The Promise of Circularity in Husserl’s Phenomenological Investigations by Vedran Grahovac A Thesis presented to The University of Guelph In partial fulfilment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Guelph, Ontario, Canada © Vedran Grahovac, November, 2017 ABSTRACT The Promise of Circularity in Husserl’s Phenomenological Investigations Vedran Grahovac Advisor: University of Guelph, 2017 Andrew Bailey Co-Advisor: Jay Lampert I argue that Husserl’s phenomenological method is distinguished by the strategy of circularity. I trace this strategy in Husserl’s early writings on logic and in both his early and his later writings on time consciousness. I conclude with a brief examination of works by Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger through the lens of Husserl’s circular strategy. I suggest that circularity in Husserl’s phenomenology unfolds on two completing levels. The circularity on the first level describes terms in relation that are defined through their reference to each other: however, this relation between the two terms is not causal, for both terms remain self-enclosed. The second level of circularity indicates that the only possibility for the reciprocity or completion between two terms is through their self-encircling. The terms refer back and forth to each other precisely because they remain in a relational asymmetry. Husserl thus avoids a situation where he either fuses the terms in relation or prioritzes one over another. This is especially important for his re- articulation of the psychologistic – ideal-logical, whole – part, and now – just past polarities. This unusual sort of circular argumentation provides Husserl with an equally unusual methodology for challenging psychologism, empiricism, neo-kantianism, formal ontology and certain philosophies of time. Husserl does not challenge psychologsim, empiricism or neo-kantianism by immediately assuming a position of epistemological primacy over these philosophies. To the contrary, Husserl is able to philosophically challenge these positions by enacting a circularity that already underlies them. Husserl’s critical distance from these theories implies a methodological proximity which enables him to advance his phenomenological project with constant backward reference to the theories he challenges. Husserl’s circular philosophy transforms the themes it investigates and the theories it criticizes, transforming itself in that process. This approach to Husserl simultaneously recognizes that Husserl’s relation with psychologism is one of overcoming-through-indebtedness, just as the relation of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to Husserl is the one of indebtedness-through-overcoming. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I was inspired to pursue this project while I was an MA student at the New School for Social Research. During my the studies at the New School I discovered the work of James Dodd, with whom I took several classes and who became my MA thesis advisor. By working with James, I discovered not only how to engage closely with Husserl’s major texts, but also how to appreciate the multilayerdness of Husserl’s methodology and philosophical reflections. Furthermore, I learned how to appreciate both Husserl’s originality and his unbreakable bond with other phenomenologists. James’ ability to point out the peculiar philosophical dynamics that is at play in Husserl’s encounter with other philosophers greatly inspired my PhD project. I am also grateful that I was able to work with Nicolas de Warren while I was a student at the New School. De Warren’s lectures on Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Marion were especially inspiring for me, as I was able to discover the importance of the indebtedness of methodological method to the themes this method investigates. While I was at the New School I attended sessions of the Husserl Seminar, which were organized by James and Nicolas. The scholarly exchange and analytical depth demonstrated at these seminars further shaped my understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology. I pursued the study of circular strategy in Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy with Jay Lampert as my advisor upon the discovery of Jay’s book Synthesis and Backward Reference in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Jay’s reflections upon Husserl’s v methodology are the main motivation for my doctoral project, especially as he observes Husserl’s philosophy as a peculiar interplay between backward and forward reference. I was influenced by the complexity of Jay’s method, as it both combines and transforms the traditions of phenomenology, German Idealism and contemporary French philosophy. Our philosophical exchange was crucial for the methodological maturation of my project, and for the further expansion of my