THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACE ENFORCEMENT MISSIONS IN THE PROMOTION OF PEACE IN AFRICA: A CASE OF AMISOM (2007-2019)

HALANE AREA

BY

ESTER NINSHABA

2017/AUG/MIRD/M221542/WKD

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL

SCIENCES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR

THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY

OF NKUMBA UNIVERSITY

OCTOBER 2019

DECLARATION

I, ESTER NINSHABA, do hereby declare that this research is my original work and has never been presented to any other institution for the award of any certificate.

ESTER NINSHABA

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APPROVAL

This is to certify that this dissertation on “The Effectiveness of Peace enforcement Missions in the Promotion of Peace in Africa” (A Case of AMISOM 2007-2019), was under my supervision and is ready for submission to the academic board of Nkumba University.

MR. SSEBUNYA ROBERT

(Supervisor)

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to the Almighty God, whom I owe everything that I am!

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I acknowledge my supervisor Mr. Ssebunya Robert, for his good leadership skills and guidance in this research work. I appreciate all staff of Nkumba University especially; Mr. Barenzi M. George; Dr. Solomon Asiimwe, for his enormous help and academic advices, and Mr. Amos Kalusuku for his kindness and helpfulness.

I acknowledge my fellow course mates for their co-operation and helpful efforts rendered to each other during discussion periods and throughout the entire course. A significant debt is due to the generous interviewees and organizations who agreed to be interviewed and gave valuable information and insights to the researcher.

I thank my family for encouraging me in all of my pursuits and inspiring me to follow my dreams. I am especially grateful to my mother Jovia Nzarombi who has supported me emotionally and financially and my late father Frank Nzarombi who believed in me most. My Aunt Maj. Night Ikiriza Mugume, thank you for every smallest way you pitched in.

This Journey and my educational pursuits would still be a dream without the help of the Ugandan State House scholarship. I am forever grateful.

My heartfelt gratitude goes to Gen. David Muhoozi Rubakuba, Maj. Gen Steven Sabiiti Muzeyi, and Lt-Gen Charles Lutaaya for enabling me to do this work. Thank you for your kindness.

Any views and comments on this work may be addressed to the author. The author takes responsibility for any errors and omissions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DECLARATION ...... i

APPROVAL ...... ii

DEDICATION ...... iii

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ...... iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... v

LIST OF TABLES ...... x

LIST OF FIGURES ...... xii

ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS...... xiii

ABSTRACT ...... xv

CHAPTER ONE ......

1 INTRODUCTION

...... 1

1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY ...... 1

1.0 Introduction ...... 1

1.1.1 Historical Background ...... 1

1.1.2 Theoretical Background ...... 8

1.1.3 Conceptual Background ...... 17

1.1.4 Contextual Background ...... 26

1.2 Statement of the Problem...... 31

1.3 Main Objective of the Study ...... 32

1.4 Specific Objectives ...... 32

1.5 Research Questions ...... 32

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1.6.1 Content Scope ...... 33

1.6.3 Geographical Scope ...... 33

CHAPTER TWO ...... 35 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 35

2.0 Introduction ...... 35

2.1 Theoretical Review ...... 35

CHAPTER THREE ...... 57

METHODOLOGY ...... 57

3.0 Introduction ...... 57

3.1 Study Approach ...... 57

3.2 Study Design ...... 57

3.3 Study Area ...... 58

3.4 Study Population ...... 58

3.5 Sampling Strategy ...... 59

3.5.1 Sample Size ...... 59

3.6 Data collection methods ...... 61

3.6.1. Primary data ...... 61

3.6.1.1 Questionnaire method ...... 61

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3.6.1.2 Interviews ...... 62

3.6.1.3 Focused Group Discussions...... 62

3.6.2 Secondary data ...... 62

3.6.2.1 Document Review ...... 62

3.7 Data collection Instruments ...... 63

3.7.1 Self-administered Questionnaires ...... 63

3.7.2 Interview guide ...... 63

3.7.3 Focused Group Discussion guide...... 63

3.7.4 Documentary review checklist ...... 64

3.8 Data quality control...... 64 3.8.1 Validity ...... 64

3.8.2 Reliability ...... 64

3.9 Data Analysis ...... 64

3.10 Ethical Considerations ...... 65

3.11 Limitations to the study/ overcoming challenges ...... 65

CHAPTER FOUR ...... 66

ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS ...... 66

4.0 Introduction ...... 66

4.1. Background characteristics of the respondents ...... 66

4.1.1 Gender of respondents ...... 66

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4.1.2 Age group...... 67

4.1.3 Level of education of the respondents...... 68

4.1.4 Occupation of respondents ...... 70

4.2 The strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019 ...... 71

4.2.1 Armed Actors in the Somali conflict ...... 71

4.2.2 African Initiative: ...... 72

4.2.3 Multiple actors as a strategy in the peace Process: ...... 73

4.2.4 Robust Mandates:...... 75

4.2.5 Civil-Military Projects (CIMIC): ...... 75

4.2.6 Multidimensional Mission: ...... 76

4.2.7 Sectorolization: ...... 77

4.2.8 Dialogue and Reconciliation ...... 78

4.2.9 Providing Protection to key State Infrastructures and the Somali Authorities ...... 78

4.3 The achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019 ...... 79 4.3.1 African Initiative ...... 80

4.3.2 Multiple Actors in the Somali Peace process ...... 80

4.3.3 Multidimensional Mission Strategy...... 82

4.3.3.1 Military Component ...... 82

4.3.3.2 Police Component...... 85

4.3.3.3 Civilian Component ...... 87

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4.3.3.4 Humanitarian Component...... 93

4.3.4 Sectorisation: ...... 114

4.4 The factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007- 2019...... 121

4.4.1. The factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007- 2019...... 121

4.4.3 The study also asked respondents whether AMISOM has the capacity to end the conflict and ensure lasting peace and the results are shown below ...... 154

4.4.4 Are Military operations the only way out for lasting peace in Africa? ...... 155

4.4.5 Gap to be bridged to move towards lasting peace in Somalia ...... 156

CHAPTER FIVE ...... 159

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...... 159

5.0 Introduction ...... 159

5.1 Summary of the Findings ...... 159

5.1.1. The strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019 ...... 159

5.1.2 The achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019 . 160

5.1.3 The factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007- 2019...... 161

5.2 Conclusion ...... 162 5.3 Recommendations ...... 163

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5.4 Areas of further study ...... 164

REFERENCES ...... 165

APPENDIX A: ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE...... 171

APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE ...... 179

APPENDIX C: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSIONS GUIDE...... 180

APPENDIX E: MAP OF SOMALIA ...... 182

APPENDIX F:POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOMALIA ...... 183

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Showing Population distribution and sample size ...... 61 Table 4.2. Showing the Age of the respondent ...... 68 Table 4. 3 Showing Findings on the level of education ...... 69 Table 4.4. Showing Occupation ...... 70 Table 4.5. Showing the armed actors in the Somali Conflict of the respondents ...... 71 Table 4.6. Showing the different actors in Somali peace process ...... 74 Table 4.7. Showing why the African Union involved other actors to the Somali’s conflict resolution...... 81 Table 4.8. Showing whether Al-shabab is no longer a threat to Somalia following the deployment of AMISOM ...... 83 Table 4.9. Showing whether AMISOM provides incentives and meaningful pathways for communication for all the warring parties to make their intentions credible...... 90 Table 4.10. Showing whether Bombers blast in Somalia lead to displacement of ordinary citizens to seek refuge in the new areas ...... 93 Table 4.11. Showing whether displacement of Somali citizen has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM in this region ...... 94 Table 4.12. Showing whether the Somali conflict has increased sexual violence against women in this region ...... 95 Table 4.13. Showing whether the Somali conflict has increased sexual violence against women in this region ...... 96 Table 4.14. Showing the conflict increased child abuse in Somalia ...... 97 Table 4.15. Showing whether Child abuse in this region has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM ...... 98 Table 4.16. Showing whether Somalis still lack food shelter water and proper sanitation because of conflict ...... 101

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Table 4.17. Showing that the number of Somalis who still lack food, shelter, water and proper sanitation has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM ...... 102 Table 4.18. Showing whether Somalia are able to move freely in Somali region peacefully .. 104 Table 4.19. Showing the Trade business family and social life have improved in Somalia since deployment of AMISOM ...... 105 Table 4.20. Showing whether the Somali government and the forces are ready for the transition and are able to take over from AMISOM the responsibility of defending and protecting their country...... 115 Table 4.21. Showing whether the current peace stability can only be attributed to AMISOM . 120 Table 4. 22 Showing the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007-2019 ...... 122 Table 4.23. Showing the failure to integrate the Somali indigenous approaches such as the guurti system ...... 151 Table 4.24. Showing whether the Somalis like foreign interference when resolving their intra state conflict ...... 152 Table 4.25 showing whether AMISOM was deployed in Somali when the conflict had already escalated ...... 153 Table 4.26. Showing whether AMISOM has capacity to end conflict and ensure lasting peace ...... 154 Table 4.27. Showing whether there is still an important gap to be bridged towards lasting peace in Somalia ...... 156

LIST OF FIGURES

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Figure 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ...... 54 Figure 4: 2 showing gender of respondents ...... 67 ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS AU African Union

AMISOM African Mission in Somalia

AU-UN JR African Union - United Nations Joint Review

CAS Comprehensive Approach to Security

CIMIC Civil Military Coordination

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

EU European Union

FGS Federal Government of Somalia

FMS Federal Member States

FOB Forward Operating Base

IGAD Inter- Governmental Authority on Development

IGASOM Inter-Governmental Authority on Development Peace Support Mission to Somalia

IEDs Improvised Explosive Devises

ISIL Islamic State of Iraq And Levant

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

IEP Institute for Economics and Peace IHDI Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index

KDF Kenya Defence Forces

MIA Mogadishu International Airport

MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in The Democratic Republic of The Congo

MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

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OCHA United Nations Office for The Coordination Of Humanitarian Affairs

ORA Operational Readiness Assessment

QUIPs Quick Impact Projects

SNA Somali National Army

SNP Somali National Police

SPF Somali Police Force

STP Somalia Transitional Plan

SNSF Somali National Security Forces

SG Secretary General TCCs Troop Contributing Countries

UN United Nations

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution UNOSOM 1 United Nations Operation in Somalia I

UNOSOM 11 United Nations Operation in Somalia II UNSOS United Nations Support Office in Somalia

UNSOA United Nations Support Office for AMISOM

UPDF Uganda People’s Defence Forces

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund ABSTRACT

This study was about the effectiveness of peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa: a case of AMISOM in the period (2007-2019) in the Halane Area. A substantial body of research exists on the effectiveness of UN Peace Operations in conflict resolution and yet it remains a strongly contested issue. A case in point is the Somali conflict that has lasted for 20

xiv years. There have been several efforts by the International Community through international organizations namely the UN and the AU to restore peace and hope in Somalia and yet Somalia remains unstable Hence this research set out (i)To identify the strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019; (ii)To establish the achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019; (iii) To find out the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007-2019. The study used a case study design in which primary and secondary data were used to enrich the study. Both quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection were used with the help of Questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions as the major tools for primary data collection. Secondary data was collected from secondary materials. Non-random sampling method was used whereby snowball, purposive, and Convenience sampling techniques were employed. The study used a sample of (250) respondents, selected using Slovene’s (1967) formula for determining sample size. Data findings were analyzed using narrative texts, Pictures, figures, descriptive statistics, frequency tables and percentages.

The study found out that the strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the Somali conflict or AMISOM’s concept of operations is derived from United Nations Security Council Resolutions and the Communiqués of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. The study also found out that, 12 years later, AMISOM recaptured considerable territory from Al-shabaab between 2011 and 2015 in six regions occupied by AMISOM troops, Halane Area which was a jungle in 2007, its now home to almost all International organizations operating in Somalia and 0ver 33 Foreign Missions and Embassies have re-opened their offices in Somalia all of which had closed since 1991; AMISOM enabled the formation of the FG in 2012 a democratic government since 1969; AMISOM has also created a conducive environment for humanitarian responses by recapturing regions that were a no go zones and by providing security to various international humanitarian agencies. The research also found out that in almost the last 4 years, no major operations have been carried out by AMISOM but only consolidating already made achievements. However; the research found that the Somali Conflict is far from being resolved due to; the mission is still unable to overcome the issues of internal coordination; multiple players where some are conflict entrepreneurs; Al-shabaab continues to be a challenging and almost an invisible enemy resorting to “hit and melt” war tactics and IEDs even in liberated areas; politicized Clans

xv and religious fundamentalism continue to impede the peace process, Moreover, the pace at which the requisite SNA troops are being generated/mobilized to take over from AMISOM is too slow (in peace meal) to match the pressure being mounted on AMISOM to draw down. The study recommends that there is no amount of force that can restore lasting peace and stability to Somalia. Somalia needs a strong rallying person (Somali National) to rally all Somalis behind a common identity, ideology and purpose; The ideology of patriotism and nationalism instead of clannism should be preached in all Universities and schools so that a good number of Somalis can speak for Somalia other than their story being told by mostly foreigners because its only Somalis that can articulate their Country’s history and dynamics, something only they could do with some degree of accuracy. The Federal government of Somalia needs to win the “hearts and minds” of the people. This is where the government institutions need to work together and enhance the effectiveness of the government and make the Al-shabaab feel that they are not effective as they could be. The government needs to come out with a strategy to compel the Al-shabaab to come to the table. The war against Al-shabaab can only be; an all-out victory; negotiated victory or negotiated settlement.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.0 Introduction The chapter is composed of the background to the study, statement of the research problem, main objective of the study, specific objectives of the study, research questions, Scope of the study, significance of the study, Delimitations/ overcoming challenges, Justification of the study.

1.1.1 Historical Background According to Rita Abrahamsen (2013) “Conflict and security in Africa”, More than any other part of the globe, Africa has in the post-cold-war period been associated with conflict, insecurity and human rights atrocities. In the 1990s, Robert Kaplan’s (1994) nightmare vision of ‘the coming anarchy’ epitomized the continent’s perceived affinity with ethnic hatred, senseless violence and environmental dystopia. Two decades later, Pulitzer prize-winning journalist Jeffery Gettleman painted a similar picture, despairing that the continent’s wars ‘never end’ but spread ‘like a viral pandemic’, making ‘quiet places ‘like Tanzania ‘the lonely exceptions’ in Africa. A significant change in Africa’s Post-Cold war security landscape appears to be an increase in religious fundamentalist and terrorist violence, aligned in various ways to global struggles against western hegemony. The long-standing warfare of Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the rise of al- Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the 2012 insurgency in Mali all seem to suggest that fundamentalist violence is spreading across the continent. Boko Haram, with its chilling translation ‘western education is forbidden’ and violent attacks on Christians, police stations and aid workers in Nigeria, similarly seems to indicate a rise in religious intolerance and violence. Both the religious and the global dimensions of these conflicts merit careful investigation. It is therefore, against this changing nature of conflicts in Africa that this study seeks to assess the effectiveness of peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa: a case of African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM).

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Somalia officially the Federal Republic of Somalia and formerly known as the Somali Democratic Republic, is a country located in the Horn of Africa. It is bordered by Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti to the northwest, the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Guardafui Channel and Somali Sea to the east, and Kenya to the southwest. Somalia has the longest coastline on Africa's mainland, and its terrain consists mainly of plateaus, plains and highlands. Climatically, hot conditions prevail year-round, with periodic monsoon winds and irregular rainfall. Somalia was an important centre for commerce with the rest of the ancient world, and according to most scholars, it is among the most probable locations of the fabled ancient Land of Punt. During the Middle Ages, several powerful Somali empires dominated the regional trade, including the Ajuran Sultanate, the Adal Sultanate, the Warsangali Sultanate, the Sultanate of the Geledi and the Majeerteen Sultanate. In the late 19th century, through a succession of treaties with these kingdoms, the British and Italians gained control of parts of the coast, and established British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland. In the interior, Mohammed Abdullah Hassan's Dervish movement successfully repulsed the British Empire four times and forced it to retreat to the coastal region, but the Dervishes were finally defeated in 1920 by British airpower. Italy acquired full control of the north-eastern, central and southern parts of the territory after successfully waging a Campaign of the Sultanates against the ruling Majeerteen Sultanate and the Sultanate of Hobyo. This occupation lasted until 1941 when it was replaced by a British military administration. North-western Somalia would remain a protectorate, while north-eastern, central and southern Somalia by agreement became a United Nations Trusteeship on 1 April 1950, with a promise of independence after 10 years. On 1 July 1960, the two regions united as planned to form the independent Somali Republic under a civilian government. The Somali National Assembly, headed by Haji Bashir Ismail Yusuf, approved the act uniting the former Italian Somaliland with British Somaliland, establishing the Republic of Somalia.1

Joshua Muvumba (2007),“Discerning the Somali Clan Structure”, to the great consternation of the contemporary world a 246,155sq.mile chunk of African real estate has existed without formal governance since 1989.The lacuna of nation-statehood in Somalia can only be understood after examining its culture, history and geopolitics. All the same the clan is the key. “Every Somali child knows by heart his or her genealogy more than 20 generations, back to the revered common ancestral eponym of all Somalis, Somaale, from the words “go and milk”. Beyond this hero the

2 line is traced presumptuously up to the prophet Mohammed or to noble Arabian families”. The population of the Somali people is and was always impossible to estimate even before the demise of the state because they ignored the meaningless boundaries, which on July 1, 1960 officially demarcated the Somali Republic. The Somalis are divided into two main clan families: the largest (constitutes 75% of all Somalis) is known as Somaal and is basically if not strictly nomadic. It is divided into four sub-clans-namely the Darod, Isaaq, Hawiye and Dir. The second clan family is the Saab who make up 25% of all Somalis. More sedentary farmers, they sub divide into the Digil and Rahanweyn sub-clans. These six sub-clans are further divided into what may be called sub- sub- sub clans, which in turn are circumscribed into a plethora of lineages. These are themselves delimited into Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary lineages! The depth of Primary lineage is 12 to 14 generations. Usually lineages of the same clan form some perpetual alliances which become legal entities so that for example in the event of a homicide all the members of the alliance share in paying or receiving compensation. The cardinal fact is that, all these social units, at all levels, are active mobile polities and since 1989 are all armed with modern weapons (ibid).

Traditionally, Somalis never evolved nation statehood; instead, their segmental nation was held together by 4 comprehensive permeates- namely: Language, Religion, History and Poetry. Their language, which is classified as “lowland Eastern Cushitic”, is spoken and understood by all. It is only recently, however that the Somalis began writing in the Roman alphabet. All Somalis are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi Sect. They claim ancestry from the Qurayshitic lineage of the Prophet himself! Their disputed claim asserts that both Somaal and Saab were grandsons of Abu Taalib uncle to Muhammad and brother of Ali the husband of the prophet’s daughter Fatima. Perhaps no other people have so exalted poetry as the Somalis. They have in fact made it into a weapon in politics and made military mobilization. Whereas all Somalis are poetic, it is said that every fourth person among them is a publicly acknowledged poet. Indeed their greatest poet of the twentieth century Muhammad Abdillah Hassan whom the British nicknamed the “Mad Mulla” nearly succeeded in uniting all Somalis in a fierce 20 year resistance against British colonization. His final defeat and hanging in 1920 paved the way for the tragic dismembering of the Somali people. Ironically the African people who had the key ingredients of nationhood were set upon and systematically shredded into fragments. When independence eventually came in 1960 only British and Italian Somalis were dumped in the new horseshoe republic (ibid).

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The Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia became second-class citizens there while those under France became the tiny city-state Djibouti. However all Somalis continued to roam back and forth across the 424 mile border with Kenya, the 1,0022 mile with Ethiopia and 38 miles with Djibouti. Somalis embarked on a crusade for forming a united “Greater Somalia”. Armed irredentist movements were launched: NDF against Kenya; WSLF against Ethiopia and FLCS against Djibouti. Unfortunately the irredentist crusade was hijacked by the Cold War. But by 1989 both the Cold War and the crusade were exhausted – hell broke loose. The shadow institution which had masqueraded as a state of republic since 1960 simply disintegrated and ever since, Somalis have gone back to what Thomas Hobbes called “the state of nature” where “war is waged against all” (ibid).

Expectedly, the actors in the Somali tragedy are bewildering! At independence Abdullah Osman a Hawiye assumed power over the republic. Seven years later he was succeeded by Abdirirashid Ali Shermarke a Darod who two years later was succeeded by Ibrahim Egal an Isaaq who was assassinated seven months later. Barre a Marehari (a Darod sub-clan) managed to hold onto power by using Cold War largess to manipulate the clans. He was naturally toppled when the Cold war ended. The current Somali society is made up of labyrinthine warring factions using fancy names to beguile the naïve international community. All factions are sub-clan or lineage based. Ideology and political entrepreneurship are both still based on kinship. A fighting force can be recruited only through clan affiliation (ibid).

Globalization, modern communication and September 11th have all internationalized the Somali anarchy. Firstly, there is no earthy corner where there are no Somalis, but wherever they are they keep their clan identities and using modern communication technology, they open websites through which they keep in touch with their kinsmen at home and abroad! They are then able to fundraise and send money home most of which is used to buy arms. Before and after “September 11th” international terrorism has joined in the Somali fray not only have the Somali fighter been trained in the Middle East inferno but most of the weapons they use are supplied by terrorists organizations worldwide. One of the serious consequences of Somali lawlessness has been piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. With astounding sophistication and employing modern communication Somali piracy has succeeded in holding the world at ransom. It appears that the only remaining solution to the Somali predicament is a massive military intervention by the world’s powers that be (ibid).

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THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOMALI STATE 1991

As already discussed above, British Somaliland, to the north, gained independence on 26 June 1960, and the former Italian Somaliland followed suit five days later. On 1 July 1960, the two territories united to form the Somali Republic. A government was formed with Aden Abdullah Osman Daar as President, and Abdirashid Ali Shermarke as Prime Minister, later to become President (from 1967-1969). On 20 July 1961 and through a popular referendum, the Somali people ratified a new constitution. In 1969, following the assassination of President Shermarke, a military government assumed power in a coup d’état. General Siad Barre became the president and was to rule Somalia until 1991, when he was ousted by combined northern and southern clan-based forces.2

As a violent power struggle developed between two warring clan lords, Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed, the former British Somaliland, comprising the northwestern section of the country, between Djibouti and the northeastern area known as Puntland, declared its independence. However, its sovereignty is not recognized by any nation or international organization. Barre and his armed supporters remained in the south of the country until mid1992, causing further instability. Meanwhile, the fighting in Mogadishu devastated the city. All this disrupted agriculture and food distribution in southern Somalia, causing a famine and the deaths of up to 300,000 people. The UN responded by authorizing a limited peacekeeping operation, United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I). UNOSOM’s use of force was however limited to self-defense and it was soon disregarded by the warring factions.2

Faced with an impending humanitarian catastrophe, the United States organized a military coalition with the purpose of creating a secure environment in southern Somalia for the conduct of humanitarian operations. This coalition (Unified Task Force or UNITAF) entered Somalia in December 1992, launching Operation Restore Hope, which was successful in restoring order and alleviating the famine. In May 1993, most of the United States troops withdrew and UNITAF was replaced by the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). Aideed, though, saw UNOSOM II as a threat to his power, and his militia attacked UNOSOM II troops. Fighting escalated until 19 American troops and more than 1,000 Somalis were killed in a raid in Mogadishu during October 1993. The UN withdrew in March 1995, having suffered significant casualties, and

5 with the rule of government still not restored. In August 1996, Aideed was killed in Mogadishu. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of the Republic of Somalia is the most recent attempt to restore national institutions to Somalia. Established in 2004 and internationally recognized, its support in Somalia was waning until the United States-backed 2006 intervention by the Ethiopian military, which helped drive out the rival Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in Mogadishu and solidify the TFG’s rule. Following this defeat, the ICU splintered into several different factions. Some of the more radical elements, including Al-shabaab, regrouped to continue their insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military’s presence in Somalia.2

Communiqué (PSC/PR/comm(LXIX) of the 69th meeting of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; created the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) an active, regional peace support mission operated by the African Union (AU); to provide support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and to create conducive conditions for long- term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia. AMISOM replaced and subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to Somalia or IGASOM, which was a proposed Inter-Governmental Authority on Development protection and training mission in Somalia approved by the African Union in September 2006. IGASOM was also approved by the United Nations Security Council.2

Originally IGASOM was proposed for immediate implementation in March 2005 to provide peace operation forces for the latest phase of the Somali Civil War. At that time, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) had not yet taken control of Mogadishu, and most hopes for national unity lay with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). By May 2006, the situation was radically different, as the ICU had engaged the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism or ARPCT and was fighting for control of Mogadishu in the Second Battle of Mogadishu. By June, they had established control of the capital. Plans for IGASOM continued, though by July there were indications of opposition from the ICU, who saw the initiative as a western means to curb the growth of Islamic movement. Until December 2006, the UN Security Council had imposed an arms embargo on the group, but the embargo was partially lifted and a mandate for IGASOM issued in December 2006. On 20th February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized 6 the African Union to deploy a peace operation support mission with a mandate of six months, adopting resolution 1744(2007)13. The aim of the peace support mission was to support a national reconciliation congress and requested a report within 60 days on a possible United Nations Peacekeeping Mission. AMISOM was mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. As part of its duties, AMISOM also supports the Federal Government of Somalia's forces in their battle against Al-shabaab militants.2

In October, 2014, the Security Council (Resolution 2182 (2014) gave a green light to the African Union to continue its mission in Somalia until 30th November 2015. Furthermore the council authorized the African Union mission to take all measures, as appropriate, to carry out support for dialogue and reconciliation by assisting with free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in a national reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders, including political leaders, clan leaders, religious leaders and representatives of civil society. Subsequent six-monthly renewals of AMISOM's mandate by the African Union Peace and Security Council have also been authorized by the United Nations Security Council. In August 2017, the UNSCR 2372 (2017) mandated AMISOM to pursue the following strategic objectives: Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia; Reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabab and other armed opposition groups; Assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia. The duration of AMISOM's mandate has been extended in each period that it has been up for review, latest being UNSCR 2372(2019) that expires in 2021. AMISOM is actively working closely with the FGS and SNA to bring peace and stability to the nation.2

1.1.2 Theoretical Background

Realism Theory Vinay Kumar Malhotra (2002) “International relations”, the theory of realism is an old theory which was in existence even in the eighteenth and nineteenth century and revived after the Second World War. The credit of being “the first noted realist” of twentieth century is usually given to N.J. Spykman who sometime in late thirties insisted in his book, America’s Strategy in World Politics, that the “preservation objective” of a state. The contribution of reviving the theory in a 7 more coherent way after the Second World War goes to Hans J. Morgenthau. He is regarded as the most persuasive advocate of this theory in the post-war era. Among the other principal prophets of this world view were EH. Carr from the United Kingdom, and those writing in the United States including Morgenthau (1948), Kenneth W. Thompson, and those (1960). Reinhold Niebuhr (1947), George Kennan (1954 and 1967) and later Henry A. Kissinger (1957 and 1964)

In international relations, realism does not mean either the platonic doctrine which attributes reality to abstract ideas, or the political doctrine of expediency with which Machiavelli is so often associated or the philosophic doctrine of empiricism given by John Locke. Its meaning resolves around security and power factors. These notions are the outcome of individual’s belief that others are always trying to destroy him and hence he must be constantly ready to kill others in order to protect himself. The realists assume that rivalry, strife and struggle for power continue among nations in some form or the other and it cannot be controlled by international law or government. Therefore, the main job of diplomacy and statesmanship is to check the contest for power and the means to be adopted for it is new balance of power. As struggle for power is permanent phenomenon realism is indifferent to the question of relationship between means and ends in international politics. The realist theory explains international politics in terms of the concept of interest defined in terms of power. Interest guides the statesman more than anything else and that it is useless to try and understand his actions in terms of “his motives” or “his ideology.” In fact, ideology is only a clock for power politics. Statesmen think and act only in terms of national interest (ibid).

Realists put the moral significance of politics in a different way. To them, morality means weighing the consequences of political action. They do not believe in an ethics which lays down abstract universal principles and judge all actions by its conformity with such principles. Most realists express awareness of other standard of judgment, viz. the moral or legal, but argue that both history and experience prove that it has paid only to follow the “political standard,” namely national interest, moderated by legal and moral considerations. Thus, they give first place to the political standard that is, judging by the consequences of political action. Kegley and Wittkopf sum up what many realists want to convey in the form of the following assumptions and tenets: 1) A reading of history teaches that humanity is by nature sinful and wicked; 2) of all of man’s evil ways, no sin

8 is more prevalent or more dangerous than his instinctive lust for power, his desire to dominate his fellowmen; 3) If this inexorable and inevitable human characteristic is acknowledged, realism forces dismissal of the possibility of progress in the sense of ever hopping to eradicate the instinct for power; 4) Under such conditions, international politics is a struggle for power, a war of all against all; 5) The primary obligation of every state in this environment or the goal to which all other national objectives should be subordinate is to promote the national self-interest, defined in terms of the acquisition of power; 6 ) National, selfinterest is best served by doing anything necessary to ensure self-preservation; 7) The fundamental characteristic of international politics requires each state to trust no other, but above all never to entrust self-protection to international organization or to international law; 8) The national interest necessitates self-promotion, especially through the acquisition of military capabilities sufficient to deter attack by potential enemies; 9) The capacity for self-defense might also be augmented by acquiring allies, provided they are not relied upon for protection and 10) If all states search for power, peace and stability will result through the operation of a balance of power propelled by self-interest and lubricated by fluid alliance systems. Morgenthau in his famous book “politics Among Nations” has developed Realist theory in the form of six principles of political realism. The same are explained in brief as under:

Objective laws of Human Nature. Political realism believes that politics is governed by the objective laws that have their roots in human nature. The laws by which man moves in social world are eternal. He cannot get rid of those laws by which man moves in social world are eternal. He cannot get rid of those laws because they are eternal and permanent. Man is a mixture of good and bad, selfishness and altruism, loving and quarrelsome traits and possessive and sacrificial qualifies. His is the story of struggle for survival. Human nature has not changed, and it explains constancy and repetitions nature of political conduct. The complexity of international politics can best be understood only with the help of these objective laws. If one desires to appraise the nature of foreign policy it can be done only when one examines the activities of the statesmen, who always act in a manner that safeguard their country’s interests(ibid).

Interest in terms of power. Concept of interest is defined in terms of power. National interests are the motivating force of a state’s activity in the sphere of international politics. The state meets these interests with the help of power. That is why every nation wants to acquire more and more

9 power. In this way, international politics is a struggle for power. The theory of realism does not bother about what is desirable or immoral. It cares only for the national interests which are desirable under the concrete circumstances, time and place. In other words, this theory preaches that states should not be led by ideologies; ethics or motives, as they do not govern the field of international politics. In short, the main function of a state and its statesman is to protect national interests with the help of power (ibid).

Interests are dynamic. The meaning attached to interest and power is not static and fixed once for all. National interests are changed and shaped by the circumstances. If the circumstances make the state a powerful one, its national interests become different from what they had been when the state was a weaker one. Not only interests are dynamic, but the power position of most countries also varies with time. The content and manner of the use of power are themselves determined by political and cultural circumstances (ibid).

Universal moral principles inapplicable. Realism maintains that universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulations. They must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. Prudence is the supreme virtue in politics, and political ethics judge’s action ultimately by its political consequences. An individual may sacrifice his interests to safeguard the abstract or moral value but the state cannot and should not sacrifice its interests. On the contrary, the states generally sacrifice the abstract or moral laws for the sake of national interest (ibid).

Moral Aspirations of Nationals. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the nation. This theory considers the nations as actors of international relations which strive to pursue and achieve their national interest with the help of power. The actions of the states can only be interpreted with this principle. The moral laws that govern the universe do not apply to states. Realism seeks to distinguish between truth and idolatry. Each state is tempted to identify its particular aspirations and actions in terms of universal moral principles (ibid).

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The autonomy of political sphere. Realism declares the autonomy of political sphere. The difference between political realism and other schools of thought is real and profound. A political realist thinks in terms of interest defined as power, an economist thinks in terms of utility, a lawyer of conformity of conduct with legal rules and a moralist of such conformity with moral principles. He is exclusively concerned about the relevance of a particular policy to the national power (ibid).

