Max Scheler and the Emotional Turn
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3, 2015 Max scheler and the emotional turn 1 ISSN 2284-2918 Thaumàzein - Rivista di Filosofia ISSN: 2284-2918 DOI® NUMBER Each paper published in Thaumàzein is assigned a DOI® number, which appears beneath the author's affiliation in the published paper. DIRETTORE GUIDO CUSINATO REDAZIONE GIOVANNI ALBERTINI, MARIA CHIARA BRUTTOMESSO, GIACOMO PEZZANO, ALBERTO ROMELE, RIE SHIBUYA, PAOLO VANINI. COMITATO SCIENTIFICO Damir BarBarić - ZagaBria marcelo Boeri - Santiago Del cile antonio Da re - PaDova roBerta De monticelli - milano, S. raffaele cinZia ferrini - trieSte elio franZini - milano, Statale Shaun gallagher - memPhiS (uSa) roBerta guccinelli - lucca liangkang ni - guangZhou, cina mauro magatti - milano, cattolica Paolo auguSto maSullo - PotenZa mauriZio migliori - macerata chriStoPh horn - Bonn luca illetterati - PaDova elena Pulcini - firenZe rocco ronchi - l’aquila maSSimo recalcati - Pavia holmer Steinfath - göttingen Salvatore teDeSco - Palermo Dan Zahavi - coPenhagen Thaumàzein - 3, 2015 Max Scheler and the Emotional Turn Edited by Guido Cusinato and Maria Chiara Bruttomesso © 2015 Thauumàzein doi:/10.13136/thau.v3i0 Creative Commons 4.0 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION. V 1. EMOTIONAL TURN: SHARING AND BIRTH JOACHIM FISCHER Der Emotional turn in den Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften aus der Perspektive Max Schelers. 11 GUIDO CUSINATO Anthropogenese. Hunger nach Geburt und Sharing der Gefühle aus Max Schelers Perspektive. 29 ALESSANDRO SALICE Shared Emotions – A Schelerian Approach . 83 HANS BERNHARD SCHMID Collective Emotions – Phenomenology, Ontology, and Ideology. What should we learn from Max Scheler’s War Propaganda?. .103 ALEXEY ZHAVORONKOV Scheler und Nietzsche über das Mitleid: Ein zweiter Blick . .121 2. PHENOMENOLOGY OF FEELINGS AND ORDO AMORIS ROBERTA DE MONTICELLI The Sensibility of Reason: Outline of a Phenomenology of Feeling . 139 günter fröhlich Individuelle Lebensordnung und Weltbezug. Die Frage nach der Ordnung des „Guten Lebens“ in Schelers Ordo Amoris. .161 MIKHAIL KHORKOV Zu Max Schelers Konzeption des emotionalen Apriori. .183 SAMANTHA NOVELLO Max Scheler’s Ordo Amoris in Albert Camus’s Philosophical Work. 199 3. FEELINGS AND VALUES ÍNGRID VENDRELL FERRAN Das Fühlen als Grundbaustein für Schelers Wertsoziologie . 219 ROBERTA GUCCINELLI Value-Feelings and Disvalue-Feelings. A Phenomenological Approach to Self-Knowledge. .233 VENIERO VENIER The Reasons of Emotions. Scheler and Husserl. 249 FRIEDRICH HAUSEN Affektives Erfassen von Bedeutsamkeit – Überlegungen zu Schelers «Wertfühlen». .271 LEONARDO RODRÍGUEZ DUPLÁ Zur Begründung der These Max Schelers vom Primat der Liebe. .287 4. PHENOMENOLOGY OF ALTERITY LIANGKANG NI Zum Problem der Originalität der Einfühlung bei Husserl und Scheler. 307 WEI ZHANG Einsfühlung bei Scheler und im Neukonfuzianismus – Eine phänomenologische und interkulturelle Untersuchung . 337 RIKU YOKOYAMA Liebe als Kommunikationsform in der Intimität. 365 MARIA CHIARA BRUTTOMESSO The Affective Shape Perception and the Encounter of Others. .383 EMANUELE CAMINADA „Relativ natürliche Weltanschauung“ als common sense. Die wissenschaftstheoretischen Voraussetzungen für Schelers Funktionalisierungstheorie. 397 5. PERSON AND BILDUNG EUGENE KELLY Das Schicksal des Personenbegriffs im Spätwerk Schelers. .417 EVRIM KUTLU Liebe - Bildung - Person: Die Bedeutung der Bildung im Mensch- und Gottwerdungsprozess . 433 MARCO RUSSO Kosmologie und Person . 453 LUIGINA MORTARI The Practice of Self-Understanding. .471 DANIELE BRUZZONE Max Scheler’s Concept of Bildung and the Affective Core of Education. 523 MICHELE AVERCHI The Role of Idleness in Bildung. A Schelerian View. .537 6. SCHELEr’S ANTHROPOLOGY WOLFHART HENCKMANN Schelers Anthropologie in der zeitgenössischen Kritik. .559 HANS RAINER SEPP «Schöpfung des Geistes in die wolkenhafte Materie der Empfindung». Schelers Theorie von der Sublimierung des Lebens. .577 ZACHARY DAVIS Scheler on the Embodiment of Value . 593 JIAXIN WANG Hyle der Instinkte: Husserl und Scheler im Vergleich . .611 Thaumàzein 3, 2015 GUIDO CUSINATO INTRODUCTION HIS volume is based mainly on the papers presented during the 13th conference of the Max Scheler Gesellschaft, which took place in TVerona, Italy, from 27th to 30th May, 2015, with the title «Ordo Amoris and World-Openness. Philosophy of Emotions and Process of Individu- ation of the Person». At the core of the debate in this volume, there is a critical and inten- sive confrontation with the phenomenology of feeling by Max Scheler and its potentiality for the so-called emotional turn. The perception of the importance of emotions changed radically during the decade from 1987 to 1996. This was particularly due to some works that reached the general public, such as