DUTY, HONOR… PARTY? IDEOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY James Thomas Golby June 2011 © 2011 by James Thomas Golby. All Rights Reserved. Re-distributed by Stanford University under license with the author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/ This dissertation is online at: http://purl.stanford.edu/jw856qf5672 ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Kenneth Schultz, Primary Adviser I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Simon Jackman I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Scott Sagan I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Paul Sniderman Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies. Patricia J. Gumport, Vice Provost Graduate Education This signature page was generated electronically upon submission of this dissertation in electronic format. An original signed hard copy of the signature page is on file in University Archives. iii iv Abstract In this dissertation, I argue that political ideology and domestic political institutions structure civil-military debates about how and when to use military force. Although previous studies of military influence typically have portrayed civil-military relations as a stand-off between conservative military officers and liberal civilians, this characterization ignores the significance of partisan differences in American politics and neglects the importance of American political institutions. I develop an informational theory of military influence that accounts for these domestic factors and explains when and how senior military officers will influence presidential decisions about whether to use military force. I argue that divisions over political ideology, and not civil-military differences, routinely shape the most salient dimension of interaction between political leaders and senior members of the U.S. military. I also argue that domestic political institutions – political parties, national elections, congressional approval of military appointments, and bureaucratic hierarchy – lead to predictable patterns of convergence and divergence in the preferences of the president and his senior military advisors. My informational theory suggests that the resulting variation in preference alignment will have profound effects on whether presidents decide to use force to accomplish their foreign policy goals. Using a multi-method research design, I find broad support for the primary claims of my informational theory. I show that there are large and significant differences in the foreign policy attitudes of Republicans and Democrats that hold both for military officers and for elite civilians. Moreover, when I condition on political ideology and partisan identification, differences between the attitudes of elite civilian leaders and senior military officers disappear; in other words, I find no evidence of a general civil- military gap. Nevertheless, the disproportionate number of conservative officers in the senior officer corps does lead to an asymmetry in the ability of presidents appoint senior officers who share their preferences. Using a new dataset that includes information in the political campaign contributions of 382 retired four-star generals v and admiral from 1977-2002, I show that Democratic presidents are likely to appoint liberal officers only when their co-partisans control the Senate. In contrast, Republican presidents almost always appoint conservative officers, though my qualitative analysis suggests that closer preference alignment occurs in cases when Republicans control the Senate. I then demonstrate that the resulting patterns of civil-military preference alignment and divergence profoundly affect presidential decisions to use military force. Presidents from both parties are more likely to use military force when advised by military officers whom they appoint when their co-partisans control the Senate, though the effects are larger for Democratic administrations than for Republican administrations. I also introduce evidence from five historical case studies to provide external validity for my quantitative analysis and to explore private signaling and public dissent as mechanisms of military influence. Throughout each chapter of this dissertation, I also find clear evidence of a distinct partisan asymmetry; Democratic presidents face unique challenges when identifying, appointing, and dealing with senior military leaders. vi To Kristen. vii viii Preface and Acknowledgements Just over four years ago, I received an email in Iraq from Colonel Ike Wilson in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy. He already had selected me to attend graduate school and teach American Politics at West Point. Now, he was offering me the opportunity to have a third year to pursue a PhD instead of Masters Degree. At the time, an extra year with my wife and family – with a guarantee of no deployments – sounded like an excellent idea. And although the time with my family indeed has been sweet, if I had known what I was about to get myself into, I might be back in Iraq or Afghanistan today instead of in Palo Alto! Of course, I jest. I am deeply thankful for the sacrifices of the men and women who are apart from their families and in harms way on their fourth and fifth deployments. Many of them are my soldiers, peers, and commanders. I am humbled to have such an amazing opportunity, and I hope that my experiences here at Stanford will equip me to better serve with them again in the future. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Colonel Wilson and to Colonel Mike Meese for providing me with this tremendous opportunity, and for supporting me throughout the process. There are far too many people to thank individually for they help they have given me both before and during this process. My soldiers, teachers, mentors, friends, and family all have helped to prepare me to successfully complete a doctorate. The credit for this work belongs with them; any errors, omissions, or inaccuracies are no one’s fault but my own. As a cadet, my professors in Sosh inspired me to want to follow their example and return to the Academy to develop future leaders for our Army. My love for the study of American politics began on my first day of class with Colonel Rob Gordon, and it has continued to this day. John Nagl, Paul Yingling, Bill Ostlund, Russ Howard, and Jennie Koch also took an active role in my development as a soldier-scholar, and supported me even when I did not deserve it. Don Snider sparked my interest in civil- ix military relations. His love, support, and guidance have been instrumental in my development as an officer, as a scholar, and as a husband and father; I hope to emulate his example. I also am indebted to a number of terrific mentors and officers who encouraged me to pursue a doctorate. General (ret.) Barry McCaffrey and Brigadier General H.R. McMaster both were instrumental in my decision to attend graduate school, and Stanford in particular. Colonels Patricia Frost and Eric Angeli helped me overcome the bureaucratic hurdles necessary to complete a successful command before returning to graduate school. Major Paulie Krattiger and Lieutenant Colonel John Henderson continue to mentor me, advising me on matters big and small. My advisors and the faculty at Stanford have been exceptional. Ken Schultz helped me adapt quickly to graduate school, and suffered through many of my initial bad ideas. He forced me to think rigorously about the questions I explored, and kept me grounded throughout this process. I could not have asked for a better advisor and mentor. Scott Sagan also played a particularly important role in the development of this dissertation; it was during a directed reading with him that I first identified the initial ideas that later came to form the basis of this project. Scott has been an amazing mentor and friend, and he has helped me make sure that my project remained relevant beyond academia. I also appreciate the support of my other committee members. Paul Sniderman opened my eyes to the true joy of making a discovery and Simon Jackman gave me useful insights and methodological advice throughout this project. Terry Moe, Barry Weingast, Mike Tomz, Jim Fearon, Judy Goldstein, and Justin Grimmer also provided helpful feedback to me at various points throughout the development of this project. And Will Howell and Heidi Urben generously shared their data with me. Along the way, my peers and friends at Stanford also challenged me and made my experience here enjoyable and fulfilling. I am indebted to Colonel Joe Felter, Major Bryan Price, and Major Scott Handler for charting the path before me and establishing a terrific reputation for Army officers in the program. Sarah Anzia, Bobby Gulotty, x Isaias Chaves, Melissa Lee, and Jen Haskell, in particular, graciously dealt with my frequent interruptions and half-cocked ideas, helped me resolve difficult theoretical and methodological problems, and allowed me to keep my sanity. Molly Cohn, Saul Jackman, Kyle Dropp, Nan Zhang, Wendy Gross, Paul Ling, Maggie Peters, and Rachel Stein all read various drafts of this dissertation, lent critical advice, and helped me even when I didn’t know how to ask for it.