Just War Theory

Just war theory is a doctrine, also referred to as a tradition, of military ethics studied by military leaders, theologians, ethicists and policy makers. The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure war is morally justifiable through a series of criteria, all of which must be met for a war to be considered just. The criteria are split into two groups: "right to go to war" (jus ad bellum) and "right conduct in war" (jus in bello). The first concerns the morality of going to war, and the second the moral conduct within war. Recently there have been calls for the inclusion of a third category of just war theory-jus post bellum-dealing with the morality of post-war settlement and reconstruction. Just war theory postulates that war, while terrible (but less so with the right conduct), is not always the worst option. Important responsibilities, undesirable outcomes, or preventable atrocities may justify war. Opponents of just war theory may be either inclined to a stricter pacifist standard (proposing that there has never been and/or can never be a justifiable basis for war) or toward a more permissive nationalist standard (proposing that a war need only serve a nation's interests to be justifiable). In a large number of cases, philosophers state that individuals need not be of guilty conscience if required to fight. A few ennoble the virtues of the soldier while declaring their apprehensions for war itself. A few, such as Rousseau, argue for insurrection against oppressive rule. The historical aspect, or the "just war tradition", deals with the historical body of rules or agreements that have applied in various wars across the ages. The just war tradition also considers the writings of various philosophers and lawyers through history, and examines both their philosophical visions of war's ethical limits and whether their thoughts have contributed to the body of conventions that have evolved to guide war and warfare. A 2017 study found that the just war tradition can be traced as far back as to Ancient Egypt, "demonstrating that just war thought developed beyond the boundaries of Europe and existed many centuries earlier than the advent of Christianity or even the emergence of GrecoRoman doctrine.3

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Chinese philosophy produced a massive body of work on warfare, much of it during the Zhou dynasty, especially the Warring States era. War was justified only as a last resort and only by the rightful sovereign; however, questioning the decision of the emperor concerning the necessity of a military action was not permissible. The success of a military campaign was sufficient proof that the campaign had been righteous. Though Japan did not develop its own doctrine of just war, between the 5th and 7th centuries they drew heavily from Chinese philosophy, and especially Confucian views. As part of the Japanese campaign to take the northeastern island Honshu, Japanese military action was portrayed as an effort to "pacify" the Emishi people who were likened to "bandits" and "wild-hearted wolf cubs" and accused of invading Japan's frontier lands. The Indian Hindu epic, the Mahabharata, offers the first written discussions of a "just war" (dharma- yuddha or "righteous war"). In it, one of five ruling brothers (Pandavas) asks if the suffering caused by war can ever be justified. A long discussion then ensues between the siblings, establishing criteria like proportionality (chariots cannot attack cavalry, only other chariots; no attacking people in distress), just means (no poisoned or barbed arrows), just cause (no attacking out of rage), and fair treatment of captives and the wounded. The war in the Mahabharata is preceded by context that develops the "just cause" for the war including last minute efforts to reconcile differences to avoid war. At the beginning of the war, there is the discussion of "just conduct" appropriate to the context of war.3

Nine hundred years later, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) laid out the conditions under which a war could be justified (combining the theological principles of faith with the philosophical principles of reason, he ranked among the most influential thinkers of medieval Scholasticism) First, just war must be waged by a properly instituted authority such as the state. (Proper Authority is first: represents the common good: which is peace for the sake of man's true endGod.) Second, war must occur for a good and just purpose rather than for self-gain (for example, "in the nation's interest" is not just) or as an exercise of power (just cause: for the sake of restoring some good that has been denied. i.e. lost territory, lost goods, punishment for an evil perpetrated by a government, army, or even the civilian populace). Third, peace must be a central motive even in the midst of violence. (right intention: an authority must fight for the just reasons it has expressly claimed for declaring war in the first place. Soldiers must also fight for this intention.3

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In the Summa Theological, Thomas proceeded to distinguish between philosophy and theology, and between reason and revelation, though he emphasized that these did not contradict each other. Both are fountains of knowledge; both come from God. The School of Salamanca expanded on Thomistic understanding of natural law and just war. It stated that war is one of the worst evils suffered by mankind. The School's adherents reasoned that war should be a last resort, and only then, when necessary to prevent an even greater evil. Diplomatic resolution is always preferable, even for the more powerful party, before a war is started. Examples of "just war" are: In self- defense, as long as there is a reasonable possibility of success; Preventive war against a tyrant who is about to attack; War to punish a guilty enemy. A war is not legitimate or illegitimate simply based on its original motivation: it must comply with a series of additional requirements: It is necessary that the response be commensurate with the evil; use of more violence than is strictly necessary would constitute an unjust war; Governing authorities declare war, but their decision is not sufficient cause to begin a war. If the people oppose a war, then it is illegitimate. The people have a right to depose a government that is waging, or is about to wage an unjust war. Once war has begun; there remain moral limits to action. For example, one may not attack innocents or kill hostages; it is obligatory to take advantage of all options for dialogue and negotiations before undertaking a war; war is only legitimate as a last resort; under this doctrine expansionist wars, wars of pillage, wars to convert infidels or pagans, and wars for glory are all inherently unjust.3

Criteria

Just War Theory has two sets of criteria, the first establishing jus ad bellum (the right to go to war), and the second establishing jus in bello (right conduct within war):

Jus ad bellum- Just cause: The reason for going to war needs to be just and cannot therefore be solely for recapturing things taken or punishing people who have done wrong; innocent life must be in imminent danger and intervention must be to protect life. A contemporary view of just cause was expressed in 1993 when the US Catholic Conference said: "Force may be used only to correct a grave, public evil, i.e., aggression or massive violation of the basic human rights of whole populations."3

Comparative justice: While there may be rights and wrongs on all sides of a conflict, to overcome the presumption against the use of force, the injustice suffered by one party must significantly

13 outweigh that suffered by the other. Some theorists such as Brian Orend omit this term, seeing it as fertile ground for exploitation by bellicose regimes.3

Competent authority: Only duly constituted public authorities may wage war. "A just war must be initiated by a political authority within a political system that allows distinctions of justice. Dictatorships (e.g. Hitler's Regime) or deceptive military actions (e.g. the 1968 US bombing of Cambodia) are typically considered as violations of this criterion. The importance of this condition is key. Plainly, we cannot have a genuine process of judging a just war within a system that represses the process of genuine justice. A just war must be initiated by a political authority within a political system that allows distinctions of justice".3

Right intention: Force may be used only in a truly just cause and solely for that purpose correcting a suffered wrong is considered a right intention, while material gain or maintaining economies is not.3

Probability of success: Arms may not be used in a futile cause or in a case where disproportionate measures are required to achieve success.3

Last resort: Force may be used only after all peaceful and viable alternatives have been seriously tried and exhausted or are clearly not practical. It may be clear that the other side is using negotiations as a delaying tactic and will not make meaningful concessions.3

Proportionality: The anticipated benefits of waging a war must be proportionate to its expected evils or harms. This principle is also known as the principle of macro-proportionality, so as to distinguish it from the jus in bello principle of proportionality. In modern terms, just war is waged in terms of self-defense, or in defense of another (with sufficient evidence).3

Jus in bello: once war has begun, just war theory (jus in bello) also directs how combatants are to act or should act:

Distinction: Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of distinction. The acts of war should be directed towards enemy combatants, and not towards non-combatants caught in circumstances they did not create. The prohibited acts include bombing civilian residential areas that include no legitimate military targets, committing acts of terrorism or reprisal against civilians

14 or prisoners of war (POWs), and attacking neutral targets. Moreover, combatants are not permitted to attack enemy combatants who have surrendered or who have been captured or who are injured and not presenting an immediate lethal threat or who are parachuting from disabled aircraft and are not airborne forces or who are shipwrecked.3

Proportionality: Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of proportionality. Combatants must make sure that the harm caused to civilians or civilian property is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated by an attack on a legitimate military objective. This principle is meant to discern the correct balance between the restriction imposed by a corrective measure and the severity of the nature of the prohibited act.3

Military necessity: Just war conduct should be governed by the principle of military necessity. An attack or action must be intended to help in the defeat of the enemy; it must be an attack on a legitimate military objective, and the harm caused to civilians or civilian property must be proportional and not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. This principle is meant to limit excessive and unnecessary death and destruction.3

Fair treatment of prisoners of war: Enemy combatants who surrendered or who are captured no longer pose a threat. It is therefore wrong to torture them or otherwise mistreat them.3

No means malum in se: Combatants may not use weapons or other methods of warfare that are considered evil, such as mass rape, forcing enemy combatants to fight against their own side or using weapons whose effects cannot be controlled (e.g., nuclear/biological weapons).3

Ending a war: Jus post bellum

In recent years, some theorists, such as Gary Bass, Louis Iasiello and Brian Orend, have proposed a third category within Just War theory. Jus post bellum concerns justice after a war, including peace treaties, reconstruction, environmental remediation, war crimes trials, and war reparations. Jus post bellum has been added to deal with the fact that some hostile actions may take place outside a traditional battlefield. Jus post bellum governs the justice of war termination and peace agreements, as well as the prosecution of war criminals, and publicly labeled terrorists. This idea has largely been added to help decide what to do if there are prisoners that have been taken during battle. It is, through government labeling and public opinion, that people use jus post bellum to

15 justify the pursuit of labeled terrorist for the safety of the government's state in a modern context. The actual fault lies with the aggressor, so by being the aggressor they forfeit their rights for honorable treatment by their actions. This is the theory used to justify the actions taken by anyone fighting in a war to treat prisoners outside of war. Actions after a conflict can be warranted by actions observed during war, meaning that there can be justification to meet violence with violence even after war. Orend, who was one of the theorists mentioned earlier, proposes the following principles:

Just cause for termination: A state may terminate a war if there has been a reasonable vindication of the rights that were violated in the first place, and if the aggressor is willing to negotiate the terms of surrender. These terms of surrender include a formal apology, compensations, war crimes trials and perhaps rehabilitation. Alternatively, a state may end a war if it becomes clear that any just goals of the war cannot be reached at all or cannot be reached without using excessive force.3

Right intention: A state must only terminate a war under the conditions agreed upon in the above criteria. Revenge is not permitted. The victor state must also be willing to apply the same level of objectivity and investigation into any war crimes its armed forces may have committed.

Public declaration and authority: The terms of peace must be made by a legitimate authority, and the terms must be accepted by a legitimate authority.3

Discrimination: The victor state is to differentiate between political and military leaders, and combatants and civilians. Punitive measures are to be limited to those directly responsible for the conflict. Truth and reconciliation may sometimes be more important than punishing war crimes.3

Proportionality: Any terms of surrender must be proportional to the rights that were initially violated. Draconian measures, absolutionist crusades and any attempt at denying the surrendered country the right to participate in the world community are not permitted.3

1.1.3 Conceptual Background

According to Nigel D. White (2014), “Advanced introduction to international Conflict and Security Law”, intuitively, peace is the antithesis of war. Peace should be the normal human condition and war the exception if our basic premise about the survival instinct remains true.

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John Galtung, defined peace as the absence of ‘structural violence’. Structural violence is violence that is ‘built into the structure’ of society and ‘shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances’. It follows that in order to understand structural violence and the causes of war, issues of development, equality and more broadly, social justice, have to be considered. This in turn leads to a broader definition of peace as consisting not only of the absence of war or other forms of structural violence but also having a positive aspect, defined by Galtung in terms of the ‘integration of human society’. Only the achievement of both negative and positive peace will ensure human survival and human flourishing.

According to Trevor Findlay (2002), “The use of force in UN peace operations”, Enforcement refers to designate military operations mandated by the Security Council, either implicitly or explicitly, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to use force or the threat of force to impose the will of the international community on a single errant state or sub-state party. In such missions there is no pretense at neutrality or impartiality. If necessary, force is authorized to bring about military defeat of the designated ‘enemy’. They will usually be organized from the outset to conduct war against such parties, although clearly ‘war’ can vary in intensity and purpose. One of the most vexing issues to have faced the international community since the end of the cold war is the use of force by United Nations peacekeeping forces. intervention in civil wars-as in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in Rwanda-has thrown into stark relief the difficulty of peacekeepers operating in situations where consent to their presence and activities is fragile and where there is little or no peace to keep. The first history of the use of force by UN peacekeepers is from Sinai in the 1950s to East Timor in 2001.

According to Joshua S. Goldstein (2003) “International Relations”, In Angola, the UN sent only a few peacekeepers and when the government won, internationally observed elections in 1992, the rebels took to arms and the civil war resumed. Meanwhile in Somalia, the UN sided against one faction leader but could not defeat him and had to pull back. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge faction refused to disarm according to the UN- brokered peace plan it had signed; later a coup interrupted Cambodia’s transition to democracy. According to Chris McGreal “A world of problems: The United Nations at 70”, the betrayal of the Tutsi in Rwanda was a low point for UN peacekeeping. During the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, Hundreds of desperate Tutsi sought refuge on the first day of the genocide at a school where 90 UN troops were under the command of Captain

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Luc Lemaire. Here, they were surely safe from the Hutus and their machetes. The UN flag flew over the school. The Belgian peacekeepers were armed with a machine gun, planted at the entrance. These soldiers were the world’s army. The Tutsi could not imagine they would stand by while people were slaughtered. Within days, the UN command decided there was more important work for Lemaire and his men than protecting Tutsi. The peacekeepers were ordered to escort foreigners to the airport and out of Rwanda. As the soldiers left, Tutsi begged to be short rather than left to the militia’s machetes. Within hours, the 2,000 people at the school were murdered by gun, grenade and blade. A year later, Dutch peacekeepers failed to stop the massacre of 8,000 Muslim men in Srebrenica, a supposedly UN “safe area”, the most notorious mass killing by the Serbs in Bosnia.

Since the 1990s, the UN has had to acknowledge that consent-based deployment of lightly armed peacekeepers is insufficient when peace agreements do not hold or were not signed by all conflict parties. In response, the Security Council began to provide missions with so-called robust mandates, empowering them to use force not only for self-defense, but also for the enforcement of the mandate. In 2012 more than 110,000 persons (military, police and civilian) served in UN missions around the globe. Over the 60 years of their existence, over 69 UN peacekeeping operations have been deployed worldwide. UN missions have evolved to meet the demands of different conflicts and a changing political landscape. The Security Council has never itself commanded such an enforcement operation, but has authorized member states to do so (ibid).

According to J.G.Merrills (2011) “International Dispute Settlement”, the role played by a particular regional organization depends very much on the characteristics of the organization concerned: where it is located, how it is structured and what resources it commands. Solomon A. Dersso (2010), “the role and place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and Security Architecture”, in the post-Cold War era, the peace and security scene of Africa has changed fundamentally. This change relates not only to the changing nature of conflicts and the focus of the discourse on security, but also to various initiatives taken by Africa to institute an effective peace and security regime. In this context a remarkable development has been the establishment of an African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by the continental body, the African Union (AU). The AU took over from the OAU with the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. The entry into force of the Act on 26 May 2001 marked the birth of the AU and its inauguration in Durban in 2002 its official launch. According to the preamble to the

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Constitutive Act, one of the factors underlying the establishment of the AU was the recognition of ‘the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio- economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda’. In line with this, the Act provides that one of the objectives of the AU is to ‘promote peace, security, and stability on the continent’.

Solomon A. Dersso (2010), the Act stipulates in Article 4(h) that the AU has the right to intervene in a member state ‘pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’. This is a more than mere generic commitment to the promotion of peace and security and encapsulates the resolve of Africa to never let another Rwanda happen again. It not only creates the legal basis for intervention but also imposes an obligation on the AU to intervene to prevent or stop the perpetration of such heinous international crimes anywhere on the continent. The lack of guidance was rectified with the adoption of the PSC Protocol at the first ordinary session of the AU heads of state and government in Durban, South Africa. It came into force in January 2004 following its ratification by a simple majority of member states of the AU and was launched in May 2004. This Protocol endowed the AU with a comprehensive peace and security architecture, which has come to be known as the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is central to the APSA and is ‘a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts’ which operates as ‘a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’. The mandates accorded to the PSC as stipulated under Article 7 include that the PSC should:

Anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity; Undertake peacemaking and peace-building functions in order to resolve conflicts where they have occurred; authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions; Recommend to the Assembly intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances as provided for in article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act; Support and facilitate humanitarian; action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters (ibid).

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Article 2 of the PSC Protocol also identifies other components of the APSA, which support the PSC in fulfilling its mandates. One of these is the African Standby Force (ASF). Article 2 of the PSC Protocol defines the components of the APSA that support the works of the PSC. These are the AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), an African Standby Force (ASF), and a Special Fund. The different components of the APSA come into play sequentially in the process for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. Initially, the collection and analysis of information at the level of the CEWS triggers the application of the APSA. The CEWS uses the information it has collected mainly from public sources to analyze developments on the continent with a view to alerting the other relevant bodies to developments that require attention. The Chairperson shall then consider the information and analysis to plan appropriate courses of action that the situation demands through the Commission for Peace and Security. She/he uses the information to first timeously advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to the peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action and second initiate efforts for preventing potential conflicts or for making peace. It is at the stage where efforts for conflict prevention and peacemaking are deployed that the Panel of the Wise comes into play. The Panel has a peacemaking and advisory role and is also mandated ‘to support the efforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention’. Specifically, the Panel has the mandate to ‘advise the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the AU Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa’ (ibid).

In addition, ‘at its own initiative, the Panel of the Wise shall undertake such action deemed appropriate to support the efforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission for the prevention of conflict’. Within the framework of the APSA, the ASF comes into action in cases where violent conflicts are about to erupt or have already erupted and/or to intervene in respect of grave circumstances. Under normal circumstances it therefore acts at the end of the chain of the APSA components and processes. However, depending on the conflict situation, it can be deployed alongside other components of the APSA who are assigned peacemaking roles. The system thus has the flexibility to deploy the ASF at any stage of a conflict, including for preventive deployment. One of the most important - and probably the most ambitious institutional tools that the AU decided to establish as part of the APSA is the African Standby

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Force (ASF). The ASF is intended to be one of the mechanisms through which the AU seeks to respond to future conflicts and crisis situations on the continent ‘timely and efficiently’ (ibid).

Clearly, the ASF is one of the most critical elements of the APSA that will enable the AU to deliver on its promise of intervention to protect people in grave circumstances and to provide a prompt and robust response to manage and resolve African crises. It enables the PSC first to prevent and manage conflicts, among others by containing their spread or escalation, second to support its peace processes as a peace support mission, and third to enforce its decisions in cases of grave circumstances or to intervene. As envisaged in the PSC Protocol, the ASF is to be prepared for rapid deployment for a range of peacekeeping operations, including: Observation and monitoring missions; other types of peace support missions; Intervention in accordance with Articles 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act; Preventive deployment in order to prevent a conflict from escalating, or an ongoing conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or states, or the resurgence of violence after peace agreements are achieved; Peace-building, including postconflict disarmament and demobilization; Humanitarian assistance in situations of conflict and major natural disasters (ibid).

The ASF was thus conceived from the outset as a mechanism that will undertake a whole range of modern peacekeeping and peace-building activities. Indeed, it is envisaged that the ASF should be able to respond to a range of conflict scenarios. The Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee identifies six possible conflict and mission scenarios that the ASF is likely to face and will need to respond to: AU/regional military advisor to a political mission; AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission; Stand-alone AU/regional observer mission; AU regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions; AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission – low- level spoilers; AU intervention in cases of grave circumstances. According to Article 13(1) of the PSC Protocol the ASF ‘shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice’. As the italicized emphasis indicates, the ASF is not the equivalent of a national army for, unlike a national army, it is not a standing force. The standby arrangement is to be achieved on the basis of pledges from member states and preparations by regional economic communities (RECs) / regional mechanisms (RMs). To this end member states identify and earmark military, police and

21 civilian personnel and forward their names and details to the REC or RM. On the basis of these pledges each REC/RM raises and prepares the regional brigade and develops the standby roster (ibid).

The RECs/RMs then forwards all the data on the capabilities they raised and the standby roster they developed to the AU. While part of the ASF standby arrangement, the identified personnel (contingents) remain in their countries of origin. This means that it is only when a decision is made to deploy an ASF mission will they be called up, assembled at a certain point and jointly deployed to the mission area. However, while on standby they do participate in various predeployment activities, including training and joint exercises, which are organized on a regular basis by each REC/RM to keep them prepared for deployment. Another point flowing from Article 13(1) is that the ASF is a multidimensional force. Since most conflicts on the continent are complex and of long duration, they call for a multifaceted approach and require capabilities to address not only security and military aspects, but also the political, humanitarian, developmental and legal/institutional dimensions of the conflicts. There is therefore a need for not only military but also police and especially civilian components. Accordingly, in terms of the Policy Framework, as well as the Roadmap for the Operationalization of the ASF (Roadmap I) the ASF is to be composed of three components, namely a military, a police and a civilian component. The ASF is organized into five regional brigades: The Southern African Development Community (SADC) brigade (SADCBRIG); The East African Peace and Security Mechanism (EAPSM) brigade, which is known as the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) brigade (ECOBRIG); The North African Regional Capability (NARC) brigade, which is known as the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG)’ The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) brigade (ECCASBRIG), or Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC) (ibid).

The authorization of a Forced Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the UN Stabilization Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), with the mandate to neutralize the M23 and other rebel groups, is seen as a rare example of a UN peace operation that has been tasked to do peace enforcement The FIB is understood to be a peace enforcement mission because it is explicitly

22 tasked to use offensive force to neutralize the M23 and other specified rebel groups. As such the FIB’s mission is not consensual or impartial, in the sense that it does not require the consent of the rebels (although it has the consent of the host-nation), and it does explicitly take sides against specific identified aggressors The FIB overcame the limitations the UN normally have when it comes to peace enforcement operations mentioned earlier, because (1) the FIB had clear political support to use force from all the key stakeholders in the region: the UN, the AU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC)-the host-nation Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and all three Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) are members of the SADC-as well as support from the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICCGLR); (2) all the TCCs came from the SADC and they have been involved in joint trainings and joint exercises together before under the auspices of the SADC Standby Arrangement of the ASF, which meant that they had a common understanding of doctrine and command and control; (3) the FIB had its own commander and command and control system, although it also fell under the overall command of the MONUSCO Force Commander; (4) the FIB was deployed with its own enablers and force multipliers that enabled it to undertake offensive enforcement actions, such as special forces, artillery, attack helicopters, and specially trained troops that were prepared for and anticipated combat (ibid).

On one occasion, the AU did come close to seeking UN authority for a non-consensual intervention. In mid-December 2015, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) was extremely concerned about the number of deaths, alleged human rights abuses, and the level of violence in Burundi, and it authorized the AU to deploy an operation with a protection of civilians’ mission mandate to Burundi (MAPROBU). In addition, the PSC recommended that should the government of Burundi not consent to the mission, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government should consider a 4(h) The Government of Burundi rejected MAPROBU that is, it withheld consent. However, when the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government met a month later, the level of violence had reduced and a non-consensual intervention was no longer warranted. The AU has thus come close to authorizing a non-consensual operation, which in UN terms would be considered peace enforcement and which would have required a UN Security Council Chapter VII enforcement mandate, but the situation changed and the AU has not yet crossed that threshold. In recent years, the AU has also authorized a range of more offensive types of operations led by

23 countries in a specific region, often referred to as ad hoc security initiatives. These include the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF) and the G5 Sahel Force. The AU missions in especially Somalia, CAR, and against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) have made use of offensive force to proactively contain pre identified aggressors, or to actively regain control over territory controlled by rebel groups. The AU’s most recent operation, to provide support to the AU-endorsed Multination Joint Task Force (MNJTF) that is combating Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, exemplifies this approach. This is a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism mission where countries such as Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria operate mostly within their own borders, and occasionally in hot pursuit across their borders, but in a coordinated manner with a shared political-strategic mandate and a joint force headquarters supported by the AU.4

In UN peacekeeping doctrine, peace enforcement is understood as operations that do not necessarily require consent from the host-nation or other parties to the conflict. In fact, peace enforcement typically presupposes that an aggressor(s) has(ve) been designated by the UN Security Council, and that the use of force has been authorized to impose the will of the Council on the aggressor(s) (United Nations, 2008 United Nations. (2008). United Nations peacekeeping operations: Principles and guidelines. Peace enforcement provides for offensive action. They operate in the midst of ongoing conflicts, rather than in post-conflict situations as many UN peacekeeping operations; They are mandated to contribute to restoring and maintaining stability, by helping to protect the government and its people against identified aggressors, helping the government to reclaim control over territories previously controlled by such aggressors , helping the government to extend the authority of the State throughout its territory; They operate in support of and alongside the security forces of the host-nation, and their mandates often include supporting efforts to build the capacity of these national forces; They are mandated to use force, including offensively, in the face of anticipated attacks against themselves and those they are tasked to protect, and encouraged to do so proactively.4

Peace enforcement operations typically require that the intervening organization be willing to employ offensive force to deny one or more parties the option of using violence to achieve their political aims. In other words, peace enforcement operations imply that the intervening force must be willing and able to engage in combat, and this implies that TCCs must have the will and means

24 to use force. In the AU experience to date, the only countries that have been willing to do that are those whose national security interests are affected by the conflict, for instance, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Kenya in Somalia, or those that have national strategic interests to do so, for instance, Burundi and Uganda in Somalia. This is an aspect of peace enforcement that is fundamentally different from UN peacekeeping, where the impartiality principle implies that TCCs should have no interest in the conflict. It also helps to further explain why UN peacekeeping operations are not well suited for combat operations. Another requirement for peace enforcement operations is that the command and control system should be geared for combat. In the AU context, civilian leadership and military command can range on a spectrum from a lead-nation approach, such as in the early days of AMISOM, to a more networked approach, as in the case of the LRA and Boko Haram operations. In networked approaches, the AU provides strategic-level political direction and coordination, but the members of the coalition act independently and coordinate at the operational and tactical levels. In a lead-nation approach, for instance when South Africa led the AMIB, unity of command is achieved through the core capabilities contributed by the lead-nation, and by providing overall command and control to the whole operation. Often, as is the case also in AMISOM in Somalia, each major TCC has control over a sector within which it is able to employ its national command and control system, according to its national doctrine, at the tactical level. The Force Commander, typically from the lead-nation, thus has control over own national forces and coordinates with the sector commanders of the other TCCs to try to ensure as much strategic coherence and overall unity of command as is possible under the circumstances. In Somalia, for instance, where the AMISOM is engaged in stabilization, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism operations, the AU understands that it can temporarily stabilize a situation by winning selected battles and by controlling territory, but that it cannot ultimately defeat Al Shabaab militarily. They can only be defeated in the long term if the Government of Somalia can provide better security, governance, and social-economic opportunities than what Al Shabaab can offer.4

1.1.4 Contextual Background

According to Jeffrey Gettleman (2007) “Humanitarian crisis in Somalia is worse than Darfur”, the country has higher malnutrition rates, more current bloodshed and fewer aid workers than Darfur. The Relentless urban combat in Mogadishu, between an unpopular transitional government

25 installed partly with American help and a determined Islamist insurgency, has driven waves of desperate people up the Afgooye road, where more than 70 camps of twigs and plastic have popped up seemingly overnight.. People are hungry, exposed, sick and dying and a few aid organizations willing to brave a lawless, notoriously dangerous environment could not keep up with their needs, like providing milk to thousands of babies with fading heartbeats and bulging eyes. The situation in Somalia is the worst on the continent. The surveys put malnutrition rate at 19 percent, compared with about 13 percent in Darfur; 15 percent is considered the emergency threshold. The situation has included floods, droughts, locusts, suicide bombers, roadside bombs and near-daily assassinations. Unlike Darfur, where the suffering is being eased by a billion-dollar aid operation and more than 10,000 aid workers, Somalia is still considered mostly a no-go Zone.

It was for this reason therefore that AMISOM was deployed in Somalia to restore peace in Somalia. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional peace support mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations Security Council. It is mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces, and to assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. As part of its duties, AMISOM also supports the Federal Government of Somalia's forces in their battle against Al-Shabaab militants. AMISOM was created by the African Union's Peace and Security Council on 19 January 2007 with an initial six-month mandate. On 21 February 2007, the United Nations Security Council adopting authorized the African Union to deploy a peace support mission with a mandate of six months. In March 2007, Ugandan military officials arrived on the ground in Somalia. On 20 August 2007, the United Nations Security Council extended the African Union's authorization to continue deploying AMISOM for a further six months and requested the Secretary-General to explore the option of replacing AMISOM with a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation to Somalia. Most recently, on 31 May 2019, the Security Council unanimously approved resolution 2472, authorizing Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM until 31 May 2020, with a reduction of the number of troops to 19,626 by 28 February 2020.2

AMISOM has four operational components that is; Humanitarian component, the Civilian Component, Military component and Police component. Civilian Component AMISOM is authorized to have 70 international civilian personnel. As of September 2018, there were 72

26 international civilians (two seconded from the AU Commission), 14 consultants, and 58 national staff. Less than half of the international personnel are in substantive roles. The AU’s recruitment process for civilians has proven very slow. Almost all of AMISOM’s civilians have been based in Mogadishu. Of the substantive national staff, there were two Assistant Political Officers deployed in Galmuduug and three in Mogadishu. Following the joint AU-UN review of AMISOM in May 2018, the Security Council decided not to authorize an increase in AMISOM’s civilian component in resolution 2431 (30 July 2018). AMISOM has adopted a cluster-based approach to its civilian component since 2014. The clusters are Political Processes, Stabilization and Early Recovery; Protection, Human Rights and Gender; Security Sector Reform; and Mission Support. The clusters comprise personnel from the civilian substantive, support, police and military components, and in some cases representatives from other partners. They are therefore both multidimensional and integrated.2

The substantive civilian components of AMISOM are organized into six units: Political Affairs; Public Information; Humanitarian Liaison; Protection, Human Rights and Gender; Security Sector Reform; and Civil Affairs. There is also a Security and Safety unit and a Mission Support component consisting of several units: Political Affairs is responsible for operationalizing the AU PSC’s political decisions on Somalia. Its personnel monitor, analyze and report on political developments in Somalia, and provide advice to the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC). (They also assist the Somali government in building its capacity for public service, for instance, by organizing training courses for managers in the Somalia civil service.); the humanitarian component of AMISOM is limited to a facilitation role. The mandate provides that AMISOM shall “Facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)”. The humanitarian Liaison serves as a bridge between AMISOM and humanitarian agencies. Its personnel coordinate, facilitate and liaise with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and other UN agencies, as well as Somali and international NGOs. The unit works closely with AMISOM’s military component, especially its CIMIC cell, to respond to requests for support from the humanitarian community; Protection, Human Rights and Gender is mandated to implement the

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AU’s commitments and policies on human rights and protection as well as gender equality and other related issues. The unit mainstreams human rights, protection and good gender practices in AMISOM and supports the FGS. It has been involved in the pre-deployment training of troops, especially in the domain of adherence to international humanitarian law and human rights law; Civil Affairs works at local political levels to facilitate the implementation of AMISOM’s mandate and to support efforts at ensuring sustainable peace in Somalia. The unit conducts activities aimed at confidence-building, effective governance management, and support to reconciliation. It also assists the state in restoring and extending its authority. Security Sector Reform is the focal point of AMISOM on all security sector matters; it coordinates support in this area from AMISOM and other partners with the host state authorities. The unit’s responsibilities include the exchange of information, provision of technical assistance, and negotiating contribution agreements with donors related to the security sector.2

Public Information is responsible for disseminating information on AMISOM’s activities through regular interaction with local Somali and international journalists; Safety and Security is charged with undertaking relevant programmes and activities in AMISOM to protect civilian staff and property. The unit comprises three subunits: Security Information and Operation Unit (SIOU), Personal Protection Unit (PPU) and Investigation Unit (IU). It is tasked with the management of mission security and also manages the security for high-level events, conferences and meetings in which the mission is involved. Mission Support encompasses the logistics, transport, supply, engineering, information and communications, technology, finance, personnel, procurement, general services, medical, travel and protocol, asset management and verification, and contingent- owned equipment functions of the mission, among others. Other elements of the civilian component include legal affairs, conduct and discipline, a civilian casualty tracking analysis and response cell (CCTARC), and a mission analysis cell. The civilian component also advises AMISOM’s leadership and mission planning processes, and provides analysis, internal training and guidance. The SRCC, deputy SRCC, mission chief of staff, and their support personnel are also civilians (non-uniformed), but they are not part of the Civilian Component of the mission.2

Police Component: AMISOM police component has the mandate to train, mentor, monitor and advise the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible and effective organization adhering to strict international standards. It was not until 2010 that AMISOM’s first

28 police officers arrived in Mogadishu (34 of the 270 authorized officers). They were tasked with providing training to the SPF in a number of areas, including cordon and search, traffic policing, investigation and demining training. The dire state of the SPF meant that far more AMISOM police capabilities were needed and, in October 2010, the AU PSC authorized the deployment of 1,680 police, comprising trainers, advisers and mentors as well as eight Formed Police Units (FPUs) comprising 140 personnel each. The UN Security Council, however, did not endorse this enhanced police component. It was only in 2012, following the liberation of Mogadishu, that two FPUs were deployed by Uganda and Nigeria. They provided operational support to AMISOM and the SPF to consolidate security in Mogadishu through joint patrols, stop-and-search operations, public order management, VIP escorts, and providing protection to the individual police officers (IPOs) co- located with the SPF. In 2016, the FPUs were split into platoons and deployed in more locations, including Baidoa, Kismayo, Beletweyne and Jowhar.2

Following UN Security Council resolution 2372 (2017) authorization of an increase in the number of AMISOM police from 540 to 1,040, Sierra Leone deployed an additional FPU in April 2018. Today, AMISOM police comprise 233 IPOs (from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia), 480 officers in three FPUs, and five in senior leadership. AMISOM thus remains short of two FPUs but has entered into negotiations with Ghana to see if it can deploy one FPU.2

The Military Component is the biggest of the four components of the AU Mission in the country. The component is mandated to conduct peace support operations in Somalia and seeks to stabilize the situation in the country, create the necessary conditions for the conduct of humanitarian activities and an eventual handover of the Mission to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation. The component also provides protection to the country’s Federal Institutions as they carry out their functions and helps secure Somalia’s key infrastructure including its airports and seaports. Currently the military component is comprised of troops drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia who are deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia. Ugandan troops who were the first to land in a war-torn Mogadishu were controlling less than 10 per cent of the battered capital Mogadishu. However, subsequently other countries joined the AU peace operation and deployed troops to reign enforce the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) in Somalia with each force or group of forces allocated designated areas for own command and control where they have been fighting the AlShabaab Islamic militants in

29 one of the most daring peace support operations in the world today. Currently, AMISOM has over 20,000 troops drawn from Uganda deployed in Sector 1(Mogadishu: Banadir and Lower Shabelle regions); Burundi deployed in sector 5 (Jowhar: Middle Shabelle region); Kenya deployed in sector 2 (Dobhey: Lower and Middle Juba regions) Djibouti deployed in sector 4(Beletweyne: Hiiraan region); Ethiopia deployed in sector 3 (Baidoa: Bay, Bakool, Gedo regions).2

The monitoring and evaluation of AMISOM’s mandate is done by the Joint African Union – United Nation Joint Review Team. AU-UN Joint Review Team visits AMISOM headquarters, Forward Operating Bases and evaluates steps taken by the AU Mission in implementing its tasks mandated by the UN Security Council Resolution and the African Union Peace and Security Council. The Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhancing Partnership on Peace and Security, launched in April 2017, is often seen as a culmination of efforts to boost coordination between the two organizations strategically and operationally. The reviews Joint Review Team among other issues, establishes challenges the AU Mission faces, informs the decisions to be made by the UN Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) on the renewal of AMISOM’s mandate. 5

1.2 Statement of the Problem.

The deployment of AMISOM in Somalia in 2007 with an initial six month mandate was to provide support to the Transitional Federal Institutions in their efforts towards stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia. (PSC/PR/comm(LXIX).

However, Despite having a robust mandate to enforce peace in Somalia, 12 years later, The humanitarian crisis in Somalia is one of the most complex and longstanding emergencies in the world. The ongoing conflict and the continued threat of al-shabaab’s ability to mount deadly attacks, not only on the Somali population but also in the neighboring countries continues to

30 undermine the resilience of communities, trigger displacement and impede civilians’ access to basic services as well as humanitarians’ access to those in need. Exclusion and discrimination of socially marginalized groups are contributing to high levels of acute humanitarian need and lack of protection among some of the most vulnerable. More than 6.2 million people, half of the population, will continue to need humanitarian assistance and protection, including 3.3 million who will require urgent life-saving assistance (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs report 2017). More than one-third of those in need are internally displaced persons (IDPs). 2,300 children were recruited by armed groups and forces in 2018; 3 million children out of 4.9, are out of school; 40% of the population has access to safe water in 2018; 1.2 million children are malnourished in 2018(UNICEF) and bombs are still exploding in Mogadishu as on 14th October 2017 with over 500 fatalities and 15 July 2019 with over 20 fatalities.

For this reason, therefore, this research set out to investigate the effectiveness of peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa a case of AMISOM (2007-2019).

1.3 Main Objective of the Study

The main objective of this study was to assess the effectiveness of peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa a case of AMISOM since 2007-2019.

1.4 Specific Objectives

This study was guided by the following specific objectives;

(i)To identify the strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019

(ii)To establish the achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 20072019

(iii) To find out the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007-2019

1.5 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following research questions;

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(i) What strategies is AMISOM using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019?

(iii) What are the achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 20072019?

(iii) What are the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007-2019?

1.6 Scope of the Study

The scope of the study is divided into three section; geographical scope, content scope and time scope and indicated below.

1.6.1 Content Scope

The study focused on the effectiveness of African peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa a case of AMISOM since 2007-2019 with main emphasis on the: To identify the strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019; to establish the achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019; to find out the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007-2019

1.6.2 Time Scope

The research study surveyed the period of 2007-2019. This is because AMISOM was for the first time in history deployed in Somalia in 2007 for a peace enforcement mission operation and it is working on the Transition Plan starting 2019 according to UNSCR 2472 (2019).Therefore; the time period of 2007-2019 helped to asses AMISOM whether it has been effective in its peace support efforts or not before it exits Somalia.

1.6.3 Geographical Scope

The study was carried out in Somalia with specific reference to Halane area of Mogadishu, which flanks Mogadishu International Airport (MIA). Halane is populated by African Union troops deployed to support the Federal Government of Somalia. This heavily secured compound is home

32 to African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Headquarters, AMISOM Force Headquarters, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) Headquarters, United Nations Support Mission in Somalia (UNSOS) Headquarters, a number of Foreign Embassies, European Union, a number of other United Nations Agencies like United Nations High Commissioner For Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) among other Humanitarian agencies, Somali small local markets known as Marine and OPD markets, AMISOM grade 11 hospital and other Companies.

1.7 Significance of the study

This research study is in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Master of Arts in international relations and diplomacy of Nkumba University.

The study adds to existing body of knowledge which is likely to fill in the knowledge gap which existed before in the body of knowledge and inspire future researchers to carry out research on similar topics and discover more information relevant to peace enforcement in Africa.

