CONFERENCIA DE DESARME
CD/1850 9 de septiembre de 2008
ESPAÑOL Original: INGLÉS
CARTA DE FECHA 26 DE AGOSTO DE 2008 DIRIGIDA AL SECRETARIO GENERAL DE LA CONFERENCIA DE DESARME POR EL REPRESENTANTE PERMANENTE DE GEORGIA POR LA QUE TRANSMITE EL TEXTO DE UNA DECLARACIÓN EN QUE ACTUALIZA LA INFORMACIÓN SOBRE LA SITUACIÓN REINANTE EN GEORGIA
Tengo el honor de transmitir adjunto el texto de la declaración formulada por la delegación de Georgia en la 1115ª sesión plenaria* de la Conferencia de Desarme, celebrada el 26 de agosto de 2008, sobre la agresión militar de la Federación de Rusia contra el territorio de Georgia, junto con otros documentos conexos.
Le agradecería que tuviera a bien hacer distribuir la presente carta, la declaración anexa y los documentos adjuntos como documento oficial de la Conferencia de Desarme.
(Firmado): Giorgi Gorgiladze Embajador Representante Permanente de Georgia
* El texto de la declaración, tal como fue pronunciada, figura en el documento CD/PV.1115.
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El Representante Permanente de Georgia, Embajador Giorgi Gorgiladze, aprovecha la oportunidad para actualizar la información de la Conferencia de Desarme sobre la situación actual en Georgia, que fue objeto de debate en la sesión de la semana pasada.
En términos jurídicos, Georgia ha sido sometida a una agresión militar en gran escala por la Federación de Rusia, en violación de los principios y las normas de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas, incluida la prohibición del uso de la fuerza entre los Estados y el respeto de la soberanía y la integridad territorial de Georgia. Es realmente una vergüenza que la Federación de Rusia se valiera de la presunta violación de los derechos de los osetios en Georgia como pretexto para cometer sus actos ilícitos. Georgia no entrará en un debate respecto de las argumentaciones esgrimidas por la Federación de Rusia para justificar su acto de agresión, pero se limitará a señalar que en general la comunidad internacional no aprueba el concepto de recurrir al uso de la fuerza para una supuesta "protección de ciudadanos o nacionales en el extranjero", dado que ello contradice los principios de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas y carece de toda legitimidad si no cuenta con la autorización del Consejo de Seguridad. Es irónico que la Federación de Rusia nunca haya recurrido a ningún mecanismo internacional como foro adecuado para ventilar sus preocupaciones, incluso si se aceptara que hay razones legítimas en apoyo de la argumentación de Rusia. Las justificaciones de Rusia resultan muy sospechosas a la luz de la masiva emisión de pasaportes que se llevó a cabo en Abjasia, Georgia y Osetia del Sur (Georgia), y que representa una violación de los principios de soberanía y buena vecindad1. Georgia, por otra parte, pone en tela de juicio la verdadera finalidad y los verdaderos motivos de tal intervención, especialmente considerando que se llevó a cabo sin apelar previamente a la comunidad internacional2.
La Federación de Rusia adujo como motivo jurídico adicional para justificar su intervención la escala masiva de muertes de civiles en la región de Tskhinvali en Georgia, pero esto no ha sido confirmado ni por las organizaciones internacionales de derechos humanos, como Human Rights Watch, ni por las autoridades rusas encargadas de hacer cumplir la ley3. Es de lamentar que haya habido bajas civiles durante las hostilidades, y lo sentimos de todo corazón, dado que la muerte de civiles en situaciones de conflicto armado es siempre trágica.
1 Declaración del Alto Comisionado de la OSCE para las Minorías Nacionales sobre la protección de las minorías y los ciudadanos en el extranjero, que se puede consultar en: http://wwww.osce.org/item/32663.html.
2 Cabe destacar que no se permite a las organizaciones internacionales humanitarias entrar en los territorios controlados por las fuerzas rusas. Solamente el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja, tras largas negociaciones, ha recibido permiso para entrar en Tskhinvali (Georgia).
3 Human Rights Watch dijo que podía documentar menos de 100 muertes de civiles en el transcurso de las hostilidades. También observó que durante las hostilidades los ataques se dirigieron a objetivos militares y no civiles. Esta información se puede consultar en: http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/08/10/georgi19581.htm. Los investigadores de la Oficina del Procurador General de Rusia informaron de solamente 133 muertes de civiles en Osetia del Sur (Georgia), como se puede comprobar consultando: www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID =1013890&ThemesID=301. CD/1850 página 3
Es sumamente lamentable que la población civil de Georgia resultara víctima directa de los actos de agresión de la Federación de Rusia. Las fuerzas armadas rusas han actuado en violación de los principios generales que rigen los medios y métodos de guerra con arreglo al derecho internacional humanitario. Las violaciones continuaron incluso después del acuerdo de cesación de fuego mediado por el Presidente de Francia, Sr. Sarkozy, en su calidad de Presidente de la Unión Europea, y firmado por los Presidentes de ambas partes, Georgia y la Federación de Rusia, los días 15 y 16 de agosto de 2008. El 23 de agosto, cuando ya había pasado una semana de la ocupación militar de parte del territorio de Georgia, las autoridades rusas anunciaron su retiro de los territorios de Georgia propiamente dicha, lo que, sin embargo, sólo se ha cumplido parcialmente. A la fecha de hoy, las fuerzas rusas ocupan territorios de Georgia propiamente dicha4, que se extienden fuera de la zona de conflicto de la región de Tskhinvali en Georgia. Fuera de que la conducta de Rusia representa una violación manifiesta del acuerdo de cesación del fuego, la situación se ha visto agravada por actos de saqueo, pillaje y destrucción de bienes, arrestos de la población civil, que fue sometida a tratos inhumanos, ejecuciones sumarias y toma de rehenes por las fuerzas armadas de Rusia en los territorios bajo su control.