R. De Sousa (1987), A. Damasio (1994), D. Goleman (1995) and J. LeDoux (1996). Before 1987 the dominant idea was that emotions should be considered as private and internal states of consciousness. At the beginning of the twentieth century an important exception was represented by Max Scheler’s phenomenology of emo- tions. We may attempt to sum up his position in five main points: 1. Feelings and emotions are not the final result of a cognitive pro- cess; on the contrary they are at the origin of every perceptive and cog- nitive process. In this sense, «every primary relationship with the world [...] is essentially and primarily not representational or perceptive, but [...] emotional»;1 2. Feelings and emotions are not confined to a solipsistic dimension. They are what allow us to get into contact with others and make em- pathy possible. Through the act of feeling we are able to have a direct perception of the other person’s expressivity without the need for an argument from analogy. In the other’s smile we can perceive his inten- tions and his happiness directly (M. Scheler, Zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle von Liebe und Hass, 1913); 3. Feelings and emotions are not inner and private states, but they rather give shape to a precise «emotional bre akthrough» (emotioneller 1 «Alles primäre Verhalten zur Welt überhaupt [...] ist eben nicht ein „vorstelliges“, ein Verhalten des Wahrnehmens, sondern [...] ein emotionales [...] Verhalten» (M. Scheler, Formalismus, GW II, 206). V INTRODUCTION Durchbruch) into reality by which human beings place their own exis- tences in the world. In fact, emotions draw the landscape of our experi- ence (M. Scheler, Zur Rehabilitierung der Tugend, 1913); 4. In the human being feelings are not regulated au tomatically, but are functionalized by the ordo amoris, which becomes the principium individuationis of the person. Each ordo amoris matches a different per- spective on world-openness (Weltoffenheit) (M. Scheler, Ordo amoris, 1916 ca.); 5. There is not an immediate feeling at the roots of ethics, but an act of feeling that takes shape in a maturation process aimed at transcend- ing the self-referential horizon of one’s own egological pole (epoché from egocentrism and narcissism). This act of feeling deals with the objectivity of value judgments just as the external perception deals with that of factual judgments, and is affected by phenomena of illusion just as the external perception. There isn’t therefore a priority of inner per- ception over external perception and even feelings and emotions are affected by phenomena of illusion and deception (M. Scheler, Die Ido- le der Selbsterkenntnis, 1911). This means that, at the core of the phe- nomenology of feelings, there is not an exaltation of an immediate act of feeling, but rather the process of cultivation of emotions through vir- tue (M. Scheler, Zur Rehabilitierung der Tugend, 1913). The aim of the conference was to deal with the above-mentioned is- sues, keeping in mind the current debates on personal identity, we-in- tentionality, the phenomenology of otherness and the role of embodi- ment. For some scholars there is also a need to emphasize the limits of classical cognitivism concerning emotions. David Hume had already proved that the problem of personal identity can no longer be under- stood in terms of a «rational self», but should instead start from pas- sions, i.e. in terms of a «moral self». Is it possible to share an emotion, and in which way does Scheler enter into the contemporary debate about collective intentionality? How is the person shaped by others and by an ordo amoris? What is the relevance of the emotions for the formation process of the person? Although this issue cannot exhaust the variety of questions that involve the aforementioned topics, the scholars who contributed to this volume outline the richness and complexity of Scheler’s relevance for the phi- VI GUIDO CUSINATO losophy of emotions. By collecting different viewpoints that concern the international philosophical debates, we are guided by the idea of furthering a perspective on the person that is more and more detached from any abstraction of a mind from the body, of feelings from reason, of the individual from the world. VI VII 1. EMOTIONAL TURN: SHARING AND BIRTH Thaumàzein 3, 2015 JOACHIM FISCHER DER EMOTIONAL TURN IN DEN KULTUR- UND SOZIALWISSENSCHAFTEN AUS DER PERSPEKTIVE MAX SCHELERS INHALTSANGABE: 1) Einleitung; 2) Emotional turn / Affective turn in den Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften; 3) Max Schelers Emotional turn. 1) Einleitung CH beginne mit einem offensichtlichen, geradezu schreienden Wi- derspruch: Es gibt einen sogenannten Emotional turn, einen inter- Inationalen Affective turn in den Sozial- und Kulturwissenschaften seit ungefähr 25 Jahren, im englischsprachigen und zeitversetzt