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Annex E.4.13

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GEORGIA'S CONFLICT: MAKE HASTE SLOWLY

Europe Report N°183 - 7 June 2007

lnternationa Crisis Group WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICT WORLDWIDE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS i

1. INTRODUCTION 1 II. COMPETING GOVERNMENTS 2 A. SANAKOEV'S EMRRGF.NCF. 2 B. SANAKOEV'S DTSPlITED PRESENCE 4 I. 's view 4 2. The view 6 3. The international view 7 C. THENEWTEMPORARY ADMrNISTRATIVEUNIT 7 III. STALLED NEGOTIATIONS 9 A. THR JO TNT CONTROT, COMMlSSTON 9 B. PF:ACF: PLANS 11 rv. SE.CURlTY ·1sstJES 12 A. TllREATS l 2 1. Perceptions 12 2. lncidents 14 8. PEACEKEEPING 17 C. LAW ENfORCE:MENTAND POLICE COOPERATION 19 V. ECONOMIC REHABILITATION 20 A. THE OS CE-LED PROGRAM 21 B. 0TllliR1NlTlATlY.L::S 22 1. Tbilisi's package for 22 2. Moscow's support for Tskhinvali 23 C. FROM ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCE TO CONFLICT OVER REsOURCES? 23 VI. CONCL.USION 25 APPENDICES

A. M/\P OF GEORGI/\ 26

B. MAP OF THE SOlJTH OssETIAN REGION 27 c. JPKF MAP OF GKOIWIAN-CONTROLLKI) AREAS IN SOlJTH Oss1-;nA 28 D. TBILISI'S MAP OF GEORGIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS IN Sourn OSSETIA 29 E. ABOITTTHE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROlW 30 F. lNTERNA TIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE 31 G. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES 33

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lnternationa Crisis Group WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICT WORLDWIDE

Europe Report N°183 7 June2007

GEORGIA'S SOUTH OSSETIA CONFLICT: ~fAKE HASTE SLOWLY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Tbilisi is taking imaginative steps towards solving the Russia should step back tram unilaterally supporting the Gcorgian-Ossctian conflict but its new strategy may de facto South Ossctian govenuncnt of Eduard Kokoity backfire, and frequent security incidents could degenerate and formally reconfirm Georgia's territorial integrity. into greater violence, unless it proceeds cautiously and Together with Tskhinvali it should recognize that engages all actors. Georgia is determined to solve the Tbilisi resents its vulnerability in existing negotiation and conflict but on its own terms and perhaps too quickly. peacekeeping formats and will be unwilling to engage in The establishment of Dmitri Sanakoev and his alternative a meaningful step-by-step process unless they are changed. power centre in the Georgian-administered areas in Tf modifications are not negotiated, the political process the zone of conflict is alienating the broader Ossetian could break down completely. A bigger role should be constituency. It would be a mistake to dismiss Ossetian given to direct Georgian-Ossetian dialogue, and new aspirations together with the Kokoity regime in external parties. such as the EU. should be included. Tskhinvali. Tbilisi should resume substantive dialogue with Tskhiuvali, while Sanakocv tries to steadily build Tbilisi should consent to an agreement on non-use of force, credibility with the Ossctians. while to lessen its concern for Moscow's role, it needs a mechanism for observing movements from Russia into Since hostilities resumed in summer 2004. confidence South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel. As most security between Georgians and Ossetians has been low and the incidents in the zone of conflict begin as criminal activity, security situation volatile. The sides view the conflict the sides should cooperate on joint policing. bringing differently, arc mutually suspicious and trapped in in an international. possibly EU, clement but also with conflicting fears about the other's security calculations. Russian invol emcnt. This could lead ultimately to Though they have signed numerous agreements in the converting the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF) tram a past, all negotiations are stalled. large, static mission to a slim, crisis management tool.

Georgia's frustration with Russia's role has reached an OSCE-led economic projects arc the only area of practical unprecedented level. It claims its conflict is really with cooperation in the zone of conflict. Donors have pledged Moscow, not the Ossetians, and cites Russian military €7.8 million to fund rehabilitation and development but aid to Tskhinvali and the presence of officers among Tuilisi and Moscow have also invested significantly in the de facto authorities as powerful reasons why Russia unilateral programs. Competing initiatives may improve cannot be an honest broker in the resolution process. local conditions but do not foster confidence or conflict Tbilisi has taken assertive actions to change the status resolution. quo on the ground as wel I as in the negotiation and peacekeeping formats, which it feels give Russia too much weight, but it should tackle the external and internal RECO~IENDATIONS conflicts in parallel. Focusing on containing Russia, To All Sides (Georgian, South Ossetian, North however legitimate, will not resolve interethnic issues and satisfy Ossetian aspirations and tears. Ossetian, Russian) in the Joint Control Commission: Agree on changes to the negotiations format that Georgia needs to work on changing perceptions. The 1. emphasise direct Gcorgian-Ossctian dialogue and Tskhinvali leadership is dependent on Russia, but South give the EU a role on a par with Russia and the Ossetians consider that dependency a necessity and arc OSCE. wary of reunification with Georgia. The several peace initiatives Tbilisi has produced since 2004 are viewed 2. Avoid inflammatory rhetoric. as directed primarily at proving good intentions to the 3. Establish an OSCE/Joint Peacekeeping Forces intemational community and so freeing Georgia to pursue observation point at Didi Gupta, agree on a a solution on its own terms.

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mutually acceptable monitoring regime for the To the Russian Federation: Roki tunnel and sign an agreement on non-use of force. 16. Encourage Tskhinvali to be more open-minded on changes to the negotiation and peacekeeping 4. Set up joint policing, with an international civilian formats. police component, including Russia, gradually scale down the JPKF operation and replace it in 17. Encourage both sides to implement verifiable time with a flexible crisis response mechanism. demilitarisation measures. 5. Further interethnic cooperation and confidence 18. Halt unilateral economic rehabilitation programs by implementing economic development and benefiting the Ossetian side alone. rehabilitation through the joint efforts of the OSCE• led Economic Rehabilitation Program (ERP), not To the Wider International Community: competing unilateral projects, 19. Set up an informal consultative group (with at To the Georgian and South Ossetian Sides: least the EU, U.S. and Russia) to assist the sides, including by developing new ideas. and commit 6. Dismantle fortifications, clear mines, fill in trenches new economic funding in the zone of conflict and remove all unauthorised equipment and only for joint projects. personnel from the zone of conflict. Tbilisi/Brussels, 7 June 2007 7. Allow unhampered JPKF and/or OSCE patrolling throughout the entire JPKF area of responsibility. R. Remove unauthorised law enforcement posts from the zone of conflict. 9. Reestablish the Special Coordinating Centre for law enforcement and enhance its operational capacity; organise joint police training programs and regional police chief meetings: and launch joint police patrolling and a mechanism for joint criminal investigation.

To the Georgian Side: l 0. Focus on restoring territorial integrity through gradual confidence building, not rapid status determination. 11. Engage in substantive dialogue with the Tskhinvali de facto authorities, while allowing ample time for Sanakoev to build credibility with South Ossetians. 12. Show respect for Ossetian self-determination aspirations and security fears: consider reconciLiation strategies and a statement regretting past injustice. 13. implement the Law on Property Restitution and Compensation. 14. Allocate economic rehabilitation assistance to OSCE-led programs in at least equal measure to unilateral programs.

To the Ossetian Side:

15. Build a pluralistic, open society and discuss amending negotiation and peacekeeping formats with Tbilisi.

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lnternationa Crisis Group WORKING TO PREVENT CONFLICT WORLDWIDE

Europe Report N°183 7 June2007

GEORGIA'S SOUTH OSSETIA CONFLICT: ~fAKE HASTE SLOWLY

INTRODUCTION The Georgian, Russian and Ossetian sides each contributed a peacekeeping battalion.'

Georgia's South Ossctia region' empted into violence in For twelve years there was no military confrontation. January 1991. Urban warfare in the capital, Tskhinvali, Even though the peace process was frozen, Georgians and lasted until June 1992. Competing claims - Georgia' s for Ossctians engaged in lively exchanges and uncontrolled territorial integrity, the Ossetians for self-determination, trade. Upon becoming president of Georgia in January were among the root causes. The war resulted in some 2004, made restoration of territorial 1,000 dead, 100 missing, extensive destruction of homes integrity his top prioritj . His South Ossetia strategy and infrastructure and thousands of refugees and internally combined an anti-smuggling campaign, aimed primarily displaced persons (TDPs). The leadership of the former at closing the sprawling Ergneti market," with a oblast retained control over the districts of Tskhinvali. "humanitarian offensive" and measures to undermine the regime in Tskhinvali. These steps increased support for , Znauri and parts of . The Tbilisi central government had authority over the rest of AkhaJgori and the de facto Ossetian leader, Eduard Kokoity, among the the Georgian villages in the .' many South Ossctians who depended on illegal trade for economic survival. In the first half of 2004 and as a The 1992 "Agreement on the Principles of the Settlement result of the anti-smuggling campaign, Georgian interior of the Gcorgian-Ossctian Conflict between Georgia ministry troop presence grew significantly. Jn July• and Russia" produced a ceasefire and a Joint Control August 2004 tensions escalated, dozens were killed, and Commission (JCC), a quadrilateral body with Georgian, the situation nearly degenerated into full-scale war.' Russian, North and South Ossctian representatives, plus participation from the Organisation for Security and Since August 2004, a new ceasefire has held but the zone Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The JCC was tasked of conflict is volatile. with daily shootings, frequent to supervise observance of the agreement draft and criminal incidents and occasional killings. Negotiations implement conflict settlement measures, promote are at an impasse. The sides have almost no confidence dialogue, devise and carry out measures to facilitate in each other or the conflict resolution process. There is refugee and IDP return, solve problems related to a risk of new explosion. economic reconstruction and monitor human rights. In a bid to change the status quo peacefully, Tbilisi since Additionally it was to coordinate the activities of the November 2006 has supported an alternative de facto Joint Peace Keeping Forces (JPKF), which were to restore South Ossctian administration led by Dmitri Sanakocv, peace and maintain law and order in the zone of conflict. a former official of the prc-Kokoity administration in Tskhinvali. He has been appointed to the Georgian government as head of a new "temporary administration unit" for the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia. He has secured support in Georgian-populated areas6 but whether 1 Georgia abolished the ob last 's autonomous status by 1990 presidentialdecree and refers to South Ossetia as the Tskrum

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Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly Crisis Group Europe Report N°J83, 7 June 2007 Page Z he can gain influence over Ossetian-governed territory II. COMPETING GOVERNMENTS will determine the future of the conflict. Unless Tbilisi engages with Tskhinvali and shows that its takes Ossctians aspirations and concerns seriously, it "'~II be extremely A. SANAKOEV'S EMERGENCE difficult for Sa.nakocv to develop a support base in Ossetian-majority areas. There arc two self-proclaimed, competing authorities in South Ossetia, both struggling to assert their legitimacy locally and internationally. The Tskhinvali-based administration, backed by Russia and now headed by the de facto president, Kokoity, has sought independence since 1990. Jndcpendencc, or unification with Russia's North Ossctia-Alania, appears to be widely supported by Ossetians. The new Sanakoev administration. based in Kurta, a Georgian village in the zone of conflict, pledges allegiance to Tuilisi and territorial integrity.

The competing governments appeared after 12 November 2006, when two sets of de facto presidential elections and status referendums were held.' The one in Tskhinvali reconfinncd Kokoity in office and reiterated the overwhelming will of the region· s population to separate from Georgia. The alternative poll, in the Georgian• administered village of Ercdvi in the zone of conflict, resulted in Sanakoev. an ethnic Ossetian with old ties to a previous Tskhinvali breakaway administration, becoming alternative de facto president.8

This was Tskhinvalis third presidential elcction.9 According to the South Ossetian Central Election Commission (CEC). there were 55, 163 registered voters,

; Thilisi considers electoral processes in the conflict regions illegal and. because !DPs do not participate. unrepresentative. The international community. except for Russia, which is more ambiguous. backs Uic Georgian position, Tbc Russian foreign ministry statement of IO oYember2006 said: .. The presidential election is being held in accordance with the Constitution and constitutional acts of the Republic of South Ossetia ... " Irrespective of Uc incrnatioual reaction, Uic referendum results are an indicator of the sentiments of the South Ossetian population. so must be taken i.rto account politically. Sanakocv was born in I %9 in SouU1 Ossctia. He graduated from the South Ossetian Pedagogical State Institute in I 993, served as a Soviet army officer in Lithuania 1987-1989. In tile 1991-1992 conflict le fought on Uc Ossctian side and in 1993- 1996 worked in the South Ossetian de facto defence ministry, Jn 1996 he was appointed defence minister and in 1998 also vice prime minister. Jn July 200 I he becarrc prime minister of South Ossctia, serving until December 200 I, when Eduard Kokoity replaced Ludvig Chibirov as South Ossetia 's leader. villages are administered by Tskhinvali, It has been impossible 9 Since 1992 three presidential and four parliamentary de facto for the sides to establish clear lines of control over extended elections have been lcld, Clubirov won the first presidential poll areas. There are several key enclaves of Georgian villages, most in 1996,Kokoit)' the secord inDecember2001with over 55 per significantly the mnlem erclave, Tamarasbeni, Achabeti, Kurta, cent of the ' ote in the second round. defeating U1e chairperson Kekiwi, which arc strategically placed along the TransCam road of the de facto parliament and Communist Party regional leader, between Tskhinvali and Java. Tamarasheni and mack Stanislav Kochi.ev. Estimated turnout was 63 per cent. In the the boundaries of the enclave and arc located respectively one first round Kokoity received 47 per cent, Kochicv 24 per cent and 8 km north of Tskhinvali, and Chibirov 21 per cent. "Georgia Conflict Assessment",

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and Kokoity was re-elected with 98.l per cent of the vote.'? Figures released by both sides were obviously inflated. Local civil society, however, criticised the process." ln The upper-end estimates for the population of the entire the simultaneous referendum, Tskhinvali claims 99.88 region fluctuate between 60,000 and 70,000. '6 per cent answered "yes" to the question: "Do you agree that the Republic of South Ossetia preserve its current Sanakoev's power base is in the Georgian-administered status of an independent state and be recognised by the villages in the zone of conflict. He says his movement is international community?" formed "from the local people" and that ethnic Ossctians. including some from Tsk.hinvali, support his The alternative poll was formally organized by the cause and have joined him in Kurta. He and his "Salvation Union of Ossctia", established a few weeks administration admit, however, that they control mostly earlier by Ossctians who served in the previous Tsk.hinvali only Georgian villages," where, they claim, some administration of de facto president Ludvig Chibirov 20,000-25,000, including approximately 8,000 (1996-2001) and by Ossctian activists who live in Georgia Ossctians, live." Even this appears optimistic, proper.'? Tts electoral commission, based in Ercdvi,'3 according to an international observer who regularly claimed 96 per cent of about 57,000 registered voters travels to the villages .19 By April 2007, he had twelve participated and gave Sanakoev 94 per cent of their ministries. staffed by 113 people, including 43 ethnic ballots." The alternative referendum asking for the start of negotiations with Georgia on a federal arrangement for