En relación con la violación de las normas relativas a los medios y métodos de guerra, es evidente que el principio de humanidad que guió a Fyodor Martens cuando redactó los tratados sobre el derecho internacional humanitario han sido olvidados por las actuales autoridades rusas. En las dos últimas semanas, blancos civiles de Georgia (ciudades, hospitales, instituciones académicas, iglesias) han sido sometidos a ataques militares en violación del principio de distinción entre civiles y combatientes. Al retirarse de parte del territorio ocupado de Georgia, las fuerzas armadas rusas dejaron minadas carreteras, infraestructura civil y oficinas públicas, que no son objetivos militares con arreglo al derecho humanitario. Esos actos tenían por objeto aumentar la magnitud de la crisis humanitaria, crear problemas económicos y aterrorizar a la población civil. Se adjunta a la presente declaración un calendario con información sobre los objetivos civiles sujetos a ataques y bombardeos.
Georgia desea señalar especialmente a la atención de la Conferencia el uso por las fuerzas armadas rusas de munición de racimo y otros tipos de medios de guerra que tienen efectos indiscriminados en la población civil. En particular, las fuerzas armadas rusas usaron extensivamente y dejaron en el territorio un sistema de misiles Iskander 9M72 (SS-26 Stone), misiles balísticos tácticos de corto alcance Tochka-U (SS-21 Scarab), sistemas de lanzamiento de cohetes múltiples Grad y Uragan, y diferentes variedades de municiones de racimo (con inclusión de RBK-250). Se adjuntan a la presente declaración fotografías de municiones de racimo.
El gran número de municiones, artefactos explosivos y minas antipersonal sin explotar que se han dejado, a menudo deliberadamente, en caminos, prados y granjas están causando bajas civiles a diario. La situación actual tiene graves consecuencias para cientos de miles de desplazados internos que querrían volver a sus lugares de residencia permanente.
4 Esto significa que las fuerzas armadas de Rusia, además de permanecer en Abjasia, Georgia y Osetia del Sur (Georgia), todavía permanecen en territorio que estaba bajo control de las autoridades de Georgia antes del estallido de las hostilidades, como las aldeas cercanas a Gori, Port Poti y sus alrededores, Alto Kodory, etc. CD/1850 página 4
Fuera de los objetivos civiles y la población civil, las fuerzas armadas de Rusia atacaron el medio ambiente de Georgia, bombardeando con munición incendiaria las regiones montañosas de Borjomi y el asentamiento de Tsemi. Se han incendiado vastas extensiones de tierra maderera y varios cientos de hectáreas de flora única, entre las que cabe mencionar las especies de plantas protegidas del Parque Nacional, en abierta violación del Protocolo III sobre prohibiciones o restricciones del empleo de armas incendiarias5.
Hoy día Georgia todavía espera que el Gobierno de Rusia observe el acuerdo de cesación del fuego, acordado de buena fe, y se retire de los territorios de Georgia que actualmente ocupan sus fuerzas armadas. A ese respecto, Georgia lanza un llamamiento a todos los miembros de la comunidad internacional para que apoyen la internacionalización del proceso de solución del problema y aumento de confianza con la activa participación de todas las organizaciones y los mecanismos internacionales pertinentes.
5 El Protocolo III de la Convención sobre prohibiciones o restricciones del empleo de ciertas armas convencionales que puedan considerarse excesivamente nocivas o de efectos indiscriminados, de 10 de octubre de 1980, prohíbe explícitamente en el párrafo 4 del artículo 2 atacar con armas incendiarias los bosques u otros tipos de cubierta vegetal. CD/1850 página 5
Annex [ENGLISH ONLY]
Timeline of Russian Aggression in Georgia
DOCUMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT OF GEORGIA 25 AUGUST 2008 TBILISI
The Government of Georgia invites the international community and journalists to verify the information laid out in the timeline below.
PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT In seeking to justify its invasion of Georgia, Russia has claimed that its forces entered Georgian territory only after a purported “surprise Georgian assault” on Tskhinvali; however, Moscow continues to refuse to make public the time at which Russia launched its invasion into Georgia.
As the following timeline makes clear, Georgian Government forces advanced into the Tskhinvali region only after days of intensive shelling that caused civilian deaths in villages under Georgian control —and after confirmation that a massive Russian land force had begun invading Georgia through the Roki Tunnel.
This was the culmination of months of meticulous planning by Russia; 40,000 Russian troops were soon occupying Georgia, as part of a simultaneous land, air and sea assault, unfolding a premeditated strategy that had little to do with Russia’s stated claim of protecting its recently created “citizens” in the Tskhinvali region.
This document is organized into the following three sections:
I. RUSSIAN ESCALATION 2004-AUGUST 2008: Russian Policy Toward Georgia in the Months Before the Invasion II. KEY POINTS: The Days Before, During & After Russia’s Invasion of Georgia III. DETAILED CHRONOLOGY: HE DAYS BEFORE, During & After Russia’s Invasion of Georgia
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I. RUSSIAN ESCALATION 2004-JULY 2008: Key Developments in the Russian Military & Political Escalation Before the Invasion of Georgia
• Georgian peace proposals repeatedly rejected by Russia (2004 onwards): Beginning in 2004, the Georgian Government has repeatedly proposed to launch a genuine peace process for South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Years of stalemate had left all ethnic populations in both conflict zones impoverished and without any effective protection of basic rights; Georgians in particular were targeted and persecuted on ethnic grounds. The Russian Federation and separatist leaders have rejected Georgia’s peace initiatives each and every time they have been proposed—even when the international community backed the initiatives. As a result, South Ossetia and Abkhazia have become hubs for acute criminal activity, including kidnapping, extortion, counterfeiting, smuggling of arms and drugs. At least one case of nuclear smuggling has been confirmed (Annex 1). • Russia gains stranglehold over separatist governments (2005 onwards): In recent years, Moscow has been exerting an increasingly strong hold over the separatist governments; since 2005, Russian military and civilian officials seconded from Moscow effectively have been governing South Ossetia (Annex 2). • Russia builds illegal base near Tskhinvali (2006): In spring 2006, Russian forces illegally build of a forward military base in the strategically located town of Java (north of Tskhinvali). The base has capacity for 2,500 soldiers, and includes substantial fuel-storage capabilities for tanks and other armored vehicles. • CIS arms/economic embargo lifted illegally by Moscow (March 2008): In March, the Russian Federation unilaterally—and illegally—withdraws from a CIS economic and arms embargo imposed in 1994 on the secessionist region of Abkhazia, Georgia. • International community condemns Russia’s legal recognition of S. Ossetia & Abkhazia (April 2008): On April 16, Moscow sharply escalates tensions by decreeing the establishment of legal links between Russia and the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; this is a form of de facto annexation of Georgian territory and draws sharp rebukes from the entire international community—including the EU, the US, the OSCE, and others, who call for the immediate reversal of this Russian decision. • United Nations confirms Russia downs Georgian aircraft over Georgian airspace (April 2006): On April 20, a Russian fighter jet downs an unarmed Georgian drone (MIA) over Georgian airspace (near Ganmukhuri), an act of aggression confirmed by formal UNOMIG and OSCE investigative reports. (Annex 3) • Russia increases troop strength & introduces paratroopers into Abkhazia (May/June 2008): In the following weeks, Russia continues to unilaterally increase its troop strength in CD/1850 página 7
Abkhazia, without fulfilling its legal obligation to seek the consent of Georgia; among other moves, it deploys paratrooper units, which are incompatible with the existing format for peacekeeping. • Russia moves illegal heavy weaponry & offensive forces into Abkhazia (May/June 2008): In direct contravention of all peacekeeping norms and agreements, Russia introduces additional offensive military troops and heavy weaponry in Abkhazia, verified by UNOMIG. • Russian railroad troops sent to Abkhazia to prepare rails for invasion (May 26, 2008): On May 26, Russia sends more than 400 hundreds of Ministry of Defense “railroad troops” into Abkhazia to reinforce the rail infrastructure needed for military action; these troops do not belong to any peacekeeping unit. • As peace plan advances, Russian provocations move to S. Ossetia (July 2008): In July, as the efforts by Georgia and the international community to advance peace proposals for Abkhazia are gathering pace, the focus of Russian provocations suddenly shifts to South Ossetia. • Separatists attempt to assassinate S. Ossetian unionist leader (July 3, 2008): On July 3, South Ossetian separatists attempt to assassinate Dimitry Sanakoyev, the Head of the Temporary Administration of South Ossetia; three policemen are injured. • Russia defiantly acknowledges violating Georgian airspace (July 10, 2008): On July 9, Four Russian military aircraft violate Georgian airspace on the eve of US Secretary of State Rice’s visit to Georgia. Although Russia continually violates Georgian airspace, this is the first time Moscow acknowledges it has done so deliberately. • Russia undertakes large-scale military exercises near S. Ossetia: & Abkhazia (July 2008): Russia launches large-scale military exercises (July 15-August 2) in the immediate vicinity of Georgia’s northern border; they are named “Caucasus 2008.” The Russian Defense Ministry claims that the exercises, involving over 8,000 troops and 700 pieces of military hardware, are aimed at preparing for “special peace enforcement operations” in the Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During the exercise, anti-Georgian leaflets are distributed entitled “Know Your Enemy”. • Russian troops fail to redeploy (August 2 2008): Russian troops participating in the exercise do not re-deploy from the region when the exercises are finished. • Separatists reject German-mediated peace plan (July 18, 2008): On July 18, Abkhaz separatists reject a German-mediated peace plan and refuse to attend peace talks scheduled in Berlin. • EU organizes peace talks, separatists fail to appear (July 22-24, 2008): On July 22-24, the EU tries to hold talks in Brussels between representatives of the Government of Georgia and the South Ossetian separatists, with the participation of the Russian Federation. The CD/1850 página 8
separatists refuse to participate, initially objecting to the title of Minister Yakobashvili— “Minister for Reintegration.” In response, the Georgian Government appoints Mr. Yakobashvili as a Special Envoy for Conflict Resolution. The separatists once again refuse to attend the talks on unspecified grounds. • OSCE proposes peace talks, separatists reject proposal (late July 2008): OSCE Chairman in Office, Finnish Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, proposes talks in Helsinki in early August between South Ossetian separatists and the Georgian Government. The separatists reject the proposal.