The researcher believes that no matter how different we may be, a desire for peace binds us together. And yet, despite this universal ideal, world peace remains elusive. The chasm between what is and what could be is what makes this research so valuable. Therefore; this research presents enough findings so that rational group of decision makers will seek to avoid war and conflict.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

According to Bogere M and Gesa A (2015) “Understanding Research and Statistical Methods”, Literature Review refers to reading other people’s works. This chapter presents the Literature review, theoretical review and the conceptual framework. The literature survey identifies the gaps the study is attempting to fill, identifies the models and theories other scholars have used to study a similar problem in similar environment elsewhere, it points out the current knowledge, pertaining to a particular area of study and the conceptual framework provides the framework of analysis for the study. This chapter therefore discusses the relevance of the Just War theory and Realism theories to peace enforcement; literature review is done according to strategic objectives of this study and the missing gaps identified and lastly, the conceptual framework.

2.1 Theoretical Review

Relevance of Just War theory

Daniel E. Soller (2002) Operational Ethics: Just War and Implications for Contemporary American Warfare”, Why is just war tradition a logical and viable guidepost to the conduct of American warfare? First, in the modern era just war tradition is an idea, not a set of rules that is binding on any society. The manner in which a state consciously or unconsciously adheres to the just war tradition is a reflection of choice, its values, or its culture. Just war tradition is a universal ethical standard among Western and Christian states, although it is not exclusively Western. All major world religions and societies espouse a concept of respect for human dignity and life in warfare, albeit in varying shades. For the U.S. and many nations, the values inherent in just war tradition are inseparable, intrinsic elements of culture, policy, and the conduct of war, values that are not imposed from without, but are fundamental within. Just war values resonate decidedly religious overtones; however, non-Christians and atheists of good will mutually share those values. Today, those values are manifested in the secular society in the form of ethics and basic human morality, what is simply called “the right thing to do.” The weapons of war represent for the

34 moralist tangible evidence of the ethical difficulties of warfare. Weapons are physical, concrete objects with known destructive capabilities and are easy to single out for their potential to excessively kill, maim, or destroy. Countless books and articles have been written about the “horrors” of modern weapons. The truth is that war is horrible for the participants regardless of what weapons are used and time has honored the witnesses of war with an endless progression of new and more lethal weapons that with each generation continue to shock the uninitiated and captivate the apprentices of warfare. The weapons of war by their existence and use are not immoral. Even the most destructive weapons in the U.S. arsenal, to include thermo baric bombs, depleted uranium munitions, anti-tank mines, cruise missiles, and strategic nuclear weapons are not qualitatively immoral. This is not to suggest that military proponents can obfuscate military necessity behind the catchphrase cited by supporters of the National Rifle Association, “Guns don’t kill people, people do.” For it is true that the responsibility for “pulling the trigger” rests with people at individual and command levels. To this end therefore, this study set out to find out whether Military intervention (AMISOM) in the Somalia Conflict was the “right thing to do” or not.

Realist Theory

Relevance of Realism Theory

Malhotra (2002), Political realism seemed relevant in the world where suspicion of the motives of others was the rule and where prospects for peace were not bright. The development of superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union and its expansion at global level in the name of cold war between East and Western blocs, the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the seemingly continuous turmoil around the world –all these symptoms testify the realist theory. To many, the opinion that, in a threatening world environment, foreign policy takes precedence over domestic problems and policies was also relevant. Thus in the post-second world war period the picture of the world depicted by the political realists obsessed the minds of many. Moreover, failed States are constructed and scrutinized by western governments as catalysts of threats for their societies. The porous borders of failed states permit the passage of refugees and the exercise of arms smuggling. Giving data, the amount of arms by Somali exiles in Kenya is

35 approximately 5000 rifles per month. Through border, not only weapons, but also drugs and people become objects of criminal traffics. This uncontrolled movement of people brings with it the spread of diseases, affecting the health aspect of security of the population living in the neighboring countries.10 To this end therefore, this study set out to find out whether Military intervention (AMISOM) in the Somalia Conflict was in the best interests of Somalia and Somalis or the individualistic interests of the external players involved in the Somali Peace process. Previous literature and specifying the research gap

The previous literature is this chapter looks at the existing body of knowledge about the Somali Conflict, peace enforcement and gaps identified according to the study objectives which include; to identify the strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019; to establish the achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019; To find out the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007-2019. Trevor Findlay (2002) “The use of force in peace operations”, John Karlsrud (2015) “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peaceenforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali” and Rita Abrahamsen (2013) “Conflict and security in Africa”, are reviewed in this study and the missing gaps identified.

The strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019

The available literature discusses the causes of the Somali conflict. For example; Rita Abrahamsen (2013) “Conflict and security in Africa” The key driver of the Somali conflict is clannism. Somalis are described as a collective of clans, and as a nomad society, clan based systems have been in place in Somalia for long time. It was a means to resolve conflicts that used to arise due to competing on resources since most of Somalis are a pastoral society. Outside urban centers, different clans contest over resources such as water, livestock and grazing land as in the past Somali nomads have fought over the ownership of camels because of their utility for survival in Somalia‘s harsh environment. There are four major clans: Daarood, Hawiye, Dir and Rahanweyn or Digial and Mirifle. There is a coalition of smaller clans, as some clans are combined with one another. For example, the Isaaq clan, which is the dominant clan in the selfdeclared

36 northern region Somaliland, is considered a sub-clan of Dir. However, it is not a clan that is a problem in Somalia nor is it a factor of state failure, but it is clannism that has caused Somalia to fail. Clannism is the application of clan interests into the political system for three reasons: one, to gain more than others, two, to push your clan to be the dominant political actor in the country, and third, to mobilize clan members to show power. Clan wars that Somalis used to engage were just a source of clannism as the concept of clannism did not just begin in 1991. The ruling systems that existed from independence applied clannism in many forms. Before the military rule, the main mechanism for selecting leadership was based on clan. Clans were selecting their representatives in the Somali parliament. Furthermore, during the military regime from 1969-1991, even though clannism was buried it was applied in different forms. The selection of those who used to serve in the cabinet or in the ranking military personnel was mainly from the Daarood clan, and specifically on the Marehan sub-clan to remain in power. Competency and the capability of the one who held a position was not on the basis of selecting civil servants, and nevertheless, because of the fretfulness that is caused by nepotism and injustices, other clans started to revolt against the regime. After Siad Barre‘s regime came to an end in 1991, Somalia‘s internal conditions went spiraling further down into a ditch, as the country‘s stability collapsed under the pressures of mass starvation due to drought and famine and continued violent civil wars between different political factions and militia groups built around clans and sub-clans. This division and fighting among Somalia clans and the absence of a central government to retain the necessary power needed to run the country, as was discussed earlier, Somalia became an anarchic state.

After former President Barre was ousted from office a rift between the fourteen different political or clan factions developed. This quickly became an inter-clan rivalry for the control of political power, as the various clans and sub-clan groups armed themselves and battled each other, in a bid to establish separate factions in different regions of Somalia. Today, this kind of clan conflict and the grab for political power is a major challenge to the peace building process at the national level, with, it seems, no hope of resolution or clans coming to an amicable solution for the good of all Somalis and the nation as a whole. Somali clan and sub-clan families it can be said, do not identify with the nation, as was the case on the dawn of the country‘s independence, when nationalism was a strong sentiment expressed by Somalis wanting an end to imperialism.

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Somalia, following the years after the country‘s independence, began to once again rely on clan identity, strengthening clan lines and in the process causing the expulsion of certain clans from certain areas. This, one can see, had created conflicts due to the need for the control of resources and major cities. One clear example of how clan conflict had and continues to impede the peace building process, can be seen in the four month long fight that took place in Mogadishu for control of it by clan militias of General Aideed and Ali Mahdi. In the aftermath of this fighting, what little was left of Mogadishu, was completely destroyed. Inter-clan rivalry for control of cities was also evident in Kismayo and Baidoa where the Absame and Harti clans clashed as well as in Baidoa where the Digil and Mirifle clans fought for power struggle (ibid).

Furthermore, another major driver of the Somali conflict has been the issue of Somaliland. Somaliland, the breakaway region of Somalia has for some time been seeking for recognition as a state that is independent from Somalia. As in disputes arising with Puntland region, Somaliland claims to the entire area of the former British Somaliland. Additionally, while Somaliland is calling for its breakaway and independence from Somalia, Puntland is advocating for the reestablishment of a united, but federal Somalia. Further, when one looks at the issue of clan rivalry, it is clear that the same thing is happening in the self-declared region of Somaliland as intra-clan warfare caused significant damages there. As this report clearly uncovered, foreign meddling, whether regional and international, inter-clan rivalry, and such are issues directly related to a nation that has maintained a state of statelessness for over two decades (ibid). This research therefore set out to identify the strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019.

The achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019

Available literature shows that robust peace operations have short and long term consequences. For example, John Karlsrud (2015) “The UN at war: examining the consequences of peaceenforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali.” The UN peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Mali were in 2013 given peace enforcement mandates, ordering them to use all necessary measures to ‘neutralize’ and ‘disarm’ identified groups in the eastern DRC and to

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‘stabilize’ CAR and northern Mali. It is not new that UN missions have mandates authorizing the use of force, but these have normally not specified enemies and have been of short duration. The urge to equip UN peacekeeping operations with enforcement mandates that target particular groups has significant long-term implications for the UN and its role as an impartial arbitrator in post- conflict countries. What happens when the UN wages war? In March 2013 the UN Security Council mandated the inclusion of the Force Intervention Brigade in (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), mandated to ‘take all necessary measures’ to ‘neutralize’ and ‘disarm’ groups that pose a threat to ‘state authority and civilian security’. United Nations, S/RES/2098, 7–8. In April 2013 the Council authorized the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in Mali ‘in support of the transitional authorities of Mali, to stabilize the key population centers, especially in the north of Mali and, in this context, to deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas’ United Nations, S/RES/2100, 7.

When the UN, representing all the states of the world, uses peacekeeping operations to wage war, it violates the core principles of peacekeeping, well established with the Brahimi Report and the subsequent Capstone doctrine: UN peacekeeping operations are only supposed to be deployed where there is a peace to keep and should be impartial; should use a minimum of force (in self- defense or in defense of the mandate); and should have the consent of the main parties to a conflict.. United Nations, Report of the Panel; and United Nations, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. While there is general agreement after the failures of the UN in Rwanda and Bosnia that these principles have to be balanced by the need to protect civilians, the authorization and implementation of UN war-fighting in the Central African Republic (CAR), the DRC and Mali is moving UN peacekeeping into unknown and perhaps unwanted territory (ibid).

UN peacekeeping has changed significantly since the first observer missions in the Middle East in the early 1950s, but most observers agree that the use of force by the UN should be reserved for extreme cases. Over the past two decades a practice has gradually emerged where peace enforcement has mainly been delegated to regional organisations, and the UN has deployed

39 peacekeeping operations. This has helped to maintain its impartial role on the ground and its ability to provide its so-called good offices – being a mediator between the parties. It is not new for UN missions to have a robust posture, but this has normally been under the general authorisation of a Chapter VII mandate, where the threats have not been spelled out in such clarity as above, and for shorter durations. The inclusion of robust stabilization mandates in UN peacekeeping will have practical, doctrinal and ethical consequences that may not yet be foreseen more broadly, in terms of the willingness of traditional as well as Western troop contributors to provide troops, and of the perception of the missions by host states, neighbouring States, rebel groups, and humanitarian and human rights actors. In the aftermath of the failures of the UN to protect civilians in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia in the 1990s, doctrinal changes emerged allowing the UN to be ‘robust’ and to use force when necessary to protect civilians. However, there is a big difference between using force for short durations to protect civilians from harm, giving the UN peace-enforcement mandates – including a general authorisation to use all necessary means and authorizing the UN to ‘neutralize and disarm’ particular groups, as was the case in the DRC – and effectively mandating the conduct of war-fighting against alQaida in the Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali (ibid).

Another precedent was the robust action taken by MONUC against rebel groups in eastern DRC in 2006 “The Use of Force.” MONUC’s support of the national Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) resulted in MONUC being considered a party to the conflict, even by some of its staff members.. In 2010 the mission added stabilization to its name, signalling the will of the UN to use force more proactively to protect civilians. But, since 2010, the mission has again been faced with accusations of inaction and failing in its main mandate – protecting civilians under imminent threat. In November 2012 the M23 took Goma with almost no resistance from MONUSCO. Remnants of its reputation for not being able to stop the M23 with the largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission in the world, the UN made a counterproposal to establish a Force Intervention Brigade, composed of troops from the SADC countries. The Force Intervention Brigade was authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 2098 on 28 March 2013. The UN Security Council mandated MONUSCO and the Force Intervention Brigade to ‘take all necessary measures’ to ‘neutralize’ and ‘disarm’ groups that were posing a threat to ‘state authority and civilian security’. The brigade is composed of troops from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi, and it’s very active support was essential in fighting the M23. After the defeat of the M23,

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MONUSCO received an additional capability – South African Rooivalk gunship helicopters, which were used against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the first half of 2014(ibid).

Two key worries have been voiced – giving peace-enforcement mandates to UN peacekeeping missions may compromise the impartiality of UN peacekeeping operations and may jeopardize the safety and security of peacekeepers. The new aggressive mandate of the mission, the inclusion of the Force Intervention Brigade and the on-going war-fighting against armed groups such as the M23, the Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FRPI) and the Congolese People’s Liberation Army (ALPCU) could increase the perception that the UN is taking sides and increase the risk of attacks against civilian and humanitarian components of the UN. The analysis of the consequences of UN peace enforcement operations can be divided into two levels. At the strategic level a division of labour has developed between the UN and regional organisations. The African Union is less than thrilled that the UN replaced its missions in Mali and the CAR before it got a chance to show that it could handle these situations. At the operational and tactical levels the UN does not have the tools or capabilities to execute combat operations and it is highly uncertain whether it is possible to enable it to be a combat organisation. Indeed, there is currently no consensus among member states that this is a desired development. In particular some of the traditional troop-contributing countries (TCCs), which provide the absolute majority of troops on the ground, are wary of a development towards peace enforcement as this increases the risks their troops are exposed to (ibid).

The UN is being given tasks it has not been designed for and in the long term this will have grave consequences, undermining the general acceptance of UN peacekeeping operations as a tool to help states emerging from conflict, and in direct conflict with all the core principles of UN peacekeeping. There is a clear mismatch between doctrine and current practices in UN peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping is now at the deep end of the pool, without solid footing for its operations; member states and other stakeholders have good reasons to be worried about this development. The kneejerk response has been to ask for the development of new guidelines for UN peacekeeping to reflect the developments on the ground. When inaugurating the first surveillance drones in December 2013, Hervé Ladsous said that UN peacekeeping had finally ‘entered the 21st century’. The willingness to update UN peacekeeping with modern tools should be applauded, but the desire to use it as a combat tool is a less fortunate development and needs

41 careful scrutiny. The re-engagement by Western member states with UN peacekeeping is long awaited and very much needed in order to legitimize UN peacekeeping operations and bring on board new capabilities, but these member states should carefully consider how their tools and troops are used, with due concern for the long-term consequences. At the tactical level there is an increasing risk of deadly attacks on UN troops, e.g. by jihadists in Mali or armed groups in the CAR – as an example, the Chadian UN troops in Mali have suffered significant losses. However, it is unlikely that the UN will react until successful attacks on UN civilians are mounted something which is increasingly likely, particularly in Mali. It is difficult to see how the UN will be able to sustain and support this new type of operation once their enemies start to target UN civilians and humanitarians at large (ibid).

Implications for the policy level. The division of work between the UN and regional organisations should also be considered. The predicted decline of UN peacekeeping has been postponed as new situations have emerged and the Security Council has chosen the UN as its preferred tool for conflicts in Africa. However, in the long term, African regional and subregional organisations are increasing their competence and improving their track record and should continue to be responsible for the more robust end of the conflict spectrum, while the UN should focus on situations where there is a peace to keep (ibid). However, despite robust peace operations having short and long term consequences as discussed by John Karlsrud (2010) above, there is need to show the achievements of peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa using AMISOM 2007-2019 as our case study.

The factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 20072019

Available literature shows that peace enforcement efforts have failed before in Somalia. For example, Trevor Findlay (2002) “The use of force in UN peace operations” analyses the setbacks of the first UN peace enforcement mission in Somalia UNOSOM 11. Following the eruption and escalation of the Civil Conflict in Somalia in 1992, the UN and the Organization of the African Union (OAU) intervened, citing the war starvation. Of the Somali population of 10 million people, over half were in severe danger of starvation and malnutrition-related diseases, mostly in the drought-stricken rural areas. United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1) was the first part

42 of a UN sponsored effort provide, facilitate, and secure humanitarian relief in Somalia, as well as to monitor the 1st brokered ceasefire of the Somalia Civil War conflict in in the 1990s.The operation was established in April 1992 and run until its duties were assumed by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) mission in December 1992.Follwoing the dissolution of UNITAF in May 1993,the subsequent UN mission in Somalia was the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 11).A series of security council resolution (733,746) and diplomatic visits eventually helped impose a cease fire between the two warring parties with the help of other actors such as OAU and League of the Arab States. Despite the UN’s efforts, all over Somalia the ceasefire was ignored, fighting continued, and continued to increase, putting the relief operations at great risk.

In November 1992, the United States of America offered to establish a multinational force under its own leadership to secure the humanitarian operation. This offer was accepted by the Security Council, and what came to be known as the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) also known as the Operation Restore Hope and it was authorized to utilize “all necessary means” to ensure the protection of the relief efforts. UNITAF was composed of forces from 24 different countries with the vast bulk contributed by the United Sates. However, Somalia continued to stable, and in March the UN decided to transform the UNITAF mission into UNOSOM 11.The mandate of UNOSOM 11 stipulated that the operation was to secure continued relief efforts and, more significantly, to restore peace and rebuild the Somali state and economy. However, all these peace efforts failed (ibid).

One of the principal lessons drawn from Somalia was that purely military solutions are unlikely to succeed in ‘failed states’; a political strategy, in which the use or threat of force is well integrated and calibrated, is more likely to succeed. Political negotiations and inducements, along with institution building, must be the principal tool, with force taking only a supporting role. If force is to be used judiciously, there must be a proper understanding of the local political situation and the likely impact that the use of force will have. To be fair, Boutros-Ghali was fully conscious, from the outset, of the primacy of political over military means. He pinned his hopes on two approaches to reconstituting Somalia disarmament and political reconciliation with the re-establishment of the civilian police thrown in for good measure. However, these were not integrated into a holistic vision and comprehensive strategy. Chopra et al. claim that they were ‘very much a vestige of the

43 diplomatic activity of UNOSOM I that approached reconciliation through negotiation rather than by institution-building’ (ibid).

Under Secretary of Defense Wisner surely exaggerates in claiming that: ‘The single most serious flaw in our policy was that we tried to accomplish political objectives solely by military means’. Yet what is notable about UNOSOM II is the vagueness of its non-military goals compared with the specificity of its military ones. There was no political operational plan comparable to the military one. Indeed, ‘surprisingly little energy seems to have been devoted to the concepts actually needed to make peace . . . Instead, the US and the UN seem to have been left with the hope that the warlords would somehow become peace lords’. Alarmingly, Bir told the US Senate Armed Services Committee that he had encountered neither a political nor a military plan: ‘We were not given broad political guidance, so there was no military plan’. In an open letter to Boutros- Ghali he pleaded for one. There was also a mismatch of responsibility between the military mandate, where the UN was, at least in theory, in charge, and the non-military aspects, where it was not. Chopra et al. also argue that the military concept of operations was itself flawed since the stages were defined by the degree of military activity involved, without criteria for judging the political progress necessary before each successive stage could be entered into (ibid).

A poor transition from one mission to another has serious implications for the use of force, since it is likely to be perceived by the warring parties as an opportunity to take advantage of a power vacuum and to test the resolve of the incoming mission’s leadership and military forces. Since UNOSOM I was such a small mission, the transition to UNITAF had not been problematic. The sub- sequent transition from a large, militarily powerful coalition force to a substantial UN peace operation was at the time unique although much emulated in subsequent years. With UNITAF only just holding the lid on violence and a more intrusive, quasi-enforcement operation but with less military strength now envisaged, it was vital that there be a seamless transition. Regrettably, transition planning was delayed by dispute between the UN and the USA over two key issues, both with major implications for the use of force the date when UNOSOM II would take over, and the type of operation (peacekeeping or peace enforcement) it should be. In effect, BoutrosGhali refused to present the plan for a follow-on mission as requested by the Security Council in the hope that UNITAF could be induced to carry out disarmament and deploy throughout the country before the UN deployed its own force. The Secretary-General also refrained from deploying the 3500 UN

44 troops to Somalia that he was authorized to under UNOSOM’s preUNITAF mandate, thereby making the transitional shortfall that much greater (ibid).

Once the arbitrary date of 4 May 1993 was set for the handover; UNITAF naturally refrained from undertaking new initiatives, especially those that might have involved the use of force. Howe explains that a handover date has ‘major psychological ramifications and a significant influence on decisions such as whether to undertake military operations’. So suddenly did the last UNITAF units withdraw that UNOSOM II’s fledgling command was left scrambling to organize itself, bargaining desperately with the departing force to leave behind essential equipment and personnel. The withdrawal itself was so complete that when the last units left for the airport they did so in a single truck. When planning for the transition did finally begin, most of it was done in the field and most of the initiative came from UNITAF. UNITAF’s planning tended to assume that it would hand over to an organization not unlike itself, with instant access to experienced people, adequate resources and operational doc- trine. The plans were thus not necessarily appropriate for a UN force and, perhaps more importantly, had not been collectively devised and were therefore not collectively ‘owned’. ‘Many aspects of the transition, from logistics, to infantry battalion handoffs, to intelligence, operations, and psychological war- fare (“Psyops”) posed problems for a UN uncomfortable with the operational tasks and aggressive nomenclature of a military mission.’ The US reliance on a UN-based exit strategy, says Durch, ‘reflected US domestic political requirements and wishful thinking much more than a realistic appraisal of UN capabilities’. Hoar admitted in retrospect that his expectations of the UN were too high. The lack of UN preparedness and involvement in planning until very late led to a ‘tardy, half-realized operation with a double dose of problems’, namely, a more ambitious mandate with fewer resources. It is only possible to speculate as to whether a month’s extension of UNITAF’s stay would have made a difference regarding the attacks against Pakistani peacekeepers in June. The difficulties of the transition would have been known to the Somalis. Anticipating the arrival of a less well organized, less robust UN force, Aided in particular, and other Somali leaders, would have seen the opportunity for advantage. This in turn would have led to a need for coercion to implement the new mandate (ibid).

The lack of mission planning also resulted in confusion among the military about the authorizing resolution and mandate. There was no prior consultation and agreement among troop contributors to UNOSOM II on the political and military functions of the mission. Many contingents did not

45 appear to appreciate what Resolution 814 meant or what it would take to implement. Some considered themselves bound by Chapter VI rather than Chapter VII and accordingly restricted themselves to self-defense. This included several Middle Eastern countries Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) whose troops were new to peace operations. Citing Germany’s constitutional limitations, the German troops interpreted Chapter VI as meaning that they should protect their own camp at Beledweyne but nothing outside it. Other contingents, such as those from Bangladesh, Malaysia, Nigeria and Pakistan, signed up without any apparent initial restrictions on their activities. Although the Italian force was assumed to be a Chapter VII contingent, there was later controversy as to whether they had ever agreed to this. One result, with major implications for the use of force, was the adoption of different military postures by different contingents. Prunier argues that the very appearance and demeanor of the US troops helped to provoke fear and loathing on the part of the Somali population. US troops always appeared in flak jackets and helmets, were heavily armed and were guarded by helicopters or other protection forces. The Somalis joked about this, calling the US troops ‘human tanks’. Without the latter realizing it, Prunier says, ‘this was a constant irritant and a definite factor in the Somali aggressiveness toward them during summer 1993’. The French troops, by contrast, only wore helmets or flak jackets when fighting was a strong possibility and when off duty wore the native futah “skirt” (ibid).

The Somali lessons-learned report mused that, had planning been done before UNOSOM II, ‘perhaps the different national perceptions and agendas which resulted in unity of command problems would have been exposed sooner rather than during the operation itself’. It might also have prevented over- militarization of the mission and thereby reduced the likelihood of force being used ill-advisedly or at all. It was ironic that UNITAF, a non-UN mission with a limited, humanitarian mandate covering only part of southern Somalia, was given generous military and civilian resources while UNOSOM II, a UN operation with a much more ambitious mandate and nationwide coverage, was given vastly fewer resources. UNOSOM II’s strategy was derailed not only by an over-reliance on military means but also by a lack of resources to support nonmilitary means. The Humanitarian Division had neither the money nor the resources to support voluntary disarmament and the Justice Division had no resources to train or equip police forces. UN under

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Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Eliasson has pointed out that, for every dollar spent on the humanitarian operation, 10 were spent on the military (ibid).

UNOSOM II’s military component was itself not adequate for the ambitious military tasks envisaged. Military resources arrived piecemeal and were often inadequate to the task. Whatever their intentions, the Bangladeshi, Malaysian, Nigerian, and Pakistani troops did not adapt well to peace enforcement. Deficiencies in marksmanship and urban warfare training, as well as a lack of aggressiveness in patrolling, rapidly contributed to the UN losing control of the streets of Mogadishu. Critically, the Pakistani troops who replaced the US Marines in south Mogadishu sharply curtailed day and night patrolling, partly because of lack of equipment and personnel, but also because their doctrine and training were different. Some countries had apparently ‘volunteered’ only after the USA had promised their troops protection. This limited their usefulness and in some instances necessitated additional forces to assist them. Hence Mogadishu Airport continued to be over-defended, as some contingents restricted their deployment to guarding that facility. A British parliamentary committee investigation concluded that: ‘Given the chaotic circumstances prevailing in parts of Somalia, only a force both more heavily armed than conventional UN peacekeepers, and with the rules of engagement that allowed them to use arms aggressively where necessary, could achieve the aims of the UN’. The US Senate Armed Services Committee charged that the Clinton administration’s policy of reducing the US military presence in Somalia to a minimum, while at the same time agreeing to UN requests (via Admiral Howe) to perform a variety of high-risk military operations, had ‘stretched the capability of US forces’. Along with proper planning, there must be close intra-mission coordination if an operation in which military force is contemplated or used is to be successful (ibid).

The Pakistani commander, Brigadier-General Ikram Ul Hassan, records that on his arrival in April 1993, before the handover to UNOSOM II, he had expected a ‘substantive meeting’ to integrate the military, humanitarian and diplomatic plans, but none occurred. Of greater concern, the interpretation of the UNOSOM II mandate was apparently never formally discussed between the political and military wings of the mission. Policy guidelines and interpretation of the mandate fell to the respective contingents, who operated according to their own perspectives and understanding. Political decisions were kept separate from military considerations and military commanders, and vice versa. An official of the Political Division reported that when UNOSOM

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II replaced UNOSOM I the division was ‘left completely in the dark’. Between 7 May and 9 October 1993, he alleges, there were ‘no relations between the political and military side of UNOSOM’. For its part the Political Division was occupied in the countryside trying to establish regional and district councils, while the military component was involved in fighting a war. Only after 9 October did the two sides begin to cooperate, with the Political Division negotiating between the Somali National Army (SNA) and the UNOSOM II military regarding such issues as troop deployments. Although the Political Division was in touch with Howe, there were no round tables convened between the components until 9 October 1993 (ibid).

One of the most painful lessons for the use of force in peace operations that can be derived from the Somalia experience is the paramountcy of strong command and control. Boutros-Ghali himself acknowledged that the Somalia tragedy ‘exposed weaknesses in UNOSOM II’s complicated operational structure’. Somalia illustrated two major types of problem to be avoided first, the operation of allied military forces outside UN command structure, and, second, insubordination within the UN command structure. The most egregious flaw was the separation of the US support forces from the UN command and control structure. By keeping the QRF and the Rangers under its own command, the USA was able to unilaterally militarize the operation and propel the UN towards trying to capture Aideed. Jane Boulden contends that UNOSOM II’s command and control problems were ‘symptomatic of the UN decision to subcontract the UNITAF operation, and then to accept heavy US involvement and control in UNOSOM II in order to keep American assets involved’(ibid).

Within the UN command structure there were also major difficulties from the outset. Although all national contingents except the US support units were in theory under the operational control of the force commander, the reality was quite different. Indian and Pakistani troops, for instance, would not serve under each other’s control. On numerous occasions national contingents sent operational and tactical orders issued by Bir or Montgomery to their governments for approval, and in some instances they were countermanded. In August 1993, for example, Saudi troops were ordered to protect a certain perimeter, but replied that this was outside their understanding of Chapter VI. Montgomery complained about the ‘timid behavior of the coalition with which our security rests’.276 Chopra et al. argue that UNITAF contingents which transferred to UNOSOM II found it especially difficult to adapt to the tighter control demanded of UN operations. It is a

48 truism of peacekeeping that, as the level of violence rises, so do command and control difficulties. This was certainly the case in Somalia. Following the 5 June ambush, the deficiencies in UNOSOM’s internal command and control became worse. While the US military leadership demanded greater use of force, contingents which claimed that they were limited to a Chapter VI mandate entrenched their positions against participating. Howe notes that, paradoxically, just as UNOSOM II was becoming more militarily capable, its ability to implement a coherent strategy was waning because of such constraints. According to Bir: ‘Nations were here for a humanitarian mission and when forces started to take casualties, they stopped cooperating, with negative consequences.’ US planners felt that Bir was not forceful enough in demanding compliance with the UN mandate from his assorted contingents (ibid).

The Italian contingent convinced that as the heirs of the former colonial power they understood the Somali people better than anyone else, caused the greatest command and control difficulties. They actively opposed the anti- Aideed policy and contended that a softer, negotiated approach would work better. Their commander, General Bruno Loi, began to insist on clearing instructions with Rome and conducted what Durch describes as ‘his own operation-within-an-operation, intended to show UNOSOM how experts deal with Somalis’. Boutros-Ghali bluntly describes the Italians as pursuing ‘their own agenda at the expense of the common UN effort’, accusing Loi of unilaterally negotiating with Aideed and, even more alarming, giving him warning of UN military movements.US and UN officials also accused the Italian troops of deliberately refusing to come to the aid of other peacekeepers, including Nigerian and Pakistani troops. The Under Secretary- General for Peace- keeping Operations, Kofi Annan, publicly rebuked Loi and on instruction from Boutros-Ghali called for him to be replaced. Italy in turn accused the UN of incompetence and blamed it for not seeking its advice in dealing with the Somalis. The French contingent, too, began to check UN orders with Paris, returning to Baidoa after an operation against a USC/SNA enclave in Mogadishu in June despite being told by Bir to remain in Mogadishu (ibid).

Rules of Engagement (ROE): Although UNOSOM II’s ROE were very similar to UNITAF’s, the UNOSOM command was much less successful than UNITAF’s in imposing common ROE on participating contingents. Zinni noted of some contingents that: ‘They come with different rules of engagement which makes life interesting when the shooting begins’. Every country which contributed troops to UNOSOM II placed restrictions on the way in which its forces could use

49 force, and this was reflected either in their own ROE or in how they interpreted the supposedly common ROE. Chopra et al. speculate that the force commander did not even have a collection of all national ROE, discovering them only by ‘trial and error’. Daniel and Hayes conclude that: ‘In the end, each contingent used whatever rules with which it felt most comfortable’. Without agreed ROE, different contingents used different levels of force. This increased tensions between contingents and put UNOSOM at risk. Certain of the contingents were reportedly notorious for lack of discipline in firing. On several occasions they opened up with full protective fire, using weapons of all calibers, including heavy machine guns, when the situation did not warrant it. Allard contends that there was a noticeable difference in the way US troops interpreted the ROE, stressing aggressive enforcement, while other national contingents emphasized more graduated responses before using deadly force. Contrary to this view, Margaret C. Harrell and Jonathan Howe claim that training vignettes and anecdotes indicate that US forces in UNOSOM II ‘possibly used excessive restraint more than required by the ROE or recommended for personal safety by higher command’. They found that the lower echelons in particular frequently interpreted ROE more restrictively than intended (ibid).

Intelligence: Although the USA provided UNOSOM II with a 60-person Intelligence Sup- port Element (ISE), it remained under US command and its products were not shared between all contingents, mission headquarters and UN Headquarters according to standard procedures. This was clearly unsatisfactory and put lives at risk. Noting that a well-managed intelligence programme can have a dramatic effect on the success of any military mission, the 1995 lessonslearned report urged the UN to continue to move beyond its traditional nervousness about the propriety of ‘intelligence’ and its role in UN peace operations. Had the presence of al-Qaeda operatives in Mogadishu been more widely known, there might have been a different assessment of the problems facing the mission (ibid).

Enforced disarmament: One of the enduring arguments about peace operations, which first arose in the Congo case, is whether they can and should use force to achieve the disarmament of warring parties. In the Somalia case Durch accuses the UN Secretariat of engaging in wishful thinking about UNITAF’s chances of disarming a ‘hypertrophied Somali gun culture, in the process neutralizing Somalia’s rapacious faction leaders and making them suitably respectful of traditional peacekeepers’. Yet enforcement of disarmament would surely have signaled to the factions that

50 attempts to maintain or seize political power by force of arms would no longer be permitted, that military prowess would not confer legitimacy, and that the USA and the UN were serious about restoring law and order. Early enforced disarmament would also have avoided the later loss of life during UNOSOM II’s belated attempts at enforced disarmament in a more hostile environment. Boulden notes that most observers agree in retrospect that the UNITAF period provided the only window of opportunity for disarmament to be carried out (ibid).

Using the momentum of its deployment, its impressive show of force and the initial disarray of the factions, UNITAF could have made substantial inroads into the disarmament problem. Heavy weapons could have been systematically seized and destroyed, major light-arms caches uncovered and impounded, and bandit activity brought under control. This could probably have been done with minimal resort to the use of force, although it would certainly have required a more determined military posture and perhaps stronger ROE (although, as seen above, these were already reasonably robust). It would also have had to start immediately a sufficient number of troops had arrived. Hirsch and Oakley retrospectively concede that: ‘There is little doubt that most heavy weapons could have been removed from control of the factional militias and organized “bandits” throughout Somalia by UNITAF, probably with minimal combat, had it maintained momentum’. Complete enforced disarmament throughout Somalia would, however, have required a substantial increase in military and financial resources, an indefinite time commitment, expansion of the original mandate, and a willingness to confront and overcome armed resistance. For its long-term success it would have required the sealing of air, sea and land borders, presumably through the usual system of UN military observers (ibid).

Whether force was used to compel disarmament or not, its long-term sustainability would have required a plan which included demobilization and reintegration components, so that those who were disarmed did not simply rearm immediately, as well as the resuscitation of the Somali national police. The 1995 lessons-learned report concluded that what was required was an integrated strategy aimed at supporting the judiciary, the police, local government, the economy, reconciliation, disarmament and demobilization. Finally, progress in political reconciliation would ultimately have been necessary to sustain disarmament over the longer term. Such a strategy would, however, have taken UNITAF well into the nation-building it was so keen to avoid. The UN commission of inquiry placed some blame for the Somalia debacle on the fact that there were no

51 seasoned peacekeepers among the UNOSOM military leadership to advise on and teach ‘the modalities of UN disarmament inspections and other useful practices learned during 45 years of UN peace- keeping’. It argued, for instance, that a ‘non-confrontational typical UN peacekeeping approach’ to disarming the factions would have obliged UNOSOM II to draw the SNA’s attention to its disarmament obligations, and if the SNA persisted in breaching them more forceful action would have been appropriate. This is in fact exactly what UNOSOM had done although this can hardly be described as typical peacekeeping behavior (ibid).

Humanitarian intervention and the use of force: A further lesson of Somalia with implications for the use of force was the difficulty of conducting humanitarian and nation-building activities while the UN is also engaged in military operations. Not only are those involved in humanitarian activities often uncomfortable with the use of any force, but military operations can stop, severely disrupt or distract attention and resources from humanitarian ones and, conversely, the proximity of humanitarian operations can hamper military operations. Since it may be difficult for the local population to distinguish between the different parts of the UN involved in the peace enforcement and non-enforcement aspects of the mission, all international actors may be ‘tarred with the same brush’ by local belligerents and the local populace generally. Sometimes this is deliberately encouraged by the belli- gerents, who are aware that the civilian parts of UN operations are the most vulnerable to attack. Paradoxically, in Somalia the security situation was so bad that humanitarian organizations and NGOs called on both UNITAF and UNOSOM II to provide them with military protection. Ironically, in some cases, the enforced disarmament of their hired guards had left them vulnerable. When offensive military operations began, however, the humanitarian organizations once more felt the need to distance them -selves from the international military presence. Chester Crocker, former US Assistant Secretary of State, argued that the humanitarian purist cannot have it both ways: ‘If there is an appeal for outside force, it must be accompanied by an outside strategy for leashing the dogs while healing the wounds of war’(ibid). “The use of force in the Somalia case was ultimately self-defeating. Somalia should, however, be seen not as a failure of peace enforcement doctrine but as a failure to conceive of one properly and then apply it effectively” (Trevor Findlay, 2002).

Therefore, there is need to show the factors behind the failures of AMISOM in its bit to restore peace in Somalia since 2007-2019 and see if the international community has learnt lessons from its first mistakes/ failures or not.

Figure 1: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

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Independent variables Dependent variables

Peace enforcement mission

( AMISOM ) Promotion of peace

Conducts peace support Stabilization of the operations in Somalia. situation in the country,

Trains, monitor s and dialogue and advises the Somali Police reconciliation, reduced threat of Al - shabaab Force. C redible organization Coordinates Humanita rian operations. adhering to strict international standards. A ssist the Somali government in building its Relief of human suffering capacity for public service Intervening variables Functional and

Source of Funding professional Government Institutions Governance

Ethnic wars

Military victory

Source: Primary Data, 2019 Peace enforcement mission is the independent variable and the dependent variable is Promotion of peace. AMISOM’s Military was mandated to conduct peace support operations, seeks to stabilize the situation in the country, Provides protection to the country’s Federal Institutions as they carry out their functions, Secures Somalia’s key infrastructure including its airports and seaports; The Police Component trains, monitors and advises the Somali Police Force with the aim of transforming it into a credible organization adhering to strict international standards; The 53

Humanitarian component coordinates humanitarian operations; in which the principle goal is the relief of human suffering such as repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), provision of basic needs to IDPS among others. The Civilian Component helps in Mission Support, Political Processes, Stabilization and Early Recovery, Protection, Human Rights and Gender, as well as Security Sector Reform. However;

Doyle and Sambanis ((2010), “Making war and Building peace”, argues that the deployment of a peace operation mission is not enough to ensure lasting peace. There are many factors that can affect lasting peace such as a rebel group's involvement in illicit financing through means such as through the export of diamonds and other minerals; participation in the trafficking of drugs, weapons and human beings. Virginia Fortna (2008), if a group is funded by drugs, diamonds or other illicit trade then there is a substantial increase in the chance of renewed violence .For the case of Somalia, the source of funding apart from external support, the Al-shabaab has been collecting a lot of revenue from charcoal export to sustain their violence. Doyle and Sambanis' analysis (2010) finds that UN plays a strong, but indirect role and success in lasting peace is predicated on the development of institutions that support peace, rather than serving as a deterrent for renewed war.

While Virginia Fortna (2008) “Does peacekeeping really work: shaping belligerents’ choices after Civil War”, finds that wars which involve many factions are less likely to resume, Doyle and Sambanis find the opposite. Costly wars and wars fought along identity lines both provide varied chances of the renewal of violence. Virginia Fortna (2008), perhaps one of the most statistically significant contributors to a lasting peace is whether or not military victory was achieved by one side. According to Fortna's research, civil wars in which one side wins, resulting in a cease-fire or truce, have an approximately 85%-90% lower chance of renewed war. For example, third-party attempts at a negotiated settlement (Arusha accords) between the Hutu and Tutsi afforded an opportunity for Hutu extremists to prepare for the killing of Hutu moderates and the genocide of the Tutsi. Modern strategies that rely solely on consent-based negotiations are severely limited and that victory by military means should not be ignored.

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CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter shifts the focus of the study to a discussion of the research methodology for this study. In this chapter, the research design, population, sampling strategies, data collection methods, tools validation and reliability, procedure, data quality control and proposed data analysis techniques are discussed.

3.1 Study Approach

The study also adopted qualitative and quantitative research approaches. Qualitative approach was adopted because there was always communication between the researcher and the respondent, data is expressed in non-numerical terms and pictures. Quantitate data is presented in numerical terms inform of statistics and tables.

3.2 Study Design

The United Nations sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16, seeks to promote peace, justice, and inclusive institutions. This Study used 2 Indexes to qualify negative and positive peace; 1) Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI) and 2) the Global Peace Index (GPI) to measure peace. This is because according to Galtung (1964), peace is both negative and positive. The origins of the HDI are found in the annual Human Development Reports produced by the Human Development Report Office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). According to the 2010 Human Development Report, IHDI is a statistic composite index of life expectancy, education, and per capita income indicators, which are used to rank countries into four tiers of human development. A country scores a higher IHDI when the lifespan is higher, the education level is higher, and the gross national income GNI (PPP) per capita is higher.6 Global Peace Index (GPI) measures the relative position of nations' and regions' peacefulness. The GPI ranks 163 independent states and territories (99.7 per cent of the world’s population) according to their levels of peacefulness. In the past decade, the GPI has presented trends of increased global

56 violence and less peacefulness. According to the Global Peace Index(GPI) report (2019) by the Institute for economics and peace(IEP), the indicators of peace include; 1.The extent of domestic and international conflict (conflict, duration of conflicts, deaths from organized conflicts) 2.The level of safety and security in the society(refugees and internally displaced people, Global terrorism index, homicides per 100,000 people, jailed population per 100,000 people, internal security officers and police per 100,000 people) 3.The degree of militarization(military expenditure, UN peacekeeping funding, Transfers of major conventional weapons per 100,000 people, armed services personnel per 100,000 people.7 AMISOM in this study was assessed according to its mandate.

The study adopted a case study design in which Primary data and literature survey data were used. This design was adopted because the use of multiple data sources, case studies allow a lot of detail/ in-depth content to be collected that would not normally be easily obtained by other research designs. Qualitative and quantitative data was collected using questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions. Quantitative data focuses on descriptive and inferential statistics. This approach produced results in form of tables, figures and graphs, which were the basis for discussion and conclusions about the findings. For qualitative data is data in form of pictures, statements by which respondents give suggestions, opinions or strategies for achieving the results. The analysis of qualitative data provides the basis for in – depth understanding of the situation under study (Bogere M and Gesa A, 2015).

3.3 Study Area

The study was carried out in Somalia with specific reference to Halane area of Mogadishu, which flanks Mogadishu International Airport (MIA).Somalia was chosen because Somalia, is considered germane to the way in which UN follow-on operations used force and because it seem to suggest models for future UN missions (Trevor Findlay, 2002).

3.4 Study Population

The local Population of Mogadishu is over 2.5 million residents according to the World population review report 2019.8 Halane area has over 22,000 AMISOM workers minus other NGOS, Foreign Missions and local Somalis that the researcher targeted however; the researcher could realistically

57 access a study population of 670 from Halane area of Mogadishu which is separated from the rest of Mogadishu by a massive security wall built by the United Nations from which she selected her sample size. This research drew respondents from Halane area only because of the distance between the regions and mostly because the researcher could not move out of the Base Camp due to the insecurity of the country and more so, the population in Halane was capable of giving the information that the researcher needed. The study population of 670 was composed of AMISOM soldiers, Somali locals, Humanitarian agencies, UN workers, AU workers, AMISOM officials and International Diplomats.

3.5 Sampling Strategy

Non-random sampling method was used in this research where the researcher used snowball, purposive, and Convenience sampling techniques. Snowball sampling involves asking a key informant to name other people who should be contacted by the researcher in order to understand some aspects of a situation under study. Key informants were recommended by colleagues who knew they could offer good information; Convenience sampling was used on the basis of how accessible and cooperative the subjects were. Purposive sampling, the researcher used her judgment regarding the key participants from whom the information was collected because there was no need of interviewing too many people who would give the same answer. (Bogere M and Gesa A, 2015)

3.5.1 Sample Size

The study sample size of 250 was determined using Robert Slovene’s formula(1960) that was published by Yamane (1967: 886).The Slovene’s formula for determining sample size is; n=N/1+N*e2. Where;

N= population size n=sample size e=margin of error (Margin of error, also referred to as

“confidence interval”, refers to the amount of error you wish to allow in your results). For this research, the study population size was 670 allowing 5% for margin of error;

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N=670, e=0.05

Calculation n=N/1+N*e2 n=670/

(1+670*0.05x2) n=670

(1+670*0.0025) n=670/

(1+1.675) n=670/

(2.675)

n=250.4

The study sample size=250

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Table 1. Showing Population distribution and sample size Study Population Number of Respondents Sample Size AMISOM soldiers 190 250*190/670=71 Somali locals 292 250*292/670=109 Humanitarian agencies 85 250*85/670=32

UN workers 17 250*17/670=6.3 AU workers 60 250*60/670=22.3 AMISOM officials 3 250*3/670=1.1 International Diplomats 23 250*23/670=8.5 Total 670 250 Source: Primary data 2019

3.6 Data collection methods

The study utilized both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods. Primary data was obtained using questionnaires, Focused Group Discussions as well as interviews. Secondary data were sourced from reading literature in secondary sources

3.6.1. Primary data

This study used open ended questionnaires, interviews and focus-group discussions methods to collect primary data (Bogere and Gesa, 2015).

3.6.1.1 Questionnaire method

The questionnaire was used to generate quantitative data. The questionnaire covered three sections: biographical data; the achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007- 2019 and the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007- 2019. This involved the use of self-administered and open ended questionnaires to International Diplomats, AU workers, UN workers, Humanitarian agencies, Somali locals and AMISOM soldiers. Questionnaire method was used because it helps to investigate motives and feelings and enables on-spot collection of data (Bogere and Gesa, 2015).

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3.6.1.2 Interviews

The interview method was used to explore qualitatively from key informants; the strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019; the achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019; the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007-2019. This method took the option of face to face interviews with key informants that included; International Diplomats, AU workers, UN workers, Humanitarian agencies, Somali locals and AMISOM soldiers. Interview method was used because it provides an excellent opportunity to probe and explore questions (Bogere and Gesa, 2015).

3.6.1.3 Focused Group Discussions

Focus Group Discussions method was used to qualitatively collect data about the achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019; the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007-2019. This method was subjected to respondents who did not have time to fill the questionnaires and the local Somalis who could not write and speak in English with the help of an interpreter. This method was used because it provides many possible answers to specific questions, helps to explain trends, reasons and causes through the diverse views of the participants (Bogere M and Gesa A 2015).

3.6.2 Secondary data

Secondary data was sourced from reading literature in secondary sources such as articles, journals, magazines, books and periodicals to obtain historical and other types of information (Bogere and Gesa, 2015).

3.6.2.1 Document Review

A document review method was used to collect qualitative data from secondary sources about; the strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019; the achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019; the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 20072019.Secondary

61 sources included; journals, online articles/information, text books UNSCRs, Communiqués of the Peace and Security Council of the AU and other relevant reliable sources.

3.7 Data collection Instruments

Data collection instruments included questionnaires, interview guide, focus group discussions guide and documentary checklist

3.7.1 Self-administered Questionnaires

Self-administered and open ended questionnaires were used to generate data. Open ended questionnaires call for a free response in the respondent’s own words. They provide for greater depth of response where respondents give their personal views and attitudes about the item in the research, Its less expensive compared to other methods, on-spot-collection provides quick results, assurance of anonymity, time saving, questionnaires are hard copy that can be filed for reference purposes and Questionnaires are helpful when the study population is scattered over a wide geographical area Bogere and Gesa (2015).

3.7.2 Interview guide

Face to face interviews with the help of an interview guide were conducted. Interviews were used because they permit the researcher to follow up leads and thus obtain more data and greater clarity, interviews create a friendly atmosphere for data collection, people are willing to talk than to write and the respondents give information in their own words without being limited (Bogere and Gesa, 2015).

3.7.3 Focused Group Discussion guide

The study also carried out Focus Group Discussions to collect data from respondents who did not have time to fill the questionnaires and the Somali locals who could not read and write with the help of an interpreter using a focus group discussion guide.

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3.7.4 Documentary review checklist

The study also carried out reviews of existing documents primarily the UNSCRs African Union Peace and Security Council Communiqués, journals, textbooks and other relevant reliable sources. This gave an overview of how much has been addressed in this topic.

3.8 Data quality control

3.8.1 Validity

Content Validity was used in this study. The instruments provided adequate traits due consultations with the researcher’s supervisor and, colleagues before they were administered to the respondents and this helped in strengthening the validity of the research instruments. Content validation is basically judgmental. Alone, or with others, one judges the representativeness of the items (P.C. Tripathi, 1987).

3.8.2 Reliability

Reliability was determined according to the nature of data. The strategies for obtaining reliability of qualitative data peer debriefing, prolonged engagement and audit trails. The researcher was adaptable to the respondents, holistic and ensures processional immediacy. Data was systematically checked, focus maintained and there were identification and correcting errors to ensure accuracy of data. Research tools were pre-tested before going to the field. (Bogere M and Gesa A, 2015).

3.9 Data Analysis

This research used quantitative and Qualitative Data Analysis. After data collection, the researcher summarized the data and analyzed it. The data was categorized and entered in to the computer by using excel. The quantitative data was analyzed using descriptive statistics and presented in frequency tables and pie charts. Qualitative data on the other hand was analyzed using content analysis following (Bogere M and Gesa A, 2015) in line with the research questions and findings presented in non-numerical data and pictures. The researcher was immersed and integrated into her respondents, which helped in data organization, data interpretation and pattern identification.

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3.10 Ethical Considerations

Research ethics that were put into Consideration in this study include; Informed Consent,

Voluntary participation, Do no harm, Anonymity and confidentiality and, Respect for privacy. (Bogere M and Gesa A, 2015)

3.11 Limitations to the study/ overcoming challenges

Access to information on military matters is often hard however, the researcher got permission from Uganda Peoples Defense Forces to access the mission area in Somalia; recommendations from AMISOM sector 1 to be able to access her respondents in Halane Area; the researcher convinced the respondent that the research was purely for academic purpose to get positive responses and hence participation was entirely out of their free will and the respondents in Halane Area were able to give enough information that the researcher wanted.

While the researcher exercised due caution in this study, readers should observe that research on such sensitive themes is problematic for multiple reasons.

CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS, PRESENTATION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings on the effectiveness of peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa a case of AMISOM since 2007-2019. The findings are presented in the gist of the three objectives that the study was set to achieve: To identify the strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019; to establish the achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019; to find out the

64 factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 20072019.The analysis was based on the objectives of the study and the presentation and the interpretation done with the help of tables, pie charts, pictures and narrative text as follows;

4.1. Background characteristics of the respondents

The basic social-demographic characteristics of respondents were probed. Key among them included the following; age, sex, education level and occupation.

4.1.1 Gender of respondents

The gender of respondents was necessary in order to assess the effectiveness of peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa: a case of AMISOM (20072019).Findings on the gender of the respondents revealed the following information results.

Figure 4: 2 showing gender of respondents

Gender of respondents

Female 33 %

Male 67 %

Male Female

Source: Primary data 2019

The pie chat in the figure above shows that majority of the respondents, 67% were male while 33% were female. Though there were more male respondents, however, both males and females

65 provided relevant responses for this study and the data about gender reflects gender balance between men and women meaning the research was not gender biased.

4.1.2 Age group

The study also considered the age characteristic to be very essential in the investigation of the effectiveness of African peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa a case of AMISOM since 2007-2019. Findings on the age of the respondents revealed the following information results.

Table 4.2. Showing the Age of the respondent Responses Frequency Percentage (%) 20-29 30 12.5

30-39 90 37.5 40-49 80 33.3 50+ 40 17.7 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

The study found out that the majority of respondents, 90 (37.5%) were in the age range of 3039, this was followed by 80 (33.3%) in the age range of 40-49, then followed by those with 50 years and above who were 40(17.7%) while the least age range was 20-29 which was represented by only 30 (12.5%). This represents those years when people are most active and with enormous experience in terms of engagement in work activities. This therefore implies that the respondents were mature, experienced, informed and energetic thus provided the valid information regarding the effectiveness of African peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa a case of AMISOM since 2007-2019.

4.1.3 Level of education of the respondents.

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The educational level of the respondents was categorized under Primary, Certificate, Diploma, Degree, Masters, and PHD. The study asked respondents to reveal their educational level and the results were tabulated below;

Table 4. 3 Showing Findings on the level of education Respondents Frequency Percentage (%) PHD 3 1.25 Masters 40 16.7 Bachelors 80 33.3 Diploma 33 13.7 Certificate 14 5.8 Primary 70 29.1 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table, 3 respondents (1.25%) had attained PHD as their highest level of education, 40 respondents (16.7%) had Masters, 80 respondents (33.3%) had Bachelors, 33 respondents (13.7%) had diplomas, and 14 respondents (5.8%) had certificates while 70 respondents (29.1%) had primary level of education. This implies that the majority of respondents were literate and able to understand, internalize and give valid information according to the questionnaires distributed to them and during focused group discussions and interview sessions. Although 70 respondents (29.1%) had primary level of education, they were mature Somali nationals who were the direct victims of the Somali conflict and direct beneficiaries of AMISOM’s peace operation efforts in Somalia and thus were able to give informed responses because they understood the situation on ground.

4.1.4 Occupation of respondents

The study asked respondents about their occupation. The results are indicated in table below:

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Table 4.4. Showing Occupation Responses Frequency Percentage (%) Army officer 80 33.3 Business man 4 1.7 Doctor 20 8.3 Lawyer 10 4.2 Counselor 10 4.2 Public relations 3 0.1 ICT officer 20 8.3 Accountant 6 2.5 Administrator 6 2.5 Writer/Author 1 0.4 Foreign Service officer 10 4.2 Not known 70 30 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

According to the table above, 80(33.3%) respondents were army officers, 4(1.7%) were business men, 20 (8.3%) were doctors, 10(4.2%) were Lawyers 10(4.2%) were counselors, 3 (0.1%) were Public relations officers, 20(8.3%) were ICT officers 6(2.5%) more accountants, 6 (2.5%) were Administrators, 1(0.4%) were Authors, 10 (4.2%) were Foreign Service officers and lastly 70 (30%) their occupations were not known but still they were active members in the society. This implies that the respondents were active members in the society and in the Somali peace process and could provide the necessary and relevant information needed on the effectiveness of peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa a case of AMSOM in the period

2007-2019.

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4.2 The strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019

4.2.1 Armed Actors in the Somali conflict

This study asked respondents about the actors in the Somali Conflict and the results were as follows;

Table 4.5. Showing the armed actors in the Somali Conflict of the respondents Respondents Frequency Percentage (%) Somali Islamic Front 40 16.7 Hizb al- Islamiyah Al-shabaab 30 12.5 Al-Qaeda 25 10.4 Islamic courts Union 30 12.5 Harakat Al-shabaab (The Youth 60 25 Movement) Anole group 20 8.3 Federal Government 35 14.6 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From table 4.5 it shows different armed groups in Somalia conflicts. 40 (16.7% of respondents argued Somali Islamic Front; 30 (12.5%) respondents argued Hizb al- Islamiyah Al-shabaab; 25(10.4%) respondents argued Al-Qaeda; 30(12.5%) respondents argued Islamic Courts Union (ICU); 60(25%) respondents argued Harakat Al-shabaab (The Youth Movement); 20(8.3%) argued Anole group while 35(14.6%) respondents argued Federal Government.

However, According to respondents that were interviewed and in focused group discussions, the armed groups in the Somali Conflict include the Al-shabaab as the major rebel group, which has allegiance to al-Qaeda, the other one is Islamic state of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) which is an offshoot of Al-shabab with their leader shk Mumir who was a senior member of al-shabab and broke away from it, The rest of the armed groups are the militia groups that are based on clans mostly who conflict on issues of land, resources, political power or clan hegemony and all these fighting against

69 the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS). Below, this study discusses different strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the Somali Conflict since 2007-2019 as argued by key informants and from secondary sources such as United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) and the Communiqués of the African Union Peace and Security Council (APSC)

4.2.2 African Initiative:

According to respondents in interviews, AMISOM’s concept of operations is derived from UNSCRs and from the Communiqués of the APSC. Solomon A. Dersso (2010), In 2002, the African Union was born and adopted a comprehensive measure to address conflicts in its Constitutive Act for example: “Article4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act, not only creates the legal basis for intervention but also imposes an obligation on the AU to intervene to prevent or stop the perpetration of such heinous international crimes anywhere on the continent. According to the preamble to the Constitutive Act, one of the factors underlying the establishment of the AU was the recognition of ‘the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda’. In line with this, the Act provides that one of the objectives of the AU is to ‘promote peace, security, and stability on the continent’. The AU has the right to intervene in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity pursuant to a decision of the Assembly” .Within the ambit of the AU Constitutive Act, several interventions by African countries in conflicts have taken place in the recent past. AMISOM is one of these interventions. Respondents in interviews argued that the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an active, regional enforcement mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the African Union’s Peace and Security Council on 19th January 2007, authorized by United Nations Security Council. The aim of the peace enforcement mission according to PSC/PR/Comm. (LXIX), 19 January 2007, was to provide support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; Facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and Create conducive conditions for longterm stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia. on 20thFebuary 2007 adopting UNSCR 1744 (2007)13, the UN Security Council authorized AMISOM to take all necessary measures as appropriate to carry out the following 70 mandate: Support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia by assisting with the free movement, safe passage, and protection of all those involved with the process; Provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs to help them carry out their functions of government, and security for key infrastructure; Assist, within its capabilities, and in coordination with other parties, with the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan, in particular the effective re-establishment and training of all-inclusive Somali security forces; Contribute, as may be requested and within capabilities, to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance; and Protect its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and requested a report within 60 days on a possible United Nations Peace keeping Mission. According to respondents in interviews, AMISOM troops are drawn from African Union Members states namely; Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, Djibouti and Ethiopia. African Union has moved from the principles of sovereignty of member states and noninterference in internal affairs of member states that were challenging the resolution of intrastate conflict. According to these respondents, the AU members have shown willingness, commitment, ability and desire to act expeditiously and generally independent to ensure their own national security. In addition, Africa and African Countries have proved that they can solve their problems with the international community only giving a supporting role.

4.2.3 Multiple actors as a strategy in the peace Process:

In this Study, the respondents were asked about the different actors in the Somali Peace Process and they argued as follows:

Table 4.6. Showing the different actors in Somali peace process Respondents Frequency Percentage (%)

Media 25 10.4 Civil society organization 35 14.6 Federal government 50 20.8 Terrorists 15 6.3 AMISON 55 22.9 Neighboring state 20 8.3

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United states 40 16.7 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 25(10.4%) respondents argued Media; 35 (14.6%) respondents argued civil society organization; 50(20.8%) respondents argued Federal Government of Somalia; 15 (6.3%) respondents argued terrorists, 55(22.9%) respondents argued AMISOM; 20(8.3%) respondents argued Neighboring state; 40 (16.7%) respondents argued United States. In Interviews, One respondent argued that multiple actors have provided the necessary resources to sustain the mission. European Union (EU), United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are among the actors in Somalia’s peace process. Civil Society Organizations in the Somali Peace process include United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), and Bancroft Global Development among others. AMISOM is unique because of its reliance on a complex set of partnerships between several international organizations notably AU,EU AND UN and major bilateral states notably the United States, Ethiopia, Kenyan, Uganda and the United Kingdom. Thus while six African Countries provided AMISOM troops, it was UN support Office that provided the logistical support and the EU that paid for the peace keepers allowances and other forms of mission support, while the United States provided various train, and later, special forces operations and air strikes.11

4.2.4 Robust Mandates:

UNSCR 1744 (2007)13 authorized AMISOM to take all necessary measures as appropriate to achieve its mandate. Williams (2018), the basis of AMISOM’s current mandate was set in July 2016 when the UN Security Council authorized the mission to pursue three strategic objectives, four priority tasks, and six essential tasks. The three strategic objectives were to: Reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; Provide security in order to enable the political process at all levels as well as stabilization efforts, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia; and Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent according to the abilities of the Somali security forces. AMISOM’s four “priority tasks” were to: Continue to conduct offensive operations against al- Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; et al (see S/RES/2297, 7 July 2016). Respondents in

72 interviews argued that AMISOM forces jointly with the Somali Security Forces conduct targeted offensive operations against Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to bring the conflict to a manageable level where it can be managed by the Somalis themselves. Respondents argued that the robust strategy was adopted because all initial peace talks had failed and there was no peace to keep by the time AMISOM was deployed. It was real combat. One respondent who is a Somali national argued that;

“When AMISOM was deployed in Somalia, AMISOM did don’t know much about Somalia and Somalia did not know much about AMISOM, the resources were few, and everyone was in the learning curve together. Things were very unstable both politically and security wise. The government was literally losing ground day after day and the entire mood was downward low. There was no much motivation to be in the city and everyone was running away and people who remained behind had very strong reasons to stay behind because there was no reason to stay behind when you are losing the city inch by inch, you do not see peace coming, the risk is getting higher by the day and very few people had the guts to hang around”.

4.2.5 Civil-Military Projects (CIMIC):

According to S/RES/2297, 7 July 2016, one of the AMSIOM’s six “essential tasks” is to engage with communities in recovered areas, and promote understanding between AMISOM and local populations, within its capabilities, which will allow for longer-term stabilization by the UN Country Team and other actors. According to respondents in interviews, AMISOM carries out a number of quick impact projects (Quips) aimed at alleviating the suffering of people. Projects such as building bore halls for clean water supply, Supply of food to locals, health outreaches among others. For example, AMISOM provides a number of health services at Level 11 hospital located in Halane area to over 1,000 patients from Halane and beyond monthly and these quick projects are carried out in all AMISOM sectors. However, one respondent in an interview argued that, Civil-Military Projects are not only aimed at alleviating human suffering but also aimed at winning the “hearts and minds” of the Somalis to support the mission and the peace process. The then Col. Peter Elweru, the first Ugandan Contingent Commander into AMISON is quoted to have said; “A jerry can of clean water, tablets of good medicine and a mug of rice are more powerful than

73 machinegun bullets in winning the hearts and minds of the thirsty, the sick and hungry” (Oloya, 2016). Furthermore, another respondent added that, AMISOM pays more attention to Somali cultural values and norms to draw the support of the populace. For example, AMISOM female soldiers in Halane area veil their heads to respect Women’s dress code in Islam.

4.2.6 Multidimensional Mission:

Dersso (2010) Article 13(1) of the PSC Protocol the African Standby Force (ASF) ‘shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice.’ UNSCR 2086 (2012) noted that Multidimensional Missions achieve the twin goals of peace enforcement and peace building by preventing recurrence of conflict, building local capacities for sustainable peace and development. It also noted that the approach brought comparative advantages in early peace building, including by drawing strength from international legitimacy and political leverage derived from a Council mandate, and using a mix of Civilian, police, and military capabilities under a unified leadership.5 According to Respondents in Interviews, AMISOM has four Components which include: The military Component, Civilian component, Humanitarian component and the Police Component. The Military component Conducts peace support operations, seeks to stabilize the situation in the country, Provides protection to the country’s Federal Institutions; the Police component trains, monitors and advises the Somali Police Force with the aim of transforming it into a credible organization adhering to strict international standards. The Police component has Police Officers from Uganda, Nigeria, Kenya, Sierra Leone among others; The Humanitarian component coordinates humanitarian operations, in which the principle goal is the relief of human suffering; The Civilian Component is responsible for Mission Support, Political Processes, stabilization and early recovery, protection, Human Rights and Gender, as well as Security Sector Reform.2

4.2.7 Sectorolization:

According to S/RES/2297, 7 July 2016, one of four “priority tasks” of AMISOM is to maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, in coordination with the Somali

74 security forces. UNSCR 2372 (2017) authorizes AMISOM to maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations, prioritizing the main population centers. (Williams, 2018) having initially been tasked with securing a foothold in Mogadishu to support the TFG and a potential peace process, AMISOM has evolved geographically, politically, and militarily. Geographically, the mission has expanded from occupying just a handful of strategic locations strung across Mogadishu. In interviews, key informants argued that, AMISOM today maintains presence in all 6 sectors which include; sector 1 head quartered in Mogadishu with 34 Forward Operating Bases (FOBS) covering the regions of Banadir, and Lower Shabelle and predominantly the responsibility of Ugandan contingent. Halane area is in this region; Sector 2(Dobhey: Lower and middle Juba regions) which is a port city in the southern lower Juba province of Somalia and is predominantly the responsibility of the Kenyan contingent operating 7 FOBS; Sector 3 headquartered in Baidoa covering Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions which is the capital of the southwestern Bay region of Somalia and is predominantly the responsibility of the Ethiopian Contingent operating 8 FOBS. Kenya and Ethiopia also occupy sector 6 in Kisimayo with police units. Sector 4(Beledweyne: Hiiraan region), which is a city in Central Somalia located in Beledweyne District and it’s the capital of Hiiraan province. The town is situated in the Shebelle valley near the Ethiopia border north of Mogadishu and predominantly the responsibility of the Djiboutian contingent; Sector 5 (Jowhar: Middle Shabelle region)Jowhar is the capital city of Hirshabelle state of Somalia and the administrative capital of Middle Shabelle region of Somalia. Hirshabelle consists of Hiran and Middle Shabelle regions of Somalia and is located in South Central Somalia and it is predominantly the responsibility of the Burundian Contingent operating 18 FOBS. According to one respondent in an interview, all the regions occupied by AMISOM were previously occupied by Al-shabaab. He argued that, the rationale behind the Sectorolization strategy is to make the mission more effective by recapturing different regions from Al-Shabaab and other armed rebels groups thereby limiting their freedom of operation.

4.2.8 Dialogue and Reconciliation

PSC/PR/comm (LXIX) of the APSC mandated AMISOM to provide support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation. S/RES/2297, 7 July 2016 authorizes AMISOM to Receive, on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the UN. 75

Respondents in interviews argued that AMISOM has continued to support dialogue and reconciliation efforts at local, regional and national levels. At local and national levels, in areas recovered from Al-shabaab, AMISOM has mobilized clan elders, religious and political leaders including members of parliament to resolve political and other differences. At the regional level, AMISOM has continued to provide protection to those involved in the peace process However, one respondent in an interview argued that AMISOM engages with the local leaders like clan elders and religious leaders at a minimal level through civil-military projects.

4.2.9 Providing Protection to key State Infrastructures and the Somali Authorities

In February 2007, the UN Security Council authorized AMISOM to take all necessary Measures to

.

According to respondents in interviews and focused group discussions, the military component of AMISOM provides protection to the country’s key institutions including the State House, Parliament. AMISOM troops also protects the VIPs from Federal Member States involved in the peace process, UN/AU staff and other humanitarian agencies as they operate in Somalia.

4.3 The achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019

This part discusses the achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019 with more emphasis on Halane area and how AMISOM evolved beyond Halane politically, militarily and geographically. The achievements are discussed according to each strategy used by AMISOM as already discussed above.

“Col Elwelu had spent a sweaty restless night with his troops at Afisiyooni. He woke up already unhappy with the poorly defended area that essentially exposed his troops to danger. The discovery of the mines was the final straw. The commander decided the force had to relocate to a new defence, a head of the hundreds of more troops arriving by the end of the day. He phoned the head of the TFG Intelligence Service, Colonel Mohamed Warsame Farah, nicknamed “Darawiish”, also acting as liaison personnel with the Ugandan contingent, and asked if there

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was another space to review for setting up base camp. Yes, the Colonel answered, there was Halane, near the airport, the former training ground for the Siyaad Bare military. Then he Colonel added in a worried voice, the area was practically abandoned y everyone including the insurgents because it was infested with venomous snakes and prickly thorn bushes. Unappealing as it sounded, Col. Elwelu, Major Ddamulira and a few officers piled into the Mamba and headed to the site. The new site was strewn with dilapidated long crumpled concrete structures, overrun by thick thorn bushes taller than a man’s head, and almost impenetrable even in broad daylight. From a strategic defensive consideration, it was plainly obvious why this was the most secure staging ground for AMISOM,……..Somalis say the Americans planted the thorn bushes by spraying seeds from aircrafts, but non really knew how they got there. More likely than not, sixteen years earlier, the Americans made the thorns their best allies when all around them were murderous militias eager to spoil American blood. The prospects of the thorn bushes often persuaded insurgents to resort to firing from great distance wildly inaccurate mortar rounds into the base, hoping to hit something. ‘This is where I am going to set up my base, if need be, where I will die.’” Col Elweru remarked to the officers (see Opiyo Oloya, 2016).

4.3.1 African Initiative

According to respondents in Interviews, initially AMISOM was comprised of just Ugandan soldiers who were deployed to Mogadishu City in March 2007. They were joined by Burundian troops a few months later. Paul D. Williams (2013) “Fighting for Peace in Somalia: AMISOM’s Seven Strategic Challenges”, after more than four years of bloody fighting in the streets of Mogadishu, AMISOM attracted additional contributing countries, reaching a strength of nearly 18,000 personnel by late-2012. Now in its 12th year according to respondents in interviews, AMISOM has over 22,000 troops drawn from 6 African Countries namely Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti and Ethiopia and Sierra Leone with Civilian, Police and Humanitarian components. These African peace enforcers have played the leading role in combating Alshabaab, one of the world’s deadliest insurgencies and AMISOM is remarkable in several respects. AMISOM is the African Union’s (AU) longest running and largest peace operation by a considerable margin. By mid-2017 it was the largest deployment of uniformed peacekeepers in the world with over 22,000 personnel. Unsurprisingly, therefore, AMISOM also became the

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AU’s most expensive operation; since 2014 it has cost approximately $1billion per year.11 Respondents also argued that AMISOM is hinged on the spirit of Pan-Africanism “African solutions for African Problems”. Even when Uganda was attacked by the Al-shabaab in July 2010 Kampala suicide bombings and Nairobi‘s Westgate Shopping Mall attack in September 2013, These countries did not withdrawal their forces. They instead doubled their troops due to the sense of ownership. Today, AMISOM has sustained and supported a functioning government in Somalia since 1991. Sadly, it has been the world’s deadliest peace operation, probably by a considerable margin, although the prices number of causalities has not been made public.11

4.3.2 Multiple Actors in the Somali Peace process

The study asked respondents why the African Union involved other actors to the Somali’s conflict resolution and the results are shown below;

Table 4.7. Showing why the African Union involved other actors to the Somali’s conflict resolution Respondents Frequency Percentage (%) Civil society pressurize the belligerent 17 7.1 Media mobilize public support 53 22.0 Broader society create opportunity for peace 60 25 Foreign military forces weakens 40 16.7 the belligerent

Financial support 70 29.2 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

Respondents in interviews argued that; Involving the civil society creates opportunity for peace and humanitarian assistance, pressurises the belligerents, mentoring of soldiers such as Bancroft Global Development that has been mentoring AMISOM troops in urban warfare tactics and it also offers health services including cleft lip surgeries and level 11 hospital in Halane area; Involving foreign Military forces weakens the belligerents;the combined efforts weakens both Al-shabaab

78 and their supporters get oppressed hence Al-shabaab fails to lobby for support; Actors like European Union (EU) and United States of America (USA) support the mission financially, provide military logistics, help in negotiations because AMISOM does not politic and pressurises the belligerents; The media are the eyes and ears of the Mission; mobilises public support, enhancement of public diplomacy by creating a favorable image for the Mission’s policies and actions. For example, according to the RUSI white hall report 2019, the majority of the 38 Serendi residents interviewed in November 2017 about how they disengaged from Alshabaab, they argued that their main information and communication channels while with Alshabaab were radio and mobile phones. It is through these channels that many were driven to exit the organization, for instance, having been encouraged by their families or having heard the amnesty proclamations. In an interview, one respondent argued that;

‘The host nation (Somalia) engages other players as a sovereign state and those other players are driven by their respective (bilateral) interests.”

However, according to this respondent, the challenge with having multiple players is that they do not always speak with one voice and others are conflict entrepreneurs benefiting from the conflict. Therefore getting the coherence among all the players towards one common purpose to ensure Somalia’s lasting peace is very difficult to achieve.

4.3.3 Multidimensional Mission Strategy.

As already discussed above, AMISOM has four Components; Military, Police, Humanitarian and Civilian Component and below this study discusses the achievements of each strategy in the according to respondents in this and secondary data.

4.3.3.1 Military Component

According to key informants in this study that were interviewed, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2372 (2017) authorized AMISOM to pursue the following strategic objectives: Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia; Reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; Assist the Somali

79 security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia. To achieve these objectives, AMISOM is authorized to assist, as appropriate, the Somali security forces to protect the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, their efforts towards reconciliation and peace building, and security for key infrastructure; to protect, as appropriate, its personnel, facilities, installations, equipment and mission, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, as well as of United Nations personnel carrying out functions mandated by the Security Council; to secure key supply routes including to areas recovered from Al Shabaab, in particular those essential to improving the humanitarian situation, and those critical for logistical support to AMISOM, underscoring that the delivery of logistics remains a joint responsibility between the United Nations and AU; to conduct targeted offensive operations against Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, including jointly with the Somali Security Forces.

4.3.3.1.1 The study asked respondents whether Al-shabab is no longer a threat to Somalia following the deployment of AMISOM and the results are shown below:

Table 4.8. Showing whether Al-shabab is no longer a threat to Somalia following the deployment of AMISOM Response Frequency Percentage Yes 160 66.7 No 80 33.3 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 66.7% of the respondents argued that al-shabaab is still a threat to Somalia while others (33.3%) of the respondents argued that Al-shabab is no longer a threat to Somalia because it has been weakened by AMISOM and FGS’ forces. In an interview, one respondent said that the threat of Al-shabab has been reduced since 2007.He argued that, when AMISOM had just been deployed in Somalia, AMISOM troops were received by hails of gunfire and bombs everywhere. Halane area was a deserted area covered with thorn bushes by the time AMISOM was deployed in Somalia and Mogadishu International Airport was under Al-shabaab among other areas in Somalia. “We were fighting day and night. Al-shabaab was like the sitting Government”. Another respondent argued that, the support of the Transitional Federal government (TFGS) of 80

Somalia was waning until AMISOM was deployed and sustained it in power until 2012, Today, the Al-shabaab has been somehow pushed out of the main cities and towns occupied by AMISOM. According to one key informant in an interview, AMISOM broke the back born of the Al-Shabaab in 2011 and pushed the Al-shabaab rebels out of Mogadishu city. Facilitated the selection of a new Federal Government led by President Hassan Sheik Mohamud in 2012 and continues to support the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS); AMISOM has helped expand humanitarian access and provided various forms of relief to significant numbers of Somalis in Halane area and outside Halane through Civil-Military activities such as offering health services at Level 11 hospital in Halane Area.

The respondents argued that, the mission also still provides protection to all other international actors to enable them operate in Somalia. Today, there are over 30 Foreign Missions and consulates in Somalia that re-opened their offices in Somalia after the deployment of AMSOM all of which had closed their offices since 1991.For example; Britain was the first European country to re-open its Mission in Somalia in 2013 after 22 years. Turkey resumed its formal bilateral diplomatic relation with Somalia in 2011; United States of America re-opened its permanent diplomatic presence in Somalia in Dec 2018 after 28 years of closure, In 2014, the new Chines Embassy officially opened in Mogadishu, Yemen, Qatar, among other Foreign Missions have all re-opened their diplomatic missions in Somalia since the deployment of AMISOM. Halane is now home to a good number of International Organizations Including but not limited to; AU, UN, EU, United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Food Program (WFP) and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) which mentors and trains AMISOM troops in Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat mitigation all operating under the protection of AMISOM. The Mission troops also provide protection to key State infrastructures for example, the State House, Mogadishu City, Sea Port, Parliament, Mogadishu International Airport that is adjacent to Halane area among others and all these areas were re-captured from the Al-shabaab.

According to one respondent in an interview, Mogadishu International airport currently receives over 90 flights a day. Airlines operating in Somalia include Turkish, Djibouti, Qatar, and Kenya Airways. Williams (2018), Militarily, AMISOM evolved from a small force comprised of two Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) operating in parallel with a larger Ethiopian force to protect

81 the TFG in Mogadishu into a considerably more multinational force with up to six TCCs. Uganda joined in 2007, Burundi in 2007, Djibouti in 2011, Kenya in 2012, Sierra Leone in 2013 and Ethiopia in 2014. One respondent argued that, with the arrival of more troops, more regions were recaptured from Al-shabaab which includes Banadir occupied by Ugandan troops, Baidoa occupied by the Ethiopian troops, Dobhey occupied by the Kenyan troops, Johar occupied by the Burundian troops, Beletweyne occupied by the Djiboutian troops and Kisimayo which is currently under Sierra Leone, Ethiopian, and Kenyan Police Units. Kisimayo was a stronghold of Al- shabaab after they had been expelled from Mogadishu. During the Battle of Mogadishu (2010-2011), Kisimayo fell under the control of Kenyan military together with Somali military in the Second battle of Kisimayo in 2012. AMISOM protects and transports officials associated with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS) and AMISOM troops continue to provide mentoring to Somali National Army (SNA) units. Another respondent in an interview also argued that for almost the last 4 years, AMISOM has not carried out major offensive operations but only consolidating the achievements already made moreover, AMISOM troops have now gained good skills in urban warfare, which may be used in other areas in Africa. However, in an interview, one respondent argued that, Al-shabab is still a threat to Somalia because you cannot tell who the al-shabab is; they do not have labels and they are all Somalis. One is an Al-shabaab at night and a business man, father or mother during the day. Another respondent argued that;

“The Al-shabab is still there in liberated areas but with no freedom of operation”. Another respondent argued that; “AMISOM has reduced the threat of Alshabab but not eradicated them completely from Somalia because the host nation’s institutions such as the army, police, judiciary and governance to compliment AMISOM effort remain extremely weak.”

Another key Challenge according to respondents in focused group discussions especially in regards to the Military component of AMISOM is the insufficient numbers of troops and critical multipliers and enablers such a guard force and air assets coupled with lack of counter Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDS) technologies. AMISOM is therefore constrained to expand its area of operations, to sustain the gains already achieved in areas liberated from alShabaab and to continue with

82 military offensive to root out all rebel armed groups in other areas of the country. AMISOM Troops’ strength does not match with its mandate and the size of Somalia.

4.3.3.2 Police Component

UNSCR 2372(2017) authorizes AMISOM to mentor and assist Somali security forces, both military and police, in close collaboration with UNSOM and in line with the National Security Architecture. Williams (2018) argues that it was not until 2010 that AMISOM’s first police officers arrived in Mogadishu (34 of the 270 authorized officers). They were tasked with providing training to the Somali Police Force (SPF) in a number of areas, including cordon and search, traffic policing, investigation and demining training. In October 2010, the AU PSC authorized the deployment of 1,680 police, comprising trainers, advisers and mentors as well as eight Formed Police Units (FPUs) comprising 140 personnel each. It was only in 2012, following the liberation of Mogadishu, that two FPUs were deployed by Uganda and Nigeria. They provided operational support to AMISOM and the SPF to consolidate security in Mogadishu through joint patrols, stop- and-search operations, public order management, VIP escorts, and providing protection to the individual police officers (IPOs) co-located with the SPF. In 2016, the FPUs were split into platoons and deployed in more locations, including Baidoa, Kismayo, Beletweyne and Jowhar. Following UN Security Council resolution 2372 (2017) authorization of an increase in the number of AMISOM police from 540 to 1,040, Sierra Leone deployed an additional FPU in April 2018. Today, AMISOM police comprise 233 IPOs (from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia), 480 officers in three FPUs, and five in senior leadership.

According to the 2018-2021 concept of operation (CONOPS), AMISOM police is mandated to support the capacity building of the Somali Police at Federal and State levels through mentoring, training, advising and provision of operational support in line with the National Security architecture (NSA) and the Somali Transitional Plan (STP). In the previous CONOPS, AMISOM police focused on supporting the establishment of the State police and building the capacity of both the Federal and State Police, which significantly improved their capacity to provide relative peace and security Mogadishu and in the State capitals.

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To this end, Williams (2018), AMISOM police provides support to both the Somali federal and state police structures. AMISOM has provided support for screening, vetting, recruiting, training and mentoring the police at both the federal and state levels. This includes specialized training for the SPF on investigations, anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency. For example, in collaboration with the UN and the two regional authorities of Puntland and Galmudug, AMISOM police trained 100 police officers for joint patrols for the implementation of the Galkayo Ceasefire Agreement. AMISOM has also trained 600 police officers for Jubaland and South West regional administrations. Support is being provided to Hirshabelle for the recruitment and training of an 800-strong force that will be deployed to Jowhar and Beletweyne. As part of their efforts at supporting sustainable governance in Somalia, AMISOM police provided training on close protection for police offices in Jubaland and Southwest State in 2017 to enable them to provide required training for elected officials of the region and their guests. In order to support institutional development, AMISOM police have helped to undertake a biometric registration of the SNP. This is to help identify the number of police personnel, their bio data, skill set, location, and areas of deployment. Training on the use of the biometric registration system has also been provided, and it has now been launched in the administrative capitals. To help with stabilization, AMISOM is supporting the reactivation of Somalia’s National Bureau of Interpol, which will assist in Somalia’s fight against organized crime.

Although Somalia has opted for a federal policing model, there is little clarity on the type of federal policing preferred. To assist Somalis in the decision-making process, AMISOM has planned a number of study visits abroad for the senior leadership. The first was a visit by nine senior police officers to Nigeria to obtain first-hand information on their policing model to help determine the type of federal policing model that Somalia should adopt. AMISOM police have co-located with the SPF in several areas, and IPOs are assigned to support the local police stations where they are able to mentor and monitor the Somali police. This collaboration has helped facilitate election security management for the Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2012 and 2016-17 and help their military colleagues provide security during the months of Ramadan in 2017 and 2018. AMISOM police provide the SPF with training on handling sexual and gender-based violence and helped to establish gender desks in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Beletweyne and Kismayo AMISOM police have promoted gender balance in the SPF, with gender representation being one of the

84 conditions for the training support provided to the various regional administrations. AMISOM police provide the SPF with training on handling sexual and gender-based violence and helped to establish gender desks in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Beletweyne and Kismayo (ibid). However, despite this progress, respondents in interviews argued that there is a shortage of manpower; AMISOM Police Officers are not enough, they are not well equipped and there is also a problem of language barrier.

4.3.3.3 Civilian Component

The UNSCR 2372(2017) mandated AMISOM to pursue the following strategic objective among others: to Assist the Somali security forces to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization, reconciliation and peace building in Somalia. Williams (2018), AMISOM also was authorized by UNSCR 2372(2017) to receive on a transitory basis, defectors, as appropriate, and in coordination with the United Nations and the Federal Government of Somalia as one of the priority tasks. AMISOM is authorized to have 70 international civilian personnel. As of September 2018, there were 72 international civilians (two seconded from the AU Commission), 14 consultants, and 58 national staff. Less than half of the international personnel are in substantive roles. The AU’s recruitment process for civilians has proven very slow. Almost all of AMISOM’s civilians have been based in Mogadishu. Of the substantive national staff, there were two Assistant Political Officers deployed in Galmudug and three in Mogadishu. Following the joint AU-UN review of AMISOM in May 2018, the Security Council decided not to authorize an increase in AMISOM’s civilian component in resolution 2431 (30 July 2018). AMISOM has adopted a cluster-based approach to its civilian component since 2014. The clusters are Political Processes, Stabilization and Early Recovery; Protection, Human Rights and Gender; Security Sector Reform; and Mission Support. The clusters comprise personnel from the civilian substantive, support, police and military components, and in some cases representatives from other partners. They are therefore both multidimensional and integrated

Williams (2018), the substantive civilian components of AMISOM are organized into six units: Political Affairs; Public Information; Humanitarian Liaison; Protection, Human Rights and Gender; Security Sector Reform; and Civil Affairs. There is also a Security and Safety unit and a

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Mission Support component consisting of several units. Political Affairs is responsible for operationalizing the AU PSC’s political decisions on Somalia. Its personnel monitor, analyze and report on political developments in Somalia, and provide advice to the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC). (They also assist the Somali government in building its capacity for public service, for instance, by organizing training courses for managers in the Somalia civil service.) Protection, Human Rights and Gender is mandated to implement the AU’s commitments and policies on human rights and protection as well as gender equality and other related issues. The unit mainstreams human rights, protection and good gender practices in AMISOM and supports the FGS. It has been involved in the pre-deployment training of troops, especially in the domain of adherence to international humanitarian law and human rights law. Civil Affairs works at local political levels to facilitate the implementation of AMISOM’s mandate and to support efforts at ensuring sustainable peace in Somalia. The unit conducts activities aimed at confidence-building, effective governance management, and support to reconciliation. It also assists the state in restoring and extending its authority. Security Sector Reform is the focal point of AMISOM on all security sector matters. It coordinates support in this area from AMISOM and other partners with the host state authorities. The unit’s responsibilities include the exchange of information, provision of technical assistance, and negotiating contribution agreements with donors related to the security sector.

Public Information is responsible for disseminating information on AMISOM’s activities through regular interaction with local Somali and international journalists. Safety and Security is charged with undertaking relevant programmes and activities in AMISOM to protect civilian staff and property. The unit comprises three subunits: Security Information and Operation Unit (SIOU), Personal Protection Unit (PPU) and Investigation Unit (IU). It is tasked with the management of mission security and also manages the security for high-level events, conferences and meetings in which the mission is involved. Mission Support encompasses the logistics, transport, supply, engineering, information and communications, technology, finance, personnel, procurement, general services, medical, travel and protocol, asset management and verification, and contingent- owned equipment functions of the mission, among others. Other elements of the civilian component include legal affairs, conduct and discipline, a civilian casualty tracking analysis and response cell (CCTARC), and a mission analysis cell. The civilian component also advises 86

AMISOM’s leadership and mission planning processes, and provides analysis, internal training and guidance. The SRCC, deputy SRCC, mission chief of staff, and their support personnel are also civilians (non-uniformed), but they are not part of the Civilian Component of the mission. Through these civilian components, AMISOM supports the efforts of the Federal Government to strengthen its capacity to provide public services and to extend state authority, especially in newly recovered cities and territories, and with a special focus on the security and judicial sector (ibid). Respondents in Interviews argued that, AMISOM organized democratic elections in 2012 since 1969, The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) which was itself operating from Nairobi came after capturing Parliament and Statehouse from the Al-shabaab; the Civilian Component continues to support the Somali Political process and is currently organizing 2020 general multiparty elections. However, respondents argued that the Civilian component continues to be understaffed compared to its mandate. According to Williams (2018), the security situation in Somalia requires that all staff who leave the protected airport area or other AMISOM bases have an armed escort. There is limited escort capacity, and escort needs are thus prioritized. Routine liaison with civilian counterparts is a low priority, which has made coordination more difficult. Visiting civilian counterparts, other than those in the Federal Government’s Villa Somalia compounds, with an armed escort in tow can have negative consequences, including putting those counterparts at risk. AMISOM’s civilian component thus operates in a highly constrained environment which negatively affects its impact, despite the strategic importance of its contribution towards achieving sustainable peace and stability in Somalia.

4.3.3.3.1 The study asked respondents whether AMISOM provides incentives and meaningful pathways for communication for all the warring parties to make their intentions credible and the results are shown below.

Table 4.9. Showing whether AMISOM provides incentives and meaningful pathways for communication for all the warring parties to make their intentions credible. Response Frequency Percentage Yes 92 38.3 No 148 61.7 Total 240 100

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Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 61.7% of the respondents argued that AMISOM does not provide incentives and meaningful pathways for communication for all the warring parties to make their intentions credible while 38.3% of the respondents argued that AMISOM provides incentives and meaningful pathways for communication for all the warring parties to make their intentions credible. In an interview, one respondent argued that, AMISOM does not politic or involve in negotiations. Negotiations are done by the political wing of AMISOM which is UNSOM and other actors such as EU, UN, and IGAD. AMISOM is mandated to undertake operations. When asked about incentives given to Al-shabaab to make peace more desirable and war costly, one respondent argued that AMISOM receives defectors on a transitional basis meaning it does not keep them but rather hands them over to the government’s institution responsible for defectors.

He added;

“AMISOM is not here to order them and call them to order because Somalia is a sovereign state so there is a limit to what AMISOM can do.”

Another respondent argued that “AMISOM’s role is to create space in which political process can take place by annihilating or helping to reduce on the lethality or problems created by the Alshabaab, so the Somalis themselves can prop or develop governance that is formidable and acceptable.” Another respondent argued that AMISOM does not negotiate with the Al-shabab because AMISOM is at war with people who are totally opposed to AMISOM’S ideology which means that AMISOM is either with them or against them. He argued that, Al-shabaab can never agree and accept the western notion of governance. He added that, there are people who join the Al-shabab because they have been hurt economically or suspects or fugitives of the law, or disillusioned by the government, such people who have different reasons can be talked to and they can come and these defectors are always received on transitional basis. When this respondent was asked how AMISOM helps such a fragmented society to come together, he argued that, at a micro level, AMISOM engages Somali clan leaders; carries out conflict resolution and reintegration programs; coordinates national partners to support the government to come up with programs and actives and policies that can engender the unity and stabilization of the country. He argued that;

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“AMISOM can only empower and support them but Somalis have to take the destiny of their country in their hands.”

Dialogue meeting between the warring parties in Marka organized by AMISOM. Source: AMISOM Sector 1 archives, 2019

According to this respondent, AMISOM facilitates clan based dialogue meetings between the warring clans to end clan based conflicts but this is at a minimal level only with those clans that show interest to cooperate with AMISOM. . This respondent added that, the mandate of AMISOM to enable Dialogue and Reconciliation is also limited by the fact that AMISOM cannot order the FGS on what to do or not especially when it comes to how ex-combatants or Alshabaab defectors are handled. AMISOM receives defectors on transitional basis and hands them over to FGS. What happens to them after that, AMISOM does not know or cannot do much for them. For example; the former Al-shabaab leader Mukhtar Robow who quit the Jihadist group in 2013 and surrendered to authorities five years later in what was widely held as a major step for peace and reconciliation in the war-torn country. Mukhtar Robow decided to contest in Southern Somali city of Baidoa regional elections. He was however arrested by the SNF with the support of the Ethiopian forces and put in prison sparking wide spread protests and AMISOM could not do anything to stop his

89 arrest. His arrest was a discouragement for other members of Al-shabaab to put down their tools and join the government.

4.3.3.4 Humanitarian Component

According to respondents in interviews; the humanitarian component works closely with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), the UN Children’s Fund, United Nations High commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP), and other UN agencies and other International NGOs to establish coordination mechanisms and the sharing of information. It also collaborates closely with the relevant Somali Government agencies and ministries.

4.3.3.4.1 The study asked respondents whether they think bomb blasts in Somalia lead to displacement of ordinary citizens to seek refuge in new areas and the results are shown below.

Table 4.10. Showing whether Bombers blast in Somalia lead to displacement of ordinary citizens to seek refuge in the new areas Response Frequency Percentage

Yes 220 91.7

No 20 8.3

Total 240 100

Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above, Majority of the respondents (91.7%) argued that argued that bomb blasts in Somalia lead to displacement of ordinary citizens to seek refuge in new areas. All respondents generally argued that bomb blasts in Somalia lead to displacement of ordinary citizens to seek refuge in new areas though the respondents could not tell the exact numbers of people who have been displaced by bomb blasts because the internally displaced people are many and others left the country.

4.3.3.4.2 The study asked respondents whether displacement of Somali citizen has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM in this region by:

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Table 4.11. Showing whether displacement of Somali citizen has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM in this region Response Frequency Percent

5% 52 21.7 10% 49 20.4 20% 59 24.6 50% 20 8.3 Uncertain 60 25 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 21.7% of the respondents argued that the displacement of Somalis in this area has reduced by 5%; 20.4% of the respondents argued that the displacement of Somalis in this area has reduced by 10%; 24.6 of the respondents argued that the displacement of Somalis in this area has reduced by 20%; 8.3% of the respondents argued that the displacement of Somalis in this area has reduced by 50% while 25% of the respondents were uncertain. Respondents in interviews generally argued that displacement of Somali citizens has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM by at least 50%. Majority of respondents in focused group discussion argued that, when AMISOM was first deployed in Somalia, Bombs and explosives were everywhere in the country. “You could not take an hour without hearing a bomb exploding. But now we take weeks and even months without hearing any bomb going off”. In an interview, one respondent working with a humanitarian organization argued that, the displacement of Somalis is no longer due to bomb blasts especially in liberated areas but due to other reasons such as food, water, health services. He also argued that currently, there are many Somalis who are voluntarily returning into the country.

4.3.3.4.3 The study asked respondents whether the Somali conflict has increased sexual violence against women in this region and the results are shown below

Table 4.12. Showing whether the Somali conflict has increased sexual violence against women in this region Response Frequency Percentage Yes 160 66.7

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No 80 33.3 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above, 66.7% of the respondents generally argued that Somali conflict increased sexual violence against women in Somalia and 33.3% of the respondents generally argued that Somali conflict increased sexual violence against women in Somalia. Reports from AMISOM grade 11 hospital indicate that most reported disease cases include; Urinary Tract Infection (UTIs), Pelvic Inflammatory Disorder (PID), which are especially sexually transmitted diseases. In an interview, two respondents argued that, there are still many cases of sexual exploitation especially against girls and women such as rape, early marriages and forced marriages; because of hunger and poverty where by parents force their daughters into marriage for money and for survival.

4.3.3.4.4 The study asked respondents whether sexual violence against women in this region has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM Table 4.13. Showing whether the Somali conflict has increased sexual violence against women in this region

Response Frequency Percent

5% 62 25.8 10% 53 22.1 20% 45 18.8 50% 31 12.9 Uncertain 50 20.8 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above, 25.8% of the respondents argued that sexual violence has reduced in Somalia since the deployment of AMISOM by 5%; 22.1% of the respondents argued that sexual violence has reduced in Somalia since the deployment of AMISOM 10%; 18.8% of the respondents argued that sexual violence has reduced in Somalia since the deployment of AMISOM 20%; 12.9% of the respondents argued that sexual violence has reduced in Somalia since the deployment of AMISOM

92 by 50% while 20.8% of the respondents were Uncertain whether sexual violence has reduced in Somalia since the deployment of AMISOM or not. However, majority of the respondents in focused group discussions argued that sexual violence against women has reduced by 20% in Halane area and other liberated areas. According to the AU Gender Policy of 2009, AMISOM Gender unit has the mandate to reflect AU strong commitment on advancement of gender equality and gender equity at the contingent and also address gender related issues regarding the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, security and peace specifically fighting against sexual exploitation and abuse. One respondent in an interview argued that, AMISOM carries out Gender sensitization activities to help reduce gender related exploitations and abuses. For example, according to AMISOM CIMIC reports, in March 2019, gender officer of AMISOM sector 1, intelligence officers, CIMIC and Public Information officers held a meeting with civilians in marine market. This is located near the airport with in the basecamp. It is estimated to be 3km from sector 1 head offices and the population is approximately over 200(women majority) shops is the main source of income engaged in general merchandise especially electronics. The aim was to acquaint with the challenges faced by civilians at marine and how to improve on Gender issues, sensitization on gender awareness to enlighten them on their rights, roles and responsibilities as mothers and fathers, also enlightened ways through which women should be part of peace building and say no to all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), Channels of reporting gender issues were established between gender office and leaders of marine market.

4.3.3.4.5 The Study asked respondents whether the Somali conflict has increased child abuse in this region and the results are shown below.

Table 4.14. Showing whether the Somali conflict increased child abuse in Somalia Respondents Frequency Percentage (%) Child labor 70 29.2 Trafficking 20 8.3 Sexual abuse 60 25 Radicalization 50 20.8 School dropouts 40 16.6 Total 240 100

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Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 70(29.2%) respondents argued Child labor; 20(8.3) respondents argued trafficking; 60(25%) respondents argued Sexual abuse; 50(20.8) respondents argued radicalization; 40(16.6) respondents argued School dropouts. One respondent in an interview argued that the Somali conflict has also led to increased rate of child soldiering and child sacrifice as suicide bombers by the al-shabab. According to UNICEF annual report 2018, the challenges facing children in Somalia remain formidable. UNICEF Somalia Annual Report 2018; the health situation,1 in 12 women die due to pregnancy related cases, 1 in 42 children die between the ages of 5 and 14, 6,700 cases of cholera; 9000 cases of measles recorded in 2018.

“Each of these millions has their own story. On the outskirts of Baidoa, eight-months-old Zakaria and his mother Hamida, his parents and five siblings had been living in the camp for the displaced for the past 9 months. “We left our home because of hunger and conflict. All of our crops failed and or animals died,” said Hamida. “From time to time, we got some help from kind neighbors.” UNICEF annual report 2018

UNICEF Somalia Annual Report 2018, Nutrition Situation: 1.2 million children malnourished in 2018, 232,000 of them suffering from severe acute malnutrition. In education: 3 million children out of 4.9 million are out of school, only 44% of the children enrolled in schools are girls, less than 1 in 5 children in rural households are in school, 64 schools were attacked and 21 forced to close in 2018. In child protection: 98% of Somali women aged 15 and 49 have undergone FGM, 2,300 children (2,228 boys, and 72 girls were recruited by armed groups and forces in 2018, 4,880 children(4,100 boys and 780 girls) were affected by grave violations as reported in the draft SG annual report.

4.3.3.4.6 The study asked whether Child abuse in this region has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM and the results are shown below:

Table 4.15. Showing whether Child abuse in this region has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM

Response Frequency Percent

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5% 40 16.7 10% 50 20.8 20% 66 27.5 50% 45 18.8 Uncertain 39 16.3 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 16.7% of the respondents argued that Child abuse in this region has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM by 5%; 20.8 of the respondents argued that Child abuse in this region has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM by 10%; 27.5% of the respondents argued that Child abuse in this region has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM by 20%; 18.8% of the respondents argued that Child abuse in this region has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM by 50% while 16.3% of the respondents were uncertain whether child abuse in this region has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM or not. However, in interviews the respondents generally argued that Child abuse has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM by 20% in Halane area and other liberated areas. According to UNICEF annual report 2018, In health situation: more than 1million people, including more than 320,000 children under 5,receved health facilities; more than 4.4 million children vaccinated against measles; more than 535,000 women received at least one antenatal visit; almost a quarter of a million (234,742) patients screened for malaria. In Nutrition: 1.2 million children received one dose of Vitamin A; 200,000 children received lifesaving treatment for sever cute malnutrition. One such boy is two-year old Zakariya Abdullahi who was among the 200,000 children who received treatment for severe acute malnutrition from UNICEF and partners in 2018. “For days, baby Zakariya had high fever and had been losing weight rapidly. His family, living in a camp for displaced persons (IDPs) on the outskirts of Mogadishu, struggled to make ends meet. The only thing they had to eat was a bit of milk and porridge every day. In short, all the signs of a pointless, avoidable death. “I lost hope when I saw his condition deteriorating”, recalled the mother, Fatuma. “I thought he would never make it”. After spending two months in the treatment programme, which included feeding with high-energy ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF) and nutrition

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education for mothers, Zakariya recovered. 95.7% recovery rate; more than 385,000 pregnant women received iron folate for anaemia prevention.” UNICEF annual report 2018

In education: according to UNICEF annual report 2018, more than 10,000 children, 45% of whom are girls, were reached with education in emergencies interventions. Nearly 200,000 children had access to formal or non-formal early learning; 19,615 out-of-school pastoralist children were enroll in alternative basic education centers; 239 classrooms constructed. In child protection: Almost 50,000 children accessed protection services; more than 9,100 survivors of GBV had access to legal, medical, psychosocial support, 1,446 children affected by armed conflict received reintegration support.

“Amina, a child, was raped by two men. She became pregnant. The “shame” (Amina’s words) was too great. She fled to Mogadishu. As she carried a new life, she felt her life was just beginning. She thought about finding a place to give birth and then abandoning the baby. But in an IDP camp in Mogadishu she met girls who were going to a center in town where they were taught vocational skills. “I told them my story and they suggested that I should go with them, so I did”. The center Amina visited was supported by UNICEF and implemented by a local NGO partner. It offers a range of services for children and women affected by the violence, including gander-based violence. When Amina told the staff her story, she and her baby were brought to a safe house to stay. “They took me in, they counseled me, helped me start a new life. I began to feel hopeful and decided to keep the baby.” Her baby now has become the source of hope for Amina. She took vocational training courses at the center, hoping that the skills she is learning will lead to a better life for her and her baby. “I am learning a lot.I want to open a beauty salon one day. I will use that money to raise my daughter,” Says Amina with a smile.” UNICEF annual report 2018

One respondent in an interview argued that before AMISOM, there were no humanitarian agencies in Somalia to extend such services to the citizens. A case in point is UNICEF which reopened its country office in Mogadishu after more than 25 years of operating remotely from Kenya, Nairobi. UNSCR 2472 (2019) mandates AMISOM to secure key supply routes including to areas recovered

96 from Al Shabaab, in coordination with stabilization and reconciliation actors, in particular supply routes essential to improving the humanitarian situation, which may include commercial goods essential to meeting the basic needs of civilians. In an interview, one respondent argued that;

“The more stability Somalia obtains the more number of children that are saved and protected under the family care.”

4.3.3.4.7 The study asked respondents if Many Somalis still lack food, shelter, water and proper sanitation because of the conflict and the results are shown below.

Table 4.16. Showing whether Somalis still lack food shelter water and proper sanitation because of conflict Response Frequency Percentage Yes 160 66.7 No 80 33.3 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above 66.7% of the respondents argued that Many Somalis still lack food, shelter, water and proper sanitation because of the conflict while 33.3% of the respondents argued that Many Somalis still lack food, shelter, water and proper sanitation because of the conflict. Though most of the respondents were not sure of the exact figure of the Somalis who are still in need of food, shelter and proper sanitation but they all argued that a big number of Somalis was still in need of basic needs such as food, shelter, water and proper sanitation. According to the Report from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Published on 29 Nov 2017; the humanitarian crisis in Somalia is among the most complex and longstanding emergencies. While large-scale famine has been averted in 2017, the humanitarian impact of the drought has been devastating. More than 6.2 million people, half of the population, are in need of humanitarian

97 assistance and protection. The ongoing conflict continues to reduce the resilience of communities, trigger displacement and impede civilians’ access to basic services and humanitarians’ access to those in need. Exclusion and discrimination of socially marginalized groups are contributing to high levels of acute humanitarian need and lack of protection among some of the most vulnerable. Disease outbreaks such as acute watery diarrhea (AWD)/cholera and measles continue to lead to preventable deaths across the country. More than 3.1 million Somalis are in acute need of humanitarian assistance for survival.

This includes 87,250 children (point prevalence) suffering from severe acute malnutrition who are far more vulnerable than any other group. Overall about 1.2 million children are expected to be suffering from acute malnutrition. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), both protracted and newly displaced, and civilians in conflict-affected areas, are among the most vulnerable, with many lacking access to essential basic services including health, education and Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) services (OCHA).

4.3.3.4.8 The study asked respondents whether the number of Somalis who still lack still lack food, shelter, water and proper sanitation in this area because of the conflict has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM and the results are shown below.

Table 4.17. Showing that the number of Somalis who still lack food, shelter, water and proper sanitation has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM

Response Frequency Percent

5% 62 25.8 10% 53 22.1 20% 45 18.8 50% 31 12.9 Uncertain 50 20.8 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 25.8% of the respondents argued that people who still lack food, shelter and proper sanitation has reduced by 5%; 22.1% of the respondents argued that people who still lack

98 food, shelter and proper sanitation has reduced by 10%; 18.8% of the respondents argued that people who still lack food, shelter and proper sanitation has reduced by 20%; 12.9% of the respondents argued that people who still lack food, shelter and proper sanitation has reduced by 50% while 20.8% were uncertain. In interviews, most respondents argued that lack of food shelter, proper sanitation has only reduced by 5% in liberated areas. In an interview at Level 11 hospital in sector 1, one respondent argued that most times, one patient comes with 8 attendants simply to get food that the hospital provides and that shows you how hungry Somalis are. One Somali national who had come for treatment at Level 11 hospital argued that, “AMISOM is not an NGO and therefore it cannot do much for us. We come here and eat the food meant for soldiers, and sometimes the food is not enough but they share with us what they have”. AMISOM quick impact (quips) projects or what one respondent who is a military officer called “Military Diplomacy” were a turning point in the history and future of AMISOM as explained by Opiyo Oloya in his book “Black Hawks Rising”.

“In the midst of the cholera crisis at Halane base, an event occurred involving, the cure of a young Somalia boy that some AMISOM commanders would later describe as a ‘game – changer’ for the direction and future of the mission. Overtime, it gained a mythical status. The troops had not yet put fences around the base, and Somali civilians freely walked through, some on their way to the ocean to fish, a few to spy on the new arrivals. On Saturday afternoon, March 10, 2007, a Somali man named Omar and his wife walked into Halane Base, desperately seeking medical help for their sick 11-year old son, Hassan. The bedraggled couple half-dragged and half carried Hassan. The boy was suffering from terrible diarrhea similar to what the troops were experiencing. Skeletal, Hassan was brought by his loving parents to AMISOM doctors as a last resort, the alternative being death and burial. There was a serious debate among the commanders whether to treat the boy or acquiesced to AU/UN army regulations that forbade the use of medicine meant for troops to treat civilians. When the issue reached then Col. Elwelu, he turned to one thing he knew very well-the UPDF doctrine drilled into soldiers during training and in the field by UPDF CIMIC officers who sung the same song everyday: A jerry can of clean water, tablets of good medicine and a mug of rice are more powerful than machinegun bullets in winning the hearts and minds of the thirsty, the sick and hungry…….Hassan’s parents left with a living son and, that very evening, spread the word of the miraculous cure by the AMISOM

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doctors. The following morning, Halane camp was a ’sea of people’. The old, sick, dying and everyone else in between came from all of Mogadishu neighborhoods including medina, which had the only functioning hospital in the city. Overwhelmed by the humanity, a call was made to General Katumba Wamala, asking for direction on what to do with the multitude of sick Somali looking for medical care. At first, unhappy with the development, Gen Wamala revisited the UPDF doctrine that said, “Reach for the hearts and minds of the people, be a human first before you are a soldier.” He knew then what to do to counsel the commanders in Mogadishu. If the Somali people needed medical treatment, it was a duty of the UPDF to provide it. With that, the AMISOM Outpatient Department (OPD) was born and in years to come, turned into a cardinal feature of the peace mission in every town reclaimed by AMISOM troops. The public service was expanded to include provision of clean water and, later, food given to some women in return for cleaning Mogadishu streets with brooms. Meanwhile, assisting the army doctors as the language interpreter at that initial OPD that later became known as Gate f Hope was none other than Hassan’s father, Omar. (Oloya, 2016)

4.3.3.4.9 The study asked respondents whether Somalis are able to move freely and peacefully in this area and the results are shown below.

