The History of Phenomenology
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THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ............................................................................................................................................................. THE HISTORY OF PHENOMENOLOGY Edited by DANZAHAVI OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS OXFORD UNIVBR.SITY PRESS Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, ox2 6DP, United Kingdom CONTENTS Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries © the several contributors 2018 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted Contributors ix First Edition published in 2018 Impression: 1 Introduction I All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the DANZAHAVI prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the PART I TRADITIONS address above You must not circulate this work in any other form I. Aristotle in Phenomenology 5 and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer PAVLOS KONTOS Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, Umted States of America 2. Descartes' Notion of the Mind-Body Union and its British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Phenomenological Expositions Data available 25 Library of Congress Control Number: 2017959163 SARA HEINAMAA AND TIMO KAITARO ISBN 978-0-19-875534-0 3. Kant, Neo-Kanti.anism, and Phenomenology Printed and bound by 45 CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CRo 4YY SEBASTIAN LUFT Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials 4. Phenomenology and German Idealism 68 contained in any third party website referenced in this work. ALEXANDER SCHNELL 5. Phenomenology and Descriptive Psychology: Brentano, Stumpf, Husserl 88 DENIS FISETTE PART II FIGURES 6. Husserl's Early Period: Juvenilia and the Logical Investigations 107 PETER ANDRAS VARGA 7. Husserl's Middle Period and the Development of his Ethics 135 JOHN J. DRUMMOND Vi CONTENTS CONTENTS vii 8. Pre-Predicative Experience and Life-World: Two Distincfl Projects in 21. Jan Patocka's Philosophical Legacy Husserl's Late Phenomenology 155 JAMES DODD ! ANDREA STAITI 22. An Im~ense I Po':er: The Three Phenomenological Insights 9. Scheler on the Moral and Political Significance of the Embtions 173 Supporting Derndean Deconstruction 412 ZACHARY DAVIS AND ANTHONY STEINBOCK LEONARD LAWLOR 10. Edith Stein's Challenge to Sense-Making: The Role of the Lived Body, 23. When Alterity Becomes Proximity: Levinas's Path 430 Psyche, and Spirit 193 ROBERT BERNASCONI ANTONIO CALCAGNO 24. Turn to Excess: The Development of Phenomenology in Late 11. The Early Heidegger's Phenomenology 211 Twentieth-Century French Thought 445 DANIEL 0. DAHLSTROM CHRISTINA M. GSCHWANDTNER 229 12. The Middle Heidegger's Phenomenological Metaphysics PART III THEMES STEVEN CROWELL 25. Phenomenological Methodology 13. Phenomenology and Ontology in the Later Heidegger KARL MERTENS TOBIAS l<EILING 26. Subjectivity: From Husserl to his Followers (and Back Again) 14. Schutz and Gurwitsch on Agency 492 RUDOLF BERNET MICHAEL D. BARBER 27. The Inquietude of Time and the Instance of Eternity: 15. Sartre's Transcendental Phenomenology 286 Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas 511 JONATHAN WEBBER NICOLAS DE WARREN 16. The Later Sartre: From Phenomenology to Hermeneutic[ 28. Embodiment and Bodily Becoming to Dialectic and Back 302 533 SARA HEINAMAA THOMAS R. FLYNN 29. From the Origin of Spatiality to a Variety of Spaces 17. Simone de Beauvoir: Philosopher, Author, Feminist 320 558 FILIP MATTENS DEBRA BERGOFFEN 30. Intentionality: Lived Experience, Bodily Comportment, and the 18. Science in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology: Horizon of the World From the Early Work to the Later Philosophy 340 579 DERMOT MORAN KoMARINE RoMDENH-ROMLuc 31. Practical_ Intentio~'.11~: From Br.entano to the Phenomenology of 19. Merleau-Ponty from 1945 to 1952: The Ontological Weiwt of the Muruch and Gottingen Circles Perception and the Transcendental Force ofDescriptiod ALESSANDRO SAUCE DONALD A. LANDES I 32. Ideal Veri:ficationism and Perceptual Faith: 20. Rereading the Later Merleau-Ponty in the Light of his I Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on Perceptual Knowledge Unpublished Work WALTER HOPP EMMANUEL DE SAINT AUBERT 578 FILIP MATTENS Husserl, E. (2008), Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution, Husserliana 39, ed. R. Sowa (Dordrecht: Springer). CHAPTER 30 Laasik, K. (2011), "On Perceptual Presence;' Phenomenology and Cognitive Sciences 10: 439-59. Lotze, H. R. (1846), "Seele und Seelenleben;' Handwiirterbuch der Physiologie, vol 3, ed. R. Wagner (Braunschweig: Vieweg). Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002 [1945]), Phenomenology ofPerception (London: Routledg~). INTENTIONALITY Minkowski, E. (1970 [1933]), Lived Space: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Studies, translated by N. Metzel (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press). Overgaard, S. and Griinbawn, T. (2007), "What Do Weather Watchers See?" Cognitive Lived Experience, Bodily Comportment, Semiotics 1: 8-32. and the Horizon of the World Pradelle, D. (2000), Earcheologie du monde (Dordrecht: Kluwer). Scheerer, E. (1986), "The Constitution of Space Perception; Acta Psychologica 63: 157-73. Schuhmann, K. (1977), Husserl Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). DERMOT MORAN Straus, E. (1963 [1935]), The Primary World ofSenses (London: Macmillan). Straus, E. (1966 [1930]), "The forms of spatiality;' in Phenomenological Psychology (New York: Basic Books), 3-37. Stumpf, C. (1873), Ober den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung (Leipzig: Hirzel). Veto, M. (2008), 'Teidetique del'espace chezMerleau-Ponty;' Archives de philosophie 71: 407-37. Wehrle, M. (2015), "Feelings as the Motor of Perception?" Husserl Studies 31: 45-64. 30.1 INTENTIONALITY AS THE MAIN THEME OF PHENOMENOLOGY INTENTIONALITY (lntentionalitiit, Gerichtetsein), "directedness," or "aboutnesS:' is central to the phenomenological tradition. Husserl calls it the "principal theme" (Hauptthema) of phenomenology (Husserl 2014: 161). Phenomenology treats intentionality not narrowly as a relation between a mental act and its object, and especially not as a kind of representation of the outer world in the inner mind (Stich and Warfield 199~ Drummond 2012). Rather, intentionality is a claim about the sensefulness of experience based on the irreducible inter relatedness between embodied consciousness and the surrounding world of significance. Intentionality; for phenomenology, involves both sense-giving-whereby consciousness confers sense on what it encounters-and sense-explication-whereby consciousness articulates preexisting objectual and worldly significance. Both are normally intertwined. Sense, moreover, is broader than linguistic meaning. Husserl distinguished between "sense'' (Sinn) (e.g., ofnon-linguistic perceptions) and "meaning" (Bedeutung), which requires lin guistic expression. Perceptions, feelings, moods, and emotions already have "sense" prior to articulation. Phenomenologists generally reject immanent, representationalist ("in the head"), causal, and naturalist accounts of intentionality and instead consider conscious states as having "sense'' primarily through embodied "comportment" (Verhalten) and intersubjective "in teraction" (Ineinandersein) in a pre-given world already charged with significance. -- 580 DERMOT MORAN INTENTIONALITY 581 rj i l Intentionality was reintroduced into modern philosophy by Frant Brentano in 1874 l - in the world, but constitutes the entire sense of the world. For Husserl, subjectivity is not (Brentano 1995), who himself drew on medieval thought (Black 201 ).1 In his effort to I simply "in the world;' but is, as he puts it in the Crisis, "for the world" (Husserl 1970: 181). define the domain of psychological science, Brentano proposed that intentionality was Heidegger similarly adopts an explicitly transcendental attitude in Being and Time the defining characteristic of all and only mental phenomena. Edlnund Husserl ex (Heidegger 1962; Crowell and Malpas 2007; Moran 2014, 2013b, 2oooa; Zahavi 2013), 1 i pand~d this insight to make intentionality the meaning-endowing c1aracter of all lived i albeit replacing the term "intentionality" with a more radical account of ecstatic tran experiences. scendence and practical human "involvement" (Bewandtnis) in the world, through In the Brentanian tradition, largely developed within twentieth-century philos I :nga~ement with ~hings and others in concern, solicitude (Fursorge), and, ultimately, ophy of mind following Roderick Chisholm, intentionality is co~strued quite nar ! care (Sorge). Fmally, Merleau-Ponty, while emphasizing bodily comportment, rowly as the "aboutness" or "directedness" of individual consciou~ episodes (Forrai defends a transcendental-phenomenological approach-although his transcendental 2005 ), but Husserl and his followers speak more expansively of the f onsciousness-of" subjectivity is also, paradoxically, incarnate. Merleau-Ponty speaks