South Ossetia reportedly received 94 per cent support. A 16 journalist said senior Tbilisi officials urged the international Crisis Group interview, OSCE head of mission. Tbilisi. May 2007. On population estimates. sec Crisis Group Report, press to cover the vote but the Salvation Union turned Avoiding War in South Ossetia, op. cit, pp 5-6. In other Crisis down a request from a Georgian NGO, "Multinational Group interviews. the JPKF commander said there are up Georgia", to monitor it.15 10 50.000 Ossctians and approximately 10.000 Georgians. Tskhinvali authorities said there arc up to 82.000 Ossctians, many of whom move between Tskhinvali and Russia. They prepared for Llte U.S. Agency for International Development argued tliat according to official Georgian electoral data there (USAID), 23 January 2002, p. 36. are only 1-lA(>-l voters in tbe Georgian-controlled areas of the iv 52,443 voted for Kokoity. Other candidates were Leonid old oblast (5,570 in Akhalgori district and iun~ in the villages Tibilov (476 votes), JCC Secretary for the South Ossetian side. in Didi Liakhvi and Patara Liakbvi gorges). Sanakoev said there Inal Pukhayev ( L94 votes), head of the Tskhirrvali district are ~0.000 Ossetians and 35,000 Georgians. administration and Oleg Gabodze (175 votes). I" Crisis Group interview, Dmitri Sanakoev. Tbilisi.. April 2007. 11 According to the de facto foreign minister. Murat Jiocv. tJ1e According to Sanakocv, he most significantly controls the election attracted observers from seventeen countries. including following villages north east of Tskhinvali: Eredvi, Ksuisi, Georgia. Russia. Ukraine. Jordan, Latvia and Venezuela Crisis Vanati. Tamarashcni. Kuna, Dzartscmi. Kckhvi, Kcmcrti, Group interview, de facto foreign ninister, Tskhinvali, March Beloti Didkhcvi and Satikari, The last two arc Ossctian• 2007. On criticism of the process. Crisis Group interview. administered villages. according to an .international military elections observers, Tskhinvali, February 2007. expert. Sanakocv said in LllC Ossctian ' illagcs he controls. few 12 The term "Georgia proper'' is used in this report to describe live. He also said he controls all villages in the Akhalgori the territory currently controlled by the Tbilisi government. The district, expect for Orchosari and Tsiragari which arc Ossctian• organisation was founded on 24 October 2006 by Sanakoev, administered. He claimed links also to Artsevi, a mixed village. Maia Cliigocva-Tsaboshvili (head of uc Tbilisi-based NGO but said he only really controlled Ute Georgian part. He also lber-Ironi Georgian-Ossetian Union), Giogi Chigoev, Teirnuraz claimed a Georgian enclave in the west. on the administrative Jeragoev, Jemal Karkusov (former interior minister in the border with the Georgian region of Racha - Tedeleti Jalabeti secessionist government), Uruzmag Karkusov, and Vladimir and Karzamani. Sec map in Annex C below. Sanakoev of the pro-Tbilisi Ossetian Alania TV. 18 Ibid. The Ossetian figure seems to combine some who live in 13 Eredvi was perceived by many Ossetians as an offensive Georgia proper, others who live in the Georgian-administered choice. It evokes painful collective memories of crimes allegedly areas as part of mixed families and a limited number from conunitted there by ethnic Georgians against ethic Ossetians Tskhinvali. during the war. Crisis Group interview, Tskhinvali, March 2007. 19 According to this source, Georgian gO\ emmeol maps of SouU1 14 "Results of S. Ossctia 'Alternative· Polls Announced", Civil Ossctia claim effective control also over high mountain areas Georgia, 16 November 2006. Other candidates were Maya where nobody lives, and "there is nothing Lo control". Crisis Chigoeva-Tsaboshvili, Gogi Chigoiev, Teimuraz Djeragoiev and Group interview. Tbilisi, June 2007. He calls a map prepared Tamar Charaieva Georgian analysts convinced the alternative by the JPKF "more realistic", though with a discrepancy in the de facto government. is a project of the Georgian power area of Nikozi-Avncvi/Nuli where Tbilisi controls a slightly ministries, say it was hard to find an Ossetian with "a powerful wider area. The village of Artsevi is mixed and Ksuisi is enough name and background"; none of the handful of activists Georgian-controlled. The contrasting maps are reproduced in living in Georgia proper would do. Crisis Group interview, civil Appendix C below. On Tbilisi's map, especially the area of society activist/analyst, Tbilisi. May 2007. Znauri is misportrayed as Georgian-controlled. The other two 15 Crisis Group interview.journalist, Tbilisi March 2007: Crisis large areas which rue marked on Tbilisi's map but not U1e JPKF's Group interview, Multinational Georgia, March 2007. have nearly no settlements.

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Ossetians." Manv of the latter live in Georgia proper. B. SANAKOEV'S DISPUTED PRESENCE Sanakoev says he was initially funded by the "South Ossctia Development Fund", to which contributions arc 1. Tbilisi's view made by Ossetians living in Russia, Georgia and other places. Now that he has been appointed formally to The Georgian government secs Sanakocv as a genuine a Georgian government position, however, he and his Ossetian interlocutor with whom it can negotiate a administration are funded from the state budget? Georgian settlement which would keep South Ossetia in the country. civil society welcomes the change as a way of ensuring It hails the "appearance of local Ossetians who will fight greater transparency and control over resources." for a high level of autonomy and their rights but want to do this with Georgia''26 and argues that he has credibility His "government" is located some 5 kilometres from because he is not only an ethnic Ossetian.. but also a former Tskhinvali. This very proximity is risky. Sanakoev is senior separatist. It calls him a home-grown force with a building a 150-strong spetznaz (special forces) unit. within genuine stake in the Ossetian cause" with more legitimacy his de facto interior ministry. A camp for 25 militiamen than the current Tskhinvali leadership composed "of was set up in Kurta, after the Georgian parliament passed Russian generals and members of special services"." a resolution on the establishment of the temporary territorial unit on 11 April 2007.23 However, he claims the Tbilisi believes Sanakoev can transform hearts and minds, security situation in the zone of conflict has improved, including of political and economic elites, by distributing because "the Georgian side has once and for all abandoned rehabilitation and development aid in the zone of conflict." the war option"." The strategy is to win over the Ossetians by displaying impressive development in the Georgian-administered Sanakocv's main challenge is to gain legitimacy among areas. With government encouragement, Georgian Ossctians, especially in Tskhinvali and areas under its construction and other companies are investing in these control. Many arc opposed to his professed goal of formerly underdeveloped villages, Cinemas and a concert negotiating with Tbilisi a solution through which hall arc being built several banks have opened branches." "Georgians and Ossetians can live together" within A national pharmacy chain will offer drugs at much lower Georgia. He says he had always fought for South Ossctian prices than in Tskhinvali. Georgian officials say economic independence but has come to understand that even Russia development "ill crack the .. siege mentality of a military would never offer more than inclusion in its federation. camp .. _31 produce "a breakthrough in consciousness" and that he sees no perspectives in Kokoitys pro-Russian persuade Ossetians there can be peaceful coexistence in orientation and policies aimed at militarising the Ossetiao.s a unified Georgia." and wants to become part of official negotiations. in which he would support Georgia· s territorial intcgriry" Tuilisi is approaching tbc conflict in an imaginative way but needs to realise the strategy cannot work overnight or solely on the basis of economic incentives. Ossetian aspirations and fears must also be addressed. The

26 Crisis Group interview. secretary to the national security council of Georgia, 13 April 2007. 20 Economy, justice, interior, security, transportation and road =1 Crisis Group imerview, vice prune minister of Georgia. Tbilisi, construction, external relations, education, culture, tourism 13 April 2007. Some in Tbilisi say Sanakocv is Iar-siglucd, and sport, finance, information and press, and presidential realising now, not in a few years when Georgia will be stronger, administration,ibi d. Pre-war Georgia bad an Ossetian population is the t:i.. me lo negotiate a good deal for South Ossetia of some 164,(X)O, approximately 98.000 living in Georgia proper. ::s Crisis Group interview. secretary to the national security The 2002 census listed some 38,000 ethnic Ossetians in the council of Georgia, 13 April 2007. areas controlled by Thilisi. Crisis Group Report Avoiding War ;!) Crisis Group interview. vice prime minister of Georgia, in South Ossetia, op. cit, pp. 5~. Tbilisi, 13 April 2

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Tskhinvali Ossetians doubt Sanakoev can represent their Some in the Georgian leadership or close to it deny they interests ahead of Tbilisi's and regard the strategy as a are behind Sanakoev' s emergence. 39 Vice Prime Minister superficial attempt to co-opt them. If it is driven by the Baramidzc claims "Sanakocv is not our product; rather government's pledge to deliver by summer 2008 on its there are people in Tskhinvali who realize that Georgia election promise to restore Georgia· s territorial integrity, now is different than when the conflict occurred". He the situation couJd explode. emphasises that while Sanakocv represents "genuine local population, he is no longer a separatist"." Others say Georgia is in parallel working to de-legitimise Kokoity and propping up his venture is risky but worth it because "no his administration. It considers him a criminal but says it alternatives are visible, we cannot tolerate the status quo, is ready to negotiate with any group in South Ossctia, and the hope is that in the long run this will work"." including him. President Saakashvili says "the VC1)1 fact that we made some sort of a gesture to Kokoity is Nevertheless, it is evident that the Georgian government significant'?" but Tskhinvali considers the formal helped create Sanakocv. He himself admits Georgian help invitations to dialogue as empty pledges. That Kokoity was key," and he openly co-operates with Tbilisi, which is labcUed a criminal diminishes the readiness to engage is engaged in a not so subtle effort to build his credibility. with Thilisi in good faith. Kokoitys group and others Sanakocv and Saakashvili met on 19 March 2007.4~ with anti-Tbilisi views believe Georgia is calibrating its Sessions with governmental officials and the ruling messages to what the international community expects National Movement party followed, including with the to hear so as to gain more political and financial support." speaker of the parliament on 4 May.41 Saakashvili gained Indeed, Saakashvili's speeches abroad differ in tone and opposition support for the Sanakoev project at a 28 March content from the ones delivered at home. 35 meeting where he let it be understood he would not tolerate dissent." On 17 April. leaders ofthc Industrialists Since the international community and especially Russia party met in Kurta with Sanakoev and donated 500,000 sec Kokoity as a player, Tbilisi is trying to keep him lari (approximately $298,000) to economic projects; involved in a minor way while marginalising him. But on 23 April it was the turn of the New Rights party .46 moving him aside while building confidence with his Georgian civil society is also being encouraged to work constituency is difficult. Georgia needs to engage groups with Sanakoev even if they do not always recognise him around him which support the separatist movement not as a credible interlocutor. 47 just concentrate on a dcaJ with those Ossctians who arc inclined to agree with it. Indeed, there seems to be a growing sense in the Georgian leadership that "confidence building has not worked?" and a growing conviction that sticks arc more efficient than There is tension carrots." campaign to "repent" mistakes lliat lead to Ilic" ar in Abkhazia, between the government's rhetoric and the manner in It did not get wide support. Another civil society activist says which its initiatives are implemented. Tbilisi has also the leadership and elites have no interest in dealing with the shown only a half-hearted willingness to take responsibility past. Crisis Group interview. Tbilisi. May 2007. President for past injustices or engage in transitional justice efforts." Saakashvilisa id: ··we need not apologise, it is to us they should apologise. for they have violated our and our children 's · rights", lmed.i News.. 4 May 2007 (in Georgian) at hnpJ/imedinews.ge/ ~c/uews rcad/37379. 9 Crisis Group interviews. Tbilisi, April 2007. 33 Text of report by Georgian TV Mze on 7 May 2007, as 41i Crisis Group interview. Giorgi Baramidze. Tbilisi, 11 April translated by the BBC Monitoring Service. 2007. 34 Crisis Group interview, de facto official, Tskhinvali, April 41 Crisis Group interview. Georgian official, lbilisi. April 2007. 2007. 4' Crisis Group interview. Dmitri Sanakoev, March 2007. 35 Crisis Group interview. ci ...i l society activist Tbilisi. May 43 "Saakashvili Meets S. Ossctian Alternative Leader", Civil 2007. According to several interlocutors, speeches in Georgian Georgia.19March2007. are more assertive than those for foreign consumptiou and show '"1 "Saakashvili to Meet S. Ossetian Alternative Leader". Civil limited patience for Ossctian or Abkhaz aspirations. One called Georgia. 5 May 2007. the speeches "belligerent". especially if 4~ "Saakashvili Discusses 'South Ossctia Administration' with delivered at a military facility. Opposition", Civil Georgia. 29 March 2007. Crisis Group 36 Crisis Group interviews. senior Georgian officials. Tbilisi. interview, chi! society activist Thilisi. May 2007. According April 2007. to opposition intcrtocuiors. it is rare for Saakashvili to seek their 37 Crisis Group interview, diplomat citing a meeting with a support and thus indicative of how high this issue is on his senior Georgian official, Thilisi. May 2007. agenda. 38 A few Georgian civil society activists say it is time for Tbilisi 46 "Opposition MPs Visit South Ossetian Conflict Zone", Civil to apologise for mistakes in the early 1990's which lead to the Georgia. 23 April 2007. two conflicts. On 14 March 2007 Ilic Human Riglus Inlormation ·11 Crisis Group interview. civil society activist, Thilisi. June and Documentation Centre, an NGO, launched a public "Sorry" 2007.

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Many in Tbilisi are pleased the government is trying non• Tskhinvali,55 whose chief negotiator, Boris Chochiev, violence but some civil activists warn that Sanakoev may claims Thilisi wants to provoke a civil war in South cause further confrontation and docs not promote genuine Ossctia, which would justify a broader, internationally• dialogue with Ossetians." Others fear he .. may gamble sanctioned Georgian intervention.i" Civil society with causes as easily as with money?" or tum against representatives from South Ossctia confirm that Sanakoev Tbilisi after he has built himself up." and his administration arc view cd as traitors by a majority of Ossetians in Tskhinvali and areas under its control .57 TI1c Georgians also want the international community to recognise Sanakoev. They invited him to detail his Nevertheless, not all are happy with internal developments platform at a NA TO Parliamentary Assembly seminar on in Tskhinvali. An activist opposed to Kokoity said: 19-20 April" and encourage ambassadors and international Nobody in South Ossetia supports the idea of organisations to see him. The response has been cautious unification with Georgia but Sanakoev could have but his appointment to an official Georgian government emerged because of Kokoity 's mistakes: Kokoity position gives him a legal status which makes contacts won the first election fairlv but the second time easier. Since then Tbilisi has included him in meetings around he did everything to prevent any alternative between the state minister on conflicts and senior from emerging. We could not show the world that international interlocutors. 52 within the Ossctian society free choices arc possible, so the Georgians did it on our behalf. "8 2. The Tskhinvali view Another called Sanakoev ·"the product of our dependence Tskhinvali views Sanakocv as a Quisling and details his on Russia ... s-J But none of this means he is an acceptable gambling debts, which were allegedly paid by Tbilisi alternative. to buy his loyalty. As proof of Sanakocv 's lack of trustworthiness and credibility. it also cites his alliances The link with Russia presents strong opportunities for with the Karkusov brothers, who arc claimed to be wanted economic profiteering in South Ossetia, including among by lntcrpol." Most importantly it claims Sanakocv has the de facto lcadcrship/" but there is a genuine self• no real support among ethnic Ossetians. and his only real determination drive. The idea of .. Alania" - a unified constituency is the Georgian govemment." North-South Ossetia61 - is very strong. Many Ossetians recognise it ' ould be achievable only within Russia, to Sanakoevs emergence is portrayed as a direct threat to which Tbilisi would never agree. Not all Ossetians want the peace process: "Saakashvili is not interested in real that either; some of the more radical elites arc openly anti• peace but in the destruction of confidence", Sanakocv 's Russian/? But they see no way to engage meaningfully law enforcement arm is a great concern, especially '' ith Georgia as long as it claims tbe conflict is political, as their numbers are seen as high for the size of the not ethnic, and denigrates Ossetian self-determination population, and they arc stationed very close to with Saakashvili statements like "the Georgian-Ossetian conflict docs not exist at all'".63 Tf Sanakocv is seriously

'1~ Crisis Group interview, civic activist, Tbilisi, March 2007. ~9 Crisis Group interview. civic activist. lbilisi, April 2007. 50 Public debate on U\C situation in SouU1 Ossctia al lhc Heinrich Boll Foundation, lbilisi, 18 April 2007. 55 Ibid. The Ossetian side claims up to 1,500 law enforcers, 51 The Georgian side considered this the first international including military-type special troops. are to be posted in the acknowledgement of diverse opinions in U1e zone of conflict Georgian-administered enclave north of Tskhinvali. OSCE and that there are forces interested in a constructive dialogue. monitors have reported a unit of 25 militiamen armed with NATO co-organisers bad not planned on Sanakoevs assault ri.flles. The munber of militia in Kuna-controlled areas is ~articipal ion. to grow to 150, according to U'IC KuI1a de facto edministraiion 2 56 · For example, Sanakoev was present at a meeting between Crisis Group interview, JCC co-chair for the South Ossetian State Minister Antadze and Sir Brian Fall UK's Special side. Tskhinvali, April 2007. Representative 10 the South Caucasus. The Stale Ministry's 57 Crisis Group interviews, Tskhinvali, February 2007. T nfonnation for Press. 31 May 2007. 58 Crisis Group interview. Tskhinvali, February 2007. 53111e brothers are from a family in the Ossetian-controlled Java 59 Crisis Group interview, Tskhinvali, April 2007. valley and held high posts in the past de facto govemrreni Tbeir ~Crisis Group interview, international expert. Tbilisi, May 2007. house was burned attcr they became involved with Sanakocv. 61 Many Ossctians desire a united Ossctia/Alania and consider Crisis Group interview, adviser to the de facto Ossetian leader. the division of Georgia's South Ossetia and Russia's North Tskhinvali, 8 April 2007. Neither brother is on publicly Ossetia-Alania arbitrary. Crisis Group interviews, Tskhinvali, accessible Interpol lists. lbilisi, April 2(Xl7. 54 Tskhinvali also blames "U.S. special services" for his rise. 62 Crisis Group interviews. Tskhinvali, March-April 2007. Crisis Group interview, advisers to de facto Ossetian leader, 63 "Saakashvih Rejects Tenns 'Ooorgian-Abklaz' and Tskhinvali, 8 April 2007. 'Georgian-Ossetian' Conflict", Civil Georgia, 15 March 2007.