Table 4.18. Showing whether Somalia are able to move freely in Somali region peacefully Response Frequency Percentage Yes 140 58.3 No 100 41.7 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; majority of the respondents (58.3%) strongly argued that Somalis cannot move and trade freely in all Somali regions peacefully while some (41.7%) argued that Somalis can move and trade freely in all Somali regions peacefully. In an interview, one respondent said that, some territories are still under the command of Al-shabaab who still put road blocks and checkpoints to collect revenue and extort civilians. Another respondent argued that a number of supply routes have been opened but you cannot 100% say that they are safe but they are generally

100 usable especially in the liberated areas. Another respondent argued that there is also a problem of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), “if you are not killed by the Al-shabaab, you will be amputated by the Improvised explosive devises” along the road. However, the researcher was never allowed to step out of the Mogadishu Base Camp of sector 1 due to security reasons. When the researcher asked why she could not step out of the base camp, one respondent argued that;

“The presence of various armed groups which are not under a single command make it difficult to predict what one is to anticipate enroute to the country side.”

4.3.3.4.10 The study asked respondents whether Family life, Trade and Business in Somalia have improved in Somalia since the deployment of AMISOM and the results are shown below.

Table 4.19. Showing the Trade business family and social life have improved in Somalia since deployment of AMISOM

Response Frequency Percent

5% 40 16.7 10% 50 20.8 20% 66 27.5 50% 45 18.8 Uncertain 39 16.3 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 16.7% of the respondents argued that trade business family and social life have improved in Somalia since deployment of AMISOM by 5%; 20.8% of the respondents argued that trade business family and social life have improved in Somalia since deployment of AMISOM by 10%; 27.5% of the respondents argued that trade business family and social life have improved in Somalia since deployment of AMISOM by 20%; 18.8% of the respondents argued that trade business family and social life have improved in Somalia since deployment of AMISOM by 50% while 16.3% were uncertain. In interviews; respondents argued that Trade, business, family and social life have improved in Somalia since the deployment of AMISOM by at least 50% especially in Halane area and other liberated areas. Halane area which was once a bushy area in 2007 is not

101 only liberated but also developing slowly. In an interview, one respondent argued that, the Somali International Airport that is adjacent to Halane area was recaptured from the Al-shabaab and business at this airport is now steadily growing. Other areas liberated include Barawe port, Mogadishu town, Mogadishu international airport, Sea port, Kisimayo airport, various transit routes and other places occupied by AMISOM Forces. Also, according to another respondent in an interview, AMISOM provides security to two local markets in Sector 1 called OPD and Marine markets where the Somali locals especially women are trading in general merchandise. In focused group discussions with the Somali locals, respondents argued that;

“Before AMISOM, there was no life at all; our farms, homes and businesses had been destroyed by the al-shabab but now that the Al-shabaab group has been weakened, we have started rebuilding our homes and businesses again.”

However, in another interview, one respondent argued that Al-shabaab still taxes farmers, in form of cash, goats, and camels or even take their children if a family does not have what to give them. This mainly happens in areas that are not yet liberated. Another respondent argued that the al- shabaab collects taxes more than the government and for you to trade in some areas; you must pay tax both to the government and to the Al-shabaab. In another interview; one respondent said that, a conflicting community has a lot of needs in that services have been affected by the conflict and it depends on the capacity that AMISOM has to be able to provide for the population. AMISOM’s Quick Impact Projects (QUIPs) are aimed at alleviating the immediate needs of the community. For example if its water, AMISOM provides a well or a bore hall, roads, bridges, and health services. According to AMISOM’s grade 11 hospital monthly patient attendance report located in sector 1, a total of 840 of patients came for treatment; 326 (Men), 391(women), 123(children) in May 2019 and a total of 5941 patients; 2054 (Men), 2862(women), 1025(children) in April 2019.Diseases treated UTIs, RTIs, PUD and operation conducted include; Cleft lip, palate and fracture humerous. However, these are not major projects but aimed at alleviating the suffering of the people. All AMISOM sectors carry out these projects. AMISOM is not a humanitarian agency but it creates conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance as mandated by the UNSCR 2472 (2019); “Expressing grave concern at the humanitarian situation in Somalia, and commending AMISOM’s efforts to create conditions conducive to the delivery of humanitarian assistance”.

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AMISOM CIMIC ACTIVITIES (QUIPs)

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Operations on patients with fracture humerous at AMISOM Level 11 hospital. Source: AMISOM Sector 1 archives, 2019

AMISOM’s Level 11 hospital located in the base camp of AMISOM sector 1 serves both AU security forces and the local population. It has both outpatient and in-patient services as well as x- ray, theater, dental and laboratory facilities. At AMISOM’s Level 11 hospital, there is always a daily steady stream of local Somalis, among them, mothers seeking urgent medical care for their children, and others seeking surgical procedures according to one AMISOM medical officer.

Source: AMISOM Sector 1 archives, 2019

AMISOM has been helpful to the Somali nationals with a number of projects they offer such as free treatment through their periodic outpatient departments or outreaches. Such medical outreaches are conducted in all AMISOM sectors.

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Source: AMISOM Sector 1 archives, 2019

AMISOM has been helpful to the Somali nationals with a number of projects they offer such as free treatment through their periodic outpatient departments or outreaches. Such medical outreaches are conducted in all AMISOM sectors.

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Source: AMISOM Sector 1 archives, 2019

AMISOM has been helpful to the Somali nationals with a number of projects they offer such as free treatment through their periodic outpatient departments or outreaches. Such medical outreaches are conducted in all AMISOM sectors. According to one respondent who is a medical officer with AMISOM, “Approximately 700-800 Somali patients receive free medical care across our field aid outlets per month”.

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Construction of a bridge at Ceeljaley that was formally destroyed by Al-shabaab. Source: AMISOM Sector 1 archives, 2019

According to one respondent, AMISOM embarked on the improvement of key access road networks in an effort to enhance peace and security towards the development of the Horn of Africa Nation. Through such road clearance initiatives, Somalis can hope for access to basic social service and delivery of humanitarian aid can be improved. It as well eases transit along the main supply routes.

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AMISOM Holds Blood Donation Drive on 14th June 2019 to Mark World Blood Donor Day

Source: AMISOM Sector 1 archives, 2019

To help improve access to safe blood in Somalia, AMISOM troops, civilian staff and international partners gathered in Mogadishu to donate blood for use at the AU mission’s level 11 Hospital, the mission’s largest medical facility in Somalia. The blood donation drive was part of a series of activities to mark the World Blood Donor Day, which is celebrated on14th June. The blood bank at AMISOM Level 11 hospital serves both AU Mission personnel and residents of Somalia according to the medical officer at AMISOM level 11 Hospital. AMISOM’s Deputy Force Commander Maj.Gen Nakibus Lakara said, AMISOM activities was not only restricted to military operations but also humanitarian activities such as voluntary blood donation. “Today’s exercise is not about war or fighting. It’s about supporting and saving lives by donating blood.”

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Happy women of Quoryole receiving food stuffs from AMISOM, Source: AMISOM Sector 1 archives, 2019

AMISOM troops have in the recent past, intensified humanitarian activities aimed at improving the lives of the residents in the broader towns and neighboring areas. The donations comprising a variety of food and medicine services are aimed at alleviating the suffering of the less fortunate but these are only quick projects and they can never be enough according to one respondent.

According to UNICEF annual report 2018, In water, sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) situation; more than 1million people affected by emergencies had access to safe water, More than 800,000 people acquired permanent access to safe water, about 150,000 people reached with access to emergency sanitation facilities, more than 92,000 people obtained access to improved sanitation through community lead sanitation programs, 800,000 people were reached with WASH message. In an interview, one respondent said that;

“The presence of AMISOM’S success story has attracted many humanitarian organizations which to a greater extent have extended some relief aid to the needy communities.”

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In sum, According to OCHA 2017 report, abuses against civilians, including widespread sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), child recruitment, limitations on the freedom of movement, forced evictions and displacement remain a pervasive feature of the conflict in Somalia. An estimated 3.6 million people are in need of protection services. The drought has triggered huge displacement in 2017, with negative coping strategies leading to violations of rights. IDPs face insecurity and violence in their displacement settings, especially women and children. The majority, 76 per cent, of reported GBV incidents were reported by IDPs. Vulnerable groups such as women-headed households, unaccompanied children, socially marginalized and discriminated communities are at particular risk and face specific protection concerns. More than three million Somalis are in need of livelihood support, to avoid sliding into Crisis or Emergency. What is left of livelihood assets of 3.1 million people also need to be protected in order to prevent more people from slipping into emergency. Pastoral and agro-pastoral communities in rural areas are experiencing significant water shortages, livestock losses and poor crop harvest due to drought require livelihood support, as do IDPs and socially marginalized groups in urban and periurban areas. Nearly two million people are estimated to be living in hard to-reach, conflict-affected, rural areas in southern and central Somalia, and in the contested Sool and Sanaag regions in the north. The presence of non-state armed actors or active fighting severely constrains safe humanitarian access in these areas. With limited access to life-saving assistance, crisis affected communities in these areas are disproportionally affected by food insecurity, malnutrition, disease outbreaks and inadequate WASH services. While the needs are similar to those listed above, they are often more acute and people in hard-to-reach areas face additional and very specific protection concerns.

4.3.4 Sectorisation: UNSCR 2372 (2017) authorizes AMISOM to maintain a presence in the sectors set out in the AMISOM Concept of Operations, prioritizing the main population centers. In an interviews with key informants , they argued that, AMISOM today maintains presence in all 6 sectors which include; sector 1 head quartered in Mogadishu with 34 forward operating bases (FOBS) covering the regions of Banadir, and Lower Shabelle and predominantly the responsibility of Ugandan contingent. Halane area is in this region; Sector 2(Dobhey: Lower and middle Juba regions) which is a port city in the southern lower Juba province of Somalia and is predominantly the responsibility of the Kenyan contingent operating 7 FOBS; Sector 3 headquartered in Baidoa covering Bay, Bakooland Gedo regions which is the capital of the southwestern Bay region of

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Somalia and is predominantly the responsibility of the Ethiopian Contingent operating 8 FOBS. Kenya and Ethiopia also occupy sector 6 in Kisimayo with police units. Sector 4(Beledweyne: Hiiraan region), which is a city in Central Somalia located in Beledweyne District and it’s the capital of Hiiraan province. The town is situated in the Shebelle valley near the Ethiopia border north of Mogadishu and predominantly the responsibility of the Djiboutian contingent; Sector 5 (Jowhar: Middle Shabelle region)Jowhar is the capital city of Hirshabelle state of Somalia and the administrative capital of Middle Shabelle region of Somalia. Hirshabelle consists of Hiran and Middle Shebelle regions of Somalia and is located in South Central Somalia and it is predominantly the responsibility of the Burundian Contingent operating 18 FOBS. All these area were formally under the control of al-Shabaab and in these areas where AMISOM is established, there is a resemblance of governance. One military officer in an interview argued that, Sectorisation has helped recover considerable territory from Al-shabaab, however, the challenge with Sectorisation is that, if the military unit in a certain sector is weak or under equipped, it means that the objectives of the mission in that sector will not be fully realized. For example, several respondents argued that Baidoa( Bay, Bakool and Gedo) regions which is predominantly a responsibility of Sector 3, is not yet that much safe compared to other sectors and this because, the Ethiopian forces occupying these regions are very few operating only 8 FOBS covering very big regions.

4.3.4.1 The study asked respondents whether the Federal Government of Somali and the government Forces are ready for the transition and are able to take over from AMISOM the responsibility of defending and protecting their country and the results are shown below:

Table 4.20. Showing whether the Somali government and the forces are ready for the transition and are able to take over from AMISOM the responsibility of defending and protecting their country. Response Frequency Percentage Yes 165 68.7 No 75 31.3 Total 240 100

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Source: Primary data 2019

UNSCR 2472(2017) mandated AMISOM to pursue the following strategic objective among others; to Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces contingent on abilities of the Somali security forces and political and security progress in Somalia. To achieve this objective, AMISOM was authorized to carry out the following tasks among others: to assist, as appropriate, the Somali security forces to protect the Somali authorities to help them carry out their functions of government, their efforts towards reconciliation and peace building, and security for key infrastructure; to mentor and assist Somali security forces, both military and police, in close collaboration with UNSOM and in line with the National Security Architecture. From the table above; 68.7% of the respondents argued that FGS and the SNSF are not yet ready to take over from AMISOM while 31.3% of the respondents argued that FGS and the SNSF are ready to take over from AMISOM. In a focused group discussion however, respondents argues that the Somali Government and the government Forces are ready for the transition from AMISOM because currently, FGS and SNA have shown a little bit more of commitment and they are doing joint operations with AMISOM. In an interview, when asked whether the FGS has government structures in areas occupied by AMISOM, one respondent argued that in areas under the control of AMISOM, local government structures are very weak or still being established and in some areas non-existent. For example, AMISOM handed over Janaare police unit to the Somali police and within a month, the Al-shabab attacked them and took the police post from them. This respondent argued that, the perception is that the transition should happen when the Somali security forces and institutions have acquired some capacity to be able to take over from AMISOM. In some cases, AMISOM has been able to handover security responsibilities to the Somali Security Forces and institutions. For example, the Somali University used to be an AMISOM camp, the Somali National Stadium, Somali Military Academy, Mogadishu city have all handed over to the FGS while the Mogadishu International Airport and the Sea Port are still under the control of AMISOM and the FGS control but they are not contentious. He argued therefore that;

“The transition is gradual and it depends on how fast the FGS and the Federal Member states can generate forces to take over from AMISOM and if this process is slow, it means that the transition is equally slow”. Another respondent argued that;

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“The FGS is preoccupied with other priorities other than focusing on its troop’s generation, integration of militia forces from FMS to raise a capable, affordable, accountable and acceptable SNA forces.”

However, according to respondents in interviews with key informants, although imperfect, considerable progress has been made by the FGS with support from AMISOM and other international players. For example; according to the Somalia Security Pact 2017, Somalia’s government signed a pact on ‘security architecture’ with its foreign backers at a London conference hosted by the British government in 2017.The 17-page Security Pact incorporates text of a detailed agreement reached in April between Somalia’s fledgling federal government and its member states on how to unify their disparate forces into a national army and police force. The London pact is not intended to be a binding agreement and does not create any obligations under international law. But it brings the support of 42 foreign governments and international bodies behind the April security plan. As such it marks a significant step toward building a consensus position on how to develop Somalia are various security institutions:

Composition of forces: Somali National Army: The pact calls for an army of at least 18,000 people, excluding the Special Forces. Somali Police: 32,000, divided into Federal Police and State Police. This figure also includes Coastguard and Darwish (rapid reaction police forces). Somali Air Force: Number not determined. Somali Maritime Forces/Navy: Number not determined. Special Forces: Each army sector shall have 500 ‘Danab’ Special Forces, reporting not to the sector command but to the Danab Brigade HQ in Baledogle. There are currently eight army sectors, though the plan calls for the existing army sectors to be redrawn to align with Federal Member States’ boundaries, which are fewer in number. This means the number of Danab Special Forces would in the area of 3,000-4,000.

Relations between federal and state forces: Existing regional forces must become part of either the national army or state police, a process to be completed before the end of August this year. The distribution of the argued figure of 32,000 police between federal and state levels is still a matter of contention. Likewise, federal and state politicians have yet to agree on how many should be of the heavier ‘Darwish’ type. The Darwish elements of the state-level police will work with the army ‘in times of national crisis’ and serve as a reserve force that can be activated as deemed necessary.

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The process of redistributing troops among federal and state forces will be facilitated by a ‘National Integration Commission,’ which shall include regional states’ representatives. Somalia’s federal government will pay for the salaries and support of the army, but the federal states will be responsible for the salaries and support of the stat-level police. However, the pact says that “there shall be a Federal financial responsibility to support sections of State-Level Police that are engaged in active operations against internal threats.”

Command and control: The President of the Federal Government of Somalia will serve as the Commander in Chief and Chair of the National Security Council. The National Security Council will include the Federal Member States’ presidents, the Prime Minister, Ministers for Internal Security, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Defense and Finance, and the Governor of Banadir Region (mayor of Mogadishu).While the National Security Council will handle policy and strategic matters, the Regional Security Councils will enforce implementation. The Regional Security Councils will be chaired by Federal Member States’ presidents and will include the Somali National Army sector commanders and the state-level security departments. AMISOM will conduct a “conditions-based” withdrawal from Somalia starting in late 2018. The withdrawal will depend on progress in setting up the Somali security institutions.

According to Francisco Madeira’s comment (21 Jun 2019) on “Somalia’s transition plan on track as AMISOM begins exit”, on April 30 2018, the African Union Peace and Security Council endorsed the Somalia transition plan. Since then, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has registered progress in implementing its mandate, guided by the transition plan. The plan is a comprehensive guide developed by the federal government of Somalia and its partners for the transfer of security responsibility to the Somali security forces ahead of AMISOM’s anticipated exit in 2021. Important targets that AMISOM set out to achieve as part of our Somalia exit strategy are being completed. This would not have been possible without the involvement of the Somali authorities, who agree that Somalia’s security forces should take over from AMISOM. In the Lower Shabelle region, the Somali National Army, alongside AMISOM forces, have conducted operations that have seized territory. The most recent victories were recorded in Sabiid and Bariire. For seven years, Sabiid was a base where armed groups assembled explosives, but now it is liberated. This is proof that given the right conditions, the Somali National Army is capable of leading successful anti-terror operations and can take over security responsibility of their country. 114

These conditions include, among others, generating the required troop numbers, proper training, equipment and payment of salaries.9

This year in February 2019, According to Francisco Madeira, AMISOM completed a further reduction of 1 000 troops. This reduction has meant that AMISOM has to hand over forward operating bases and other facilities to the Somali security authorities. AMISOM forces have withdrawn from Mogadishu University in 2017, Mogadishu Stadium in August 2018, and Jaalle Siyaad Military Academy and have handed over the security responsibility for these facilities to Somali security institutions. Last year, AMISOM developed a new concept of operations to support the implementation of the Somali transition plan that guides our exit strategy. As part of the operationalization of this new concept for 2018/2021, AMISOM has been reconfiguring its military, police and civilian components. The military commanders of AMISOM and the Somali National Army have since developed a detailed plan to implement the military aspects of the new concept. Under the reconfiguration, AMISOM will either collapse some forward operating bases or hand them over to Somali security forces. Already, in Jubaland, AMISOM has handed over the Afmadow base to local security forces. As of 2016, a police force comprising more than 5,000 men and women recruited, trained, mentored and equipped with the support of AMISOM, is in place.9 At the same time, other critical government institutions are taking shape and impacting positively the lives of the Somali population. The revenue collection department has been established and has begun collecting taxes; the Central Bank is putting in place fiscal and monetary measures to regulate the economy and the immigration department is visibly registering improvement in its services. The World Bank has appointed a country representative for Somalia, while the International Monetary Fund last year reviewed the country’s economy for the first time in 25 years. As a result, it is not surprising that the Somali economy is growing at a rate above 5 percent, driven by the booming construction industry and the strong services sector.12

Multiparty Politics: Respondents in interviews argued that, In February 2018, After very nearly 50 years, representatives from both the FGS and FMS argued on a road map to implement a popular vote in 2020.This was a major step for the new government, which came into power in February

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2017, as it prepares for the Transition from an imperfect, clan based system to a one person, one vote model in the 2020 elections.

Disengaging from Al-shabaab: according to RUSI Whitehall report (2019); a former IED-maker whose device accidentally killed adults, a child, and approximately 20 cattle, rather than the intended Kenyan AMISOM soldiers and more than two-thirds of the respondents at Serendi center, claimed that amnesty proclamations by successive Somali presidents substantially motivated their decision to exit. On this basis, Al-shabaab’s loss of territory between 2011 and 2015 provided a major enabling factor for disengagement. For instance, a former Al-shabaab cook was able to leave the organization after state forces retook his community, although other members of the group reportedly shot him in the leg after he refused to participate in the battle. Similarly, a former member of the Al-shabaab police asserted that the primary reason he disengaged was that his home location was recaptured by forces loyal to the state, and he conceded that he may still otherwise be active within Al-shabaab. Judging from this therefore, it is clear that starting from a very low base; Somalia is making slow but definite, if reversible, progress towards becoming a capable, peaceful, and fully sovereign state. In an interview, one respondent argued that “

The Somali National Forces have started doing some limited operations on their own and with improved command and administration, they will eventually gain confidence. The challenge however remains that the pace at which the requisite SNA troops are being generated/mobilized to take over from AMISOM is too slow (in peace meal) to match the pressure being mounted on AMISOM to draw down.”

4.3.4.2 The study asked respondents whether the Current peace and stability in Somalia can only be attributed to AMISOM and the results are shown below

Table 4.21. Showing whether the current peace stability can only be attributed to AMISOM Response Frequency Percentage Yes 180 75 No 60 25 Total 240 100

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Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 75% of the respondents argued that the current peace stability can only be attributed to AMISOM while 25% of the respondents argued that the current peace stability can not only be attributed to AMISOM. According to the Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) report 2018-2019 done by AMISOM and FGS, Somalia has more than 20,000 pro-government fighters operating in the five federal member states. According to the report, the fighters who are members of various regional forces or clan-based militias have played a major role in fight against Al-shabaab and other armed opposition groups in the Federal Member States. In places like South West and Jubbaland States, the report details that the forces have fought alongside the Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops to dislodge Al- shabaab in various regions and protect communities. The report is based on an ORA exercise conducted in the federal member states of Jubbaland, South West, Galmudug and Puntland between March 2018 and January 2019.The exercise sought to establish, among others, the number of fighters in each of the states, their level of training, remuneration and capability. Though ORA was not conducted in HirShabelle State, the Federal Member state like others, also boasts of a pro- government regional force. In an interview, one respondent argued that;

“The current peace and stability in Somalia is a result of tireless effort by AMISOM,FGS, SNA plus other international partners including the EU,US,UN, Bancroft and the Somalis.”

4.4 The factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 20072019

This part discusses the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007-2019 as argued by respondents in interviews, questionnaires, focus group discussions and secondary data.

4.4.1. The factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 20072019.

Here respondents were asked about the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to enforce peace in Somalia and the results were as follows;

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Table 4. 22 Showing the factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007-2019 Respondents Frequency Percentage (%) Lack of inclusiveness has led to the failure 30 12.5 to establish peace

Internal structures of each opposition group 32 13.3 have been a challenge to peace process

Presence of majority power interest has 38 15.8 impeded peace

Failure to understand the intensions of each 23 9.6 group by other has impeded peace

Spoilers have been responsible for the 37 15.4 failure of peace

The availability of weapons has impended 40 16.7 peace

Clannism has impended peace 20 8.3 Language Barrier 8 3.3 Death of soldiers 12 5 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data, 2019 The above table shows the responses according to respondents in questionnaires however the rest of the data collected from secondary materials and from respondents in interviews and group focus decisions is discussed below as follows:

Initial International Pessimism: One respondent argued in an interview that, AMISOM had underestimated the situation when they landed in Mogadishu for the first time in 2007:

“We came here with few forces and with white UN vehicles, knowing it was a peacekeeping mission, but we found a different situation. There was no peace to keep, we were received with gun fires and bombs and we had to re-paint our UN white cars green; it was real combat.”

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One respondent in an interview argued that, “we came here when everyone knew we were going to fail especially where the Americans had already failed several times and few African countries were willing to commit their troops”. Paul D. Williams (2013) argues that the first major challenge AMISOM faced was the widespread pessimism about embarking on the mission in the first place. This pessimism was evident across many member states of the African Union and beyond. It was partly rooted in the legacy of the UN peace operations in Somalia in the 1990s but was dramatically amplified by views that AMISOM simply would not work and was an ill thought out mission. The fact that Mogadishu was an active warzone at the time meant that very few countries were willing to come forward and champion the mission despite its authorization by the AU and endorsement by the UN Security Council. Indeed, only Uganda stepped forward until December 2007 when Burundi also committed troops. But these two states were left as the only troop contributing countries (TCCs) for nearly four years. Some African states, including Nigeria, conducted their own technical assessments of the situation in Mogadishu and concluded the circumstances were not right for them to deploy forces. This negative perception was further reinforced by the fact that AMISOM forces came under fire from the outset from some of the warlord factions which were vying for control of the airport. The combination of these factors created a widespread aura of pessimism around the mission and its prospects for success and contributed significantly to leaving Uganda and Burundi as the only TCCs for the first four years of the operation with no enough capabilities to fight against the Al-shabaab at the time. Another respondent argued that, if more African countries had committed troops into AMISOM, probably the Somali peace process could not have taken this long.

Multi-dimensional command and control: In interviews, respondents argued that today AMISOM is still faced with the challenge of multi-dimensional command. In many instances, the command of AMISOM troops is exercised not by the AMISOM Force Commander but from the National Capitals of the TCCs and this is because, the soldiers and equipment used are theirs. Although all contingents will be expected to keep in regular contact with their national military authorities, there are varying degrees to which UN/AU orders will be checked with national capitals. The greater the actual or potential use of force in the mission, the greater the tendency to seek instructions from home. And if the FGS is not okay with any operation, nothing can be done because it’s a sovereign country and FGS has the final say before undertaking any operation. Paul D. Williams (2013)

119 argues that the second strategic challenge emerged from the multifaceted nature of the AMISOM mission. Indeed, in some senses the mission was so fragmented that it is more accurate to think of it as separate AMISOMs (in the plural) than one single, coherent operation. The challenge of internal coordination and coherence also had several dimensions. The first was the geographical separation of some of the key mission components. AMISOM’s strategic planning and political work was based out of Addis Ababa, its head of mission and mission analysis unit was headquartered in Nairobi, while the military units and operational command were in Mogadishu. The fact that the various international training mechanisms for the TFG’s security forces were also spread around Uganda, Ethiopia and Djibouti, among other places, did not ease this problem. Such a disparate mission set up was hardly conducive to internal coherence and effective coordination, especially for operational and tactical issues. A second aspect of the problem related to the relatively disengaged stance of AMISOM’s political leadership. As already noted, the fact that AMISOM’s head of mission was based in Nairobi until the end of 2012 not only sent an unhelpful political signal to both locals in Somalia and the outside world, but it left several AMISOM force commanders in the difficult position of having to act as the principal political representative of the mission in Mogadishu. While this task was handled more astutely by some AMISOM force commanders than others, this was not a position they should have been placed in and badly undermined international attempts to kick-start a peacemaking process and reconciliation. It was a task made even more difficult because of the lack of a dedicated and appropriately sized force headquarters in Mogadishu until 2012. While this geographical problem could have been overcome by a major commitment to regularly travel to Mogadishu on the part of AMISOM’s heads of mission, they did not all oblige.

A third dimension of the problem was coordination between AMISOM’s military, police and civilian components. This was not a major issue in the early years of the mission because the dire security situation on the ground in Mogadishu meant that it was inappropriate to deploy significant numbers of police officers and other civilian personnel. The latter were a scarce commodity within AU circles at any rate while the former carried out various training initiatives mostly outside Somalia and did not start deploying into Mogadishu in large numbers until mid2012 when the first Formed Police Units arrived from Uganda and Nigeria. The majority of the civilian component of the mission also arrived only late in the day from 2012 but the exact nature of the tasks civilian

120 peacekeepers would perform and how they would relate to the military efforts became the subject of considerable debate within AMISOM as it moved beyond Mogadishu and started to become embroiled in governance and stabilization issues. (From late 2012, this also become a contentious issue with the new Federal Government in Somalia as well.) Finally, especially after the new military and strategic concepts of operations were developed for AMISOM in late 2011 and early 2012, AMISOM had to contend with more problems of internal coordination with the arrival of new TCCs and the mission’s deployment across the four land sectors which covered most of south- central Somalia. During 2012, Djibouti, Sierra Leone, and Kenya each signed a memorandum of understanding with the AU to join the mission. However, all of them experienced protracted debates over details of their deployment, either logistical or financial. From this point on, AMISOM faced the additional challenge of coordinating activities across the four sectors and the respective contingent commands. This proved easier in some cases than others: the Djiboutian battalion slated for deployment to sector four arrived approximately one year late, while the Kenyan forces in sector two were particularly concerned with operational security and hence not always forthcoming about their activities even with the AMISOM force headquarters . This was especially true in the run up to assault on Kismayo in September 2012 (Williams, 2013).

Problematic Local Partners: According to respondents, limited manpower on the side of FGS has impeded the Somali peace process. Respondents argued that some clans have almost more guns than the government. The FGS also lacks force enablers like helicopters, infantry fighting vehicles and other force multipliers to fight such kind of war partly because of the UN’s arms embargo on Somalia. UNSCR 2444(2018) in regard to Somalia, “the council-renewing the arms embargo imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733(1992), further elaborated upon in paragraph 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified in various subsequent resolutions-decided to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2142(2014) until November 2019.Those provided sanctions exemptions for deliveries of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training intended solely for the development of FGS’ security forces to provide security for the Somali people. More to this according to respondents, death of soldiers, lack of local forces, coupled with lack of local power structures; to occupy and hold a swathe of land has impeded peace. Somalia it too big and AMISOM is not deployed in all

121 regions.The local forces are too few to hold the areas that AMISOM has liberated and so AMISOM cannot expand because it will leave gaps.

One respondent in an interview argued that, Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army/Movement in Uganda, started by putting in place citizen-led governance institutions in the “liberated areas” of Uganda. Citizens in the famous Luwero Triangle which was the bedrock of the NRM resistance rebel activities quickly organized themselves into RCs which were then very instrumental institutions that kept the war going through popular mobilization of local citizens to support the war, reconnaissance missions and keeping law and order in the areas under NRM rule. When NRM took over power in 1986, the RCs then became the de facto institutions that were used to deliver social services and also help to restore law and order. This respondent argued that, since 1986’s turning point in Uganda’s history, it has been citizen engagement that has propelled the country forward and helped it conquer periods of peril. Unfortunately, such local structures are not there in Somalia to the extent that most Somalis call the FGS a “Pocket Government”. This respondent argued that, absence of local structures and lack of enough local forces makes it hard for AMISOM to expand because “the more ground you cover the more the demands for deployable forces.”

Paul Williams (2013) argues that, as well as its own internal communications, AMISOM’s mandate made it crucial that the mission work closely and effectively with the authorities in Somalia. It is an established element of counterinsurgency doctrine that the efforts of external forces are highly unlikely to succeed without a legitimate and effective local partner. Between March 2007 and September 2012, AMISOM’s local partner in its campaign against Al-shabaab was the TFG, which came in two versions. Both versions were far from being effective local partners for AMISOM to work with. The first TFG, led by President Abdullahi Yusuf from Puntland, was created in Kenya in 2004 but installed in Mogadishu by Ethiopian forces in December 2006. It remained in place until the end of 2008 when Yusuf resigned and the Ethiopian troops withdrew. It was perceived by many Somalis as both illegitimate being foisted upon them by Ethiopia and other external powers and ineffective inasmuch as it provided neither any form of public services to its citizens nor undertook any major attempts at reconciliation between the conflicting factions. The TFG’s security forces also proved to be largely ineffective against Al- 122 shabaab and regularly committed abuses against the local population. The combination of local hostility towards Ethiopian troops and the TFG’s weaknesses provided ample fodder for Al- shabaab to successfully recruit considerable numbers of fighters to its cause, both in Mogadishu and beyond. AMISOM was caught in the middle in as much as its mandate called for it to work with and support the TFG. As Ethiopian forces drew down, AMISOM became more and more central to the TFG’s continued survival and this, in turn, encouraged Alshabaab to intensify its attacks on the AU force. The fact that the Ethiopian troops did not fully coordinate the details of their departure with AMISOM also meant that in early 2009, Alshabaab forces were quickly able to occupy most of the former ENDF positions in the city, many of which were very close to AMISOM positions. In sum, despite AMISOM’s best efforts, in the eyes of many locals, the mission’s association with the TFG and Ethiopian forces meant that its first local partner was something of a liability rather than a help. The situation did not fundamentally improve with the second iteration of the TFG, which formed in early 2009 after Yusuf’s resignation. This was led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, one of the former leaders of the Union of Islamic Courts which had taken control of Mogadishu in mid-2006 and leader of the Djibouti faction of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) which eventually decided to work within the TFG structure (unlike the Eritrean-based faction of ARS led by Hassan DahirAweys which refused). This configuration of the TFG was initially welcomed by some Somalis as an improvement on the previous authorities, but it still suffered from criticisms that it was too close to Ethiopia and too heavily influenced by diaspora elites and one particular clan, the Hawiye. It was also widely seen as corrupt, ineffective and largely uninterested in pursuing a strategy of conflict resolution and political reconciliation across Somalia. Instead, its politicians spent much of their time engaged in a variety of acrimonious feuds.

In addition, many of the TFG’s members continued to reside outside Somalia and some of them were widely suspected to be Al-shabaab sympathizers if not outright supporters. Within Mogadishu, the TFG still lacked an effective fighting force beyond a core group of militia that was little more than Sheikh Sharif’s private army. Indeed, TFG troops and police quickly became associated with illegal roadblocks and looting. They were also accused by AMISOM of selling their weapons and ammunition on the black market and sometimes of selling information about AMISOM’s activities to Al-shabaab. A particularly embarrassing incident along these lines 123 involved Sheikh Sharif’s elite personal guard, three of whom publically defected to Al-shabaab in July 2010. The TFG was therefore largely dependent upon AMISOM troops for its immediate physical survival and on external actors, primarily the UN and Western states, for its finances and the training and arming of its security forces. Once again, this fed local impressions that the TFG was ‘more accountable to the international community for its survival, than on the Somali people, a perception that continu[ed] to undermine trust in the TFG’ (ibid).

Clan militias of marka assembled for documentation by AMISOM: Source: AMISOM Sector 1 archives, 2019

Somali clans according to respondents in focused group discussions, have more guns than the FGS and clan militias are more organized and efficient than the government forces. According to these respondents, the financial inabilities of the FGS to construct barracks and pay soldiers up to day has impeded peace. Because of poverty, some government soldiers defect to Al-shabaab in order to sustain themselves and their families. Respondents also argued that al-shabaab collects more taxes than the government and most times, the Somalis find it easy to deal with the Alshabaab than the SNA because the Al-shabaab are more efficient than the SNA. For example, “for the Al-shabaab, if you are transporting your cargo from one place to another, you pay them once at any of their check points but for SNA, you have to pay at each and every checkpoint you

124 find on the way.” Other respondents argued that because of ignorance and poverty; Somalis become vulnerable to Al-shabaab’s recruitment drive and then used for heinous crimes. According to respondents in interviews, in 2017, a multinational readiness assessment was conducted by the FGS and several international partners including AU, UN and US. These respondents argued that the assessment was needed because neither the Somali Government nor its partners had reliable basic information about the army, including the identities of its personnel, their locations and unit affiliations, or their weapons and equipment.

Clan militias of marka assembled for documentation by AMISOM: Source: AMISOM Sector 1 archives, 2019

According the respondents, the assessment confirmed that the National army was in a dire state: there were few frontline personnel than previously estimated (on average battalions had only 63 percent of their authorized strength), there were inconsistent recruiting standards and most battalions lacked basic equipment, including ammunition, communications kit, and vehicles. The result was the army in name only and often reliant on AMISOM.

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UPDF training clan militias in Marka for eventual reintegration; Source: AMISOM Sector 1 archives, 2019

One respondent argued that the war against the Al-shabaab has been hampered by the absence of a national army since Somalia’s central government collapsed in 1991.Even after the Federal Government was resurrected in 2012; it has struggled to control its capital city and immediate hinterland, let alone the rest of the country. Today, Somalia desperately needs an effective army that is well equipped, motivated and disciplined to stabilize the country and protect its citizens from one of the world’s deadliest militant groups, Al-shabaab. Paul D. Williams (2013) argues that, at the operational level, AMISOM experienced its own lack of trust with the TFG’s security forces, which were disorganized, poorly equipped, poorly motivated, and often unruly. Instead of being a reliable local partner in the fight against Al-shabaab, members of the TFG’s security forces engaged in a variety of unhelpful activities including leading AMISOM troops into ambushes, selling their ammunition and weapons on the local market, and passing operational information to AMISOM’s opponents. There were regular defections and an unwillingness to engage in risky operations, which was understandable given the lack of salaries, equipment, and medical support provided to them. All these things led to a major deficit of trust between AMISOM and TFG forces, which took considerable time and effort to close. This was eventually achieved from late 2010

126 onwards as AMISOM and TFG forces started to participate in more successful joint operations; first repelling Al-shabaab’s Ramadan offensive and then working together to conduct joint offensive operations themselves. But trust took time to earn and build in the field and it had to endure several serious breaches by TFG forces along the way. Even by 2012, however, the Somali security forces were in a dire state. Among the long list of challenges facing the Somali army, perhaps the most severe and urgent were problems of unresolved clan loyalties and more operational issues of command and control. These problems were particularly acute at the level of senior officers, between clan leaders, warlords, and the official military commanders; they also involved an absence of collaboration between the existing brigades of the Somali National Army However, One respondent argued that, Since 2010 AMISOM and TFG forces have started to participate in more successful joint operations; first repelling Al-shabaab’s Ramadan offensive and then working together to conduct joint offensive operations themselves. In an interview, one respondent argued that;

“When the central government is weak as it is in Somalia today, it is easy for the non-state actors to organize themselves and disorganize the country”.

An additional problem was that different components of the army had received different types of training, mostly abroad, and there were poor levels of training for non-commissioned officers. Salaries were also unreliable: most having been provided in the form of US$ 100 per month stipends paid by the United States and Italy to some but not all Somali soldiers. The forces also lacked modern weaponry with many ostensibly Somali National Army weapons belonging to warlords, clans, and individuals and effective logistical and medical support capacity. Finally, there remained major problems with recruitment, created by this long list of issues. In sum, AMISOM did not have the luxury of working alongside a popular and effective local partner in the pursuit of its mandate. Instead, its initial local partner was seen as a major part of the problem by large numbers of Somalis and AMISOM’s central role in protecting the TFG brought more negative attention on the AU force. Finally, AMISOM still founds itself with the hugely difficult task of facilitating legitimate and effective governance structures across south central Somalia. In many respects, this is the mission’s most fundamental challenge because degrading Al-Shabaab’s forces was actually considerably easier than resolving Somali’s many political disputes. Finding a

127 way to play a constructive role in Somalia’s governance structures will be AMISOM’s central strategic challenge moving forward (Paul D. Williams, 2013).

Clannism: in an interview, the respondent argued that, the Somali conflict is based on the structural challenges that started with the unresolved national issues since independence. The respondent argued that there were groups that were disgruntled and not satisfied. These were partly answered by the coup of 1969 that brought in Siad Barre. Whereas Barre’s government addressed some of them, it created more problems. For example, it devolved a means of violence to clans and used clans to become the provider of security to support him especially following the failed attempt to invade and annex the Somali area of Ethiopia called Ogaden in 1977/1978 what was called the Ogaden War against Ethiopia on the platform of Somali nationalism and pan-Somalism. So for Siad Barre to sustain himself in power after the failed invasion, he started playing around between the demands of one clan against the other and he ended up arming one clan against the other. The respondent argued that this feud between clans saw his down fall in 1991.

Another respondent argued that, power sharing in the previous government of Somalia was based on clan system and the formula which was adopted was a 4.5 formula. The 4.5 power system means that the four major Somali clans of Daarood, Hawiye, Dir, Rahanweyn take the lion’s share of the national cake and the rest of the minorities (0.5) are marginalized. For example, according to one respondent in an interview, the major four clans have more sits in parliament and it’s the parliament that elects the president and the speaker. According to one respondent who is a Somali National, the current Somali president comes from Daarood clan, the Prime minister comes from Hawiye clan, the Deputy Prime Minister is from Dir clan, and the Speaker of Parliament is from Rahanweyn clan. Another respondent in the interview argued that, it’s these four major clans that are considered first when recruiting for the National Army and Police which makes it hard for a security officer of one clan to be deployed in another clan area without risking being rejected, ineffective or even killed. However, another respondent who is also a Somali National in an interview argued that the current administration of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed has been trying being inclusive of other clans into the government institutions which was not the case in the previous governments.

Another respondent in an interview argued that, due to this clan marginalization, the marginalized clans end up joining the Al-shabab seeking for protection and consider the Alshabab to be fighting 128 a justified war against clan injustice. He argued that when the central government of Siad Barre collapsed, people started retreating into the refugee of a clan. A clan became the insurance of the individuals as the source of security, comfort and social network. In other words, clans become the basis of people’s identity, security and protection which become a mobilizing factor because other clans are doing it so others must also make sure their clan is capable of protecting them too and therefore;

“To transform from clannism to nationalism is the hardest part for Somalia.”

Multiple players: Respondents in an interview argued that Somalia is a melting point of many players and in all these internal and external partners plus Somali Diasporas; there are conflict entrepreneurs who do not want to see the Somali conflict end because they are benefiting from it. One respondent argued that;

“Others come here as vultures to eat and create new business on the Somali dead body. They can’t keep being terror supporters and conflict motivators and then become peacekeepers and supporters of AMISOM and the government at the same time.”

Paul D. Williams (2013) argues that, AMISOM also suffered from several challenges related to strategic coordination between its external partners, which came in a variety of forms. These problems were not unique to Somalia but are rather common features of the messy attempts to conduct what one recent analysis called ‘collective conflict management’ where informal coalitions of networks of state, intergovernmental and non-state actors that display diffuse, improvised, ad hoc and pragmatic patterns of cooperation temporarily converge to address a particularly complex conflict. Arguably AMISOM’s most important external partners were the United States, which provided considerable amounts of equipment, training and logistical support to the contingents from Uganda and Burundi; the UK and France, which also provided various bilateral support packages to the TCCs; the United Nations, which from 2009 established an unprecedented mechanism (UNSOA) to provide AMISOM with logistical support via its base in Mombasa and the European Union (EU), which from 2011 began to pay the allowances for AMISOM’s uniformed personnel and conducted a training programme based out of Uganda through its African Peace Facility. Diplomatically, the most prominent coordination mechanism was the International Contact Group. But since the Contact Group was so large and incoherent the

129 practical decisions and supporting roles for AMISOM tended to be developed, from 2012, within the Joint Coordinating Mechanism, which worked at the ministerial level and the Military Operations Coordination Committee at the chief-of-staff level. One challenge was that these external actors did not always speak with one voice on how to engage with Somalia. This was hardly surprising given that strategic coordination between different actors is always a deeply political process. In this case, differences quickly emerged over several issues. The most prominent early on was whether to deploy a UN peacekeeping operation to take over from AMISOM. While in 2007 the Security Council was broadly in agreement that the time was not right to re-hat AMISOM into a blue helmet force, by late 2008 the George W. Bush administration in the United States led a political campaign to deploy a multinational stabilization force to Mogadishu which would pave the way for transitioning AMISOM into a blue helmet mission. As it turned out, this course of action was rejected by most UN members who proved unwilling to supply the necessary troops for the proposed stabilization force or the UN peacekeeping operation proposed by the Americans. Nevertheless, the subsequent Security Council resolution 1890 passed on 16 January 2009 left open the prospect of a UN takeover of the mission at a later date when the circumstances became appropriate. It also authorized the UN Department of Field Support to establish UNSOA in order to deliver a logistics capacity support package to keep AMISOM afloat (ibid).

This was seen as critical for boosting the operational effectiveness for AMISOM but also as a necessary preparatory step in case a UN operation was required. Other issues that divided AMISOM’s external partners included the amount of resources which should be devoted to antipiracy activities in the Gulf of Aden and whether to engage Al-shabaab in peace talks. In relation to the former, in December 2008, the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and a variety of other countries embarked on a major set of maritime security operations off the coast of Somalia to stem the rise in piracy. In Somalia, this unprecedented commitment of resources generated considerable bewilderment as it did almost nothing to tackle the causes of piracy which stemmed from the conflict dynamics on the mainland. Even the UN Secretary- General publicly noted that his efforts to generate forces to tackle Somalia’s problems on land stood ‘in such sharp contrast to the exceptional political will and commitment of military assets which Member States have shown in respect of the fight against piracy.’ AMISOM also became 130 increasingly frustrated with these maritime operations because although they helped protect the logistics and supply ships which arrived into Mogadishu, they did little to coordinate with AMISOM on how best to deploy these maritime assets to stem Al-shabaab’s war economy, particularly its continued export of various illicit commodities, most notably charcoal traded out of the southern port of Kismayo. When it came to the issue of talking to Al-shabaab, the picture was also mixed. At one end of the spectrum, the United States was firmly against the idea, having designated Al-shabaab a Foreign Terrorist Organization in March 2008 and actively conducting air strikes and Special Forces raids in Somalia to eliminate other Al-shabaab and alQaida targets. At the other end of the spectrum actors including the League of Arab States, Finland, Kenya and even Ethiopia instructed their officials to talk to members of Al-shabaab in the hope of finding a political route beyond the impasse or marginalizing the movement’s most extreme elements. A second challenge was raised by Kenya’s unilateral intervention into southern Somalia in October 2011, and the renewed Ethiopian military campaign which followed shortly thereafter. While these operations obviously helped AMISOM’s struggle against Alshabaab by opening up two new fronts, it also complicated things politically and logistically because it kick-started the process of AMISOM’s expansion beyond Mogadishu and raised questions about coordination between the Kenyan, Ethiopian, AMISOM and TFG forces. Ethiopia quickly made it clear that its forces would not be integrated into AMISOM, although it did deploy a number of officers to the mission’s new force headquarters in Mogadishu in 2012. Its troops also played the crucial stabilizing role in AMISOM’s new sectors three and four throughout 2012 as the Djiboutian contingent slated to deploy to Beletweyne failed to arrive until December, and the relatively small contingent of Ugandan and Burundian troops deployed to Baidoa operated largely in the Ethiopian’s shadow (ibid).

Kenya’s relationship with AMISOM was more sensitive because it was slated to run sector two in the south of the country. However, several issues arose. First, Kenya was initially reluctant to reveal the extent of its military forces in southern Somalia, including its air and maritime assets. Second, an argument occurred between Kenya and the EU over the start date for the payment of allowances to Kenya’s contingent in AMISOM given that Kenya did not sign the memorandum of understanding with the African Union until 2 June 2012 but wrote into the document that its forces would be paid allowances backdated to February 2012 (the date of UN Security Council resolution

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2036). A third problem was suspicions about Kenya’s motives in pushing its so-called Jubaland initiative. These became particularly acute after September 2012 when the new Federal Government voiced its suspicions about Kenya’s agenda in Jubaland and its approach to administering Kismayo (ibid).

Asymmetric warfare: Respondents argued that fighting asymmetric warfare is also a challenge that AMISOM still faces today in its peace operation efforts in Somalia. According to one respondent, asymmetric warfare is typically a war between a standing, professional army and an insurgency or resistance movement militias who often have status of unlawful combatants. Asymmetric warfare is a form of irregular warfare. Unlike in a conventional warfare where the warfare is conducted by using conventional weapons and battle field tactics between two or more states in open confrontation, forces on each side well-defined, and fight using weapons that primarily target the opponent’s military, in asymmetric war, the forces are not well-defined, targets civilian populations as well as the armed forces. According to respondents in interviews, the enemy in Somalia is not well identified. Another respondent argued that the Al-shabaab has resorted to “hit and melt” war tactics even in liberated areas. One is a farther and a business man during the day and an al-shabaab at night. Though not legally recognized, they have command structures with in themselves. Al-shabab is comprised of all age groups; trained in all technologies, trained to use sophisticated weapons; suicide bombers, assaults, bombing, land mines, maneuvers, fighters among others. Respondents argued that Al-shabab is an ideology with no barracks but they have concentration areas and they have leaders who organize them for attacks. This argument correlates with Mao Zedong’s quote;

“The guerrillas must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea.”

Paul D. Williams (2013) argues that, another set of challenges flowed from the nature of AMISOM’s principal opponent: Harakat Al-shabaab (‘The Youth’). Formally established in the early 2000s, the name Al-shabaab was not widely used until 2007 and came to refer to a populist and militaristic movement which gained popularity after the defeat of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts in 2006. In the space of a couple of years, Al-shabaab went from obscurity to being the principal anti-TFG and hence anti-AMISOM force. During December 2006 and January 2007, Ethiopian troops nearly destroyed Al-shabaab’s relatively small forces and it was not until

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November 2007 that Al-shabaab was able to launch a serious counter-offensive. After that, however, growing resentment at the Ethiopian presence and brutality and all sorts of rumors linking Ethiopia’s activities to Washington’s nefarious counter-terrorism policies in the region presented Al-shabaab with a huge propaganda victory and its ranks swelled accordingly.

Al-shabaab’s military wing was organized in three main layers: the top leadership (qiyadah), the foreign fighters (muhajirin), and local Somali fighters (ansar). The qiyadah was thought to be comprised of a small group of Afghanistan veterans, former members of al-Ittihad al-Islami, and Somali diaspora ideologues. The dominant ideologue was probably Sheikh FuadMuhammad Qalaf and by 2012 Ahmed AbdiGodane (aka Sheikh Abu Zubeyr) was in command of the organization. Al-shabaab also employed a range of media outlets and websites such as Hegaan, Kata’ib, Al Hesba and Al Qimmah. The movement proved particularly adept at producing anti- Ethiopian and anti-AMISOM propaganda using videos, websites, and later a Twitter account. Part of the challenge in combating Al-shabaab was that its fighters came from several different feeder routes, making it difficult to identify and target a single center of gravity. In brief, it comprised of a core of locally focused fighters, particularly from the sub clans associated with its leading figures; a larger number of what David Kilcullen called ‘accidental guerrillas’ those fighting because they felt aggrieved at Ethiopia’s presence in Mogadishu not because they wanted to invade Ethiopia or had strong ideological commitments to the messages disseminated by Al-shabaab’s leadership and an unknown number of foreign, often takfiri, fighters associated with al-Qaida who had arrived in Somalia to fight the Ethiopians and other non-believers. Estimates for the number of foreign fighters (muhajirin) in Al-shabaab’s ranks varied widely from 200 to over 1,500, with most said to hail from Kenya’s Swahili coast, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Yemen, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Saudi Arabia. Similarly, estimates of Alshabaab’s local strength varied considerably, in part because of the shifting allegiances of many rank and file fighters (ibid).

While al-Qaida’s ideas about the global struggle between Islam and the West were thought to influence some of Al-shabaab’s leaders, most of its foot soldiers were initially motivated primarily by the desire to expel the Ethiopians and facilitate the operation of sharia courts in Somalia. Later, Al-shabaab entered into the longstanding issue of clan conflicts where it often sided with smaller sub clans in local disputes. It was also widely believed that a significant part of Al-shabaab’s

133 attraction was that its leaders would pay new recruits and also compensation to the families of militiamen who died in action. In early 2009, for example, AMISOM’s Force Commander told the UN that Al-shabaab was offering TFG troops $50 a month to swap sides. Community dynamics were also important with the organization offering youth a means of empowerment and financial security for them and their families which was either too attractive to ignore or group pressures were too intense to resist. This meant that AMISOM often had a very difficult task of deciding who exactly was an Al-shabaab fighter as well as designing strategies to combat them. Yet while in one sense Al-shabaab’s multiple sources of support was a strength, it also suffered from a prolonged power struggle between its so-called ‘nationalist’ and ‘transnational’ factions, particularly after the Ethiopian forces withdrew from Mogadishu in early 2009. As part of this internal struggle, some elements of Al-shabaab gradually increased their extremist rhetoric and trumpeted ties to al-Qaida. In mid-March 2009, for example, Osama bin Laden had described TFG President Sheikh Sharif as a ‘surrogate of our enemies’, declared his authority ‘null and void’, and said ‘he must be dethroned and fought’. In June 2009 the Alshabaab group in Kismayo apparently responded to this call by releasing a video pledging allegiance to Osama Bin Laden. Al-shabaab made a formal declaration of allegiance to al-Qaida on 2 February 2010. Although it seemed clear that Al-shabaab was not under the operational control of al-Qaida, the exact nature of the practical relationship between the two organizations remained hazy (ibid).

Since mid-2009, Al-shabaab tended to adopt a hit-and-run strategy and avoid set piece battles after it suffered a major defeat in Mogadishu on 12 July. (The major exception was the ultimately disastrous Ramadan offensive in September 2010) Given that many Al-shabaab positions in Mogadishu had been occupied immediately following the Ethiopian withdrawal, a major question mark remains over how strong a conventional fighting force Al-shabaab actually was. It certainly does not appear to have mastered what one eminent scholar has described as the ‘the modern system’ of tactics, i.e. the ability to use ‘cover, concealment, dispersion, small-unit independent maneuver, suppression and combined arms integration’ on offence and the integrated use of ground, deep positions, reserves and counterattack in defense. Nevertheless, it utilized tactics from insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan to good effect and regularly caused casualties among the TFG and AMISOM troops through the use of IEDs, suicide bombings, snipers, and the occasional ambush. It also effectively utilized a system of tunnels in central

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Mogadishu and had the odd success with tank-traps designed to immobilize AMISOM’s large armored vehicles and tanks. In this sense, Al-shabaab was able to benefit from the difficult urban terrain in which AMISOM was forced to fight and in which its troops were not initially wellversed (ibid).

Respondents in interviews argued that fighting an urban warfare was a serious setback to AMISOM in its first years of operation in Somalia and AMISOM forces incurred a lot of casualties. According to respondents, it took the help of Bancroft’s mentoring efforts to improve the skills of the AMISOM troops and cut down on civilian causalities; showing the troops how to build sniper pits or smash holes in walls to move between houses and more generally turning a bush army into an urban fighting force. Williams (2013), however, after AMISOM’s deployed strength was increased following the suicide bombings in Kampala in July 2010 and the Ugandan and Burundian contingents received additional training in various techniques of urban warfare, Al-shabaab forces suffered a series of sustained assaults from AMISOM (in Mogadishu) and later Kenyan forces (in southern Somalia) and Ethiopian troops (across central Somalia) during 2011. These assaults were so significant that in December 2011 Al-shabaab reportedly established a 500-strong Amniat (internal security) force to stem an increasing number of defections from its approximately 9,500 fighters. By February 2012 the Somali National Security Agency was receiving on average 3-4 defectors per day. Respondents in interviews added that Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are still a setback to AMISOM’s peace support efforts in Somalia today even in liberated areas. According to one Military officer in an interview, improvised explosive device is a homemade bomb, constructed from military or nonmilitary components, that is frequently employed by guerrillas, insurgents, and other non-state actors as a crude but effective weapon against a conventional military force. IEDs are normally attached to a detonating mechanism and commonly used as roadside bombs and this is what the Al-shabaab is currently using in Somalia.

In economic terms, Al-shabaab was estimated to have generated about $70-100 million per year in revenue from taxation and extortion in areas under its control, especially the export of charcoal and contraband into Kenya. After its withdrawal from Mogadishu in August 2011, Kismayo was identified as the movement’s ‘single largest revenue-generator and a strategic military fortress.’ This was estimated to generate around $35-50 million per year from the port revenues. This

135 revenue stream was only halted in October 2012 when AMISOM and Somali government forces occupied Kismayo, driving Al-shabaab forces further north. By mid-2012, the estimated number of Al-shabaab fighters in northern Golis Mountains was 300-400. This posed another major headache for AMISOM inasmuch as Al-shabaab’s displaced forces gravitated north towards sector four; however this sector had only one battalion of AMISOM troops because at the time the force configuration was developed in late 2011 Al-shabaab forces were not concentrated in this area. Respondents agreed with this argument and said that even today, Al-shabab collects more taxes than the FGS (Paul D. Williams (2013).

Inadequate Resources: Respondents emphasized that, the inability of the AU to fund its own initiatives has constrained AMISOM’s peace support efforts in Somalia. According to one respondent in an interview, AMISOM is funded by the Trust Fund, (basket of willing partners) and funders are fatigued. Another respondent argued that, “the UNSCR 2472 (2017) for the first time ever, reduces the level of uniformed AMISOM personnel by 1000 to a maximum level of 19,626, by February 2020, yet other regions are still under the control of Al-shabaab because the AMISOM forces have not been enough to cover the whole of Somalia and the SNA forces are still very few. At the same time, AMISOM is expected to fulfill its mandate UNSCR 2472 (2019). How is this supposed to be possible?” He argued that;

“The failure of AU to fund its own initiatives leaves AMISOM at the mercy of well- wishers which affects its decision making and operational capacity.”

Another respondent argued that, slow pace of having our own African means and mechanisms of conflict resolution impede the peace processes in Africa. “We have the AU yes, we have the regional blocs and their security architectures like the East African Standby force but it’s not yet fully operationalized in terms of capabilities, in terms of even the politics of it. People have not agreed on the approach. For example, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) a temporary multinational African interventionist standby force set up in November 2013 and supposed to be replaced by the African standby force when it becomes fully operational. ACIRC was more of a coalition of the willing initially brokered by the Americans with a few African countries who were volunteering including Uganda, South Africa, Tanzania,

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Chad and Algeria but it was misunderstood by some countries including Nigeria and Egypt because of issues of hegemony thinking this was a South African thing.” When this respondent was asked whether it’s possible to have African Collective measures of conflict resolution, He argued that the boxes are there like the AU and regional blocs but not yet filled. He argued that, what Africa needs to do is to fully operationalize the regional infrastructure that can intervene quickly in case of need, have early warning systems to prevent even conflicts from breaking out but also that can respond effectively and quickly when they break out and work around the politics because it feeds into mandating, sustainment of these operations when they happen and all kinds of factors that enable or disable these initiatives when the need arises. “What you will, you should also fund but if you keep passing the basket then you depend on the one who pays.”

Paul D. Williams (2013) argues that, another strategic challenge facing AMISOM was its major lack of resources and capability gaps relevant to its mandated tasks. These resource limitations assumed a variety of forms. On the planning side, the mission lacked the necessary support, planning and management capabilities. When AMISOM deployed, the AU was simply not at a stage in its development where it could effectively manage the day-to-day running of such a large and complex operation. As a result, AMISOM’s planning began with a small core planning team made up of some AU members of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) and UN planners from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Then a new ad hoc planning team was formed led by a Ugandan general: it was known as the Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU), had about 30 vacancies, and achieved initial operating capacity (of 19 planners) in September 2007. It drew in planners from the UN, the EU, and NATO, a US liaison officer as well as the AU and the TCCs. It remains unclear whether any of the non-AU planners had been to Mogadishu before taking on the position and there was a distinct lack of expertise in counterIED techniques. From November 2007 to mid-2009 the SPMU was funded by €6.4m from the EU’s Emergency Fund and a support package from the US Government gave $250,000 per year for logistics and office equipment. From late 2009 it received funds from the EU’s African Peace Facility. Planning capabilities increased slowly overtime with a major breakthrough coming in 2012 with the establishment of AMISOM’s force headquarters in Mogadishu. A second challenge was the gap between AMISOM’s authorized strength and its actual deployed strength on the ground. The fact that AMISOM took over three and a half years to reach its initial authorized

137 strength of 8,000 troops placed an enormous strain on the Ugandan and Burundian soldiers who were deployed. AMISOM’s depleted numbers had several negative consequences.

First, for the peacekeepers themselves, it could hardly have been good for morale being deployed as a peacekeeper by an organization that could not muster the required strength in the field. Second, it signaled to Al-shabaab and other Somalis that the AU and its partners were not prepared to invest the necessary resources to comprehensively address Somalia’s conflict. Third, in operational terms, it meant the AMISOM force was unable to do much more than adopt a defensive posture and shuttle between the few sections of the city it occupied.

The result was that during 2009 and 2010 bloody battles raged across the city but they produced only a strategic stalemate with neither AMISOM nor Al-shabaab able to decisively defeat or dislodge the other. Ironically the impasse was broken after Al-shabaab carried out two suicide bombings in Kampala in July 2010 which resulted in the mission receiving considerable numbers of reinforcements with which it then repelled Al-shabaab’s subsequent Ramadhan offensive in September. This helped to overcome this particular challenge as AMISOM went on the offensive shortly thereafter. A third challenge related to AMISOM’s specialist capabilities. Here gaps were apparent in several areas. Perhaps the most fundamental given the Mogadishu terrain was AMISOM’s initial lack of training and equipment for conducting offensive urban operations. It is widely acknowledged that urban theatres are a particularly complex environment for conducting warfare comprising of manmade features superimposed on natural terrain and usually with a significant population size and density and complex infrastructure. They tend to constrain movement, conceal opponents, limit observation distances and engagement ranges as well as weapons effectiveness not least because lines of sight are often interrupted (ibid).

All these elements tend to reduce technological advantages and put a premium on logistical as well as engineering capabilities. Moreover, academic studies of urban warfare campaigns have concluded that ‘short-term tactical advantage usually lies with the side having least regard for casualties’ and appropriate training and experience are of greater significance than doctrine and technology. For AMISOM, Mogadishu’s urban environment brought to the fore its lack of several key capabilities, particularly in the first few years of operations. Perhaps most notable were a lack of military engineering units, air assets (including UAVs), and comprehensive training in counter- 138

IED, sniper and other techniques of urban warfare. Upon realizing its limitations, AMISOM tried to rectify these deficiencies as soon as possible. Its need for training in urban warfare techniques was largely provided through a private contractor firm called Bancroft Global Development and some bilateral support packages from the US, UK and France. As one Ugandan colonel put it, his troops had been used to bush warfare not in an urban environment but after several years of operations and training in Mogadishu, ‘We can now deal with enemies hiding in buildings’ (ibid).

The lack of air assets also significantly constrained the mission. AMISOM’s strategic concept of operations finalized in early 2012 had recommended fourteen rotary and fixed-wing aircraft to support the operation. However, UN Security Council resolution 2036 (February 2012) authorized an aviation component of up to twelve helicopters (nine utility and three attack). The helicopters would provide air cover for troops, escort convoys, rescue/evacuation missions, and airdrop forces. Although AMISOM eventually had access to two civilian utility helicopters provided by UNSOA, its attempts to rectify its lack of military air assets met with disaster when in August 2012 three Ugandan military helicopters crashed on the slopes of Mount Kenya while flying at night to join AMISOM. The fact that by 2012 AMISOM had begun operating a small number of Ravens, hand- held surveillance drones, did not completely offset this loss. The other major capability gaps were in the area of logistics. Until early 2009, AMISOM’s logistics was basically carried out by the two TCCs (Uganda and Burundi) with bilateral assistance packages from several Western states. This did not work well with the Burundian contingent in particular suffering major logistical problems, including an inability to get reasonable supplies of rations to its soldiers. In January 2009, however, the UN established an unprecedented mechanism to provide logistical support to AMISOM. Specifically, as noted above, UN Security Council resolution 1863 created the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) to provide logistical support to AMISOM across a range of areas, excluding ammunition (ibid).

This was the first time the UN funded a regional peace operation through UN assessed peacekeeping contributions. UNSOA had been recommended by the Prodi Panel on AU-UN peacekeeping collaboration (2008) and was consistent with the UN’s ten-year plan to strengthen the AU’s capacity in peacekeeping. In August 2009 UNSOA established its logistical support base at Mombasa, from where stocks would be sent to AMISOM in Mogadishu, and an administrative base in Nairobi. The Mombasa-based team shipped consumable and nonconsumable items such as 139 rations, engineering materials, supply and communications and information technology items, direct to Mogadishu every two weeks without fail. UNSOA dramatically improved AMISOM’s logistics, turning it into a much more effective operation. However, it was not without its problems and limitations. The main problem from AMISOM’s perspective was that UNSOA was authorized to provide logistical support to AMISOM as if it were an ‘ordinary’ UN peacekeeping operation, which it was not. The key here was that AMISOM’s war-fighting activities were degrading vehicles and supplies at a much faster rate than a UN blue helmet operation. The subsequent disconnect between demand and supply generated considerable problems for AMISOM. In addition, the UNSOA package focused on the mission’s military component, which caused problems as AMISOM, became more multidimensional. Specifically, in September 2011 the AU voiced its concerns that UNSOA ‘is essentially directed at the military component of AMISOM, thus excluding the police and civilian components. This approach negates the very essence of the multi-dimensional nature of AMISOM and affects the effectiveness of the Mission in delivering support to the Somali people.’ Even so, it is difficult to imagine that AMISOM would have been able to conduct the offensive operations it did during 2010-11 without UNSOA. In that sense, UNSOA was far from a perfect solution but it represented a huge advance on what was previously available (ibid).

Governance without Government: According to two respondents in interviews, they argued that, since 2015 onwards, which was the second phase of AMISOM, there were no major operations. AMISOM had reached the climax of its strength and it could not extend beyond that. The issue was how to sustain those achievements that it had already attained. AMISOM military forces had gone too fast but then there was no follow up by the other lines of operation such as social economic and political. They argued that;

“The security forces run very fast, they reached but then there was no follow up by the political to do the governance, to do small local elections to enhance the legitimacy of the government. The government was nonexistent but the forces had gone too far.”

According to these respondents, Up to date, the country has not followed AMISOM to consolidate those achievements. The political line of operation has not followed to sustain the achievements

140 of AMISOM partly because the government was unprepared to manage such a wide territory and population who would have basic needs to be fulfilled, AU/AMISOM had not foreseen the eventuality of that expansion whether they needed to have a new mandate to enhance the operational capacity. The international community and the donors could not also foresee the eventuality of AMISOM advances, and the government not being able to catch up with them and what to do with it. That’s what has been happening in the last five years.

Paul D. Williams (2013) argues that, another challenge facing AMISOM was its role in the provision of governance structures. Although this was not a formal part of its initial mandate, as the primary source of protection for the TFG from early 2009, and as AMISOM expanded beyond the city of Mogadishu in 2012, the mission became implicated in questions about the provision of governance in Mogadishu and beyond. As AMISOM started to deploy outside Mogadishu, it became increasingly entangled in governance issues in what were initially called the ‘liberated areas’ those where Al-shabaab forces had been removed but the Somali authorities had yet to gain full control. For the AU, stabilization in Somalia referred to the multidimensional process of extending the administrative authority of the federal government, delivering services including food and water, healthcare, shelter, policing, and de-mining to local populations, and conducting a programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration for Al-shabaab and other militias that wished to lay down their arms. To win the support of the people in these areas, AMISOM had to help deliver some form of peace dividend to them.

One dimension of this challenge was that even the newly strengthened AMISOM (with just under 18,000 personnel) was nowhere near large enough to effectively stabilize its huge area of operations across south central Somalia. Whether one uses popular ratios of soldiers to locals; soldiers to territory; or soldiers to armed foes, AMISOM lacked the necessary numbers. The problem was that it also lacked an effective and sizable partner in the form of the Somali National Army and Police Force. Indeed, when AMISOM’s new concept of operations was developed in late 2011, the assessment had concluded that approximately 35,000 uniformed personnel would be required to do the job but since the UN Security Council was only willing to authorize half that number, the other half would come from the Somali security forces themselves. The problem, of course, was that such Somali forces simply did not exist and there were no sufficiently resourced

141 train and equip programs to generate them in the near future. In the interim period, AMISOM was left without an explicit mandate to engage in governance issues, without an argued plan to deliver such a peace dividend, without the necessary civilian personnel to carry out such tasks, and until late 2012 without a set of federal authorities to support it in the enterprise (ibid).

Warlordism: Following the downfall of Said Barre in 1991 according to one respondent in an interview, the might were the right, the state collapsed, there was no central authority to regulate state functions and there was emergency of warlordism. Warlordism is where you have the warlord mostly a military person, who takes over the area and it becomes an area of his control. He taxes people and manages the population by exploiting them. In other words, the state retracted to individual warlords in specific locations. Whoever kills the other and over runs him, he takes over. That menace of warlordism resolved some issues but also created more problems of a typical collapsed state. There was no central authority or state to execute the common good as it is supposed to be done in the modern times. Warlordism become the trend, warlords established local authority and set the pace for other clans to do the same. The Somali peace process therefore has been impeded by the structural factors which include the issue of control over land, clan superiority, the issue of sharing power and national resources.

Religion: is another rallying factor that was emphasized by the respondents behind the failures of AMISOM in its bid to restore peace in Somali. In an interview, one respondent recalled that, Somalia had been an ungoverned space for almost 2 decades and attempts in the early 1990’s, to restore order failed when the 2 UN mandated missions; United Nations Operation in Somalia 1, (UNOSOM 1) and United Nations Operation in Somalia 1(UNOSOM 11) collapsed and this ungoverned space became a safe haven for international terrorism. The first group that came in an organized form was the Union of Islamic Courts and this group was threatening the peace and stability not only of Somalia but also of the entire region. The respondent argued that the promoters of this extremist group had been trained and facilitated by the groups in the Middle East. So they came in not only with the hopes of thriving and developing from Somalia, but also to install a government based on extremist ideologies. The respondent argued that the spring board for the 2 simultaneous United States embassy bombings in 1998; one in Dar-al-salaam and another one in Nairobi in which more than 200 people were killed was in Somalia. According to this respondent,

142 in 2005, Uganda’s government accused the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) of working with other extremist groups around the world.

Robert Postings (2018) “The tentative ties between the Allied Democratic Forces and ISIS” concurs with this respondent and argues that, the ADF was founded in 1995 at Bunia in the DRC, by members of the Ugandan Muslim Freedom Fighters who had been driven out of Uganda. The ADF had the stated goal of overthrowing the Ugandan government and setting up an Islamic State and DRC offered a location from where they could launch attacks in Uganda. Other, more credible, claims have also been made linking the ADF to ISIS. The Hiraal Institute stated that, in 2016, “ADF members are said to have reached out to the Islamic State in Libya and Syria to discuss a formal relationship between the two groups. This was based on information obtained from detainee debriefs of Kenyan recruit to the ADF. Since 2017, ADF in the DRC has become a destination for Islamic State recruits from Kenya, with would-be ISIS members detained while attempting to join ADF, according to the Hiraal Institute report. MONUSCO, the UN Stabilization mission in DR Congo gave in 2014 the even more credulous claim that the ADF had links to al-Qaeda, Al-shabab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, the Taliban, and even Hezbollah. The same respondent in an interview also recalled that in the early 1990’s, Osama Bin Laden had staged his work from Khartoum-Sudan and Khartoum had become a center for Islamic renaissance in the world starting with Africa and it is at that time that a conference was held in 1992 in Khartoum in which they agreed on Islamisation and Arabnisation of the African region. The idea was to link the strategic waters of the Nile, the Islamic populations in Tanzania, Kenya through Uganda and South Sudan to the main Sudan which was Khartoum so that they have a link of Arab and Islamic interests addressed through Egypt or through Tanzania. The objective was to expand the Islamic sphere of influence and also ensure that the region had puppet governments in favor of the Afro-Arab groups in the North. And that’s how they started introducing humanitarian agencies that are of Islamic Nature such as Islamic relief agency and Islamic African relief agency. When Osama Bin Laden was finally removed from Khartoum, the extremist groups remained in Somalia. In other words, the fire for the renaissance of Islamic extremism had already started.

This respondent argued that, some groups in Uganda, including Kenya Eritrea and Ethiopia went for Islamic studies in Khartoum and some of those students who came out include; the Mufti of

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Uganda, Jamil Mukulu who was arrested in Tanzania in 2015 and is currently awaiting trial in the ICC for charges such as murder and crimes against humanity; among others. When these students came back, there was a division among them; those who felt they were supposed to execute the mission as understood and those who were liberal. That’s why the killings of Muslims in Uganda are between these groups; the liberal Muslims and the extremists according to this respondent. Robert Postings (2018) concurs with this argument and says that, in 1991, around 1,000 people, including future ADF leader Jamil Mukulu, stormed the headquarters of the Ugandan Muslim Supreme Council, an organization comprising all Muslim leaders in Uganda, over a disagreement with senior clerics’ interpretation of Islam. Four police officers and an activist were killed in the violence. Around 400 people were jailed for their involvement, including Mukulu. Upon his release in 1993, Mukulu formed the Saalaf Foundation which included an armed wing, Ugandan Muslim Freedom Fighters, the precursor group to the ADF. Ugandan forces quickly drove them out of Uganda into the DRC where the remnants would form the ADF. Robert Postings (2018) an ex-combat interviewed in 2002 said,

“The agenda of the ADF was purely political.” and “Islam was a ticket, so the leaders disguised their political motives in religion.”

