BARRY SMITH Curriculum Vitae • July 9, 2021 EDUCATION
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Objects and Their Environments: from Aristotle to Ecological Ontology1
Objects and Their Environments: From Aristotle to Ecological Ontology1 Barry Smith Department of Philosophy, Center for Cognitive Science and National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis, University at Buffalo From Andrew Frank, Jonathan Raper and Jean-Paul Cheylan (eds.), The Life and Motion of Socio- Economic Units (GISDATA 8), London: Taylor and Francis, 2001, 79–97. Introduction What follows is a contribution to the theory of space and of spatial objects. It takes as its starting point the philosophical subfield of ontology, which can be defined as the science of what is: of the various types and categories of objects and relations in all realms of being. More specifically, it begins with ideas set forth by Aristotle in his Categories and Metaphysics, two works which constitute the first great contributions to ontological science. Because Aristotle’s ontological ideas were developed prior to the scientific discoveries of the modern era, he approached the objects and relations of everyday reality with the same ontological seriousness with which scientists today approach the objects of physics. We shall seek to show that what Aristotle has to say about these commonsensical objects and relations can, when translated into more formal terms, be of use also to contemporary ontologists. More precisely, we shall argue that his ideas can contribute to the development of a rigorous theory of those social and institutional components of everyday reality – the settings of human behavior – which are the subject of this volume. When modern-day philosophers turn their attentions to ontology they begin not with Aristotle but rather, in almost every case, with a set-theoretic ontology of the sort which is employed in standard model-theoretic semantics. -
Social Objects(1)
Social Objects(1) Barry Smith Department of Philosophy, Center for Cognitive Science, and National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis University at Buffalo [email protected] 1. Introduction 1.1 Two Dogmas of Reductionism Two persistent tendencies have made themselves felt in the course of philosophical history. On the one hand is the Ockhamite tendency, the tendency to embrace one or other of a small repertoire of simplified ontologies, for example atomism or monism, together with a view according to which more complicated entities are to be ‘reduced’ by one or other means to the favoured class of simples. On the other hand is Cartesianism, the tendency to embrace one or other foundationalist doctrine in epistemology, or in other words to prize episteme at the expense of doxa. The two tendencies reinforce each other mutually. Thus foundationalism tilts the attention of philosophers in the direction of ontological simples, for it is held that in relation to the latter knowledge secure against doubt is more easily attainable. Philosophers are thus shielded from any concern with the complex mesoscopic (medium-sized, middle-range, human-scale) objects of our everyday environment and of the social world, since the latter is, after all, a realm of mere opinion, not worthy of the attention of those striving after rigour. Austrian philosophers have been marked no less than philosophers in other traditions by both of these tendencies. Brentano, especially, was an avowed foundationalist, a proponent of psychological immanentism, and in his later philosophizing he embraced an ontology according to which all objects must belong to the single category of thing or substance. -
Barry Smith Kasimir Twardowski
BARRY SMITH KASIMIR TWARDOWSKI: AN ESSAY ON THE BORDERLINES OF ONTOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC1 1. Introduction The influence of Kasimir Twardowski on modern Polish philos ophy is all -pervasive. As is well known, almost all important 20th century Polish philosophers went through the hard training of his courses in Lvov. Twardowski instilled in his students an enduring concern for clarity and rigour. He taught them to regard philosophy as a collaborative effort, a matter of disciplined discussion and argument. And he encouraged them to work together with scientists from other disciplines above all with psychologists, and also with mathematicians - so that the Lvov school of philosophy would gradually evolve into the Warsaw school of logic2. Kasimir Skrzypna - Twardowski, Ritter von Ogonczyk, was born in Vienna in 1866, the son of a high official in the Austro-Hun garian Ministry of Finance. He was educated at the Theresianum, where, as in all Austrian grammar schools, a course in philos ophy (which is to say, psychology plus logic) was compulsory in the final year3. The officially prescribed textbook for this course for much of the second half of the 19th century (and in many cases also later) was the Philosophische Propadeutik of Robert Zimmermann, first published in Vienna in 1853 and transla - ted into Hungarian and Italian shortly thereafter. Zimmermann's work, the logical sections of which are little more than lightly disguised summaries of Bolzano's Wissenschaftsfehre prepared at Bolzano's own request, can now be seen to have done much to bring about a renaissance of Bolzanianism in Austria in a period when Bolzano's own writings were officially suppressed. -
