than wartime ROE qualities of a diplomat-warrior are military operations is based on because of the primacy of political expected in special-operations the principles derived from the objectives and the need for public forces, but they are often consid- just-war tradition. These princi- support to achieve them.24 ered inappropriate for convention- ples (military necessity, discrimi- In operations other than war, al combat leaders.21 nation, proportionality and the these ROE will be more restrictive, avoidance of unnecessary suffer- detailed, and sensitive to political Restraint ing) have been incorporated into concerns than in war. Moreover, Restraint in the use of force is the law of war and have been these rules may change frequently. the fourth principle of OOTW, and applied to OOTW by analogy. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, it is interwoven with all the other Military necessity justifies the and levels of violence characterize principles. It is based on the use of offensive force to attain mili- the environment. The use of exces- premise that excessive force causes tary objectives, but that force must sive force could adversely affect collateral damage that can under- be restrained by the remaining efforts to gain legitimacy and mine the public support required principles of discrimination, propor- impede the attainment of both for political objectives and legiti- tionality and avoidance of unneces- short-term and long-term goals.25 macy. If we learned anything from sary suffering. Discrimination lim- The restricted use of force as a the Vietnam debacle, it was that no its targets; proportionality requires LIC imperative has long under- amount of military force can sub- that the attainment of mission scored the importance of the law stitute for political legitimacy: objectives be balanced with the and of ROE as requirements of mil- Legitimacy derives from the per- potential for civilian casualties and itary legitimacy: ception that [military] authority is damage to civilian property. Unnec- The nature of the LIC environ- genuine, effective, and uses proper essary suffering must be avoided ment imposes greater limits on the agencies for reasonable purposes. across the board.23 use of military power than is usual- No group or force can decree [or Standards of restraint are incorpo- ly the case with conventional war- rated into the rules of engagement, fare. This is reflected in the legal

38 Special Warfare restrictions and the operational II, and it most certainly alienated gress before committing U.S. forces and social restraints usually the Serbian population. The bomb- “where imminent involvement in encountered in LIC. Military opera- ing campaign seems to be evidence hostilities is clearly indicated by tions in the LIC environment may of a lower standard of restraint for the circumstances.” It also limits be highly visible and politically strategic air power than for ground U.S. military involvement in such sensitive. They require particular forces, having ugly precedents in situations to 60 days without the attention to international, U.S., and Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima and approval of Congress. The U.S. host nation law including multina- Nagasaki. What was unusual about strikes into Grenada (Urgent Fury) tional and bilateral agreements the NATO campaign was its moral and Panama (Just Cause) reflect and Congressional authorizations justification: It was not conducted to the historical bias of presidents and appropriations. deter international aggression but and of Congress for quick combat Excessive violence can adversely to halt ethnic cleansing. Although solutions to peacetime security affect efforts to gain or maintain the bombing campaign was militar- issues rather than for more pro- legitimacy and impede the attain- tracted and controversial OOTW, ment of both short-term and long- Helping indigenous forces such as those in Somalia, Haiti and term goals.26 the Balkans, that rely on more In peace operations, restraint is establish law and order extended noncombat activities.29 especially important to both legiti- No matter how effective combat macy and mission success: out of chaos and then operations are, lasting legitimacy Restraints on weaponry, tactics, ultimately depends upon broad- and levels of violence characterize mobilizing the public based indigenous public support. the environment of peace operations. support required for sta- In conflicts that are based on The use of excessive force may intractable cultural (religious and adversely affect efforts to gain or ble government depends ethnic) differences, achieving pub- maintain legitimacy and impede the lic support, if such a thing is possi- attainment of both short- and long- upon realistic long- ble, will require unusual persever- term goals. The ROE, and reasons range political objec- ance. Helping indigenous forces for them, need to be understood and establish law and order out of regularly practiced by all soldiers tives and the patience to chaos and then mobilizing the pub- since a single thoughtless act could lic support required for stable gov- have critical political consequences. achieve them. ernment depends upon realistic The use of force may attract a long-range political objectives and response in kind. Its use may also ily successful, its effect on long-term the patience to achieve them. Army escalate tension and violence in the NATO political objectives in the doctrine cautions commanders that local area and embroil peace opera- region remains to be seen.28 short-sighted quick fixes can tion troops in a harmful long-term threaten strategic aims: conflict that is contrary to their Perseverance Commanders must assess quick aims. For that reason the use of Perseverance, or patience, is the contingency response options force should be a last resort and fifth principle of OOTW. Political against their contribution to long- should be used when other means objectives do not often lend them- term, strategic objectives. of persuasion are exhausted. selves to a quick fix, but U.S. law If committed forces solve an In all cases, force will be pru- and political expediency have tra- immediate problem within a nation dently applied proportional to the ditionally favored short and deci- or region [with military force] but threat. In peace operations every sive applications of combat force in detract from the legitimacy of the soldier must be aware that the goal peacetime. The U.S. public has tra- government in so doing, they have is to produce conditions which are ditionally become impatient with acted detrimentally against long- conducive to peace and not to the peacetime military operations that term, strategic aims.30 destruction of an enemy.27 involve U.S. casualties. The 1999 NATO bombing cam- Public impatience is reflected in Security paign in Yugoslavia was an anom- the law. The War Powers Resolu- Security, the sixth principle of aly. The destruction of bridges, utili- tion (50 USC 1541-1548) requires OOTW, complements — and com- ties and media centers in major the president to consult with Con- plicates — the principle of cities was reminiscent of World War

Fall 1999 39 have confirmed the doctrinal principle that military legitimacy depends upon law and order being provided where there is none.33 If the predictions of Robert Kaplan in “The Coming Anarchy” prove to be correct, primal violence and the disintegration of traditional military forces could make security the predominant consideration in future OOTW — a contrast with the predominance of restraint in the past.34 Continuing experience in Bosnia and in Kosovo seems to confirm Kaplan’s predictions. Last- ing security in the Balkans will require the cooperation of the Serbs, but the hostile attitudes that were created by the NATO bombing may delay real security in the region. In any event, experience has shown that providing law Photo by Rick Sforza and order is the first requirement Civil Affairs soldiers provide the interface between military forces and civilians that is critical in of security, giving the rule of law a OOTW. Noncombat forces, such as CA, would assume the primary role in OOTW. new strategic priority in the future. restraint. While lethal force must credibility in the international Civil-military relations be restrained to achieve political arena. Effective public affairs, Civil-military relations is not a objectives in peacetime operations, PSYOP and CA programs enhance doctrinal principle of OOTW, but it that restraint must be balanced security.32 should be. In situations where with the need for security, or self- As it relates to legitimacy and to civilians are a mission objective, defense: “Regardless of their mis- the public support required for the interrelationship between the sion, commanders must protect political objectives, security for military and the civilians can their forces at all times. The intrin- civilians is just as important as it mean the difference between mili- sic right of self-defense always is for the military forces. Security tary victory and political defeat. applies.”31 is especially important when civil- The priorities of civil-military Commanders may be responsible ians are interned for any reason. operations in war are reversed in for protecting more than their own For example, when civilians are peace. In wartime, the primary forces; they may also be responsi- interned in temporary refugee concern regarding civilians in the ble for the security of civilians in camps, military authorities must area of operations is to prevent their area of operations. If so, the develop rules and disciplinary pro- their interference with combat; requirements of civil law and order cedures for maintaining law and civil-military relations are sec- make diplomacy and good civil-mil- order, much like an occupation ondary to defeating the enemy itary relations prerequisites for force would do. Whether or not the with overwhelming force. But in legitimacy: U.S. military is considered to be an peacetime, public support for polit- Security requires more than occupation force, as long as there is ical objectives, both at home and in physical protective measures. A no effective civil-law enforcement, the area of operations, is more force’s security will be significantly the military has a moral if not a important than defeating an enhanced by its perceived legitima- legal obligation to provide security ambiguous enemy; civil-military cy and impartiality, the mutual for civilian persons and their prop- relations become a primary focus of respect built between the force and erty. Experiences in Just Cause in legitimacy in OOTW. the other parties involved in the Panama, Restore Hope in Somalia, Most OOTW should be consid- peace operation, and the force’s and Uphold Democracy in Haiti

40 Special Warfare ered civil-military operations of combat forces. They urge the U.S. missions would limit opportunities because of the primacy of political to avoid military commitments like for active-component combat forces objectives that depend upon public those in Somalia, Haiti and the Bal- to deploy in peacetime, but it would support. Civil affairs, or CA, refers kans.39 Perhaps they have forgotten mollify critics of OOTW, who claim to the civil-military operations that such operations have been the that such operations degrade our and to the forces that conduct norm for special operations in LIC, combat capability. It would also them.35 CA provides the interface and that they were the norm even acknowledge the unique nature of between military forces and civil- for conventional forces prior to the military capability that is ians that is critical to legitimacy World War II.40 needed to bridge the gap between in OOTW. CA doctrine emphasizes One response to the ongoing the limits of diplomacy and war.42 civil-military relations as a com- debate about OOTW would be to Whether we consider OOTW to be mand responsibility: return the controversial civil-mili- conventional operations or special Civil Affairs (CA) is an inherent tary missions to the special-opera- operations, the principle of civilian responsibility of command. CA tions forces who are trained to per- supremacy applicable to most encompasses the activities that mil- form them. If participation in OOTW supports an enhanced role itary commanders take to establish OOTW truly degrades the combat for reserve-component personnel — and maintain relations between civilian soldiers — who have the their forces and the civil authorities skills essential for civil-military and general population, resources, In wartime, the primary operations. It should be no surprise and institutions in friendly, neu- concern regarding civil- that 97 percent of all CA personnel tral, or hostile areas where their are in the reserves, as are most mil- forces are employed.36 ians in the area of oper- itary lawyers. Unlike combat More than any other military dis- reservists who have a wartime con- cipline, CA emphasizes the princi- ations is to prevent their tingency mission, these civilian-sol- ples of restraint, security and com- interference with com- diers are not back-ups for active pliance with civilian-protection law component soldiers; rather, they are as a mission objective, which is: bat. … But in peacetime, part-time operators and advisers in To assist command compliance OOTW. In recent years, these civil- with OPLAW requirements, insofar public support for polit- ian-soldiers have demonstrated as military circumstances permit, by ical objectives, both at that they are capable of deploying providing those resources necessary on short notice for extended tours to meet essential civil requirements, home and in the area overseas. They have proven them- avoiding property and other dam- of operations, is more selves to be critical components of a ages to usable resources, and mini- peacetime-engagement capability.43 mizing loss of life and suffering.37 important than defeating In summary, the same civilians The requirements of legitimacy who are obstacles in combat opera- and the principles of OOTW under- an ambiguous enemy. tions become mission priorities in score the importance of CA both as OOTW. This reversal of priorities a concept and as a capability need- skills of conventional forces, then can confuse military leaders and ed for mission success in the new noncombat forces should assume jeopardize military legitimacy and strategic environment. dominant roles in OOTW. Mission mission success. The principles of The priority of political objectives priorities would be reversed: Non- OOTW give credence to this phe- in OOTW requires that military combat forces (such as CA) that nomenon and illustrate the impor- leaders be adaptable (adaptability is play a supporting role in war-fight- tance and the complexity of legal the sixth of the LIC imperatives) — ing would assume the primary role and political issues in OOTW. able to think outside the box.38 A in OOTW; combat forces would Civilian-protection law provides review of the requirements of legiti- take a secondary role. National standards and a workable format macy and the related principles of Guard forces, whose domestic mis- for applying those standards on the OOTW reveals their unconvention- sion is to provide emergency assist- ground, but the standards of al nature, at least relative to con- ance to civil authorities, could also restraint are less stringent for air ventional combat operations. Some assume a greater role in OOTW.41 power. Even if the conflicting argue that OOTW are inappropri- A realignment of military forces standards on restraint are recon- ate for and degrade the capabilities to more closely match their OOTW ciled, they can never substitute for