According to this respondent, the same groups had developed in Somalia and because of statelessness, they found it a better place for even hipping what Huntington calls the “clash of civilization inside agenda”, to work against western imperialism (the rule of law, democracy, western education etc.), and also act against tendencies of undermining Islamic fundamentalism by countries that are led by “Infidels” and have influence on Somalia. Samuel P. Huntington (1993) “The clash of civilization” argues that rather than the fundamental sources of conflict in the new world being primarily ideological or economic, the great divisions that would dominate conflict would be cultural. Huntington divided the world into eight great “civilizations” (Western and Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox, Buddhist, and Japanese) He predicted conflict along the fault lines of those civilizations. In contrast to realists who used balance of power theory to predict that interstate conflicts would re-emerge between Germany and its neighbors, or some liberals who expected the democratic peace to spread around the globe, Huntington saw culture as a source of conflict.

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Therefore, according to this respondent, the whole Islamic courts came in not only to provide the most needed and lucrative common good which was justice because Somali had collapsed into lawlessness, and the rule of the jungle was the order of the day, might was right, people started taking over peoples’ land, reengineered the population settlement in Somalia, and people had no say. The ICU brought justice to Somalia and since justice is so easy to dispense; you need 2 people; the judge and the complainant and the other one is brought to book, it was very easy for the ICU to take root and establish a social base in Somalia. But the agenda was not just justice; the agenda was governance; to establish a government based on Islamic fundamentalist ideologies.

In an interview, another respondent argued that the Al-shabab is a local group but with a global agenda pursuing an Islamist agenda which he called politicized religion. It’s a terrible concoction when you mix religion and politics, it becomes explosive. Al-shabab and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) are different strands or brands of the same religion pursuing an Islamist agenda. The issue of the Al-shabab not allowing people to watch TVs, or use mobile phones is just to keep the population in the dark in order to facilitate control. He argued that, Al-shabab is the product of the ICU and there are people who perceive that the ICU was effective in governing Somalia but also a number of people are opposed to anything Islamist-extremists. He compared the Al-shabab to the Christian extremists like Kony of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda who was killing people on the basis of 10 commandments. He argued that, when religion is mixed with politics, it means that you do not engage others because you see yours as the only approach to leadership and therefore, you are either with them or you are the enemy. However, another respondent argued that most of what the Al-shabab says such as; being opposed to western education, no watching Television; they do not necessarily mean them. He argued that some of the Al-shabab leaders take their children to school because they do not want to be left behind when they finally take over power. They too want to be competitive in the real market. “Most times, what they say is just propaganda”.

More so, another respondent argued that the Somali peace process has been impeded by the American policy of war on terror and the war in the Middle East. He argued that the Somali conflict is a war between the Western Gudo-Christian western world vs. Islamic Arab World. It is a clash of ideologies. When the west invaded Iraq and Afghanistan, it came to reality that the west is against the Islamic world. So the Muslims must also prepare and fight for their faith and that’s why

145 the AL-shabab is using the infrastructure of Islam to posit their argument. Currently, all the AMISOM’s troop contributing countries are Christian dominated countries. This can threaten the status quo having a lot of Christians around, and doing things that can redirect the history and the destiny of the country. Therefore, this mobilizes Al-Shabab/Muslims to even work harder and thus hindering the peace process.

Geographical Politics: When one respondent was asked in an interview as to why Somalis cannot organize themselves against foreign interferences, he argued that, when the state collapsed in 1991, Somalis were fragmented; there was no central rallying person. “A person to rally a people together must have overriding capacity. There must be a consent of a strong man who is stronger than the rest, he fights the state, establishes the government and dominates the whole country” A case in point is Yoweri Museveni in Uganda who emerged stronger than all other rebel groups, defeated the state and established his government in 1986. He argued that, if there is no body that is stronger than the others, it means they will remain fragmented in different enclaves. The respondent also argued that there is a factor of divide and rule by silent players including Ethiopia and Kenya due to Somalia’s irredentism and others because they cannot stand a united Somalia.

“Somalia is a sleeping giant, if it wakes up, it will step on others. Another sleeping giant is Congo, if Congo is organized, most countries will be finished because they will have the resources and the capacity to annihilate others. Competition between states is like competition between human beings.”

The respondent argued that, since 1991 there was no central rallying point or person that could bring people together and up to now there are still disagreements between the FGS and its FMS. Another respondent argued that the conflict of Somalia is like cutting an onion with so many layers and;

“If you cannot get the politics right, then you cannot get the governance right.”

The failure to integrate the Somali indigenous approaches such as the guurti system: From the table below respondents were asked whether the failure to integrate the Somali indigenous approaches such as the guurti system that was used in 1993 in Somaliland in ensuring the maintenances of

146 peace full talks and co-existences between clans has made it difficult to achieve lasting peace in Somalia and the results are as follows.

Table 4.23. Showing the failure to integrate the Somali indigenous approaches such as the guurti system Response Frequency Percent

Strongly Disagree 30 12.5 Disagree 65 27.1 Valid Uncertain 20 8.3 Strongly Agree 45 18.8 Agree 80 33.3

Total 240 100 Source: primary source, 2019

From the table above, 12.5% of the respondents Strongly Disagreed; 27.1% of the respondents Disagreed; 8.3% of the respondents were Uncertain; 18.8% of the respondents Strongly Agreed while 33.3% of the respondents Agree that the failure to integrate the Somali indigenous approaches into Somali conflict resolution had impeded peace. However, in interviews, respondents argued that the role of elders has been compromised in the peace process. Since the Somali conflict is majorly on clannism, clan and religious elders would play a vital role in negotiations since some of these clans support the Al-shabaab with their clan militia groups. In focused group discussions, respondents argued that Women have not been involved in this peace process. Because of the sharia law that does not allow women to participate actively in the society. One respondent argued that Women can easily pass through the Al-shabaab territories without being harmed unless they are found with AMISOM items like Apples and Yoghurt. The Al- shabaab rarely hurt women because they are their mothers, sisters and daughters. He argued that, if women could be more involved, they could act as informers to AMISOM and also help in the negotiation process. However, one respondent in an interview argued that clan elders and religious elders have been involved in the peace process but at a minimal level.

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Lack of political will: Lack of political will to do on part of the government to mobilize the Somalis to do their role has impeded peace in Somalia according to respondents. In an interview, one respondent argued that, “all of the above could be attributed however;

“The major setback is the failure of the FGS to correctly identify its priorities, mobiles the Somalis to focus on achieving those priorities while being supported by the people, AMISOM, and the international community”.

According to the report on the Ten-Year AMISOM Lessons Learned Conference published by the Peace and Security Department of the African Union Commission (2017), although AMISOM had achieved a variety of operational success over the last decade, some of those gains remained fragile and could be reversed, especially if Somalia governance structures could not deliver safety, services and justice to local populations in the areas recovered from al-shabab.13 In another interview, when one respondent was asked whether the Political institutions in Somalia establish and promote fair and balanced relationship among all Somalis he argued that;

“The Somali institutions are preoccupied with sectarianism and injustice” and hence no fair and balanced relationship among all Somalis.

4.4.1 The study asked respondents whether Somalis like the interference of the foreign countries when resolving their intra-state conflicts and the results are shown below:

Table 4.24. Showing whether the Somalis like foreign interference when resolving their intra state conflict Response Frequency Percentage Yes 77 32.1 No 163 67.9 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 67.9% of the respondents argued that Somalis do not like the interference of the foreign countries when resolving their intra-state conflicts while 32.1% of the respondents argued that Somalis like the interference of the foreign countries when resolving their intra-state conflicts. In an interview, one respondent argued that, the Somalis do not want to be bossed around

148 in their own country while another respondent in an interview argued that the interference by foreign countries exacerbate the bad situation to escalate. For example, the on-going Gulf crisis has somewhat drawn-in the FMS to ally themselves with Saudi/UAE and the FGS is seen to be allied to Qatar hence divided loyalties. Therefore, this Somalis’ resentment towards foreigner intervention in their internal conflicts has impeded the peace process because the Somalis will not be willing to cooperate with AMISOM.

4.4.2 The study also asked respondents whether AMISOM was deployed in Somali when the conflict had already escalated and the results are shown below.

Table 4.25 showing whether AMISOM was deployed in Somali when the conflict had already escalated Response Frequency Percent

Strongly Disagree 39 16.3 Disagree 47 19.5 Strongly Agree 66 27.5 Agree 50 20.8 Uncertain 38 15.8 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 16.3% of the respondents strongly disagreed that AMISOM was deployed in Somalia when the conflict had already escalated; 19.5% of the respondents agreed that AMISOM was deployed in Somalia when the conflict had already escalated; 27.5% of the respondents strongly agreed that AMISOM was deployed in Somalia when the conflict had already escalated; 20.8% agreed that AMISOM was deployed in Somalia when the conflict had already escalated while 15.8% were uncertain. In an interview, one respondent said that;

“The conflict(s) in Somalia have a long history; most of the conflicts begin locally but are mismanaged and escalate to national level and eventually are allowed to grow and escalated by international stakeholders. He argued that a case in point, is the current stalemate between the FGS and FMS where by the FMS have cut off their working relationship with the

FGS and such differences could have been resolved if they were tackled early.”

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In an interview, another respondent said that AMISOM was deployed in Somalia after when Clans had acquired guns, and the warlords had developed capability to resist at any force. There was no government by then; the sitting government was operating in Kenya. Lawlessness was the order of the day. There was no state or government only clan militias and warlords controlling given territories. Hunger, famine and a state of hopelessness was rampant. Death everywhere in thousands, Somalia was regarded as “Death on Arrival” to whoever would dare come to the country to help. He argued that, If AMISOM had been deployed before the formation of ICU; the situation would not have deteriorated to this level. Another respondent in an interview argued that “The conflict was ripe for settlement because Somalis had reached a mutually hurting point.”

4.4.3 The study also asked respondents whether AMISOM has the capacity to end the conflict and ensure lasting peace and the results are shown below.

Table 4.26. Showing whether AMISOM has capacity to end conflict and ensure lasting peace Response Frequency Percentage Yes 137 57 No 103 43 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above; 57% of the respondents argued that AMISOM has the capacity to end the Somali conflict and ensure lasting peace while 43% of the respondents argued that AMISOM does not have the capacity to end the Somali conflict and ensure lasting peace. Respondents in focused group discussions argued that AMISOM has the capacity to end the conflict and ensure lasting peace in Somalia only if it is left alone without the interference of UN and other external forces. In an interview however, one respondent argued that;

“AMISOM’s mandate is to support FGS institutions in order to pursue for an enduring peace and stability and so AMISOM alone cannot deliver peace.”

Paul Williams (2013) argues that AMISOM cannot force Somalia’s political elites to reconcile and implement a workable national security architecture focused on defeating Al-shabaab. Today

150 therefore, AMISOM like several other peace enforcement missions is stuck facing an enemy it cannot defeat alone while waiting for Somali Politicians to build the effective local security forces that would allow it to drawdown.

4.4.4 Are Military operations the only way out for lasting peace in Africa?

In an interview, when one respondent was asked why it has become a trend in Africa that every new government that comes into power is through force/blood shed a case in Point is Uganda from Amin’s government to Obote 11”s government to 1986 NRM government, Sudan has had its fair share of coup d’états, Libya among others, and AMISOM is currently sustaining the FGS by force and whether Military operations is the only way out to bring about lasting peace and stability in Africa, he argued that, The use of military to bring about the lasting peace in Africa is not the way to go . He however added that,

“Each case has its own facts and circumstance. For example, what happened in Somalia, the only way you can bring order to Somalia could only have been through military intervention because the State had collapsed. What happened in Libya was unfortunate; the removal of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 even with his imperfections because what is now the state of Libya? No order, the state has collapsed and militias all over, the similar thing likely to happen after the ouster of Omar al-Bashir on 11 April 2019 however the military has a role in keeping the integrity of Sudan together and by the look of things, they have had some compromises with other agitators and hopefully Sudan will remain contact. Therefore, the military has a role to play but it should not usurp the role of the people in determining who rules them in Africa.”

4.4.5 Gap to be bridged to move towards lasting peace in Somalia

The study asked respondents whether there is still an important gap to be bridged to move towards lasting peace in Somalia and the results are shown below. Table 4.27. Showing whether there is still an important gap to be bridged towards lasting peace in Somalia Response Frequency Percent

Strongly Disagree 45 18.4

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Disagree 42 17.5 Strongly Agree 37 15.4 Agree 78 32.5 Uncertain 38 15.5 Total 240 100 Source: Primary data 2019

From the table above, 18.4% of the respondents strongly disagreed that there is an important gap to bridge towards lasting peace in Somalia; 17.5% of the respondents disagreed that there is an important gap to bridge towards lasting peace in Somalia; 15.4% of the respondents strongly agreed that there is an important gap to bridge towards lasting peace in Somalia; 32.5% of the respondents agreed that there is an important gap to bridge towards lasting peace in Somalia; 15.5% of the respondents were uncertain. In an interview, on respondent argued that the Somali crisis is largely attributed to political/governance crisis. He argued that;

“Unless if a resolution is established in political/governance line of operation; no amount of effort can obtain lasting peace in Somalia.”

Another respondent in an interview argued that UNSCR 2472 (2019) urges FGS and the Federal Member States to resolve major three key issues; (1)Resource sharing, (2) Power sharing, and (3) what responsibilities are for the FGS and what responsibilities are for the Federal Member States (FMS). Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the UNSC calls on the FGS and FMS urgently to accelerate progress towards an inclusive political settlement, that includes: 1) their agreement on resource and power sharing to be enshrined in the revision of the Provisional Federal Constitution 2) the establishment of governance and oversight structures, and

3) the delineation of roles and responsibilities of Somalia’s security institutions; and further calls on the FGS and FMS to accelerate security planning for elections, in coordination with AMISOM, UNSOS, and UNSOM, including to allow an inclusive, peaceful, free and fair oneperson-one-vote in 2020/2021; Underlines that the threat of Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups will not be defeated by military means alone and in this regard, calls on the FGS, FMS, AMISOM, the UN and UN Member states to work together to take a comprehensive approach to security. According to this respondent, all this has not yet happened and therefore as long as there is still fighting 152 between the FGS and the Federal Member States as it is today, peace cannot prevail in Somalia. He argued that;

“If you cannot get the politics right, then you cannot get the governance right and you cannot resolve the issues of Somalia. The Somali conflict is easy to resolve if all the players understood and did their part but if the players are not sincere, we will never get anywhere.”

According to this respondent, Somalia Security Pact 2017, on 16 April 2017, was a historic political agreement reached by the FGS and Federal Member States (FMSs) on Somalia’s National Security Architecture, and endorsed by Somalia’s National Security Council on 8 May. This political agreement underpins and is central to achieving sustainable security reform and a transition of primary responsibility of security from AMISOM to Somali security Forces. This Pact sets out an argued vision of Somali-led security institutions and forces that are affordable, acceptable, accountable and have the ability to provide the security and protection that the people of Somalia deserve and need, in accordance with international humanitarian and human rights standards, as part of a comprehensive approach to security.

According to the Somalia Security Pact 2017, FMS and FGS agreed that the Somali National Army is to consist of: Somali Ground Forces, Somali Air Force, Somali Maritime Forces/Navy with Key Tasks/Responsibilities of; Safeguarding National Unity/Sovereignty of the country; Safeguarding and defending the borders of the country; Defending against external threats and any internal threats that endanger the stability of the country. Figures/Numbers of the SNA and Police Force: Recognizing the challenges of Somali budget and revenue generation recommended at least 18,000 of the Somali National Army (SNA) , excluding the Special Forces(Danab), Air force and Navy and 32,000 Somali police, divided into Federal Police and State Police as per the New Policing Model. And this work was to be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017. It is two years down the road since the Somali Security Pact was signed and according to this same respondent none or slow progress has been made so far. He argued that, if the FGS can generate these forces as agreed upon in the Security Pact 2017, then the withdrawal of

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AMISOM/Transition plan today would be just automatic. Another respondent argued that;

“We can’t have endless programs. People who are financing us become tired; the government may never grow, the child can never breast feed forever. the government must develop its own capacity more faster, AMISOM should not create conditions and think it has to be in Somalia permanently, immediately as the mission is created, the last chapter is called the exist. You must have an exit strategy.”

This respondent argued that the plan is that in the next three years, AMISOM must be able to go after a comprehensive review by an independent body to warrant it whether to remain or go. AMISOM’s job was not to reduce al-shabab but to bring it to a manageable level by the Somali government which AMISOM has done. In another Interview, a Somali National business man was asked what he thinks would happen in Somalia if AMISOM was to exist Somalia like today and he argued that; “One thing would happen. The FGS and the Al-shabab would fight and whoever wins, would take over the State.”

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents a summary of the findings, conclusions, recommendations and areas of further study derived from this study on the effectiveness of peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa with specific reference to AMISOM in the period 2007-2019.

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5.1 Summary of the Findings

This research was carried out to assess the effectiveness of peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa with specific reference to AMISOM in the period 2007-2019. The summary of the findings is done in relation to the study objectives:

5.1.1. The strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the drivers of the Somali conflict since 2007- 2019

The research found out that AMISOM has employed several strategies to mitigate the Somali Conflict which include: AMISOM is an African Initiative hinged on the idea of Pan-Africanism “African Solutions for African Problems, Robust Mandate to reduce the threat of Al-shabaab; War Lords and other Clan Militia groups, Use of Multiple Players to sustain the Mission, Sectorolization to make the mission more effective which has helped to re-capture considerable territory from Al-shabaab , Civil Military projects not only to alleviate human suffering but also to win the “hearts and minds” of the populace to support the Mission; Protection of key Government infrastructures as they carry out their functions to stabilize the situation in the country, Multidimensional Mission not only for peace and security but also to prevent the conflict from relapsing and for social economic development Somali.

5.1.2 The achievements of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019

The Research found out that, the AMISOM personnel deployed to Somalia had to endure one of the most difficult theatres in the history of modern peace operations. They were sent to an active warzone to try and make peace where there was no peace to keep. Somalia was in a state of lawlessness, statelessness, and anarchism. The might was the right- it was the rule of the Jungle. None of the multiple armed groups was particularly interested in peace because AMISOM was viewed by the armed rebel groups as the western move against the Islamic movement in Somalia. The troops were deployed amidst huge international pessimism and with almost little international support because the mission was perceived to be too challenging and impossible. The force was

155 not only deployed with no enough resources and capabilities to counteract a challenging enemy- the Al-shabaab but also, the African bush army was not familiar with urban warfare tactics. And yet, AMISOM displayed unshakable resilience and determination in the face of these challenges.

12 years later, AMISOM has been remarkable in several ways; AMISOM recaptured considerable territory from Al-shabaab between 2011 and 2015, including the capital city of Mogadishu, the Sea Port, Mogadishu International Airport, Somali Military Academy, Parliament, State House, and Somali National Stadium returning them to the jurisdiction of an internationally backed government. Halane Area which was a jungle in 2007, its now home to almost all International organizations operating in Somalia which include, UNICEF,UNHCR,UNSOS,UNSOM, EU UN,AU among others. Over 33 Foreign Missions and Embassies have re-opened their offices in Somalia all of which had closed since 1991. The regions recaptured from Al-shabaab include Banadir, Baidoa, Kisimayo, Dobhey, Johar, and Beletweyne including a number of supply and transit routes occupied by six sectors of AMISOM. AMISOM managed to ensure the TFG’s survival by fending off a much larger Alshabaab force and enabled the formation of the Federal Government of Somalia in September 2012 and AMISOM still provides protection to Key Government infrastructures including State House and Parliament as they carry out their functions to stabilize the situation in the country.

The Research also found out that AMISOM has also created a conducive environment for humanitarian responses by recapturing regions that were a nogo zones and by providing security to various international humanitarian agencies such as UNCEF, UNHCR among others thereby enabling humanitarian assistance to the IDPs, children, refugees, women among others that have been affected by the conflict. The research also found out that in almost the last 4 years, no major operations have been carried out by AMISOM but only consolidating already made achievements. The Research also found out that the Somali National Forces have started doing some limited operations on their own and with improved command and administration, they will eventually gain confidence.

However; the research found that, on the other hand, Somalia still faces a complex combination of new and old threats to its stability and progress. AMISOM is far from a complete success story. The Somali Conflict is far from being resolved. Al-Shabaab is far from being defeated and

156 continues to be a big threat to the peace and security of Somalia. The research also found out that the achievements of AMISOM can easily be reversed and the FGS still lacks the resources and capabilities to take over from AMISOM. The research also found out that according to OCHA report 2017, the humanitarian crisis in Somalia is one of the most complex and longstanding emergencies in the world. In 2018, an estimated 6.2 million people, half of the population, will continue to need humanitarian assistance and protection, including 3.3 million who will require urgent life-saving assistance. More than one-third of those in need are internally displaced persons (IDPs). The ongoing conflict continues to undermine the resilience of communities, trigger displacement and impede access to basic services as well as humanitarians’ access to those in need.

5.1.3 The factors behind AMISOM’s failures in its bid to restore peace in Somalia since 2007- 2019.

The research also found out that, the mission is still unable to overcome the issues of internal coordination, especially with the issue of Multi-dimensional command where the TCCs commanders take order from their Capitals not the force commander; AMISOM is still heavily funded from the basket of the willing partners; Somalia is a boiling port of multiple players where they do not always speak with one voice and others are conflict entrepreneurs; Al-shabaab continues to be a challenging and almost an invisible enemy resorting to “hit and melt” war tactics and IEDs even in liberated areas; AMISOM continues to largely depend on western liberal conflict resolution mechanisms without incorporating local approaches by involving local leaders such as clans and religious leaders in the peace process; The marginalization of some clans, politicized Clans and religious fundamentalism continue to impede the peace process, Moreover, the pace at which the requisite SNA troops are being generated/mobilized to take over from AMISOM is too slow (in peace meal) to match the pressure being mounted on AMISOM to draw down.

5.2 Conclusion

This research assessed the effectiveness of peace enforcement missions in the promotion of peace in Africa with specific reference to AMISOM in the period 2007-2019. This study therefore; conclusively argues that, much as the presence of AMISOM in Somalia is considered a Just war against statelessness, warlordism, lawlessness, anarchism, humanitarian crisis that the Somalis

157 have faced for the last 20years and the need to protect the peace, security and stability of the entire International Community; peace enforcement missions are effective in mitigating the anarchical state of the conflict but they are not effective in dealing with structural, historical and contextual narratives of the society where most intra-state conflicts stem from including the Somali Conflict. Reducing the threat posed by al-Shabaab is not enough to achieve sustainable peace in Somalia. The Somali conflict has been “reduced or pruned” by AMISOM but not uprooted and AMISOM cannot uproot it either. Somalia is among the 5 top unpeaceful countries in the world ranking number 163 according to GPI 2019 report by IEP with accumulated points of 3.574 on a scale of 1-5 and also ranked number 149 according to IDHI 2019 report by UNDP. If the fundamental causes of the conflict are not mitigated then the conflict is not mitigated. In order to understand structural violence and the causes of war, issues of development, equality and more broadly, social justice, have to be considered. Peace consists not only of the absence of war or other forms of structural violence but also having a positive aspect, in terms of the ‘integration of human society’. AMISOM has been able to achieve to a greater extent negative peace but not positive peace in Somalia. Positive peace can only be achieved by the Somali Government and Somalis themselves. Only the achievement of both negative and positive peace will ensure human survival and human flourishing. Things can be done cosmetically but soon or later unravel or spark other conflicts and if force is used unsuccessfully, then the belligerents will fight back.

5.3 Recommendations

There is no amount of force that can restore lasting peace and stability to Somalia. Somalia needs a strong rallying person (Somali National) to rally all Somalis behind a common identity, ideology and purpose.

Insurgents survive only when there is a sense of deprivation, and injustice in society. The Alshabaab is not a big problem to Somalia’s stability and progress. The problem is the government failing to put things in order. It needs to put its act together. This is where the government institutions; Police army, judiciary, and other Agencies need to work together and enhance the effectiveness of the government and make the Al-shabaab feel that they are not effective as they could be. Government institutions need to look like they are capable, credible, professionals, accountable, people can put their trust in these institutions. The government needs to win the

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“hearts and minds” of the people. The government needs to come out with a strategy to compel the Al-shabaab to come to the table and the government cannot compel them to come to the table when it is still disorganized. The war against Al-shabaab can only be; an all-out victory; negotiated victory or negotiated settlement. The FGS should correctly identify its priorities, mobiles the Somalis to focus on achieving those priorities while being supported by the people, AMISOM, and the international community.

The progress achieved by AMISOM is still reversible particularly due to the slow pace of national reconciliation, apart from Al-Shabaab’s threat and clan divisions, fragile FGS-FMS relations and the presence of Islamic extremist groups who are not under one single command and control in Somalia is also a grave concern. Therefore, the FGS and the FMS need to work out their differences as soon as possible and build not a fragmented but rather a united Nation. If you cannot get the politics right, then you cannot get the governance right. Donors and other partners need to Channel the resources through the TFG so that it can be able to build its institutions instead of channeling the resources through International agencies.

The Mission Capacity should match its mandate; militarily and financially. There is need to undertake an orderly and responsible transition in order to avoid reversal of the gains achieved. A poor transition from one mission to another has serious implications for the use of force, since the belligerents are likely to take advantage of a power vacuum.

African Union needs to create ways through which it can be able to fund its own Initiatives other than relying on the mercy of the willing partners. Funders get fatigued; external funding limits Africa’s decision making capacity while others impose their own interests on Africa. More AU member countries should start to participate and support AU initiatives because Africa can only be saved by Africans.

The people of Somalia and Somali Diasporas need to start telling their own story through all channels of communication; be it print or electronic; The ideology of patriotism and nationalism instead of clannism should be preached in all Universities and schools so that a good number of Somalis can speak for Somalia other than their story being told by foreigners. As Muhoozi Kainerugaba (2010) puts it; it is an obligation for more Africans to articulate the continent’s history and dynamics, something only they could do with some degree of accuracy. It is also incumbent

159 upon those external actors who claim an interest in Africa’s progress, to endeavor to understand these African voices instead of “drinking the kool Aid.”

Durable peace in African cannot be attained in African until those working for peace on the continent start to factor local approaches into their conflict management strategies. Historical and contextual drivers of the Somali conflict can only be resolved by the Somalis themselves. There is need to incorporate the wisdom of Somali elders, chiefs and women into their conflict management traditions with AMISOM and other foreign players giving a supporting role.

5.4 Areas of further study

Another researcher can set off by looking at why some civil wars take longer than others. Also another academician can critically examine the role of external players in the Somali Conflict (Uganda and Kenya).

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APPENDIX A: ADMINISTERED QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear Sir/Madam

I am currently undertaking a study on the topic “effectiveness of peacekeeping missions in the

promotion of peace in Africa” a case of AMISOM 2007-2019 in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of a Master of Arts Degree in International Relations and Diplomacy of Nkumba University.

The information sought is required only for academic purposes. Participation is entirely out of your free will and necessary for the success of this work. Information provided will be handled with utmost confidentiality.

Sincerely

......

ESTER NINSHABA

SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Your Sex Male Female

2. Your age group: 20-30 years 31-39 years 40-49 years 40-50 years above 51 years

3. Your level of education: Certificate Diploma Bachelor’s Degree Master Degree PhD Degree

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4. What is your Occupation...... ?

SECTION B: Strategies that AMISOM is using to mitigate the Somali Conflict since 20072019

5. Armed groups in the Somali Conflict a. Somali Islamic Front b. Hizb al- IslamiyahAl-shabaab c. Al-Qaeda d. Islamic courts Union e. Harakat Al-shabaab (The Youth Movement) f. Anole group g. Transitional Federal Government h. Others (please specify)...... 6. Different actors in AMISOM a. Media b. Civil society Organizations c. Transitional Federal Government d. Terrorists e. Neighbouring states f. United States g. Others (please specify): ......

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SECTION C: The effectiveness of the factors behind the victories of AMISOM in the promotion of peace in Somalia since 2007-2019

7. Why did the African Union involve other actors to the Somali’s conflict resolution? a. Involving the civil society pressurises the belligerents b. The media mobilises public support c. Involving the broader society creates opportunity for peace d. Involving foreign Military forces weakens the belligerents e. Financial support Others (please specify): ......

8. Do you think bomb blasts in Somalia lead to displacement of ordinary citizens to seek refuge in new areas? a. Yes

b. No

If Yes, How many people do you think get affected by displacements seeking refuge in new areas?

50-150

151-1000

1500-2000

2000-5000

Others (please specify…………………

9. The displacement of Somali citizens has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM by;

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5% 10% 20% 50% Others please (specify)......

10. The Somali conflict increased sexual violence against women in Somalia a. Yes b. No

If Yes, How many women do you think get affected by the conflict each week? 10-50 51-100 150-2000 Others please (specify)......

11. The sexual violence against women in this region has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM by;

5% 10% 20% 50% Others please (specify)...... Please defend your answer......

12. The Somali conflict increased child abuse in Somalia such as; a. Child labour b. Trafficking c. Sexual abuse d. Radicalization e. School dropout f. Others (please specify): ......

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......

13. Child abuse has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM by;

5% 10% 20% 50% Others please (specify)...... 14. Many Somalis still lack food, shelter, water and proper sanitation because of the conflict a. Yes

b. No

If yes, how many people do you think get affected by this crisis each day?

50-150

151-1000

1500-2000

2000-5000

Others (please specify…………………

15. The basic needs crisis has reduced since the deployment of AMISOM by;

5% 10% 20% 50% Others please (specify)......

16. Somalis are able to move and trade in all Somali regions peacefully

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a. Yes b. No

If yes or no, defend your answer? ......

17. Trade, business, family and social life have improved in Somalia since the deployment of AMISOM by;

5% 10% 20% 50% Others please (specify)...... 18. With the presence of AMISOM, Al-shabaab is no longer a threat to Somalia Yes No Please defend your answer......

19. AMISOM provides incentives and meaningful pathways for communication for all the warring parties to make their intensions credible

a. Yes b. No Please explain your answer...... 20. The Somali Government and the Government Forces are ready for the transition from AMISOM and are able to take the responsibility of defending and protecting their country Yes No Please defend your answer...... 21. The current peace stability in Somalia can only be attributed to AMISOM

Yes No

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Please explain your answer......

SECTION D: The flaws in the factors behind the failures of AMISOM in its bid to enforce peace in Somalia since 2007-2019

22. The flaws in the factors behind the failures of AMISOM (please tick where appropriate) a. Lack of inclusiveness has led to failure to establish sustainable peace b. The internal structures of each opposition group has been a challenge to the peace process c. Presence of major power interest has impeded peace d. Failure to understand the intentions of each group by the other has impeded peace e. Spoilers have been responsible for the failure of peace f. The availability of weapons has impeded peace g. Clannism has impeded peace h. Language barrier i. Death of the soldiers j. Others (please specify): ......

23.The increasing threat of global terror has brought further insecurity to Somalia

a. Yes b. No Please defend your answer......

24.Do Somalis like the interference of the foreign countries when resolving their intra-state conflicts?

a. Yes b. No Please defend your answer......

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25. The failure to integrate the Somali Indigenous approaches such as the guurti system that was used in 1993 in Somaliland in ensuring and maintaining peaceful talks and co-existence between clans has made it difficult to achieve lasting peace in Somalia. Strongly Disagree Disagree Not Sure Agree Strongly Agree

25. Addressing the causes of conflict when it’s still early enables building of sustainable peace Strongly Disagree Disagree Not Sure Agree Strongly Agree

26. Do you think AMISOM was deployed in Somali when the conflict had already escalated? a. Yes

b. No If yes or No, please defend your answer…………………………

27.Do you think AMISOM has the capacity to end the conflict and ensure lasting peace? a.

Yes

b. No If yes or no, would you please explain? ......

28. There is still an important gap to be bridged to move towards lasting peace in Somalia Strongly Disagree Disagree Not Sure Agree Strongly Agree Please explain your answer......

29. What do you think should be done differently by AMISOM to end the conflict and ensure lasting peace in Somalia?

……………………………………………………………………….

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APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. What is the main concern of this peace mission? 2. Why was it necessary for a foreign military intervention? 3. Did all warring parties consent to AMISOM’s deployment? 4. What issues of concern have made belligerents fail to establish sustainable peace? 5. Does AMISOM need to address the causes of conflict to provide sustainable peace? 6. How has the broader society been involved in the peacekeeping mission? 7. What has been the significance of different third party members in the peace mission? 8. How has been the involvement of women in the peace process? 9. How have the historical and contextual narratives in society been handled? 10. How has fair and balanced relationship among the Somali people been promoted in this peace mission? 11. Have you provided any meaningful pathway for communication for all warring parties to make their intentions known and credible? 12. Do you have any incentives for belligerents, making peace more desirable or war more costly? 13. How do you prevent political abuse by one side (generally the government) that might cause actors losing the peace to take up arms anew and spoil the peace process? Making it unbiased protector of the people rather than a weapon of suppression. 14. How do you reduce the uncertainty and fear that drives security dilemma spirals. 15. Do you encourage the armed rebels to put down their weapons and transform them into political organizations using appropriate non-violent means to mete out their grievances and compete in the election cycle? Since many of these groups serve as the chief opposition to the government, but lack the means or know-how to operate effectively as political organizations. 16. How effective have you been in helping the displaced persons since 2007? 17. How effective have you been in reducing child abuse since 2007? 18. How effective have you been in handling the humanitarian crisis in terms of food, shelter, sanitation since 2007? 19. What has been the effect of your presence in the success of this peace mission

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20. Who have been the spoilers in this peace process? 21. How has been the involvement of clan and religious leaders in the peace talks? 22. Do you think the FGS is ready for the Transition? 23. What have been your key setbacks in this peace mission?

24. What has been the role of the civil society and the media in the peace process?

25. Do the belligerents have a vested interest in sustaining peace? 26. How is your engagement with the populace? 27. Does AMISOM have clear guidelines it follows when promoting peace and good governance in Somalia? 28. Do think you have the capacity to end this conflict and ensure lasting peace? 29. What do you think should be done differently to end the conflict and ensure lasting peace in Somalia?

APPENDIX C: FOCUS GROUP DISCUSIONS GUIDE

1. Why was it necessary for a foreign military intervention? 2. Did all warring parties consent to AMISOM’s deployment? 3. What issues of concern have made belligerents fail to establish sustainable peace? 4. Does AMISOM need to address the causes of conflict to provide sustainable peace? 5. What has been the significance of different third party members in the peace mission? 6. How has been the involvement of women in the peace process? 7. How have the historical and contextual narratives in society been handled? 8. How has fair and balanced relationship among the Somali people been promoted in this peace mission? 9. How effective has AMISOM been in helping the displaced persons since 2007? 10. How effective has AMISOM been in reducing child abuse since 2007? 11. How effective has AMISOM been in handling the humanitarian crisis in terms of food, shelter, sanitation since 2007? 12. Is Al-shabaab still a threat to Somalia? 13. What has been the effect of AMISOM’s presence in the success of this peace mission

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14. Who have been the spoilers in this peace process? 15. How has been the involvement of clan and religious leaders in the peace talks? 16. Do you think the FGS is ready for the Transition? 17. Do the belligerents have a vested interest in sustaining peace? 18. How is your engagement with the populace? 19. Do think you have the capacity to end this conflict and ensure lasting peace?

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APPENDIX E: MAP OF SOMALIA

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APPENDIX F:POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOMALIA

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