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Copyright C 2020 by the Publisher 2.4 Collective Intentionality and Social Ontology
pdf version of the entry Edith Stein https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/stein/ Edith Stein from the Spring 2020 Edition of the First published Wed Mar 18, 2020 Stanford Encyclopedia Edith Stein (1891–1942) was a realist phenomenologist associated with the Göttingen school and later a Christian metaphysician. She was a Jew of Philosophy who converted to Catholicism in 1922 and was ordained a Carmelite nun in 1933. She died in Auschwitz in 1942. She was subsequently declared a Catholic martyr and saint. She campaigned publicly on issues relating to women’s rights and education. Stein is known philosophically primarily for her phenomenological work on empathy and affectivity, her contributions as research assistant to Edmund Husserl, and her Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson philosophical anthropology. She was in discussion with leading Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor philosophers of her day, including Husserl, Scheler, Heidegger, Conrad- Editorial Board https://plato.stanford.edu/board.html Martius, Ingarden, and Maritain. Her work contains original approaches to empathy, embodiment, the emotions, personhood, collective intentionality, Library of Congress Catalog Data and the nature of the state. In her later work, Stein developed an original ISSN: 1095-5054 philosophy of being and essence that integrated Husserlian Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- phenomenology and Thomist metaphysics. bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized 1. Life and Work distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the 2. -
Reinach and Bolzano: Towards a Theory of Pure Logic
Reinach and Bolzano: Towards A Theory of Pure Logic KIMBERLY JARA Y, WHfrid Laurier University The work of Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) on states of affairs, judgment, and speech acts bears striking similarities to Bernard Bolzano's (1781- 1848) work in the area of general logic. It is my belief that these similarities suggest that Reinach used Bolzano's logical work to assist with his own. Three considerations support this view. First, Bolzano's work in Die Wissenschaftslehre ( Theory of Science) was considered by Husserl to be the necessary foundation for any work in logic. Second, Bolzano's logic was a suitable alternative to Immanuel Kant's in that he formulated his essential relations as inexistent yet real, not Platonic or belonging to a transcendental realm. Third, Reinach did not openly criticize Bolzano 1 in the manner he did the Austrians of the Brentano school, suggesting that Bolzano's logic was more complementary with his own. 2 Due to his untimely death in 1917, Reinach's work on states of affairs and logic remains incomplete, some of it even lost or destroyed. I shall here offer a few brief remarks about Husserl as he was Reinach's mentor and friend, but an in depth discussion of the differences between Rein ach and Husserl will not be offered in this paper. Secondary literature tells us that Reinach admired Husserl's Logical Investigations, in which phenomenology was said to concern itself with "primarily the discovery of the terra firma of pure logic, of the Sachen (things) in the sense of objective entities in general -
Adolf Reinach: an Intellectual Biography1
Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Biography1 Karl Schumann and Barry Smith From: K. Mulligan, ed., Speech Act and Sachverhalt: Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Nijhoff, 1987, 1–27. §1 PROLOGUE As early as 1741 a Jekel Reinach is mentioned in the Memory Book of the Jewish community in Mainz, and by the end of the century the Reinachs were already one of the most notable and well-to-do Jewish families in the city.2 The Record of Names of 1808 lists Salomon (formerly Seligmann) Reinach, Jacques (Mayer Herz) Reinach, Marx (Mayer Herz) Reinach, and Bernard Jacques (Beer Jacob) Reinach.3 The descendants of Jacques Reinach spread from Mainz to Frankfurt and from there to Paris. His grandson Adolf von Reinach (1814-1879), Belgian consul in Frankfurt, was created an Italian Baron in 1866, and founded 1 The few existing published biographies of Reinach are, if not unreliable (Oesterreicher 1952), then at best very succinct (Avé-Lallemant 1975, 172-74, Crosby 1983, XI-X). In compiling the present essay we have used in particular Reinach’s letters to Husserl (Husserl Archives) and to Conrad and Daubert (Bavarian State Library, Munich). We draw further on Avé-Lallemant’s Catalogue of the Münchener Phänomenologennachlässe, on Schuhmann’s Husserl-Chronik (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), and on the pertinent Vorlesungsverzeichnisse of the University of Göttingen. We have also profited from the “Historical Introduction” to Brettler 1974, 1-15. References not given in full here are to be found in the Reinach bibliography on pp. 299-332 below. We would like to thank the Bavarian State Library, the Husserl Archives, Louvain, and Oberarchivrat Schütz of the Stadtarchiv Mainz for providing copies of relevant materials. -
Investigations of Worth: Towards a Phenomenology of Values Dale Hobbs Jr
Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations (2009 -) Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Projects Investigations of Worth: Towards a Phenomenology of Values Dale Hobbs Jr. Marquette University Recommended Citation Hobbs, Dale Jr., "Investigations of Worth: Towards a Phenomenology of Values" (2017). Dissertations (2009 -). 740. http://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/740 INVESTIGATIONS OF WORTH: TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF VALUES by Dale (D.J.) Hobbs A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, WI August 2017 ABSTRACT INVESTIGATIONS OF WORTH: TOWARDS A PHENOMENOLOGY OF VALUES Dale (D.J.) Hobbs Marquette University, 2017 The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a clear and compelling account of the existence and nature of values within a phenomenological context. Values such as beauty or virtue are certainly a major part of our experiential lives. After all, what would life be worth if we could never describe a painting as beautiful, for example, or a beverage as delicious? Nevertheless, understanding what these values are on their own terms has historically been a rather difficult task. Certainly, they are not ordinary objects that could be seen or heard, touched or tasted, like the physical objects to which they seem to be connected in some mysterious way. In this dissertation, I argue that a phenomenological approach enables us to give a solid account of the role that values play in experience. Working in dialogue with Husserl and other phenomenologists and related thinkers (especially Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann), as well as with recent commentary, I develop my own account of values as lying on the phenomenological “horizons” of experience. -
Eugen Enyvvari's Road to Göttingen and Back
Final submitted version, published as Varga, Peter Andras: “Eugen Enyvvari’s Road to Göttingen and Back: A Case Study in the Transleithanian Participation in Early Phenomenology (with an Appendix of Edmund Husserl’s Two Unpublished Letters to Enyvvari).” Studies in East European Thought 69, no. 1 (2017): 57–78 [publication date: March 2017]. © All rights reserved by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. Deposited in the Open Access repository of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (http://real.mtak.hu/) under obligation imposed by the employer, in accordance with the Copyright Transfer Statement. Unauthorized copying is forbidden. Please quote the final published version! “The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11212-017-9272-2”. Eugen Enyvvari’s Road to Göttingen and Back: A Case Study in the Transleithanian Participation in Early Phenomenology Abstract: Despite attending Husserl’s classes, his participation in the discussions of the Göttingen phenomenological circle, and his prolific writings on phenomenology, Eugen Enyvvari (1884-1959) seems to have been virtually ignored by phenomenological scholarship. I use an array of unpublished sources and a survey of his juvenilia to reconstruct Enyvvari’s biography and intellectual formation, including his confrontation with Melchior Palagyi’s critique of Husserl and Bolzano. Based on both his reports and records from the Göttingen University Archives, I attempt to establish the influences to which he could have been exposed in Göttingen. I rely on a careful micro-analysis of the development of Husserl’s notion of noematical meaning around Enyvvari’s stay in Göttingen in order to asses Enyvvari’s specific contribution to phenomenology and his significance from the point of view of the general historiography of phenomenology. -
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception Introduction
TSPACE RESEARCH REPOSITORY tspace.library.utoronto.ca 2015 The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception Introduction Post-print/Accepted manuscript Mohan Matthen Mohan, M. (2015). Introduction. In M. Mohan (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception (1-25). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press. HOW TO CITE TSPACE ITEMS Always cite the published version, so the author(s) will receive recognition through services that track citation counts, e.g. Scopus. If you need to cite the page number of the TSpace version (original manuscript or accepted manuscript) because you cannot access the published version, then cite the TSpace version in addition to the published version using the permanent URI (handle) found on the record page. Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception Introduction* Mohan Matthen University of Toronto Abstract Perception is the ultimate source of our knowledge about contingent facts. It is an extremely important philosophical development that starting in the last quarter of the twentieth century, philosophers have begun to change how they think of perception. The traditional view of perception focussed on sensory receptors; it has become clear, however, that perceptual systems radically transform the output of these receptors, yielding content concerning objects and events in the external world. Adequate understanding of this process requires that we think of perception in new ways—how it operates, the differences among the modalities, and integration of content provided by the individual senses. Philosophers have developed new analytic tools, and opened themselves up to new ways of thinking about the relationship of perception to knowledge. -
Forthcoming in T. Szanto & H. Landweer (Eds