philosophical interests. I consider myself incredibly lucky for having an opportunity to work with Jay and to articulate my ideas through our philosophical dialogue. I immensely benefited from working with Jeff Mitscherling, whose philosophical reflections had lasting impact on my dissertation. While working with Jeff on the history and philosophical significance of the phenomenological movement, I discovered the importance of the relation between early phenomenology and Husserl’s philosophy. Jeff’s exploration of early phenomenological authors and their relationship to Husserl through the lens of the question of intentionality inspired many views presented in this dissertation. Without Jeff’s attentiveness to and support of my project I would have never been able to complete my dissertation and I am incredibly grateful for having a philosophical friendship with Jeff. I would also like to acknowledge scholarly support that I have received from Andrew Bailey, whose understanding was crucial for the completion of my dissertation. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to the friends and colleagues whose intellectual and personal friendship had an immeasurable impact on my work. I consider myself privileged for my friendship and philosophical exchange with Shannon Buckley, Ian Patrick McHugh, Daniel Harris, Brent Ables, Jeannette Hicks, Chris Wood, Alina vi Vaisfeld, P.J. Gorre, Pablo Bustinduy, Trevor Arthur, Keith Whitmoyer, Nishad Patnaik, Saulius Geniusas, Dominique Lavoie, Moris Stern, Jonathan Chalier, Joseph Smith, Elodie Boublil, Thom Campbell, Brooke Struck, Martin King, Daniel Griffin, Yanis Aouamri, Sofian Aouamri, Darryl Li, Naor Ben-Yehoyada, Alireza Doostdar, Sabrina Perić, Gillian Manford and Saša Brčerević. I would have never been able to go this far without the endless support and love of my parents and sister. My parents' integrity and undying love in times of unspeakable destruction remained not only the main motivation but also the source of my work. I owe to my parents the understanding that just as resistance defines life, so too can philosophy be defined as a peculiar kind of resistance. vii Table of Contents Introduction 1 Chapter 1: Philosophy as an exercise in exaggeration: the role of circularity in Husserl’s criticism of logical psychologism Introduction 10 Tautology of inner evidence: psychologistic cynicism as a testimony to the ideality of logical laws 29 Circularity of ideal laws: the irony of purification as a testimony to the self-assurance of inner evidence 43 Husserl’s challenge to the Self-assurance of Reason 62 Bolzano’s propositions in themselves through the lens of Husserl’s truth in itself 74 Concluding remarks 78 Chapter 2: Husserl’s investigation of foundationalism as an exercise in the self- enclosure of the terms in relation; the case of the Third Investigation Introduction 80 Foundationalism vs. reconciliation 81 Phenomenological inversion of the concepts of movement and fixity in the whole-part problematic 89 The dynamics of deprivation in the reconciliatory capacity of Ratio: examining the vivacity of Kracauer’s Mass Ornament 101 Lampert – Sokolowski debate 107 Concluding remarks 112 viii Chapter 3: Husserl's bracketing of the philosophy of time: the question of time as a phenomenological experience Introduction: Modification vs. simultaneity in Husserl’s encounter with his historical interlocutors 114 On the invention of retention 132 Two types of circularity in Husserl’s analysis of retention and double intentionality: examining the dynamics of Husserl’s time diagrams 143 On the third type of circularity in the Bernau Manuscripts: the problem of transition in the analysis of protention 164 On objective time and its retentional modification, as they stare at each other: towards phenomenological method as a “performance” 179 Concluding remarks 196 Chapter 4: Phenomenological vulnerability in reversibility: on nihilism and depth in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty Introduction 198 Heidegger’s exposure to nihilism 203 Conversation with Jünger and the initiation of the turn of Being 209 The uncanny activity of the turn of being 218 Phenomenological vulnerability of reversibility in Merleau-Ponty 227 Concluding remarks 235 Bibliography 238 1 Introduction I this dissertation I suggest that Husserl’s phenomenological method should be observed as a peculiar type of circular strategy, which can be traced in his early and late writings. I propose that Husserl’s employment of the strategy of circularity is a result of his criticism of psychologism, empiricism, formal ontology and traditional philosophies of time. Husserl, in problematizing the notion of inner evidentiality in the psychologistic theory of logic, in criticizing the formal-ontological account of wholes and parts, and in challenging the concept of time-consciousness as a