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to champion Ossetian interests, he needs to gain the on the chance of a peaceful settlement"." By trying to support of its anti-Russian elites. Tbilisi needs to legalise the de facto alternative authorities, "Tbilisi is understand Ossetian perceptions and anger in order to undermining the foundations of the peaceful settlement develop an appropriate strategy to address grievances. process based on unconditional international recognition of and Tskhinvali as legitimate parties to the Representatives of ethnic Ossetians living in Georgia conflicts and accordingly to the negotiations for their proper are also sceptical of Sanakoev .M Tbilisi claims peaceful settlement". Moscow further says Georgia is South Ossctians arc only a small part of the Ossetian nation trying to create artificial negotiation partners bound to and should not dictate the Ossetian self-determination accept its positions." project. This further strengthens the South Ossctian perception that their identity is disrespected. But even The U.S. has welcomed the addition of new actors. Unlike Ossetians in Tbilisi say Sanakoev has little chance to Russia, it does not believe there are "internationally succeed because the national idea in South Ossctia is recognised sides to the conflict" and wants creation of strong, and Georgia has still to prove it respects national a forum which '~~II produce results." Deputy Assistant minority rights even on the territory it controls." One Secretary of State Bryza said Thilisi · s approach towards activist said the govcnunent has pressured Ossctians in the conflict "sounds like exactly the approach we have Georgia proper to support Sanakoev and to participate in discussed ... with [Georgian] leaders for the last few the Eredvi election." Ossetians living in South Ossetia years"." or refugees in North Ossetia often view their kin in Georgia proper with suspicion. The predominant view in The EU has yet to define a policy on Sanakoev. According Tskhinvali is that they are manipulated . .,, to a European diplomat. Tbilisi claims Sanakoev has support among Ossetians but "we have no way of Tskhinvali is dead set against Sanakocv gaining any corroborating that"." There is a strong sense, however, international legitimacy. It wants to prevent any contact that Tskhinvali cannot dictate who should be the between him and international representatives and international community's interlocutors. This could threatens to declare anyone who travels to Kurt.a to meet become particularly sensitive with respect to the with him persona non grata." This further narrows space implementation of donor-funded rehabilitation projects for constructive engagement in the zone of conflict. in the zone of conflict as discussed below.

3. The international view C. THE NEW TEMPORARYAD MINISTRATIVE Russia believes Sanakocv's administration was created UNIT by the Georgian special services'" or interior ministry." lt has accused Tbilisi of introducing "another dangerous Over the past several months. Tbilisi has adopted new factor. .. which will have an extremely negative influence laws to further legitimise Sanakoev and move forward on resolving South Ossetia 's status within Georgia. A "Law on the Creation of Appropriate Conditions for Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in the Fonner Autonomous Saakashvili speeches with welcoming sentences in Ossetian do District of South Ossetia" passed on 13 April" aims to: not balance comments like "docs the Ossclian side exist at all?" 64 Crisis Group, Tbilisi, April 2007. [f]acilitate participation of local communities 65 Crisis Group interview. March 2007. including all ethnic groups and political 66 Crisis Group interview, April 2007. Ethnic Osscl.ians who did forces ... through delegation of authority from not flee Georgia proper during the conflict or have returned have the central government to local community typically had a low political profile. An Ossetian civil society representatives, to create conditions for granting representative said they reel like a minority with few rights. European-style autonomy to the region, Some are active in Sanakoev's administration. guaranteeing political self-governance and 67 Crisis Group interview, Tskhinvali, April 2007. 68 The OSCE Mission to Georgia is in a particularly precarious position because or its presence in Ilic zone of conflict. Ossctian authorities have warned they will disallow its operation in 71 "Russia's MFA Stateroent on the Propaganda Campaign the Ossetian-controlled part of the zone if it engages with Organised by Georgia around Sanakoevs Puppet Regime". 30 the alternative administration. Crisis Group interview, Western March 2007 at www.mid.ru, diplomat, Tbilisi, April 2007. 72 "Statement". Borodavkin, op. cit. 69 "Statement Regarding U1e So-Called 'Alternative 73 Crisis Group interx iew. Tuilisi. April 2007. Governments' of Abkhazia and South Ossetia", Alexey 74 ''U.S. Backs Tbilisi's Conflict Resolution Plan", Civil Georgia, Borodavk:in, pennanent representative of the Russian Federation l April 2007. at Uic meeting of tlc OSCE Pennancnt Council, 22 March 2007. 75 Crisis Group interview. Wcstcrndiplomat, Tbilisi, May 2007. '°Crisis Group interview, Tskhinvali, 5 April 2(Xl7. 76 See the official website of the parliament, www.parfiarrent.ge.

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preservation of national identity and cultural rights provocations." He also said measures were needed to of ethnic Ossetians residing in the area; and to prepare remove Sanakoev from the territory of the "Republic appropriate conditions for democratic elections in the South Ossctia?" and warned that his regime would not region." resume talks with the Georgian government until Tbilisi renounced further contacts Sanakocv .86 Exchanges of It farther stipulates creation of a transitional administrative fire overnight 12-13 May injured one Georgian and one unit to work with central authorities to further economic South Ossetian pol ice officer." In response to Kokoity, rehabilitation of the region, ensure that the interests of lbilisi threatened that it might be forced to "neutralise" everyone in the region are represented and determine the separatist forces in the region." region's final status. The Georgian leadership argues South Ossctia's "temporary administrative unit" status is provisional, and the region will eventually receive the greatest autonomy possible?' Although from the Georgian constitutional perspective this may be a breakthrough," the new status is rejected by the significant part of the Ossctian constituency represented by Tskhinvali.

On 23 April, President Saakashvili detailed additional measures: there should be an appointed head of the temporary administration and a budget; members of the new administration would be deputy ministers in the interior, economic development. finance, education and sciences, health and social welfare, culture. justice, agriculture and environment ministries and have specific mandates on issues pertinent to South Ossetia," On 8 May, the parliament passed a resolution, based on the April law. setting up the temporary administrative unit." 111c appointment of Sanakoev as its head followed. and on 10 May he addressed the parliament in his new capacity, saying that the Ossetian people· s future was "only in a democratic and stable Georgia"."

The security situation in the zone of conflict deteriorated sharply, and the sides entered into a round of competing statements and accusations. On 11 May, Kokoity announced on Ossctian TV and radio that the TransCam road'" would be closed to traffic and accused Tbilisi of

77 Georgian government's non-paper on Ute draft law. shared with the international community in March 2007. 7~ Crisis Group interview, vice prime minister of Georgia. Tbilisi, 13 ApriJ 2007. 79 Georgia abolished the oblast's autonomous status on 22 enclave of Georgian villages in the zone of conflict and on to November 1990. Decision of the Supreme Council of the Russia across the Caucasus mountain chain Republic of Georgia. signed by the first president. Zviad 84 South Ossctian website at wwwcominf.org, 11 May 2007: Gamsakhurdia at www.parliament.ge. "Tskhinvali Says it Closes Down Roads in Conflict Zone", Civil ~0 Text of report by Georgian TV Rustavi 2 on 23 April 2007, Georgia. 11 May 2007. Concrete barricades were placed on as translated by the BBC Monitoring Service. The plan was the road unveiled to the national security council in a televised session. &5 South Ossctian website www.cominf.org, 11May2007. 81 http://eng.primeoewsonline.com/news/121/ARTlCLE/13420 86 RFE/RL Newsline. 8 Mav 2007. /2007-05-08.html. 87 "Tskhinvali Partly Re-opens Roads", Civil Georgia, 15 May 82 Speaking in Ossctian with the diplomatic corps present, 2007. Moscow criticised Kokoity for the road closures. After his he called the "current rulers of Tskhinvali and their foreign trip to Russia he relaxed the measuresaod seems to be pursuing supervisor" responsible that "people maintain constant fear a less confrontationallire . Crisis Group interview, Thilisi. May and hatred towards our Georgian brothers", Civil Georgia, 11 2007. May 2005. 88 Staterrent by cha.innan of the parliament's ad hoc commission 83 TransCam is Ute main road through the zone of conflict, on territorial imcgruy. reported by Georgian TV Rustavi 2 on 29 passing from Georgiaproper through Tskhinvali and the northern May 2007, as posted by BBC Monitoring.

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Ill. STALLED NEGOTIATIONS personnel hold high posts in the de facto government," and Moscow has given additional aid - direct budgetary support, pensions and banking and simplified visa regimes. Negotiations between Thilisi and Tskhinvali within It gives South Ossetians passports, thus facilitating their the JCC framework arc deadlocked. The quadrilateral travel but also meaning that if fighting breaks out again, commission groups the Georgian, South Ossctian, North it could cite an obligation to intervene to protect its citizens Ossetian and Russian sides. Not without merit, Thilisi abroad." secs it as a "three against one" arrangement. Most JCC decisions since 2004 have not been implemented. Since Unless formats are changed to reflect Georgia's perceived August 2006 several rounds of sterile talks and informal need for a mechanism in which its interests and security meetings failed even to produce a protocol or a press fears are considered equally, it is unlikely to engage statement. Jn the past JCC sessions focussed on security, in genuine dialogue and confidence building." Moscow economic cooperation, refogee/TDP return and, to a much should recognise that it is in the common interest to use lesser degree, status. Today the sides appear capable of its influence to encourage South Ossctians to take a more talking constructively only about economic issues and to open-minded approach, including on format changes. a much lesser extent security. TI1c Georgian position is that "existing formats arc non• transparent largely ineffective and dominated by a non• The diplomatic breakdown is closely linked to inability honest and biased broker .... Regrettably, the Russian side to agree on the conflict's root causes. Both sides arc also has become not a bridge, but a wall preventing direct setting preconditions for resuming talks. The Georgians dialogue between the parties to the conflicts", Tbilisi wants view Russia as a dishonest broker, whose role must to convert the negotiations format to one of "bilateral be limited. They insist on changing the negotiation and dialogue between the Georgian and the South Ossctian peacekeeping formats to a direct dialogue, with Russia side in the framework of the Delegations Empowered with no longer the main facilitator but the OSCE. EU and U.S. Special Authority" under the patronage of t:he OSCE'', also taking part. The South Ossetians sec Tbilisi as a threat, want no format changes but instead seek formal guarantees on non-use of force. Neither side has gained 92 Ibid: Crisis Group interview, interior ministry official, March what it wants. Sanakoev and the temporary administrative 2007. Saakashvili often implies Russian special services unit are likely to press for a seat at the table if the JCC is involvement: "[Tjhe idea that Ossetians cannot Live in retained. independen1 Georgia ... is being said by some [separatist Prime Minister] Morozov, some [fonner separatist Defence Minister] Barankcvich, some Ivanov and representatives of some other A. THE JOINT CONTROL COMMlSSION agencies who have oo ties whatsoever to tbis territory", speech to reservists in Scnaki, 2 April 2007. translated by BBC Georgia secs the conflict as political, possibly territorial, Monitoring. 91 but not ethnic. not between Georgians and Ossctians, but Crisis Group interview, Russian embassy adviser, Tbilisi. April 2007. Georgia accuses Russia of attempting to annex South rather between Georgia and Russia.89 lt maintains that Ossetia ard Abkhazia by "passportisation", while residents there Russia cannot be an honest broker or facilitaror," because argue they nocd passports for ITTIYcl Tbey arc mostly unwilling it is trying to annex Georgian territories. According to to use Georgian travel documents. While acceptance of a Tbilisi, Russia sends illegal military support through passport may imply fonnal acceptance of citizenship, many say the Roki tunnel." Russian military and secret service they feel no obligation. Duma rnerroers, however. increasingly refer to ethnic Ab.kbaz and Ossetians with Russian passports as Russian citizens. Jn JuJy 2006 the Russian foreign minister 89 Saakashvili insists the conflicts are not ethnic and been warned Georgia it would protect its citizens in die oontlict regions created by "silly and unaware people". In his annual state of the "by all means at our disposal", Interview with Sergey Lavrov, nation address he said "tbc Gcorgian-Ossctian conllict docs not "Don't touch Russians". Konnnersani, 20 July 2006. exist at all. This is one more fabricationby imperiaJ ideologues". 94 "If Russians ard Ossetians show us trey are ready to seriously He says Georgia "is constantly being threatened, They are talk by allowing monitoring of Rok.i for instance, we will be threatening to cut off parts of our territory", speech to military able to come up with a whole set of constructive proposals", personnel in Samgori, 4 April 2007, ML.c TV. translated by BBC said an interior ministry official, Crisis Group interview. Thilisi. Monitoring. May 2007. w Crisis Group imerview, vice prime minister of Georgia, 13 95 "Delegations Empowered with Special Authority" for April 2007. resolution of the conflict were set up by Georgia's president, 91 Thilisi considers the Rok.i tunnel, connecting Russia's North . and South Ossetia's leader, Ludvig Ossetia-Alania and SouU1 Ossetia, a particularly sore point. II Chibirov, in August 1996. They were to launch and guide the has no possibility to control or monitor this part of its border process for full resolution, unlike the more limited JCC. The with Russia, which hinders demilitarisation of the zone of first meeting. on 5 March 1997 in Moscow, adopted terms of conflict (sec below). and presents trafficking concerns. Crisis reference, which foresaw ex-pert groups to prepare proposals Group interview, vice prime minister of Georgia, 13 April 2CXJ7. for solutions of political and legal aspects. See statements on

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with participation of the U.S., EU and Russia as facilitators on a change of the negotiations format.'?" It has proposed and guarantors of peace." a meeting of the highest political leaders of the four J CC sides to consider this. According to a Western diplomat, TI1c JCC mechanism has been inefficient since the 2004 however, this is not considered a realistic suggestion.'?' escalation, with neither side implementing its decisions, but the positions became more radical in and after the JCC The South Ossetian co-chair says Tbilisi is trying to Moscow meeting in August 2006. Even continuation of squeeze Russia out and destroy the only functioning dialogue has become subject to the Georgian precondition negotiating mechanism. while accusing South Ossetia of for format change, and the sides have been unable to get misconduct so as to secure Western sympathy. Tbilisi- s beyond repeating basic positions." attempt to broaden the negotiations format, he says, is not "correct": Moscow has been involved in the process since In March 2007, Georgia agreed to limited use of the the ceasefire was signed and has significantly contributed JCC but continued to emphasise that it wanted to rely on to the rehabilitation and development of the region.'?' «Delegations Empowered with Special Authority", a bilateral Georgian-South Ossctian mechanism. for any Moscow perceives Tbilisi as the cause of unjustifiably substantive talks. Before an informal JCC session in long breaks in the talks due to unwillingness to work Istanbul, it tabled a memorandum detailing this approach." in existing formats'P' and is reluctant to discuss its In that meeting, on 2 l-22 March, the sides continued proposals.'?' Nor has Tbilisi seriously approached Russia. consultations on the security situation in the zone of Instead. officials say the "cruder the Russian practice, the conflict, the OSCE-led economic rehabilitation program better for Tbilisi - the international community will see and law enforcement cooperation, and the co-chairs agreed what RtLSSia is really worth".'?" Overall Georgian-Russian to prepare a formal JCC in Tbilisi?> However, strong relations do not bode well for finding a mutually acceptable disagreement remained on the future of the negotiations way forward.l'" Georgia has a legitimate desire to change process.'?" An informal consultative meeting of the co• the negotiation format but to succeed it must engage with chairmen in Tskhinvali on 19 April failed to reach any the other JCC members and look for a compromise, new agreements.'?' rather then try to impose its will with outside support.'!"

Tskhinvali wants no format changes, which would South Ossctia wants to retain the current process and is undoubtedly cost it part of the political support it gets pushing a three-stage peace plan, with status issues to be from Moscow. It accuses Tbilisi of blocking JCC work considered only at the end .111 But it needs to recognise that for many months'f and argues that it is a working-level unless Tbilisis own concerns and fears connected to mechanism with no mandate to consider, let alone decide Russia arc taken into account, the talks will get nowhere. Beyond its criticism of Tbilisi for trying to change the

meetings between Shevardnadze and Chibirov in Java, 14 103 As set up by tbc 1992 Sochi agreement between the leaders November 1997 and Vladikavkaz, 27 August 1996. The expert of Georgia and Russia. groups met ten times. lf>ct Crisis Group interview, Wcstem diplomat. Tbilisi, 17 March 96 "Basic Principles", op. cit., p. 3. 2007. 97 Crisis Group interview, W estern diplomat. Thilisi April 2007. 105 Crisis Group interview, JCC co-chair for tbc SouU1 Ossclian 98 "On Agreeing Further Activities Aimed at Final Settlement side. Tskhinvali, 5 April 2

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Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly Crisis Group Europe Report N°J83, 7 June 2007 Page 11 format, Tskhinvali has made next to no suggestions on chairs agreed the process should be in three-stages with how to overcome the impasse. demilitarisation and confidence building and social and economic rehabilitation preceding a political settlement." 3 In order to deal with the vulnerabilities that Thilisi and That month, Prime Minister Noghaideli offered a "detailed Tskhinavili feel, the sides should agree on changing road map for rue stage by stage implementation of the the negotiations format to one that emphasises direct peace plan", with timclincs for the planned Georgian Georgian-Ossetian dialogue and gives the EU Special activities.114 Representative for the South Caucasus (EUSR) a role on a par with Russia and the OSCE. Substantive dialogue To begin with, those activities would include: enacting with EU, Russian and OSCE involvement should initially a law on restitution and compensation for those who tackle step-by-step, confidence-building measures. suffered in the 1989-1992 conflict; inviting refugees including security and economic rehablitiation, as to return home from North Ossetia; promoting broad discussed below. Until the change of formats is negotiated, Gcorgian-Ossctian contacts; organising with donors a the sides should use the JCC mechanism for the day-to• needs-assessment study to launch economic rehabilitation, day management of security and other practical matters including a free trade zone, contingent on enhanced border in order to avoid a breakdown of contacts. controls especially for the Roki tunnel.'!" The needs assessment study was completed and the economic rehabilitation program launched, with international B. PEACE PLANS support,'!" but there is room for improvement. The Law on Restitution and Compensation was passed in December Since 2004, the sides have come up with several unilateral 2006 but there arc no signs of implementation. This is a proposals for resolving the conflict. Tuilisi · s plans offer crucial opportunity for Tbilisi to prove to Ossctians its Tskhi:nvali the widest possible autonomy within Georgia commitment to reconciliation. but have not detailed what that would mean in practice. They call for confidence-building, demilitarisation and Kokoity proposed his own peace plan in December rehabilitation and development of the zone of conflict. 2005.117 Its three stages arc: demilitarisation, confidence The Ossetians have rejected any discussion of status building and security guarantees; social and economic within Georgia, put forward their own initiative and been ready to cooperate on development and rehabilitation and furthering confidence, including demilitarisation. of Europe, 26 January 2005 at www.president.gov.ge, The plan offered autonomy and an executive branch and parliament to Tbilisi wishes to engage with Tskhinvali and solve the deal with culture. education. social policy. economic policy, conflict peacefully but on its own terms. It is frustrated public order. local self-govemarce and environment Language that Tskhinvali has Russian backing and correctly says it rights and status would be granted. education policy removes any Ossetian motivation to look for solutions. decentralised. The need to cultivate conditions for economic A compromise on territorial integrity is unacceptable for development was mentioned and a special law on property Georgia, whose proposals all insist that South Ossetia restitution Mixed Georgian and Ossctian police. under must first accept it is part of Georgia, after which it will international auspices would guararree order and free movement. be possible to address other issues. A better approach Saakashvili called on the Council of Europe to act as facilitator. the OSCE as peace monitor. tbe EU as peace guarantor and would build confidence on a range of topics and only then Russia as a constructive partner for peace. tackle status. More than anything, Tskhinvali wants Tbilisi 113 Crisis Group interview, international expert, Tbilisi, March and the international community to show more respect 2007. for Ossetian aspirations and security concerns. 111 Presented at U-c OSCE Pcrmarcn Council in October 2005. "Georgia's Action Plan: on South Ossetia: A Test for the Initially, Georgia said it was willing to settle the conflict Intemational Community". the Jamestown Foundation, vol. 2, by steps, starting with confidence building, ending with no. 219. 23 November 2005. The timetable aimed for decisive status. Saakashvili unveiled a peace plan after the 2004 progress between two OSCE year-end ministerial conferences, escalation, on 21 September at the UN, and in January in Ljubljana December 2005 and Brussels December 2006. 2005 he outlined a three-stage plan focusing on confidence 115 Actions to be negotiated with the Russian and South building, demilitarisation, law enforcement, a greater Ossctian sides have not been agreed, 116 international role and autonomy. Several months later, Georgia has won significant international support. The he offered South Ossetia "a distinctly broader form of December 2005 OSCE ministerial (Ljubljana) endorsed tile autonomy than it had in Soviet times and than North ~cc plan. 17 In a letter to Presidents Putin and Saakashvili and OSCE Ossetia has in the Russian Federation" and a thrcc-vcar heads of state. at the end of a five-day visit to the region by transition.l'? In Moscow, 24-25 October, the JCC. co- Russian Ambassador Kenyakin. "The Initiative of President of South Ossetia on the Peaceful Resolution of the Georgian• Ossctian Conflict". Regnum. at www.rcgnum.ru/news/ 112 Saakashvili address, Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 558935.html.

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rehabilitation; and political settlement. It also calls for a IV. SECURITY ISSUES working group to elaborate a joint South Ossetian-Georgian conflict resolution plan. Georgian Prime Minister Noghaideli publicly welcomed the initiative and said A. THREATS the two plans coincided on a number of issues.!" 1. Perceptions Indeed there was a lot of common ground but the perceptions of deadlines and time frames differed The sides have radically different perceptions of the source dramatically. While the Georgians were set on progress of security threats in the conflict zone. While Georgia feels by the end of 2006, the Russians and South Ossetians vulnerable to Moscow, South Ossetia regards Thilisi as a were wary of engaging on political and status issues threat. Tbilisi accuses Russia of supplying South Ossetia quickly. No breakthrough has been achieved, due to with militaryequi pment and ammunition through the Roki mutual distrust, combined with militarisation on both sides tunncl.f" Tbilisi argues that the lack of comprehensive and a lack of genuine political will.119 JCC meetings in control over Roki makes South Ossctia "a black hole", 2006 were inconclusive, with escalating rhetoric and a which poses global security challengcs.!" 1t claims crisis in Georgian-Russian relations further undermining that South Ossctia is the source of trafficking of risky confidence, and only informal JCC consultations have substances, including arms-grade radioactive materials, taken place in 2007.12CJ and the production of counterfeit U.S. dollars.1 ~~ The OSCE Mission has floated several initiatives. While Tbilisi considers Russian peacekeepers on its territory Tbilisi urges with little prospect expanding the format to a direct threat: "the ineffective and biased peacekeeping include international players, the OSCE suggests an and negotiating formats directly contribute to a crawling informal consultative group (EU, U.S., Russia and others) annexation of Georgia's territories't.P' It wants to see to provide the Georgian and Ossetian sides advice the JPKF .. replaced with truly impartial. international and legal or financial aid and develop ideas for ways police forces, if necessary furnished with peacekeeping forward.'!' This has not been implcmctcd. partly because elemencs··126 Tue latest Georgian proposals foresee that of rotation of ambassadors in Tbilisi. but it should be the sides should come up with ..princi ples and modalities pursued further. of the Joint Police Force composed of Georgian and South Ossctian police components operating under a joint

118 "Kokoity's Proposal Triggers Cautious Optimism in Tbilisi", Civil Georgia. 20 December 2005. 1:::: l l!I The JCC in Moscow on 27-28 December 2005 was to create Crisis Group interviews, interior ministry. lbilisi. March a working group to elaborate a joint plan on conflict resolution 27: Crisis Group interview, national security council, Tbilisi, in line with the proposals but did not agree on composition, size 13 April 2007. A parliament resolution, 11October2005. asks: and mandate. The Russians and South Osscuans wanted up to ·' Wberc and how did numerous pieces of new Russian bcav y 40 representatives from the sides, the OSCE and EU to work on military equipment appear on the territory of the former South ti~ three stages. The Georgians said the group should focus only Osscoan Autonomous Oolast, the entire administrative perimeter on political issues as oilier aspects had been agreed in principle. of which borders only Georgia and the Russian Federation?" Crisis Group interview, imcrnational expert, Tbilisi. March 121 Crisis Group interview, senior official. Tbilisi, April 2007. 2007. 124 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Tbilisi, April 2007. 120 On 22 June 2006 the JCC met in Tskhinvali. for the first Uranium smuggling reports have involved Ossetians in time with Georgian Interior Minister Mcrabishvili mid Iris de Vladikavkaz and Tskhinvali but Ute substance was intercepted facto counterpart, Mindzaev, to discuss law enforcement and a when smuggled through the official Russia/Georgia border working group to harmonise peace initiatives. A regular JCC crossing. The smugglers apparently tried to find buyers in meeting in July was postponed a month due to deteriorating Tskhinvali, Crisis Group interview. Lawrence Sheets. autlor of relations. On 8 July Russia closed the only legalb order crossing. .. Smuggler's Plot", op. cit in Kazbegi-Verkhnii Lars. requiring vehicles going south to izs "Basic Principles".op . cit Tbilisi argues that tbe peacekeepers Georgia to use the Roki tunnel. On 14 July Georgia closed that in South Ossctia grossly fail in their mandate, specifically road. On 14-15 July, its military police detained JCC co-chair, to disarm illegal armed formations. liquidate fortifications Popov, and the deputy commander of Russian land forces, and oversee withdrawal of heavy military equipment. Valeri Evneevich, and hampered their travel in and out of Ille JZ6 Ibid. p. 3. Georgia places hopes for new peacekeepers on zone of conflict. A 17 July JCC session was not held but the GUAM. the regional organisation grouping Georgia, Ukraine, four co-chairs reconfirmed the JCC as "the only mechanism Azerbaijan and Moldova, whose members are discussing allowing ... dilogue among tile conflicting parties in a legitimate joint approaches to frozen conflicts. including creation of a format", and their desire for its further work. "Joint Statement peacekeeping battalion. Crisis Group interview, ministry of of JCC Co-chairmen". 17 July 2006. foreign affairs. March 2007. The South Ossetians (and Abkhaz). 121 Crisis Group interview, OSCE official, Tbilisi, March 2007: however. view GUAM as unsympathetic to sclf-detennination Crisis Group interview, OSCE head of mission, April 2007. movements.

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command"!" lbilisi is especially keen that joint police integrity",':" is taken as a threat. Tskhinvali considers cover the entire territory of South Ossetia as delimitated the foreign military training and equipment Georgia by the December 1991 administrati vc borders of the receives':" and its increasing contribution to operations in former Autonomous Oblast.!" Iraq as a way of improving offensive capabilities,':" so "for South Ossctia to disband its own forces would be a The proposals followed a parliamentary resolution on serious mistake"!" 18 July 2006 calling for the government to arrange for suspension of the peacekeeping operations and The Georgian leadership dismisses these concerns. It says withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from South Ossetia it has repeatedly committed to non-use of force in the peace and Abkhazia.129 This was the strongest of a series of plans, which all call for peaceful resolution. It justifies the resolutions critical of Russian peacekeepers in Georgia, military spending as part of the effort to bring the army declaring them a major obstacle to a political settlement."? closer to NA TO standards and interoperability. TI1at budget is opaque, however, and Western diplomats say The Ossctians, however, consider Russia their security T-72 tanks, self-propelled artillery and large quantities guarantor. Before the start of demilitarization and any of ammunition are among acquisitions in recent years. 136 change in peacekeeping arrangements is discussed, they There is no specific agreement on non-use of force, and demand guarantees in an agreement on non-use of force Tskhinvali notes that the previous documents did not or non-resumption of hostilities. Their chief negotiator prevent the 2004 escalation.':" Perceptions on both sides explains that Tbilisi is distrusted because of its ever arc strongly aggravated by belligerent rhetoric. increasing military expenditures and that Georgia is building up its army to solve the conflict through military Russia says it is alarmed by the diplomatic impasse, the means.'?' The new emphasis on creating a I 00,000-strong increase in security incidents in the zone of conflict and armed and trained reserve force "as a clear message to the the emergence of the Sanakoev administration .138 It ill-wishers who challenge Georgia's territorial sees itself as a guarantor whose role is to prevent major confrontation. If it were to occur. Russia has repeatedly said it would protect its citizens.'?" Moscow also supports signing of a document on tbc non-use of force and sccuri ty guarantees.l'" 127 "Memorandurn oo Agreeing Further Actions Necessary for the Comprehensive Settlement of the Conflict in the Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia", Georgia. 8March2007. 128 The mandates of the peacekeepers and of OSCE in practice cover only the zone of conflict or the JPKF area of responsibility. m Saakashvili' s speech to young reservists in Senaki. Georgian not the entire territory under Tskhinvali's control. Sec Crisis Public TV. Tbilisi, 2 April 2007, as translated by BBC Group Report, Avoiding War in South Ossetia, op. cit. This Monitoring. The parliament adopted the .. Law on Military proposal is a non-starter for the South Ossetians. who argue Reserve Service" on 27 December 2006. Tskh.i.nvali similarly tlcy do not want to lose "sovereignty" over their own territory, secs as worrying summer patriots· camps, which also train 129 The Georgian parliament has passed three resolutions routlis to use arms, challenging the presence of Russian peacekeepers, sec www, 33 Crisis Group interview, Tskhinvali, April 2007. In 2002. a parliament.ge. Ire first ( 11 October 2005) set 15 February 2006 $64 million eiglzeen-rrorrh program was lauocbed to modernise as a deadline for "cessation of the peace-keeping operation" and Ilic army. U.S. military cooperation in 2007 is estimated al $34 "denunciation of the relevant international agreements and million. Yicken Cheteryan. "Georgla's Arms Race", to be abolition of the existing structures". The second (15 February rublished shortly in the Neue ZurcherZeitung . 2006) assessed "Ilic activity and fulfiJlmcnt of Ilic obligations Y1 Georgia's Iraq contingent, originally 850. is to reach 2.000 within the current mandate of the peace-keeping forces ... as in June, at a time when most European nations are downsizing. extremely negative, and actions of the Russian Federation TIX! troops have mainly served as guards. ·'U.S. President Bush as permanent efforts aimed at annexation of this region of Hails Georgia's Iraq Contribution", Civil Georgia, 2 May 2007. Georgia". The third (18 July 2006) called on the government 135Crisis Group interview. Tskhinvali, April 2007. "to launch necessary procedures lo immediately suspend 136 Crisis Group imerview, Western diplomat, Thilisi. May 2007. the so-called peacekeeping operations ... and to immediately 137 Crisis Group interview, Tskhinvali, April 2007. withdraw the armed forces of the Russian Federation from the 1.~ Crisis Group interview, Russum embassy official, Tbilisi, territory of Georgia". April 2007; also, "Statement", Borodavkin, op. cit. 130 Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 3. no. 139, 19 July 2006. i39 Foreign Minister Lavrov has repeatedly said Russia will 131 Crisis Group interview, JCC co-chair for the South Ossctian protect. its citizens in South Ossctia and Abkhazia, if the conflicts side, Tskhinvali, April 2007. TI1e Georgian defense ministry escalate. "Russian Foreign Minister warned Thilisi against announced in early May and the parliament is discussing attempting on Russian peacekeepers· lives". Regnum. 20 July an increase in military spending from 514 million lari 20(l6. (approximately ($305.3 million) to 957 million lari in 2007 140 Statement on the Conflict in South Ossetia by Alexey (approximately $570 million). "2007 Defense spending to Reach Borodavkin, pennancnt representative of the Russian Federation almost GEL l bin", Civil Georgia, I May 2007. at the meeting of the OSCE Permarerr Council, 17 May 2007.

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To dampen South Ossetian fears and remove arguments de facto defence ministry in Tskhinvali as a violation of against demilitarisation, Tbilisi should negotiate and sign the 1992 agreement. 145 Ossetian society is militarised, a non-use of force document. Some in the leadership have with youths training and at tense periods manning trenches said such an agreement would be dangerous, as Georgia's in rotation.':" Tn justification, the Ossetians cite "the hands would be tied during any Russian provocation, growing war preparations in Tbilisi''147 And, as particular especially as Jong as Russian peacekeepers arc in the zone signs of hostile intent construction of a Georgian military of conflict!" An agreement on security guarantees should, base less than twenty miles from Tskhinvali!" and a nevertheless, be considered to create an environment more military hospital in Gori.':" conducive to dialogue. Both parties since 2004 have strengthened their Parallel security guarantees are needed to give Georgia unauthorised military presence and stepped up unauthorized confidence that Russia is not using or allowing the Roki activities. The peacekeepers and the OSCE have both tunnel to be used for hostile purposes. Monitoring of reported South Ossctian trenches and fortifications at what enters the zone of conflict should be allowed by strategic locations in violation of past agreements, 1~ as establishing a joint OSCE/JPKF observation post at Didi well as the occupation of strategic heights.151 There are Gupta, a road juncture just beyond the northern boundary also ent:rcncbmencs in Georgian-controlled areas."? The of the JPKF area of responsibility. The sides should also OSCE and the peacekeepers have also highlighted cases of allow at least one impartial international monitor, preferably unauthorised Ossctian armoured vehicles in Tskhinvali.!" from OSCE or one seconded from the EU to the OSCE, The latter have seized or removed some of the observed to observe movement through the tunnel. illegal equipmenr'" but have turned a blind eye on other occasions.155 An unauthorised Georgian radar station has 2. T ncidents remained in the zone of conflict since November 2006

The confidence which existed at the community level in the zone of conflict before 2004 bas been destroyed. There under construction in Java as well. Crisis Group interview. were some positive trends in the immediate aftermath of Tbilisi , April 2007: Crisis Group interview, Tskhinvali, April that year's crisis"? but the security situation remains 2007. volatile. Repeated small incidents could easily trigger 145 This was confirmed by the JPKF/OSCE joint monitoring a larger confrontation. Crimes. detentions. shootings group ... Statement of Press Department of the State Minister of and exchanges of fire have become routine. Killings, Georgia on Conflict Resolution Issues on Results of Monitoring kidnappings. shelling. mine explosions and other ceasefire the So Called 'Ministry of Defence of South Osseua' Carried violations also occur, as do direct confrontations between Out in Tskhinvali on 1-i April 2007. 14(' Crisis Group interview. expert April 2007. armed personnel, especially in the warmer months.!" 147 Crisis Group interview. de facto official Tskhinvali, April With the rise in tension after Sanakoev's appointment 27. there is a risk of new escalation this summer 148 "Military Base Construction Fuels Georgian-South Ossetian Tension", http://eurnsiancLorg. 27 March 2007. There is heavy military equipment to the north and south of 149 "Reports: MoD Plans to Relocate Military Hospital to Gori", the JPKF area of responsibility. This docs not violate the Civil Georgia. 2 December 2005. l 992 agreement but contributes to a dangerous atmosphere. 150 An OSCE official explained: .. 2005 was characterised by a Observers confirm the presence of armour in the Java spurt of trench digging and defensive locations; in 2006 there district, citing dozens of tanks along the river and up the was a lot of trench digging in Tskhinvali, Znauri and Drnenisi; valley.!" Georgia resents the presence of South Ossetia's the South Ossetian side is now well entrenched and bas significantly improved couunand-conirol systems". Crisis Group interview, Tbilisi. March 2006. 151 CrisisGroup interview, international expert, Tbilisi, April 141 Crisis Group interviews, senior Georgian foreign ministry 2007. official, Tbilisi, March 2007; Crisis Group interview, Tuilisi, 1~2 Crisis Group interview, military observer, Tbilisi, April national security council officials, April 2007. 2007. The peacekeepers consider the two sides are respou.sible 142 The JPKF commander has cited "restoration of free for dismantling fortifications and filling in the trenches. Crisis movement of people and goods, [and] starting of the process Group interview. JPKF Commander. Tskhinvali, March 2007. of demilitarisation and liquidation of fortifications" as positive 153 For instance, ..Le tter of JPK.F Commander to JCC Co• trends in the zone of conflict, Annex to JCC Protocol #44. chairmen and Head of tbe OSCE Mission .. , 24 February 2006 143 Escalation in late spring and summer 2006 was fuelled by a 154 Sec "Letter of JPKF Commander". op. cit., 28 September general deterioration of Russian-Georgian relations. 2006. on removal of an antiaircraft emplacement near Andzisi, wi Java is a particular irritant to Tbilisi, making the nearby 155 A JPKF/OSCEjoint patrol several times saw heavy armour northern enclave of Georgian-administered villages in the zone but the JPKF refused to stop. The JPKF commander said he of conflict "Vulnerable in any confrontation The observers say would send another patrol but before it arrived, the item was the tanks arc often old but up to 80 tanks or armoured vehicles removed. Crisis Group interview. international expert, Tbilisi, are reported. A military reservaiorvtraining ground is apparently April 2(X>7.

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despite repeated calls for Tbilisi to withdraw it.156 As Sanakoev s appointment, unauthorised deployments have tensions rose after Sanakoev · s appointment, the JPKF increased on both sides. Especially in the vicinity of the observed Ossetian air defence weapons in the zone of Tamarashcni-Kckhvi enclave, Georgia conducts strict conflict.!" passport screening and checks.l'" On 20 May 2007, all Ossetian troops were put on full combat alert.'65 Both sides have repeatedly established unauthorised posts. typically stating that their purpose was law enforcement. Indiscriminate shelling and small arms fire have Armed Ossetians are present.. often without proper contributed to a rise in tensions since 2004. Shelling of identification.158 Georgia has illegally deployed military Tskhinvali on 20 September 2005 during "Independence police'?" as well as peacekeepers above agreed levels at Day" celebrations left 10 injured.l'" South Ossetian• specific locations.'?' Violations of the rotation regime by controlled Tskhinvali and Georgian-controlled Kurta, the Georgian peacekeeping battalion is another source Tamarasbeni and Eredvi have also been shelled. Small of resentment among both the JKPF and the South arms fire occurs nightly and occasionally also in daylight Ossctians.!" While Tbilisi claims its anti-smuggling in both Georgian and Ossctian-administcrcd arcas.167 operation has yielded tangible results,162 zone of conflict Less frequent but more dangerous are indiscriminate residents often consider it harassment!" After exchanges of fire between Georgian and Ossctian troops or armed rcsidcnts.!" which have left dozens of injured on both sides since 2004. Intense and frequent exchanges, especially north and south of Tskhinvali, and shelling 156 The radar station is .1.5 km south of Shavshvebi village. of positions on both sides followed Sanakoevs "Letter of JPKF Commander", op. cit., 4 November 2006. appointmcnt.l'" On 25 March 2007 two Georgian soldiers 157 A ZU-23-2 anri-aircralt gun and a Strcla-2M missile were were killed by South Ossctian forces near an Ossctian• reported on 7 May 2007. "Russia condemns Georgia's South Ossctia over aniiaircraft weapons". excerpt from report by RIA administered village.1'0 A few months earlier a clash near Novosri, Moscow, 11 May, translated by BBC Monitoring. Tibeti and Nikozi resulted in the deaths of three South 15~ Crisis Group interview, military observer, Thilisi. April Ossctians and one Gcorgian.!" 2007. 159 In January 2(Xl6 Georgia created a military police department Kidnapping and killings on both sides arc often linked to in the village of K1U1a in tbc zone of the conflict. Eleven military criminal activities, which frequently lead to road closures. police, including a major, are stationed in the Georgian• A shootout near the Georgian village of Tamarashcni on administered villages. All are local. were transferred from the 29 May 2005 resulted in the death of four South Ossetian interior ministry to U1e defence ministry aud have been formally included in the Georgia battalion. JPKF Commander Kulakhmetov called this a "blatant violation of adopted agreements". '·LeuerofJPKF Cormnandcr". op. cit. 14 January 2006. TI1e military police were put under the defence ministry interviews, OSCE official. April 2007: Crisis Group intcrivcw, in 2005 and have played a controversial role in the zone of JPKF commander. April 2007. Searches of women by male conllict, including involvement in detentions of Russian JCC officers is particularly resented. members in July 2006. In seven-ii cases they h

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Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly Crisis Group Europe Report N°J83, 7 June 2007 Page 16 soldiers and a Georgian policeman'P and triggered detained in several incidents the next month.!" On violence which continued throughout 2005. On 6 June 27 May 2006, as reported by the JPKF commander, 2005, four ethnic Georgians were kidnapped and later Georgians threatened Russian pcacckccpcrs.!" On 14 killed, allegedly in retaliation for the 29 May clash and 15 July, Georgian military police twice detained senior and after their relatives had blocked the Tamarashcni• Russian officials, including the special representative for Kckhvi road.!" Their bodies were handed over to the South Ossctia, Yuri Popov, and the deputy commander of Georgian authorities in December. 114 the land forces, Valery Yevneevich.l'"

Tuilisi claims the breakaway territories have become safe Both sides have imposed tougher restrictions on the havens for criminal activities, notably transit of dangerous movement of people and goods through the zone of substances and counterfeiting.175 Western diplomats cooflict.!" especially along the TransCarn highway which confirm that the dollar counterfeiting is a major concern.!" links Russia and Georgia. Since Sanakoev 's appointment, Tskhinvali dismisses the accusations as a pretext to road closures have become frequent and confrontational. increase hostile policing operations."? On 5 December Mine explosions have killed and maimed troops and 2005, an Ossetian deputy chief of police was hospitalised civilians from all sides. especially shepherds and villagers after a shootout with Georgian military police who tried collecting wood. Two Russian peacekeepers lost their to arrest him for involvement with countcrfciting.!" legs to a mine on 23 January 2007.185 A Georgian woman South Ossctians arrested several Georgian police the was injured on 25 May. next day, and the Georgians responded by arresting the head of South Ossctia's Akhalgori (Leningori) district Unsanctioned flights are another problem.186 On 3 administration and three other officials. The crisis was September 2006 the South Ossetians fired on a Georgian resolved when the detainees were exchanged!" helicopter reportedly carrying the defence minister and army deputy chief of staff. The JPKF commander Confrontations occasionally involve Russian peacekeepers. On 3 I January 2006 a brawl between Russian peacekeepers and Georgian military police, local police interview. Georgian analyst, Tbilisi. April 2007. The JKPF and the Georgian peacekeeping battalion followed an commander said the peacekeepers held fire to avoid .. massive accident between a Russian peacekeeping battalion truck human casualties". "Lotter". op. cit.. I February 2006. and an ethnic Gcorgians car. The Russian vehicle was 181 "Russian Officers Detained in South Osse1i.an Coofiict Zone". seized."? Russian servicemen and/or vehicles were Civil Georgia. 9 February 2005: "Georgia Seizes Vehicles of JPKF", Civil Georgia. 14 February 2005: "Georgia Sets Visa Deadline for Russian Peacekeepers', Civil Georgia, 27 February 2005. The incidents occurred when Georgia introduced stricter m "Five Die in S.Ossclia Shootout". Civil Georgia. 30 May visa and other requirements for Russian troops and vehicles. 2005 ur. "Letter JPKF Commander". op. cit., 29 May 2006. Georgia 173 "Tbilisi Claims Retaliation Behind Abduction in S.Ossetia··. accused Russian peacekeepers of illegal entry on 30 military Civil Georgia. 13 June 2005. "Road i1110 Tskhinvali Blocked". trucks in Tskhinvali on 31 May. "Louer of IJ1e Stale Minister Civil Georgia, 17 June 2005. For another kidnapping which Giorgi Khairdrava to the JPKF Commander". June 2006. In raised tensions, scc " I I-year-old Kidnapped in South Ossetian the first episode. ~I Ossctians were arrested by Georgians and Conflict Zone". Civil Georgia. 20 August 2005. taken to Gori through the JPKF's .. Pauk" post .. Arrests Trigger 174 "Tskhinvali Hands over Corpses of Four Men". Civil S.Ossclia Tensions'. Civil Georgia. 28 May 2005. Georgia, 15 December 2005. 183 According to the Russian foreign ministry, Georgian military 175 Crisis Group interview. interior ministty. Tbilisi, April 2007. police fired several shots into the air and vernally abused 176 Crisis Group interview. Western diplomat, Tbilisi. March U1c Russians. "Georgia Bars Russian Officials from Entering 2007. Tskhinvali", ('Ml Georgia, I~ July 2005; "Moscow Condemns 177 The South Ossetian side says detentions and hostage-taking Detention of Russian Officials", Civil Georgia, 16 July 2005. have been systematic, the detained have been questioned on The military police actions were condemned by the OSCE and military capacities, and there have been beatings, torture and also Georgian State Minister Giorgi Khaiodrai ·a, woo, however, killings, 2005-2006 Years. The Chronology ofthe Aggression "as dismissed soon after. ··oscE Chairman Condemns of Georgia against the Republic of South Ossetia (Tskhinvali. Detention of Russian Offlcials", Civil Georgia, 17 July 2005; 2006). pp. 81-86. "State Minister Khaindrava Slams Military Police", Civil 17~ "Defense Minister OkruashviliS peaks of S.Ossetia Shootout", Georgia, 16 July 2005. Civil Georgia, 5 December 2005 184 Obstruction of roads is a violation of U1e 1992 Sochi 179 "Georgian Policemen. Civilians Detained in South Ossctia"; Arreemcnt. "Georgian Police Arrest S.Ossetian Officials"; ''S.Ossetian l&: Crisis Group interview. OSCE official, Tbilisi, April 2007. Official: Tskhi.nvali, Tbilisi Exchange Detainees". Civil Georgia, 186 The JPKF commander reported violations repeatedly in 6 and 7 December 2005. 2006. He called them "systematic and apparently provocative". 1~0 "Tensions High in S.Ossetia as Cmcial Deadline Looms", "Letter", op. cit.. 3 September 2006. The most recent Civil Georgia. l February 2005. Georgian sources claim the unsanctioned Iliglu was on 29 September, ibid. 29 September accident was caused by a drunk Russian driver. Crisis Group 2006.

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condemned both the shooting and the violation of air space the JCC and JPKF mechanisms as unable to prevent over the zone of conflict!" clashes. The JPKF demonstrated it was not a joint force, but rather separate battalions, more loyal to their respective sides than to the peacekeeping chain of B. PEACEKEEPING command.!" The JPKF commander, however, argues that the force did prevent a full-scale war.!" In the The Georgian, Russian and Ossetian battalions of the JPKF aftermath of the 2004 clashes, the JCC and JPKF regained operate under a joint command coordinated by the JPKF some control and registered "some positive trends, namely, commander.?" The latter is nominated by the Russian the shooting and number of illegal points reduced".'?" defence ministry and appointed by the JCC. Battalion The JPKF has generally remained a passive presence, commanders (the senior military representatives) arc however, giving the local population a sense of security appointed directly by the sidcs.!" The JPKF statutes but irritating the Georgians and undermining their provide the force mandate"? but the rules of engagement confidence in the operation."? arc weak, and operations are subject to JCC decisions. Wit11 the paralysis of that mechanism, the JPKF now Since 2004, not a day has passed without shooting or more receives next to no guidancc.!" serious incidents in the conflict zone.'~ This supports South Ossetian claims that the PKF is needed. The force TI1c sides considered the peacekeeping operation a success registered 1,707 ceasefire violations from I October between 1992 and 2003.192 The security situation was 2006 to 1 April 2007 (1.075 by Georgians, 632 by South indeed relatively stable, with active, local exchanges and Ossetiansj.!" According to the JPKF commander, "we trade across the ethnic divide. But then as now, the JPKF were here on the brink of war in the period from the manned static positions and did little monitoring or vehicle beginning of spring to the end of summer of 2006 ". searches. Tbilisi accuses the JPKF of bias. It is particularly angered TI1e situation changed dramatically with new Georgian by the inability to prevent a South Ossetian military leadership in 2003.193 The 2004 confrontation showed presence in the JPKF area of responsibility. including Tskhinvali?..-i It says the Ossctian battalion is a cover for

187 ·'111e use of weapon in peacetime is a blatant violation of the ceasefire", ibid, 3 September 2006, but the sides disagree over I9'• Crisis Group interx iew, international expert, May 2007. airspace regulation. Tbilisi. 1 19' Kx The Jure 1992 agreement created a trilateral JPKF: Georgia. Crisis Group interview. JPKF commander. Tskhinvali, 2007. Ossctian and Russian. A common mispcrccption is that it is 196 JCC Protocol #U. quadrilateral, including both South and North Ossetian sides 197 Its sense of vulnerability at the absence of control over the but there is only one Ossetian battalion 11 is ullder tbe command Roki runnel bas led the Georgians to demand redefinition of of a North Ossctian officer but most troops as well as officers uc JPKF zone of responsibility. in accordance with decisions in are from the South Ossetian militia. Each side can also have JCC Protocol #3. These established the area of peacekeeping 300 reservists, who can be deployed to the zone of the conflict operations as the zore of conflict and a security corridor along in case of escalation Crisis Group interview. JPKF commander, the fonner administrative borders of South Ossetia: see Crisis March 2007. General KualkJunetov took charge of the JPKF Group Report. Avoiding War in South Ossetia, op. cit, Georgia in autumn 2004. tntemational analysts say his performance is says the security corridor should also include the segrrern of the very professional and a major improvement over that of General border with Russi.a which would ill effect task the JPKF with Naozdorov. his predecessor. control and monitoring of Ute Roki tunnel Georgian analysts 189 JCC Protocol #3. also intimate that the Russian peacekeepers are engaged in iso Crisis Group Report, 11 voiding War in South Ossetia. op. cit SlllU ggling. 191 Crisis Group interview. OSCE official, Tbilisi. April 2007: 198 Crisis Group interview. head of OSCE Mission. Tbilisi. Crisis Group interivew, JPK.F commander, Tskhinvali, April 2007. 2007. General Kulakluretov bas repeatedly called for more JCC I?J The bulk of violations were in tile Tskhinvali region (559 guidance and decisiveness on demilitarisation, law enforcement from the Georgian side, 518 from uc Osscrian), data given to cooperation, mine clearance etc. Experts say Iris frustration al Crisis Group by the JPKF commander, TskhinvaJi March 2007. not being able to deliver efficient solutions to security problems But experts say the JPKF registers every shot as a separate is mounting. violation. 192 "Memorandum on Necessary Measures to be Undertaken coo A joint JPKF/OSCE patrol on 1..i April 2007 confirmed that i..n Order to Ensure Security and Strengthening of Mutual Tmst the de facto defence ministry is in Tskhinvali, in the JPK.F area between the Parties to the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict of 16 of responsibility. where only the three JPKF battalions and Mav 1996". local law enforcement arc authorised. "Statement of Press 193 It strongly criticised the status quo in the zone of contlict, Department". op. cit. Another case was the 20 August 2005 noting that all parties were profiting from unregulated trade and military parade in Tsk.hinvali "parliament resolution". op. cit., smuggling through the Roki tunnel and the Ergneti market. 11 October 2005.

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the South Ossetian de facto defence ministry staff?" on the ground, helping prevent escalation to full-scale International observers confirm the Ossetian battalion is, war. However, violations by both parties have not been except for a few officers, manned by South Ossctians addressed effectively. Russians counter the accusations and "the biggest employer in South Ossetia".202 Tbilisi of passivity by saying they prefer to use diplomacy and considers this an opportunity for Russia to equip the would act forccfullv if certain undefined limits arc South Ossctian rnilitiaf" and a Link that allows the breached."? . Ossetians to get advance warning of JPKF or JPKF/OSCE patrols."' Before agreeing on any change of the security arrangements for the zone of conflict, the sides should cooperate in the Tskhinvali has its own grievances. lt criticises Russian JPKF. Obstructing it is tantamount to "shooting the peacekeepers for not acting decisively on violations''" and messenger". Curtailing JPKS room for manoeuvre believes Georgia intentionally disrupts the operation to prematurely would create a security vacuum that could discredit Russia. it continues to back the JPKF, however, be exploited by any party. and claims it is the sole security guarantor, and police would be ineffective in responding to military threats.i'" The OSCE Mission in Georgia has monitored the peacekeeping operation since 1992?' 1 Its eight unarmed Despite the deficiencies and systematic ceasefire violations, officers (MMOs), five of whom are based in Tskhinvali, the JPKF has improved since the 2004 crisis. Though patrol the zone of conflict and visit checkpoints. observation observers say real cooperation is missing.?" the posts and communities."? The JPKF commander has appointment of Mamuka Kurashvili as senior military at times not allowed joint JPKF/OSCE patrols to leave representative and commander of the Georgian battalion predetermined routes, thus significantly reducing OSCE's on 30 December 20062ctl is assessed as constructive.?" rapid reaction capacity."? In 2005-2007 MMO activities Russian peacekeepers seem to be in control of the situation were repeatedly obstructed by South Ossetian security scrviccs.214 In late May 2007. joint patrols were stopped at gunpoint and shots fired to prevent monitoring of :oi Crisis Group interview, Georgian official. Tbilisi, April strategic, Ossctian-controllcd arcas.?" South Ossetians 2007. deeply distrust the West which they believe supports wz Crisis Group interviews, international community. Tbilisi. Georgia in the conflict.i'" This is reflected in anti-OSCE April, May 2007. Salaries are an extra incentive to retain young demonstrations. such as 22-23 June 2006 protests in front Ossetian men's loyalty. but employment is important in a place where jobs are scarce and young males tend to emigrate. 203 Crisis Group interview, interior ministry. Tbilisi. May 2007. 204 Crisis Gr011p interview, intemational military expert Tuilisi. 1fri12007. cio The JPKF commander said .. we believe that diplomacy 2 Crisis Group interview, South Ossetian de facto minister of works here better than force ". Crisis Group interview, foreign affairs. Tskhinvali. February 2007. Tskhinvali, March 2007. Russian diplomats cite "a long history cos Crisis Group interview, JCC co-chair for Ute SouU1 Ossetian of respect to UIC peacekeeping role of Russia in the Caucasus" side. Tskhinvali. 5 March 2007 and the absence of any politically feasible alternative. Crisis zm Crisis Group. interview, international military expert, Tbilisi. Group interview. Russian embassy official. Tbilisi, March May 2007. "The Georgian side is trying to prove to the outside 2007. world that it is playing a full part, but often it acts in ways which 211 The Mission began with six MMOs in 1992. reduced to four are not helpful: giving a commander in the field a 24-hour tlS the situation stabilised. In the summer of 200-l the OSCE's notice that one of his three battalions .is about to be rotated is Permanent Council approved a further increase. Crisis Group neither helpful, nor according to U1c rules". Several times tho intcrx icw. OSCE official. Tbilisi. April 2007. Georgian battalion has refused JPKf orders, and there has 212 The OSCE web site ex-plains: .. The officers also accompany been poor communication and coordination with Russian JPKF monitoring teams and exchange infonnation with the ~acckccpcrs. commander of visited observation posts. During joint patrols. "08 "Senior Military Commander appointed in Tskhinvali weapons inspections take place to confirm the observation region", defence ministry website at www.mod.gov.ge, 4 posts are equipped in accordance with JPKF inventory and January 2007. rcfulations'· at www.oscc.org/georgia/22955.html. 209 Crisis Group interview, JPKF commander, Tskhinvali, April 21. Crisis Group interview. military adviser, OSCE Mission in 2007; Crisis Group interview, representatives of the de facto Georgia, Tuilisi. March 2007. Ossetian administration, Tskhinvali, April 2007; Crisis Group ::14 On 12 May 2007 Ossetian spetznaz prevented the OSCE interview, OSCE Mission, Tbilisi, March and April 2007. monitors from entering the area of . where Ossctian Kurashvili has a military background, unlike his predecessor. positions had been reinforced. On earlier incidents ... OSCE Paata Bedianashvili from law enlorcement, who was declared Cordemns Detention of Observ ers in SOssetia", Civil Georgia, persona non grata in Tskhinvali as "a criminal with direct I 2 Julv 2006. responsibility for the 2004 confrontation". Crisis Group 215 crisis Group interview. diplomat, May 2007. interview, de facto vice prime minister of South Ossctia, .::16 Crisis Group interview. SouU1 Ossctian de facto official, Tskhinvali. April 2007. Tskhinvali, February 2()()7.

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of its Tskhinvali office?' The climate of co-operation After 2004, the sides again stressed the need for improved has partially improved since then, and Tskhinvali probably law enforcement cooperarion.r" A first meeting between considers the OSCE as more impartial than the EU. the Georgian interior minister and his South Ossctian counterpart took place on 22 June 2006 but failed to Improving security arrangements on the ground is critical. produce a signed protocol. Tue Georgians suggested the The Georgians have lost faith in the JPKF. Since most SCC needed one authorisedperso n with OVCraJJ authority'" incidents begin as criminal acts, law enforcement but Tskhinvali does not seem to have the capacity to put mechanisms may be better suited than a peace keeping all its relevant personnel under a single joint command mission. The zone of conflict's small population suggests and questioned '~ hcther the Georgians do.223 police may be adequate to address security challenges. But as practical as this might be, it is unacceptable to The OSCE and the EU arc also urging enhanced law Tskhinvali. For joint policing to succeed, the sides need to enforcement cooperation. Since June 2006 the OSCE has agree on a detailed formula. Both sides· security concerns facilitated several meetings between regional police chiefs must be addressed simultaneously. For this reason, it is and proposed new forms of cooperation?" Some practical crucial to conclude an agreement on non-use of force and results, like coordinated arrests of criminals, have establish a joint OSCE/JPKF observation point at Didi followcd'" but more is needed. including on exchanges Gupta, as well as to develop a mutually acceptable regime of information. At least a monthlj meeting of liaison for the Roki tunnel. officers on organised crime and rapid reaction messages on car theft seem good opportunities. Revamping the mechanism is crucial, and joint training programs C. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND POLICE sec for investigators and community policing could set a good COOPERATION foundation. Joint investigations would improve confidence as well as security.226 Joint patrols are being considered?" All sides agree that law enforcement is a potential area of The Georgian side welcomes direct bilateral contacts practical coopcrarion.!" Coordinating efforts to suppress but is less keen on joint investigations, arguing that the crime in the zone of conflict. and implementing joint potential pitfalls of dealing with Tskhinvali 's de facto programs, may improve the security situation and promote legal system arc unacceptablc.f" South Ossetians counter confidence. TI1e JCC designed a mechanism to formalise there is no mutual good "ill.~ such cooperation in 1999 when the Special Coordination Centre (SCC) was established.219 While the OSCE and the EU supported the sec with equipment and expertise,

its operational capacity remained low until the 2004 221 confrontation froze its activities. Most interlocutors ascribe Prime Minister Noghlideli's October 2005 peace plan called for strcnglkning la\\ andorde r in uc region through resumption the failure to make the operational to a lack of real sec of the SCC. The South Ossctian plan proposed "an urgent political will.220 meeting of the heads of the law-enforcement structures within uc JCC format aimed at coordination of corrcspording activities in the zone of contlict". zz; Crisis Group interview. international expert, Tbilisi, April 2007: Crisis Group interivew. Georgian official Tbilisi, April 2007. This would entail control over police as well as personnel 217 See the 29 June 2006 EU Statement on South Ossetia, of security sen ices, financial police and de facto border guards. Georgia, at www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php'!lang_id= ENG&sec "23 Crisis Group interview, diplomat Tbilisi, April 2007: Crisis _id= 78&info_id=l71 l. It notes with concern that "the OSCE Group interview. interior ministry. Tbilisi. May 2007. Tskhinvali Field Office was under siege by a partly hostile 124 Crisis Group interview, OSCE official, March 2007. crowd of up to 100 persons from 22 to 23 June 2006. The ;;:5 Crisis Group interview, interior ministry, March 2007. crowd blocked access to and from the Field Office for most of Anotlcr meeting between law enforcementde legations planned the time, while tyres of the Mission and European Commission for 3 May fell through a the last minute. Crisis Group interview, Delegation vehicles were punctured. Some of these incidents OSCE official Ma)' 2007. The Georgian interior minister occurred within the view of th:: South Ossctian security guards concluded the "incident once again conlinns that cooperation al the Field Office, who only reappeared alter they had been with tlc de-facto SouU1 Ossctian autloritics has no prospects". absent for most of the evening". "Cooperation between Georgian and De-facto Ossetian Law m See Crisis Group Report, Avoiding War in South Ossetia. Enforcers Have No Prospects - Interior Ministry", Black Sea og cit. Press. 3 May 2007. 2 JCC Decision, Annex no. l, 23 July 1999; JCC Decision, 226 Tbe experieree of tbe UN-led Joint lavestigation Group set Annex no. 1, 21April2001. up in the Georgian-Abkbaz context is invaluablein this respect. 220 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, 5 April 2007. Some 227 Crisis Group interview, interior ministry, March 2007. emphasise that especially before the 2004 anti-smuggling 228 Ibid operation, many among Ute law enforcers had vested interests in :!29 Crisis Group interview. adviser to U'IC SouU1 Ossctian lcader, disorder in the zone of conflict. Tskhinvali, 5 Apnl 2007.

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A gradual process should be designed to step up police Iv. ECONOMIC REHABILITATION cooperation. Effectivej oint policing, starting with a few officers on each side and building up gradually. needs co be established. Jn parallel, a phased timeframe could be South Ossetia is poor, with dilapidated infrastructure still agreed for scaling down the three JPKF battalions once partially destroyed from the fighting of the early 1990s. the police contingent is fully operational The large JPKF Lack of investment and the frozen conflict have deprived structure, with fixed observation posts, should be reduced. residents of opportunities and caused outward migration In its place, a mobile, crisis response peacekeeping and a brain drain. Economic rehabilitation is the only field mechanism should back-up the policing operation as where Georgians and Ossetians have cooperated. Since needed. An international police component, possibly 1999 the European Commission (EC) has funded cross• including Russians, should be brought in to support the community projects run by the OSCE.230 This helped the mechanism and provide expertise, training and impartial EC gain a scat at JCC sessions dealing with economic guidance. To address threat perceptions, provide continuity rehabilitation?" 1he OSCE oonducted a needs assessment and facilitate coordination, this might include an EU police in the winter of 2005-2006 and then launched a large component, with Russian involvement, seconded to the program. Today, however, this cooperation risks breaking OSCE. d0\\.11 as Georgia and Russia invest ever greater sums in competing projects, rather than those monitored by the OSCE.

Georgia and Russia concluded agreements on economic rehabilitation of the zone of conflict in 1993z.>: and 2000.m The first was partially implemented. the second remained on paper. Russia has repeatedly blamed Georgia for not delivering promised funds, and obstructing its aid.234 Tbilisi views the Russian contribution as a means to buy Ossctian loyalty and dependence. As with the political and peacekeeping processes. it seeks to internationalise rehabilitation. To a great degree, it has succeeded.

Aid is politicised in the zone of conflict. The OSCE program promotes confidence building through practical, inter-ethnic cooperation. The unilateral Georgian and Russian programs compete for local loyalties. Economic rehabilitation can only build confidence if implemented jointly, with both communities included.

~ Sec details on the EC delegation Lo Georgia and Armenia website, www.delgeo.cec.eu.int/en/progrnmmes/ rehabilitation.html, ::31 EC representatives participate pursuant to JCC decision, Annex 4 to JCC Protocol# 10, 23 July 1999. :3:: The "Agreement between the Govenunent of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Georgia on Economic Reconstruction in the Zone of tlc Gcorgian-Ossetian of Conflict" set reconstmction costs at 34.2 billion roubles at June 1992 prices (approximately $190 million) and a 2: 1 ratio for contributions by Georgia and Russia respectively in I 993- 1997. The agreement was implemented partially. ::33 In the 2000 version, the sides agreed beuer coordination was reeded, including an inrergovemrreraal body on implementation, Annex 2 to JCC Protocol# 2. 3 July 200 l. :31 Crisis Group interview. RusSian official. Tbilisi, March 2007.

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A. THE OSCE-LEO PROGRAM intention to match donor pledges in its 2007 budget.i" Though OSCE administrative requirements and donor Then Georgian prime-minister and South demands cost time, the ERP is now underway, with the Ossctian leader Kokoity agreed on 5 November 2004 in initial focus on setting up the implementation structure?" Sochi that the JCC should examine "concrete economic The ERP observes careful parity between ethnic Georgians projects, the implementation of which would be of mutual and Ossetians and has a participatory approach. Georgian interest, and submit the agreed project proposals to the and Ossetian experts jointly identify local priorities OSCE and the European Commission for consideration". and develop work plans and timelines under steering Both sides included rehabilitation in their 2005 peace committee guidance. The confidence-building potential plans. The OSCE Mission's Needs Assessment Study is significant, and representatives of local communities (NAS)235 identified proposals for infrastructure rehabilitation have so far given a positive assessment.l" as have the two (social facilities, energy supply. and roads) and economic biggest donors. the EU and the u.s.~~3 development (agriculture, business and finance). Through a Steering Committee mechanism chaired by the OSCE, The aim is to create a local lobby for change by fostering Georgian and Ossetian engineers and economists worked links grounded in real cooperation and addressing with international experts, supervised by the JCC and common interests. The ERP multiples contacts across the NAS donors.f" The NAS identified projects worth $260 divide and with donors that were previously limited mainly million, which were reduced to a €10 million Economic to JCC members. Joint business training of Georgians and Rehabilitation Program (ERP), endorsed by the JCC,1'7 to Ossetians has been a succcss.i" as has capacity building strengthen the negotiations process through rehabilitation for small-to-medium-sized enterprises and projects of basic infrastructure, economic development, and for access to micro-credits, small grants and business confidence building,2~s as well as improve living partnerships. The ERP is looking for innovative ways conditions. around legal issues still posing trade obstaclcs.?" Possibilities include partially regulating trade links between The OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office hosted a donors local farmers and small businessmen or even registering conference in Brussels on 14 June 2006 that pledged €7.8 local farmers associations with the OSCE. Designing a million.f" In Tskhinvali on 6 October at the first steering temporary mechanism for developing trade at the Ergneti committee meeting, the Georgian side confirmed its

235 Tlc terms of reference were agreed al the 44111 session of the JCC. Moscow. 22-23 June 2005. The NAS was launched by recommendation of ihc tenth OSCE Ministerial Council (Porto) to "send an international needs assessment mission 240 Crisis Group interview, OSCE officials, Tbilisi, March 2007. to the region" and to "support the allocation of large-scale Following the June 2006 donors conference, some countries economic assistance into key areas". submiued wriucn pledges. which allowed OSCE to start contract 236 Crisis Group interview, international expert. Tbilisi, March procedures and recruit staff. Funds were placed in a holding 2007. The donors were the U.S. Agency for International account in Vienna. which the OSCE Mission draws on for Development (USAJD), the EC, Belgium. the Netberlards and projects as needed. France. 241 The program implementation unit (PIU) bas its main office 237 The NAS Steering Committee in Yerevan on 15-16 April in Tskhinvali and sob-offices in Tbilisi and Gori. Administrative 2006 prepared the €10 million draft package of agreed projects. staff, as well as local engireers and economists, from both sides The JCC in Tskhinvali on 11-13 May revised and approved it were recruited and trained. Two international development and an implementation mechanism. Key criteria were mutual experts and an international engineer were recruited. approval. visibility, confidence-building potential and ;:<1; A member of the South Ossetian delegation to the Steering enhancement of local business capacity. ERP tcnns of reference Committee told Crisis Group, Tsklunvali, February 2007, tJiat were also agreed. "based on the implementation of the EC-sponsored projects, I z3M The approved projects seek lo: improve drinking water can tell that tbe projects contribute to confidence building and supply, electricity and gas delivery; rehabilitate roads and improve the overall atmosphere in the region". schools; build healthcare institutions, youth sport centres and 241 Crisis Group interview. EC Delegation, Tuilisi. April 2007: agriculture infrastructure; create

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market is considered the single most important tool to announced a further allocation of 12 million lari ($7 boost economicti es between Georgia and South Ossetia, ~46 millionj.P?

The South Ossetian side likes the ERP, because it realises The first six million lari are mostly earmarked for the poverty and an unstable economy have cost it population?" connection of gas to villages in Didi Liakhvi and Patara Georgian attitudes are more divided. While the ERP has Liakhvi gorges?" They also cover renovation of schools, helped Tuilisi internationalise the peace process, it now improvement of water structures, construction of sports wants more dramatic and raster changes. It is concentrating facilities and lights for village streets."! The government on Sanakoev and attaches great importance to speedy, does not seem too concerned about ERP overlap but donors major rehabilitation of areas under his influence. The emphasise careful coordination is required and the possible reluctance to benefit Kokoity 's de facto structures partially need to modify some parts of the international program.i" explains why its first contribution to the ERP was only €50,000,"'18 when several millions were being allocated Georgian analysts seem to think that if well implemented, for the unilateral rehabilitation of Georgian-areas. Tbilisi the strategy of winning Ossetians over with economic is also suspicious that the consensus-based mechanism in incentives and impressing them with development can the steering committeecould be used to delay rehabilitation. work in a medium to long time frame.F" Authorities believe investments in Georgian-controlled areas can The ERP is the only tangible progress since 2004. It can demonstrate to Ossctians what they could gain by shifting create conditions for confidence building and foster ties loyalties to Tbilisi. There are immediate benefits, like free• across the conflict divide. But clear divisions exist between of-charge medical services in the Georgian villages for the sides that economic incentives alone arc unlikely to all South Ossctia residents. But the Ossctians arc yet to bridge. Economic rehabilitation can support the peace be convinced. The- sec the increased investment as part process if there is mutual will to settle the conflict but of 'the PR strategy of trying to sell Sanakocv mainly to not if readiness to search for compromises remains weak the outside world and the Georgian constituency"?~511iis and the sides engage in unilateral, competing programs. perception is reinforced by Tbilisi's small contribution to the OSCE-ledjoint program.

8. OTHER INITIATIVES Tuilisi argues the ERP is too slow,~ while international observers criticise the unilateral Georgian program for 1. Tbilisi's package for Kurta sacrificing transparency and accountability to achieve speedy results.i" Prime Minister Noghaideli signed a Emphasizing dramatic improvement in conditions in tbc waiver of normal tender requirements to ensure the fustest zone of conflict so as to portray Georgia as attractive, possible implementation.i" Given the relatively small Tbilisi is providing six million Georgian lari target population, its clan-based nature and the still (approximately $3.5 million) in direct budget support to the three municipalities in the Georgia-controlled territories?" Following Sanakocv's appointment, Georgian 250 "Finance Minister Meets S Ossetian Administration Chief', Finance Minister Alexishvili met with him in Kurta and Civil Georgia. 22 May 2007. zsi 1.850.000 lari have been sent to Kurta, 1.400.000 to Eredvi aud 700.000 to Avrevi, The remaining 2.050.000 lari have been allocated to rehabilitation of water supplies, Georgian schools and projects such as building sports facilities and street iU uminauon, 246 It is considered an important ERP element. The EU is m Crisis Group interview, deputy governor of , engaged in developing an interim agreement on mies of transit Gori. April 2007. for goods through the conflict zone. Crisis Group interview. z53 "We "ill not wail for the OSCE. and if necessary we will political adviser, EU special representative's office, Tbilisi, implement gasification projects even if they are irelnded in the Februruy 2007. list of tle selected projects. After all, we cannot work on pipeline 247 Crisis Group interview. diplomat, Tbilisi, April 2007. branches until the backbone pipeline is constructed". Crisis 24~ Crisis Group interview. Georgiand eputy minister on conflict Group interview. Georgian official, Shida-Kartli governor's resolution, February 2007. The contribution was made on 14 office. Gori, March 2007; Crisis Group interview, OSCE official, February 2007. Thilisi. March 2007. 249 Kuna, Erdevi and Avncvi, which before creation of the ::54 Cri~is Group interview.ex pert, lbilisi, May 2007. temporary administrative unit were considered part of Georgia's 25·5 Crisis Group interview. Tskhinvali, April 2007. Shida-Kartli region. Tile government's decree allocating six ::56 Crisis Group interview. senior Georgian official, Gori, million lari was signed on 21 February. "Government Unveils Februarv 2007. S.Ossetia GEL 6 min Investment Plan", Civil Georgia, 24 257 Cris~ Group interview, Western diplomats. Tuilisi, April• February 2007. Crisis Group interview, Georgian official, Shida• Mar 2007. Kartli governor's office, Gori, March 2007. 258 Cnsis Group interview, Western diplomat,Tb ilisi, May 2007.

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prevalent legacy of Soviet corruption, however, lack of the Russian-Georgian 2000 agreement on economic oversight could allow profiteering. The creation of a small rehabilitation in South Ossetia and JCC decisions.i" It elite with access to large funds could worsen criminality also refers to its right to provide humanitarian assistance in the zone of conflict. Sanakoev's alleged gambling to its citizens in South Ossetia. After the closure of the history worsens perceptions of non-transparency.f" Ergncti market, which seriously weakened socio-economic conditions, it stepped up payment of pensions and salaries For Tuilisi to convince Ossetians it has their aspirations to South Osseuans.?" According to a local expert, salaries at heart, development in Georgian areas must be coupled in South Ossetia rose tenfold?65 with tangible confidence-building measures, including restitution of the right to property or compensation as We.stem diplomats have criticised the Russian rehabilitation foreseen by the Law passed in December 2006 but not projects as "geared to back up Kokoitys pre-election yet implemented/" and dealing with grievances and old campaign in November 2006 and purely cosmetic".2<;o injustices. Rehabilitation efforts need to be focused on Moscow· s announcementi n early 2007 that it had nearly implementation. Georgia should give at least equal money finished projects funded by its Brussels contribution to ERP programs. Channelling large sums to the region surprised Thilisi and donors. Thilisi feels Moscow is with inadequate control would be counterproductive. acting arbitrarily and with impunity on Georgian Stringent parliamentary and other oversight is a must. territory. International attempts to consolidate efforts are undermined. 2. Moscow's support for Tskhinvali While some observers believe economic rehabilitation The shift in Georgia's strategy from joint efforts to competition will ultimately benefit both targeted sections unilateral investments is another reflection of its frustration of the population. unilateral initiatives do not promote with the engagement formats in the zone of the conflict. confidence. rather the opposite. By attaching Tskbinvali 's Tt also shows Georgia's resolve to enter into direct economic system to Russia. the population of the economic competition with Russia for influence in South breakaway territory is further alienated from Georgia. The Ossctia. Tbilisi criticizes Russia's unilateral investment as gap between ethnic Georgian and Ossctian communities is violating international law and Georgia's territorial integrity deepening. Competition for influence could degenerate and amounting to annexation of South Ossetia. It has into a struggle where both sides obstruct the other· s demanded that Russia coordinate any aid. At the 2006 rehabilitation efforts and weaken the international program. donors conference, Russia pledged 100 million roubles (some €3 million) for economic rehabilitation. It was C. F'ROM ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCE TO assumed that this would be allocated under the 2000 CONFLICT OVER RESOURCES? bilateral agreement in coordination with tbc OSCE. Citing OSCE delays, however, Russia informed the ERP steering committee in January 2007 that it had directly financed Serious potential exists for conflict over electricity, gas and water resources and networks in South Ossctia. This seven projects completed by the end of 2006.261 is becoming evident as all projects include significant Georgia's state minister for conflict resolution said: ''We investment for reconstruction of energy networks. have no idea on what this money was spent, though Georgian- and Ossctian-administcrcd areas arc still Moscow claims to have allocated it in October-December interdependent for access to electricity and gas. Electricity 2006, but we do not sec the results. All Russia's activities is supplied from Russia, via lines roughly following the in the region are illegal: energy supply, construction of gas pipelines" .262 Russia claims it acts on the basis of

:63 It blames Georgia for failing to implement the agreements, by not fulfilling its own financial obligations and obstructing iw Crisis Group email correspondence, Western diplomat,May Russian rehabilitation efforts. Crisis Group interview, Russian 2007. JCC oillcial. lbil.isi. March 2007. 264 ZGO For details, sec Crisis Group Europe Briefing N"38, Georgia• "Residents of So~llh Ossctia WilJ Receive Russian Pensions South Ossetia:Ref ugee Return the Path lo Peace, 19 ApriJ 2005. Averaging 1.400 roubles". Regnum, 22 February, 2007. ::61 These included reconstruction of a secondary school, dental http://w•vw.regnum.ru/ne'\\''S/district-abroad/yugoosset/786597 clinic, hotel, concert ball. sports ball and hospital laboratory in .html. Tskhinvali and construction of a road connecting Georgian• ~65 From an average of 400-600 roubles monthly to 3.000-6,000. populated villages. at a cost equal to 110.2 million roubles, Crisis Group interview. economic expert. Tskhinval.i, March according to Russia. Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat 2007. lbilisi. March 2007. 2c.G Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, April 2007. One 262 "A~tivities of Russian Side in Tskhinval.i Reg.ion without Russian project was rehabilitation of a botel in Tskhinvali, which Agreement with Georgian Side Ate Categorically Unacccpteolc", had new bathroom equipment but bathrooms that were not Black See Press, 24 April 2007. hooked up to water and waste disposal networks.

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TransCam. Before reaching Tskhinvali, it lights the water main which supplies Tskhinvali passes through the northern enclave of Georgian villages in the zone of northern enclave of Georgian villages. It is punctured conflict. Gas is supplied to the entire zone of conflict from every summer, and water is diverted to irrigat.c fields, Georgia proper. Tskhinvali profits from it before the leaving Tskhinvali with little or no drinking water. This pipeline reaches the Georgian enclave. The local gas year's water crisis came early, with the first hot May distribution network is limited in the Georgian villages but days, and was much more confrontational than in the their connection to gas supplies is Tbilisi's rehabilitation past. As many as twenty holes were cut, largely priority. This interdependency benefits both sides, though depriving the population of drinking water for at least payment issues have come up, but this may soon change eleven days,274 while Georgian police repeatedly if speculation over energy resources brings about a farther prevented South Ossetian crews from undertaking dip in confidence?" necessary repairs.i"

TI1c Russian Federation. in particular North Ossctia-Alania, Sanakocv apparently said he was aware of the difficulties arc key players in this equation. Construction of a gas Tskhinvali was facing but demanded that road blocks pipeline to link North Ossctia with Tskhinvali was around the Georgian villages be removed first~76 and Launched on 27 October 2006. two weeks before the de Tskhinvali seek his permission for repairs?" Georgian facto presidential election in South Ossetia.i" Georgia officials said Tskhinvali was responsible for the water cuts. considers it illegal, further proof Russia wants to annex The Russian foreign ministry accused lbilisi of holding part of the country.P" Western analysts say that bringing the local population "hostage to political games"?" After the pipeline over the Caucasus mountains is prohibitively international pressure was applied to both sides, an OSCE• expensive and that the plan is likely a bargaining chip.?" led team, with their participation, inspected the pipeline Both Russians and Georgians have confirmed that on 2 June and agreed on repairs. These have not yet been construction has begun however."! The pipeline would carried out and Tskhinvali is still without drinking water. make Tskhinvali independent of Georgian gas and in an The confrontational attitudes both sides have adopted easier position to cut off gas to Georgian villages in the illustrate the risk of escalation in the zone of conflict. zone of conflict.

Similarly, Russia could cut electricity to the Georgian enclave(s). Unveiling plans for a new Dzay-Tskhinvali power transmission line, the bead of the North Ossctian department for cooperation with South Ossctia said: " ... the new line will make it possible to cut off electricity in the villages of the Georgian enclave which have electricity debts"?" Jn retaliation, Georgia is apparently considering ways to connect Georgian areas in the zone of conflict to the grid eastwards in Shida Kartli, largely bypassing Ossetian arcas.i?

During summer months, water has been a source of tensions. South Ossetia is water-rich but the pipes are in poor condition, and leaks account for significant loss. The

;67 Crisis Group interview. OSCE official, Tbilisi, May 2007. 268 "Russia; Ossctia Pipeline Adds Fuel To Tiic Georgia Fire". RFE/RL, 6 November 2006. It is claimed that the 163-km Dzaurikau-Tskhinvali pipeline will be ready to carry Russian natural gas to South Ossctia by winter 2007. Kokoity and the head of the North Ossctian Republic, Tcimuraz Mamsurov. attended the launch ceremony. ~74 The head of the OSCE Mission called the situation "a real w; Crisis Group interviews; Georgian officials, Thilisi. April launanitarian crisis". '·OSCE Ambassador Calls Upon Georgian, 2007. Ossctian Sicks to Strut Talking", BS Press, 2 Jure 2007. 27° Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Tbilisi, May 2007. m Crisis Group email corespondence, diplomat, Thilisi June ::n "Russia: Ossetia Pipeline Adds Fuel", op. cit. Crisis Group 2007. interview, interior ministry official, Tbilisi, May 2007. 276 Ibid. 272 Itar-Tass news agency, Moscow. 9 April 2007, as translated m Russian foreign ministry commentary on developments in bf the BBC Monitoring Service. SouU1 Ossctia 31Mav2007. 2 3 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Tbilisi, May 2007. 278 Ibid. -

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I YI. CONCLUSION

The Georgian-Ossetian conflict has entered a new phase. Tbilisi has made strong moves to change the status quo, succeeding in sensitising the international community to its conflict with Russia and the need to change the negotiation and peacekeeping formats. It has increased the players in the zone of conflict, establishing a new temporary administrative unit in the areas of South Ossetia it controls, with an ethnic Ossctian, Dmitri Sanakocv, at its head. It is focusing on containing Russia and promoting Sanakeov, while delegitimising the de facto Ossetian leader, Eduard Kokoity. Because Tskhinvali appears ever more dependent on Moscow, however, Tbilisi says meaningful dialogue with it is impossible. But Tbilisi is making a mistake in failing to engage with Tskhinvali and with the Ossctian constituency in the areas it controls. The Georgian government's steps arc non-violent and development-oriented but their implementation is unilateral and so assertive that they are contributing to a perceptible and dangerous rise in tensions.

The Tskhinvali leadership dismisses Sanakocv as a traitor, as do a majority of South Ossctians, who perceive Georgia's strategy as a way of forcing a settlement upon them under Tbilisi's terms. They arc convinced Tbilisi threatens their security and has little respect for their aspirations and fears. Tuilisi wants quick results but it will take considerable time for Sanakoev to build the credibility needed to convince Ossetians otherwise, if it can be done at all. Confidence must be built step by step and through joint, not unilateral, efforts. In the volatile security situation, power tactics like curtailing access to resources produce only more confrontation, which risks degenerating into large-scale violence. Tbilisi/Brussels, 7 June 2007

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APPENDIX A

MAP OF GEORGIA

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Georgia's South Ossetia Conflict: Make Haste Slowly Crisis Group Europe Report N°J83, 7 June 2007 Page 27

APPENDIX B

:MAP OF THE SOUTH OSSETIAN REGION

.South Ossetia Re.ginn 1.egend • Villa.a.esunde r Georgian Control Villa_9es ur.,Jeru aseti.:.n CO<\trol

Qsg:fian t 1 pass rout« Geor~fan bypass route

...c>-e:>- Security corridor <::::> 15 l\Tn <:ontlict zone c:::z1::11:11~ Russ1anlGeo19a bOfder c.;;i;=-~ Border of termer Soutn Osseua

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="'!"'~_. This map is for reference oniy and should not be taken toimp!V poliflcal endorsementofft s content

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APPENDIX C

JPKF J.\iIAP OF GEORGIAN-CONTROLLEDA REAS IN SOUTH OSSETIA

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APPENDIX D

TBILISI'SMAP OF GEORGIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS IN SOUTH OSSETIA

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~~ • C'l•ori;1•rl-con!rollcd nrcas .. .. • Rll'!>1nnlO"v®m1 State llor

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APPENDIX E

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an Guinea. Liberia, R vv anda, Sierra Leone, Somalia., Sudan, independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, Uganda, Western Sahara and Zimbabwe; in Asia, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working Afghanistan. Bangladesh, Indonesia. Kashmir, Kazakhstan, through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. Pakistan, Phillipines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan,Thailan d, Tirnor• Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina., Cyprus, Georgia, Teams of political analysts are located within or close by Kosovo and Serbia; in the Midd1e East, the whole region countries at risk of outbreak. escalation or recurrence of from North Africa to Iran: and in Latin America, Colombia, violent conflict. Based on information and assessments the rest of the Andean region and Haiti. from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes Crisis Watch, foundations, companies and individual donors. The a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct following governmental departments and agencies regular update on the state of play in all the most significant currently provide funding: Australian Agency for situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. International Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and lntcmational widely by email and printed copy to officials in Trade. Canadian International Development Agency, foreign ministries and intcrnationa.1 organisations Canadian International Development Research Centre, and made available simultaneously on the website, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with Foreign Affairs. Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Foreign Office, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Japanese support for its policy prescriptions. international Cooperation Agency, Principality of The Crisis Group Board - which includes prominent Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg figures from the fields of politics. diplomacy. business Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ew Zealand Agency for and the media - is directly involved in helping to bring International Development, Royal Danish Ministry of the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior Foreign Affairs. Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss by the former European Commissioner for External Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador of Foreign affairs. United Kingdom Foreign and Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Department for since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign International Development, U.S. Agency fur International Minister Gareth Evans. Development. Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels, Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie with advocacy offices in WashingtonD C (where it is based Corporation of New York, Carso Foundation, Compton as a lcga.1 entity), New York, London and Moscow. The Foundation, Ford Foundation, Fundacion DARA organisation currently operates twelve region.a.1 offices (in Internacional, Tara Lee and George Gund TTT Foundation, Amman, Bishkek, Bogota, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad, Wil1iam & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has Fund, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, John D. locaJ field representation in sixteen additional locations & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Charles Stewart (Abuja, Baku, Beirut, Belgrade, Colombo, Damascus, Dili, Mott foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and Dushanbe, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kampala, Kathmandu, Pamela Ornidyar Fund, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria and Yerevan). Crisis Ploughshares Fund, Provictimis Foundation, Radcliffe Group currently covers nearly 60 areas of actual or potential Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefe11er conflict across four continents. Jn Africa, this includes Philanthropy Advisors and Viva Trust. Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, June 2007 Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org

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APPENDIX F

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON EUROPE SINCE 2004

EU Crisis Response Capability RevisitedEurope, Report N°160, Serbia's New Constiuaion: Democracy GoingBa ckwards,Europe 17 January 2005 Briefing N°44, 8 November 2006 (also available in Russian) France um/ its Muslims: Riots, Jihadism and Depoliticisation, Kosovo Status: Delay ls Risky, Europe Report N°177, 10 Europe Report N°172, 9 March 2006 (only available in French) November 2006 (also available in Albanian, Serbian and Russian) Islam and It/entity i11 Germany, Europe Report N° 181, 14 March Kosovo's Status: DifficultMo 111/ts Ahead, Europe Briefing 2007 N°45, 20 December 2006 (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) BALKANS Ensuring Bosnia's Future: A New InternationalEng agement Strategy, Europe Report N° 180, 15 February 2007 Monitoring the Northern Ireland Ceasefires: Lessons from the Balkans, Europe Briefing N''30, 23 January 2004 Kosovo: No Good Alternatives to the Ahtisaari Plan, Europe Report NOl82, 14 May 2007 Pan-Albanianism: How Big" Threat to Balkan Stability?, Europe Serbia's New Government: Turning from Europe, Europe Report N°153, 25 February 2004 (also available in Albanian and Briefing N046, J 1 May 2007 Serbian) Serbia'» U-Turn, Europe Report N°I54, 26 March 2004 CAUCASUS Collapse in Kosovo, Europe Report N°155, 22 April 2004 (also available in Albanian and Serbian) Azerbaijan: Turning Over A New Leaft ; Europe Report N° 156, E UFOR: Clta11gi11g Bosnia 's Security A rrangements, Europe 13 May 2004 (also available in Russian) Briefing N''3 I, 29 .June 2004 (also available in Bosnian) Saakashvdi's Ajara Success: Repeasable Elsewherei11 Georgia?, Serbia's Oianging Pdaica! Landscape, Europe Briefing "N°3~ Europe Briefing N"34, 18 August 2004 (also available in Russian) 22 July 2004 (also available in Serbian) Armenia: Internal Instability Ahead, Europe Report N°158, Macedonia:M ake or Bret1k, Europe Briefing N''33, 3 August 2004 18 October 2004 (also available in Russian) (also available in Macedonian) Georgia: A voiding War in South Ossetia, Europe Report N° 159, Kosovo: Toward Final Status, Europe Report N° 161, 24 January 26 November 2004 (also available in Russian) 2005 (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) Georgia-South Ossetia: RefugeeR e111m tire Path to Peace, M<1cedo11ia: Not 0111 of the Woods Yet, Europe Briefing N°37, Europe Briefing N°38, 19 April 2005 (also available in Russian) 25 February 2005 (also available in Macedonian) Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground, Serbia's Sandzak: Still Forgotten, Europe Report N°162, 7 Europe Report N°165, 14 September 2005 (also available in April 2005 (also available in Serbian) Armenian, Azeri and Russian) Serbia: Spi1111i11g its Wheel.5, Europe Briefing N°39, 23 May Nagomo-Karabakh: A Pla11 for Peace, Europe Report N° I 67, 2005 (also available in Serbian) JO October 2005 (also available in Armenian, Azeri and Russian) Kosovo After Haradinaj, Europe Report N° 163, 26 May 2005 Azerbaijan's 2005 Eleaions: Los: OpportunityE, urope Briefing (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) N°40, 21 November 2005 (also available in Russian) Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU, Europe Conflict Resolution in tile Soutlt Caucasus: Tlte EU's Role, Report N° 164, 6 September 2005 Europe Report N° 173, 20 March 2006 Bridging Ko.v011()'s Mitrm•icll Divide, Europe Report N°'165, 13 Abkhazia Today, Europe Report N°176, 15 September 2006 September 2005 (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) (also available in Russian)

EU Vi,<00.<0um/ the Western Balkans, Europe Report N°168, 29 Georgia's Armenian and Azeri Minorities, Europe Report November 2005 N°178, 22 November 2006 (also available in Russian) Montenegro's Independence Drive, Europe Report N° 169, 7 Abkhazia: Ways Forward, Europe Report N° 179, 18 January December 2005 (also available in Russian and in Serbian) 2007 (also available in French) Macedonia: Wobbling Toward Europe, Europe Briefing N°4 I, 12 January 2006 (also available in Albanian and Macedonian) CYPRUS Kosovo: The Chull.enge of Transition, Europe Report N° 170, 17 The CyprusS talemate: What Near, Europe Report N° 171, 8 February 2006 (also available in Albanian, Serbian and Russian) March 2006 (also available in Greek and Turkish) Montenegro's Referendum, Europe Briefing N°42, 29 M1y 2006 (also available in Russian) MOLDOVA Southern Serbia: In Kosovo's Shadow, Europe Briefing N°43, 27 June 2006 (also available in Russian) Moldova: Regional Tensions over Trunsdniestria,E urope Report N<' 157, 17 June 2004 (also available in Russian) An Arnw for Kosovot; Europe Report N°l 74, 28 July 2006 (also available in Albanian, Russian and Serbian) Moldova's Uncertain Ftaure, Europe Report N°175, 17 August 2006 (also available in Russian)

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OTHER REPORTSA ND BRIEFINGS

For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on: • Africa • Asia • Latin America and Caribbean • Middle East and North Africa • Thematic Issues • Crisiswatch please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org

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APPENDIX G

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Co-Chairs Zbigniew Brzezinski Christopher Patten Fo rmer U.S. National Security Advisor to the President Vonner European Commissioner for Extemal Relations, Kim Campbell Governor of Hong Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of Fom ier Prime Minis/er of 'Canada; Secretary Gen eral, Club o[Mod1id Oxford University Thomas Pickering Naresh Chandra Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and Ambassodo: qf India to the U.S. Former U.S. Ambassador Lo the l/N, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, FJ Salvador and Nigeria Joaquim Alber-to Chissano Fonner President cf Mozambique President & CF.O Victor Chu Gareth Evans Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong Former Foreign Minister of Australia Wesley Clark Executive Committee Former lvA.TO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe Cheryl Carolus Pat Cox Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Former President o/E11ropcan Parlia111e11I Secretary General of the ANC Uffe Ellemann-Jensen Maria Livanos Cattaui" Former Forei[!.11 Minister of Denmark Member· of the Hoard of Directors. Petroplus Holding AG, Switzerland; former Secretary-General: International Chamher of Commerce Mark Eyskens Fonner Prime Minister of Belgium Voichi Funabashi Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, The Asahi Shimb1111, Joschka Fischer Japan Former F01T!ig11 Minister of Germany Frank Giustra Leslie H. Gelb Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada President Emeritus

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Mark Malloch Brown Fidel V. Ramos Fonner U1VD eputy Secretary-General and Administrator of the Fonner President of Philippines UN Development Programme Ghassan Salame Ayo Obe Former]:linister; f .ebanon; Prcfessorof Intemational Relations, Paris Chair of Steering Committee of World Movement for Democracy, Nigeria Douglas Schoen F01111ding Fanner qf Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates. U.S. Christine Ockrent Journalist and author. France Thorvald Stoltenberg Former Foreign Minister cf Norway Victor Pinchuk Founder of Interpipe Scientific and Industrial Production Group Ernesto Zedillo Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Study Samantha Power of Globalization Author and Professor, Ke1111edy School of Government, Harva rd Unive rsi ty

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL Crisis Group's International Advisory Council comprises major individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience lo Crisis Group on a regular basis.

Rita E. Hauser (Co-Chair) Elliott F. Kulick (Co-Chair) Marc Abramowitz Equinox Partners PT Newmont Pacific Nusantara Anglo American PLC Frontier Strategy Group (Mr. Robert Humberson) APCO Worldwide Inc. Konrad Fischer Michael L. Riordan Ed Bachrach Alan Griffiths Tilleke & Gibbins Patrick E. Benzie Charlotte and Fred Hubbell Baron Guy Ullens de Schooten Stanley M. Bergman and Iara Lee & George Gund III VlVATrust Edward J. Bergman Foundation Stanley Weiss BHP Billiton Sheikh Khaled Juffali Westfield Group Harry Bookey and Pamela George Kellner Don Xia Bass-Bookey Amed Khan Y asuyo Yamazaki John Chapman Chester Shiv Vikram Khemka Yapi Merkezi Construction Chevron Scott J. Lawlor and Industry Inc. Citigroup George Loening Shinji Y azaki Companhia Vale do Rio Doce McKinsey & Company Sunny Yoon Richard H. Cooper Najib A. Mikati Credit Suisse Donald Pels John Ehara

SENIOR ADVJSERS Crisis Group's Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding national government executive office)w ho maintain an association with Crisis Group. and whose advice and support are called on from time to time.

Martti Ahtisanri Stanley Fischer George J. Mitchell William Taylor (ChairmanE meritus) Malcolm Fraser (Chaim umEme rttus) Leo Tindemans Diego Arria Bronislaw Geremek Surin Pitsuwan Ed van Thijn Paddy Ashdown 1.K. Gujral Cyril Ramaphosa Shirley Williams Zainab Bangura Max Jakobson George Robertson Grigory Yavlinski Christoph Bertram Todung Mulya Lu bis Michel Rocard Ufa Zapf Jorge Castaneda Allan J. MacEachen Volker Ruehe Alain Destexhe Barham McDougall Mohamed Sahnoun Marika F ahlen Matthew McHugh Salim A. Salim

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