Mikhail Barabanov, Anton Lavrov, Vyacheslav Tseluyko The Tanks of August Collected Articles Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Moscow, 2009 UDK З55.4 BBK 66.4(0) The Tanks of August/М.S. Barabanov, А.V. Lavrov, V.А. Tseluyko; ed. М.S. Barabanov. - М., 2009. - 144 pp. A compendium of articles prepared for the first anniversary of the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia that took place from 8-12 August 2008. The first article is devoted to Georgia's efforts under President Saakashvili to build up its military forces, and it contains a complex description of the basic trends in Georgia's preparations for war. A detailed chronology of military operations is the second and essentially the central body of material. Various sources are drawn upon in its organization and writing - from official chronicles and statements by top ranking figures, to memoirs and the testimony of participants on both sides of the conflict, materials on the Internet. The chronicle provides a detailed review of all the significant combat operations and episodes. The third article in the compendium deals with military development in Georgia in the period after August 2008 and what constitutes the military situation and balance of forces in the Transcaucasus at the present time. The other three articles examine several special aspects of the Five-Day War - losses suffered by Georgian forces in the course of military operations, the losses of Russian aviation in the war; the task of setting up Russian military bases in the territory of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Russia recognized as independent states. The appendix to the collection presents short summary data about Georgia's purchase of basic types of heavy weapons and military hardware during the period 2000-2008. UDK 355.4 BBK 66.4 (0) Photograph on the cover: Russian tank column in South Ossetia, August 2008 REUTERS/Denis Sinyakov © Center for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2009 Contents 05 Foreword 10 The Reform of the Georgian Army under Saakashvili before the Five-Day War of 2008 35 Chronology of military operations between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 61 The present and future of the Georgian-Russian conflict. The military aspect 80 Russian Air Force losses in the Five-Day War with Georgia in August 2008 87 The state of the Georgian Army toward the conclusion of military operations and its losses 93 Postwar facilities of the Russian Armed Forces in the newly recognized republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 103 Known deliveries of basic types of military hardware to Georgia in 2000-2008 106 About the authors Foreword Mikhail Barabanov The present collection of articles was written for the first anniversary of the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia that took place from 8-12 August 2008 and has already received the name of the Five-Day War. Brought about by the attempt of Mikhail Saakashvili, the ambitious nationalistic president of Georgia, to wage a "Blitzkrieg" with the goal of conquering South Ossetia, which had declared its independence, the conflict led to the military intervention of Russia, which acted in the capacity of the guarantor of peacemaking in this region. As a result, this became the first "official war" between Russia and one of the former USSR republics and the first large-scale use of Russian armed force beyond the borders of the territory of the Russian Federation since the involvement of the 201st Motor Rifle Division in the events in Tajikistan during the nineties. The August war between Russia and Georgia had and will continue to have the most varied and long-term political and military consequences. Without going into political problems, the present collection of articles sets as its goal that of reviewing a number of specific military aspects of the armed conflict that occurred. For several reasons the Five-Day War is of special interest from a military perspective. In the first place, it was a demonstrative and comprehensive test on a large scale of the combat readiness of the contemporary armed forces of Russia. Although from the position of untutored foreign observers the war appeared to be a rapid, massive, and decisive engagement of the Russian army and successful destruction of the Georgian armed forces, in fact, however, it was completely clear that the experience of the use of Russian armed forces in the conflict was regarded by the military-political leadership of the Russian Federation as sufficiently contradictory to lead as a result, to a new stage of radical military reform in Russia by early fall 2008 with the goal of rapidly bringing about a "new image" of the armed forces of the country, one that was oriented primarily toward involvement in local conflicts in the territory of the former USSR. Secondly, the August war also became a unique test of one of the most curious experiments in the realm of military development in the post-Soviet area – the attempt by Mikhail Saakashvili to create contemporary combat-ready armed forces in Georgia on the Western model. The Saakashvili regime tried to do this by way of a massive upsurge in Georgia's military expenditures to levels unprecedented not only for the former USSR, but in fact for the contemporary world (on the order of 8% of GDP for the republic in 2007–2008 – only Saudi Arabia, Oman, Jordan, and, evidently, the Korean Peoples Democratic Republic currently spend a comparable or greater proportion of their national wealth for military purposes) to overcome the paradigm that is fundamental for all post-socialist countries of chronic under funding of the defense sector, thus paralyzing any effective military buildup. Having obtained by means of a sharp increase in the military budget, the needed financial resources and relying on broad Western assistance, the Saakashvili government tried in many respects to mold a basically new Georgian army "from scratch," an army based on a complete acceptance of Western standards of organization, recruitment, training, and tactical application. The principal mission of this army became the restoration by force of arms of the breakaway autonomous regions of the former Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic to the control of Tbilisi -- Abkhazia and South Ossetia --, and it was precisely for the "return" of South Ossetia that the Georgian army was thrown into battle in August 2008. The first article in the collection is devoted to the experience of the military buildup in Georgia under Saakashvili. The article contains a quite complex and curious description of the basic trends of Georgia's preparation for war in its military-organizational and technological aspects. It is necessary to draw readers' attention to a number of aspects of Georgian military development that certainly arouse interest for other post-Soviet states, including Russia. It is impossible to overlook the fact that Saakashvili carried out military policy and the reform of the Georgian armed forces in a highly purposeful and logical manner, in many cases (material provisions for the military, construction of housing, creation of contemporary military bases, transition to a voluntary system of recruitment) showing a concern for the armed services. Western influence on the Georgian defense buildup was expressed among other things in the seemingly completely correct orientation toward primary investment in personnel and "human capital," without the traditional contempt of this side of the military system from which the Russian army still suffers chronically. Finally, the Georgian defense establishment is the first in the post-Soviet region (with the exception, perhaps, of what remains of the very weak armies of the Baltic republics) also to try to accomplish the transition to re-equipment of the material sector on the basis of Western standards. The first article of the compendium, however, exposes the popular myth that Saakashvili conducted the ambitious military buildup principally with means provided by foreign (basically American) military aid – on the contrary, it is quite obvious that since 2006, Georgia for the most part expended its own national wealth on preparing for war with its former autonomous regions. At the same time the sad results of August 2008 for the new Georgian army demonstrated the substantial persistent limitations of the military buildup in Georgia, which for the time being had not led to the creation of a genuinely effective military machine despite the abundance of money and extensive Western aid that Georgia had received. Regardless of Saakashvili's day-dreams about a "European future" for his country, the Five-Day War graphically showed that Georgia, in fact, was more a "Third World" country with a typical "Third World" army -- even though it was clothed in Western uniforms and armed with American M4 rifles, it suffered from a low level of self-organization and self-discipline, low morale, pervasive corruption and nepotism, a low level of education, deficits of trained cadres, and the absence of a national military school and traditions. The situation is enhanced by well-known characteristics of the Georgian national mentality and problems of adequate self-evaluation that are obvious to Georgians. Indeed, it was the extreme narcissism of the Georgians, their megalomania and contempt for neighboring peoples, the Georgians' hypertrophic passion for a brilliant external facade in so many things that appear to have contributed to the rise of Saakashvili's extremely exaggerated conception of the military potential of the army so cherished by him, and to have led to the fateful decision to commit it to battle. Finally, the rapid growth in numbers of the Georgian armed services under conditions of the most acute deficit of trained and ready cadres led to the fact that Georgia's problems with its enlisted troops seemed hardly capable of resolution in principle.