II. KEY POINTS: The Days Before, During & After Russia’s Invasion of Georgia
• July 3: One month before Russia’s invasion into Georgia, separatists try to assassinate Dimitri Sanakoyev, Head of the Temporary Administration of South Ossetia. A remote control road bomb exploded while Mr Sanakoyev’s cortege was passing by. Five policemen accompanying Mr. Sanakoyev were wounded. Mr. Sanakoyev—a former separatist fighter and defense minister in the separatist government - laid down his arms in 2006 to promote the peaceful re-integration of the region with the rest of the country under a broad autonomy arrangement. Mr. Sanakoyev was elected in democratic elections and administered up to 50% of the territory of the region.
• July 29: For the first time since last major hostilities, separatist militia begin intensively shelling ethnically mixed villages under Georgian control, including those of them where the Georgian peacekeepers held their check-points, with large-caliber artillery (greater than 82 mm) which is prohibited by existing agreements. This fact is formally acknowledged by the Head of “Peacekeeping Forces,” Russian General Marat Kulakhmetov on August 4 (he makes specific reference to the shelling on villages under Government control on August 1 and 2 with high caliber artillery). Shelling of this magnitude continues on a regular basis through August 7, in advance of the Russian land invasion into Georgia. • 1 August: A pickup truck carrying six police officers of MIA of Georgia is hit by two remote-control explosive devices (IED) on the Eredvi-Kheiti bypass road, close to the Government controlled enclave north of the city of Tskhinvali. Five policemen are severely wounded. • 3 August: Russian media outlets report the large-scale mobilization of volunteers across the Russian North Caucasus, including pledges by Cossacks to deploy mercenary troops into Georgia. • 4 August: The separatists announce the evacuation of the civilian population from Tskhinvali and from the separatist controlled villages of the region. CD/1850 página 9
• 5 & 7 August: At the request of President Saakashvili, Special Envoy Temur Yakobashvili twice attempts to negotiate with separatists, but his requests are rebuffed. • 7 August: The Special Envoy of Russia’s Foreign Ministry, Yuri Popov, fails to mediate preliminary agreed talks on a ceasefire, citing refusal by the separatists, while shelling of Villages under Government control continues. • General Kulakhmetov, during the meeting in Tskhinvali with Special Envoy Yakobashvili, declares that he cannot contact the separatist leaders, and that Russian “peacekeepers” cannot stop the separatist attacks; General Kulakhmetov admits that the separatists were shooting from the vicinity of Russian “peacekeeping” posts. • In spite of casualties among Georgian peacekeepers and civilians killed by separatist fire, President Saakashvili orders an immediate ceasefire and calls for negotiations. He reaffirms the Government’s proposal to grant broad “European standard” autonomy to the region, and offers Russia to serve as a guarantor. President Saakashvili also announces an unconditional amnesty for separatists who agree to cease hostilities. • Despite the ceasefire declared by President Saakashvili, the separatists intensify their shelling of villages under Georgian control and Georgian peacekeeper posts. • Approximately 150 armored vehicles and military trucks of the Russian regular army stream into the Roki Tunnel and head towards Tskhinvali. In response to the entry of Russian armed forces into Georgian territory, the Georgian military enters the conflict zone in the region. • Russia claims that its forces entered Georgian territory only after a purported “surprise Georgian assault” on Tskhinvali; however Russia continues to refuse to make public the time at which it launched its invasion into Georgia. • 8 August: The Ministry of Defense of Russia and various senior officials claim that Georgian forces “have killed 2,000 civilians” in Tskhinvali. • 11 August: Human Rights Watch representative say that Russia purposely exaggerated casualty figures in Tskhinvali, leading to revenge killings against the ethnic Georgian population (Annex 4). • 21 August: The Russian Prosecutor General’s Office reports significantly lower civilian casualty figures in the South Ossetia region at 133. There is a strong likelihood that the majority of these casualties were separatist militiamen, as local officials frequently refer to non-Russian servicemen as civilians (Annexes 5 and 6). CD/1850 página 10
• 9–24 August: Following the retreat of Georgian armed forces towards Tbilisi, the Russian armed forces and paramilitary groups conduct widespread atrocities, including the burning, looting, kidnapping, raping, and summary executions of Georgian civilians inside and outside the zone of conflict. Within the zone of conflict, entire villages of Eredvi, Avnevi, Nuli, Kurta, Achabeti, Tamarasheni, Kekhvi, Disevi, etc., are deliberately burned and destroyed, resulting in the ethnic cleansing of Georgians. Many of these events are confirmed in reports issued by international human rights organizations. (Annex 7).
III. DETAILED CHRONOLOGY: The Days Before, During & After Russia’s Invasion of Georgia
28 July: Separatist units open fire at joint peacekeeping forces and an OSCE observer group moving towards the village of Chorbauli (Znauri district), thus disrupting monitoring activity. 29 July: Separatists open fire at villages under Government control to the north of Tskhinvali. They fire at a group of OSCE observers, working with the joint peacekeeping forces, who are on their way to the village of Andzisi. (Annex8) 120 mm mortars and grenade launchers target a Georgian peacekeeping checkpoint near the village of Sarabuki. 30 July: A Georgian police car, traveling between the villages of Kekhvi and Sveri, is fired upon from positions in the separatist-controlled village of Andzisi. 31 July: The joint monitoring group of the JPKF and the OSCE mission observe large-scale fortification works undertaken by the separatists on two checkpoints between Tskhinvali and the village of Ergneti. 1 August: A pickup truck carrying six Georgian police officers is hit by two remote-control explosive devices (IED) close to a Georgian enclave north of the city of Tskhinvali. Five policemen are severely wounded. Later that day,separatists open fire with machine guns and grenade launchers on the villages under Government control Kvemo Nikozi, Zemo Nikozi, Avnevi, Ergneti, and Eredvi. Attacks also are directed at Georgian police and peacekeepers checkpoints. In the village of Nuli, one person is wounded and several houses damaged. Georgian peacekeepers checkpoint in Sarabuki comes under attack. In the village of Ergneti, one person is wounded and two houses are damaged. Separatists reported, that six separatist militia are killed and 12 wounded after Georgian police open fire in response. 2 August: Six civilians and one servicemen of MIA of Georgia are injured after separatists shell villages under Georgian control in the conflict zone overnight. The villages of Zemo Nikozi, Kvemo Nikozi, Nuli, Avnevi, Eredvi, and Ergneti come under intense large-caliber mortar fire the separatists. Georgian law enforcers initially shoot back in self-defense, but are soon ordered to cease fire in order not to escalate the situation. 3 August: The separatist government starts an evacuation of the civilian population from the city of Tskhinvali and villages under separatist control of the region. The evacuation continues for the next two days.
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Russian media outlets start a massive propaganda campaign against Georgia, advocating for volunteers and militias to support separatists in South Ossetia. Representatives of major Russian television networks (i.e. NTV, RTR, ORT, Ren TV, TVC, etc.) are on-site in Tskhinvali. South Ossetia media sources report the mobilization of volunteers from across the North Caucasus of Russia. 4 August: General Marat Kulakhmetov, Head of the “Peacekeeping Forces,” formally acknowledges the shelling of Georgian positions with illegal (large-caliber) artillery. (Annex 9). On the evening of August 4, the medical and communication units of Russia’s 58th Army enter South Ossetia, according to human intelligence received by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. Eleven artillery gunships (2S1-“Gvozdika”) in the possession of separatists are relocated from Java to the villages of Andzisi, Dzari, and Tsru, close to Tskhinvali, according to intelligence provided to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. 5 August: 3 tanks and 2 military trucks with armed soldiers are reported moving towards the village of Avnevi. According to telephone intercepts, separatist internal affairs minister M. Mindzaev (formerly head of the General Staff of the Ministry of Interior of North Ossetia, Russia and former head of the Alfa Special Forces Group during Russia’s operation in Beslan) orders a massive attack on—and the elimination of—the village Dvani (SigInt)*. *Here and below signal interseptions are cited. They are available upon request. Special Envoy Temur Yakobashvili visits the conflict zone Tskhinvali, meets Russian General Marat Kulakhmetov, to agree the next meeting for 7 August to defuse the situation. A journalist of Le Figaro, Laure Mandeville later quotes a Russian soldier in Gori who says that Russian troops began moving from Shali in the Chechnya region of Russia towards Georgia on August 5. 6 August: Approximately 150 volunteers from the North Caucasus arrive in Tskhinvali as reported by local television; militants from other North Caucasian republics join separatist units. Russian and local employees working on the military base in Tskhinvali are temporarily dismissed. Shops and other offices are closed, as reported on local television. In the late afternoon at approximately 16:00, separatists open mortar fire from the villages of Pranevi, Ubiati, and Khetagurovo at ethnically mixed and Georgian-controlled villages of Eredvi, Prisi, Avnevi, Dvani, and Nuli. Khetagurovo was the main artillery base of the separatists. This attack continues until approximately 19:00. A lull is then observed for one hour, with attacks resuming at 20:00 and lasting until late into the night. Georgian government forces fire back in order to defend their positions and the civilian population. As a result of intensive cross-fire during the night, two servicemen of the Georgian battalion of the Joint Peacekeeping Forces are injured. The separatist regime also CD/1850 página 12
claims several persons are injured on their side. Despite these provocative, targeted attacks on peaceful civilians and on Georgian police and peacekeeping forces, the Government of Georgia decides not to respond with heavy fire, in order not to escalate the conflict. 7 August: In a morning interview with Russian TV (NTV) and news agencies, South Ossetian separatist leader Eduard Kokoity declares that if the Georgian government does not withdraw its forces from the region, he will start “to wipe them out.” The Georgian military forces to which he refers are peacekeepers legally present in the South Ossetia conflict zone. Georgian Special Envoy Temur Yakobashvili visits the conflict zone on August 7 to meet with representatives of the separatists. He meets General Marat Kulakhmetov, in Tskhinvali; Kulakhmetov states that he cannot contact the separatist leader Kokoity, and that Russian peacekeepers cannot stop the separatist attacks. Kulakhmetov admits that the separatists are shooting from the vicinity of Russian peacekeeping posts. During this meeting, at approximately 16:00, General Kulakhmetov suggests to Minister Yakobashvili that the Government of Georgia declare a unilateral ceasefire.
The Special Envoy of Russia’s Foreign Ministry, Yuri Popov fails to arrive to Tskinvali, as previously agreed together with Minister Yakobashvili, citing a flat tire and a flat spare tire. When he finally reaches Tskhinvali, Popov meets Kokoity, and afterwards concedes that he cannot convince the separatists to hold urgent talks with Minister Yakobashvili (Annex 10).
Earlier, at approximately 00:15, separatists begin attacking the villages of Eredvi, Prisi, and Vanati, with artillery, including mortars and grenade launchers. Simultaneously, the separatists attack the Sarabuki Heights, where Georgian peacekeepers are stationed. Three Georgian peacekeepers are wounded during the Sarabuki attack. The fighting in this area continues until approximately 10:00. At approximately 11:00, separatists resume shelling the Georgian villages of Nuli, Avnevi, Vanati, from the village of Khetagurovo. Three Georgian servicemen are injured; a Georgian law enforcers return fire towards the village where the firing comes from, Khetagurovo, killing two separatists and wounding two others. At approximately 14:00, the Georgian peacekeeping checkpoint in Avnevi is shelled, including again from Khetagurovo, killing two Georgian peacekeepers and eight civilians. Phone conversation interception of separatist militia confirming the death of Georgian military servicemen and civilians is available (Sigint)*. After the killing of civilians and Georgian peacekeepers, at approximately 14:30, Georgian armed forces receive intelligence that Russian troops that had still not redeployed from July’s North Caucasian military exercises have been put on high alert and have received orders to prepare to march towards the Georgian border. At approximately 14:30, Georgian forces mobilize tanks, 122mm howitzers, and 203mm self- propelled artillery in the direction of the administrative border of South Ossetia, in an effort to deter further separatist attacks, and to be in a position to defend the Russian-Georgian border in the event that Russia invades. CD/1850 página 13
At approximately 17:00, Minister Yakobashvili calls General Kulakhmetov to inform him of the Government of Georgia’s decision to implement a unilateral ceasefire. At approximately 17:10, Georgian peacekeepers unilaterally cease fire to defuse tensions. At 18:40, Minister Yakobashvili holds a press conference to discuss the results of his visit to Tskhinvali, and announces the decision of the Government of Georgia to call for and implement a unilateral ceasefire. At 19:10, in a televised address, President Saakashvili declares a unilateral ceasefire and calls for the separatists to respect it and resume talks. At approximately 20:30, a Government controlled village of Avnevi comes under separatist mortar fire from Khetagurovo. The chairman of the separatist Security Council, Anatoly Barankevich (a long-standing Russian military officer, who served for four years as First Deputy of the Military Commissioner in Chechnya), tells the local TV that armed groups of Cossacks are headed towards South Ossetia to “fight against Georgian forces”. At 22:30, separatists fire at the Government -controlled village of Prisi and Tamarsheni, from Tskhinvali and the mountain of Tliakana, wounding civilians. At 23:30, separatists open heavy fire on all Georgian peacekeepers’ positions around Tskhinvali, including the villages of Tamarasheni and Kurta; the Kurta police station is destroyed. At 23:30, Georgian Government receive multiple human intelligence reports that about 150 armored vehicles and trucks with Russian soldiers are approaching the Roki Tunnel from Russia and moving towards Tskhinvali. Multiple signal intercepts of separatist security and military officials at around 3am and later confirm that columns are stretched from Roki to Java. (Sigint)*. At 23:50, for the first time, and in response to the entry of Russian armed forces into Georgian sovereign territory, Georgian armed forces enter military action—using armor, including tanks, 122mm howitzers, and 203mm self-propelled artillery system Dana. At approximately 00:45 on August 8, Georgian forces fire artillery rounds at the invading Russian forces on roads being used by a Russian column already moving south of the Roki Tunnel. After Russia’s Full-Scale Invasion: 8 August to present Outside Tskhinvali On August 8, after advancing into the conflict zone of South Ossetia, Georgian armed forces seized control of a significant number of villages around Tskhinvali during a five-hour period (Tsinagara, Orchosani, Didmukha, Muguti, Gromi, Dmenisi, and Artsevi). During the fighting, Georgian armed forces encountered substantial Russian forces and separatist militias on the Zara bypass road leading to the northeastern part of Tskhinvali and the village of CD/1850 página 14
Khetagurovo, which had been substantially re-enforced with advanced artillery systems, armored vehicles, and self-propelled artillery. In response, Georgian artillery shelled both positions. Georgian artillery and aviation conducted a targeted attacks on the Gupta bridge, where Russian armed columns where entering Tskhinvali. Outskirts of Tskhivali and Inside Tskhinvali Tskhinvali is a small regional town, located in a river valley, approximately 75 kilometers from Tbilisi. Immediately prior to the conflict, the population was approximately 7,000, based on local intelligence estimates and on-the-ground reports. Following the mass evacuation on August 3-5, the number of residents decreased substantially. Several Georgian positions were under attack from points on the outskirts of town, specifically from Verkhny Gorodok (the location of the Russian “peacekeepers” on the non- residential southwest portion of the city). This was the first position in the immediate vicinity of Tskhinvali that Georgian forces targeted using GRAD multiple-rocket launching systems, following repeated warnings to the Russian “peacekeeping” forces not to allow their positions to be used for attacks. Soon thereafter, Georgian artillery (again using GRADs) targeted stockpiles of munitions and fuel depots located on the western part of the city—outside civilian areas—and military barracks in the northwest part of Tskhinvali—also outside civilian areas. At approximately 11:00, once Georgian forces had secured the heights around Tskhinvali, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior forces entered the city of Tskhinvali. These forces came under fire from positions around the main government compound, located in the center of Tskhinvali. In response, Georgian forces employed precise artillery system Dana (not GRAD) against the ministries of defense, interior, intelligence (KGB), and the main government building of the separatists. Russian aviation bombed Georgian positions on a continuous basis inside and around Tskhinvali once Government forces began advancing on the town. Russian aviation continued bombing in and around Tskhinvali for the next two days (until late in the day on August 10). At approximately 14:00, Georgian forces took control of most of Tskhinvali. At 15:00, Georgian forces declared a 3-hour ceasefire to establish a humanitarian corridor. Georgian forces began a phased retreat from Tskhinvali during the evening of August 9. Forces re-positioned themselves south of the city. During the two days that Georgian forces were in control of separatist controlled villages (from August 8) there were no credible reports of looting or abuse of civilian populations, according to international human rights organizations. The ethnic Ossetian population in the conflict zone was not displaced, unlike the ethnic Georgian population under the Russian occupation. The only village that sustained severe damage was the village of Khetagurovo due to the location of substantial amounts of military equipment and forces around the village. After Government forces seized Khetagurovo, there was no cruel or degrading treatment of the civilian population, as documented by Human Rights Watch (Annex 11). CD/1850 página 15
Russian Attacks & Invasion Outside the Conflict Zone Ethnic Cleansing of Georgian Villages Beginning on August 8 at 09:45, Russian aviation bombed a series of civilian and military targets across Georgia, outside the zone of conflict in South Ossetia, damaging infrastructure and causing significant civilian casualties. (annex 12) These targets include but are not limited to: 1. Gori and surrounding villages (including civilian infrastructure) 2. Marneuli airfield, central Georgia 3. Vaziani airfield, central Georgia 4. Kopitnari airfield, western Georgia 5. Oni (civilian areas), western Georgia 6. Poti port, western Georgia 7. Baku-Supsa oil pipeline, central Georgia 8. Anaklia, western Georgia 9. Zugdidi, western Georgia 10. Upper Abkhazia/Kodori Gorge, Abkhazia region 11. Tbilisi (aircraft factory and civilian radar facility in Tbilisi airport) 12. Khelvachauri, Ajara region 13. Shiraki, eastern Georgia 14. Senaki airport and military base, western Georgia 15. Kaspi, central Georgia 16. Khashuri district villages, central Georgia 17. Borjomi National Park, central Georgia.
International human rights groups have documented seeming targeting of civilian objects by the Russian regular troops. (Annex 11a). The Russian Federation’s nationwide bombing campaign included the use of SS-26 “Iskander” short-range tactical missiles used against the Baku-Supsa oil pipeline. Russian forces also used short-range tactical missiles SS-21 “Tochka-U”on the cities of Poti and Gori. In the villages around the town of Gori, Russian forces used “Hurricane” missiles. Cluster bombs were used extensively in Gori and nearby villages, including Ruisi and Shindisi. (Annexes 12 and 13) CD/1850 página 16
On August 10, the Russian navy landed in the port city of Ochamchire and launched an unprovoked attack in Upper Abkhazia/Kodori Gorge using artillery and massive air bombing. Until this point, there had been no hostilities in Abkhazia, Georgia. This attack began only after Georgian armed forces, located at the Senaki military base, were re-deployed eastward (August 9). On August 12, Russian forces invaded the western Georgian town of Zugdidi and the strategic port of Poti. Over 100 Georgian civilians are still being kept as hostages in inhumane conditions in the prison of Tskhinvali (Annex 14). Following the retreat of Georgian armed forces towards Tbilisi, until today the Russian armed forces and paramilitary groups conduct widespread atrocities, including the burning, looting, kidnapping, raping, and summary executions of Georgian civilians inside and outside the zone of conflict. Within the zone of conflict, entire villages of Eredvi, Avnevi, Nuli, Kurta, Achabeti, Tamarasheni, Kekhvi, and Disevi, are deliberately burned and destroyed, resulting in the ethnic cleansing of Georgians. These atrocities have been committed after r all military clashes in the area were over. Many of these events are confirmed in reports issued by international human rights organizations (Annex 7). Currently the Russian troops continue to occupy significant parts of Georgia – Annex 15. CD/1850 página 17
Russian Illegal Check-points in Georgia
Locations of the Russian illegal check-points in the Eastern Georgia, including Shida Kartli, other adjacent areas of "South Ossetia" and "South Ossetia" itself according to the MIA sources asofAugust25 2008:
1. Perevi (Sachkhere district) 2. Ghodora (Sachkhere district) 3. Muguti (Znauri district) 4. Ali (Khashuri district) 5. Ptsa (Kareli district) 6. Variani (Gori district) 7. Karaleti (Gori district) 8. Shavshvebi (Gori district) 9. Ergneti (Gori district) 10. Tsiara (Java district)
Note: There are approximately 60 Russian servicemen and 4 armoured vehicles stationed in each place. The vehicles often move from one place to another "patrolling" the nearby territories and villages. 11. Ikoti in Akhalgori district (7 infantry combating vehicles, 1 armoured vehicle, 6 Ural-type vehicles, 2 Gaz-66 vehicles, 1 military power shovel, 1 mobile medical unit, 2granade-launchers, trenches are dug, 100 Russian servicemen) 12. Approximately 150 armoured vehicles are stationed on the territory between villages Meghvrekisi and Brotsleti in the Gori district.
Locations of the Russian check-points in the Western Georgia according to the MIA sources as ofAugust25 2008:
Samegrelo-Zemo Svaneti Region
1. Village Teklati (near city Senaki), on the territory of the former mechanical plant (5 armoured vehicles, 1 crane, 2 Ural-type vehicles, 1 vehicle with communication systems, 1 UAZ-type vehicle, 1 Vilis-type car, 1 large army tent, trenches are dug, 40 Russian servicemen)
2. Village Pirveli Maisi (Khobi district), near former Georgian police check-point (2 armoured vehicles, 2 Ural-type vehicles, 1 UAZ-type vehicle, 1 large army tent, trenches are dug, 40 Russian servicemen) CD/1850 página 18
3. Between villages Shua Khorga and Chaladidi (Khobi district), so called Poti Minor, near the turning to Kulevi oil terminal ( 4 armoured vehicles, 2 Ural-type vehicles, 1 large army tent, 30 Russian servicemen)
4. Village Menji, Bakaraia neighborhood (Senaki district), on the territory of sanatorium "Menji", 10 meters from railroad (3 armoured vehicle, 4 Ural-type vehicle, 2 cranes, 1 military power shovel, 1 large army tent, 40 Russian servicemen)
5. Village Kantisubani, between Tsalenjikha-Chkhorotsku road section (3 armoured vehicles, 2 Ural-type vehicles, 1 large army tent, trenches are dug, 30 Russian servicemen)
6. Crossroad at the entrances of villages Chale and Muzhava in the Tsalenjikha district (3 armoured vehicles, 1 Ural-type vehicle, 20 Russian servicemen)
7. Town Chkhorotsku, on the territory of former airfield, near Senaki-Chkhorotsku highway (3 armoured vehicles, 2 Ural-type vehicles, 1 vehicle with electricity generator, 2 large army tents, 40 Russian servicemen)
8. Nabada settlement, at the entrance of Poti (2 armoured vehicles, 1 Ural-type vehicle, 1 UAZ-type vehicle, 1 military power shovel, 1 large army tent, 30 Russian servicemen)
Upper Abkhazia/Kodori Valley
9. Gentsvisi 10. Omarishara 11. Sakeni 12. Chkhalta 13. Kvapchara
Note: Due to the extremely difficult situation in the region, obtaining accurate numbers on Russian and Abkhaz military deployment is difficult. All sources report substantial Russian and Abkhaz deployments in the region.
In addition, deputy head of the Russian General Staff, colonel-general Anatoly Nogovitsin stated during the press-conference on August 22, 2008 that the Russian armed forces established new check-points in the following locations:
14. Khudoni 15. Jikmuri 16. Ochamchire 17. Gupagu CD/1850 página 19
18. Meore Gudava 19. Anaklia 20. Mount Kvira Note: The Russian side has not denied existance of the abovementioned check-points throughout Georgia.
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