Forthcoming in T. Szanto & H. Landweer (eds.). Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotion. London/New York: Routledge, 2019. Dietrich von Hildebrand Jean Moritz Müller It is sometimes alleged that the study of emotion and the study of value are currently pursued as relatively autonomous disciplines. As Kevin Mulligan notes, “[t]he philosophy and psychology of emotions pays little attention to the philosophy of value and the latter pays only a little more attention to the former.” (2010b, 475). Arguably, the last decade has seen more of a rapprochement between these two domains than used to be the norm (cf. e.g. Roeser & Todd 2014). But there still seems to be considerable potential for exchange and dialogue if the situation is compared with their intimate relationship in central strands of early realist phenomenology. The philosopher perhaps most representative of this ecumenical approach is Husserl’s early student Dietrich von Hildebrand (1889-1977). From the very early stages of his philosophical career, Hildebrand has developed one of the most original, comprehensive and nuanced accounts of emotions at whose core is a detailed examination of their connection to value. While his central concern with the ethical significance of our affective life is in many ways continuous with Scheler’s work1 and draws crucially on Reinach’s philosophy of mind, Hildebrand’s own reflections considerably expand on and substantially modify the picture of the ontology and normative role of emotions defended by these authors. In the following, I reconstruct Hildebrand’s view of emotions with a particular focus on those aspects which represent his most distinctive contribution to this subject.2 1. -
ON the ORIGINS of ANAL YTIC Philosophyl Barry SMITH
ON THE ORIGINS OF ANAL YTIC PHILOSOPHyl Barry SMITH Internationale Akademie für Philosophie, Liechtenstein F or some time now, historians of philosophy have been gradually coming to terms with the idea that post-Kantian philosophy in the German-speaking world ought properly to be divided into two separate traditions which, for want of a bett er alternative, we might refer to as the German and Austrian traditions, respectively. The main line of the first consists in a list of personages beginning with Fichte, Hegel, Schelling, Ulrici, Cohen, and ending with Heidegger, Adorno and Bloch. The main line ofthe second may be picked out similarly by means of a list beginning with Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, Twardowski, the early Husserl, and ending with, say, Wittgenstein, Neurath and Gödel. Austrian philosophy is characterised by an orientation around problems of logic, language and ontology. It is a philosophy of detail, a philosophy 'from below', often dealing with examples drawn from extra-philosophical sciences. It is characterised by a simplicity and straightforwardness of style that is in marked contrast to what (at least from the usual Anglo-Saxon perspective) seems like an oratorical and obfuscatory verbigeration on the part of philosophers of the German sort. And it is marked further by a sympathy towards and in many cases a rootedness in British empiricist philosophy. Moreover, because the Kantian revolution was not accepted in Austria, this philosophy is marked further by a special relation to realism, understood both in an ontological and in an epistemological sense. German philosophy, on the other hand, has remained faithful to Kant, in the sense that it has been centred largely around concerns deriving from epistemology and ethics. -
Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences
Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences Volume 8 Series Editors Ruth Edith Hagengruber, Department of Humanities, Center for the History of Women Philosophers, Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany Mary Ellen Waithe, Professor Emerita, Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, USA Gianni Paganini, Department of Humanities, University of Piedmont, Vercelli, Italy As the historical records prove, women have long been creating original contributions to philosophy. We have valuable writings from female philosophers from Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and a continuous tradition from the Renaissance to today. The history of women philosophers thus stretches back as far as the history of philosophy itself. The presence as well as the absence of women philosophers throughout the course of history parallels the history of philosophy as a whole. Edith Stein, Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir, the most famous represen- tatives of this tradition in the twentieth century, did not appear form nowhere. They stand, so to speak, on the shoulders of the female titans who came before them. The series Women Philosophers and Scientists published by Springer will be of interest not only to the international philosophy community, but also for scholars in history of science and mathematics, the history of ideas, and in women’s studies. More information about this series at https://www.springer.com/series/15896 Ronny Miron Hedwig Conrad-Martius The Phenomenological Gateway to Reality Ronny Miron Interdisciplinary Studies Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan, Israel ISSN 2523-8760 ISSN 2523-8779 (electronic) Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences ISBN 978-3-030-68782-3 ISBN 978-3-030-68783-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright.