Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences

Home , Early phenomenology, Hans Lipps, Herbert Spiegelberg

Volume 8

Series Editors Ruth Edith Hagengruber, Department of Humanities, Center for the History of Women Philosophers, Paderborn University, Paderborn, Germany Mary Ellen Waithe, Professor Emerita, Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH, USA Gianni Paganini, Department of Humanities, University of Piedmont, Vercelli, Italy As the historical records prove, women have long been creating original contributions to philosophy. We have valuable writings from female philosophers from Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and a continuous tradition from the Renaissance to today. The history of women philosophers thus stretches back as far as the history of philosophy itself. The presence as well as the absence of women philosophers throughout the course of history parallels the history of philosophy as a whole. Edith Stein, Hannah Arendt and Simone de Beauvoir, the most famous represen- tatives of this tradition in the twentieth century, did not appear form nowhere. They stand, so to speak, on the shoulders of the female titans who came before them. The series Women Philosophers and Scientists published by Springer will be of interest not only to the international philosophy community, but also for scholars in history of science and mathematics, the history of ideas, and in women’s studies.

More information about this series at https://www.springer.com/series/15896 Ronny Miron

Hedwig Conrad-Martius The Phenomenological Gateway to Reality Ronny Miron Interdisciplinary Studies Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan, Israel

ISSN 2523-8760 ISSN 2523-8779 (electronic) Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences ISBN 978-3-030-68782-3 ISBN 978-3-030-68783-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-68783-0

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This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Preface

Introduction: “Die Frau in der Philosophie voran-!”

A. The Prize Essay (Die Preisschrift) Hedwig Margarete Elisabeth Martius (27 February 1888–15 February 1966)1 (HCM)2 ﬁrst appeared in the phenomenological discourse when, in 1912, she won the essay competition of the Philosophy Department of the University of Göttingen. A while before, in 1910 she had started attending the lectures of Edmund Husserl, who was a professor there. The founding father of phenomenology, who rose to prominence with the publication of Logical Investigations (1900–1901), established a prize competition about “The epistemological principles of positivism” in honor of the University’s festival. The prize was promised to the best original philosophical essay (HCM, 2015b, 62).3 About two hundred essays were submitted to the strict, anonymous judgment of philosophy professors of repute and status. Only one essay, entitled “The epistemological foundations of positivism” (Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus) was found worthy of the prize. This essay, later called the “Prize Essay” (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 52, 213, 1975b, 197), was written

1The literature suggests two options regarding the places of HCM’s birth and death. Except for Hart, who reports that she was born in Königsberg (Hart, 1973, 14), all other sources indicate Berlin. There also appears to be disagreement regarding the place of her death. The majority (and most probable) position indicates Munich, while a few sources (Wikipedia.de included) note it as Starnberg. Martha Martius, HCM’s mother, composed a family chronicle in four volumes in which she described both the positive and negative sides of her six children (HCM was the third), who were rather different from each other. Martha Martius’ grandchild, Goetz-Alexander, published some sections from this chronicle (Martius, 2002, 2003a), which has also been published as a book (Martius, 2003b). 2In his speech from 27 February 1958 for HCM’s 70th birthday, Avé-Lallemant indicted that “HCM” was Conrad-Martius’ nickname among her pupils at the University of Munich. 3This source is a ﬁrst publication of the text of HCM’s acceptance speech (to be referred to later in the body text) (HCM, 1958bN). It contains the original German text (HCM, 2015a, 56–59) and its translation to English by Ferrarello (HCM, 2015b, 60–63), which also added an introduction (Ferrarello, 2015, 51–55). See references to the speech in: Ursula Avé-Lallemant (1965/1966, 207), Pfeiffer (2005, 49).

v vi Preface by a 21-year-old student named Hedwig Martius. The surprising win was covered by the local press. On 6 June 1912, the Berliner Tageblatt wrote:

A woman at the forefront of philosophy! Or better, a young miss (Fräulein), since this is not Madame Curie or a famous lady scholar, but a young student who, by submitting an essay to a prize competition (Preisbewerbung) defeated all the other applicants […] The essay was crowned with the prize in full. The author’s name was revealed when the envelopes were opened, Miss Hedwig Martius from Rostock. (HCM, 1912N)4

The San Francisco Examiner, an English language newspaper published in Berlin, wrote on 22 September 1912, under the headline “German Fraulein is a Clever Thinker”:

People who dislike clever woman [sic] are in a tragic mood. The Cleverest philosopher in Germany is a woman, and a brand-new woman, too. Hedwig Martius has had her book on philosophy crowned and prized by Goettingen Univer- sity [sic]. A 21-year-old girl, with the round, pleasant features of an everyday German hausfrau, has beaten the cleverest brains of Germany. (HCM, 1912N)

The reporter added that the essay was found worthy of the prize due to its being “profound, original, and striking”. They guessed that the essay had been written by a brilliant young professor from Leipsig [sic]. But when they opened the envelope, they saw to their amazement that the essay had been composed by a young woman. It was reported that a professor from Göttingen University exclaimed: “if women begin with philosophy they will go further. They will degenerate to the condition of their English suffragist sisters, and take to breaking windows” (HCM, 1912N).5 On the face of it, this win could have seemed as a natural, perhaps even expected, progression for someone who was known as one of the ﬁrst women to have studied at a grammar school (Gymnasium)6 and then at university in Germany (Sander, 1997, 155). HCM described her feelings upon graduation from the secondary school for girls (Höhere Töchterschhule) as a “sudden… passionate desire to study” (HCM, 2015b, 60). After completing her grammar school studies, she attended courses in

4All translations from the German original into English are mine. Emphases follow the original unless stated otherwise. In cases of unique terms or phrases, the original German is included in parentheses. I have attempted to maintain consistency in the translations I offer. However, at times, certain contexts have obliged me to choose a different English phrase for the same word in German. There is no doubt that HCM’s unique vocabulary and her solecisms have frequently necessitated the inclusion of the German term in parentheses. Regarding other German sources, in particular the writings of Edmund Husserl and Adolf Reinach, the text refers to English translations of the German sources, where available. In light of the many sources mentioned, and in order to assist the readers, a system of abbreviations is employed. This system is listed alongside each item in the References section at the end of each article and at the end of the book. For convenience, I have avoided using the abbreviation ibid, and I have repeated the abbreviation with each reference. 5This citation is taken from a photograph of the newspaper cutting that is stored in Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich and cataloged under the title Zeitungsveröffentlischungen zur Preisschrift 1912. 6In 1903, HCM enrolled in the Gymnasialkurse für Frauen at the Helene Lange School in Berlin, and in fall 1907/1908 she received her Abitur at the Sophien-Realgymnasium in Berlin. Preface vii

History and Literature at the universities of Rostock and Freiburg.7 Thus, she became the first woman (Stein, 2013, 7 n. 10),8 or at least one of the first women (Sander, 1997, 155), to study in a German university. Without any doubt, moving to Munich in 1909 and choosing to study at the Ludwig Maximilian University there were a formative step in HCM’s life.9 Although her first encounter with academic studies in philosophy was already in Rostock,10 it seems that in Munich it has dawned on her that philosophy was her calling.11 She describes this period as follows:

It was a seminar on Hume.12 At the end of that semester he [Moritz Geiger - RM] gave me a note for Adolf Reinach, a lecturer in Göttingen who was like him a pupil of Husserl, and said “You have to go to Göttingen to go to Husserl.” I knew virtually nothing about Husserl, but I went and dropped right into the center of the original circle of phenomenologists. Lightning (Blitz) struck for a second time. (HCM, 2015b, 61)13

7In WS 1907/8, HCM enrolled in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Rostock and spent three semesters attending courses in philosophy and German Studies. In SS 1908 (one semester), she studied philology at the University of Freiburg. In 1908–1909, she returned to Rostock for two more semesters (WS = winter semester; SS = summer semester). Avé-Lallemant refers to HCM’s writing of fine literature, yet he adds that “later she burned her own poetic and dramatic attempts” (Avé-Lallemant, 1984, 212). Avé-Lallemant also testified that after her religious experiences at the beginning of the 1920s (concomitant with Stein, to be discussed below), HCM had a big auto-da-fé and in 1929 she burned also her poetic writings from her time at Bergzabern. Nonetheless, a copy of two valuable manuscripts survived. For this study of particular importance is: HCM 1916aN (cited from: Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 79 n. 45). 8This note was composed by the editor of Stein’s mentioned work, Andreas Uwe Müller. 9In October of 1909, HCM transferred to the University of Munich, where she studied philosophy with Max Scheler and Moritz Geiger. She remained there for two semesters (WS 1909/10 and SS 1910). During her first semester in Munich, HCM enrolled in courses with Max Scheler and with professors who were the students of Theodor Lipps, in particular Ernst von Aster (1880–1948) and Aloys Fischer (1880–1937). 10In Rostock, she participated in an advanced seminar on Spinoza’s Ethics with her Professor, Franz Bruno Erhardt. Later she would describe her encounter with Spinoza as her first experience of being “hit by lightning” See: HCM (2015b, 61). 11Fréchette suggests that in 1905, two groups of philosophers in Munich can be largely distinguished (Fréchette, 2012, 156–157). One, whose members remained largely faithful to Theodore Lipps and included August Gallinger, Aloys Fischer, Fritz Weinmann, and Max Ettlinger. See here also: Smid (1982, 114–115), Schuhmann (1973, 128–132). The second group included Theodor Conrad, Johannes Daubert, Adolf Reinach, and Moritz Geiger. Fréchette characterized them as “already showing more than a mere interest in phenomenology and it progressively abandoned most of the Lippsean conceptions” (Fréchette, 2012, 156). 12Hart indicates that according to Ludwig Maximillian, in Munich the seminar was on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, see: Hart (2020, 2 n. 3). 13A similar testimony of this striking experience that took place as HCM first encountered Husserl’s phenomenology appears in Avé-Lallemant’s Habilitation. It documents a conversation Avé-Lallemant conducted with her on the occasion of her 70th birthday at Munich University. The conversation (in manuscript) was stored in the Munich Archive. See Avé-Lallemant (1971, 212 n. 1). viii Preface

HCM took Moritz Geiger’s advice, having attended his courses on Psychology and Art History at Munich University in 1909–1910, and went to Göttingen.14 On his part, Geiger prepared HCM’s arrival to Göttingen well. In a letter to Husserl from 28 September 1910, he informed him about HCM’s plan to study phenomenology and probably write her dissertation at the University of Göttingen on phenomenology. He also mentioned in this regard her preparing studies in phenomenology already in Munich. Geiger asked Husserl to pay attention to HCM despite her timidity “since she is philosophically the sharpest woman I have encountered so far” (Geiger, 1910b, 103). On the same day, Geiger delivered a special postcard to Reinach informing him about HCM’s arrival at Göttingen and expresses his special recommendation about “our most talented Munich philosopher”. Geiger promised Reinach: “you will already notice what makes her into what she is” (Geiger, 1910aN).15 B. “The Munich Invasion of Göttingen” HCM moved from Munich to Göttingen together with a group of young philosophers previously related to the “Academic Society for Psychology” (Akademische Verein für Psychologie).16 Their plan was to attend the courses of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and of Adolf Reinach (1883–1917). The subsequent designation of the event by the local phenomenologists as “The Munich Invasion of Göttingen”

14Ferrarello details the courses delivered by Husserl and Reinach between WS 1910/11 and SS 1912 that HCM attended in Göttingen. In the WS 1910/11, she attended Husserl’s following courses: “logic as a theory of cognition” (Logik als Theorie der cognition), “Basic Problems of Phenomenol- ogy”, and “Philosophical Exercises in connection of David Hume’s Tractatus ‘On the Human Spirit’” and Adolf Reinach’s “Kant’s Critique of Reason”. In SS 1911, she attended Husserl’s “Basic Prob- lems of Ethics and Theory of Values” and “Philosophical Exercises with connections with Ernst Mach” along with Reinach’s “Philosophical Exercises: Selected Problems of Present Philosophy”. In the WS 1911/12, she attended Husserl’s “Kant and the Post-Kantian Philosophy”, and “Philo- sophical Exercises in Connection with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason” and Reinach’s “Freedom of the Will, Attributions and Responsibility” (Ferrarello, 2015, 52 n. 1). See here also Schuhmann’s report of the courses Husserl delivered in Göttingen. See: Schuhmann (1977, 67–198). 15HCM’s exceptional talent was well-known among her family members, even many years after her death. See, for example, the report of Hueglin, the grandson of HCM’s younger sister, Helene: “Her [Helene’s] sister Hedwig Conrad-Martius had gone through life as an independent philosopher and university teacher, and her brother was a famous gynecologist and author of numerous scientific treatises and textbooks. Many around my grandmother were certain that she could have been the brightest star of them all” (Hueglin, 2010, 108). 16During her first period in Munich, HCM was involved in the related society, see: Feldes (2015, 20- 22), Fréchette (2012). Apart from HCM, four more women were involved in the society: Margarete Calinich, Frau Dieltrich, Frau Dr. Ortner, and Katharine Tischendorf (indicated in the list of members from Maximilian Beck’s estate in the Bavarian State Archive (BSM)) (signature: Ana 354 D. II. 1), cited from: Hart (2020, 2 n. 4). The society was established in 1895 by Theodor Lipps and later operated by his students and assistants. Walther’s addendum of “philosophy” to the name of the society (Akademische Verein für Psychologie und Philosophie) (see: Walther, 1960, 379) mirrors its origin in “the Munich psychological school” (Die Münchener psychologische Schule)andits declared objective of “scientific engagement with psychological questions and the philosophical [questions] included in it” (cited from: Smid, 1982, 114). Preface ix seems to reveal a sense of a threat.17 However, alongside the apparent negative aspect, a positive one transpires from Schapp’s description of the time, in which he testifies “we used every opportunity, day and night, to engage in philosophical discussions with the Munichers. In our opinion, they were much ahead of us in every aspect” (Schapp, 1959, 20). The admired figure of Reinach served as “con- nector” (Klammer) between the phenomenologists from Munich and the local ones (Avé-Lallemant & Schuhmann, 1992, 85 n. 8).18 Husserl, who felt rare admiration toward Reinach, stated: “The phenomenological mode of thinking and investigation soon became second nature to him” (Husserl, 1983, xii, 1987b, 301).19 Likewise, HCM called him “the phenomenologist among phenomenologists, the phenomenologist par excellence” (HCM, 1951b, 7).20 The group received various names, whose use was not consistent even by those who coined then, yet they all referred to the same cultural occurrence: The Göttingen Circle (Rosenwald, 1989, 16, 21–22); The Göttingen Movement; The Göttingen School (Conrad, 1953/1954N; Schmücker, 1956, 7).21; The Munich-Göttingen Phenomenologists; The Munich Circle; The Munich-Göttingen Phenomenology (Conrad, 1954N)22; The Munich Phenomenology23; The Munich-Göttingen School (Rosenwald, 1989, 19)24;The Munich-Göttingen Circle (Hart, 1973, 14); The Munich-Göttingen Group (Avé- Lallemant, 1975a, 23); The Munichers (Die Münchener) (HCM, 2015b, 62 n. 1)25; The First Phenomenological School (Landgrebe, 1963, 22); The Old Phenomenology

17In Göttingen, the group met Husserl’s and Reinach’s students, among which were Wilhelm Schapp, Karl Neuhaus, Alfred von Sybel, Alexander Rosenblum, Dietrich Mahnke, Heinrich Hofmann, David Katz, and Erich Heinrich. 18Johanes Daubert (1887–1947) is also mentioned as “an important mediator between the Munich phenomenological circle and Husserl” (Stein, 2005b, 204 n. 5) (notes by Maria Amata Neyer and E. Avé-Lallemant). The students’ admiration for Reinach is also indicated in the obituary Husserl composed about him after he fell during the First World War (16 Nov. 1917). The obituary ﬁrst appeared in the daily newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung (6 December 1917) (see: Husserl, 1917/1987a). Subsequently to Husserl’s transcendental turn (to be discussed below), it was Reinach’s philosophy on which the Munich phenomenologists relied. Spiegelberg argues that “independently of each other, the Göttingen students of phenomenology […] in their accounts of this period refer to Reinach, not to Husserl as their teacher in Phenomenology. […]”. It was his [Reinach’s] “death in action in 1917 rather than Husserl’s going to Freiburg which cut short not only his own promise but that of the Göttingen phenomenological Circle” (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 191–192). After Reinach’s death, his students published his writings, and HCM wrote two introductions to his essays. See: HCM (1921b, 1951b). 19See here also: Husserl (1919/1987b/1983) (English translation). 20This statement by HCM echoed in the research literature. See: Spiegelberg (1960, 195/1984a, 192), Schuhmann and Smith (1987, 16/1989, 618), Feldes (2015, 55). 21See here also: Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann (1992, 85 n. 8). 22Cited from: Smid (1982, 112). 23Like Smid, I favor the term “Munich Phenomenology” since several important phenomenologists belonged to the group who had no connection to Husserl or to Göttingen. For the history and various appearances of the term, see a review in: Smid (1982). 24This phrase was coined by Theodor Conrad and describes the philosophical realism that united the phenomenologists of Munich and Göttingen. See also: Rosenwald (1989, 14). 25See here also: Spiegelberg (1959, 60). x Preface

(Rosenwald, 1989, 13); The Older Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg, 1960, 168f.)26; “The oldest generation” (Spiegelberg, 1985); The Early Phenomenology (Rosenwald 1989, 13); the Original Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 166f.), and The Beginning Phenomenology (anfangenden Phänomenologie) (Husserl, 1999, §59 138/1991, §59 165). Finally, due to their special affinity to Reinach, the group was called “‘Reinach Phenomenologists’” (Stein, 2005b, 203). Whatever the terminology, it denoted the first generation of phenomenologists active during and immediately after Husserl’s time.27 Among their leading members: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, and Jean Hering. The younger members of the group were: Hans Lipps, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Alexandre Koyré, Roman Ingarden, Edith Stein, and Hedwig Conrad-Martius.28 HCM’s star seemed to be on the rise in Göttingen, where she moved in the fall of 1910/1911. Rapidly, she became the living spirit and the driving force of the young group. During this period, she participated in the seminar of the Göttingen Young Phenomenologists, which she chaired in 1911, and was appointed Chair of The Philosophical Society in Göttingen (Die philosophische Gesellschaft Göttingen).29 In all these early settings, where the participation of a woman was unusual, HCM stood out as an original and daring intellectual, leading to her being known as the “first lady” of German philosophy (Hart, 1972, 1, 1973, 14). HCM described the atmosphere at that time with the following words:

We were not doing anything other than carefully scrutinizing virtually everything with regards to its real essence. We disputed about the essence of nature, amongst all the genres of nature plant, animal, human—kinds of nature, about the sociological and historical and its nature, about art, about the psychological, ethical and transcendental. We talked about nature spirits, demons and angels as if we had, de facto, met them. We didn’t meet them de

26Likewise, Theodor Conrad described them as “the oldest group” (cited from: Feldes, 2013, 206) and Alexander Koyré referred to them as “the ‘old people’” (Stein, 2005b, 193). 27In this context, see Spiegelberg’s discussion of the three generations of phenomenology, including his characteristics of the members of the first generation, which included the members of the Munich and Göttingen circle (Spiegelberg, 1985). Spiegelberg posits that regarding the significance of a generation in philosophy, “Here the decisive criterion would be the relation not between child, parent and grandparent etc., but the analogous one between a student—his teacher and his teacher’s teacher etc.” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 252). 28Avé-Lallemant suggests dividing the phenomenologists in this period into three groups, which maintained mutual relations and were connected to Husserl before the first world war: (1) The real Munich group, including: Pfänder, Daubert, and Geiger; (2) The Munich-Göttingen group, including Reinach and Theodor Conrad, and later also Wilhelm Schapp, Jean Héring, Alexander Koyré, Hans Lipps, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Roman Ingarden, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Edith Stein, Fritz Kaufmann, and Adolf Grimme; (3) Max Scheler’s group, which had a counter-influence of the two previous groups (Avé-Lallemant, 1975a, 23). See here also: Schmücker (1956). 29The related Society was chaired by Theodor Conrad up to the summer semester of 1912, with breaks, during which his place was filled by HCM (SS 1911, WS 1911–1912) and Hildebrand. Feldes describes this group as constantly admitting new members, who later composed the group that became known as the Munich-Göttingen Group. In this context, see also: Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann (1992), Feldes (2015, 30–32). Preface xi

facto—at least not the angels, but we met their essence and got a grasp of it. We didn’t ask at all whether they actually really existed. (HCM, 2015b, 61)30

The plural used by HCM is not just an expression of a style typical in this period, but also denotes the fundamental understanding of the Munich phenomenologists that they were part of a “phenomenological movement” (Phänomenologische Bewegung) (Avé-Lallemant, 1988, 62). This formulation became popular with the publication of the first treatise presenting the history of phenomenology to the English-speaking world, with the title: The Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg, 1960). Furthermore, Reinach’s description of this period shows that not only were the early phenomenologists conscious of the group ethos, it also possessed a visionary component: “At the moment when, in place of momentary brainstorms, there sets in the laborious effort at illumination, there philosophical work is taken out of the hands of individuals and laid in the hands of ongoing generations” (Reinach, 1969, 221, my emphasis).31 Indeed, this period would later be characterized by Spiegelberg as “a time of group philosophizing and of a vigorous mutual criticism” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 169) or “period […] of joint philosophizing and live mutual criticism”. In connection with Reinach, Spiegelberg adds: “Like all the other early phenomenologists he firmly believed in philosophy as a cooperative scientific enterprise to which each researcher would have to contribute patiently and unhurriedly, much in the same way as was the case in the sciences. There could be no such thing as a one-man system” (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 166/1960, 196).32 From the methodical aspect, the circles of Munich and Göttingen followed Husserl’s doctrine of regional ontology that is designated to serve as a framework for the study of essences. In this regard, the region (Region)is marked as the highest material genus of the essences that belong together (Husserl, 1952a, §9/2012a, §9) and consolidate “the highest and most inclusive generic unity belonging to a concretum” (Husserl, 1952a, §16 36/2012a, §16 31). From a wider historical perspective, the related ethos of philosophical group communicated the Hegelian ideal of philosophy as an organic unity whose moments “not only do not conflict, but […] each is necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole” (Hegel, 1977, 2).

30In this context, see a similar testimony given to Edith Stein. Dr. Georg Moskiewicz (1883–1955), who studied with Husserl in Göttingen and was very close to him, said: “In Göttingen, they only philosophized—day and night, about the essence, in the street and everywhere. They spoke only about ‘phenomena’”. This testimony is cited in: Avé-Lallemant (1988, 70). 31These words are taken from Reinach’s best-known text, based on a lecture he gave at Marburg in January 1914. The German original of the lecture was published twice (Reinach, 921b/Reinach, 1951) and received two English translations (Reinach, 1968, 1969). 32However, regarding the similarity of phenomenology to the sciences, Spiegelberg wonders “what was to be the place of phenomenology, then, in such a framework?” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 196/1984a, 193). In any event, he establishes that “compared with the intensity and vitality of the philosophizing that went on in these two circles during the ten years of the ‘phenomenological spring’ (as Jean Hering has called it), the later Phenomenological Movement, though richer in literary output, seems to be almost shapeless and anemic” (Spiegelberg 1960, 168–169/1984a, 166). Likewise, Seifert emphasizes the uniqueness of the Munich phenomenology as a philosophical occurrence that has no equivalent in the history of modern philosophy. See: Seifert (1971, 97). xii Preface

However, the early phenomenologists rapidly discovered that the very thing for which they had gathered around the founder of phenomenology in Göttingen was largely no longer in existence. In a letter from Reinach to Conrad dated 1907, he reported about a conversation with Daubert who maintained that “one might really question whether proper phenomenology, as it is pursued in Munich, has its roots in Husserl” (Reinach, 1907N).33 Likewise, shortly before the start of the semester, the Ideas appeared in Husserl’s yearbook.34 Stein writes:

[…] the Ideas included some expressions which sounded very much as though their master wished to return to idealism. His oral interpretation could not appease our concerns. It was the beginning of that development which led Husserl to see, more and more, in what he called ‘transcendental Idealism’ […] the genuine nucleus of his philosophy […]. This was a path on which, to his sorrow as well as their own, his earlier Göttingen students could not follow him. (Stein, 2002a, 201)35 Finally, in retrospect HCM recalls her personal disappointment already during her time in Göttingen. Back then, it would soon transpire that winning the prestigious prize from Göttingen University was merely a fleeting moment, after which signals of trouble and difficulty started to appear one after the other. Among these, it is barely even possible to include declining an offer of marriage from a wealthy man from Marburg who wanted a wife who would bake him cakes rather than a brilliant philosopher (HCM, 1912N). HCM clearly felt in real time the arrows of criticism and mistrust directed at her following her win. Later in life, she described the responses to the fact that none other than “a little female student from Rostock had won the first and only prize—very much to the delight of Husserl but not to the delight of those opposed to the academic education of women” (HCM, 2015b, 62). Unfortunately, HCM’s case transpires as one in which determination, exceptional talent, and unending dedication to the human spirit were not enough. C. PhilosophicalPeripeteia The “prize essay” should have framed as a nice early episode that would be expected to be forgotten in light of HCM’s subsequent massive crop of writings and unique

33Reinach’s letter is mentioned also in: Smid (1982, 116), Fréchette (2012, 150). 34Husserl’s Ideas first appeared in the first volume of Husserl’s Yearbook (Husserl, 1913). 35The research literature generally identifies the ontological-formal starting point with Logical Investigations, while the shift to an idealistic-transcendental position is identified with the publication of the first volume of his Ideas in 1913, where this position appeared in writing (see: Husserl, 1952a/2012a). However, later in life, HCM reached an understanding that what she called “Husserl’s incomprehensible retreat to transcendentalism, to subjectivism, if not to psychologism” occurred “already in volume 2 of ‘Logical Investigations’” (HCM, 1965c, 395). Avé-Lallemant also indicated the gap between the two volumes of Logical Investigation. See Avé-Lallemant (1971, 14ff.). Avé- Lallemant shares this view about the Logical Investigation with Spiegelberg, who observed that the two volumes designated two periods in Husserl’s Phenomenology (the pre-phenomenological and the period of phenomenology), see: Spiegelberg (1960, 74/1984a, 70). In any case, Husserl himself testified that in 1905, already at his time in Göttingen he “first executed the phenomenological reduction” (Husserl, 2002b, 315). See also Husserl (1966 [Seefelder Manuskripte über Individu- altion (1905–1907)], 237-268), Heffernan (2018/2016), Nakhnikian (1964), Seifert (2004–2005, 146f.). Preface xiii phenomenological approach. However, in the spirit of Aristotle, the winding path awaiting HCM after winning the prize could be characterized as a sort of peripeteia in both her philosophical and her personal life, namely: the turning point in a tragedy where the transition from happiness to misery occurs.36 Thus, instead of this mile- stone, where her philosophical and critical talent was shining brightly, paving her way as one of the most original and daring phenomenologists of her time, HCM’s work was pushed into the distant margins of contemporary philosophy. As a result, her philosophical ideas were largely formulated through internal dialogue and in the absence of a real possibility of sharing them and growing from the echoes they would have created among colleagues and students.37 To an extent, this evaluation of the event of winning of that philosophical prize as a sort of peripatetic moment complies with HCM’s retrospective observation of her life. Thus, on the occasion of the recognition and celebration of her reception of the award of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic of Germany (Groβes Verdienstkreuz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland) on 1 March 1958, she speaks out: Even when I explore the most remote corner of my heart, I find no inkling of any possibility that I could ever be worthy of a celebration like this or be honored with such an award. This is not modesty. I wasn’t pampered by life and there have been more crosses in a negative sense than crosses in a positive sense of exaltation. (HCM, 2015b, 60) Against the background of this description, HCM added that precisely those people who objected to women receiving an academic education were responsible for her not being able to write her dissertation at Göttingen University, basing it on the prize essay.38 The official reason was that her matriculation was of the Realgymnasium Abitur type, which did not include learning Greek, without which, they argued, it would be impossible to write a doctoral dissertation.39 HCM explains that not only would male students have been granted an exemption in such circumstances, but that the school curriculum did not include such studies, so that she had not been given the chance to meet this condition.40

36The proposed simile of peripeteia follows Aristotle’s Poetics. While the peripeteiac moment is described as sudden, its roots are planted in the circumstances of preceding events. HCM herself used this simile in connection to Being and Time. See: HCM (1965g, 371). HCM employs this simile also in her theological discussions. See: HCM (1965e, 189, 1965m, 222, 1965n, 196). 37Kuhn testified to the “long painful lack of teaching activity” (Kuhn, 1966). 38This directly disproves Spiegleberg’s statement that HCM submitted her doctoral dissertation in Munich with Pfänder and not in Göttingen with Husserl “for technical reasons” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 252). In fact, both statements, regarding the affiliation and regarding the identity of the supervisor, are incorrect. Husserl did not directly supervise HCM in writing her dissertation, and this was not “for technical reasons”, as it transpires HCM was well-aware. Spiegelberg’s statement, written in the USA, where he had emigrated, is tainted with blindness toward the difficulties HCM faced in the period where very few women even tried to write dissertations, let alone be considered for tenured academic positions. 39See Karl Schuhmann’s editorial comment on Husserl’s letter to Theodor Conrad on 21 July 1912, where he wrote that “for technical reasons she [HCM] was promoted with this essay but not by Husserl rather by Pfänder in Munich” (Husserl, 1994a, 16). 40One wonders how Husserl, who, according to HCM was “delighted” by her winning the prize (HCM, 2015b, 62), was unable to influence her admission to the Philosophy Department at Göttingen xiv Preface

In any case, in 1912, HCM left Göttingen and returned to Munich. Under the supervision of Alexander Pfänder, who led the Munich phenomenologists group, she developed into an extensive treatise the ﬁrst chapter of the prize essay entitled “The perception of ‘the Natural world view’ that is immanent in the ‘consciousness- independent external world’” (HCM, 1920a, 10–24).41 In this opening chapter to her essay, HCM addresses positivism as “a content-designated doctrine that historically attached itself to the name positivism” (HCM, 1920a, 2). However, despite praising positivism for its awe toward “real experience (wirklicher Erfahrung)” and more generally accepting the “lawful positivistic basic tendency towards the datum (das Gegebene)” (HCM, 1920a, 4), she accuses positivism for “utter Blindness towards the living-being (Lebewesen)” (HCM, 1920a, 1).42 HCM described the process of writing the new elaborated and enlarged essay, which took only four weeks,43 as follows: “My doctorate came to me apriori. It was obviously bestowed on me in the cradle since I was already reading Critique of Pure Reason at the age of ﬁfteen” (HCM, 2015b, 63).44 Pfänder immediately recognized the related essay as a dissertation entitled The Epistemological foundation of Positivism. On the Ontology and the Doctrine of the Appearances of the Real External World (Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus. Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt) (HCM, 1913N).45 It was submitted on 3 July 1912 to the Ludwig Maximillian University of Munich and was given the grade “summa cum laude”. A pretty close version to the dissertation was later published in the Husserl’s Year- book46 in 1916 under the title “On the Ontology and Doctrine of the Appearances of the Real External World, in Connection with Critiques of Positivistic Theories”

University, where he was a senior professor. Also, Hart supports HCM’s impression and indicates that: “Husserl was willing to accept the work for a doctorate at Goettingen”, Hart (1972, 12 n. 1). However, it is still difficult to accept this state of affairs at face value. 41The first part of the dissertation, “The Entire Phenomenon of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916b, 345–397), is based on the first chapter of the “prize essay”. The second part of the dissertation “Sensory Givenness: Feeling and Appearing” (HCM, 1916b, 397–542) is entirely new and anticipates the subsequent book, Realontologie (HCM, 1923b). 42Avé-Lallemant testified that the plan to adapt the remaining chapters of the Prize Essay was never realized. See Avé-Lallemant (1971, 213). 43During these weeks, HCM was in Munich, and not as Spiegelberg wrote: “her main work having been done at Gottingen” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 253). 44The understanding of becoming a phenomenologist almost as an innate givenness is repeated by several phenomenologists. In this spirit, as we have seen, Husserl characterized Reinach: “The phenomenological mode of thinking and investigation soon became second nature to him” (Husserl, 1983, xii, 1987b, 301). Stein referred to those who “were born phenomenologists” (Stein, 2013, 6) and HCM maintained that the phenomenologists “as [naturally] born out of a common spirit” (HCM, 1960b, 62). 45HCM was the first woman to be promoted in a German university. This was in 1912, by Alexander Pfänder, on the basis of her prize essay. See Stein (2013, 7 n. 10) (by the editor, Andreas Uwe Müller). 46Husserl’s Yearbook (Jahrbuch für Phänomenology and philosophische Forschung)thatwas published between 1913 and 1930 and contained eleven issues in which the most foundational works ever in phenomenology were published, such as Husserl’s first volume of Ideen (Husserl, 1913) and Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Heidegger, 1927). Schuhmann wrote the only article to date that is wholly dedicated to Husserl’s Yearbook (Schuhmann, 1990). Preface xv

(Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt. Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien) (HCM, 1916b).47 The apparent change in the dissertation’s title, emphasizing the ontological aspect while relocating the criticism of positivism into the subtitle, is a clear hint of the direction HCM started to take immediately afterward. Its peak was the first treatise she wrote after her dissertation, Realontologie (HCM, 1923b). In any case, even prior to composing this work, it seems that she herself sensed that her philosophical oeuvre would not be restricted to ontological inquiries, but would enter the realm of metaphysics. In this spirit, she explained that eventually epistemological questions can be grasped only from the objective stance of the real to which the metaphysical dimension relates (HCM, 1920b, 130). In any event, subsequently to obtaining her dissertation, her achievements seem to have faded as though they had never happened. HCM described her life in the following years: “During the following years my husband and I had to make a great effort to make a living and continue to substantiate it in a practical manner. […] there was no way of making preparations or plans for the habilitation” (HCM, 2015b, 63). Thus, at the critical stage, after her doctoral dissertation had been approved in 1912, HCM encountered the fundamental barrier of inability to find a university where she could write a Habilitation, which was an indispensable condition for applying for academic positions.48 D. Bergzabern—The Domestication of Phenomenology 1. The Conrads’ Place and the Bergzabern Circle In 1912, HCM married the philosopher Hans Theodor Conrad (1881–1969) and left Munich for his hometown Bad-Bergzabern.49 Theodor Conrad’s plan was “securing the economic foundation and free time for her further philosophical work through the establishment of an orchard farm” (Avé-Lallemant, 1984, 213) that he had purchased before the First World War (Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 69). However, behind this choice to leave Munich, both the city and its university, stood Conrad’s disillusioned awareness of “the difficulty of finding a place for a woman in university”. Therefore he “encour- aged her to devote herself to another passion, caring for plants” (Ales Bello, 2002, 210). In the following years, besides her arduous work in the orchard farm50 HCM

47Only in 1920 was the prize essay published by a private press. It is possible that the delay in publishing this treatise, and also perhaps its publication by a marginal press, contributed to the connection between it and HCM’s doctoral dissertation not being known. Many of the articles in this volume are devoted to the interpretation of this complex essay, which is packed with the important elements of HCM’s entire philosophy, including her later thought. 48Gerda Walther also described the difficulties women encountered when seeking to enter the university’s lecture halls. See: Walther (1960, 17). 49The couple moved first to Theodor’s mother in the Southern Palatinate, close to the French border. Theodor Conrad was a professor of Philosophy in Munich and belonged to the older Göttingen students of Husserl. Among the members of the Munich Circle, Theodor Conrad’s nickname was Autós (“self” in Greek), inspired by his self-assurance. See: (Stein, 1960, 1993, 149 n. 2) (letter no. 146 to Theodor Conrad). In the circle of her friends, HCM’s nickname was Hatti. Stein uses Hatti for HCM quite systematically, in particular in: See: Stein (2005b, 1960). 50Stein testified that HCM “has worked well beyond her strength in the farm” and therefore she planned to go and help her there (Stein, 2005b, 187). Walther, who was invited to the orchard farm in xvi Preface explored the foundation of an ontology of reality and studied intensively German philosophy (especially idealism) and natural sciences (Avé-Lallemant, 1984, 213). The fruits of her study at that time were the Metaphysische Gespräche (HCM, 1921a), Realontologie (HCM, 1923b) 51 and several essays on plants.52 In 1920, the couple built their own house in Bergzabern.53 A year later, and throughout the 1920s, the Göttingen phenomenologists gathered there, usually in the autumn and discussed the development of phenomenology, philosophical, religious, and political issues.54 These meetings at the Conrads’ home, in between which few hundreds of letters were exchanged among the members (Feldes, 2013, 16),55 would later be called the “Bergzabern Circle” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 220).56 Except for the Conrads, the members of Circle—“the children of the house” as Stein put it (Stein, 2005, 203)—included: Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Hans Lipps, Edith Stein, and Alfred von Sybel57 (Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 69). All these were Reinach’s

1923, found as an “accurate description” the impression HCM gave Walther’s relative: “completely not an abstract thinker” but by means of “nice little apples […] a seminal philosopher” (Walther, 1960, 331–332). 51An essay on the soul that preceded Metaphysische Gespräche was later included in it (HCM, 1917, 26–86). Stein was utterly impressed by Realontologie (Stein, 2005b, 188) and by Metaphysische Gespräche as well (Stein, 2005b, 196–197). However, Stein reports that Ingarden expressed a “vehement reaction to the book” and “fear for phenomenology” due to the metaphysical and religious tone that he found in it, see: Stein (2005b, 196). 52See: HCM (1933, 1934, 1938, 1963g). The common discourse of HCM’s time often suggested a philosophy of natural sciences from the standpoint of human studies and in this regard communicated the philosophical project of Wilhelm Dilthey (see in particular: Stein, 2010a; Husserl, 1976/1970c). However, beside her realistic phenomenology, HCM consolidated a philosophy of nature in the most strict and classical sense that also manifested the spirit of German romanticism. Hart suggests that her “early and deep interest in nature owed much to her father who was a famous botanist” (Hart, 1973, 14). Also, Ales Bello argued that HCM’s “interest in nature is also bound with her personal experience” (Ales Bello, 2002, 210). 53The Conrads continued to own their apartment in Munich, where they visited frequently even after their move to Bergzabern. However, following financial difficulties, the apartment was sold in 1919 (Feldes, 2013, 210). The mutual assistance among the circle’s members was reflected by one of the members, Alfred von Sybel, handling the sale. The words of encouragement he sent the couple in this context show that the Conrads’ home in Munich was a significant place for the circle’s members. In a letter dated 12 September 1919, he wrote: “It is very sad that the Munich apartment now is not anymore. But meanwhile the orchard house grows, and this is actually much more beautiful” (cited from: Feldes, 2013, 210). 54Feldes (2013, 205); Hart (2020, 4). 55Only Stein’s letters were published. See: Stein (1993), Stein (2005). From the correspondence of the Bergzabern circle in HCM’s estate, her letter to Hering (HCM, 1955aN), as well as letters she received from him (Hering, 1914–1965N) and from Alexandre Koyré (Koyré, 1911–1964N), are preserved. The importance granted to letters at the time is articulated in Stein’s following words: “man’s life lies in his letters […] not only for the interest of biography, but for arriving at the inside of things” (Stein, 1993, ix). 56Feldes discussed the origin of the name “Bergzabern Circle”: Feldes (2015, 9–10). 57Feldes published the only study, so far, on von Sybel (see: Feldes, 2013). Preface xvii students and before the First World War, all were members of the “Philosoph- ical Society in Göttingen”.58 The plan was to establish an institute with a library and an archive for phenomenology.59 This idea seems to follow the early plan of Hering and Reinach before the First World War to erect what Hering referred to as a “Foundation for Phenomenological Purposes” (Stiftung für phänomenologische Zwecke) (Feldes, 2013, 63).60 The group, whose members called themselves “the ‘old people’”, intended to initiate a “‘new direction’” that would provide a “counter” response to the “the unedifying relationships that have developed around him [Husserl]” in Freiburg under the influence of Heidegger (Stein, 2005b, 193). In their view, the latter turned Husserl’s surrounding into “a dark spot” (Stein, 2005b, 191). They even invited Husserl to Bergzabern for the purpose of, as Stein put it, “[having] him here with us without the whole Freiburg atmosphere” (Stein, 2005b, 195).61 Stein was also involved in gathering books for erecting a library at the Conrads’ place62 and observed that “indeed it has become the general home for phenomenologists (allgemeine Phänomenologenheim)” (Stein, 2005b, 187) and referred to it as “the phenomenology house (Phänomenologenhaus) in Bergzabern” (Stein, 2005b, 191). These designations, to the point of urging Ingarden to come for a visit, arguing that this “certainly belongs to the category of ‘demands of phenomenology (Förderung der Phänomenologie)’” (Stein, 2005b, 190), not only express the emotional attach- ment to the Conrads’ place but also manifest the spiritual depth that tied the members of the group to each other.63 HCM shed light on the uniqueness of the connection between the phenomenologist that gathered in Bergzabern, with the following words:

58For an account of the society, see: Feldes (2015, 29–41). 59After Husserl moved to Freiburg, and following the dismantling of the philosophical society of Göttingen, the Conrads’ place became the constant address for their communication (Feldes, 210). Thus, for example, Hering asked about von Sybel, who had been sent to the front. The letters he sent to HCM are cited by Feldes (Feldes, 2013, 209). 60See here a letter of Hering from 23 April 1915 (found by Avé-Lallemant in HCM’s estate, cited in: Feldes, 2015, 64). However, Feldes leaves open the question whether the Bergzabern Circle was the realization of this early vision of Hering’s (Feldes, 2015, 64). 61It is hard to miss the deep, almost maternal concern that the circle’s members felt for Husserl, in particular Stein who expressed her sense of personal responsibility for working with Husserl as his assistant (Stein, 2005b, 39) and her fear that: “alone the master would not publish anything else” (Stein, 2005b, 65). 62The small library was sponsored by Winthrop Pickard Bell (1885–1956), Husserl’s student from Göttingen, who belonged to the circle there. Bell regularly read the writings of his phenomenologist colleagues (see Stein, 2005b, 65, 79, 89, 90 n. 4, 170), provided Stein with funding for her research activities (Stein, 2005b, 187), which probably ﬁnanced the activity of the Bergzabern Circle (see: Stein, 2005b, 190; Feldes, 2013, 205), and probably had political inﬂuence, which he employed for Germany after the First World War. Later, Bell held a professorship in Canada (See Stein’s references to this in: Stein, 2005b, 162, 173, 190). Husserl’s letters to Bell were published in: Husserl (1994b, 3–58). 63For Stein, the Conrads’ house also possessed a spiritual value. In 1921, during a visit there, Stein reached the decision to convert to Christianity and was baptized, with HCM serving as her Godmother. Herbstrith describes Stein’s stay with Conrad-Martius before her baptism. See: Herbstrith (1972, 24–25). xviii Preface

The way in which we felt about each other was something totally different from usual friendship. There was ﬁrst the communality of the philosophical atmosphere, from which we together with many others were born out (herausgeboren). We, that have been the personal pupils of our highly respected teacher and master, Edmund Husserl.64 “spiritually born out”! I wish to emphasis here, that it was not about mere common type of methodical thinking and study, especially not common world view or the like. The certainly deep common type of methodical thinking and study produced – and posed – a connection between Husserl’s pupils, that I cannot designate other than a [natural] birth from a common spirit, that nevertheless is exactly not a common world view from the aspect of content. Nothing better than some words by Peter Wust could describe the essence of the communality of all genuine phenomenologists. He said that “from the outset in the intention of every new philosophical direction must well be concealed something entirely mysterious, a yearning back to the objective, to the sanctity of Being, the purity and virtue (Keuschheit) of the things, the ‘things themselves’. (HCM 1960b, 62–63)65 Against this background, Avé-Lallemant maintained that Bergzabern Circle “should not be understood as the Göttingen [circle] and the Munich [circle] in connection to their respective universities but as friendly-familial, philosophically fruitful relationship (Beziehung) of the always again meeting phenomenologists” (Avé- Lallemant, 2015, 69). Another evaluation of the Bergzabern Circle referred to is as “a kind of institutional response to Freiburg, whose goal was to sustain the genuine phenomenology” (cited from: Feldes, 2015, 14–15) that distinguished itself from the Heideggerian that has been established in Freiburg. During the period of National Socialism, the paths of the seven phenomenologists of the Berzgabern Circle parted. Stein was murdered at Auschwitz in 1942. Hans Lipps and Alfred von Sybel died. Avé-Lallemant’s attempt to study the history of the Bergzabern Circle after the war were unsuccessful, and he was unable to obtain access to their writings, which were kept by their families and not published. 66 Apart from Feldes’ studies (Feldes, 2013; Feldes, 2015), there are still no comprehensive studies about the group, even though it is mentioned in various contexts in studies of early phenomenology. These studies, and the few sources that exist, open a window upon the human experience, and thus enable a glimpse of the personal and even theological dimension behind their philosophical investigations. 2. The Friendship with Edith Stein and the Choice of Faith Stein and HCM knew each other already from the Göttingen period from the circle of phenomenologists that formed around Husserl. HCM had already been mentioned in the newspapers following her winning of the prize (HCM, 1920a). However, the personal meeting took place in 1920, when Stein visited Bergzabern for a few months and even considered moving there (Stein, 2005b, 188). Between 1921 and 1922, the

64Spiegelberg indicates that “[Der] Meister”, namely the master, was “the inner circle’s affectionate nickname for Husserl, or his associates” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 253). 65See here HCM’s reference to the similarity between her ontological understanding of the dialectic between Being and nothingness and the idea of spirit (Geist) in the thinking of Peter Wust (1884– 1940) in: HCM 1963f, 261 n. 6. Wust was influenced by Max Scheler and was very involved in the Munich-based Catholic monthly Hochland (1903–1941) in which many of HCM’s articles appeared. 66See: Feldes (2015, 14 n. 25). Preface xix two experienced an “identity crisis” (Sinnkrise) (Stein, 2005b, 60 n. 4),67 which was accompanied by a crisis in philosophical creation.68 HCM considered taking a radical step following her religious experiences, as she described in a letter a few years later: “In me grows incessantly the demand (Verlangen) to lose everything for the sake of Jesus Christ. I know and feel that my philosophical desire stops me from being entirely poor and void before the Lord of all Lords” (HCM, 1924N). Eventually, the two chose different paths. As HCM put it: “we walked along a narrow ridge, close to each other, each present in every moment of divine call. It happened but is has led us to confessional different directions” (HCM, 1960b, 73). According to Avé- Lallemant, in the end, HCM “found her spiritual homeland in a community within the evangelic church” (Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 71)69 joined the Protestant Free Church (protestantische Freikirche) (Stein, 2013, 7 n. 10).70 For her, the choice of “liberal Protestantism” was after her parents’ home, which was in connection with the vivid evangelical community (Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 70). In contrast, in 1922 Stein joined the Catholic Church and entered a Carmelite monastery. Interestingly, even in retrospect, the two did not view the choice of faith as conflicting with their philosophical work. For HCM, the choice of faith is based on essence intuition (Wesensfassung) that unveils its “existence possibility (Daseins- möglichkeit)” that leads to a “tremor about heresy” (HCM, 1951b, 16). Likewise, in 1928 also Stein wrote (to Sister Callista): “it is possible to worship God by doing scholarly research […] and even in the contemplative life, one may not sever the connection with the world” (Stein, 1993, 54). It appears that this fundamental approach shared by the two philosophers is based upon their realistic philosophical position, which helped them detect the basic connection between phenomenology and Catholicism. For Stein, the path from phenomenology is inherent in the close connection she discerned between Husserl’s phenomenology and medieval scholasticism. Her first and foundational scholarly elaboration of the connection between phenomenology and Catholicism takes place in her essay on Husserl’s Phenomenology and the philosophy of Aquinas from 1929 (Stein, 2014, 119–142). However, in Finite and Eternal Being,71 which was written after her conversion to Catholicism, Stein reveals herself as the one of the modern thinkers who approached the question of Being “out of inner necessity” and “unmediated proximity”, yet independently of the traditional ties. Stein wrote: this is especially the imperative way of the author for whom the school of Edmund Husserl is a homeland and her philosophical mother tongue is the language of phenomenologists. She must attempt to find in this starting point her way in the great cathedral of scholasticism.

67The note added by the editor, Andreas Uwe Müller 68According to Avé-Lallemant, their stay at Bergzabern in this period entailed a break in publication and a turning to Christianity on the existential level, which was doubted in the scientiﬁc research the two had engaged in up to that point. See: Avé-Lallemant (2015, 78). 69The community was established in Schobdach Franconia and HCM always spent the Christian holidays there (Avé-Lallemant, 2015, 48 n. 15). 70The note added by the editor, Andreas Uwe Müller. 71According to Uwe Müller, it is almost certain that the treatise Finite and Eternal Being was composed between July 1935 and January 1937. See: Stein (2013, xiv). xx Preface

She believed that as much as she is aware of this goal, as is necessary, it will guide her on the way. (Stein, 2013, 19–20) It seems that the inner dialogue Stein shares here with her readers contributed to the interpretation that her “intellectual conversion led to a personal one” (Baring, 2019, 75). Later, in a treatise she wrote about Stein, in relation to the religious aspect of her ﬁgure, HCM quotes the following words from Peter Wust: “even if the curse of subjectivism could not entirely be overcome by the father of this new direction of thought (Husserl), still many of his pupils endeavored in the direction of the original intention of the openness to the object (Objektgeöffnetheit) belonging to this school further on the path to the things, to the facts, to Being itself, and even to the habit of the catholic man, for whom nothing is more appropriate than the eternal measures of the knowing spirit to the decisive things”. Subsequently, she establishes the unequivocal determination: “if one marks the catholic in this way, then certainly all phenomenologists could be called ‘catholic’ also when they in no way confess to it” (HCM, 1960b, 63). In any event, the friendship between the two philosophers had a mutual, formative inﬂuence, mentioned in Stein’s letters and in research about Stein in the context of her decision to convert to Catholicism. Perhaps Stein’s tragic fate, which became well-known after her canonization in 1998, and particularly following the awakening of intensive study of her writings from 2000 onward, contributed to HCM not being completely forgotten in phenomenological research. Incidentally, during that period, the Catholic church in Germany was losing parish- ioners. Therefore, the choice of some of the early phenomenologists to convert to Christianity has attracted scholarly attention. In addition to Max Scheler, von Hilde- brand, the most famous case was of Edith Stein, who converted from Judaism to Catholicism.72 Husserl himself converted from Judaism to Protestantism at the age of 28 in 1886 (Schuhmann, 1977, 15–17). However, he distanced himself from the theistic position, which he interpreted as “a sign of inner wretchedness (Elends) in the soul”, explaining that “a true philosopher cannot be other than free: the essential nature of philosophy is the most radical autonomy” (Husserl, 1968, 22).73 Nonetheless, the connection between his

72For further reading on the conversion of Husserl’s early followers, see here: Schaber 2003. 73Husserl and Ingarden rejected this link between faith and philosophy on the basis of identifying the religious dimension with Christian dogmatism (see: Feldes, 2015, 143). This position of theirs was expressed explicitly in reference to HCM’s work Metaphysische Gespräche (HCM, 1921a) (Stein sent Husserl and Ingarden copies, see: Stein, 2005b, 198 n. 1). Stein naively commented that “Husserl sent a card expressing his delight”, though she certainly mentioned Husserl’s stinging remark when he received the book and wrote to her: “I will first have to see how much of it considers philosophy as a rigorous science” (Stein, 2005b, 197). In his letters to Ingarden (Husserl, 1968, 23) and to Bell, Husserl expressed himself more decisively against HCM’s approach, which he considered to lack scientific rigor and to be instead “romantic ingenious soulful” (Sinnig-seelenvolle Romantik) (Husserl, 1994b, 34). In this spirit, he correctly identified the influence of the Catholic philosopher of romance, Franz von Baader (1765–1841). See Husserl (1994b, 34 n. 104). For examples of HCM referring to Franz von Baader, see HCM (1921a, 62, 66, 127, 140). Feldes also notes Von Sybel’s reference to Franz von Baader (Feldes, 2015, 153). Preface xxi phenomenology and his students’ search for the self in relation to Christianity did not escape Husserl’s attention, and it seems to have bothered him. Thus, for example, in a letter to Rudolf Otto dated 5 Match 1919, he wrote: “my philosophical influence has something remarkably revolutionary: evangelic become Catholic, Catholics become evangelic” (Husserl, 1994c, 206). This background seems to explain Oesterreicher’s indication that Christianity was a loaded and tense issue for Husserl. He quotes from a private conversation he had with HCM and Sister Adelgundis Jaegerschmidt (O.S.B., St. Lioba-Kloster, Freiburg im Breisgau), in which Husserl said about his New Testament: “It is always on my desk, but I never open it. I know that once I open it and read it, I shall have to give up philosophy” (Oesterreicher, 1952, 43).74 Other accounts of the matter suggested that the conversions of a few phenomenologists of the first generation concern phenomenology’s appeal to intuition and its reservation regarding empiricism that made it open to religious belief.75 To this extent, Baring characterized this phenomenon as “philosophical conversions” (Baring, 2018, 115). Spiegelberg presents a balanced position on this issue. Similarly, also Spiegelberg believed that this phenomenon should be linked to the nature of phenomenology. In his words: “The Truth of the matter would seem to be that the phenomenological approach in its openness to all kinds of experiences and phenomena is ready to reconsider even the traditional beliefs in the religious field in a fresh and unprejudiced manner”. Nonetheless, Spiegelberg established that in spite of the many famous cases of conversion, still some of the members of the Munich circle chose to maintain their religious affiliation (Spiegelberg, 1960, 172–173).76 Husserl, for his part, expressed indifference to the related phenomenon and in this regard wrote to Rudolf Otto: “I would be delighted to influence all true men, be it catholic, evangelic or Jewish” (Husserl, 1994c, 207). In any case, it would be difficult to disregard the conspicuous phenomenon of conversion among the early phenomenologists or ignore the influence of Christian thought on the phenomenologists who in the end did not convert or turn religious faith into the focus of their intellectual endeavor, such as HCM.

The Realistic Orientation in Phenomenology

A. The Call for “Go Back to the ‘Things Themselves’” Husserl’s resounding call in his Logical Investigation from 1900 of “go back to the ‘things themselves’” (auf die ‘Sachen selbst’ zurückgehen) (Husserl, 1970a,

74See here also: Oesterreicher (1952, 334 n.1). 75See here: Vidal 1972 (cited from: Baring, 2018, 115 n. 5). 76Spiegelberg’s words appear as an excursus entitled “Note: Phenomenology and Conversion”. This section was omitted from the third expanded edition of his book (Spiegelberg, 1984a), despite the fact that in contrast to its predecessors, this expanded edition devoted space to discussing the realistic phenomenologists. The issue of conversion is addressed in “Faith, Individuality, and Radicalism”, appearing as an appendix to this volume. xxii Preface

168/1984a, 10),77 already at the time of Logical Investigations was referred to as the slogan of phenomenology, implied an unmistakably revolt against another current call of ‘back to Kant’.78 This last call, by the neo-Kantian movement, was addressed to the then-dominant idealistic and materialistic theories of knowledge in the name of the possibility of a universal scientific truth, whose supreme ideal was the Kantian “thing- in-itself”. However, Husserl’s endeavors were harnessed to turning one’s gaze to what is already known or clearly seen. Tothis end, whatever presents itself to consciousness must be approached and understood on its own terms while avoiding addressing any category external to it. The subsequent elaboration of Husserl’s early call in Ideas from 1913 was consolidated as “The principle of all principles” that marks “an absolute beginning” for phenomenological study. In this regard, knowledge as such is regarded as based on an awareness of phenomena that can be presented to us “as it were in its bodily reality” (Husserl, 1952a, §24 51/2012a, §24 43). The early phenomenologists, who perceived themselves as “confirmed realists” (entschiedende Realisten) (Stein, 2002a, 200), were attracted to Husserl’s call to “go back to the ‘things themselves’”. But beyond the inspiration they drew from Husserl’s reverberating call, when they came to realize the vision it embodied, they were not guided by a model. Rather, their encounter with Husserl’s ideas brought about, as Spiegelberg put it: “interpretive studies of the first-hand work of other well-known phenomenologists” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 251). Spiegelberg added in this regard that they “could enjoy again some of the freedom of the first generation in approaching the Sachen themselves without intermediaries. You no longer need to study the phenomena under the shadow of the historical authorities, not even the authorities of the founders of phenomenology” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 254). Likewise, Kuhn portrays vividly the atmosphere of the time as follows: “The slogan ‘back to the things’ (zurück zu den Sachen)” was: “a signal of inner relief (Befreiung). The chains (Fesseln)ofthe idealistic construction that held captive the spirit in its own made abstractions have fallen. The world in the multiplicity of phenomena opened itself up like an eye waking up from a slumber” (Kuhn, 1966). These observations by Spiegelberg and Kuhn were retrospectively confirmed in HCM’s description of her time in Göttingen: “Wir wollten nur an die Sachen selbst heran” (we only wanted to come close to the things themselves) (HCM, 2015b, 62). Moreover, the primary, foundation nature embodied in Husserl’s reverberating call was directly expressed in the first attempts to formulate a “metaphenomenology”, meaning reflective writing about phenomenology itself.79 The independent inquiry into the essence of phenomenology is apparent in the essays written by the first generation of phenomenology with the titles: “What

77The phrase “to return to the things themselves” appeared in Husserl’s writings in several contexts. See also: Husserl (1970a, §4 172, §6 174–175/1984a, §4 17–18, §6 22-23). This saying has also been discussed extensively in connection to the realistic orientation in phenomenology, see: Seifert (1971, 1995); Kuhn (1969); Schmücker (1956). 78For further reading, see: Willey (1978). 79This writing about phenomenology contradicts Spiegelberg’s statement regarding the first generation of phenomenology: “They could not but be ‘original’ in the sense of doing phenomenology without the threat of metaphenomenology” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 253). Preface xxiii is phenomenology?” (Stein, 2014, 85–90) and “About phenomenology” (Reinach, 1969). 80 In this regard, HCM described the phenomenological turning to the things as a “veil” falling “away from the eyes” (HCM, 2015b, 61),81 similar to Reinach’s description that: “things will present themselves to us quite differently than is today believed” (Reinach, 1969, 204). Also, the first generation of phenomenologists understood the call to “go back to the ‘things themselves’” as an appeal to return to the “origin phenomena” (Urphänomen / arch-phenimenon) in the spirit of Goethe. In this approach, phenomena are regarded as delineating the entire field of observation, to the extent that there is nothing meaningful behind or beyond it (Goethe, 1840, 67– 68; Deibel, 1921).82 The approach has been depicted by Reinach with these words: Phenomenological analysis means that we are not permitted to inject the customary concepts of representation, thinking, feeling, and will in order to “build up” premeditation out of them, a process which inevitably would involve the loss of what is most essential to it. Rather do we have to make an effort to transport ourselves into the phenomenon in order to be able to render faithfully what we can vividly intuit there. (Reinach, 1921a, 122)83 Moreover, based on the fundamental principles of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, the Munich-Göttingen phenomenologists sought to establish knowledge and truth on evidence as immediate recognition of things, in contrast to the skeptical position whereby “there is no truth, no knowledge, no justification of knowledge” (Husserl, 1970a, §32 76/1975, §32 120). In contrast to the skeptical position, Husserl stated: “The most perfect ‘mark’ of correctness is inward evidence, it counts as an immediate intimation of truth itself. […] Ultimately therefore, all genuine, and, in particular, all scientific knowledge, rests on inner evidence: as fare as such evidence extends, the concept of knowledge extends also” (Husserl, 1970a, §6 17–18/1975, §6 28–30). Finally, the phrase “go back to the ‘things themselves’” indicates the assumption that the ultimate independence and non-reductiveness of real things and of knowledge about them are a condition for achieving the objectivity of things. HCM described this principle as being “at the foundation of the sort of phenomenology… that I am targeting” to which she cannot “grant a particular name” to her own approach that she

80HCM’s reﬂections about the issue appear particularly in two main treatises written in relation to the question: what is phenomenology? See: HCM (1951b, 2015b). 81The German original says: “Um Phänomenologen zu sein oder zu werden, muβ einem ja irgenwie der Star gestochen sein” (in order to become a phenomenologist, one must somehow be a stabbed star) (HCM, 2015a, 57). These lines were omitted from the English translation of the speech (HCM, 2015b, 61). This passage is also cited in: U. Avé-Lallemant 1965/66, 208. However, the image of a “veil” falling appears in HCM’s critique of Idealism (see: HCM, 1963l, 44; HCM, 1963c, 195) and Positivism (see: HCM, 1920a, 1), within which they were accused of philosophical “blindness”. 82HCM declared the connection to Goethe explicitly as driving to return “the eye and the gazing power”. As she put it: “We see that alongside the wisdom that analyzes conceptually, the eye and the observing power return again to the order (Rechte), as was requested by Goethe” (HCM, 1963g, 347–348). An afﬁnity between Goethe’s theory of colors and HCM’s view of the issue is noticeable in: HCM, 1929a). The association of Husserl’s phenomenology to Goethe has been indicated in the literature, see: Heinemann (1934), Seifert (2004–2005, 133–137), Spiegelberg (1984a, 23 n. 9). 83English translation cited from: Spiegelberg (1960, 197/1984a, 193). xxiv Preface terms as “phenomenology in the comprehensive and radical sense. Phenomenology equals essence-research! Phenomenology without any thematical restriction” (HCM, 1965g, 377). However, the most fundamental principle behind her phenomenology is portrayed as follows:

There is not only the pure consciousness, there is not only the existing human person. There are not only what is relative to pure consciousness directed intentionally, not only everything that is relative to the existential (existenziell) that is caring for the world, that is projected, and experiencing existence personally. There is also the world itself in its very own independency-of-Being (Seinsunabhängigkeit) in regard to consciousness and also from the existing I (Ich). […] such independence of Being belongs to the essence of the real world!Iftheworldin which we live possessed no independence of Being… then there would be no real world, only a fake real (vorgetäuscht Wirklische). (HCM, 1965g, 374–375)84

Dietrich von Hildebrand, a member of the Munich-Göttingen Circle, clarified this connection between the world’s independent existence and the possibility of obtaining knowledge about it: “The act of knowledge is an ultimate datum which cannot be reduced to anything else. Therefore, we cannot ‘define’ it; we can only point to it indirectly. The true nature of knowledge can be grasped only in-itself and not through anything else” (Hildebrand, 1973, 13).85 Furthermore, independence on consciousness transpires for von Hildebrand as a unifying foundation of the objects of knowledge themselves, and at the same time as a justification of knowledge itself.

The unities in which […] necessary states of facts are grounded stand entirely on their own feet. […] If they are unequivocally and clearly given, they do not need any criterion for the integrity of the act that grasps them, but, on the contrary, they themselves justify the grasping act as not contaminated by error. (Hildebrand, 1973, 13)

Notwithstanding, for the ﬁrst generation of phenomenology, Husserl’s related appeal of going “back to the ‘things themselves’” in no way denoted a call for addressing

84See here HCM’s distinction between three types of phenomenology: the idealistic-transcendental of Husserl; the existentialism of Heidegger; and the ontologism of the Munich-Göttingen phenomenologists. See: HCM (1965c/1959a). The division into three types of phenomenology appears already in an unpublished manuscript from 1916 (HCM, 1916aN, 7–8). Avé-Lallemant testified that the manuscript was lost until 1960 (Avé-Lallemant, 1975a, 34). Also, in a handwritten note, Avé-Lallemant adds that probably Jean Hering produced the manuscript in a typewriter font during the First World War (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 197; see here also: Parker, 2019, 170). Avé-Lallemant emphasizes that already from the beginning, a difference was apparent between the phenomenology of the Munich Circle and that of Husserl, which he characterized thus: “For Husserl, the method of phenomenology was essentially an intentional analysis (Intentionalanalyse). For the Munichers [it was] essence analysis (Wesensanalyse)” (Avé-Lallemant, 1975a, 24). See here also: Avé-Lallemant (1971, 218). 85Von Hildebrand, a student of Reinach, taught in Munich after the Second World War (Avé- Lallemant, 1975a, 23). He was recognized by Husserl as continuing to develop Reinach’s theory (Schuhmann, 1987, 243) and as developing on the basis of his teacher a theory of phenomenological realism (Dubois, 1995, 97 n. 83). Preface xxv real objects in the external world. In this regard, Arnold Metzger proposed an unam- biguous phrasing when he said about “the motif of ‘addressing the things’ (Wendung zu den Sachen)” the following: “the ‘things’ are the ideal objects. The turning to the ‘things’ is the turning to the a priori as an object” (Metzger, 1966, 28).86 HCM continues the same line as she addressed her ontological studies to “essence-holdings (Wesensbeständen) existing de facto” (HCM, 1916b, 354) and establishes the importance of the “‘science of essences of the real world (Wesenswissenschaft vom realen Sein)’” provided by ontology as the “unabbreviated complete concept of finite reality” (unverkürzter Vollbegriff endlicher Realität) (HCM, 1963b, 82). However, as will be discussed later, the ontological orientation of phenomenology did not satisfy HCM either, and she sought to open paths from it to metaphysics. B. Essence-Observation, Regularity, Necessity, and Unity Husserl’s early struggle in Logical Investigation against psychologism, relativism, and various forms of reductionism (Husserl, 1970a, §23, §31/1975, §23, §31), and particularly his demand that the conditions of consciousness be examined independently of the thinking subject (Husserl, 1970a, §66/1975, §66), served as primary principles for the phenomenologists of the Munich Circle. To this extent, Spiegelberg established that for the early phenomenologists, “Husserl’s Logical Investigations was the bible” (Spiegelberg, 1959, 60). In this spirit, Reinach wrote to his friend Theodor Conrad in a letter dated 22 January 1904 that he was studying Husserl’s Logical Investigations and “you certainly have to believe (glauben) them too” (Avé- Lallemant and Schuhmann, 1992, 77, my emphasis). Theodor Conrad’s familiarity with Husserl’s phenomenological method from Logical Investigations was presented as evidence of his being a “full-blooded phenomenologist (Vollblutphänomenolo- gist)” (Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann, 1992, 78).87 Finally, the importance of the Logical Investigations within the evolution of the Munich Circle transpires also from the significance attributed to a meeting between Husserl and Johannes Daubert (1887–1947) in summer 1902. Just like the other members of the circle Daubert, then a student of Theodor Lipps in Munich, read Husserl’s book and was thor- oughly impressed by it. In this regard, Schmücker reported that after this meeting, Husserl told his wife: “here is someone who read my Logical Investigations and understood!”. Schmücker further maintained that “in a sense, with this conversation commenced the ‘School’ that will be known as phenomenology” (Schmücker, 1956, 1). Theodor Conrad referred to this meeting several times (Conrad, 1954N,

86Arnold Metzger (1892–1974) returned to Germany having left to the USA during the Nazi period. He held a teaching position at Munich University, alongside HCM. The work cited is his main treatise, in which he dealt with the problem of relativism, which he believed phenomenology was unable to solve. For further reading on phenomenology and relativism, see: Carr (1985). 87Notwithstanding, Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann rightly noted here, the esteem in which the members of the Munich Circle held Husserl’s Logical Investigations should not be seen as mere acceptance. A more critical approach on this point was voiced by Rosenwald, who followed Land- grebe’s critique (Landgrebe, 1963, 21–22), arguing that their static understanding of the corre- lation between an object and intending it “turns out into faith, a faith which for many adher- ents of the Munich-Göttingen school was easily transformed into religious faith. This opened to phenomenology a path towards irrationalism” (Rosenwald, 1989, 19). xxvi Preface

2, Conrad, 1965–1969aN, 1; Conrad 1965–1969bN, 1)88 and Spiegelberg maintained that “this conversation was easily the most important single event in the History of the Munich phenomenological Circle” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 171/1984a, 169). Avé-Lallemant, who was personally exposed to these figures who were the first to provide a historical account of that time, unreservedly justified this determination by Spiegelberg (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 31). In any event, among the various issues Husserl addressed in Logical Investiga- tions, essence intuition had a particularly formative influence on the members of the Munich-Göttingen phenomenologists. They saw it not just as Husserl’s most essential achievement, but also as the genuine core of phenomenology.89 Following him, they were convinced that the objects perceived and the ways in which they are known are founded upon lawfulness of essence (Wesensgesetze) (Husserl, 1970a, 168/1984a, 10) stemming from the things themselves and capable of being directly grasped by the art of phenomenological intuition.90 The “essence observation” (Wesensfassung) method shaped in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, which HCM called a “the genuine philosophical assignment (Aufgabe)” (HCM, 1916b, 348),91 was aimed to reveal the essential “what” (was/Washeit) that makes something into this specific object, “while break[ing] through with theories and constructions” (Reinach, 1969, 220). Reinach explains: “There is no accidentally-being-so in essences, but rather a necessarily-having-to- be-so, and an essentially-cannot-be-otherwise” (Reinach, 1969, 210). Moreover, according to Reinach, the direct access to things is aimed at leading us not only to the essences we have “already” intended (intendiert), but also to new essences that must be discovered and brought into the gaze (Reinach, 1969, 210).92 At the same time, he believes that “new light is thrown upon the old problems supplied by the history of philosophy” (Reinach, 1969, 219). In his opinion, “the first effort of phenomenology has been to trace out the most diverse of the domains of essence relations-psychology and aesthetics, ethics and law, etc. Everywhere new domains of such relations open up to us” (Reinach, 1969, 219, my emphasis). In the same spirit,

88The reference to Theodor Conrad’s estate is cited from: Smid (1982, 130, 150 n. 139). 89Ludwig Landgrebe, Husserl’s close student in Freiburg, was one of the most severe critics of the Munich-Göttingen Circle’s. He argued that his colleagues’ use of the observation method was not only more intensive than that characteristic of Husserl, but also irresponsible. In his opinion, this gave phenomenology a bad name, and as a result, it was perceived as “method-less intuition”. See: Landgrebe (1963, 21). 90Regarding the formative influence of “essence intuition” on the Munich Circle, see: Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965), Pfänder (1913), Hering (1921, 39–40), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Reinach (1951). 91See also: HCM (1923b, 159, 1965g, 377, 1965k, 347). 92In this context, Reinach likens direct observation as a movement from Socrates to Plato: “Socrates did signification analysis […] Here it is a question of clearing up the obscurities and contradictions of significations a procedure which, moreover, really has nothing to do with definition, and certainly not with induction. By contrast, Plato does not start with words and significations. He aims at the direct view of the ideas (Ideen), the unmediated grasp of essences as such” (Reinach, 1969, 210, my emphasis). Preface xxvii

HCM adds that in fact, there is not one essence that the whole of phenomenological thinking is harnessed to the philosophical understanding, but an “inexhaustible kingdom (Reiche) of entities (Wesenheiten) and of rules of essence that ﬂow from it. This in-itself lies beyond the entire historical-philosophical difference of mere appearing and metaphysical in-itself” (HCM, 1951b, 6). Along with the Husserlian essence intuition, and as part of it, the realistic phenomenologists also adopted the Husserlian thesis regarding the rationality of the world (Husserl, 1952a, §136–§137, §139, §142/2012a, §136–§137, §139, §142). This statement was particularly true for HCM. Assuming the fundamental intelligibility of Being in general (HCM, 1963h, 230),93 she argued that the presence of essences in real things is original and perceptible (HCM, 1931aN, 2–3).94 HCM explains that the “forms of essence” (Wesensformen) originating from the hidden depth of the human spirit are shaped by the objective logos of the real world (HCM, 1965l, 311–312). HCM apparently wonders: “don’t the two radically contradict each other?”. However, she immediately answers: “I don’t believe it. The same logos, which is intended in the conceivable most universal sense, accords with the essence and the Being of the world, lies concealed with the same universality also in human intelligence” (HCM, 1965c, 400–401).95 Thus, the harmony existing between the logos of the self and the logos of the world is enabled. Despite its being peculiar and incomparable to any other mode of being (HCM, 1963h, 240), the ontological exclusivity of the I might be illuminated also “on the ground of Being itself” (HCM, 1963h, 243). Alternatively, “only out of this ontological foundation” of the real being in general is “a true ‘comprehension’ (Begreifung)” of the I possible (HCM, 1931aN, 6). Thus, inspired by Reinach’s statement according to which “that does not mean that intuition is thought of as a sudden inspiration and illumination” but rather with

93Here, “Being” indicates the all-encompassing phenomenon of primordial Being (Das Sein)or “the Being or beings”, while “being” stands for particular existing things (die Seiende). This choice follows the classic translation of Heidegger’s Being and Time. See translator’s note in: Heidegger (1962, 19 n. 1). While for Heidegger it seems that almost anything one can think or talk about might count as a “being” or entity (books, animals, numbers etc.), regarding “Being” he clariﬁes: “In the question which we are to work out, what is asked about is Being—that which determines entities as entities, that on the basis of which entities are already understood, however we may discuss them”, Heidegger (1962, 25–26). 94In this context, see Rosenwald’s assertion that on this point HCM opposed her realistic phenomenologist colleagues, who adopted the quantifying approach typical of the modern scientiﬁc method, which relied on what was then called the “‘subjectless’ aspect of reality” (Rosenwald 1989, 22–23). However, as I have demonstrated above, HCM’s argument that harmony between the personal logos and the world’s logos represents a more complex position of HCM, who assimilated her philosophy of the I into the philosophy of Being. 95This insight enabled HCM to view Heidegger’s perception, in Being and Time, of human understanding as the key to the philosophy of being and the interpretation of reality as an expression of “performing a radical existential turn”. Although alongside this, we should also mention her criticism of his chain of thought, which she described as “an absolutization of the mode of existence of the I-being by means of which once again brought about relativization of any other being”. See HCM (1963i, 186). xxviii Preface

“a gradual approximation to the object” (Reinach, 1969, 220),96 HCM added that “‘essence’ is not mystical nor is it a speculative construct or something thought out (Erdachtes). It presents itself from the exact […] respective givenness itself. This possibility is proven through actual essence study” (HCM, 1965g, 377–378). She explains that studying the essence:

Mostly it requires a long and very precise philosophical work, in which the spiritual eye must be incessantly directed at the presently only darkly anticipated “sense-position” (Sinnstelle) of the essential (wesenmäßig) of the discussed issue. This is phenomenology in the inclusive and radical sense. Phenomenology or the study of essence! (HCM 1965g, 377)

From HCM’s point of view, revealing the essence at the basis of things requires mining into the depths for which surface-appearance (Erscheinungsoberfläch) functions as a sort of cover (HCM, 1916b, 353–354). In any case, the philosophical toil demanded of the phenomenologist by essence intuition should not remove from it the immediate quality that constitutes its hallmark. On the contrary, the presentation of essences to intuition appears as a brilliant light, to the extent that, as HCM puts it, “all of a sudden you see a thousand things you didn’t see before” (HCM, 2015b, 61).97 Two far-reaching insights regarding essences underly the above assertion. The first concerns the aspect of lawfulness in the essence, whose seeds first transpired in Husserl’s study of the laws of logic. In Logical Investigations, Husserl argued that mental activities only have mental significance when they have the form of logical law (Husserl, 1970a, §8 22/1975, §8 19–20). In addition, “what they say has entire validity: they themselves in their absolute exactness are evident and proven”. Instead of being “one of countless theoretical possibilities”, logical law as such is “the single, sole truth which excludes all possibilities” (Husserl, 1970a, §23 53/1975, §23 84). The second insight in this regard relates to the component of necessity entailed in this law. As Husserl phrased it: “To see a state of affairs as a matter of law is to see its truth as necessarily obtaining… [we] call every general truth that itself utters a law, a necessary truth” (Husserl, 1970a, §63 146/1975, §63 233). These two elements—law and necessity—are explicitly tied to the element of essence in Reinach’s following words:

96One of the strictest critics of the early phenomenologists’ perception of essence was Ludwig Landgrebe, who characterized their use of Husserl’s phenomenology as “‘method-less intuitionism’ (methodenlosen Intuitionismus) that gives phenomenology a bad name” (Landgrebe, 1963, 21). No less severe was Rosenwald’s critique, claiming that: “Göttingen circle shows the results of advancing the ‘seeing of essences’ in isolation from the other procedures of the phenomenological method, and demonstrates the contradictoriness and lack of clarity that characterize phenomenology as a whole” (Rosenwald, 1989, 32). 97The image of a “veil” falling ﬁts well into the severe criticism HCM directed at Idealism (HCM, 1963l, 44, 1963c, 195) and Positivism (HCM, 1920a, 1), which accused them of philosophical “blindness”. Preface xxix

Of essences laws hold true, and these laws are incomparable with any fact or factual connection of which sense perception informs us. These laws in question hold of the essences as such, in virtue of their nature (Wesen). There is no accidentally-being-so in essences, but rather a necessarily having-to-be-so, and an essentially-cannot-be-otherwise. That there are these laws is one of the most important things for philosophy and-if one thinks it out completely-for-the-world at large. (Reinach, 1969, 210) The language of plurality employed by Reinach regarding essences and their laws, as a result which he observes that “the realm of the aprioriis incalculably large” (Reinach, 1969, 215), echoes also in the HCM’s related idea of “kingdom of entities (Wesenheiten) and of rules of essence” flowing from it (HCM, 1951b, 6). The plurality of essences inserts to them an aspect of diversity. To this extent might be challenged the ideal of absolute exactness that accompanies Husserl’s discussions of the logical lawfulness upon which essences are established. Even more so, the question regarding the force that can bring together several essences in one and the same reality is of special importance for a realist phenomenology. At this point, the realist phenomenologists seem to speak with almost one voice when emphasizing the unity that characterizes the givenness of essences. This is apparent in Reinach’s criticism of the rejection of the aprioriby empirical psychology. In this regard, he equates the significance theory of essences for empirical psychology to geometry for natural science and clarifies the following: It is not correct to say that, when I have at the same time perceived A and B, and now represent A, a tendency exists also to represent B. I must have perceived A and B together in a phenomenal unity […] in order to that distinct tendency to arise. Where two objects appear to us as related, an association sets in. Further, if the relation is one which is grounded in ideas (Ideen) themselves, e.g., similarity or contrast, then not even such a previous appearence [sic] is necessary. […] Any relation at all is capable of setting up associations. But above all it must be said that in association we have to do, not with empirically collocated facts, but rather with rational (verstehbare) connections, grounded in the nature of things. (Reinach, 1969, 218, my emphasis) This observation by Reinach of a unify that pervades essences, recurs also in HCM’s observations with the ontological accentuation typical of her thinking, in her words: “[if] we remain on the strict ontological ground, thus can be only the substantial unity, the existing (Daseinede) itself , that by virtue of the existential own potency (Eigenpotenz) ‘forms’ itself into the concerned essence” (HCM, 1963c, 220). Like- wise, von Hildebrand devoted a special discussion to the aspect of unity existing in essences as such. In this regard, he postulated categorically: “Every existing thing is a unity and its such-being must in some way be characterized as a unity” (Hildebrand, 1973, 100). That is to say that not only are essences necessary, but the unity of the essence is also indispensable. Moreover, according to von Hildebrand, “necessary unities are the only genuine ‘essences’” (Hildebrand, 1973, 116). Moreover, in the view of the realist phenomenologist, the force of the related unity operating in givenness is experienced as an evident aspect in essences themselves. In this regard, Reinach determines that one must be directed by “distinctions of essence which are ultimately given and found before us” (Reinach, 1969, 197–198), to the xxx Preface extent that “Wherever in the world we find ourselves, the doorway to the world of essences and their laws always stands open to us” (Reinach, 1969, 211). Elsewhere, he writes: [to] try to explain it would be just like trying to explain the proposition, 1 x 1 = 1. It is a fear of what is directly given (Angst vor der Gegebenheit), a strange reluctance or incapacity to look the ultimate data in the face and to recognize them as such which has driven unphenomenological philosophies […] to untenable and ultimately to extravagant constructions. (Reinach, 1983, 46) In an unmistakable resemblance, also for HCM the givenness of essences is evident to the extent that she argues “Either one sees the essence, or he does not see it. It’s impossible to prove (beweisen) it but only to lead to it. Where the spiritual organ for this is lacking, where it is still buried, or where it’s completely rotten, the real philosophical organ is also lacking there. Entities (Wesenheiten) are givennesses” (HCM, 1951b, 10–11).98 Likewise, she explains that “one cannot prove the empirical-sensory fact of the presence (Vorhandensein) of trees. They are there, and whoever is not blind sees them. One cannot prove the spiritual-empirical (rather than psychological) fact of entities prove. They are there, and whoever is not blind for essence (wesensblind) sees them. There is the cosmos of essences (Wesenskosmos), just as there exists a cosmos of Being (Seinskosmos)” (HCM, 1951b, 15). However, while for Reinach and HCM the matter of the unified givenness of essences in reality is so evident that not further explanation if required, von Hildebrand construes the following: […] necessary essence is given in its generic character when we perceive a concrete individual being possessing that essence. When we see a triangle for the first time, we grasp not only this concrete triangle, but also the genus “triangle.” The necessary such-being in its generic character discloses itself intuitively in the concrete individual triangle which we perceive. […] thanks to the very nature of the necessary essence, the generic imposes itself on our mind when we perceive the concrete individual. (Hildebrand, 1973, 112) This “generic character” that is imposed on every individual being, introduced by von Hildebrand, is but the force that brings about the unity that brings together various individual essences that possess one and the same essence. Obviously, this possession exceeds the “concrete individual” as it is inherent in any other or even possible beings that bear the same essence. Finally, Scheler seems to continue the same line while arguing that “what constitutes the unity of phenomenology is not a particular region of facts, such as mental or ideal objects, nature, etc., but only self-givenness in all possible regions” (Scheler, 1973, 145). Alongside the path of establishing the presence of essences within realty and arguing for their unified givenness, common to the main figures of the Munich Circle. HCM discusses also the aspect of the very meaning of essence intuition for realist phenomenology. In this regard, she clarifies that “phenomenology does not deal with a description of so-called mere phenomena in some possible contrast to some transcendent in-itself but especially both with an ‘in-itself’ and its ongoing exposure

98See also another reference by HCM to the need for a “spiritual eye” (HCM, 1965g, 377) and a “philosophical organ” (HCM, 1965j, 404). Rosenwald characterizes HCM’s approach to nature following this insight as “ontologized sensuality”, see: Rosenwald (1989, 28). Preface xxxi

(fortschreitende Bloβlegung)” (HCM, 1951b, 5). She observes that description alone is insufficient because “the world is full of apriorimeaningfulness” (apriorischer Sinnhaftigkeit) (HCM, 1951b, 10). These meanings, which von Hildebrand saw as the ultimate object of philosophy (Hildebrand, 1973, 63),99 do not denote primarily contents perceived mentally, but as HCM clarifies: “‘sense’ (Sinn), is here equal to ‘essence’; and essence is precisely this last, qualitative, type of its own that grants each smallest or biggest being-existence (Seinsbestand) its sense-position (Sinnstelle) that is that cannot be replaced or be withdrawn” (HCM, 1951b, 10). This primordial affinity taking place between “sense-position” (Sinnstelle) and “being-existence” (Seinsbestand), that has been revealed and explored by the phenomenology, enables then its essences to serve as a very basic infrastructure for obtaining understanding of reality. True, essence (Essenz) and existence (Existenz) are not identical.100 HCM asserts categorically: “Reality is something that from the aspect of its entity (seinsmäβig) stands on its own ground” (HCM,1963e, 36). Moreover, existence is characterized by “selfness” (Selberkeit), which constitutes “the ontological root of any real being”. Such a being is characterized by “that which is in-itself and stands underneath Being and suchness” (das Sich-selber-im-Sein-und-Sosein-Unterstehen) (HCM, 1957, 84). In contrast, “essence lacks precisely this selfness” (HCM, 1957, 85) that brings about what HCM calls “the radical independency-of-Being (Seinsun- abhängigkeit) of essences” (HCM, 1957, 84, 1965g, 374). Exactly the absence of a specific belonging to Being that might enable then positioning themselves in existence deprives essences of the capability stand on their own feet. This also implies what HCM refers to as a lack of “objectivizing grasp” (vergegenständlichenden Zugriff ), which makes essences “alien to the object” (gegenstandfremd) as such. To this extent, so argues HCM, essences “‘have no objective Beingness’ (keine gegen- stänsliche Seinshaftigkeit)!” (HCM, 1957, 84). She explains that this means not only that essences cannot be objectivized, but rather that “they themselves are not self- fully placed under themselves. They possess no self (Selberkeit), within which its own Being or its suchness (Sosein) could have been grounded” (HCM, 1957, 84). Conse- quently, unlike the existences of the real world that can be encountered (begegnen), “access to the essences can be achieved only indirectly, in the concrete realization where they constitute the essence of objects, or as an idea through a transcendental action” (HCM, 1957, 85). The realist phenomenologists are well aware of the apparent vagueness and the sense of evasiveness that accompany the above-discussed descriptions of essences. Reinach establishes that the infinite distance from the things persists even when we address an intentional attitude toward the things. He says that it is a mistake to assume that this distance is reduced by science (Reinach, 1969, 196). In contrast,

99See here also: Reinach (1921c) or Reinach (1976). 100On this point, HCM accepts Hering’s fundamental distinction. See: Hering (1921). HCM stated her agreement with Hering’s approach in this regard, see: HCM (1923b, 162). For further reading, see: De Santis (2015). The influence of Hering on HCM and Stein is discussed in: Ales Bello (1993), Surzyn (2002). xxxii Preface he believes that it is precisely philosophy that can penetrate “through all signs, definitions, and rules to the facts themselves” (zu de Sachen selbst)” (Reinach, 1969, 204). Likewise, HCM maintains that “constructive solidity (Festgelegtsein) does not and never did belong to real phenomenologists” (HCM, 1951b, 10). She explains that it is precisely the inability to achieve an accurate definition that expresses the spirit of phenomenology that establishes what she portrays as “a distance towards things, light hand, all-around open gaze” (HCM, 1951b, 9). Von Hildebrand takes a further step in this regard and refers to the inadequacy and incorrectness of a priori knowledge as such that result from the nature of its object. He explains while Husserl’s method addressed objects “which intuitively reveal to us an essential unity that is necessary and possesses high intelligibility”, the such-being (Sosein)ofreal objects cannot be approached by “bracketing its real existence” (Hildebrand, 1991, 128). However, the related vagueness is by no means an ideal for its own sake. Rather, HCM clarifies that “the ambiguous and chaotic that I reckoned for a tainted spiritual stomach, destroys directly the real philosophical distinction (Unterscheidungssinn), darkens the pure vision of the very own (ureigen), the fullness and depth of things and of essence, destroys the enchantment from the beauty of the spiritual cosmos” (HCM, 1951b, 14). Thus, in the absence of any point or ability to classify essence at all, HCM presented the related vagueness and sense of evasiveness that concern a factual necessity hidden in the things themselves. Against this background, it transpires that the meaning of the essences of real entities (Seinssinn) does not denote a cognitive dimension and cannot be concretely pinpointed, but concerns the very “thing-in-itself” of beings. HCM asserts explicitly that phenomenology deals precisely with exposing this “in-itself” that denotes “an entity (Wesenheit) or an essence that with the same characteristic essence of a being-existence (Seinsbestand) is something final, deep-rooted, singular, independent”. Therefore, “wanting to go beneath it would make no sense” (HCM, 1951b, 6). Nonetheless, “essences themselves are capable of being studied” and they also grant all existents their meaning and logos (HCM, 1957, 85). This is precisely the reason that recognizing the essence of a thing does not require an investigation of its appearance within the multiplicity of empirical cases, but it is sufficient to investigate a single case in order to analyze its essence. Furthermore, this singular case does not have to be perceptually given but can be given to pure observation (HCM, 1965g, 375). The fact that the essence is shared by different entities—abstract or concrete— makes phenomenological essence study into the key to the formal discourse about reality and Being in general. Indeed, only “existence” can achieve concrete or material realization. However, since essences also exist (HCM, 1923b, 162), its exposure to a certain thing is simultaneously the understanding of its reality. At this point, Reinach’s words are enlightening: “The essential laws which we have brought out in this work can be considered purely in themselves and apart from their realization. One could conceive of a world in which these laws would not at all be realized […]. But when all of this exists, it is intimately interwoven with the rest of the natural world” (Reinach, 1983, 130, my emphasis). This expressed intimacy that exists between the world of essences and the natural world epitomizes an essential aspect of the stance of the realist phenomenology, HCM’s included. Preface xxxiii

However, it is exactly in this view of essential connectedness between the ideal and the real inhere the seeds of the above-discussed broke up between the Munich and Göttingen phenomenologists and Husserl. Well before the appearance of Ideen in 1913, already in the Prolegomena to Logical Investigations, namely in 1900 and as a radical means against psychologism Husserl inaugurated “the fundamental sense of ideality, which puts an unbridgeable gulf (unüberbrückbare Kluft) between and real” (Husserl, 1975, § 59 220/1970a, §59 138), and accordingly established that “no conceivable gradation could mediate between the ideal and the real” (Husserl, 1975, § 22 80/1970a, §22 50).101 Nonetheless, HCM’s phenomenological studies that are discussed in this volume serve as a mouthpiece for Husserl’s doctrine of essence intuition, which was first founded and considerably explored in Logical Investigations. Despite the apparent disagreements with Husserl’s accentuation of the ideal already at that time, she relied on his observations as point of departure in her most foundational contention that it is possible and necessary to obtain the meaning of the presence of beings in the world. This should be achieved not only or primarily through clarifying the conscious and idea-based relations toward them but first and foremost by gazing into their essence. This essence is perceived as an ontological element with a distinct structure whose exposure grants a key to understanding the world and reality in general. C. From Epistemology to Ontology: “The Turn to the Object” The marginalization of ontology and metaphysics in nineteenth-century philosophy, especially in neo-Kantian thought, played a central role in the consolidation of the thinking of the early phenomenologists. Their striving to obtain a grasp of real things while being free of dealing with the conscious dimensions involved in the human relation toward them, took shape in their choice to shift from epistemology to ontology. In particular, the shift to ontology, which became a lever for the revival of metaphysics in the first decades of the twentieth century, is well reflected in the works of the members of the Munich-Göttingen Circle.102 In this regard, HCM writes: “we got completely out of the habit of making any kind of epistemological, scientific, arbitrary speculative assumptions or drawing respective conclusions” (HCM, 2015b, 62).103 In fact, shifting the emphasis of the philosophical discussion from epistemology to ontology was already inherent in the interpretation the Munich phenomenologists gave to the Husserlian phrase “go back to the ‘things themselves’”. Stein explicitly noted this: “The Logische Untersuchungen had in particular made an impression as a

101See here Seifert’s argument that Husserl’s separation between the ideal and the real in Logical Investigation led him to Idealism (Siefert, 1987, 142). 102Rosenwald argues that phenomenology played a specific role in what he calls “the process of ‘ontologization’ in the twentieth century western philosophy” (Rosenwald, 1989, 11). A systematic expression of this trend is apparent in Reinach’s phenomenological a priori doctrine, which captures the range of his phenomenological realistic insights. It is also found in the background of his discussion of Kant. See in particular: Reinach (1951, 1921b/1968, 1969, 1921c/1976, 1921d/1983). 103The precedence given to ontology over epistemology is at the center of HCM’s continuing dialogue with the leaders of this trend. See in particular her extensive discussions with: Heidegger: HCM (1963i, 1963k, 1963c, 1963h, 1930N, 1963b, 1965g, 1965j, 1965c, 1965d); on Nicolai Hartmann, see: HCM (1963b). xxxiv Preface radical departure from critical Idealism which has a Kantian and Neo-Kantian stamp. It was considered a ‘new scholasticism’ because it turned attention away from the ‘subject’ and towards things themselves” (Stein, 2002a, 200). HCM even adds that fundamentally, Husserl “was indifferent toward epistemology just as we ontological phenomenologists were always indifferent. This too we learned from our great teacher (Meister)” (HCM, 1965c, 402).104 The relevance of essence intuition to the study of the phenomenon of reality that grants it precedence and value above any epistemology was explained by HCM as follows: “the epistemological sphere in no way relates to the question of being able to prove these ‘essences’ as concrete elements of the real world. We believe that philosophy, in genuine and rigorous sense, stands outside any (epistemological) question of reality” (HCM, 1916b, 355). Later, and as her critique of idealism became more explicit and detailed, HCM presented epistemology as a burden whose removal would enable entry into the realm of metaphysics, the final destination of phenomenology (HCM, 1963l, 48).105 One of the dominant aspects behind the overall shift from epistemology to ontology typical of the Munich Circle’s phenomenological study of essence relates to the focus of attention on objects as such. This trend was characterized as “the turn to the object” (Die Wende zum Objekt). Moritz Geiger asserts that this approach enables a glimpse of the “tension between the I and the object” at the basis of any reference to the world. Geiger explains: […] while in the past people almost always saw the objects as images of the I, now the tension between the I and the object in accordance with its law returns. [We seek] what is in front of the I, the object. Overcoming the tension between them cannot be achieved through absorbing the object into the subject but through turning to the object itself, as a result of which the construction of the world that is given in an unmediated manner receives a different gaze. (Geiger 1933, 13) Like Geiger, Edith Stein describes the new approach as follows: “the cognition (Erkenntniss) again appeared as reception (Empfangen), deriving its laws from the things not—as in criticism—from determination (Bestimmen) which imposes its laws on the thing” (Stein, 2002a, 200). HCM joins this approach and lists the essential prerequisites for this philosophical achievement, especially distance and separation from the perceiving subject, persistence of the object in-itself, and openness to the perceiving gaze. In her words: An object (Gegenstand) is the objective (Objektive) par excellence (kat’ exochen). In order to possess something as an object in the pure sense, it must be conceived and construed in distance, in total separateness from the perceiving subject. It must be conceived and construed at the position of its true standing (Stehen) and existence (Bestehen): this is the standing- opposite (Gegen-stand) in the accurate sense of the word. This is the first [meaning]. And the other [meaning] is that something can first become an absolute object when it enters the perceiving gaze sharply and without residue; when it already contains any change in itself or enables such without reservation, by giving itself to the conceiving gaze and as such opens up as such, without losing the separated position of distance of the opposite (der Gegenüber).

104As will transpire later, according to HCM, after the transcendental turn, Husserl’s indifference toward epistemology turned to formulating “real epistemological philosophy” (HCM, 1965c, 395). 105In this context, see also: HCM (1963e, 1931dN). Preface xxxv

Here, the precise ideal relationship between the knower and the known is plainly realized. (HCM 1921b, viii) These words of HCM’s add an important clarification regarding the principle of “turning to the object” that the early phenomenologists adopted, some more and others less.106 Her fundamental argument here is that the object’s various dimensions do not undermine the epistemic relation toward it on the part of the perceiving subject. Instead, the sharpness characterizing the basic qualities identified in the object enables its very recognition. Hence, the realistic orientation toward the world of objects is not in conflict with the possibility of establishing mental relations toward it. Indeed, the relation between ontology and the realistic position was not explicit early in the journey of the early phenomenologists. Nor was it typical of their understanding of Logical Investigations. HCM explains that their philosophizing took place without “ask[ing] at all whether they actually really existed. […] we were still entirely indifferent to the existential question” (HCM, 2015b, 61). This approach can be explained, in retrospect, through HCM’s perception that such metaphysics do not aim to prove the reality of the external world. She clarifies that the reason for this is that “such proof cannot succeed and never will succeed. This stems from the factuality of the things that cannot be reached. Because the factuality is here and now—and essentially!—such of unmediated phenomenality facing a transcendent factor” (HCM, 1963l, 45). In other words: In light of the factuality of the real Being itself, there are no more empirical or essential rational questions. There is no unmediated why, no infinite regression from condition to condition, from reason to reason, in which empirical research can once more always find its satisfaction. However, nor is there any essence understanding (Wesenseinsicht) that can solve the question of factuality at all. (HCM, 1963b, 85) This understanding of factuality as such that cannot be proven from within itself, places, then, an unpassable boundary for both science and philosophy. This is also the deep reason for HCM and most of her Munich phenomenologist colleagues not rejecting the epoché.107 In this regard, HCM employs the expression “real reality” (wirkliche Wirklichkeit), to appear later in many references to her idea of reality, in her words: Both the transcendental and ontological phenomenology stand in an attitude facing the epoché. The two have nothing to do with an assertion (Behauptung) of or doubting the Being of this world. This is because real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) can never be known evidentially. (HCM, 1965c, 401)108

106Following his criticism of the early phenomenologists (particularly Reinach, Geiger, and HCM) on the issue of their understanding of Husserl’s essence intuition method, Landgrebe asserts that the “turning to the object” they employed expressed “more or less a ‘static’ correlativism between the intention and the object”, and that “essence intuition liberated from theories regarding the real in all areas”. In his opinion, they surrendered the essential that was Husserl’s ontological starting point. Yet, Landgrebe argues that for Husserl this point did not serve a naïve realism that lead to the escape of subjectivity but to deepening its problematic. See: Landgrebe (1963, 21–22). 107This stance has exceptions, for example Reinach and Pfänder. For Reinach see: Dubois (1995, 148–149); for Pfänder see: Spiegelberg (1982, 26–34). 108HCM discusses the term “real reality” also in: HCM (1965c, 397). xxxvi Preface

A few occurrences of the expression “real reality” (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) preceded its use by HCM. Apparently, the first was in a lecture by Theodor Lipps from 1899 (Schuhmann & Smith, 1985, 792) and the subsequent is in a manuscript of Johannes Daubert from 1904.109 Also Husserl used the related phrase for indicating “the full givenness of a thing, a givenness in which the thing exhibits its actual reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit)”. For Husserl, the self-exhibition of the thing “must contain, at the very outset, components that refer back to the subject, specifically the human […] subject in fix sense” (Husserl, 1952b, §18 55/2002a, §18 60–61). However, the mentions of the related phrase in HCM’s discussions encapsulate her straight response to the Husserlian view, according to which the ego is an inherent aspect within the account of reality. In this regard, Kuhn explains that by this seem- ingly tautological expression HCM meant the real being as standing on its own and deliberately not as reduced to a phenomenon or any representation by the I (Kuhn, 1971, 2).110 Ferrarello added that “‘real reality’ served to distance the Göttingen- Münchner’s […] understanding of reality, in which she [HCM] had a leading role, […] from the other conceptions of reality, which with and according to Husserl and his other pupils made its way via Freiburg” (HCM, 2015b, 62 n. 1.) Finally, Avé- Lallemant clarified that while for Husserl the reality of the objective material thing can exist solely as an intentional unity of sensory appearances, for HCM, “real reality” relates to the independent and in-itself existence of real being that preconditions any possible fulfillment of spatial-temporal existence (Avé-Lallemant, 1975a, 33 n. 41). In any event, besides the obvious emphasis on the element of reality, HCM’s discussion of the phrase “real reality” indicates an unequivocal and explicit rejection of Husserl’s transcendental reduction due to the repercussion of the decisive status granted to the ego within his philosophical account of reality. In retrospect, HCM recalls: “there came a moment where each one of us had to start self-questioning by asking: ‘Well, do these things really exist?’ After we fathomed the essence of reality, we started asking whether the world, the worlds below and beyond as well as everything that belongs to them was really real or is now real” (HCM, 2015b, 62, my emphasis). This “moment” was preceded by confusion that was a shared experience among the Munich Circle phenomenologists, as HCM described: I… and certainly the others too… became baffled (ratlos) in the face of Husserl’s transcendentalism. It seemed to me… that he lost what was for us veteran phenomenologists the priciest philosophical thing: radical practicality (Sachlichkeit)… that cannot be mistaken, always restarting anew in the face of any perceived problematic. (HCM, 1965c, 396) Moreover, the insight that the relation between essence and being is inevitable generated an explicit deviation also from the narrow boundaries of the Husserlian epoché. This means that the realistic criticism of Husserl’s transcendentalism was not confined to its, so to speak, operative methodical stage, i.e., the phenomenological

109See: Daubertiana A I 5, Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich, cited from: Schuhmann and Smith (1985, 792 n. 39). Schuhmann and Smith indicate that Daubert’s manuscript was “written in preparation for his discussion with Husserl on Jan. 18 1904” (Schuhmann and Smith, 1985, 792). 110However, Kuhn was suspicious about the capability of what he designates as “duplication of the embarrassment” to solve the philosophical problem of reality (Kuhn, 1971, 5). Preface xxxvii reduction, but pervaded also to the preliminary stage of the epoché that concerns the philosophical stance toward reality. In this regard, HCM explains that the element of epoché contained two undistinguished meanings of reality: the noematic one revealed through the conscious process, and the one that exists independently of any mental process. HCM’s criticism in this context is not only that this duality “oddly never reached clariﬁcation in Husserl” (HCM, 1965c, 397) but also that for him, “the epistemological question whether the noematic being responds to a factual being was shifted aside completely” (HCM, 1965c, 398).111 However, the Munich phenomenologists, among them HCM, believed that rationality, apparent in reality, as formulated in idealistic thinking, including its transcendental incarnation in Husserl’s thought, does not enable access to aspects that are not concrete or consciousness-related. Whether these aspects exist in the so-called real reality or whether they are present in the subjective being of individuals, rational thought cannot penetrate them. In any event, regarding both the phenomenological reduction and the epoché problem of the Munich realistic phenomenologists concerns the excessive status of abstract consciousness in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and in idealistic thought as a whole.112 As is well known, the publication of the ﬁrst volume of his Ideas in 1913 (Husserl, 1952a/2012a) signaled Husserl’s turn to the idealistic-transcendental direction, which placed the study of consciousness and subjectivity in general in the center. Paul Ricoeur clearly phrased the position that viewed the publication of Ideas I as an expression of a turning point in Husserl’s though, as a result of which the world of objects was sucked into the realm of consciousness: In transcendental phenomenology, the objects are not only “for me” (für mich), but are also “drawn from me” (aus mir). Consequently, reality is interpreted only within the boundaries of consciousness (Ricoeur, 1967, 89). Likewise, HCM asked “How should the noema of the existing-being (Seiend-sein) not belong to the overall meaning (Gesamtsinn) of absolute consciousness?” (HCM, 1965c, 397). For her, “considering something real, seeing it, estimating it, believing in reality— be it conscious or unconscious,

111In this context, see the criticism of Theodor Celms, Husserl’s student from Freiburg, who characterized the epoché as a phenomenological reflection that leaves open the question of idealism-realism and the phenomenological reduction that is a methodological tool. In his opinion, due to the lack of distinction between epoché and reduction, Husserl reaches metaphysical spiritualism. See: Celms (1928, 309). In this context, see the discussion of Avé-Lallemant on this issue: Avé-Lallemant (1971, 230–231). On one point, Avé-Lallemant goes further, stating that HCM’s approach whereby “in the clarification of the essences not only should ‘the handed-down preconceptions’ of ‘all philosophical and scientific fields’ be disregarded, but also the factual reality of the objects under investigation and of the subject performing them” must be dismissed. He clarifies that HCM “carried out a ‘phenomenological reduction’ without using that label” (Avé-Lallemant, 1984, 214). Russell maintains that concerning the epoché, “Husserl and his critics […] failed to understand each other on this point”. Moreover, the “self-limitation [that has been imposed by the epoché…] even prevents Husserl from taking a side on the question of realism/idealism” (Russell, 2007, 89). 112See here Schuhmann’s reference to Reinach’s description of pure consciousness as Husserl’s “favourite concept” (Lieblingsbegriff ). Schuhmann establishes that this choice of Husserl’s played a decisive role in the segregation of the Munich-Göttingen phenomenologists from Husserl’s Ideas (Husserl, 1952a/2012a), see: Schuhmann (1987, 253). xxxviii Preface be it with a simple way of life (Lebenshaltung) or through scientific abstraction— are themselves thinking (Vermeintheiten), noemata in the very own sense” (HCM, 1965c, 397). Moreover, HCM’s idea of “real reality”, which highlights the general orientation of the members of the Munich-Göttingen Circle to place reality at the focus of their philosophical study, amounted to an inclusive counter-response to the transcendental turn in Husserl’s phenomenology. HCM’s unmistakable judgmental response to Husserl’s transcendental turn is apparent in her determination that with him, the world of objects was sucked into the realm of consciousness until “eventually it seemed that Husserl found the entrance into real epistemological philosophy” (HCM, 1965c, 395, my emphasis). Eventually, this response took shape as a “path from phenomenology to metaphysics”—a path regarded by her as obvious to the extent that she found it as “not so difficult to understand” (HCM, 2015b, 61).113 However, the removal of the element of reality from Husserlian phenomenology that emerged in Ideas I, as expressed by some members of the Munich-Göttingen Circle, is far from a simple hermeneutic move.114 Husserl himself, in various places, as Moran presents it, “reinforces the claim made in Cartesian Meditations that phenomenology is eo ipso transcendental idealism” (Moran, 2012, xxix).115 However, Husserl also explicitly recoiled from German idealism and even admitted this in 1915, that is after the publication of Ideas I: “throughout my life I have searched for reality”.116 Later, Husserl clarified that this was constituted reality, and accordingly he asserted that “the real task of phenomenology is to clarify the constitution of any reality”.117 Obviously, for Husserl the pathways to any reality are deliberately paved from consciousness and positioned with a fundamental relation to it. However, the special status granted to consciousness therein is insufficient to remove the issue of reality from Husserlian phenomenology. This acknowledgment is apparent in Eugen Fink’s rejection of the argument “[…] that Husserl’s phenomenology is unin- terested in the ‘question of reality’, in the ‘problem of being’, or that phenomenology

113Stein emphatically phrases a similar position and even views the metaphysical stance as the ultimate expression of a true philosopher. As she says: “… certainly each philosopher is in his heart, fundamentally, a metaphysician, either explicitly or implicitly. […] Each great philosopher has his own…” (Stein, 2005b, 197, letter no. 80 to Ingarden). However, the shift from phenomenology to metaphysics is far from being obvious and can even conflict with some prevailing opinion about phenomenological philosophy. See here Dubois’ note: “Phenomenology is stereotyped as being independent of metaphysics, so much so that we find a philosopher like Karol Wojtyla (now Pope John Paul II), i.e., a metaphysical realist engaged in phenomenological analysis, in the Acting Person and elsewhere, despairing of arriving at metaphysical knowledge on the basis of phenomenology” (Dubois, 1995, 148). 114The discussion of the issue of Husserl’s idealism-realism exceeds the scope of this Preface. For the view of Husserl as a realist, see Ameriks (1977), Smith and McIntyre (1971). For the view of Husserl as an idealist, see: Ingarden (1975), Küng (1972a), Küng (1972b), Morriston (1976). The third interpretation of Husserl’s stance toward the related debate as “neutrality” is presented in: Holmes 1975. 115See here also: Husserl (2012b, xil). 116These words were said by Husserl in conversation with his student Helmuth Plessner. See Plessner (1959, 35). 117These words by Husserl are cited in: (1952, xv). Preface xxxix thematized the existent merely as a Subjective formation of meaning, as a moment of sense in the intentional life of consciousness” (Fink, 1981b, 44).118 Nonetheless, even Fink believed that Husserl was not presenting what he called the “thematic concept” of reality, namely a positive perception of reality (Fink, 1981a, 58–61), and obviously could not meet the one that the Munich phenomenologists were seeking (Fink, 1981a, 58–61). This complexity of the indeterminacy of Husserl’s concept of reality is well articulated in the concluding words of Avé-Lallemant’s Habilitation. Thus, observing Husserl’s concept of reality from the Munich Circle’s perspective, Avé-Lallemant maintains: In studying his [Husserl’s] concept of reality, we touch a boundary. […] Husserl assumed in advance a meaning of reality and determined it only in a formal definition way […]. Here we lack the clarification of the meaning that was assumed in advance […] of what reality is from itself. […] The essence analyses of the real being required here can be found […] in Hedwig Conrad-Martius. (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 327–328) Without doubt, these words of Avé-Lallemant echo his profound identification with HCM and his deep appreciation of her unique and exceptional contribution to the phenomenological movement. D. Husserl and the Munichers After the meaningful experience in Bad Bergzabern, the Conrads returned to Munich in 1930. Now, HCM was able to resume her philosophical work and focus on developing a universal ontology on phenomenological foundations. The cold response of the founding father of phenomenology was not late to arrive.119 In a letter dated 28 March 1932, Husserl wrote to HCM: I cannot join your metaphysical ways. Your philosophizing is fundamentally different from what I call phenomenology. I no longer expect you will have the time and inner freedom to enter my large, arduous works that are based on extensive research, in which you will understand what I call phenomenology—this is, of course, the assumption of any acceptance or rejection. In any case, I am interested in your progress and your tranquility, since you are consolidating a philosophy. I am afraid you will not be able to take the Yearbook into account for your planned work. The next one is not possible. It will be in the winter of 1933, and the following one is entirely unclear. (Husserl, 1994a, 19–20)120

118See here Husserl’s approval of Fink’s interpretation of phenomenology in a preface he composed to Fink’s article dealing with criticism of his transcendental phenomenology. Husserl wrote: “I am happy to be able to state that it contains no sentence which I could not completely accept as my own or openly acknowledge as my own conviction” (Husserl, 2000, 71). 119Husserl’s reservations about the Conrads were well-known and discussed among the members of the Munich Circle. See here Stein’s comment in a letter to Ingarden dated 19 February 1918: “I do not know what I would do if Husserl takes offense at my letter and, like Conrad, I fall out of his favor” (Stein, 2005b, 89). Husserl’s reservations about HCM’s philosophy are more than implied in his letter to Fritz Kaufmann dated 4 January 1937, where Husserl asks him not to mention this issue to her, because: “she is having a hard enough time as it is” (Husserl, 1994b, 350). 120Ingarden, too, recoiled from the metaphysical accentuation of HCM’s phenomenology. Stein came to defense her friend with the following words: “I do not know whether your fear for phenomenology is justiﬁed. Of course, that is not phenomenology without exception. […] It is not just ‘poetic fabrication’. You noted that yourself […] You feel that a claim for truth is hidden here […] You will not deny that, in part, it concerns itself with reasonable connections in a strictly xl Preface

These unpalatable words resonate with Husserl’s fundamental attitude to the phenomenologists of the Munich Circle as a whole. He protested their rejection of the developments that had occurred in his writings after the publication of Logical Inves- tigations (1900–1901), in particular Ideas I, first published in 1913. This work was centered on explicit consolidation of the transcendental reduction that removed the element of existence from the realm of phenomenological study. In light of the critical response of the Munich phenomenologists to the developments and changed in his phenomenological philosophy, Husserl dismissively described them as “remaining stuck in ontologism and realism”121 and characterized them as “the philosophical island in Bergzabern” (Husserl, 1994b, 34).122 In this spirit, he added: “almost half of my mature students have remained stuck in half-measures (Halbheiten) and are afraid of the radicalism of the necessary essence of phenomenology, precisely what established my life component and to which I owe all my insights” (Husserl, 1959, 285).123 In fact, already on 24 December 1921, before the publication of the first part (Buch I)ofRealontologie in the Yearbook (HCM, 1923b), Husserl wrote to Ingarden that he felt “alien” (befremdet) to HCM’s latest work (Husserl, 1968, 23).124 While HCM called Husserl on almost every occasion “our good, esteemed teacher and master” (HCM, 2015b, 61) or her “honored teacher and master”,125 he wrote to phenomenological sense” (Stein, 2005b, 196). See in this context HCM’s discussion on the relation between phenomenology and speculation, in: HCM (1965g/1959b). 121Husserl’s words are cited from: Spiegelberg (1959, 60). See also in this context: Schuhmann (1973, 1–16). Similar sentiments appeared in Husserl’s letter to Spiegelberg from 12 August 1930, in which he said: “it would be a pity if you, like some of the phenomenologists of the early period, remained stuck in ontologism and realism” (cited from: Schuhmann, 1973, 4). Spiegelberg regarded himself as “one of the few survivors of an older generation” (Spiegelberg 1985, 251), but also as “a second-generation student of Husserl and Becker, but mostly of Pfänder, who supervised my Ph.D. thesis” (Spiegelberg, 1985, 253). 122The citation is taken from Husserl letter to Bell from 28 January 1922. 123Husserl’s words were addressed to Dorion Cairns in a later from 21 March 1930. Avé-Lallemant adds in this regard that for this reason, “he [Husserl] could not consider them as genuine phenomenologists and nor even as philosophers” (Avé-Lallemant, 1975a, 28). These words received additional confirmation from Spiegelberg’s report that was based on his personal conversations with Husserl. Spiegelberg maintained that for Husserl, the writings of the Munich phenomenologists did not constitute real phenomenology or even philosophy but could only be valid as individual scientific achievements. Furthermore, from his final meeting with Husserl on 8 October 1926, he understood that for Husserl the break with the Munich phenomenologists was irreparable. See: Spiegelberg (1959, 60–61). However, in Cartesian Meditations, Husserl saw fit to praise the early phenomenologists for developing a different ontology to that prevalent in the 18th century and for using terms that were far from the sensory-visual view or alternatively for leaving the concrete gaze to build a priori sciences. See: Husserl (1999, §59 138/1991, §59 165). In this context, see: Rosenwald (1989, 13). Obviously, Husserl did not mean by these words retreating from his transcendental orientation, rather they indicated his growing awareness of the involvement of concrete dimensions in the transcendental subjective experience. 124Husserl refers here to the work: HCM (1916b). On the obstacles accompanying the publication of this essay, which was intended to appear in the second volume of the Yearbook in 1916, but which eventually appeared in the third volume the same year, see: Schuhmann (1990, 10). 125See here also: HCM (1965c, 402, 1920b, 130 n. 1). Stein also testified that “both Conrads also always speak of Husserl with great admiration” (Stein, 2005b, 193). However, Stein was less naïve Preface xli

Ingarden that like Stein, HCM “was never really my student and she consciously rejected the ethos of philosophy ‘as a rigorous science’” (Husserl, 1968, 23).126 It seems that accepting this ethos functioned almost as an audition for Husserl when he evaluated the phenomenologists of his period (Husserl, 1987a, 296).127 Also, in practice for Husserl a person’s attitude to his transcendental accentuation became a test of the authenticity of the phenomenological position. In this spirit, Stein wrote in a letter to Ingarden dated 30 September 1922: […] all the orthodox “transcendental phenomenologists”, those who do not stand with idealism are considered “Reinach phenomenologists [sic]” […] and are really no longer affiliated with the group. Husserl explained that before Freiburg he never really had any students. (Stein, 2005b, 203–204)128 Husserl’s difficulty in accepting other perceptions of phenomenology was already apparent in his dissatisfaction with his contemporary phenomenologists’ understanding of phenomenology. In general, Husserl was far from being satisfied with the great diversity of the materials that appeared in the Yearbook. He even had reservations about the work of the Yearbook’s sub-editors. He wrote about Pfänder that his phenomenology was “essentially different to his”, called Geiger “only ¼ of a phenomenologist” (Husserl, 1968, 23), while he termed Scheler a “fake phenomenologist” (Talmiphenomenologen) (Spiegelberg, 1959, 59). Later on, Husserl wrote: “Given the way in which the contributions, though by my earlier ‘disciples’, have taken shape, leading to a cumulated effect, the Yearbook has become an under- taking to annihilate the fundamental meaning of my life’s work”.129 In this respect, than HCM in this regard. Thus, in a letter to Ingarden from 15 October 1921 she wrote that despite “look[ing] up to him with unbounded admiration and thankfulness”, this takes place “in spite of everything” (Stein, 2005b, 193). Elsewhere, in a letter to Fritz Kaufmann from 22 November 1919, Stein clarifies: “[…] the Master […] it is not easy to maintain the right attitude […] for me he will always remain the Master, whose image cannot be blurred by any human weakness” (Stein, 1993, 37–38). Again, in a letter to Kaufmann from 25 January 1920: “I will never stop having a boundless veneration for the philosopher Husserl and will always concede any human weakness as his fate” (Stein, 1993, 39). 126Notwithstanding, in the literature HCM frequently mentions as Husserl’s student. See: Walther (1960, 331), Avé-Lallemant & Schuhmann (1992, 79). 127See here also Husserl’s letters to Roman Ingarden: Husserl 1968, 61 [21 Dec. 1930], Husserl 1968, 73 [13 Nov. 1931], Husserl 1968, 77 [11 June 1932]. 128In another letter to Ingarden dated 9 October 1926, Stein describes as a “real tragedy” the fact that: “none of his students are in complete agreement with him… he obviously feels that, without really wanting to acknowledge it” (Stein, 2005b, 235). For further reading about Stein’s view of Husserl’s Phenomenology, see: Stein (2014, 147-150). 129Husserl’s words are cited from a letter he wrote to H. Stolenberg in 1934 (see: Thyssen, 1959, 179) after Stolenberg sent him a manuscript for submission to the Yearbook. Probably, Stolenberg did not know that the Yearbook ceased being published at the end of 1933, though this was never officially declared. Schuhmann emphasizes that it was not the external political circumstances of National Socialism that led to this, but Husserl’s conviction “that he should not go on undermining the future chances of his own phenomenology by publishing under his own name and editorship all these pseudo-phenomenologies which were a lethal threat to it” (Schuhmann, 1990, 23). Schuhmann refers to the great importance that Husserl ascribed to his stance as the editor and his overall identification with the Yearbook. See: Schuhmann (1990, 10). xlii Preface

Husserl’s lack of sympathy for the original phenomenological approach that HCM was shaping was no exception compared to his attitude to other phenomenologists of the time. In any case, the lack of spaces for publishing her writings and the lack of sympathy from the undisputed authority in phenomenology did not deter her. She wrote continuously throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and described it as follows: “I have always been writing something” (HCM, 2015b, 63).130 HCM continued writing even when the Reichsschrifttumskammer banned the publication of her writings in 1935 due to her Jewish ancestry (Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 258),131 despite her Protes- tant religious lifestyle. She also never gave up attempting to find a university in which she could write her Habilitation. The first attempt took place immediately after in 1930 the possibility to do this was opened in principle to women. This transpires from a draft dated to 1931 that was intended for Tübingen University in Germany (HCM, 1931cN). The second attempt occurred in 1937, when she applied to Vienna University in Austria (HCM, 1937bN). The plan was to write about the fundamental structures of the cosmos of nature under the supervision of Alios Dempf.132 Neither plan was realized due to the economic crisis in Germany after the First World War. The issue of the Habilitation continued to occupy HCM, as is apparent from her extensive correspondence with researchers and colleagues, in which she refers to her failure to find a university in which she could write her Habilitation, and asks them to help her obtain funding to continue her activity. HCM’s insistence on clearing paths to continue her studies is apparent in the many letters she wrote to her colleagues and acquaintances, telling them about her requests for support for her research and her tense expectation of answers from the various institutions.133 For example, in 1930 she applied for grants in Berlin and the Academic Assistance Council and the Sarah Smith Research Fellowship in England.134 None of these and other attempts succeeded.

130In this context, see Stein’s description of HCM as “someone, who at no time writes from other than an irresistible inner force…” (Stein, 2005b, 196). 131See here also: Avé-Lallemant (1977, 301–302), Avé-Lallemant (2015, 70); for the Jewish background of HCM’s family, see: Hueglin (2011, 110–117). 132Alios Dempf (1891–1982) was a Catholic philosopher. Due to his resistance to National Socialism, he was banned from teaching in 1938. In 1958, he honored HCM with a preface to the Festschrift that was dedicated to her 70th birthday. See: Dempf (1958). 133See here HCM’s letter to Stein from 13November 1932 (Stein, 1993, 125) and to Marvin Farber (HCM, 1952N). 134In a letter from 9 January 1923, Husserl wrote to HCM about a possible grant in Berlin, suggesting that she compose an application from the materials she was dealing with (philosophy of nature). On 1 October 1930, HCM submitted a grant application to the Sarah Smith Research Fellowship of Newnham College on behalf of which Husserl wrote a recommendation letter. Yet, in a letter from 28 November 1932, Husserl wrote to HCM that he was sorry she had not received the grant (Husserl, 1994a, 19–20). The archive contains several applications HCM submitted to various institutions, both at early and rather late stage of her career, the late 1940s and early 1950s. See: HCM (1931bN, 1932N, 1937aN, 1949cN). The letters Marvin Farber wrote her (25 January 1952; 7 February 1952) indicate that HCM also applied to the Rockefeller Foundation and the topic of her proposal was: The Ideological Roots of National Socialism. See: Farber (1952N). Preface xliii

In fact, HCM was not alone in encountering such barriers on the way to realizing her philosophical vision. One could say that the circumstances of time and place were not welcoming to her phenomenologist colleagues from Munich or to phenomenology in general. HCM states that already when Husserl was summoned to Freiburg in 1916, where, in her view “a school was not really established”, and more so during the First World War, the work-school (Lehrtätigkeit) Husserl set up in Göttingen completely dissolved (HCM, 1965c, 393–394). Similarly, Spiegelberg wrote: “The Munich Circle lost most of its coherence after the First World War” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 168/1984a, 166). Eventually, after Husserl’s death in 1938, and certainly after the Second World War, phenomenology disappeared from the scene in Germany. Against this background, it is not surprising that even from the time when she already received signiﬁcant, though belated, recognition, when she looked back upon this period and the phenomenological movement to which she tied her fate, she saw missed opportunities, loss, and death all around:

The First World War started and brought a lot of hardship, misery and sickness. Also, an inner crisis that I don’t want to talk about here. Husserl died. Even before that, Scheler died and also Geiger, who had already emigrated to America long before the Third Reich. Then Pfänder died as well, and Adolf Reinach had been killed during the First World War. Phenomenology disappeared from the scene in the scientiﬁc community. When I could ﬁnally start to think about my habilitation the foreshadowings of the Nazi era darkened all life. Women were no longer wanted in such professions. (HCM 2015b, 63)135

Against this background, James Hart explains that “although the actual life-time of the circle as an existing community was only a few years, the attitudes and convictions formed then never seemed to leave the various members. This was certainly true for Conrad-Martius” (Hart, 1972, 4–5). In any event, for her philosophical work to progress, the world wars had to come to an end.136 The wars indeed came to an end. As will transpire later, developments awaited HCM on the other side of the war. They might have arrived a few decades too late and found her quite old when the signs of time already started to make themselves known in her health, which started to decline. But still, her return to Munich University, this time as a philosopher who had already established her own philosophical system, and no less than this, the experience of teaching and nurturing students who came to learn her philosophy, enabled her to taste the good ﬂavor of leaving her mark, and in particular, laying the groundwork for revealing her philosophical heritage to future generation.

135Two of HCM’s brothers (Leonhard Martius and Friedrich Franz) also fell in the Second World War, see: Martius (2002, 14), Hueglin (2011, 115). 136Like HCM, also Stein referred in her letters to damage of war to phenomenology. For example, a letter to Ingarden from 27 April 1917 Stein wrote: “Nothing is going on with phenomenology during the war. […] Summer has to come sometimes since surely the laws of nature have not changed and it seems to want to come. I wonder whether peace will come then, too?” (Stein, 2005b, 65–66). xliv Preface

Return to the University of Munich: Profn. Drn. Hedwig Conrad-Martius

A. The Lecturer on Philosophy of Nature After the Second World War, a new period in HCM’s life commenced. As part of the attempt to rehabilitate Germany’s universities, HCM was invited in 1949 to the Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich and appointed Lecturer on Philosophy of Nature.137 There, as Spiegelberg describes, she “revived the interest in ontological phenomenology among an enlarged group of colleagues and students” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 220). Furthermore, the ethos of group philosophizing that originated in the communal circle of phenomenologists in Munich and Göttingen was also resurrected with HCM’s arrival in the university Munich in 1949. Theodor Conrad reported that under the influence of the Göttingen discussions, the “Phäno-Club” was established. This was a setting where the participants of HCM’s philosophy of nature seminars met for philosophical evenings between 1953 and 1954.138 There is no doubt that this development was enabled first and foremost thanks to the fact that HCM was not defeated by the difficulties her fate presented her during the historical era and cultural circumstances in which she was active. As Kuhn testifies: “Her laboriousness did not darken the exhilaration of her essence” (Kuhn, 1966). Thus, subsequently to the Second World War, HCM entered to a very fertile creative period, at the center of which she explored her philosophical stance toward various aspects of nature—the time, the space, the constitution of nature, evolution, the phenomenon of life, the earthly (Der Irdisch), etc.139 In fact, HCM’s interest in the issue of nature started at a very early stage and is documented in the first version (erste Fassung)ofRealontologie (HCM, 1915– 1919N).140 The draft plans for the two Habilitations confirm that HCM did not

137For further reading, see: Plümacher (1996, 15-95). 138These meetings were organized by Franz Georg Schmücker who wrote his dissertation on their basis (Schmücker, 1956). See: Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann (1992, 79). Interestingly, late in his life, Husserl also began to view the idea of group philosophizing as more dominant in the perception of philosophy and the sciences. In Crisis, his fundamental argument is that the continuity of philosophical problems and the discourse of philosophers with the history of philosophy enables a “community of philosophers” (Philosophengemeinschaft) and a “common unit of thinkers” (Denkerge- meinschaft) that establish what he calls the “generativity” (Generativität) of philosophy (Husserl, 1976, 443-444) and the “communalization” (Vergemeinschaftung) that occur in philosophy, the sciences, and in general experience. Husserl explains: “[…] in living with one another each one can take part in the life of the others. Thus, in general the world exists not only for isolated men but for the community of men; and this is due to the fact that even what is straightforwardly perceptual is communalized” (Husserl, 1970c, §47 163/1976, §47 166). See also: Husserl (1970c, §34, §52/1976, §34; §52). 139See here: HCM (1940N, 1948, 1949a, 1949b, 1965h, 1949b, 1951a, 1954, 1955b, 1957, 1958a, 1960a, 1960b, 1960c). 140See her two manuscripts with an identical title: 2 Abschnitt: Natur (§32–§48); 2 Abschnitt: Natur (in: HCM, 1915–1919N). In this context, see an enthusiastic recommendation letter from Husserl, dated 10 January 1915, to the editor of the journal Logos, Paul Siebeck, to consider publishing a planned work of hers about philosophy of nature, in which he expressed his appreciation of her Preface xlv abandon her early plan to engage seriously with the issue of nature. However, just like so many plans and beginnings throughout her life, only at a later phase, from the 1940s, did the stage of realization come to fruition. Thus, HCM’s philosophical interest in nature would arrive at mature formulation in a book that she would write in 1944, The Self-Assembly of Nature (Der Selbstaufbau der Natur) (HCM, 1961); a book that Dempf described as the final achievement of HCM’s “indispensable step from phenomenology to ontology that has been taken above and beyond the honored master and thereby entered to the big movement of the new philosophy of nature and indicative metaphysics”. In his view, thus “the metaphysics has been raised to a speculation and nevertheless remained a scientific philosophy” (Dempf 1958, 1). However, despite the fact that only in her later works did the issue of nature become central, some have identified her contribution to phenomenology precisely with her philosophy of nature, ignoring her original early phenomenological philosophy of being, which constitutes an essential basis for interpreting her later works, too. Thus, for instance, while no reference to HCM’s realistic phenomenology appears in Spiegelberg’s main treatise on realty,141 HCM is mentioned once in the context of the issue of nature (Spiegelberg, 1975, 7). Even Kuhn that had a considerable acquain- tance with HCM’s work establishes that “one is only little exaggerating if saying that Hedwig Conrad-Martius was the philosopher of nature of her epoch” (Kuhn, 1966). Ales Bello regards HCM’s idea of nature as “the most original aspect” of her work and adds that “it is not by chance that the few studies of her thought all tend to concentrate on this particular area of inquiry” (Ales Bello, 2002, 210). Finally, Hart established that “the phenomenologists of this generation saw themselves as regional co-workers. Conrad-Martius, as we have seen, felt called to the region of “nature’” (Hart, 2020, 223 n. 19/1972, 596 n. 2). Another important development that occurred upon HCM’s return to the Univer- sity of Munich and appointment as a member of staff relates to the publication of her writings, almost all by Kösel publishing house, which became the publisher of the vast majority of her published works. Thus, in the middle of the 1940s and throughout the 1950s and to the early 1960s, many of HCM’s works were published and awakened great interest (HCM, 1949a, 1965h, 1949b, 1951a, 1954, 1955b, 1957, 1958a, 1960a). Also, in 1955, she was awarded the title of Honorary Professor, an honor HCM knew well she deserved. As she said: “I was very happy, because as Morgenstern said: ‘one understands that a prophet is only recognized on becoming a professor’. […] My honorary professorship was a posteriori: that is to say, it was a result of many studies, plans, deliberations etc.” (HCM, 2015b, 63).142 One year talents (Husserl, 1994d, 269). The early date of this letter indicates that HCM’s interest in the issue of nature was already familiar to her colleagues early in her career, many years before any of her publications on this issue appeared. Also, in a letter dated 16 March 1921, Husserl writes to HCM that he is sorry that her manuscript on the philosophy of nature is not ready, and that he would be happy to print it as the first or second chapter of his Yearbook. See Husserl (1994a, 18). 141See here: “The phenomenon of reality and Reality”, in: Spiegelberg (1975, 130–172). 142A letter from HCM to Martin Heidegger dated 27 October 1947 indicates that there was a possibility that she would receive a “teaching position” (Lehrauftrag), which was in fact an honorary professorship, not only in Munich but also in Erlangen. She wrote that Munich had a “momentary xlvi Preface earlier, in 1954, she had received a scholarship of The German Research Association (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) (DFG) that granted her financing for the rest of her life. This relieved her of concern for her survival needs and allowed her to develop her phenomenology and philosophy of nature. B. Eberhard Avé-Lallemant In 1955, HCM met Eberhard Avé-Lallemant (1926–2015), who came to Munich University to study philosophy, physics, and mathematics. This was a fateful meeting for both of them. Avé-Lallemant returned to West Germany having served in the Germany navy and having been imprisoned in England for three years. He described to me his meeting with Prof. Conrad-Martius, the charismatic lecturer in seminars on the philosophy of nature, as “a revelation”.143 She rapidly became a spiritual lighthouse for him, way beyond an admired philosophy lecturer and the supervisor of his studies.144 From this point onward, he devoted the rest of his life to HCM and her work, despite knowing that her honorary professorship at Munich University would not be able to open the possibility of a tenured academic position for him. Avé- Lallemant became her research assistant and the deciding factor in the publication of HCM’s writings, on whose editing and bringing to press they worked together, intensively and pedantically.145 Avé-Lallemant’s crowning achievement is the trilogy of Writings in Philosophy (Schriften zur Philosophie) in which he gathered and edited HCM’s important articles, what can be called her small essays (kleine Schriften), of which only some had previously been published (HCM, 1963a, 1964a, 1965a).146 No less important was his curating of HCM’s literary estate in the Bavaria State Archive (BSM) in Munich (Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek), where he was given a tenured position and put in charge of the literary estates of the philosophers of the Munich Circle.147 Despite inflation of philosophers” and asked about the situation at the time in Freiburg, where he was then serving as a professor. See: HCM (1947N). 143During the years 2003–2004, I spent time alternately at the universities of Munich and Frankfurt for my post-doctoral research for the Minerva Fund. During this period, lasting a few weeks each time, I worked with Avé-Lallemant for many long hours every day. He shared with me much of his knowledge about HCM and her life story and gave me access to many original materials. I am greatly in his debt for much of my knowledge about her character and thought. 144Avé-Lallemant’s dissertation was devoted to HCM’s work and was written under her supervision. See Avé-Lallemant (1959). 145In 1958, HCM received financing for an assistant from The German Research Association (DFG) and appointed Avé-Lallemant to this position. See: Pfeiffer (2005, 26). 146The publication ban imposed upon HCM left HCM no choice but to publish her ideas in articles and lectures. Many of these were gathered in this trilogy. In this context, see: Avé-Lallemant (1984, 261 n. 5). 147Avé-Lallemant’s curating work on the literary estates of the prominent members of the Munich-Göttingen Circle was collected in: Avé-Lallemant (1975b). The volume is divided into the following chapters: Alexander Pfänder (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 1–40), Max Scheler (Avé- Lallemant, 1975b, 41–124), Johannes Daubert (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 125-138), Moritz Geiger (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 139–159), Theodor Conrad (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 159–170), Adolf Reinach (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 171–180), Maximilian Beck (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 181–190), Hedwig Conrad-Martius (Avé-Lallemant, 1975b, 191–256). Preface xlvii the extensive work he had already invested in its editing, Avé-Lallemant was himself unable to bring to publication the manuscript of the unpublished chapters of HCM’s foundational treatise, Realontologie,148 nor the manuscript “The metaphysical problematic of the earthly world” (Die metaphysische Problematik der Irdischen Welt), which she regarded as her opus magnum, whose first draft is dated to 1940.149 The importance of the meeting with the educated and extremely devoted student to HCM cannot be overestimated. She wisely recognized that in light of her advanced age and ill health (HCM, 2015b, 63) she would be unable to publish her writings by herself, and therefore entrusted them to the loyal hands of her student. Even though the publication of most of her writings has yet to be completed, and even though most of her work remains largely unknown even among phenomenologists, one can state without hesitation that for HCM’s oeuvre, her encounter with Avé-Lallemant was a unique historic opportunity that was not missed.150 C. Research into Conrad-Martius’s Thinking The first studies dealing with HCM’s work appeared around the time of her return to Munich University with a teaching position, and later her appointment to honorary professor at this university. The first monographic studies on HCM’s thought were written by Avé-Lallemant (Avé-Lallemant, 1958, 1959), who also reconstructed the

148The treatise Realontologie has two versions (see: HCM, 1915–1919N; HCM, 1919–1922N). The published version is taken from the second, mature version (HCM, 1923b) that did not appear in its entirety. The treatise that appeared in Husserl’s Jahrbuch is composed of three parts: 1. Realität (HCM, 1923b, 159–190), 2. Materialität (HCM, 1923b, 191–245), 3. Konkrete Stoffgestaltung (HCM, 1923b, 246–333). The third part is composed of five paragraphs: a. Materialer Konstitution (HCM, 1923b, 246–282), b. Ton und Geräusch (HCM, 1923b, 282–295), c. Temperature (HCM, 1923b, 295–303), d. Licht (HCM, 1923b, 303–333). Paragraph d. has a second section called “Farben—Ein Kapitel aus Realontologie” (HCM, 1929a). This section appeared as a contribution to special issue of Husserl’s Yearbook that was devoted to Husserl’s 70th birthday (HCM, 1929a). This chapter is divided into sections. Sections §251–§289 are a direct continuation of the published book that ends at §250. Paragraph d. has another section, “Geruch und Geschmack” (HCM, 1929bN) sections §289–§309 (supposed to be §290–§309, probably a mistake by HCM). Yet, the last section was not completely elaborated in the second version (zweite Fassung) (HCM, 1919–1922N) and in the archive there is a manuscript that in the first version (Erste Fassung) (HCM, 1915–1919N) was part of the section “Geruch und Geschmack” and has the same title (HCM, 1929bN, §185–§206, §299–§257). Part of this section overlaps parts in “Farben—Ein Kapitel aus Realontologie”(HCM, 1929a). Finally, in the file of Realontologie in the archive there exists another manuscript whose title is “Historisch-metaphysische Anmerkung” (3 pages, no archive registration) that was supposed to close part one (Realität), but due to some unclear reason was not printed together with it. As stated before, in the first version (erste Fassung)ofRealontologie (1915–1919) HCM intended to publish the sections that dealt with the issue of nature (two manuscripts with an identical title: 2 Abschnitt: Natur (§32–§48); 2 Abschnitt: Natur, see: HCM, 1915–1919N). However, the discussion of nature was left outside the published version of Realontologie that is based on the second version of the treatise (zweite Fassung) (HCM, 1919–1922N), probably due to the plan that it would serve as a basis for a second book of Realontologie. Again, this plan, just like so many others of her plans, never took place. 149This work has two drafts: HCM (1940aN, 1940bN). 150The relationship between Avé-Lallemant and HCM has been discussed in different contexts in Feldes’ book. See: Feldes (2015). See also Herald Seubert’s words following Avé-Lallemant’s death in 2015: https://iap.li/downloads/Nachruf-EAL.pdf. xlviii Preface historical context of her period and in phenomenological thinking in general (Avé- Lallemant, 1971, 1975a, 1980, 1984, 1988; Avé-Lallemant and Schuhmann, 1992; Avé-Lallemant, 1994, 2015). No less than his studies that addressed HCM’s work directly, Avé-Lallemant merits priceless recognition for publishing HCM’s writings and the cataloging and curating work with the manuscripts that remained in her literary estate. Indeed, Avé-Lallemant’s scholarship about HCM’s thinking is inseprable part of his work in bringing her writings to publication and currating the manuscripts of here estate (Nachläss). It seems inevitable that in the third, expanded edition of his historical book, The Phenomenological Movement (Spiegel- berg, 1984a), Spiegelberg chose Avé-Lallemant to write the chapter devoted to HCM (Avé-Lallemant, 1984), as the loyal student, editor, curator, and publisher of HCM’s writings, who was so absolutely identified with her philosophical oeuvre. To this very day, Avé-Lallemant’s writing provides the most extensive documentation and historical background to the work of the Munich-Göttingen Circle, and particularly to the work of HCM. There is no doubt that Avé-Lallemant’s studies will remain an indispensable resource for any future studies on her thinking. Alongside the studies by Avé-Lallemant during the 1950s, which placed HCM’s thinking and that of the Circle members in the center, several other studies were published around that time that addressed the wider historical context. Among these we should mention the contribution of Herbert Spiegelberg who laid the first historical foundations of the realistic approach in phenomenology in the Anglo-American world.151 Presumably, the Order of Merit of the German Federal Republic, which she received in 1958, also increased her visibility. In that year, a Festschrift of her work was published (Wenzel et al., 1958), along with additional studies dealing with her thinking (Avé-Lallemant, 1958; Hering, 1959). Research studies with a philosophical orientation were written between the 1950s and the 1970s. Some of these studies, written at the University of Munich itself, addressed specific aspects related to realistic phenomenology, and HCM was mentioned in them rather sporadically (Landgrebe, 1949; Schmücker, 1956; Herzog- Dürck, 1956; Habbel, 1959; Wiser, 1960; Diemer, 1965; Kuhn, 1969). A few studies also appeared that referred to HCM comparatively (Schmücker, 1956; Behler, 1956). However, since her death in 1966, none of her additional works has been published,

151Spiegelberg was himself one of the thinkers who developed the realistic approach in phenomenology (see: Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 2), and even Husserl treated him as such, see: Spiegel- berg (1959, 61). In the first two editions of his historical book, a tiny amount of space was devoted to the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen Circles. In this context, HCM was mentioned alongside eight other phenomenologists, under the category “Other Members of the Göttingen and Munich Circles”, who were mentioned with a few biographical details and their main themes and select bibliographies. See: Spiegelberg (1960, 220–221, 1965, 218–227). But in the third, expanded edition of The Phenomenological Movement (Spiegelberg, 1984a), the phenomenologists of the Munich and Göttingen Circles were reclassified from “the older phenomenological movement” (Spiegelberg, 1960, 168) to “the original phenomenological movement” (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 166). Also, separate chapters were devoted to the work of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (Avé-Lallemant, 1984) and Roman Ingarden (Küng, 1984). Spiegelberg explained the changes he introduced in the third edition while focusing on the figures of HCM and Ingarden saying that “[the] two have risen later to independent importance” (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 170). Preface xlix and her writings have not been translated into English or any other language.152 Furthermore, apart from the only dissertation written about her work in English (Hart, 1972) that has just been published (Hart, 2020), and studies in Polish (Machnacz, 1985; Machnacz, 1992) and Italian (Vrana, 1963), it seemed as if the two decades of awakened interest in her philosophy had reached their end, and her work became almost entirely absent from academic and intellectual discourse. Thus, those writings that had already been published were marginalized, while the manuscripts remained stored in the Bavaria State Archive in Munich in the form of their creation: typed on a home typewriter or handwritten on yellowing, strongly scented stencil sheets. It appears that with the end of the world wars and the rise of the so-called Cultural Turn, phenomenology fell into “forgetfulness” and “darkness” (HCM, 1951b, 6–7), and HCM’s work also sunk into the depths of oblivion.153 However, in the early 2000s, interest was reignited in the early phenomenology of the work of the Munich-Göttingen Circle members. Perhaps the declaration of Edith Stein as a saint by the Vatican in 1998, followed by international interest in her work, contributed to this.154 Whether or not this theory is true, the issues of early phenomenological thought started to be discussed seriously in the research literature. This indicated the beginning of historical justice for the work of the group of young intellectuals who sought to handle the crisis of the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth centuries through phenomenological philosophy.155

152An exception to this rule is a single article translated into English: HCM (1959b). The German source is: HCM (1965g). 153Smid suggested two explanations to the question of how come the huge scope of the writings of the outstanding thinkers of the Munich circle did not attract the attentions of scholars. The first, voiced by Paul Stern, Lipps’ student, maintains that one cannot undertake the phenomenological method of “pure description” since all concepts are already shaped beforehand by ones use of the language. The second concerns the neglection, already at the early stage, of the universal foundations of phenomenology (Smid, 1982, 140–142). 154Some grounds for this theory can be found in the fact that in the third and enlarged edition of Spiegelberg’s book (Spiegelberg, 1984a), where he expanded the discussion of the works of HCM and Ingarden, his reference to Stein, who had yet to be declared a saint, remained minor (Spiegel- berg, 1960, 223–224/1984a, 238–239). Thus, in a new paragraph he includes Stein among “other members… [who] can be introduced only as background in a condensed section” (Spiegelberg, 1984a, 170). Since 1998, there have been regular academic conferences about Edith Stein. The growing interest in Stein’s thinking is apparent in the many studies that were written since her canonization, see: Calcagno (2007, 2016, 2018), Sawicki (1997), Borden Sharkey (2008), Borden Sharkey (2010), Feist and Sweet (2003), Schulz (2008), Vendrell-Ferran (2008), Lebech (2010), Ales Bello, Alfieri, and Shahid (2010a), Ales Bello, Alfieri, and Shahid (2010b). 155Fritz Heinemann, a phenomenologist contemporary with HCM, properly classified this crisis as “a quiet process of disrupting the entering into the appearances (In-Erscheinung-Tretens)” (Heine- mann, 1960, 184). Consequently, instead of what appears to testify to its reality and to the unity that connects the thing and its appearance to each other, destruction occurs in the world of phenomena. Eventually, appearance does not indicate reality, while reality cannot reveal its face through its appearances (Heinemann, 1960, 183–185). In this context, see further: Alles Bello (2004, 2008a, 2008d), Pfeiffer (2005), Moran and Szanto (2016). l Preface

The Phenomenological Gateway to Reality

Edmund Husserl’s question what would be the “entrance-gate of phenomenology” (Husserl, 1952a, §30 60/2012a, §30 55) has been pivotal to the phenomenological discussions ever since.156 This question is often interpreted as concerning the proper methodology for phenomenological study that typically involves epistemological matters. Sometimes, such methodological discussions also involve metaphysical aspects concerning the assumed idea of reality within phenomenological inquiries. However, in HCM’s phenomenological path, the metaphysical dimensions are brought to the fore of her philosophizing that addresses reality both as an idea and as an existence. Moreover, she seems to transform the transcendental ponderings into a firm determination, according to which reality does not concern “more or less objectivity”, rather it is “something totally different” (HCM, 1923b, 180) that stands with “an unbridgeable and absolute opposition” (HCM, 1923b, 162) to “the nonex- istent or nothingness” (HCM, 1923b, 160). Moreover, “the real existence is not one ‘form of existence (Daseinsform)’ among others but something plainly and absolute new” (HCM, 1923b, 163). Accordingly, she describes the real thing as such that is “at first positively elevated by itself from nothingness” and thus “becomes entirely its own” (HCM, 1923b, 181). In this regard, she calls “gateway to reality” (Tor der Realität) the datum-point where “a radical overcoming” of the “mere formal positioning” of reality takes place and things “elevate” themselves from nonexistence or mere ideal and formal existence, but do not yet arrive at factual existence (HCM, 1923b, 173). The expression “The Gateway to Reality” in the volume’s subtitle indicates the anchor of the discussion in the chapters of the work Realontologie from 1923. To this extent, the articles composing this volume reveals them as various attempts to address, each via its own specific topic, the meaning of that “Gateway to Reality”.157 Moreover, the ontological foundation identified in HCM’s early work, which would reach full maturation in her writings from the late 1930s, constitutes the core of her phenomenological thought. Although after the Second World War, as stated above, she turned in other directions, she never abandoned her early anchor point.158 Thus, the philosophical issues discussed in the articles in this volume, I argue, sketch the indispensable infrastructure of HCM’s thought and they should be considered in any discussion of her work. Indeed, it is not difficult to show that her renewed and vigorous activity after the war realized philosophical potential whose foundations were established mainly in relation to her phenomenological thinking in her writings

156See here also Husserl’s question what would be helpful in “preparing the way for phenomenology” (Husserl, 1952a, §65 139/2012a, §65 129) in order to position us “on the threshold of phenomenology” or a the “beginning of phenomenology” (Husserl, 2012a, §84 174)/1952a, §84 191). 157The expression “Gateway to reality” is discussed in the article from 2014 (Chapter 4). At this point “Gateway to” seems to me as a better option than “Gate of”, as it preserves the metaphorical sense of the word “gate” yet remains faithful to the original. 158See also: Avé-Lallemant (1971, 319–320). Preface li up to the end of the 1930s. The discussion about them exceeds the scope of the studies collected in this volume, centered around HCM’s metaphysical phenomenology. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in the preliminary remark (Vobenerkung) to her book Das Sein, published in 1957 but explicitly based on her early thought from the 1930s, she writes: No special justification is needed today to present fundamental philosophical studies on Being, essence, and reality. Regarding existential philosophy with its highly significant, yet confined to the human person, concept of Being, for which it is “existence” (Existenz), [these studies] are relevant than ever. (HCM, 1957, 11) That is to say, shifting the focus of her philosophical engagement to issues related to nature did not involve withdrawing from the phenomenological metaphysics she had developed earlier. Moreover, her early inquiries, which are grounded in Husserlian essence intuition are self-standing. In contrast, her later inquiries, which are usually beyond the scope of the articles included in this volume, rely on the earlier ones to the extent that understanding them requires an investigation of the roots of her early phenomenological thought.159 In some respects, already the early study based on her doctoral dissertation (HCM, 1916b), belonging to her early phenomenological oeuvre, can be considered as the first chapter of her philosophy of nature. Although the word “nature” is absent from the title of this work, it appears that she herself viewed this horizon projected from it when she stated: “one should fix a special scientific field (Wissenschaftsgebiet) that could carry the title of “‘Doctrine of Appearance’” (Erscheinungslehre) whose sphere would lie between “‘nature’” and “life-essence” that refers from natural approach to this nature” (HCM, 1916b, 353 n. 1). In any event, it would take her a while until she would address these phenomena of nature in a direct manner. The articles included in this volume present a hermeneutic discourse with HCM’s writings composed during the formative stage of her work, dedicated to revealing the metaphysical dimensions involved in the phenomenological observation of reality. This results in a consequential diversion from the epistemological, considered as the core of transcendental phenomenology, to the ontological. In my view, this is the most fundamental ground, whose explication and exploration pave a reliable path to HCM’s phenomenological metaphysics as a whole. The interpretation of HCM’s writings discussed in this volume reveals the classical speculative dimensions, originating in the Aristotelean ontology typical of HCM’s philosophizing style. At the same time, these writings are brimming with fresh, original thinking that reveals a complex, layered view of reality that contains varied modes of givenness: empirical, transcendental, eidetic, and speculative. The uncovering of the rich perception of givenness woven into HCM’s discussions is essential for elucidating her choice to radically reject the phenomenological reduction at the heart of Husserl’s transcendental philosophy, where epistemological or other considerations turned the world into an intrinsic correlate of absolute consciousness that is referred to as “world phenomenon”(Weltphänomen) (Husserl, 1952a, §47; §51; §76/2012a,

159Avé-Lallemant too stresses the particular important of her early work “for understanding the overall oeuvre of Hedwig Conrad-Martius”. See: Avé-Lallemant (1977, 301). lii Preface

§47; §51, §76). In this context, she asks, rhetorically, whether “this noematic world that is also really real (wirklich wirklich), entirely remains undecided” (HCM, 1965c, 396) or alternatively: “but where does the world remain?” (HCM, 1965g, 371). This somehow naïvely worded question encapsulates the core of HCM’s criticism of Husserl’s transcendental reduction. Speciﬁcally, it doubts precisely his conﬁdence that bracketing the reality for the sake of establishing and studying pure consciousness would not destroy the thesis of the “world” that underlies the “natural attitude”. In Husserl’s words:

“The” world is as fact-world always there […] “it” remains ever, in the sense of the general thesis, a world that has its being out there. To know it more comprehensively, more trust- worthily, more perfectly than the naive lore of experience is able to do, and to solve all the problems of scientiﬁc knowledge which offer themselves upon its ground, that is the goal of the sciences of the natural standpoint. (Husserl, 1952a, §30 61/2012a, §30 65)

However, for HCM, the transcendental reduction damages to the point of eradication the most important promise of phenomenology, to enable grasping the fundamental structures of reality as such. In this regard, she establishes: “instead of hypothetically bracketing the real Being and thereby seeing the world (in the reduction) stripped of the real reality, it is suggested now to hypothetically posit the real Being of the world and thereby present it with its own rootedness into Being” (HCM, 1965c, 398). These unmistakable words can summarize the position of the person who became the leading force in the phenomenological circle that gathered around Husserl in Göttingen. HCM eloquently opposed Husserl’s transcendental turn to the extent that she was defined as a figure who “by means of the cohesive force (Wucht)ofher literary work became the appointed speaker (berufenen Sprecher) of this opposition (Widerstrebenden)” (Kuhn, 1966). Her fundamental argument was that the essences, which were the original object of phenomenology, cannot be approached except through observation whose horizons are anchored in reality itself (Kuhn, 1966). Thus, unlike Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology, which, by means of a glorious transcendental step, withdraws from the temporal and the experienced in a person’s world, HCM’s phenomenological inquiry seeks exactly what she refers to as “transcendent objectivation” (transzendenten Objecktivation) (HCM, 1965c, 401), namely the objective region of the world whose very reality, as opposed to non-existence (HCM, 1963j, 93–94), is considered as “the grounding of its own Being in its self (die Gegründetheit des eigenen Seins in Selbst)” (HCM, 1963c, 207). Against this background, she classifies her phenomenological approach as deliberately exceeding the boundary of the noematic reality that exists within the boundaries of pure consciousness. Pure consciousness deals with “the world itself in its peculiar independency-of-Being (Seinsunabhängigkeit) in regard to consciousness and also from the existing I (Ich)” (HCM, 1965g, 374). This is precisely the “real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit)” (HCM, 1965c, 397, 401) toward which HCM’s phenomenological interest was directed. Unfortunately, HCM’s phenomenological metaphysics did not escape the fate of metaphysics, which had already well before been dethroned from its status as the “queen of all the sciences”. Like many other members of the Munich Circle, Preface liii

HCM was also destined to “write for the drawer” during the most formative period of her creativity. Furthermore, even today, more than ﬁfty years after her death on 15 February 1966, she remains largely “the unknown known” (Die bekannte Unbekannte), just as she was termed in Kuhn’s eulogy immediately after her death (Kuhn, 1966). My hope is that this volume will bring some historical justice to this unique philosopher.

The Collection of Articles

The articles collected in this volume offer a presentation and interpretation of HCM’s writings and share with the reader my experience of interpreting her ideas. The first articles deal with her first major publication from 1916 “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916b). This is a particularly challenging treatise due to the idiosyncratic nature of the ideas it expresses, its singular conceptual language, and no less than this, its characteristic stylistic density. These features necessitated repeated attempts to clear pathways into this essay, and this led to the multiplicity of articles on this work included in this volume. Along- side Doctrine of Appearance, that is based on HCM’s dissertation, her subsequent treatise Realontologie (HCM, 1923b) from 1923 is also an indispensable component in any interpretation of HCM. These two works, which were published in Husserl’s Yearbook (Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung), were in fact the only writings published soon after their composition. Also, they were largely aimed at the community of contemporary phenomenologists, to whom her ideas were familiar, and whose support she enjoyed.160 The fruits of engaging with Doctrine of Appearance and Realontologie are the articles included in the first part of this volume. Next, I turned to her foundational essays, most of which were collected in three volumes edited by Avé-Lallemant (HCM, 1963a, 1964a, 1965a). The importance of the essays collected in this trilogy is that alongside continuing the development of her philosophy of Being, they open an essential window to understanding the issue of the I in HCM’s writings. HCM’s conspicuous achievement in this regard concerns her explicit and consistent endeavors to suggest a comprehensive alternative to Husserl’s transcendental philosophy. This is apparent in her choice, quite typical of the realistic phenomenologists, to employ the term “i” (Ich) and avoid the term “ego” at the center of Husserl’s construct of “Pure consciousness”. In hindsight, the essays collected in the trilogy are helpful in identifying HCM’s first tentative approach to the I nascent in Doctrine of Appearance. The development of a realistic phenomenological philosophy of the I is one of the greatest and most ground-breaking

160Schuhmann refers to Reinach’s assistance in publishing HCM’s work in the third volume of the Yearbook (HCM, 1916b). See Schuhmann (1990, 10). liv Preface achievements of her work, in which the prejudice about the Munichers’ abandonment of the issue of transcendentalism is also dismissed.161 Each of the articles included in this volume sketches a unique path cleared from the enormous totality of HCM’s writings, and in this respect each one is self- standing. At first, the paths seemed to run parallel to each other, but upon analysis, points of tangency emerged between the various articles indicating that certain ideas had a formative influence on how she addresses various issues. From the interpretative perspective, these occurrences not only reveal the cohesion of HCM’s thinking that alludes to the entirety of her work. Moreover, just as these tangen- tial points multiplied, they accumulated into a more encompassing picture of HCM’s philosophy. A. The Hermeneutics of the Incommensurable Philosophical Voice “A truthful philosophical work, and as such Being and Time must assuredly be addressed, eludes external criticism. It is an organism that arises from the center of life (Lebensmittelpunkt) and remains incommensurable with respect to every measure- ment (Messen) using an alien scale” (HCM, 1930N, 1). These words of HCM’s about the opus magnum of her contemporary phenomenologist, Martin Heidegger, lay the foundation for what I call the hermeneutics of the incommensurability. This unique philosophical position, which is marked out in a momentary flash in a document from HCM’s estate, took shape over the years during which the articles in this volume were published, as the hermeneutical space most appropriate for studying her work. As this hermeneutical position became established through continued discourse with HCM’s own work, it also came to contain general insights related to philosophical interpretation as such. In this regard, two aspects are involved in the act of interpretation. The first takes place in the part of the interpreter and concerns the consolidation of an unmediated interpretive stance toward the philosophical text. This aspect responds to Husserl’s direction, according to which phenomenological meditation “can best carry on in the first person” (Husserl, 1952a, §27 56/2012a, §27 51). The second aspect pertains to text under discussion, which, in this regard, is conceived as an individual to the point of incommensurable expression of its author. The two aspects are correlated with each other in the sense that the individuality of the interpreter matches itself to the incommensurability of the text. Moreover, in connection with the study of phenomenological texts the awareness to this twofold individuality could be particularly valuable given their being, as Simon Glendinning aptly maintained, “works of words whose capacity to work as philosophy is inseparable from their capacity to involve their reader’s capacity to acknowledge the matter for thinking itself for themselves” (Glendinning, 2007, 27). The following section will present and analyze four main steps in the constitution of the realm of the hermeneutics of the incommensurability. The first two are preliminary stages that consolidate the proper stance of the interpreter of a given incommensurable text while the subsequent two concern the practical matter of

161In this context, the criticism of Brecht, who accused the Munich philosophers of “philosophical wretchedness” due to their lack of handling the issue of transcendentalism, is typical. See: Brecht (1948, 42 n. 2). See here also: Schmücker (1956, 39). Preface lv coping with the incommensurability of the contents themselves. Each of the four steps employs aspects of analysis and synthesis. It is instructive that also Helmut Kuhn too made a similar observation regarding the idea of the person that underlies HCM’s philosophy of nature, in his words: Man himself is drawn to the attention of the thinker about nature not so much by its inside- view (Innensicht) or the role he played as a subject of knowledge, but rather through his division (Aufgliederung) and integration (Eingliederung) into the total of wholeness of the order (Ordnungsganzheit) of the world. (Kuhn, 1966) The first step in constituting the hermeneutics of the incommensurable relates to marking the presence of the incommensurable in the text. Thus, the incommensurable is affirmed as the hallmark of real philosophical work and not as a problem seeking solution or an obstacle that needs to be overcome. In other words, the incommensurable in philosophical work is here to stay. Moreover, we can draw from HCM’s words about Heidegger’s Being and Time fundamental guidance that marks the incommensurable as a cornerstone in philosophical interpretation. Consequently, the latter turns out to be deprived of a general criterion for true philosophical argument. This sort of “guidance” can appear in the text explicitly or as a mere indirect hint, as part of the development of the philosophical moves, or off-the-cuff, in his statements about other philosophers. Either way, these are rare moments of grace that the author grants the readers. Readers, in turn, gradually learn to seek them out during their reading of the philosophical text and to locate their complex presence within it, aiming to wrench from them insights about the work under discussion. Furthermore, I believe that as the consciousness accompanying the experience of these moments grows, the presence of the incommensurable transpires as an inevitable element of the metaphysical search itself, a search intimately involving what Karl Jaspers called the “impermanence (Unbeständigkeit) of metaphysical objects”, which circumscribed them with “a circle, a tautology or as an internal contradiction” (Jaspers, 1956, 15).162 Reflection about the above-mentioned “moments of grace” is a cornerstone in the formation of the hermeneutics of the incommensurable, which thematizes them and thus helps turn them into an effective tool of philosophical interpretation. The second step in the hermeneutics of the incommensurable involves the identification of the connection between the personal or individual dimension of the text and the philosophical argument conveyed in it. Thereby, the perspective viewing the two as mutually exclusive is rejected. Regarding this nexus, we can find support in HCM’s own words. Thus, in her preface to a volume that collected Reinach’s writings, she asserts: “a philosopher creates exclusively out of the position (Rang)he saw from his essential personal individual-spirit (Individualgeist). Only through him outwards or inwards to the observable world—whether he is explicitly aware of it or not” (HCM, 1921b, vii). At the same time, she clarifies that no “false relativization and subjectivization of philosophical cognition” underlies her principal stance in this regard. Rather, she maintains that “philosophical matter is precisely not unambigu- ously perceivable and definable through an unequivocal analysis par excellence of

162See here my reference to this view by Jaspers in: Miron (2012, 273). lvi Preface understanding like scientific matter is” (HCM, 1921b, vii). The individual spirit of the philosopher functions then not only as the treasured source of philosophizing but also as inhering in an essential accessibility to the world itself. Moreover, loyal to the principle of “turn to the object” discussed above, HCM explains the complexity that binds the personal and the individual together through the fundamental nature of metaphysical objects, which is infinite and inexhaustible. In fact, the complexity embodied in the philosophical interpretation of the incommensurable necessitates responding precisely to the state of affairs in which the individual spirit seeks to perceive a philosophical object objectively. The meeting between the two can be enabled thanks to the dimensions of multiplicity and infinity that they share. As HCM puts it:

The fullness of the aspects, into which the philosophical object can enter, is infinite. The fullness of intuitions, which should be perceived from it objectively, cannot be exhausted [just like] the infinite number of possible individual spirits—spirits whose specific configuration is capable of intuitively seizing Being in this and no other way. (HCM, 1921b, vii)

Subsequent to the two preliminary steps discussed above, which are addressed to the interpreting reader, the next two steps address the incommensurable contents themselves. Thus, the third step deals with the proper attitude toward the truth claims of the text. Again, HCM’s guidance in this regard is unequivocal:

As philosophers, we can grasp the structure of his [Reinach’s] philosophical world only if we accept as our point of departure exactly what he regarded as the same level of the most rigorous objectivity and practicality (Sachlichkeit) at which philosophy has arrived and [are also] capable of realizing just as natural sciences do in their ﬁeld. An objectivity that immediately manifests its results in the exact categorical conceivability. (HCM, 1921b, vii)

With these words, HCM presents a double requirement—not only accepting the truth claim that is expressed in a philosophical text as the starting point of an inquiry, but also referring to it as the “most rigorous objectivity”. This means that for the far-reaching incommensurable contents, they attain to the unconditional status of objectivity already at the start of the inquiry. HCM further clarifies that only the one exactly for whom “every peculiar, the pure givennesses of an intuitively perceiving and encompassing gaze is the presumption of any philosophical study” can have “an enlightened relation to the philosophical matters, which are more like the attitude of the artist than of that of natural scientist” (HCM, 1921b, vii). Again, this means that rigorous objectivity and the peculiarity attained by intuitive perception do not exclude each other. Even more so, the two join together within that philosophical study that is dedicated precisely to the illumination of their co-existence in the studied thinking of the philosopher. This is also apparent in HCM’s determination that “the requirement for absolute objectification and thereby the fixation of essential cognition is unaccomplishable” (HCM, 1921b, vii). In other words, HCM detects no contradiction between a self-constituted philosophical stance and the related “most rigorous objectivity and practicality” desired by both philosophy and sciences. Preface lvii

This choice to adopt the text’s truth claims as a means of understanding and interpreting is manifested also the decision to employ in each of the collected articles a method of putting of the philosophical influences on HCM into parentheses. Instead, by mimicking HCM’s approach through a piecing together and explication of her own arguments and ideas, I sought to formulate the core of her foundational phenomenological thinking. Moreover, this method was also favored due to the fact that unlike other philosophers, such as Heidegger, who developed their ideas through dialogue with Kant, Parmenides, Aristotle, Descartes, and others, many of HCM’s writings fall into the essay genre, in which her ideas are formulated directly, without media- tion or clear reference to other philosophers. Even when her words echo Aristotelian concepts, or the flavor of scholastic thought, or the phenomenological attention of Husserl’s school, her unique and singular voice immediately bursts out of each line of her writings. This results in the unparalleled nature of HCM’s philosophy, which developed in independent directions different even from those of members of the Munich-Göttingen Circle. Furthermore, this state of affair has been considerably influenced by the fact that most of HCM’s writings were published many years after their composition. Thus, once they appeared, they often encountered a new philosophical and cultural context. In any event, this does not imply that HCM’s writings lack echoes and influences of contemporary phenomenologists. Indeed, the introduction composed especially for this volume seeks to convey above all the lively discourse the Munichers held on shared philosophical questions. Finally, the most inclusive expression of the related choice to adopt HCM’s truth claims concerns the overall interpretative tone employed in the collected articles in this volume. As opposed to a discursive approach to the text, focusing on the logical and systematic dimensions of the arguments it expresses in order to extricate from it a decisive conclusion on the given issue, the hermeneutical approach withdraws from the text in order to enable the truth it embodies to emerge from its multiple dimensions, with the tensions that exist among them. In a profound sense, the hermeneutical position harnesses itself to the text’s interest, whether by searching for the strengths it contains or by locating aspects that could complement it from other philosophical texts, located on the horizon of this text. This approach finds expression in the Intro- duction in turning to the work of other phenomenologists in the Munich-Göttingen Circle, in order to emphasize HCM’s unique contribution to the realistic orientation in phenomenology, to elucidate vague aspects of her work, and to explain ideas and arguments that are not fully developed in her writings. Like the third step, the fourth step also addresses the incommensurable contents themselves, but it does so by way of the philosopher’s peculiar vocabulary. With regard to HCM, this emerges as one of the greatest challenges raised by her idiosyncratic terminology, with its plethora of neologisms. HCM’s unique and challenging writing style was well-known and apparently also discussed among contemporary phenomenologists. Thus, in a letter to Roman Ingarden from 22 September 1921, Edith Stein referred to Ingarden’s critical attitude to HCM’s style and maintains: “I see it differently. The language is very much her own and, therefore, probably, not easily accessible to you; throughout, however, it is quite suitable” (Stein, 2005b, lviii Preface

190). Indeed, Stein’s approach confirms that HCM’s individual presence in her writings and thinking is, as we have seen, a foundation in the discussed hermeneutics of the incommensurable. In general, scholarly attitudes to a peculiar vocabulary of the sources can range between two essentially different choices. The first suggests a translation of the thinker’s unique vocabulary into philosophical terms that are familiar in the history of philosophy. Thus, it helps connect the particular philosophy with which it is dealing to the history of ideas. This undoubtedly makes it more accessible to new readers. This approach is reflected in Edith Stein’s description of thinkers who find access to “things” (Sachen) through conceptual perception that has been established by their predecessors, which helps them reach “understanding” (Verstehen) and exposure of the historical contexts (Stein, 2013, 6). However, in the articles gathered in this volume, I have adopted a different hermeneutical position. Instead of proposing a conceptual construction of HCM’s terms through comparison to phenomenological thought or the history of philosophy in general, I have chosen to name her ideas using her own language. This means that instead of moving away from HCM’s unique, even idiosyncratic, vocabulary, I have chosen to adopt it and even turn it into part of the language of the research itself. In any case, it is important to clarify that the choice to adopt HCM’s unique language does not grant the unconventional terms and concepts that oppose the meaning of a metaphor. For example, HCM’s view of the real being as a “wedding (Vermählung) of substantial fullness with the abyss (μη` Ôν / meonic)” (HCM, 1923b, 225)163 employs a word that seems to refer to an entirely different context. One might think that here “wedding” is merely a casual metaphor. However, I argue that in this regard, “wedding” incarnates HCM’s most profound idea of reality, namely: reality as preceded by nothingness (“abyss”) and observation of real beings as permeated by an ideal aspect that is not manifested in their phenomenal appearance yet concerns their entirety. Again, the reader of this study might be guided by HCM’s own clarification that one should not understand the terms she uses in their naturalistic sense, but “only in their pure formal ontological sense” (HCM, 1923b, 190), i.e., regardless of their possible ontic actualization. She explains that “reality is thereby constituted, [its] self- bearingness (Selbstträgerschaft) in this pure formal formative sense is given, it need not be added to materially useful or to immanent creative potencies” (HCM, 1923b, 190). In short: “in their purified (formal) meaning […] all these images (Bilder)are also indispensable to an accurate visualization of the thing (Sache). There remains in them a final and plain sense” (HCM, 1923b, 176). Elsewhere, while discussing “spatial operative immaterial entities”, she establishes that these being “occupy the space […] in an entirely ‘elevated’ mode”, i.e., they cannot penetrate it but at the same time they are not “swallowed” in it. Then comes her amazing request that “this last expression should be understood entirely literally” (HCM, 1923b, 232). As noted above, the hermeneutics of the incommensurable responds precisely to “guidance” such as that HCM sometimes gives her readers. At first, this response is intended to

163The word in ancient Greek means relating to, or consisting of void or nothingness, yet it potentially can be transformed into a material thing (unlike absolute blank nothingness). Preface lix help in coping with the hurdles encountered concerning the specific philosophical ideas at stake. However, subsequently a transcending takes place from the specific confines of the discussed matter in favor of more general insights that seem to concern other aspects as well and even philosophical thinking as a whole. Moreover, I argue that the commitment to this type of hermeneutics inevitably involves not only adopting unique terminology as a legitimate philosophical language, but also necessitates its explicit thematization. The article “The Vocab- ulary of Reality,” included in this volume, not only most explicitly and directly addresses this issue, but also suggests that HCM’s unique vocabulary constitutes one of her most important contributions to the phenomenological movement and the realistic philosophical movement in general. I find an echo of this approach in Stein’s characterization of those she called “born phenomenologists”, whom she depicted as “devoted to a direct study of the things (unmittlebar Sachforschung) and arriving at an understanding of the other’s spiritual work only with the help of their own intellectual capability” (Stein, 2013, 6).164 This standing against the philosophical knowledge that accrued as critical for interpreting the idiosyncratic is obviously in contrast to comparative and conceptual approaches that strive for generalizations such as those usually employed in the sciences, described by Husserl as follows: All sciences proceed methodically in the pursuit of truth, employ […] artificial aids in order to bring to knowledge truth or possibilities that would otherwise remain hidden, and in order to use the obvious or the already established as a level for achieving what is remote and only mediately attainable. The comparative treatment of these methodical aids […] should provide the means for setting up general norms for such procedures and likewise rules for their inventive construction in various classes for cases. (Husserl, 1970a, §6 19/1975, §6 32) Needless to say, this comparative approach, with its striving to achieve general norms and phraseology, has no place in the philosophical inquiry into the incommensurable that constitutes HCM’s thinking. In Hegel’s spirit, we can characterize the comparative approach in the philosophical context as leading to identifying the different as contradictory, and thus it not only misses the value that could be embodied in the unique, but also does a disservice to the philosophical search for truth. As he puts it: […] the very attempt to define how a philosophical work is supposed to be connected with other efforts to deal with the same subject-matter drags in an extraneous concern, and what is really important for the cognition of the truth is obscured. The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to except a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical system as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements. (Hegel, 1977, 1–2) The difficulty involved in coping with HCM’s idiosyncratic vocabulary is exacer- bated by the fact that many of her writings relevant to the studied period are archive materials that were never published, some of which are still in handwriting. These include sketches (Skizze) (HCM, 1931dN); work plans (Entwurf ) (HCM, 1931aN,

164Likewise, HCM related to “birth from common spirit” that binds the phenomenologists together (HCM, 1960b, 62). lx Preface

1937bN); schemes (Schematik) (HCM, 1931aN, 1930, 1930–1931N); fragments (HCM, 1931cN); synopses (Übersicht); writing down (Niederschrift) (HCM, 1930– 1932aN, 1930–1932bN, 1930–1932cN); and even notes (Notizzettel) (HCM, 1912– 1938N). All these required not only interpreting and transcribing from handwriting but also adding complements and syntheses from the research itself, and as part of it. Coping with the challenge of the accessibility of her ideas, which is not usually the lot of scholars of modern philosophy, made particularly tangible the modern hermeneutical insight, classic since Friedrich Schleiermacher, that the basis of any interpretation is in reconstructing the content with which the reconstruction deals. The reader may easily notice the reconstructive work in the background of the interpretation of HCM’s philosophy offered in light of the special attention devoted to the exposition of her ideas. This accentuation of the interpretation of HCM’s texts is also necessitated by the relative unfamiliarity of her ideas and the paucity of research into her oeuvre. In fact, the reconstruction is necessary not only for writings in HCM’s estate, but also for those that have been published. Despite the intensive editing performed by Avé-Lallemant on HCM’s writings prior to their publication, many of them still require significant hermeneutical efforts from the reader due to the fact that they still contain unfinalized discussions or, alternatively, were phrased as a sort of continuation of a discussion that does not appear in them. It is typical of HCM’s style to open her articles and treatises with a series of rhetorically-phrased questions and immediately afterward to dive into the discussion without clearly indicating what for her is taken for granted. Thus, even her published works necessitate reconstruction and comparison among different treatises, including the manuscripts and documents that remain in her estate that deal with the same issue. In any event, any exposition of thinking involves decisions and syntheses on the part of the reader that exceed the boundaries of a given text. In this regard, a critical assessment unavoidably underlies the exposition of HCM’s ideas in these collected articles. Eventually and inevitably, facing the incommensurable encounters a fundamental hermeneutical isolation in which the interpreter stands alone facing the boundary of the text, or the text as boundary, lacking all the general means that could help understanding the text apart from joining it—a joining that amounts to a single encounter between the monadic individual and the incommensurable text. Indeed, a reflection of this state of affairs can also be found in HCM’s own words:

Here we reach the absolute boundary of the replaceability of one scholar by another. While a researcher in the natural sciences completely enters the objective scientiﬁc community, a philosopher enters the monadic solo appearance (Einzelerscheinung), and eventual solitude becomes his lived experience (Erlebniss). (HCM, 1921b, vii)

B. The Structure of the Collection This volume is composed of a Preface and three parts. 1. Preface The Preface presents what has been largely absent from the discussions in the various articles: HCM’s personal background and the social and philosophical contexts of her thought. In addition, the Preface addresses aspects I found to be crucial for Preface lxi understanding the hermeneutic philosophical aspects the articles apply in relation to specific issues. In this context, special emphasis has been given to the mutual influences of the early phenomenologists. HCM’s ideas are discussed in the Preface along with those of Husserl, Reinach, Geiger, Pfänder, Stein, von Hildebrand, and Spiegelberg. At the same time, the fascinating phenomenon whereby often the ideas of one member of the Circle were explained and further developed by other members reveals the group nature as a philosophical characteristic, which thus transpires as a key for the interpretation of early phenomenology in general. Naturally, over the years, as my research into HCM’s work expanded and developed, changes have sometimes occurred in my interpretation of some of her ideas. Despite this, the articles appear in the original form in which they were published. 2. Part One: The Philosophy of Being This part is composed of five articles based on an analysis of one of two early works, Doctrine of Appearance or Realontologie. 1. From the “Still Covered” to the “Pure Primordial” Phenomena and Back: The External World in the Phenomenology of Conrad-Martius A previous version of this article appeared in Hebrew. The current revised and elaborated English version was composed especially for this volume. The article addresses the two questions HCM poses at the opening of her first great treatise, “On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World” (HCM, 1916b): “In which real mode are perceived ‘essences (Washeiten)’ given to us, in more or less big definiteness (Bestimmtheit)? And where do we encounter them in their concrete realization?” (HCM, 1916b, 356). These questions initiate the problematization of the given and thus pose a clear limit between the immediate appearance of the external world and its real being, which in HCM’s opinion are not identical (HCM, 1916b, 427). The philosopher deals with the first through a careful investigation of what she refers to as “feeling givenness (Empfindungsgegebenheit)”, and the second through a keen observation of the givenness of “manifest-appearance”. These two tracks are woven together, and thus the phenomenology of the external world moves simultaneously in two opposing directions: by following the line from the “still covered” to the “pure primordial” phenomena we are looking for the ideal reality that brings about the reality of things. This reality does not manifest itself on the phenomenal level but transpires as covering or hiding reality as such. However, since the phenomenon of the external world is not an idea, while moving from the “primordial” to the “covered”, we search for the reality that transcends its ideal boundaries—a transcending that is embodied in the fundamental essence of reality achieving external dimensions. The real transcendence of the external world to human consciousness is revealed in these opposing directions, and thus the reality of the phenomenon of the external world is confirmed. 2. The Realism of the Transcendence: A Critical Analysis of Hedwig Conrad- Martius’ Early Ontology Like the previous paper, this article also focuses on the treatise On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b), this time lxii Preface addressing the issue of transcendence that is essential to the ontology of the external world. HCM’s establishing argument associates transcendence with mundane reality while eliminating any mystical meaning from it. Although the ontological aspect of the problem of transcendence is more dominant in her approach, its epistemological dimensions are not denied but illuminated through her discussion of the nature of human spirit in the face of which the world appears as external. My main argument in this article is that HCM’s phenomenology of externality lays the foundations for the phenomenology of transcendence. Consequently, transcendence transpires as the depth and the most ultimate meaning not only of external phenomena but also of reality as such. 3. The External World—“Whole” and “Parts”: A Husserlian Hermeneutics of the Early Ontology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius This article proposes an analysis of HCM’s On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appear- ance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b) from the perspective of Husserl’s theory of whole and parts presented in his Logical Investigations. Here the “whole” (Ganz) is identified with “sensory givenness” and “parts” (Teile) with “feeling givenness (Empfindungsgegebenheit)” and “appearance givenness (Erscheinungsgegeben- heit)”. The main argument thus established is that dependent-independent relations and the necessary laws that prescribe the unity of objects, at the center of Husserl’s theory of whole and parts, are also foundational in HCM’s early ontology. This ontology is torn between two forces that comprise an unsolvable tension. On the one hand, she searches for an essential and unified whole, viewed as independent of the senses, of consciousness, and of the human subject in general. This search is expected to provide a grip on the problem of “reality as such”. On the other hand, while searching for access to this whole, HCM encounters the involvement of the senses and consciousness in its appearances, that is, in the appearing of the external world. 4. The “Gate of Reality”: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Idea of Reality in Realon- tologie The next two articles included in part one of this volume focus on the treatise Realontologie (Real Ontology) from 1923. This treatise should be considered as the crowning achievement of her metaphysics, although to this very day it has yet to be published in whole. The question “what is reality?” that opens this treatise, just as her contemporary phenomenologist, Martin Heidegger, asked in Being and Time indicates the attempt to reexamine the foundations of metaphysics (HCM, 1923b, 159; Heidegger, 1962, §3 31.). HCM asserts that a “blinding insight” exists in modern philosophy regarding the unfathomable contrast between the ideal and the real and argues that this insight blocks access to the question of reality. To counter this, HCM’s ontology seeks what she calls the “gateway to reality”, meaning the datum- point where things “elevate” themselves from non-existence or mere ideal existence but do not yet arrive at “operative Being” or realistic fulfillment. The discussion in the article distills from HCM’s thinking three characteristics of the real that should be capable of addressing what she what she refers to as “the task of Being”. Each is personally imposed on the real and brings about the fulfillment of the essence Preface lxiii inherent in it: corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit), selfness (Selbsthaftigkeit), and primordiality (Primordialität). The suggested interpretation of each of these three seeks to unravel the only apparent contrast between the real and the ideal in favor of what HCM regards as the only genuine and primordial opposition that separates the real from nonexistence. 5. The Vocabulary of Reality Like the previous article, this article also concentrates on Realontologie (HCM 1923b). It addresses HCM’s unique contribution to the philosophical realistic discourse by extricating and explicating the unique vocabulary that HCM consol- idates within her phenomenological analysis of reality. The article analyzes the following concepts: “Essence” (Wesen), “Bearer” (Träger), “Selfness” (Selb- sthaftigkeit), Capability (Konnen¨ ), Tangentiality(Tangirbarkeit), Corporeality (Leib- haftigkeit), Internality, “Quiet”, Fullness (Fülle), Depth, divisibility (Teilbarkeit), Abyss (Abgrund), and others. HCM does not always coin them as distinct concepts, but they function philosophically due to the meaning she pours into them and the way she uses them. These terms initiate an essential vocabulary for establishing a new philosophical discourse about reality, which is nearly absent in twentieth-century philosophy that has been overshadowed by literal and advanced idealistic discourse. 3. Part Two: The Philosophy of the “I-Being” This part contains four articles dealing with the perception of the I in HCM’s philosophy, referred to as “I-being” (Ichhaftes Sein). The sequence of the articles addresses her early corpus but provides the key to understanding the later writings dealing with her idea of the I, offer a method for approaching her philosophy of the I in its entirety. HCM’s fundamental argument in this context is that the I should be understood as part of Being in general, even if it possesses unique characteristics. Thus, the analysis of HCM’s idea of the I that is presented in Part Two of this volume integrates the insights obtained from her perception of Being that were discussed in the articles that are included in Part One. 6. The Phenomenal Experience of the I: The Idea of the I in Hedwig Conrad- Martius’ Early Phenomenology This article addresses the phenomenal experience of the I that is at the foundation of HCM’s realistic phenomenology. Focusing on her early book Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External World from 1916, the discussion strives to interpret the modes of the involvement of the I in the appearances of the real external world. It also extricates from HCM’s analysis of the external world two primordial dispositions of the I: “passive and resting self-inclusiveness” (passive und ruhender Ichhaltung) and “active consciousness”. These two real dispositions correspond to two kinds of consciousnesses: as “saturated” (inprägniertheit) in itself, the I illuminates itself by itself and as such that “objectively absorbs”(gegenständlich aufnehmende) the reality external to it. Moreover, the two dispositions correspond to the two spheres of objects in the external world discerned by HCM: that of sensory manifest (sinnfällige) objects and that of covered objects. Thus, in relation to the sensorially manifest (sinnfällige) lxiv Preface objects, regarding which the I conducts itself as passive and self-including being vis- à-vis the phenomenality of objects. However, regarding the sphere of covert objects, the I is active and directed beyond itself, to the concealed essence that is covered over by the phenomenal layer of things. 7. The Ontological Exclusivity of the I. The pivotal insight that paved HCM’s way in elucidating the ontological exclusivity of the I, often referred to as “I-being” (Ichhaftes Sein), is that despite its peculiarity and incomparability to any other mode of being, only by coming to terms with the “ontological foundations” of the real being in general can “a true ‘comprehension’ (Begreifung)” of the I be enabled. The phenomenological interpretation suggested in this article presents HCM’s ontological understanding of the I vis-a-vis her philosophy of Being, in particular in regard to three of its general characteristics—existence, intelligibility, and “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit / Sichheit / Selberkeit)—which provide the critical approach to the ontological study of the I. Finally, the ontological exclusivity of the “I-being” is illuminated by means of explication of the joining together of its typical affinities and discrepancies in regard to Being in general. 8. The Duality of the I: A Commentary on Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s Realistic Phenomenology This article deals with the duality that characterizes the idea of the I in the realist ontology of the phenomenologist Hedwig Conrad-Martius (HCM) (1880–1966). The basis of the discussion reveals two dimensions of duality in HCM’s perception of the I: one, which appeared in her early work On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appear- ance of the Real External World (HCM, 1916b), focuses on the phenomenological dimensions of the I and lays the critical foundations for the more developed ontological duality in HCM’s later writings that address the ontological aspects of the I. The later phase in HCM’s thinking regarding the I focused on the spiritual I and established the simultaneous operation of two elements in it: its “origin-like” nature (Ursprungshaftigkeit) and its spritualness (geistlichthafte), which is referred to also as “infrastasis” (Infrastase). The phenomenological interpretation of the idea of the I in HCM’s thinking commences with unveiling these two phases in her writing, proceeds to the explication of the meaning of the I explored in them, and culminates in the illumination of the relations between them. Meanwhile, HCM’s radical response to Husserl’s turn toward transcendentalism and the well-established criti- cisms of realistic phenomenology contemporary with Husserl regarding the lack of discussion of the issue of the ego or the I is refuted. 9. A Philosophical Resonance: Hedwig Conrad-Martius versus Edith Stein This article seeks to unearth the philosophical resonance of HCM’s ideas with Edith Stein’s thinking. Thus, it adds an element of content to the better-known personal relations between the two phenomenologists. Here, resonance has two meanings. The first is phenomenological and apparent in the manifestation of a spiritual communality between the two philosophers. The second relates to the constitutive establishing of a new hermeneutical framework from which new possibilities of understanding might Preface lxv emerge from analyzing the ideas under discussion. The article starts with presenting HCM’s and Stein’s basic stance regarding core metaphysical aspects that serve as an introduction to their idea of the I. The discussion presents the dual structure of the I in the thinking of HCM and Stein and analyzes their different stances toward it. The former regards it as an utmost indication of the realism of the I; the latter illuminates its compatibility with the Christian religious faith. 3. Part Three: The Convergence of Being and the I-Being This part is composed of three articles in which the insights from HCM’s philosophy of Being converge with aspects related to her perception of the I. The most extensive article in this context is the first one, while the two articles that follow present the integration between the philosopher’s perceptions of Being and of the I from a defined perspective. 10. In the Midst of Being: A Journey into the Internality of Being in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Metaphysics This article delineates the main milestones in the trajectory to the internality of Being in HCM’s thinking against Husserl’s transcendentalism. It starts by uncovering the multi-aspect duality that characterizes the real being, continues in encountering the limitations and constraints that are imposed by a study anchored in the appearances of the real external world, and culminates in the articulation of the internality of Being as “selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit or Selberkeit) that typifies real beings and the spiritual-I. This trajectory is not marked by HCM herself, but like any phenomenological journey it is personal and can be best carried out in the first person. The discussion in the article delineates the path to the internality of Being in Husserl’s phenomenology, in which the gap between the internal and the external is intensified to the point of the reduction of the external world. As a result, the world is eliminated and sometimes even seems entirely forgotten. In contrast, for HCM, there is no such opposition. On the contrary, in her thinking the simultaneous gaze to the internal and the external aspects of reality is preserved and the thematization of the gap between the two transpires as a useful hermeneutical tool achieving an abundant and complex perception of the internality of Being that in no way leaves behind its external dimensions and the world in general. 11. Essence, Abyss, and Self: Hedwig Conrad-Martius on the Non-Spatial Dimensions of Being The point of departure of the discussion in this article is HCM’s description of the reality to which her philosophizing is addressed as “totally non-material corporeality”. With this contradictory expression, she seeks to affirm two foundational aspects regarding reality. The first is the spatial that achieved material realization in real existents. The second refers to the concealed non-spatial that is at the cradle of reality and remains present behind its phenomenal and material appearances. In this regard, three ontological elements in HCM’s idea of reality—“essence”, “abyss”, and “selfness”—are distinguished as both implying and raising the issue of the non-spatiality of Being in her thinking. Moreover, the force in real beings that can never shine in its entirety evolves from the illumination of each of the related elements. By means lxvi Preface of philosophical explication of the ideas of “essence”, “abyss”, and “selfness” and of their dialectic relations with the corresponding spatial aspects, this article demonstrates the evolution of HCM’s understanding of the issue of spatiality that mirrors her metaphysics as a whole. 12. The Metaphysical Absolutizing of the Ideal: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Criticism of Husserl’s Idealism This article discusses the main arguments of Hedwig Conrad-Martius against the world view (Weltanschauung) of idealism in connection to her phenomenological idea of reality. The discussion focuses on her most far-reaching critical argument concerning the damage caused by idealism to the possibility for metaphysics due to its turning of the real (das wirkliche) to the ideal (Ideelles) or the concept. Consequently, so she argues, reality is consolidated in idealism as an idea. The article suggests an analysis of Conrad-Martius’ understanding of the evolution of the world view of idealism and of her criticism regarding what she refers to as metaphysical absolutizing of the ideal in idealism. Against this background, HCM’s counter-response to idealism is articulated, suggesting rehabilitating facticity (Faktizität) of real reality (wirkliche Wirklichkeit) within metaphysics. 4. Appendix 13. Faith, Individuality, and Radicalism: A Jewish Perspective on Edith Stein The basis of this article was originally published in Hebrew, and the English version as it appears here was prepared specially for this volume. The relevance of this article to this volume stems not only from Edith Stein, like HCM, belonging to the Munich- Göttingen Circle, but particularly from the many references to parallels between Stein and HCM, as expressed in the notes to this paper. The relations between the two thinkers, made explicit in this article, partially underly the discussion in article nine. In this regard, the term “resonance” is preferred over “influence” because HCM’s ideas appeared in writings composed and published after Stein’s death. In any case, it is unclear how accessible HCM’s writings were to Stein during the years when HCM composed her main works, or how much the two discussed these ideas before their ways parted during the war and up to Stein’s murder in Auschwitz in 1942. However, the main discussion in this paper confronts Stein’s Christian idea of faith with the Jewish one of Yeshayahu Leibowitz (1903–1994) on the basis of the radicality that is common to their view of religious faith as such. The discussion commences with uncovering the common starting point of the two thinkers, which anchors the religious faith in one’s volitional decision. Yet, this commonality appears to be under- mined by essential differences between their understandings of the religious experience. Delving into the differences between Stein’s and Leibowitz’s idea of faith demonstrates two faces of radicalism in the human religious experience.

Ramat Gan, Israel Ronny Miron Preface lxvii

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165HCM’s writings are listed according to the publication year, with the date of composition added in brackets. Works by the same author are listed in order of publication, from earliest to latest and alphabetically. Archive materials that have yet to be published are noted with the letter N (Nachlass) after the year of their composition. lxviii Preface

Avé-Lallemant, E. (2015). Edith Stein und Hedwig Conrad-Martius—Begegnung in Leben und Werk. In B. Beckmann & H. Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz (Eds.), Edith Stein, Themen-Bezüge- Dokumente (2nd ed.) (pp. 66–88). Dresden: Verlag Text and Dialog. Avé-Lallemant, E., & Schuhmann, K. (1992). Ein Zeitzeuge über die Anfänge der phänomenol- ogische Bewegung: Theodor Conrad Bericht aus dem Jahre 1954. Husserl Studies, 9, 77– 90. Avé-Lallemant, U. (1965/1966). Hedwig Conrad Martius. Jahrbuch der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, XV, 203–212. Baring, E. (2018). Neo-Scholasticism, Phenomenology, and the Problem of Conversion. In R. Heynickx & S. Symons (Eds.), So What’s New about Scholasticism? How Neo-Thomism Helped Shape the Twentieth Century. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter. Baring, E. (2019). Converts to the Real: Catholicism and the Making of Continental Philosophy. Cambridge, MA, London, England: Harvard University Press. Behler, W. (1956). Realität und Ek-Sistenz, Auseinandersetzung mit der Konzeption Martin Heidegger in Konfrontation mit der ontologischen Schriften von Hedwig Conrad-Martius (Diss.). München. Borden Sharkey, S. (2008). Edith Stein and Thomas Aquinas on Being and Essence. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 82(1), 87–113. Borden Sharkey, S. (2010). Thine own self: Individuality in Edith Stein’s later writings. Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press. Brecht, F. J. (1948). Bewusstsein und Existenz, Wesen und Weg der Phänomenologie. Bremen: J. Storm. Biemel, M. (1952). Einleitung des Heraugegebers. Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologische Philosophie, Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, Husserliana (Vol. IV, pp. xiii–xx). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Calcagno, A. (2007). The Philosophy of Edith Stein. Pittsburg: Duquesne. Calcagno, A. (Ed.). (2016). Edith Stein: Women, social-political philosophy, theology, metaphysics and public history, new approaches and applications. Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, and London: Springer. Calcagno, A. (2018). On the vulnerability of a community: Edith Stein and Gerda Walther. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 49(3), 255–266. Celms, T. (1928). Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls. Latvijas Universitatis Raksti, XIX, 251–436. Conrad, T. (1953–1954N). Überblick über die Untersuchungen zur phänomenologischen Methode im WS [Winter Semester] 1953/54 und SS 1954. In Conradiana A.V.2, 13 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad, T. (1954N). Bericht über die Anfänge der phänomenologischen Bewegung. In Conradiana A.V.1, 6 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad, T. (1965–1969aN) [Späte Manuskripte]. Was ist und was will die Phänomenologie heute? In Conradiana A.VI.5, 16 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad, T. (1965–1969bN) [Späte Manuskripte]. Zum Gedanken an Husserl und seine phänome- nologische Methode. In Conradiana A.VI.6, 5 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1912N). [Aus der Studienzeit, Zeitungsbericht], Conrad-Martiusiana, D.I 2 [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1912–1938N). [Aus der München-Bergzabener Zeit], Conrad-Martiusiana, D.I 3 [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1915–1919N). Realontologie I, Buch. (erste Fassung). Conrad-Martiusiana, A.I 4, 294 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich. Conrad-Martius, H. (1916). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt: Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien. Jahrbuch für Phänomenology and philosophische Forschung III. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 345–542. Preface lxix

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The Preface was written for this volume and has not been previously published. 1. From the “Still Covered” to the “Pure Primordial”: The External World in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Phenomenology. Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosoph- ical Quarterly 63, 2014, 407–429. Translated from Hebrew for this volume and reprinted with permission. 2. The Realism of the Transcendence: A Critical Analysis of Hedwig Conrad- Martius’ Early Ontology. The International Journal of Literary Humanities 11 (3), 2014, 37–48. Reprinted with permission. 3. The External World—“Whole” and “Parts”: A Husserlian Hermeneutics of the Early Ontology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy XVI, 2018, 299–316. Reprinted with permission. 4. The “Gate of Reality”: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Idea of Reality in Realon- tologie. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 2014, 59–82. Reprinted with permission. 5. The Vocabulary of Reality. Human Studies 38 (3), 2015, 331–347. https://doi. org/10.1007/s10746-015-9345-5 (printed by Springer). 6. The Phenomenal Experience of the “I”: The Idea of the “I” in Hedwig Conrad- Martius’ Early Phenomenology. The Irish Philosophical Society Yearbook, 2014/15, 99–123. Reprinted with permission. 7. The Ontological Exclusivity of the “I”. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 2017, 97–116. Reprinted with permission. 8. The Duality of the “I”. Phänomenologische Forschungen, 2019, 71–98. Reprinted with permission.

166An early version of the articles appeared in the places listed. Before their reprinting as chapters in this volume, all the translations from German to English have been checked and edited, some previous phrasings have been improved, and slight updates have been introduced in the notes.

lxxxi lxxxii The Articles in this Book were Previously Published in the Following Places

9. A Philosophical Resonance: Hedwig Conrad-Marius versus Edith Stein. Empathy, Sociality, and Personhood. Essays on Edith Stein’s Phenomeno- logical Investigations, Elisa Magrì and Dermot Moran (eds.), 2017, 193–216. (printed by Springer). 10. In the Midst of Being: A Journey into the Internality of Being in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Metaphysics. Phenomenological Ontologies: Individuality, Essence, Idea. A special issue of the Italian philosophical journal: Discipline Filosoﬁche 26 (1), 2016, 217–244. Reprinted with permission. 11. Essence, Abyss and Self: Hedwig Conrad-Martius on the Non-Spatial Dimen- sions of Being. Woman Phenomenologists on Social Ontology, Sebastian Luft and Ruth Hagengruber (eds.), Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences Series, Chan Switzerland: Springer, 2018, 147–167. (printed by Springer). 12. The Metaphysical Absolutizing of the Ideal: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Crit- icism of Husserl’s Idealism The Idealism-Realism Debate in the Early Phenomenological Movement, Rodney K. B. Parker (ed.), Springer, 2020. (to be printed by Springer). 13. Faith, Individuality, and Radicalism: A Jewish Perspective on Edith Stein. Revised version of: Faith and Individualism—Edith Stein and Yeshayahu Leibowitz, Daat: A Journal of Jewish Philosophy & Kabblah 82, 2016, 33–57 (Hebrew). Revised and translated from Hebrew for this volume and reprinted with permission. Acknowledgments

This book has been published with the support and encouragement of many dear people and institutions. It originated in a post-doctoral study supported by the Minerva Fund, which I conducted at the universities of Munich, Frankfurt, and Cologne in 2002–2003. After about a decade, during which I focused on other topics of research, I returned to study Hedwig Conrad-Martius. These two periods are connected by an almost random meeting with Prof. Ruth Hagengruber at Cologne University in 2002. This encounter was preserved in our shared memory, and it received new life in 2015 at Paderborn University, Germany, at a conference held at the Center for the History of Women Philosophers and Scientists, which Ruth established and manages. Ruth was among the very few who were familiar with Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and was immediately excited by the study I wanted to carry out. She gave me invaluable impetus and encouragement at the ﬁrst stage of my study into an almost anonymous philosopher, whose value and importance to the history of philosophy was hardly known to anyone. I give her my deep gratitude for her true friendship, her unending enthusiasm, and her exemplary commitment to revealing the legacy of women philosophers and scientists. All this was accompanied by many invitations to her Center, enabling me to use its archive and to share the fruits of my research with colleagues and students from Paderborn University in concen- trated courses as part of the Erasmus Program, and in international summer schools held between 2017 and 2019. I also wish to thank the Center’s always helpful team, particularly Christian Meineke and Julia Mühl. Following Ruth’s recommendation, I contacted Eberhard Avé-Lallemant, who generously shared with me his knowledge and rare texts of Conrad-Martius’s writings. I deeply regret that he did not live to see the fruits of this research. My warm thanks to Prof. Mary Ellen Waithe for the shared work on the manuscript of this volume. The deep reading of the text by a scholar of her stature gave me an unforgettable lesson in proper philosophical work. My sincere gratitude also goes to Prof. Antonio Calcagno for true friendship, limitless giving, a thorough reading of drafts, wise comments, helpful advice for translating German terms into English, and much more. I would also like to thank Rodney Parker, who generously shared with me many materials of phenomenological thinking. Special thanks to Burt Hopkins

lxxxiii lxxxiv Acknowledgments for the metaphysical brotherhood and to George Heffernan for the knowledge he shared with me and for his friendship. Many thanks to my colleagues at Bar-Ilan University for the support and trust they gave a study about an anonymous philosopher whose name they had never heard. The Rector of Bar-Ilan University, Prof. Miriam Faust, is a paragon of a leader guided by the unconditional value of academic research that is an inseparable part of the life of the spirit. Prof. Elda Weizman, the Chair of the Interdisciplinary Studies Unit at Bar-Ilan University, and Prof. Edward Greenstein, the Head of the Program for Hermeneutics and Cultural Studies at Bar-Ilan University, gave valuable support and appreciation for the study during their years in office. My thanks and affection also to my students in the phenomenological seminars, and especially to my Ph.D. students who took up my enthusiasm for the unfamiliar philosopher, took it upon themselves to study the early phenomenological thinking, and joined my travels overseas and wherever they could hear about the thinking of Conrad-Martius and other female phenomenologists. Through them, I was able to relive the spirit of group philosophizing established by the members of the Munich Circle, of which Conrad-Martius was the living spirit. My thanks to Ruth Ludlam, who devotedly and professionally undertook the editing and preparation for print of the book’s chapters. Finally, my gratitude goes to my family members, my children Shira, Noa, Itamar, and Neta, and my partner Ben Hecht, who supported my many overseas travels, and who was the first to listen to my lectures about Conrad-Martius, to comment, to encourage, and to rejoice in every advance in my study of her thinking. Neither the “covered” (verhüllten) primordial phenomena (Urphänomene) nor especially the perceived ideas lie themselves on the concealed in the “bare surface of the mere appearances” (baren Erscheinungsoberfläche). Accordingly, the work required here can thereby nevermore be achieved, so that through passive observation that is devoted to the plane of appearing, one perceives descriptively the directly obvious phenomenal differences, and be it also down to the finest nuances. On the other hand, from this “‘surface-appearance’ […] only the present essence-holdings (Wesensbestände) that are present de facto, to which the surface-appearances lead through a respective precise analysis as to its own foundation must also emerge.” (HCM, 1916, 353–354). Contents

Part I The Philosophy of Being 1 From the “Still Covered” to the “Pure Primordial” Phenomena and Back: The External World in the Phenomenology of Conrad-Martius ...... 3 1.1 Preface ...... 4 1.2 The “Still Covered” and the “Pure Primordial” Phenomena . . . . . 7 1.3 “Sensory Givenness” ...... 10 1.3.1 “Feeling Givenness” ...... 12 1.3.2 The Sensorially Manifest “Appearance Givenness” . . . . . 18 1.4 Conclusion ...... 26 References ...... 26 2 The Realism of Transcendence: A Critical Analysis of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Ontology ...... 31 2.1 The Problem of Transcendence ...... 31 2.2 Essence and Transcendence ...... 34 2.3 Gap and Transcendence ...... 38 2.4 The Human Spirit and Transcendence ...... 41 2.5 Epilogue ...... 44 References ...... 45 3 The External World—“Whole” and “Parts”: A Husserlian Hermeneutics of the Early Ontology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius ...... 47 3.1 Preface ...... 47 3.2 The “Whole”: “Sensory Givenness” ...... 50 3.3 The “Parts”: “Feeling Givenness” and “Appearance Givenness” ...... 53 3.3.1 “Feeling Givenness” ...... 54 3.3.2 “Appearance Givenness” ...... 57

lxxxvii lxxxviii Contents

3.4 Discussion ...... 61 3.5 Summary ...... 66 References ...... 67 4 “The Gate of Reality”: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s Idea of Reality in Realontologie ...... 71 4.1 Preface ...... 71 4.2 “Selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit) ...... 77 4.3 Corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit) ...... 81 4.4 Primordiality (Primär) ...... 83 4.5 Epilogue ...... 90 References ...... 93 5 The Vocabulary of Reality ...... 95 5.1 Preface ...... 95 5.2 “Essence” (Wesen, Washeit) and “Bearer” (Träger) ...... 97 5.3 Materiality ...... 98 5.4 “Selfness” (Selbsthaftigkeit) ...... 99 5.5 “Homeland” (Heimat) and “Dwelling” ...... 99 5.6 Fulﬁllment and Capability (Konnen¨ ) ...... 100 5.7 Tangentiality (Tangierbarkeit) ...... 101 5.8 Corporeality (Leibhaftigkeit) ...... 103 5.9 Internality ...... 104 5.10 “Soundness” (Solidität) and “Rest” (Ruhe) ...... 105 5.11 Fullness (Fülle),Depth,andDarkness’ ...... 107 5.12 Divisibility (Teilbarkeit) and Abyss (Abgrund) ...... 108 5.13 Discussion ...... 110 5.14 Summary ...... 111 References ...... 112

Part II The Philosophy of the “I-Being” 6 The Phenomenal Experience of the I: The Idea of the I in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Phenomenology ...... 117 6.1 Preface ...... 117 6.2 Essence and Phenomenal Givenness ...... 119 6.3 Two Fundamental Dispositions of the I ...... 122 6.3.1 The Disposition of Passive Self-Inclusiveness ...... 122 6.3.2 The Disposition of Active Consciousness ...... 127 6.4 Epilogue ...... 133 References ...... 134 7 The Ontological Exclusivity of the I ...... 137 7.1 Introduction ...... 137 7.2 Existence ...... 139 Contents lxxxix

7.3 Intelligibility ...... 145 7.4 Epilogue ...... 153 References ...... 154 8 The Duality of the I: A Commentary on Hedwig Conrad-Martius’s Realist Phenomenology ...... 157 8.1 Introduction ...... 157 8.2 The Dual Ontological Foundation ...... 159 8.3 The Phenomenal Duality ...... 161 8.4 The Ontological Duality ...... 167 8.5 Discussion ...... 170 8.6 Epilogue ...... 175 References ...... 178 9 A Philosophical Resonance: Hedwig Conrad-Martius Versus Edith Stein ...... 183 9.1 Introduction ...... 183 9.2 Conrad-MartiusVersusStein...... 185 9.2.1 Reality as a Common Point of Departure ...... 185 9.2.2 Philosophy and Theology ...... 189 9.2.3 The Beginning in Nothingness ...... 191 9.2.4 TheIdeaoftheI ...... 194 9.2.5 TheDualStructureoftheI ...... 195 9.3 The Destiny of Duality ...... 201 9.4 Conclusion ...... 204 References ...... 205

Part III The Convergence of Being and the “I-Being” 10 In the Midst of Being: The Journey into the Internality of Reality in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Metaphysics ...... 211 10.1 Introduction: Idea, Essence, and Appearing ...... 212 10.2 The Fundamental Duality ...... 214 10.3 Toward the Internality of Being ...... 219 10.4 TheRealSelf ...... 225 10.5 Epilogue ...... 231 References ...... 233 11 Essence, Abyss, and Self: Hedwig Conrad-Martius on the Non-spatial Dimensions of Being ...... 237 11.1 Introduction ...... 237 11.2 Essence ...... 243 11.3 Abyss ...... 247 11.4 Self ...... 252 11.5 Epilogue ...... 256 References ...... 257 xc Contents

12 The Metaphysical Absolutizing of the Ideal: Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Criticism of Husserl’s Idealism ...... 261 12.1 Introduction ...... 261 12.2 Idealism’s Architectonic and Its Damage to the Metaphysical Absolutizing of the Ideal ...... 265 12.3 Conrad-Martius’ Alternative to Idealism: Securing the Possibility for Metaphysics ...... 271 12.4 Epilogue ...... 279 References ...... 280

Appendix: Faith, Radicalism, and Individuality—A Jewish Perspective on Edith Stein ...... 285 Works Cited ...... 315