Fall 1999 41 the moral context of decision-mak- command judge advocate (IMA) of been reordered in this article to correlate ing at all levels. the JFK Special Warfare Center them to the LIC imperatives. 3 Following the NATO campaign and School; and as the staff judge The principles of war are listed in Appen- dix A to Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint in Yugoslavia and the exodus of advocate for the Army Civil Affairs Operations, 1 February 1995: Objective, Serbian forces from the embattled and Psychological Operations offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, province of Kosovo, President Clin- Command. He is currently unity of command, security, surprise and ton proclaimed that NATO had assigned to SWCS (IMA), with duty simplicity. The principles of OOTW are listed “done the right thing the right at the Army Special Operations in chapter V of the same publication. For a summary of arguments for and against way.” That is a strategic conclusion Command. Colonel Barnes has OOTW, see Military Legitimacy, pp. 155, 156. that is yet to be seen. And ques- served on a number of deployments, 4 See JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07, p. I-26; also see tions remain: Did the extensive most recently as a Civil Affairs offi- JCS Pub (OOTW) 3-07, pp. II-5. bombing of infrastructure targets cer accompanying the North Car- 5 Barry Crane, et al., “Between Peace and so alienate the Serbian populace as olina National Guard to Moldova War: Comprehending Low Intensity Con- flict,” Special Warfare (Summer 1989), p. 5. to undermine regional peacekeep- as part of the Partnership for Peace. 6 Civilian protection law is the subject of ing operations? Will Milosevic and He has written numerous articles chapter 7 of the Operational Law Handbook his henchmen answer at the Hague on operational law and Civil (Charlottesville, Va.: International and for their crimes?44 Affairs, and he is the author of Mil- Operational Law Department, The U.S. At both the operational level and itary Legitimacy: Might and Right Army Judge Advocate General’s School [JA422 2000]). Human rights is the subject the tactical level, the interrelated in the New Millenium (London: of chapter 6 of the OPLAW Handbook. issues of public support, restraint Frank Cass, 1996). A graduate of 7 The evolution of democracy, human and security will continue to haunt the Army Command and General rights and the rule of law in diplomacy is commanders in the new milleni- Staff College and the Army War covered in chapter 4 of Military Legitimacy. 8 um. In the ambiguous and unfor- College, he holds a BA from the See FM 100-1, The Army, Headquarters, Department of the Army (May 1986), chap- giving conflict environments of Citadel, as well as an MPA and a ter 4; and FM 22-100, Military Leadership OOTW, the military leader must JD from the University of South (coordinating draft), Department of the be competent in military skills; he Carolina. Colonel Barnes practices Army, June 1988), chapter 4. must demonstrate a knowledge of law in Prosperity, S.C. 9 Letter from General Dennis J. Reimer on civilian-protection law and adhere Army values, dated 14 May 1997. Also see Military Legitimacy, pp. 21-23, 155-57, and Notes: to a sound ethical code; and he note 59 at p. 163. 1 The activities of OOTW and the reversal must also have the finesse of a 10 See Military Legitimacy, pp. 106, 107. of mission priorities therein are discussed 11 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civi- diplomat — that is, he must be as in the author’s book, Military Legitimacy: lizations,” Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, p. 22. comfortable working with civilians Might and Right in the New Millennium 12 On cultural issues in LIC, see James K. as he is with military personnel. (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 36-48, 133, Bruton and Wayne D. Zajac, “Cultural Inter- 135 (hereinafter referred to as Military That may be beyond the capability action: The Forgotten Dimension of Low Legitimacy). of conventional forces, but it is Intensity Conflict,” Special Warfare (April 2 For a discussion of military legitimacy 1988), p. 29. business as usual for special-oper- and its relationship to the principles of 13 As to primacy of the political instrument ations forces. OOTW, see Military Legitimacy, chapter 3. and political dominance, see JCS Pub (LIC) 3- References to doctrinal principles and 07, p. I-25; JCS Pub (OOTW) 3-07, pp. vi, I-2; imperatives are from the following: JCS Pub also see FM 100-20, p. I-8. 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Colonel Rudolph 14 A. J. Bacevich has emphasized the role of Intensity Conflict, the Joint Chiefs of Staff “the people” in contemporary warfare in C. Barnes Jr. served (Final Draft, January 1990), p. I-6 (here- “New Rules: Modern War and Military Pro- on active duty as inafter referred to as JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07); fessionalism,” Parameters (December 1990), assistant staff judge the principles of OOTW are stated in JCS pp. 12, 19. On the need for public support for Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Opera- advocate for the JFK legitimacy in OOTW, see Military Legitima- tions Other Than War, 16 June 1995, at Center for Special cy, pp. 58-60, 133, 134. chapter II, which superseded the earlier 15 FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Warfare and subse- draft of JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07 (hereinafter Operations Forces (Final Draft, October quently as group judge advocate referred to as JCS Pub (OOTW) 3-07); FM 1990), pp. 2-29, 30. and Civil Affairs legal officer for 100-5, Operations, Headquarters, Depart- 16 FM 100-20, p. I-85. ment of the Army, June 1993, at p. 13-4 Special Action Force-Asia (1st Spe- 17 JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07, see supra note 2. (hereinafter referred to as FM 100-5); and cial Forces Group and 97th Civil Mission creep resulting from the lack of a FM 100-23, Peace Operations, Headquar- clearly defined mission statement and end Affairs Group). As an Army ters. Department of the Army, December state no doubt contributed to the loss of Reservist, he has served as the legal 1994, at pp. 15-18 (hereinafter referred to as legitimacy for U.S. forces in Somalia follow- officer of the 360th CA Brigade; as FM 100-23). The principles of OOTW have

42 Special Warfare ing the abortive 1993 raid in Mogadishu. 32 FM 100-23, p. 17. See Military Legitimacy, pp. 20, 135. 33 See Military Legitimacy, pp. 143, 144. 18 FM 100-23, p. 15. One frustrated U.N. 34 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” commander characterized the political The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. dilemma as follows: “None of the political 44, 46. leadership can tell me what they want me to 35 Civil Affairs, or CA, and civil-military accomplish. That fact, however, does not operations, or CMO, are closely related stop them from continually asking me when terms that are used interchangeably in this I will be done.” See OPLAW Handbook, context. CA encompasses all activities supra note 6, at p. 7-5. involving the interface between military 19 FM 100-5, p. 13-4. and civilian personnel; CA is defined by law 20 FM 100-23, p. 16. as a special-operations activity. CMO is a 21 See Military Legitimacy, pp. 107-15, 135, generic term referring to the use of military 136, 155, 156. forces to perform traditionally nonmilitary 22 FM 100-5, p. 13-4; JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07, p. activities. See JCS Pub 3-57, Doctrine for I-26; JCS Pub (OOTW) 3-07, pp. II-5, II-7, II- Joint Civil Affairs, 21 June 1995, pp. I-1, I-2 8; FM 100-20, p. I-9; also see Military Legit- (hereinafter referred to as JCS Pub 3-57); imacy, pp. 138-43. also see Military Legitimacy, pp. 70, 71, 149- 23 See FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, 55, 167-78. Department of the Army (1956), para 3a 36 JCS Pub 3-57, p. I-1. (military necessity); para 34 (unnecessary 37 Ibid., p. I-8; also see pp. II-3, II-4. suffering); and para 41 (proportionality); for 38 See Kalev I. Sepp, “Preparing for 2010: the application of the principles of discrimi- Thinking Outside the ‘War Box,’ ” Special nation and proportionality to peacetime Warfare (Winter 1997), p. 2. military operations, see William V. O’Brien, 39 See Military Legitimacy, pp. 155, 156. “Special Operations in the 1980s: American 40 Ibid., pp. 145-55, 157. Legal, Political, and Cultural Constraints,” 41 Ibid., pp. 170, 171. Special Operations in U.S. Strategy (Wash- 42 Ibid., pp. 107-14. ington, D.C.: National Defense University 43 Ibid., pp. 166-69, 174-78. Press, 1984), pp. 53, 69-73. 44 At least one author has characterized the 24 Rules of engagement are directives NATO campaign as a failure, citing, inter issued by competent military authority that alia, the bombing of “objects indispensable to delineate the circumstances and limitations the survival of the civilian population,” which under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or is prohibited by Article 14 of the 1977 Proto- continue combat engagement with other col to the 1949 Geneva Convention. See forces encountered. Joint Pub 1-02, Depart- Michael Mandelbaum, “A Perfect Failure: ment of Defense Dictionary of Military and NATO’s War Against Yugoslavia,” Foreign Associated Terms, 1 December 1989. See Affairs, September/October 1999, pp. 2, 6. generally, OPLAW Handbook, supra note 6, chapter 8. 25 FM 100-5, p. 13-4. 26 JCS Pub (LIC) 3-07, pp. I-24, I-27; also see JCS Pub (OOTW) 3-07, pp. II-4, II-7. 27 FM 100-23, p. 17. 28 Eliot Cohen has advocated the use of air power against urban infrastructure targets as a matter of national policy, but the incon- sistency, if not illegality, of such a strategic policy has not been lost on warriors on the ground who are subject to more stringent standards of restraint. Eliot A. Cohen, “The Mystique of U.S. Air Power,” Foreign Affairs (January/February 1994), pp. 109, 123. For a discussion of this issue that cites the Cohen article, see Military Legitimacy, chapter 1, pp. 13-19. But see note 44, infra, which takes issue with the premise of the Cohen article in concluding that the NATO bombing campaign was a failure. 29 See generally, Military Legitimacy,pp. 137, 138. 30 FM 100-5, p. 13-4; also see FM 100-23, p. 18. 31 FM 100-5, p. 13-4.

Fall 1999 43 Armageddon 2000: Military Implications of the Y2K Problem

by Dr. James J. Schneider

arly in 1993, Mary Baudar of unable to unlock its doors: The school’s Winona, Minn., received an invita- security computer could not recognize Feb. Etion from state school officials to 29 as a legitimate date, and it refused to attend kindergarten in the fall. The 104- unlock doors accessed by magnetic key year-old woman was puzzled: She had cards. attended kindergarten years before crayons The United States’ armed forces have were even invented. But to the digitally experienced similar digital horror stories. myopic Minnesota computers — which In 1997, according to a congressional could recognize dates in the 20th century report cited in the Sept. 13, 1997, issue of only — Baudar was just another four-year- Science News, the Defense Logistics old born in 1989. Agency — the organization that manages Four years later, in 1997, the Amway $1 trillion worth of contracts; supports Corporation, a $6-billion company based in 1,400 different weapons systems; and Ada, Mich., began rejecting a certain batch maintains the supply of food, clothing, fuel of solvents used in making cleaning prod- and medicine for the U.S. military — sim- ucts. According to the manufacturing ply struck 90,000 items from its inventory. plant’s computers, the shelf life of the Since the DLA has 86 automated informa- chemicals had expired: The system soft- tion systems running 39 million lines of ware read the expiration date of the year computer code, the error took 400 hours to 2000 as 1900. In April 1997, Money Maga- correct. In September 1997, the Aegis mis- zine reported that the computer network sile cruiser USS Yorktown lost propulsion. that schedules appointments at three hos- The critical failure resulted from a soft- pitals and 75 clinics in the Philadelphia ware-data overflow error. area crashed when an operator scheduled The Year 2000 computer problem, or Y2K, an appointment after Jan. 1, 2000. has now become a daily news item as it per- On Sept. 27, 1998, the Kansas City Star colates in the American public conscious- reported that an Olathe, Kan., couple had ness. Perhaps it is time for the U. S. Army to been charged nearly $18,000 in insurance recognize Y2K as the first tangible example premiums: Premiums that should have of the Information Revolution. been charged in advance for coverage beyond Dec. 31, 1999, were mistakenly Rolling chaos posted as being in arrears since Jan. 1, Sometime during the late 1950s, comput- 1900. In the same article, the Star reported er engineers more or less tacitly agreed to that on Feb. 29, 1996, a Kansas school, computer-code year dates in a two-digit Johnson County Community College, was

44 Special Warfare Y2K failures of embedded systems could shut down a variety of the military’s mechanical devices, including vehicles and weapons systems. Photo by Jeff Viano format. At the time, that method made ment pension), a newborn, or 20 years sense for three reasons: First, since com- unborn. puter procedures of the day were based The costs to sort out the computer code mostly on data-entry operations, keyboard and to fix the Y2K problem are expected to operators would save countless keystrokes. be enormous. The Sept. 19, 1998, issue of Second, the two-digit year format saved The Economist projects a high-end global significant room on computer punch cards. cost of $530 billion to fix the problem and Finally, the format saved precious space on another $1 trillion to pay for litigation con- mass-storage devices. In 1965, one sequences. The Economist’s low-end esti- megabyte of magnetic-disk storage cost mate is a mere $200 billion to $300 billion, $761. Today it costs 75 cents, but most but it still expects litigation costs to run to computers throughout the world still store $1 trillion. date information with only two digits While the software side of the Y2K prob- reserved for the year. lem will likely cause system crashes and As we have seen from the examples malfunctions, sorting failures, date errors, above, the two-digit format causes many subtle miscalculations or unexplained sys- computers to read the year 2000 as 1900. A tem inactivity, there is another side to the task as simple as calculating one’s age for problem. The other side may be even more Social Security or military pension payouts devastating to military and other civil- can therefore become problematic on many security organizations. computer systems. If you were born on Despite all the discussion of the Y2K March 31, 1920, the computer would cor- problem, the point is seldom stressed that rectly calculate your age on your birthday we are actually facing two distinct prob- in 1998 as 980331-200331=78 years old. lems: The one most often discussed is the On your birthday in the year 2000, howev- information-technology problem (computer, the computer would calculate your age ers and software). But the more sinister as 000331-200331=-20 years old. Depend- problem deals with embedded systems. ing on the computer-code defaults, the sys- Embedded systems monitor, regulate or tem will either crash or render you 20 control the operation of devices, networks years old (and ineligible for that fat retire- and systems. They are generally simple

Fall 1999 45 integrated-circuit chips. They are embed- tems out of the tens of thousands installed. ded in all electronic technology, from wrist- Nor is the problem of embedded systems watches and video games to dedicated confined to the power industry. The aver- processors that control large industrial age automobile may have as many as 20 plants and electric-power grids. Embedded time-sensitive embedded systems. (Ever systems have time-sensitive logic written wonder how your car knows when to signal in permanently coded instructions called that it needs an oil change?) Embedded firmware. These instructions are stored in systems play a dominant role in control the chip’s programmable read-only memo- technology, and the failure of embedded ry. The code cannot be reprogrammed. The systems could have a broad and profound embedded chip itself must be found and effect on all segments of society. replaced. The Gartner Group, a consulting firm The Day the Earth Stood Still based in Connecticut, estimates that 50 In the late 1950s, Michael Rennie and billion embedded systems are in use Patricia Neal starred in the movie The Day around the world, and that 1-3 percent of the Earth Stood Still. The premise of the them will experience a Y2K-related failure. movie reflected the atomic culture of the The Gartner Group estimates that 25 mil- times: Aliens came to earth to stop the lion embedded systems worldwide will planet from destroying itself with nuclear have to be replaced in order to prevent mis- weapons. To prevent such a catastrophe, sion-critical failures. the aliens somehow shut down all mechan- Electric power utilities are among the ical devices on the planet. The movie was a users that are most vulnerable to risk from moderate success, but all entertainment embedded systems. Estimates place the value aside, its title can serve as a useful evaluation, repair and testing phases of a illustration of the possible consequences of Y2K conversion effort for a medium-sized the Y2K problem to our society and to our conventional power plant at 21 months. In military. a typical power plant, it will cost $30 mil- During the Industrial Revolution in the lion-$40 million to find, repair and test the 19th century, civilization began moving 500 or more noncompliant embedded sys-

In complex systems such as modern military organizations, there are no independent elements. The loss of one element may render the entire system ineffective.

DoD photo

46 Special Warfare toward massive dispersion and distribu- lution is determined by the initial condition. Time was the one common element tion of the system and by its boundary con- that could integrate and coordinate the ditions, or capabilities. For example, the efforts of vastly dispersed organizations initial deployment of each weapon system and societies. New systems of distributed prior to a battle will determine both the technologies, such as the railroad, required course of that battle and the outcome. internal control subsystems to make the Change the location of a weapon (its initial whole structure work effectively. Now, in condition) or its capability, and you change the late 20th century, those control subsys- the battle in some way. tems have been replaced by the technology Second, a complex system is nonlinear. of the computer revolution. Like silicon There are no independent elements in a sentinels, embedded systems now regulate complex system. Each element of the sys- and monitor the individual components of tem interacts with all the other elements. our distributed technologies, keeping those In a rifle squad, for example, the loss of a components operating as a harmonious rifleman does not necessarily lead to a lin- whole. ear (directly proportional) subtraction of The full scope of the Y2K problem and its the squad’s combat power. The combat consequences are still unknown to us, but cohesion of the entire squad is affected, we can be certain about some of its aspects. and as a result the unit may be rendered First, we know that the Y2K bug is a tech- ineffective for combat. The idea that the nological problem that cannot be solved whole is greater than the sum of its parts with more technology. It will require a (and that the reduction of the whole is major problem-solving effort that will greater than a reduction of one of the involve virtually everyone. Second, Y2K is parts) is an expression of the nonlinear a series of irrevocable and non-negotiable quality of complex systems. deadlines. We know precisely when the The two characteristics hold true with event will occur; there is no mystery or sur- even greater force for massively complex prise there. We do not, however, know all systems like societies. Essentially, the con- the consequences of the event. Third, this sequences of the loss of any part of a com- is perhaps our first major crisis within a plex social system cannot be predicted in complex global system. Complexity theory any mathematical way, because mathemat- tells us that complicated systems become ics has evolved to the point that it deals complex not because they have many only with fundamentally linear systems. parts, but because their components are tied together by the speed-of-light flow of Contingency planning information. Today, there is generally guarded opti- Consider, for instance, a classic military mism about the likely consequences of the organization like Napoleon’s army. The Y2K problem. Only here and there do we army clearly had many moving parts, hear a note of caution. For instance, the thanks to organizational innovations such National Football League recently issued a as the division and the corps; but its struc- Y2K warning to all its members, noting ture was complicated at best. With the com- that the last scheduled game of the 1999 ing of the Industrial Revolution, armies season falls on Sunday, Jan. 2, 2000. The developed a distributed quality that led, league instructed its teams to consider the among other things, to the emergence of Y2K problem when making their travel operational art. New, operationally-based plans for the last scheduled game. More formations had to be harnessed together ominously, National Guard units around with speed-of-light technology such as the the country are developing plans to deal telegraph, which was borrowed from the with Y2K contingencies. The Washington railroad system. Times reported on Feb. 22, 1999, that New A complex system, such as a modern Mexico plans to keep all 28 of its National army or a society, displays two fundamen- Guard armories open on New Year’s Day. tal characteristics: First, the system’s evo-

Fall 1999 47 Because many complex weapons systems are under automated control, the effect of the Y2K problem could be the same as if the failed systems had been struck by a hostile enemy.

Photo by Sean Megy In Washington, half of that state’s Nation- • How many embedded systems are in al Guard units will be on duty that day. your equipment? Where are they? How Lieutenant Colonel Tim Donovan, a can they be detected? spokesman for the Wisconsin National • How many embedded systems in your Guard, said, “The business we’re in is to inventory of equipment rely on date help communities when they’re over- information? whelmed by an event, a blizzard, riot or • What kinds of failures do you antici- other natural or man-made disaster. We pate? How will embedded-system fail- have the resources. And many of the conse- ures affect the accomplishment of your quences being speculated about Y2K are mission? not unlike the things we’ve been doing for No one in the Army knows all the years.” answers to these questions. On Jan. 1, 2000, Actions in support of local emergency- the question for commanders and staffs management authorities are recognized may not be, Who will the Army help sup- as the legitimate domain of the active port because of Y2K problems? Rather the Army. However, as of this writing, there is question may be, Who will help support the no evidence of similar contingency plan- Army? ning on the active-Army side. It may be that deployments to stability operations Information revolution (such as those in Bosnia and possibly in Pundits have trumpeted the last few Kosovo), and defensive deployments to decades of the 20th century as the Infor- places such as Korea have diminished mation Age. Many of these same pundits concern about active-Army participation have also become self-appointed heralds in Y2K contingencies. Whatever role the of an “information revolution.” Since the U.S. Army ultimately plays in addressing initial blast of rhetoric, a more reasoned Y2K issues, one thing is certain: Active view of the Information Age has begun to and reserve components are vulnerable to emerge. Scholars like Michael Hobart and the same Y2K consequences. A battalion Zachary Schiffman (Information Ages, commander, for example, standing in his 1998) argue that the present information motor pool, cannot, on any given day, revolution marks the third in a series of answer all of the following fundamental information upheavals that go back 4,000 Y2K questions:

48 Special Warfare years or more. The first information revo- strike against the entire automated con- lution began with the invention of the trol structure of the industrialized world. alphabet and the rise of literacy. The sec- The lessons could be staggering. ond began in the 16th and 17th centuries with the development of double-entry bookkeeping, algebra and calculus; and Dr. James J. Schneider is with the emergence of numeracy (the abil- professor of military theory ity to reduce and manipulate packets of at the School of Advanced numerical information). The most recent Military Studies, U.S. Army information revolution, computeracy (the Command and General Staff ability to write the software that controls College, Fort Leavenworth, the computer), began during the Industri- Kan. He has also written al Revolution, when Charles Babbage extensively on the subject of military theory, envisioned a universal calculating especially as it relates to issues concerning machine — a computer. strategy, operational art and tactics. Prior The Industrial Revolution replaced mus- to his appointment to SAMS in 1984, cle with machine, but the machine still had Schneider spent four years as an operations to be controlled by the hand of man. At the research analyst with the Analysis Center end of World War II, however, engineers of the Army Training and Doctrine Com- developed computers that could automati- mand. He served three years in the Army, cally control the machines. Automation including a year in Vietnam with the 1st was born, creating the so-called informa- Infantry Division. He attended the Univer- tion revolution and the new and powerful sity of Wisconsin at Oshkosh and the Uni- science of cybernetics — the science of con- versity of Southern California. He holds a trol. The consequences of the embedded- Ph.D. in Russian history from the Universi- system aspect of the Y2K problem may rep- ty of Kansas. resent a tangible revolutionary event. In a special sense, the Y2K problem is the information revolution, and it will be its own herald to trumpet its coming on Jan. 1, 2000. Virtual info-war The three information revolutions of literacy, numeracy and computeracy have all had significant military implications. Literacy has led to the rise of an effective means of commanding and controlling large military formations. Numeracy has led to the emergence of an analytically oriented general staff. Computeracy has led to the automated control of advanced and complex weapons systems such as the cruise missile. Whatever the consequences of the Y2K problem, the overall effect will be the same as if the failed systems had been struck deliberately by a hostile enemy. Perhaps the greatest military significance of the Y2K problem is that it will afford us a practical, real- world exercise in dealing with the consequences of a massive deep-information

Fall 1999 49 1999 Index Special Warfare

Articles Adelstein, LTC Dan; “The 1999 SF Conference: Setting a New Standard”; Fall, 21-23. Army Values: Duty — Russell Volckmann; Summer, 21. Army Values: Loyalty — Bull Simons; Fall, 31. Army Values: Personal Courage — Roger Donlon; Spring, 25. Barnes, Colonel Rudolph C. Jr., USAR; “Military Legitimacy in OOTW: Civilians as Mission Priorities”; Fall, 32-43. Berg, SGM Edward A.; “Special Forces: In Search of a Core Ideology”; Summer, 40-42. Boyatt, COL Mark D.; “Special Forces Core Purpose: ‘What’ vs. ‘How’ ”; Winter, 19. Bush, CW3 Larry E. Jr.; “Building Special Forces to Last: Redesigning the Organizational Culture”; Summer, 16-20. Cart, Ray; “The History of the 1st Special Service Force Air Detachment”; Summer, 32-35. Clarke, SFC Paul; “Humanitarian Demining Operations: Relieving Human Suffering Worldwide”; Spring, 12-15. Clearwater, CPT John M.; “Scud Hunting: Theater Missile Defense and SOF”; Spring, 26-35. Creese, PFC Jon; “Special Forces Conference: Looking to the Future, Celebrating the Past”; Summer, 2-3. Crerar, COL J. H., U.S. Army (ret.); “Special Forces Core Purpose: A Second Opinion”; Winter, 14-18. Diemer, LTC Manuel A. and MAJ Thomas M. Joyce; “Special Forces Entry-Level Training: Vision for the Future”; Winter, 2-11. Dyer, Dr. Mark F.; “Theory, Research, Practice: Three Ways to Increase PSYOP Effectiveness”; Fall, 24-30. Faulkner, Charles C. III; “ARSOF War Game III: Highlighting the Regional-Engagement Concept”; Winter, 12-13. Hazlett, MAJ Gary A. and Dr. Michael Sanders; “Cognitive and Personality Assessment in Special Forces Assessment and Selection”; Fall, 14-20. Ivosevic, CW3 Michael J.; “Unconventional Warfare: Refining the Definition”; Spring, 39. Jones, COL Gary M. and MAJ Chris Tone; “Unconventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Special Forces”; Summer, 4-15. King, LTC Charles; “The Trek: Critical Event in SF Officer Training”; Spring, 22-24. McCrann, SSG Michael; “Unconventional Assisted Recovery: Providing the Doctrinal Framework”; Spring, 2-11. Paddock, Dr. Alfred H. Jr.; “Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of Army Special Warfare”; Fall, 2-9. Petit, CPT Brian S.; “SOF Initiatives in Demining: The Bosnian Entity Army Training Centers”; Spring, 16-21. Ricks, Thomas E.; “Is American Military Professionalism Declining?”; Winter, 20-25. Schneider, Dr. James J.; “Armageddon 2000: Military Implications of the Y2K Problem”; Fall, 44-49. Schoomaker, GEN Peter J.; “The Millennium Bug: Y2K Problem Demands Everyone’s Help”; Winter, 40-42. Shachnow, MG Sidney, U.S. Army (ret.); “Mentoring: Critical Assistance for the SOF Community”; Spring, 36-38. Shelton, General Henry H.; “Steel Wings and a Wielded Sword: The 160th SOAR”; Fall, 10-13. Storlie, CPT Chadwick W.; “The Liaison Coordination Element: Force Multiplier for Coalition Operations”; Spring, 40-46. Tone, MAJ Christopher; “ARSOF Vision 2010 and ARSOF XXI: An Alternative Viewpoint”; Winter, 26-36. Weimer, LTC Curt F.; “The Multidimensional Schoolhouse: SWCS to Incorporate Distance Learning”; Winter, 37-39. Young, MAJ Rich; “Special Forces at West Point: Planting the Seed”; Summer, 36-39. Zazanis, Michelle M., Robert N. Kilcullen, Michael G. Sanders and Doe Ann Crocker; “Special Forces Selection and Training: Meeting the Needs of the Force in 2020”; Summer, 22-31. Books Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War; by Mark Bowden; reviewed by COL J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.); Fall, 64-65. Built to Last: Successful Habits of Visionary Companies; by James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras; reviewed by Chaplain Thomas Murray; Summer, 52-53.

50 Special Warfare Crippled Eagle: A Historical Perspective of U.S. Special Operations 1976-1996; by Rod Lenahan; reviewed by COL J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret); Spring, 57. Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA’s Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong; by Mark Moyar; reviewed by LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr., U.S. Army (ret.); Winter, 53. Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies; Edited by COL Frank L. Goldstein, USAF, and COL Ben- jamin F. Findley Jr., USAR; reviewed by Mark R. Jacobson; Spring, 56-57. Raiders of the China Coast: CIA Covert Operations During the Korean War; by Frank Holober; reviewed by Lawrence B. Sulc; Fall, 64. Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations; by Pascale Combelles Siegel; reviewed by COL Gene Thompson; Winter, 52-53. Uncertain Fate: An Australian SAS Patrol in Vietnam; by Graham J. Brammer; reviewed by CW3 Thomas Rogers; Summer, 53.

Fall 1999 51 Letters Special Warfare

Conference attendee hard issues. Canned command the audience. provides recommendations briefings look good once; after that, • Get some of the SF groups they become boring and, in my involved using distance-learning The overall effort (of the 1999 opinion, deceptive. We know things and video-conferencing techniques. Special Forces Conference) was are not as positive as the briefings What is Special Forces? I listened highly commendable. Overall, the tell us, because we talk with the to a number of senior people three days in Fayetteville were officers and NCOs (when we can address this issue, and I was indeed well-done, and a tip of the find them). One of the purposes of astounded at the diverse respons- beret to Colonel Boyatt and the the symposiums should be to lay a es. Someone needs to capture what many people who were involved. I lot of things on the table and say, Special Forces is and tack it up on will save time and space by not com- “Hey, retirees, manufacturers and a high pole for everyone to see, menting on the positive aspects of SF groupies — here’s what our real understand and agree with. After the event. I would like to offer some problems are: bang, bang, bang, all, the meaning of Special Forces observations on those areas that I and we need your help in fixing is our Holy Grail! believe need reinforcement. them.” Some of our esteemed seniors SF NCO participation. Sitting in Recommendations: seem to have problems with basic the various lectures, panels and • Pre-brief panelists. Tell them truths; i.e., “Special Forces are teach- working groups, I was surprised by the symposium isn’t a public-rela- ers,” or “Special Forces work well the lack of NCO participation. tions drill; it’s a working session with foreign nations.” I was also sur- While there was a sergeant major with friendlies. prised by comments such as: “Special present every now and then, there • Shorten the introductions of Forces is not the Peace Corps,” and simply weren’t enough E6s, E7s panelists and of esteemed SF and “The nation-building mission is and E8s. This is particularly non-SF. Most of us know who’s who, killing us.” SF would probably be alarming, since SF prides itself on and if we need a list of assignments dead and buried now if we had not its highly skilled enlisted person- and awards, attach a copy of the become involved in every MTT we nel. Most of us remember learning individual’s Officer Record Brief or could find going to Africa, the Middle all of the important things an SF resumé as a handout. East or Central America. SF are out- officer must know from an NCO. • Preview the content of panelists’ standing because they are gifted mil- Where are these men today? They presentations. If panelists are not itary teachers who specialize in were not visible in the symposiums willing to submit at least an outline, working with foreign counterparts. or in the exhibit areas. they shouldn’t be participating. I think we should all be concerned Recommendations: • Select some panel members by the diversity of the definition of • Encourage greater participa- who are not associated with SF or SF within our own community. tion of SF NCOs. the military but who do have exper- Unless there is some recognized • Use examples of meaningful tise in the panel’s subject area. Most common ground, we could become lessons learned from NCOs. of Donovan’s OSS brain trust was all things to all people, and we could • Have SF NCOs run a CAPEX. made up of nonmilitary people. experience mission drift. Challenge them, and let’s see how • Keep panels small. In some Special Forces vs. CT. I continue they do things. cases, panels were so large that some to see a lot of confusion within the SOF panels. Having been to members never got to speak. This Army regarding counterterrorist three SOF symposiums within a defeats the purpose of a panel. units and SF. Someone needs to year (Washington, Fayetteville and • Use the Internet for some address this issue openly and cor- Tampa), I am seeing a “pattern of panel discussions — we’re living in rect it. CT units and SF are not the pablum.” We spend too much time that age. same. Because SF is often painted with introductions and light ban- • Consider events such as an with the CT brush, everyone ter, and not enough time discussing interactive CPX that would involve assumes that the two think alike.

52 Special Warfare Unfortunately, SF often gets the E. Bush defining who we are. What superiority and a great advantage in blame for any missteps taken on the we do and who we are certainly are equipment and combat support. Fif- CT side of the fence. closely related. Have we as SF teen years later, a combination of Recommendations: changed who we are because SF ancient and innovative unconven- • Correct the perception before operations have evolved since our tional techniques were used in another Mogadishu occurs. inception? Has SF’s core mission Afghanistan to defeat another • Look at how the British SAS, changed? It is appropriate that enemy who ruled the skies and had a the Israelis and the Germans have these discussions are occurring vast advantage in equipment and approached this issue. during the transition from one mil- materiel support. In both examples, • Consider bringing CT out into lennium to the next; the answers to unconventional warfare was not lim- the open (OPSEC could still be these questions will affect not only ited to insurgency, intelligence oper- maintained). how the citizen of the future views ations or sabotage: It was the princi- Need for a skunk works within spe- Special Forces, but more impor- ple at the forefront of every opera- cial operations. Historically, the most tantly, how we view ourselves. tion. As long as there are combatants innovative period for special opera- SF has recently dusted off the old with less who are fighting enemies tions was during the late 1950s and manuals on insurgency and guerril- with more, there will be a need for early 1960s. Why not today? la warfare; we have discovered that unconventional warfare. Recommendation: those operations, combined with Today, geopolitics influences any • Create a low-visibility skunk today’s technology, have relevance decision to deviate from customary, works composed of a variety of tal- in the SF arena of today and tomor- formal or accepted military prac- ent from outside the SF communi- row. We look back to the OSS and to tices. USSOCOM provides the NCA ty to look at problems and issues. our Vietnam days and say that we with the unconventional option over In closing, I think we should all be are reclaiming our core mission and a broad spectrum of operations, alarmed when General Abrams says purpose; I believe that who we are from counterterrorist strikes to that an armor division could be just as SF has more in common with the employing a surrogate to sabotage a as effective in humanitarian-assist- way Aaron Bank thought and with command’s computer network. All ance missions as Special Forces. Not the OSS command climate than SOF have unconventional aspects, one person attempted to take issue with the way Jedburg teams operat- and they should therefore be consid- with his remark. Abrams’ remark ed. The emphasis was on results, ered unconventional warriors. reminded me of a comment made by not on documentation and proce- The definition of unconventional the late General Richard Stilwell, in dure. Men exercised the latitude warfare should be broad enough to one of his old reports on the effective- given them by their commanders, include all SF operations, thus pro- ness of SF in Vietnam. He praised SF and trust was evident both ways. viding a common base on which we backhandedly, saying how effective Theoretically, who we are has not can build different terms for the they were, but also mentioning the changed. We are a group of people variety of operations we conduct. excessive number of senior NCOs on sharing common values, character The following definition is offered: A-teams. One of his final comments and capability for which we were Unconventional warfare: The use was that basically any well-trained assessed and selected to form a Spe- of nonconventional methodology infantryman could do what an SF cial Force for the specific and throughout the spectrum of conflict, officer does — possibly better. Shortly unique purpose of conducting in order to achieve stated military after that report, the reduction of unconventional warfare. objectives. Special Forces began. Webster defines “unconventional” The term “methodology” is used as not conventional; not conforming because it refers to the principles LTC Andrew G. Gembara to customary, formal or accepted that are used in solving problems; U.S. Army (ret.) practices. He defines warfare as “the “spectrum of conflict” is used action of waging war; armed conflict; because it is a broader term than conflict or struggle of any kind.” operational continuum. The defini- ‘Who SF are’ related Throughout the history of conflict, tion removes any reference to terms, to ‘what SF do’ combatants facing greater numbers such as insurgency or subversion, The Summer 1999 issue of Spe- and better-equipped forces have that are associated with GW. Lastly, cial Warfare contained an article resorted to unconventional methods, this definition reinforces the solidar- by Colonel Gary M. Jones and with varying degrees of success. Gen- ity of SF and serves as the common Major Christopher Tone defining eral Giap used unconventional thread between who we are and what we do, and one by CW3 Larry methods in Vietnam. He eventually what we do. defeated an enemy who had air There was a time when dawn

Fall 1999 53 attacks were unexpected and there- which was assigned to General Stil- logical gadgets to help us: the air- fore successful. Dawn attacks even- well’s Northern Combat Area Com- plane, the radio and the parachute. tually became standard practice, mand; the 19th Division of the In unconventional warfare, efficient until the development and use of British 14th Army; and the Ameri- communications and material support “stand to” negated their advantage. can Mars Task Force, which consist- are essential to success on the battle- This oversimplification illustrates ed of two American regiments. field. The communications people in that “unconventional doctrine” can Detachment 101 also deployed Detachment 101 built a lightweight, become an antithetical term. The battalion-sized Kachin guerrilla portable radio for field use that was more we strive to delineate, stand- units east of the Irrawaddy River, superior to any that had existed prior ardize and measure our training where there were no conventional to that time. Our support people had and operations, the more conven- Allied forces. Because of the lack of supply drops of ammunition prepack- tional we become. In our operational American conventional forces, Gen- aged with parachutes ready in a ware- environment, “conventional” means eral Dan Sultan later asked house at an airfield in India so that we failure. We must realize that in Detachment 101 to deploy a num- could receive an ammunition drop into order for our operations and tech- ber of guerrilla forces across the our perimeter within an hour, if we niques to remain unconventional, Shan States to block any attempt were surrounded and under attack by they must constantly evolve. by the Japanese Army to threaten a unit of the Japanese army. This sup- The operations and the equip- the flow of supplies on the Burma port enabled us to perform our mis- ment will be different, but let’s Road to China. Detachment 101 sions effectively. ensure that the man remains the was awarded the Presidential Unit OSS Detachment 101 was an same. By adhering to the principles Citation for effectively carrying out effective and efficient pioneer in inherent in the definitions of who that conventional mission. unconventional warfare, but its we are and what we are, we will be The primary mission of the U.S. existence was classified as “secret” successful in what we do. forces in Burma was to keep the during World War II. It received supply lines to China open so we very little publicity after the war, SFC Gary Harrington could keep China’s four-million- because old news is not news, and 5th SF Group man army engaging Japanese everyone was tired of hearing Fort Campbell, Ky. forces who might otherwise have about the war. been used against the Americans in the Pacific. That mission was essen- LTC James R. Ward Det 101 supported tial to the success of the war, but the U.S. Army (ret.) conventional operations European and Pacific theaters were Seminole, Fla. I just read the article, “Uncon- of higher priority, so few U.S. ground forces could be spared for Burma. ventional Warfare: Core Purpose of Infosphere has changed Special Forces” (Summer 1999) by Detachment 101, with its economy- Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major of-force capability, had to fill that nature of war Christopher Tone. The authors void as well as it could. It did so “Unconventional Warfare: Core should be complimented for with considerable effectiveness. Purpose of Special Forces,” by attempting to review and summa- When OSS-Detachment 101 was Colonel Gary M. Jones and Major rize the past history of UW, but the organized in April 1942, it became Christopher Tone, was excellent, past is vast, and the article con- the first organization in U.S. mili- but I feel that it was a bit limited, tained a statement that I would tary history created specifically to in that it portrays future SF activ- like to correct. conduct unconventional warfare ities taking place in nation-states The article states that there were behind enemy lines. Detachment (or in the case of Kosovo, proto- no Allied conventional efforts (dur- 101 was fortunate, (1) because we nation-states). The Information ing World War II) in the China- had time to build an intelligent base Age has created war forms that go Burma-India theater.That’s not cor- before we had to deploy guerrilla beyond conflict bounded by such rect. OSS-Detachment 101 deployed forces, (2) because we fought in Industrial Age geopolitical norms. company-sized guerrilla units of rugged, mountainous jungle terrain While the authors pay some American-led Kachins to provide that was hostile to conventional attention to the Information Age in unconventional-warfare support to forces and friendly to guerrillas, (3) their references to IO and IW, they four conventional forces: Merrill’s because the Kachins, our guerrillas, miss the idea that the nature of war Marauders, an American Army reg- were as much at home in the jungle itself has changed because of the iment; the British 36th Division, as the animals were, and (4) infosphere. The examples of Soma- because we had the latest techno-

54 Special Warfare lia and Rwanda used by the authors infosphere and attempt to out- demonstrate precisely this point. guerrilla the guerrilla. But instead of adapting to a world This will require Special Forces in full view of the glare of global TV soldiers who are optimized for this (as Mohammed Aideed did), they new kind of combat. This means recommend trying to evade. small numbers of extremely well- The Clausewitzian definition of educated soldiers, fluent in media war is that it is the extension of pol- as well as in languages, and capa- itics that uses the controlled appli- ble of four-dimensional combat cation of violence to constrain the against a worthy enemy. enemy to accomplish our will. That Moreover, why would we organize definition, however, has been eroded such future soldiers in a rank struc- by the advent of instantaneous glob- ture copied from Industrial Age al telecommunication, especially models? Does Ben Laden have nine global television. It is now possible grades of enlisted, 10 grades of offi- to affect multiple bodies politic cer and five grades of warrants? without directly applying force. The Special Forces soldier we Why else did the U.S. cut and run will need in the future will be much from Somalia? The effects of video older. Information warfare is the footage of a handful of U.S. casual- domain of older soldiers: soldiers ties completely upended the U.S. who are broadly educated and tactical victory. trained, who can first out-think As another example, consider and then out-fight an elusive that the U.S. has been engaged for enemy in any dimension of the the better part of a decade in a new Information Age. kind of war whose main proponent is the stateless ex-Saudi terrorist Chuck de Caro Usama Ben Laden. That Ben McLean, Va. Laden has been successful can be very succinctly put: One individual, primarily self-supported, has managed to engage a superpower with various large-scale acts of violence, and after several years, that man and his cause are still alive … and thriving. The U.S. inability to stop Ben Laden stems from our insistence on using Cold War-legacy systems and even more archaic thinking in dealing with an asymmetric enemy who has totally adapted himself and his operations to the infosphere; he is in effect a virtual guerrilla whose area of operations is global and four-dimensional. His adaptation to the terrain of the infosphere makes him and his organization amorphous, able to appear and disappear at will. To end the problem, the U.S. must affect the bodies politic and support mechanisms that allow Ben Laden to carry on his operations. The U.S. must adapt to the

Fall 1999 55 Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

IMAs assist in developing The JFK Special Warfare Center and School is seeking sergeants first class in doctrine, training CMF 37F, Psychological Operations, and CMF 38A, Civil Affairs, who are completing assignments in troop-program units, and who wish to continue serving their respective communities as individual mobilization augmentees, or IMAs.The PSYOP and CA Training and Doctrine Divisions of SWCS’s Directorate of Train- ing and Doctrine have IMA positions for soldiers in the Individual Ready Reserve, or IRR, to assist in the development of doctrine and training products. Members of the IRR are pre-selected, pre-trained, and assigned to authorized active-duty positions. For more information, telephone Joe Pereira, reserve affairs mobilization planner, at DSN 239-5911 or commercial (910) 432-5911; e-mail: [email protected].

Green Beret authorized In accordance with an interim change to AR 670-1, Special Forces-qualified sol- for wear at DLI diers in CMF 18 who are attending language training at the Defense Language Institute are authorized to wear the green beret. SF-qualified personnel assigned to the Airborne and Special Operations Test Directorate, Test and Experimentation Command, and the Operational Test and Evaluation Com- mand are also authorized to wear the green beret. The beret flash will be the one approved for personnel assigned to SF positions but not assigned to SF units: The flash has a gray border and a green background with three bands — gray, black and purple — from top left to bottom right.

17 PSYOP SSGs selected The 1999 sergeant-first-class promotion-selection board selected 17 staff for promotion to SFC sergeants from CMF 37, Psychological Operations. This represents a selection rate of 31 percent, vs. the Army average of 23 percent. Fourteen of the selectees were from the primary zone, and three were from the secondary zone. Statistics are shown below: TIS TIG Education Age 37F (PZ) 9.8 yrs 3.5 yrs 13.0 31.1 Army (PZ) 13.6 yrs 4.9 yrs 13.5 33.9 37F (SZ) 10.9 yrs 2.6 yrs 13.0 32.3 Army (SZ) 11.4 yrs 2.5 yrs 13.5 31.5

SRR for SFQC reduced Effective Aug. 3, 1999, soldiers who attend the SF Qualification Course incur to 24 months a 24-month service-remaining requirement, or SRR. The requirement is com- puted from the completion date of MOS training, including any required language or specialized training. Soldiers who cannot meet the SRR must extend or re-enlist before they report to the SFQC. Soldiers who recycle for academic or disciplinary reasons, or who voluntarily recycle, must extend or re-enlist as necessary to meet the SRR before they restart training. The SRR will not be adjusted for soldiers who are recycled through no fault of their own (medical recycle, compassionate recycle, etc.).

56 Special Warfare Army approves SQI ‘W’ The Army has approved skill-qualification identifier “W” for selected positions with- for SFARTAETC in CMF 18. To be eligible for SQI W, soldiers must have completed the eight-week Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance, Target Analysis and Exploitation Tech- niques Course, or SFARTAETC, which is conducted by the SWCS. A notification of future change dated June 21, 1999, authorizes early award of SQI W to qualified personnel beginning June 1, 2000.Awarding of the SQI is to be accomplished by the ser- vicing military personnel office. For more information, telephone MSG George Ben- nett or MSG Brian Bernard, at DSN 239-8423 or commercial (910) 432-8423.

PSYOP Branch newsletter The Psychological Operations Enlisted Branch newsletter has been updated available on web with the latest CMF information and new points of contact. The newsletter is available at http://www.perscom.army.mil/EPsf/37_notes.htm.

Army selects 674 SF SSGs The 1999 sergeant-first-class promotion-selection board selected 674 staff for promotion to SFC sergeants from CMF 18, Special Forces. This CMF 18 selection rate was 51.8 percent, vs. the Army average of 23 percent. Four hundred seventy- seven of the selectees were from the primary zone, and 197 were from the secondary zone. Statistics are shown below: TIS TIG Education Age CMF 18 (PZ) 11.0 yrs 4.3 yrs 13.1 31.3 Army (PZ) 13.6 yrs 4.9 yrs 13.5 33.9 CMF 18 (SZ) 9.0 yrs 2.5 yrs 12.8 29.0 Army (SZ) 11.4 yrs 2.5 yrs 13.5 31.5

SF seeks warrant-officer Special Forces is seeking enlisted soldiers who want to become SF warrant officers. applicants The 2001 recruiting year will begin in March 2000, and applicants should begin now to prepare their application packets. Applicants must be serving as a staff sergeant or above; must possess a CMF 18 MOS; must have graduated from the SF Operations and Intelligence Sergeants Course or the SF Advanced NCO Course after October 1994; and must have a minimum of three years’ experience at the SF A-detachment level. Applicants must include a current DA Form 330 (Language Proficiency Questionnaire) with a minimum 1+/1+ language proficiency, or possess a minimum score of 85 on the Defense Language Aptitude Battery. Applicants must meet the medical fitness standards for SF duty and the SERE Course, according to AR 40-501, and include an SF warrant-officer-candidate medical screening memorandum completed by the applicant’s surgeon. Applicants must also pass the Army Physical Readiness Test for the 17-21 age group. Appli- cants must possess at least a secret security clearance and have letters of recommendation from their company, battalion and group commanders, as well as from their group senior warrant officer. Individuals not assigned to SF groups must have a letter of recommendation from their current chain of command and a letter of recommendation from their previous SF-group chain of command. Appli- cants must be no older than 36. Individuals who have more than 12 years of active federal service but less than 14 years will be considered on a case-by-case basis. Those who are accessed will spend 6-8 years on an A-detachment. SF selection rates to CW3 are around 80 percent, and to CW4, around 76 percent. Interested applicants should contact their group senior warrant officer or telephone CW4 Edwards at the Special Operations Proponency Office, DSN 239-1879 or commercial (910) 432-1879.

Fall 1999 57 Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

DA approves SELCON Selective continuation in service, or SELCON, has been approved for captains for captains who have been twice non-selected for major. On a selective basis, SELCON will be granted for three years, beginning the first day of the seventh month after the SELCON list is approved (e.g., if the list is published July 15, SELCON will begin Feb. 1). Captains will continue to be eligible for promotion during SELCON status. Currently, the SELCON period is not renewable, and a captain will not be able to retire with fewer than 20 years’ service.

YG 80, 86 officers may Officers in year groups 1980 and 1986 may appeal the results of their career- appeal CFD field designation, or CFD, board only on the basis of material error. Submitting a wrong preference could be considered a material error, subject to the board’s determination. Appeals boards will consist of senior officers in the operations career field and the deputy chief of staff for personnel. Officers have 180 days following the adjournment of the CFD board in which to file an appeal.

Minority representation Special Forces has the lowest minority content of any U.S. Army combat- in SF arms population. Since 1996, the SWCS senior leadership has attempted to increase the branch’s minority content. The rationale is that SF, with its worldwide audience, should represent the diversity of American society and demonstrate the opportunities that our democracy affords its citizens. The Special Operations Proponency Office monitors minority content in the SF training pipeline and provides the SWCS commanding general with quarterly updates on the progress of minority soldiers, from recruitment through completion of SFAS. Current data indicates that the rate at which minority soldiers are selected in SFAS is proportionate to the number of minority soldiers who enter SFAS. The focus of SWCS’s minority recruiting initiatives is therefore to increase the number of minority soldiers entering SFAS. In 1998, the Rand Corporation, a nonprofit research and analysis institution, conducted a study for the Secretary of Defense on minority representation and recruiting in special-operations forces. The results of that study were published in the October 1998 report, Minority Representation in Special Opera- tions Forces. The study concluded that while minorities are underrepresented in SF, certain initiatives could improve minority representation. The following SWCS minority recruiting initiatives are based on Rand’s recommendations and on studies conducted by the U.S. Army Research Institute. • SF minority officers visit historically black colleges and universities and other institutions with sizable minority populations to inform cadets about the branch’s opportunities and challenges. These minority role models raise the visibility of SF with cadets who otherwise would have little or no expo- sure to the branch prior to being contacted by an SF recruiter. • Each summer, the SF Branch participates in the branch orientation at the ROTC Advanced Camp at Fort Lewis, Wash. That participation reinforces the branch’s campus visits during the academic year. • SF recruiting teams travel year-round to Army posts, promoting SF in com-

58 Special Warfare bat, combat-support and combat-service-support units. CSS units, with their relatively high minority content, provide a particularly fertile minority recruiting ground. The Army Recruiting Command’s SF advertising campaign and several Armywide periodicals also contain photos of SF minority soldiers. In sum, the SWCS’s minority-recruiting effort, in tandem with that of USAREC, embraces diverse approaches to attract minority soldiers to SFAS. The ultimate goal is an SF community that demonstrates the opportunities that the U.S. affords its citizens, regardless of their race or ethnic background.

FA 39 LTC promotion rates This year’s LTC promotion-selection rate for Functional Area 39 was the exceed Army average best so far, exceeding the Army average in all three promotion zones. Of the 22 officers selected for promotion, 16 were fully trained; 13 were graduates of the fully funded FA 39 master’s degree program.

Army to select White House Each year, the President’s Commission on White House Fellows selects fellows promising individuals to serve as White House fellows. Fellows are assigned to work with senior White House officials, cabinet secretaries, or other deputies. They write speeches, help review and draft proposed legislation, answer congressional inquiries, chair meetings, conduct briefings, and otherwise assist high-level government officials. Army officers may apply if they are managed by PERSCOM and meet the following eligibility criteria: be a U.S. citizen; have at least three but not more than 19 years of active federal commissioned service as of September 2000; not be competing for any other Army-sponsored program, fellowship or scholarship; be able to complete a full fellowship and a two-year follow-on assignment; be branched-qualified at current grade; have no adverse actions pending; not be serving in or scheduled to serve in a utilization assignment; meet Army height and weight requirements; and have a graduate degree. Eligible officers should submit DA Form 4187, signed by the applicant’s field-grade supervisor, to their branch at PERSCOM. Interested officers must receive permission from PERSCOM prior to competing; they must request permission prior to Dec. 1, 1999. PERSCOM’s Functional Area Management and Development Divi- sion will forward applications to those granted permission. The White House Commission is scheduled to make the final selection of fellows in June 2000. The fellowship year will begin in September 2000 and end in August 2001. Fellows must move to the Washington, D.C., area.

SF officers selected Congratulations to the SF officers who have been selected for the Army for War College War College correspondence course — the most demanding correspon- correspondence course dence course in the Army. Upon graduation, these officers will be awarded a Military Education Level 1, or MEL1. MEL1 is the Army’s highest level for military education, and it qualifies officers for the Army’s most demanding positions. The correspondence course lasts two years, including two summer phases. Officers enrolled in the class of 2001 are: LTC(P) Len Blevins; COL Gene Thompson; LTC(P) Bob Brady; LTC Ric Cantu; COL Glen Vavra; and COL James Velky. The class of 2000 is midway through the program. Its officers are COL Randy Bissell; LTC Rick Helfer; COL Frank Pedrozo; LTC(P) Gil Perez; and COL Eric Stanhagen. Congratula- tions are also in order for COL Dave Maki and COL Sid Morgan, who graduated from the program in July.

Fall 1999 59 Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Counterterrorist unit In preparation for the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympic Games, the Tactical prepares for Sydney games Assault Group, or TAG, of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment, and its rotary-wing air support, have been training in the Sydney area to familiarize themselves with local operating conditions. TAG has been Aus- tralia’s primary counterterrorism force since 1978. Since 1996, the elite unit has received more than $30 million in upgrades and new equipment to enhance its capabilities. Full-time elements of the 4th Reserve Air Reg- iment Commando, or RAR, and the New South Wales Police will augment TAG in counterterrorism operations during the Games.

New terrorist groups According to August 1999 documents received by a Milan radio station, there prompt European concerns is a new European revolutionary group that calls itself the New Communist Party.The documents made note of traditional communist revolutionary goals and the need to fight against the “economic imperialism of Western capitalist societies.” They also indicated that the New Communist Party views the terrorism and violence of the Red Brigades in a positive light, and hinted that the new group sees the need for assassination or other strikes to “continue on the road to revolution.” The announcement of the new group — so far unvalidat- ed by action or other means — may be inconsequential. However, it can also be viewed in a more serious context. Responsibility for the May 1999 assassination of Italian university professor and Labor Ministry adviser, Massimo D’Antona, was claimed two months later by the Red Brigades, a group heavily attrited by Italian authorities in past years. The assassination, one of several acts of European political violence over the last several months, raises questions about future European terrorism. Some specialists assert that suc- cessors to the old, largely dismantled terrorist groups — the German Red Army Faction, Belgian Fighting Communist Cells, French Direct Action and Italian Red Brigades — are re-forming and re-learning the clandestine crafts of the 1970s and 1980s. Recruits are said to be drawn from “lost young people, people excluded from capitalism, and opponents of the all-powerful position of NATO and the United States.” Whether such disaffected recruits will eventually constitute serious revolutionary terrorists or whether they will remain terrorist amateurs given to occasional violent acts is an active cause for spec- ulation among some European security specialists.

Japan plans greater Japan is planning to develop a greater capability of dealing with the threat of counterguerrilla capability terrorists and guerrillas. The Japan Defense Agency plans to budget for this effort beginning in the year 2000, and it will also stress the need for defense against terrorist groups that use chemical and biological weapons. According to press reports, Japanese military representatives will travel to the United States to learn more about creating and equipping counterguerrilla forces. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force is also creating a research center that will develop a counterguerrilla manual, address the protection of Japan’s critical infrastructure and examine other associated issues. The North Korean press reacted quickly to these developments by noting that Japan is “plotting to

60 Special Warfare have its Self-Defense Force officers learn the methods of special operations by sending them to the United States.” The North Korean press also characterized the homeland defense plan as the “Japanese reactionaries’ criminal maneuver to start an anti-Republic aggressive war at any time by expanding the Self-Defense Force’s area of responsibility and by fully completing prepa- rations for a war of aggression.” What was probably most provocative for the North Koreans were reports of an upcoming Self-Defense Force exercise in 2000, in which the “guerrillas” are envisioned to be North Korean terrorists infiltrated into Japan.

China forms new force China has reportedly developed a force capable of carrying out long-range air- for long-range operations borne operations, long-range reconnaissance, and amphibious operations. Formed in China’s Guangzhou military region and known by the nickname “Sword of Southern China,” the force supposedly receives army, air force and naval training, including flight training, and is equipped with “hundreds of high-tech devices,” including global-positioning satellite systems. All of the force’s officers have completed military staff colleges, and 60 percent are said to have university degrees. Soldiers are reported to be cross-trained in various specialties, and training is supposed to encompass a range of operational environments. It is far from clear whether this unit is considered operational by the Chinese. It is also not clear how such a force would be employed. Among the missions mentioned were “responding to contingencies in various regions” and “cooperating with other services in attacks on islands.” According to the limited reporting, the organization appears to be in a phase of testing and development and may constitute an experimental unit. While no size for the force has been revealed, there have been Chinese media claims that “over 400 soldiers of the force are all-weather and versatile fighters and parachutists who can fly airplanes and drive auto vehicles and motor boats.”

South African police unit The high level of violent crime in South Africa has sparked responses by to battle vigilantism organized and ad hoc vigilante groups. A new police organization characterized as an “FBI-style Special Operations Directorate” is being established to combat urban violence and vigilantism, especially in South Africa’s Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces. A major target of the “Scorpions” (as the police unit is called) will be the vigilante group, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs, or PAGAD. Despite its avowed aim to curtail criminality, especially drug trafficking, PAGAD is perceived by the government to be “deliberately subverting the authority of the state.” A second vigilante group — reportedly more exotic in its approach — is the Northern Cape vigilante organization called Mapogoa Mathamaga. It has recently become active in Pretoria. Whether the group’s supposed practice of dangling its victims in front of croc- odiles is myth or fact, it is clear that the group has beaten people to death while administering its nonjudicial punishment. The new Special Operations Directorate was supposed to have begun operations Sept. 1. When it is fully operational in December, the organization will consist of 2,000 agents with a variety of intelligence, investigative and other skills.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. and Major Michael A. Chung, both of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Fall 1999 61 Update Special Warfare

USASOC to dedicate statue special amphibious reconnaissance in memory of Bull Simons corpsman, Special Forces medic, Ranger medic, 160th SOAR medic, On Nov. 19, the Army Special 528th SOSB medic, and Air Force Operations Command will dedicate Pararescuemen who are assigned a statue to the memory of Colonel to the Air Force Special Operations Arthur D. “Bull” Simons. Command. Applicants must have The dedication is scheduled for 10 graduated from the Special Opera- a.m. at the Special Warfare Memor- tions Combat Medic, Advanced ial Plaza across from the JFK Spe- Special Operations Combat Medic cial Warfare Center and School. or Special Forces Medical Sergeant The 13-foot statue is the work of courses, or from the 300-F1 track sculptor Lawrence M. Ludtke, of that was previously conducted at Houston, Texas. Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Current Simons was born in New York paramedic certification is not a state in 1918. He entered the Army requirement for attendance. in 1941 after having been commis- Application to SOFMSSP can be sioned through ROTC. During coordinated through medics’ unit World War II, he commanded a field and component surgeons’ office. artillery battery in the South Pacif- Photo by Phil Provencher Medics whose EMT-P credential will ic and later commanded a company A clay model of the Bull Simons statue. expire March 31, 2000, will receive in the 6th Ranger Battalion. He left priority for attending the first class- The two-week course focuses on the Army after World War II, only to es. For additional information, tele- trauma care and tactical-combat- be recalled in 1951, during the phone SFC Richard Toth at DSN casualty care. Of the course’s 88 hours, Korean War. He joined the 77th 236-7775, or commercial (910) 396- 60 are in military medicine and trau- Special Forces Group in 1958 and 7775. Send e-mail to: [email protected]. later commanded the 8th SF Group ma management. Topics include in the Panama Canal Zone. emergency surgical procedures such USASOC dedicates Korean Simons is probably best remem- as inserting chest tubes, performing War Memorial Stone bered as the leader of the Son Tay venous cut-downs and establishing Raid, the Nov. 20, 1970, attempt to surgical airways. The course also On July 9, the U.S. Army Special liberate American prisoners of war includes classes in war-wound man- Operations Command dedicated the held in North Vietnam. Simons agement; diseases of military impor- Korean War Special Operations died in 1979. tance; emergency dentistry; environ- Memorial Stone in Fort Bragg’s mental emergencies; and nuclear, bio- Special Operations Memorial Plaza. Course teaches SOF logical and chemical warfare. The stone is intended to commem- medical-sustainment skills SOFMSSP meets the minimum orate the service of special-opera- requirements of the National Reg- tions soldiers who fought in the A new course at the JFK Special istry of Emergency Medical Techni- Korean war. “This is a long overdue Warfare Center and School is cians as refresher training to recer- ceremony,” said Lieutenant General designed to refresh the perishable tify current paramedics. The course William Tangney, commander of combat medical skills of special- is not designed to restore currency USASOC. “Today we lay the stone of operations medics. for those whose paramedic certifi- a tremendous series of organizations The Special Operations Forces cation has expired. that stand tall in our lineage … and Medical Skills Sustainment Pro- SOFMSSP is open to the follow- what great units they were. gram, or SOFMSSP, began its first ing specialties: SEAL corpsman, “In a very, very bloody war, in a class Oct. 17.

62 Special Warfare very critical time in our nation’s his- diverse CMO planning tasks, dier’s last OER thru date is more tory, arose great men — small num- enabling users to quickly reference than 90 days prior to the start date bers of men. Men who rose to the call mission-planning data before, dur- of the scheduled class, the soldier of duty. Men who heard the sound of ing and after their mission analysis. must have a Departure on Tempo- the distant trumpet and unhesitat- The Nongovernmental Organiza- rary Duty OER in order to receive ingly volunteered … many of whom tions Reference Handbook lists and an AER from the SFWOAC. remained on active duty after the describes nongovernmental organiza- Finally, all students must complete Korean War to serve within Special tions, or NGOs, and international the nonresident Phase 1 training prior Forces and a variety of other units — organizations, or IOs, in order to pro- to attending resident SFWOAC. Sol- soldiers who have written an indeli- vide the reader with a fundamental diers can enroll in the Phase 1 course ble page in American history.” understanding of the diversity of as soon as they are promoted to CW2. In 1951, the U.S. began a special- organizations that seek to assist oth- Soldiers can enroll via the Internet operations campaign in Korea, ers. The CD-ROM is not all-inclusive, (http://leav-www.army.mil/wocc) or by expanding what were formerly intelli- but it lists many of the organizations completing DA Form 145 according to gence activities into guerrilla opera- likely to be in an area of operations the instructions in DA PAM 351-20, tions conducted by psychological, avia- both before ARSOF soldiers arrive and and mailing it to: Army Institute for tion and tactical units under the com- after they depart. Hyperlinks take the Professional Development; U.S. Army mand of the Eighth Army. The units reader to additional information about Training Support Center; Newport supported psychological operations, NGO and IO structure, capabilities News, VA 23628-0001. The course engaged in escape-and-evasion activi- and coordination in joint publications number is 131 F41. ties and conducted raids against the and on the Worldwide Web. enemy. In January 1953, 75 officers ARSOF units will receive copies 4th PSYOP Group and enlisted soldiers from the 10th of both CD-ROMs through auto- welcomes new commander Special Forces Group, then headquar- matic distribution. Colonel Christopher E. St. John tered at Fort Carson, Colo., were SFWOAC students took command of the 4th Psycho- assigned to the units as advisers and logical Operations Group from staff personnel. By that spring, 22,000 need to prepare Colonel Charles P. Borchini in a Koreans had joined forces with the The Special Forces Warrant Offi- ceremony held Aug. 24 at Fort U.S. special-operations forces. — Spe- cer Advanced Course, or SFWOAC, Bragg’s Meadows Memorial Plaza. cialist Jon Creese, USASOC PAO advises prospective students to St. John was previously assigned SWCS publishes CD-ROMs ensure that they have the proper to the office of the Assistant Secre- clearances, evaluation reports and tary of Defense for Special Opera- The JFK Special Warfare Center prerequisites before they arrive at tions and Low Intensity Conflict, and School recently published two CD- the Special Warfare Center and where he served as director of plans ROMs that will allow planners of civil- School to begin training. and support, Deputy Assistant Sec- military operations to quickly gather DA PAM 611-21, chapter 6, para- retary of Defense for Drug Enforce- information from volumes of data. graph 8-30, requires that students ment Policy and Support. His other The G5 Staff Planner’s Guide possess a top-secret security clear- SOF assignments include detach- and the Nongovernmental Organi- ance prior to attending the ment commander, 7th Special Forces zations Reference Handbook, pre- SFWOAC. Certain training provid- Group; commander, 8th PSYOP Bat- pared by the SWCS Directorate of ed during the course requires SCI talion; deputy commander, 4th Training and Doctrine, provide rel- access, for which a top-secret clear- PSYOP Group; and a four-year evant information in concise, ance is mandatory. assignment to USSOCOM. portable, hyperlinked formats. AR 623-105, Section VII, Manda- “Soldiers in the 4th PSYOP The purpose of the G5 Staff Plan- tory Reports, paragraph 3-43, states Group are better equipped than we ner’s Guide is to place necessary lit- that students must have a Depar- have ever been before,” St. John erature into the hands of staff plan- ture on Temporary Duty Officer said. “The quality of the soldiers, ners, and to aid mission analysis Efficiency Report, or OER, in order noncommissioned officers and offi- with integrated, quickly referenced to attend any course of instruction cers is the best I have ever seen in doctrine. The CD-ROM includes that will result in the submission of my almost 20 years of working common civil-military-operations an Academic Evaluation Report, or with the group.” doctrine and its sources, from presi- AER. Warrant-officer career-pro- dential-decision directives to Army gression and professional-develop- regulations. The guide streamlines ment courses are included. If a sol-

Fall 1999 63 Book Reviews Special Warfare

Raiders of the China Coast: the smoke jumpers, the small-boat CIA Covert Operations During handlers, the demolitions-and- the Korean War. By Frank weapons experts, the underwater Holober. Annapolis, Md.: Naval specialists and the intelligence Institute Press, 1999. ISBN: 1- operators who leveraged their 55750-388-5. 253 pages. $32.95. expertise to train, equip, advise and support Chinese Nationalist When the Korean War Memorial forces — helping them to strike opened in Washington, D.C., a few back in small incursions and occa- years back, the media repeatedly sional big raids. referred to the Korean conflict as “the The communist reaction was dis- forgotten war.” Overshadowed by both proportionate. A reconnaissance by World War II and Vietnam, Korea is a few lightly armed Nationalist remembered vaguely, at best. guerrillas provoked the PRC into Many things not well-chronicled fits of excessive response, moving happen in war. Sometimes, small infantry divisions for days, or even but nonetheless “fighting” wars, weeks, after an incursion. Attacks raging far from the major battle- by larger units caused an even fields, have considerable effect on greater response. Captured main- the “main event,” even if they are land troops testified to the para- overlooked by contemporary ob- Korea. Covert action was principally noia. Communist forces thrashing servers and missed altogether by the responsibility of the CIA, which around waiting for or reacting to historians. The Korean War had unleashed a paramilitary effort. Rem- Nationalist incursions could not be such a “side show” conflict — it was nants of Chinese Nationalist forces, sent to Korea as reinforcements. the forgotten war’s forgotten war. pushed from the China mainland by That, of course, was the whole idea. In 1951, the United Nations, after the communists, were regrouped on Raiders of the China Coast fills a coming perilously close to destruc- Taiwan and on islands off the coast. void in the record. For those who tion in the South, struck back Mostly irregulars or guerrillas, these took part in the operation, the story against the North Korean aggres- Chinese Nationalist troops, aided is a source of pride. Frank Holober sors, driving them north to the bor- covertly by the CIA, struck repeated- has done a good job, and the Naval der of the People’s Republic of ly against the PRC. Institute Press is to be commended China, or PRC. It seemed that the Frank Holober was one of a band for publishing his book. Korean conflict would soon be over. of American clandestine warriors But Chinese intervention changed marshaled by the CIA to work with Lawrence B. Sulc everything: PRC forces poured into those Chinese Nationalist forces. St. Helena, S.C. North Korea, preventing a U.N. vic- Holober’s now-it-can-be-told story tory and driving U.N. forces back to about this small war has been pub- Black Hawk Down: A Story of the middle of the Korean peninsula, lished by the Naval Institute Press Modern War. By Mark Bowden. where a bloody stalemate ensued. in its Special Warfare Series. Raiders New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, The U.S. had not long since fought of the China Coast: CIA Covert Oper- 1999. ISBN 0-87113-738-0. 386 World War II, in which special opera- ations During the Korean War, is an pages. $25. tions and guerrilla warfare had exciting story and a welcome played important roles. It was time to account. The story cannot now be There are but a few serious books engage in special warfare again, this completely ignored by history. that deserve the high but ungram- time along the China coast, to take Raiders of the China Coast tells of matical accolade, “unputdownable.” some of the pressure off U.N. forces in the former American paratroopers, Black Hawk Down does.

64 Special Warfare The book describes Task Force other services, this is overwhelm- minor things that would seem to call Ranger’s bloody fight in Mogadishu ingly the story of young Ranger for military experience: the confu- in October 1993. The story is told in riflemen and machine gunners in a sion of combat, an individual’s fear of full, in chronological order, largely long, bitter, no-quarter street fight failure before his first fight, the from the viewpoint of and in the against Somali fighters with AK- inanity of recovering a “valuable” words of the Ranger participants. 47s and rocket-propelled grenades. rappelling rope under fire, and the The series of incidents by which a Glory disappeared from war early value of the cover provided by a quick prisoner-snatch raid became a in this century when people became small bump in a road. The reviewer, series of desperate street battles aware of war’s realities. Even honor who grew up in an army where call- stretching almost a full day is and respect are almost unknown in ing soldiers “boys” was at least a recounted in detail. Each event the gritty Third World brawls of mortal sin, was irritated by the presages unforeseeable but seeming- modern warfare. Neither side, how- description of some of the American ly inevitable effects. Each effect leads ever, need have any embarrassment troops as “D boys,” but the author to greater delays, more enemies, over this fight. The various elements defends this as common Ranger jar- more combat and additional deaths. of the Ranger task force fought gon. This criticism is admittedly a The first incident, a Ranger seri- against overwhelming numbers. minor objection to an otherwise out- ously injured in a rappelling fall Only discipline, training, tenacity, standing description of the Rangers’ who required immediate evacua- firepower and individual courage travail. tion, mildly disrupted the with- permitted their survival. The Soma- There is much to learn from this drawal plan. The shooting-down of lis fought against not only the account: conventional lessons of tac- the first helicopter caused a major Ranger task force but also the 20th- tics, weapons and command; sur- disruption, requiring the ground century military technology of vehi- prising lessons in psychological force to alter its withdrawal plan in cles, communications and armed operations; and lessons concerning order to recover the helicopter helicopters. Although probably nei- complex political environments and crew. A second downed helicopter ther side was satisfied with the bat- coalitions of widely disparate forces. imposed greater dispersion of the tle’s ending, both achieved their If Bowden’s subtitle is correct, and if ground force. It also added further ends: the Ranger task force accom- Mogadishu is indeed the pattern of delays. And the longer the force plished its tactical goal and kept “modern war,” then there are some remained on the ground, the longer faith with its comrades; the Somalis deep and hard lessons there. One of the armed Somali tribesmen had to defended their tribe and their turf. the most salient is that even the strike back at the Rangers. The story is so well told that it most modern technology cannot The story that Mark Bowden comes as a surprise that Bowden meet all requirements or guarantee relates could also be told by a Greek claims no military background. His success. Perhaps Black Hawk Down tragedian or by a cultural anthropol- descriptions show an appreciation of will be read by some of the officials ogist. The tragedian would tell it as a who send soldiers to do tough jobs story of peoples doomed by some in nasty places — and possibly even transgression. The anthropologist by some of those who continually would explain how each contestant beat the drum for putting women in was a prisoner of his own culture: the front-line combat. It would be well if Somalis fighting for their tribe; the these groups would think deeply Rangers performing their assigned about their goals, the probable mission in a foreign environment effects, and their responsibilities. and being led inexorably into a much Black Hawk Down is strongly deeper hazard by their warrior cul- recommended to all special opera- ture’s demand that they stand by the tors, irrespective of their grade, downed helicopter crews. There unit, skill or specialty. would be more than a modicum of truth in each of these treatments. COL J. H. Crerar Bowden, however, presents a U.S. Army (ret.) humanistic story of combat as expe- Vienna, Va. rienced by the participants. There is little account of the actions and views of headquarters here. Although TF Ranger contained disparate elements of the Army and

Fall 1999 65 Special Warfare

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